

Routledge Research in Sport and Corruption

UNDERSTANDING MATCH-FIXING IN SPORT

THEORY AND PRACTICE

Edited by
Bram Constandt and Argyro Elisavet Manoli



Understanding Match-Fixing in Sport

Bringing together leading match-fixing researchers from different fields, this book offers new theoretical and applied perspectives on this persistent problem in sport and wider society.

The book explores the foundations of match-fixing from multiple viewpoints, from sociology and criminology to policy and governance, exploring topics such as the use of network governance theory, ethics and integrity, and management aspects that position match-fixing in sport's commercial landscape. Featuring cases and data from all around the world, the book explains how match-fixing has become a prominent feature of contemporary sport, and considers the efficacy and practicability of interventions to solve these problems.

This is fascinating and important reading for any advanced student, researcher, practitioner, or policymaker with an interest in sport management, sports business, sport policy, sport development, sport law, or criminology.

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The idea to compile this match-fixing book originated during the EPOSM (Evidence-based Prevention of Sporting-related Match-fixing) Erasmus+ collaborative partnership in sport project, which ran from 2020 until 2021. The EPOSM project aimed to raise knowledge and awareness about sporting-related match-fixing, by means of research activities and the development of action plans against match-fixing. Hence, we thank the European Commission for co-financing the EPOSM project and all EPOSM partner organisations for facilitating this book and continuously moving the match-fixing debate forward.

When drafting the structure, scope, and content of this book, we realised that merely inviting authors linked to the EPOSM project would be heavily limited in many ways. We, therefore, requested match-fixing scholars all over the world to contribute to our book project. Many of them reacted positively and are included in this book with their newest match-fixing insights. Partly because of the ongoing pandemic, some of them could not accept our offer to collaborate or withdrew in the course of developing this book. Next to wholeheartedly thanking all 30 authors for their valuable efforts in making this book project a success in extremely challenging times and circumstances, we also highlight our gratitude to all other match-fixing scholars who could not participate for differing reasons. Their work and our ongoing dialogue within academia are of great help to further develop a still rather young field of study.

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Introduction

Toward a Better Understanding of Match-Fixing

Bram Constandt and Argyro Elisavet Manoli

Aim and scope

Match-fixing – i.e., the (attempted) manipulation of a (certain elements of a) sport event – is positioned by many practitioners and scholars as a particular form of corruption and as one of today's most pressing sport integrity issues (Forrest & McHale, 2019; Holden & Rodenberg, 2017; Spapens, 2021; Van Der Hoeven et al., 2020). Following growing international media and policy attention, the academic interest in studying match-fixing has steadily increased since Hill's (2009, 2010a, 2010b) seminal ethnographic work. Scholars from different scientific disciplines have thereby disentangled match-fixing as a complex phenomenon that requires a set of diverse and robust approaches to be fully understood (Moriconi & de Cima, 2021). On the other hand, much existing scholarship on match-fixing is merely empirical in nature – i.e., reporting on the prevalence and/or characteristics of (a type of) match-fixing in a given country and/or sport – and sometimes lacks a sound theoretical basis (Nowy & Breuer, 2017).

At the same time, existing theoretically informed perspectives on match-fixing have long been rooted in rational choice theory only (Marchetti et al., 2021). This theory focuses on the role of individual and strategic agency and argues that most human decisions are made after an individual's cost–benefit calculation (de Graaf, 2007). Rational choice theory overestimates the influence and independence of individual agency (Tak et al., 2018). Hence, social scientists have enriched rational choice insights in match-fixing by applying other theoretical perspectives, such as sociological institutionalism (Marchetti et al., 2021; Tak et al., 2018), doctrinal legal analysis (Holden & Rodenberg, 2017), social constraint theory (Moriconi & de Cima, 2021), psychological decision-making theories (Barkoukis et al., 2020; O'Shea et al., 2021), ethical and moral development theories (Harvey, 2015; Lee, 2017; Van Der Hoeven et al., 2020), organizational capacity theory (Nowy & Breuer, 2017), routine activity theory (Moneva & Caneppele, 2020), principal-agent theory (Geeraert & Drieskens, 2021), trade union and sport governance theories (Harvey, 2020), social exchange and social capital theory (Costa, 2018; Tzeng & Lee, 2021), strategic management theory (Manoli & Antonopoulos, 2015), monitoring theory (Forrest & McHale, 2019), public secrecy theory

(Moriconi & de Cima, 2020; Numerato, 2016), and normalization of corruption theory (Van Der Hoeven et al., 2021).

These (and other existing) contributions have strongly enhanced our knowledge about the multi-layered nature of match-fixing, indicating the need to incorporate the study of individual decision-making, relational elements (e.g., social ties and pressure, networks), and structural factors (e.g., laws and regulations, economic factors, politics, policy regimes, league structures) to enable a more profound understanding of match-fixing (Costa, 2018; Marchetti et al., 2021; Moriconi & de Cima, 2021; Van Der Hoeven et al., 2021). However, additional theoretically informed inquiry is still needed to come to a genuine holistic understanding of the interplay between explaining factors on micro (individual), meso (group-related and organizational), and macro (systemic) levels for match-fixing (Kihl, 2018; Marchetti et al., 2021; Moriconi, 2020). Such holistic understanding is important in academic terms, but it also bears clear practical relevance in today's sport ecosystem (Moriconi, 2020; Spapens, 2021).

Theory and practice

Sound analytical insights into *what* match-fixing is (i.e., types and conceptual boundaries), *why*, *how*, *when*, and *where* it (is likely to) occur(s) (e.g., causes, risk factors, contexts, rationalizations), and *which* consequences it entails are required to make individuals, organizations, and systems less vulnerable (Forrest & McHale, 2019; Hill, 2009, 2010b, 2016; Hill et al., 2020; Moriconi & de Cima, 2021; Nowy & Breuer, 2017). Clearly, match-fixing is not so much an individual responsibility of approached individuals. It rather is a systemic and shared responsibility of governmental, sport, betting, and other industries and regimes that often seem “too big” to blame or jail (Tak, 2018; Tak et al., 2018). Moreover, match-fixing is not only linked to organized crime and the infiltration of external criminals in the world of sport (Moriconi & de Cima, 2020, Spapens, 2021; Yilmaz et al., 2019). Internal sport stakeholders are often initiating a fix and some forms of match-fixing entail merely non-criminal activities, such as tactical and strategic arrangements (Spapens, 2021; Van Der Hoeven et al., 2021).

Echoing the above concerns, we believe that the theoretically informed studies of this edited volume will prove helpful to identify and counteract blaming and legitimizing strategies and, thus, strengthen anti-match-fixing practices. With theoretically informed studies, we refer to scholarship that expands and reinforces our knowledge about match-fixing, by indicating why and/or how match-fixing occurs (in line with Corley and Gioia's [2011] take on theory). Going beyond merely describing match-fixing, we, thus, aim to contextualize and better explain the phenomenon and its different types and expressions (de Graaf, 2007). Following de Graaf's (2007) recommendation for corruption research, a number of specific match-fixing cases are studied in light of the contexts in which they occurred. Such an approach enhances the current “explanations and understanding of corruption” in specific sport settings, and “can help us reconsider the effectiveness

of existing policy instruments to combat corruption” in sport (de Graaf, 2007, p. 76). As this improved understanding can be linked with either scientific or practical utility (see Corley & Gioia, 2011), we wholeheartedly endorse and reiterate the thesis that “nothing is so practical as a good theory” (Lewin, 1945, p. 129).

Content overview

Thirteen contributions are included as separate chapters in this edited volume. Bringing together 30 scholars, affiliated with universities and institutions that represent 12 countries and four different continents, this edited volume aims to function as a platform for new work of some of the world’s leading match-fixing scholars.

In **Chapter 1**, Mike Huggins focuses on the *longue durée*, across most societies, beginning before formal sport associations, codifications, and organized and formalized betting markets emerged, to indicate that match-fixing is not a new phenomenon. By means of historical analysis and scrutinizing the theorization of the meaning of “fair play”, Huggins shows that match-fixing was already widely practiced within the sporting culture before the dawn of modern sport. He further argues that match-fixing has always been relatively common across a range of class and status groups and was thereby long perceived as a “normal” and unproblematized social practice.

In **Chapter 2**, Eike Emrich, Freya Gassmann, Michael Koch, and Werner Pitsch argue that the persistence of match-fixing can be explained by two interconnected aspects. First, they show that there is a blurred line between legitimate and illegitimate forms of deliberate underperforming in sport. Second, they draw from the work of Max Weber and his concept of communitization to emphasize the dense social networks in sport as a vulnerability condition in relation to match-fixing. For both reasons, match-fixing should rather be understood as a cultural element of sport than solely as a threat to its integrity.

In **Chapter 3**, Argyro Elisavet Manoli and Georgios A. Antonopoulos emphasize how European football operates in a highly commercialized landscape to present an account of how match-fixing emerges not as a threat to many football clubs, but, in fact, often as a commercial solution that can assist them in their survival and even commercial and financial success. They enrich rational choice theory perspectives on match-fixing, by adding commercial logics and indicating that some actors involved in match-fixing feel they have no other choice than to fix to survive.

In **Chapter 4**, Maarten van Bottenburg discusses the complexity of the current coordination of initiatives to fight match-fixing, as match-fixing crosses organizational, juridical, and societal boundaries. He demonstrates that network governance theory can help better streamline these initiatives. After discussing the background and principles of network governance theory, these insights are used to analyze the current governance approach to tackle match-fixing.

It is shown that the policy network that fights against match-fixing consists of heterogeneous, unequal, and relative autonomous organizations. Despite recent improvements, he suggests that the network governance design still does not fit well with the nature of the problem and the complexity of the policy network. There is a lack of joint network framing, goal-oriented network management, and effective and efficient network participation.

In **Chapter 5**, Stef Van Der Hoeven and Annick Willem apply normalization of corruption theory to provide a more holistic and nuanced understanding of (non-betting-related) match-fixing and its underlying mechanisms. They demonstrate how institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization mechanisms can help explain the embedded, perpetuated, and taken-for-granted nature of match-fixing in numerous sport contexts and settings. In other words, they indicate how certain match-fixing forms (e.g., inappropriate collaboration) become normalized instead of problematized in multiple sport settings.

In **Chapter 6**, Mike McNamee and Norbert Rubicsek examine match-fixing in the light of the ongoing sport integrity discussion. Drawing on the definition and typology offered by the Council of Europe's Macolin Convention, they shed light on match-fixing as a particular form of sport manipulation. Enhancing our knowledge about match-fixing and the theorizing of sport ethics and integrity, McNamee and Rubicsek help better understand the sport integrity policy landscape and its associated challenges.

In **Chapter 7**, Joanna Tweedie and John Holden tackle the enduring question as to how and what extent the law should involve itself with the regulation of sport. They show that different legal strategies are used to combat match-fixing, as some nation-states have chosen to pass legislation directly targeting match-fixing, while other countries have defaulted to existing legislation that prohibits crimes like fraud or corruption. Moreover, they argue that one of the challenges, to date, in arresting the spread of match-fixing, has been crafting laws that incentivize cooperation in investigations because victims often fear either physical or reputational harm in association with giving assistance.

In **Chapter 8**, Fiona Langlois and Stefano Caneppele discuss the relevance of criminology and forensic sciences approaches with regard to match-fixing detection. Criticizing the perception of match-fixing offenders as mere rational actors, they enrich the rational choice theory perspective on match-fixing, by integrating the concept of crime script. Their chapter is based on the analysis of four fixed matches, resulting in the identification of match-fixing scripts and traces, and a better understanding of the *modus operandi* of fixers. Linking a criminological perspective (rational choice theory) with a forensic science perspective (the concept of trace) is useful to support match-fixing prevention policies, monitoring activities, and investigation processes.

In **Chapter 9**, Felipe Marchetti, Letícia Godinho, Alberto Reinaldo Reppold Filho, and Renan Petersen-Wagner explore the analytical potential of routine activity theory to improve our understanding about the set of circumstances surrounding match-fixing in Brazilian football. Investigating important macro

processes, they highlight three elements in the Brazilian case: i.e., motivated offenders such as local bettors and criminal syndicates specialized in match-fixing, available victims such as poorly paid referees and players, and a lack of surveillance. With their chapter, they aim to inform new and adapted anti-match-fixing strategies and policies that are not exclusively focused on tools that punish offenders.

In **Chapter 10**, Vassilis Barkoukis and Deirdre O'Shea study the contextual, social, and individual factors that can exacerbate or mitigate the likelihood of an individual engaging in match-fixing, drawing on extant theory and research from applied psychology. Their chapter summarizes existing evidence and discusses new perspectives in understanding match-fixing behaviors using a psychological lens. They particularly build on psychological research and theories that consider the interplay between the individual and the situation or context in decision-making and behavior.

In **Chapter 11**, César de Cima and Marcelo Moriconi use a theoretical taxonomic compliance model to discuss the effectiveness of new public and sports policies to prevent and counteract match-fixing. They seek to understand the extent to which these policies have achieved behavioral changes at the level of three interconnected dimensions: i.e., sports betting practices, reporting wrongdoing in sport, and manipulation of sport competitions. Since the Portuguese Football Federation has strictly followed the “zero tolerance” policy and has promoted a new legal framework to combat the phenomenon, they approach and discuss Portuguese football as a strategic case to assess the adequacy of these measures.

In **Chapter 12**, Catherine Ordway and Lisa A. Kihl draw from regulatory regimes theory to outline and explain the development and implementation of Australia's match-fixing regulation and broader sport integrity regulatory framework. In light of the formation of Sport Integrity Australia, they outline how the national sport integrity regulatory and policy framework has been developed through the individual sport policies and the State legislation. They conclude by discussing implications and recommendations for future research; both in assessing the effectiveness of these policy measures and how these regulatory changes can be incorporated into practice and educational materials.

In **Chapter 13**, Severin Moritzer, Niklas Neudecker, and Kirstin Hallmann outline the approach against match-fixing on a national level using the example of the Play Fair Code (PFC) in Austria. Discussing the history and approach of PFC in light of a national sport integrity framework, they stress how a non-profit organization can facilitate a better understanding of match-fixing in the sport world and how this can be executed in an efficient manner.

Taken together, the contributions of this edited volume capture match-fixing from multiple viewpoints, ranging from its sociological and ethical aspects, to legal, criminological, policy-related, and governance aspects, as well as management and economic aspects positioning match-fixing in the sport's commercial landscape. Based on the increasing academic interest that issues of corruption in sport, in general, have attracted, it is our hope that this edited volume will help not only

influence future research on corruption in sport, in general, and match-fixing, in particular, but also assist in the education of undergraduate and postgraduate students on match-fixing. At the same time, with some of the chapters being also strongly practice-oriented in nature, focusing on national or international policy approaches to counteract match-fixing, this edited volume might also inform policymakers around the globe about potential good practices and help them further strengthen their match-fixing counterapproaches.

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Match-Fixing

A 'Normal' Part of Past Sport?

Mike Huggins

Introduction

In the last four decades, sports have become more international, bureaucratic, media-driven and professional. Betting opportunities became more flexible and numerous, and platform-intermediated betting became common. Online-betting exchanges allowed punters to lay as well as bet, facilitating a fix's potentially profitable gains from betting and encouraging a dramatic expansion in the size and complexity of match-fixing attempts. Horseracing and football betting, and that in other popular sports, attracted well-organised criminal match-fixing groups, generating investigative interest from police, the gambling industry and leading sports organisations (Forrest, 2018; Harvey and McNamee, 2020; Hill, 2013; Maennig, 2005). Some recent studies have suggested that people's propensity to participate and spectate in untrustworthy sports remained unchanged, 'normalising' sport's lack of integrity (Manoli et al., 2020), but fixing is still a major current concern.

The growing research agenda on match-fixing in sports management, sports law and sports ethics university departments is largely present-centred, implying that match-fixing was *almost* a new form of corruption and has distorted current understandings of match-fixing's place in sporting culture. As historians recognise, historical data is difficult to obtain, but this chapter shows how far match-fixing has always been a 'normal' feature of many past competitive spectator sports, and that past societies expected its occasional presence, constrained only by fear of being caught. It could be found across all classes, more often for betting but, sometimes, for non-betting reasons, and more so amongst the working classes. It was most opposed by the respectable middle classes.

The difficulties of obtaining historical data

Currently, few academic studies of sport-fixing's history exist (Huggins, 2020). Coverage has focused on material representing the 'respectable' view of sport, which always heavily minimises its impact. Most books on sports' history ignore sports' unpleasant links with gambling or corruption; refer back nostalgically to a former 'golden age', a 'golden era' or 'an age of heroes'; or uncritically accept the

socially constructed rhetoric and myths surrounding the alleged ideals of ‘fair play’, juxtaposing the moral certainties of ‘integrity’, ‘honesty’, ‘responsible ethical behaviour’, ‘sportsmanship’, ‘fair play’ or ‘true athletes’ with ‘deviance’, ‘criminal’, ‘dishonesty’ and ‘corruption’ (Kihl, 2018).

Is fixing more common than in earlier periods? Here, historians lack quantifiable data. Media rumours are unreliable, except in illustrating public awareness, and often only illustrated temporary moral panics. Lack of evidence might mean no match-fixing, but also that it was so taken for granted that it was not mentioned or that evidence has not yet been found by scholars.

Specific national legislation against match-fixing has only recently been introduced in most countries (European Commission, 2012). Earlier legal prosecutions, as, for example, in the successful prosecution of a bookmaker under the 1906 Prevention of Corruption Act by Wigan Rugby Football club in 1908, were rare. He unsuccessfully tried to bribe two New Zealand members of the team to throw a match against Hunslet (*Wigan Observer*, 14 November 1908). Gaining *solid* proof was difficult.

Sports organisations needed less evidence to act. Their commissions usually dealt with cases *in camera*, providing few press details. Rumours and accusations were rife. As Furst (2014, p. 104) pointed out in discussing American professional baseball in the 1870s, the idea that it was corrupt was well-established, but ‘to what extent corruption existed ... could not be known then or now’ even if one newspaper claimed that ‘as a general thing any professional club will throw a game if there is money in it’ and that baseball fans had a considerable tolerance for the devious behaviour of their heroes (Ham, 2005).

Sports organisations have been reluctant to prosecute and damage their reputation, ignoring unevidenced accusations and claiming that match-fixing was a recent aberration, inventing a prelapsarian history of a mythological age of straightforward contests. Any brief moral panic necessitated ever-new rules and structures to address it, yet no form of regulation by sports organisations has yet been able to stop it.

There have always been few effective internal reporting mechanisms allowing actors in sport to provide information on match-fixing (Verschuuren, 2020). Whistleblowing has been rare, undermined because athletes have usually been in a weak power position or lacked their employers’ moral reasoning, understanding that revelations could lead to loss of employment and alienation from peers.

Match-fixing: been a ‘normal’ feature of competitive spectator sport?

The approach adopted here uses largely (but not entirely) historical British examples, together with relevant literature from other disciplines. It shows that from a cultural and historical position, integrity has never been a completely ‘normal’ feature in the past. Over the *longue duree*, players have always cheated or bent the rules. Match-fixing has been a ‘natural’ phenomenon within sport,

a perennial and endemic feature, sometimes relatively common, sometimes less common, depending on context and the attitudes of particular class and status groups. Individual examples fit into longer-term transformational cultural, social and economic cycles, often but not always related to betting. Definitions of crime and criminal behaviour and cultural judgements of morality have varied now and in the past, suggesting that match-fixing can be seen as a universal temptation to which all could be susceptible (Burke, 2019; Graham et al., 2016).

In the ancient world, match-fixing was practised by Greek athletes at the highest echelons of the athletic circuit, including the Olympics, and continued through the Hellenistic and Roman periods. The recent discovery of a papyrus agreement between two parties to fix the final of the boys' wrestling in the Great Antinoeia games in 267 CE shows how formalised match-fixing could be. Financial and personal motives drove many athletes to try to ensure the result they wished for. Cities encouraged and protected cheaters. In the Greek myths, the gods aided and abetted their favourite heroes in contests by unscrupulous means (Papakonstantinou, 2016; Romero, 2016; Stephens, 2020).

Fixing has been a key continuity, a feature to be half-expected and looked out for even by spectators who viewed it as an illegitimate act and where many sporting competitive events were straightforwardly contested. As one leading expert on American baseball recently commented, comparing the college baseball of the later nineteenth century with modern baseball, 'except for more sophisticated methods used, and the immensely larger stakes involved, the two eras are hardly distinguishable' in terms of result manipulation (Seymour, 2014, p. 71).

How accepting were societies in the past?

People came across match-fixing through a range of cultural experiences: family, social contexts from taverns to market places, sports themselves or the media. From the eighteenth century onwards, books, newspapers and magazines regularly mentioned examples, rumours and suspicions, whether of rich or poor contestants, criminals or bookmakers. These created a shared awareness of sports results as potentially manipulated. British horseracing fans received media hints for the 'knowing', which used easily decoded language, not specific accusations (Huggins, 2020). Pierce Egan, the early nineteenth-century boxing writer, used the sign X to denote a fixed fight.

In early twentieth-century Britain, even amongst the easily available postcards to send circa 1905 was one showing a burly soccer player standing over a diminutive referee saying, 'If we win this match you are on a quid (£1)'. The referee queries, 'but what if you lose'. The response: 'Then you are on A STRETCHER!!!', a reminder that poorly paid officials have always been susceptible to bribery and threats. Even in more recent times, there has been the 1980 Italian *Totonero* scandal and the dubious refereeing decisions that ensured Stasi-supported Berliner FC Dynamo regularly won its soccer league (Franke and Berendonk, 1997; McDougall, 2014).

Between 1918 and 1939 in British teenagers' books and comics, 'straight', honest, manly sporting heroes engaged in an unending war against a far larger group of match-manipulating villains, as in the Aldine Publishing Company's series of pulp fiction covering sports such as football, boxing and racing or Amalgamated Press's *Football and Sports Library*. Interwar and early post-WWII British and American films on sport, such as Bogart's *The Harder They Fall* (1956), likewise, presented it as usually 'all square' but with occasional crooked villains, dishonest bookmakers, fixed fights and attempts to dope horses or greyhounds (Huggins and Williams, 2006, pp. 28–32).

The key question is how something so apparently dishonest has retained its hold on a wide range of cultures, now and in the past.

Fixing and social class

There have always been cultural differences in moral judgement and behaviour, across and within societies (Graham et al., 2016). In the eighteenth- and early nineteenth centuries, some British upper-class males were happy to manipulate results. Racehorse owners, in both Britain and America, had few qualms about manipulating odds through result-fixing, and securing economic and political advantage over others. It was generally assumed that a horse's owner had the right to run his horses to win or lose as his betting book demanded.

The *gentleman* must be equally disposed to WIN or LOSE – to be *first* – *second* or *distanced* ...in strict conformity with the predominant and *privately communicated* bets of his *confederates*; his money-making emissaries.

(*Sporting Magazine*, October 1793, p. 29)

Moreover, it was usually a key tenet of the honour code that since gentlemen did not cheat, other gentlemen did not accuse them. Owner confederacies, sometimes, worked together to organise a race result. Jockeys rode races so to achieve the result as instructed by owner or trainer, going out too fast to tyre the horse, or even occasionally falling off (Huggins, 2018). A similar pattern existed in Colonial America (Cohen, 2017). A German visitor to England in the 1820s noted that 'cheating, in every kind of "sport", is as completely in the common order of things ... amongst the highest classes as the lowest' (*Edinburgh Review*, 1831). Even twentieth-century racing owners rarely complained about fixes since they themselves might hold a horse back another time (Huggins, 2004).

It has been working-class professionals who most commonly carried out fixes. They understood sport, betting and match-fixing as sites of contestation (McKibbin, 1998), and they came from backgrounds where hope of a small win had always helped poorer people maintain optimism in the face of difficult life circumstances (Downs, 2015). They often bet themselves, directly or through intermediaries. Most sportsmen faced financial pressures. Their earnings were less large than first appeared, and most sports were seasonal. The large stakes in contests were often

largely put up by backers, who financially supported professionals during training, and took much of the money afterwards. They might have families to care for and support. Competitive careers could be cut short thanks to illness, accident, serious injury, excessive weight gain, drink or addiction. Sport was risky. Winning was uncertain, income unreliable, luck played a part, and patrons and fans were fickle.

This immediately made 'cheating to win' appear ethically acceptable, still a view shared by many players and fans (Hill, 2013) and excused as mere 'gamesmanship'. There was always a psychological willingness of some athletes and teams to engage in the unobvious cynicism of the contesting of refereeing and umpiring decisions, deliberate fouls, injury feigning and sledging, purposely slowing a match down to frustrate an opponent, or moving about in a fellow competitor's eye line. Histories of soccer show how even in soccer's early history, instrumental violence and fouling were cynically adopted by some players to help obtain a favourable result (Mason, 1980; McDowell, 2013).

Living and playing where such temptation was common, match-fixing could seem just another step further, like deliberately losing at pool or snooker and then increasing the stake. It could feel tempting, more 'honourable', to make money directly or indirectly through fixing, whether arranged personally, or after an approach, sometimes from other professionals or former professionals, or more threatening and coercive by local gangsters, bookmakers or others. While prize money could be many weeks' wages, settling the result beforehand meant that both sides could bet with certainty on the result through intermediaries, provided it was done occasionally, and competently concealed. And amongst peers, money, however obtained, provided esteem, dignity, respect and status. It represented a low risk, but high reward. Practical consequences outweighed any negative moral and ethical considerations. The approach often placed a higher emphasis on taking care of their loved ones, giving them a more comfortable life. It could be portrayed as a more rational even if less moral act, not necessarily cheating but rather as ensuring they beat the odds.

And match-fixing offered its own pleasures and competitive attractions. It had its own skill set: to cheat and not be caught. The fixer was financially in a competition, prepared to do what was needed to win. Sometimes, too, deceiving those with power and authority could itself be a joy. A successful fix was another sort of win, with a liberating effect, and a release from psychological and physical stress. It had similar appeals to gambling, providing risk-taking and a sense of anticipation, and escape from mundane life, while the thought and excitement of having a larger sum for self and family were alluring (Esposito, 2008). Psychologists have suggested that those individuals who recognised, perhaps from experience, that they could derive both material and psychological rewards from engaging in unethical behaviour were powerfully motivated to behave unethically (Ruedy et al., 2013). Professionals trying to arrange fixes themselves had to arrange profitable bets. This meant risky arrangements through intermediaries or bookmaker involvement. In America from the mid-nineteenth century, for

example, there were collusive practices in early cricket, baseball and horseracing (Furst, 2014; Riess, 2011, pp. 37, 148, 237, 258).

Working-class bookmakers often shared cultural and social backgrounds. Having prior knowledge of a sporting outcome enabled them to profit through manipulating odds and laying off money on their commercial rivals. They could also initiate a fix themselves since offering a bribe beforehand to stop a strongly backed favourite made economic sense. Even when purely amateur rugby union grew in popularity from the 1870s, by the 1880s, there were complaints by Wakefield Trinity, Halifax and Batley that bookmakers had tried to influence results, and when Halifax pulled out of the 1882 Yorkshire Cup competition, they cited as a reason 'betting men' who had wanted to see their players lamed. Both Wakefield Trinity and Batley complained that bookmakers had tried to influence their players (Collins, 2006, p. 38).

Criminal gangs have always got involved in fixes since at least the eighteenth century. Between the wars, there was often a close connection between working-class East End London boxers and criminal groups like the Krays, notorious for fixing fights (Berkowitz, 2011). Al Capone provided a Chicago parallel. Even around mid-century boxing was often characterised as a metaphor for corruption although it is only in recent decades that a global network of gambling syndicates and fixers has been able to develop.

Match-fixing for non-betting reasons

Match-fixing has never been solely betting-related for immediate financial gain. There were other reasons, such as building reputation and status, or 'tanking' to gain a future advantage or influence a future handicap. In the more distant past, powerful leaders often boasted of their sporting successes, but it was rarely in their opponents' interests to win. Nero toured Greece in AD 67 competing in all the major festivals and was always declared the winner. When the Roman emperor Caligula fought fights, his rival 'voluntarily fell' (Suetonius, 2015, p. 32.2). When Commodus fought, he always won because all his rivals surrendered to him.

There have been many more recent examples of arrangements made for a variety of non-betting reasons: circumventing relegation, losing a match to avoid meeting certain competitors or teammates in the next round of a round-robin competition system or enabling another team to win a championship (Hill, 2013). Studies of British soccer show that in 1898 Stoke City and Burnley deliberately drew their game to both avoid relegation. At Middlesbrough in 1910, there were even attempts by the club's manager to bribe Sunderland's players to lose and so help his chairman to win a forthcoming parliamentary seat. Between 1919 and 1952, there were many examples of match-fixing to gain honours, promotion or avoid relegation, in a sport regularly riddled with corruption and match-fixing scandals (Budd, 2017; Cashmore and Cleland, 2014; Inglis, 1985).

It is worth remembering too that in the past crowds lost interest if contests were too one-sided, so there were regular (unsubstantiated) suggestions that

matches were fixed for that reason. In athletics, for example, there was a regular concern about the fairness of working-class 'pedestrian' athletic contests around the mid-nineteenth century. One 1843 newspaper admitted that 'it seems to be a very difficult matter now to bring pedestrian matches to a fair and satisfactory conclusion' and the travelling circus of pedestrians surrounding leading runner 'Deerfoot' famously arranged results in 1862 (Oldfield, 2017). When small groups of professional tennis players arranged tours in America from the 1950s, there were rumours that results were, sometimes, shared out to avoid results being too predictable. Even today, research shows that some people in the sports world support manipulation of competitions. It can be portrayed as almost a 'desirable deviance' (Maher et al., 2014).

Attitudes to fixing over the past three centuries

In the eighteenth century, in a period before bookmakers, all more popular commercialised competitive sports were driven by wagering in a small and inter-personal betting market. Occasional fixing of results seems to have been quite normative, widely recognised and understood, not socially sanctioned but rarely provable, across a range of sports from horseracing and pugilism to cricket. If a wagerer did not know about a potential fix, the fix did not matter. The wager was paid up. If the wagerer knew about the fix beforehand, then the wager might be placed with a 'mug punter' who did not (Huggins, 2018).

By the early nineteenth century, a nascent bookmaking industry had emerged, and a variety of professional sports continued to have regular accusations of, and sometimes, clear evidence of, fixing. Famous examples included the 1844 Epsom Derby, which included substitutions, false age declarations, nobbling, horse stealing and holding horses back (Byles, 2011). Often, however, it was trainers or owners who gave instructions to a jockey. As in Britain, American jockeys and trainers were regularly involved in race-fixing (Riess, 2011). Other professional sports, such as bareknuckle pugilism with its sham battles and fixed matches, and 'pedestrian' running contests also gained a reputation, both attracting large and unruly crowds, which were perceived as a threat to local public order. It has been argued that by 1850, there was 'match-fixing galore' and 'for every honest dedicated athlete there were several dubious untrustworthy characters' (Lile, 2000, p. 100).

A new and culturally powerful opposition to match-fixing in Britain, its Empire and parts of America came with modernity. National and then international sporting organisations became stronger, often ideologically dominated by a new culturally assertive ethos: ethical participation and the culturally fluid bourgeois inventions of amateurism, muscular Christianity and athleticism (Allison, 2001; Collins, 2013).

Leaders, largely public school/university educated, and Protestant in outlook, usually came from the 'respectable', socially well-connected middle and upper middle classes, who powerfully stigmatised gambling, which supposedly had no place in sport. Gamblers' instrumental attitude to winning and money-making had

encouraged match-fixing and other extreme ways of ensuring results, especially following the growing working-class 'betting mania' in urban areas. New 'amateur sports', associated with more middle-class participants, and sometimes using sets of regulations which were designed to separate the classes, espoused a new rhetoric of 'sportsmanship', 'fair play' and 'ethical sport', heavily value-laden, portrayed as a moral norm system (Loland, 2002, pp. 13ff.).

In earlier centuries, 'fair play' had been rooted in wagering, where contestants negotiated 'articles of agreement', each side trying to ensure that their opponent could not cheat and fix in advance without losing the wager (Vamplew, 2007). Now, new sporting rules threatened bans on competitors discovered betting. Playing for 'the love of the game' became honourable and morally superior. Professional play became potentially problematic. Sports such as rugby or hockey were even opposed to leagues in case games were over-competitive and encouraged betting. The language, ethos and values of amateurism were powerfully re-circulated by leading sections of the press and embedded in key British institutions. Sports such as rugby union, amateur rowing or athletics totally opposed professionalism, sometimes, trying to preserve a middle-class membership. Others tried hard to control their working-class players, who were treated with suspicion and their accomplishments marginalised. Most officials had little understanding of betting. In the 1930s, some English Football League administrators even believed that the popularity of football pools encouraged fixing even though it would have required fixing several results simultaneously.

This shifted middle-class (and respectable working-class) attitudes to match-fixing from a more tacitly tolerated practice. It now contradicted 'sporting' approaches. It threatened sport's moral integrity. Regulations of almost all sports were regularly altered, updated and clarified, to maintain middle-class control while making sport more attractive and, less effectively, prevent cheating. Amateur, middle-class sports such as rugby union, playing friendly matches in front of small crowds, with little betting, became largely successful in limiting match-fixing opportunities. Pedestrianism, for example, formerly a major urban working-class spectator and gambling sport, despite fixed races, lost ground to more tightly controlled new amateur track and field sports. Other governing bodies with more working-class players, working-class support and betting interest faced its challenge in different ways. Meanwhile, moral opposition led by evangelical Protestants and social reformers got state governments to close nearly all the American racetracks in the early 1900s and blocked the development of some British horse and greyhound tracks (Huggins, 2007; Riess, 2011; Thayer, 2013).

Wrestling provides an illustrative case study, as Roland Barthes (1972) pointed out. In modern American professional wrestling, match-fixing was deliberately incorporated, making it a part of the performativity of individual roles and entertainment, helping attract spectators. There, fixing played its part in the fake story-lines, the maintenance of violent spectacle and the myth-making (Rheinhard et al., 2018). By contrast, in Britain, the rule-establishers of regional variants of wrestling tried unavailingly to stop it over more than two centuries.

Cumberland and Westmorland wrestling, found in northern England, had rules as early as 1713 which stated that no wrestler 'shall have another to yield to him under any condition', with the penalty being that 'neither of them shall be capable of the prize' (Robinson and Gilpin, 1893). London visitor Charles Dickens (1858) recognised that 'various little arrangements may be made beforehand' for financial advantage, while two coming from the same place would generally refuse to wrestle, allowing the better man to save energy for subsequent rounds. In 1859, a new governing body, the Carlisle and Cumberland Wrestling Association, laid down that any wrestler

attempting sham wrestling, personation, buying or selling a fall, getting into any weight to which he is not entitled, or otherwise misconducting himself or in any way attempting a barney... shall be at once expelled... and debarred from again contending in the Carlisle ring.

The C.&W. Wrestling Association was formed in 1906 with the professed aim to 'purge' the sport from the 'virus of dishonesty and gambling', believing that wrestling had 'not been altogether honest', and in 1949, it once again believed that fixed matches were on the increase, not least where wrestlers agreed beforehand to share prize money, a feature still regularly found also in other regional wrestling forms such as Cornish wrestling (Huggins, 2001; Tripp, 2020).

Despite the efforts of such sporting organisations, there was still regular circumstantial but well-known evidence of fixed matches. Between the wars, in America, boxing, greyhound racing and horseracing were all notorious examples (Sussman, 2019; Thayler, 2013). Amateur attitudes only began to recede between the 1950s and 1970s (Smith and Porter, 2000) as deferential attitudes crumbled and more commercial approaches were adopted, though this led to an expansion of betting markets, and renewed assaults on integrity. Recently, sports organisations have addressed these through processes, law enforcement and prevention strategies (Aquilana, 2018; Haberfeld and Sheehan, 2013), portraying fixing in terms of individual ethical failure, not organisational morality or responsibility (Tak, 2018). All major national and international sports governing bodies, and many national governments, have increasingly put new measures in place against corruption and match-fixing, moving both up to their policy agenda.

Being caught?

The potential consequences for fixers of getting caught changed over time. Legal prosecutions were rare, but conviction potentially by far the most serious. In 1811, gambler Daniel Dawson was hanged for poisoning racehorses at Newmarket. In Britain, the Common Law 'conspiracy to defraud' and the later 1906 Prevention of Corruption Act could mean imprisonment and hard labour, and after the latter act, there were more cases, as, for example, in the case of a former

Manchester United footballer conspiring with Scottish bookmakers to try to fix results in 1918 (Inglis, 1985, p. 52).

More often, match-fixers merely found themselves banned. This initially had little impact. In 1790, the Prince of Wales's jockey Sam Chifney was banned from Newmarket for pulling his horse, but the Prince continued to pay him, and he was able to ride and train elsewhere (Huggins, 2018). In America, jockey Robert Gay, banned for holding back his horse at Charleston races after a £500 bribe from a leading planter, was still able to groom horses and ride at races outside the area (Cohen, 2017, p. 51). Although early cricket matches were regularly bought and sold, in the early nineteenth century when two match-fixing cricketers reminisced in the hearing of members of the MCC, they were banned, but only from subsequent MCC matches (Pycroft, 1865, p. 21). In a match at Nottingham, some members of *both* sides were trying to lose, to profit by wagers, but Lord Frederick Beauclerk, who had tried to win, was able to find witnesses to the role of professional William Lambert and have him banned, but only from Lords (Birley, 1999, pp. 60–61). After national sports organisations, such as the British Jockey Club or the English Football Association became more powerful, bans became longer, often signalling the end of a player's career. In 1876, the Jockey Club rules began including a section on 'Corrupt practices and disqualification' which focused on inducements offered to officials and jockeys. Jockey Charlie Smirk was 'warned off' by the Jockey Club in 1928 for five years for pulling a horse even without firm evidence (Huggins, 2004, p. 164). American organisations followed a similar pattern. In 1919, eight underpaid members of the Chicago professional baseball team the White Sox were accused of throwing the World Series as part of a gambling fix (Fountain, 2016). Owners had initially covered it up to avoid bad press. The players, found innocent in court, were, nevertheless, banned from the game for life. In recent years, a whole series of responses, thanks to increasing oversight, has led to sanctions, financial costs, diminished reputations and employee turnover (Kihl, 2018).

Building a future agenda

The history of match-fixing represents an overlooked, almost ignored gap in the burgeoning body of research literature on sport. Hill's (2013) identification of many gaps in the current study of football match-fixing is equally relevant to its past. Huggins (2020) recently stressed the need for a wider agenda: exploring the reasons behind lack of past government action; the relationship of fixing to different types of betting, crime and policing; the different way sporting bodies have dealt with it and their varied success; the wide range of motives lying behind fixing approaches; the practicalities of organising actual fixes; cross-cultural comparisons and the relationship of match-fixing to broader societal corruption. We need to track the malleability of match-fixing within and between sports cultures and pay attention to the diverse array of sports in which fixing has been found. The material is still there, waiting to be discovered.

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Match-Fixing as a Social Institution between Pre-Modernity and Rationality

Eike Emrich, Freya Gassmann, Michael Koch and Werner Pitsch

Introduction

Match-fixing – in the broad sense in which it is approached in this book – is often seen as a major threat to sport (Hill 2015; Interpol & IOC 2015) and its integrity (Gardiner *et al.* 2017; Lastra *et al.* 2018). On the other hand, we learn from historians that match-fixing has a long-lasting history and is considered inevitable by some scholars and practitioners (Huggins 2018; Manoli *et al.* 2019).

Given the negative estimation of match-fixing and its effects, its historic stability is stunning. As with doping, it is seen to have a negative impact on sport and is, therefore, fought against by sport organisations as well as by other agents, but evidently, it has never been effectively defeated. With regard to doping, this is evident from the low but stable rate of regularly detected dopers in sport competitions (Frenger *et al.* 2013). Such stability of phenomena, despite their negative appraisal, may result from an equilibrium of committed rule violations in relation to antagonistic policing activities which guarantees unending payoffs for all involved parties (Pitsch 2014).

Match-fixing is often compared to doping as another form of corrupt behaviour in sport. In fact, parallels between these two forms of deviance in sport have been identified in cases of both state and privately organised forms of doping (e.g. the Russian state organised doping or the Nike Oregon project doping scandal). Apart from such apparent similarities, there is, nevertheless, an important difference: doping typically occurs as an individual behaviour at the athlete level while the act of match-fixing needs at least two interacting agents, with one typically being on the athlete or referee level. Rather than discussing match-fixing as an ethical issue on the individual, athlete level only, this book chapter focuses on the interaction between different agents and levels of analysis, thereby also considering to which extent dense social networks which are characteristic of sports organisations as well as discipline-specific cultures in relation to “deviance” facilitate match-fixing. Doing so, this chapter takes a sociological, or, to be more precisely, an organisation-theoretical perspective on match-fixing, considering the work of Max Weber and Werner Sombart to elucidate the special form of sport organisation and explain why sport organisations are, therefore, vulnerable to deviant behaviour, in general, and match-fixing, in particular. This chapter builds partly on the arguments already published by Emrich *et al.* (2019).

Delimiting the definition of match-fixing as deviant behaviour

Being deviant or conformable represents the two poles on a behavioural continuum spanning all everyday actions in which deviant behaviour is viewed and/or defined as illegal (under the penal code) and/or illegitimate (based on prevailing ethical and moral views) at a specific point in time (Papathanassiou 2002). Given this context, match-fixing can be viewed as a special form of sport-related deviance in the form of corruption, which can be differentiated again, based on whether it takes place within or outside the sporting competition (Kihl *et al.* 2017). Additionally, it should be differentiated if match-fixing takes place to obtain sport-related or non-sport-related benefits – thus sports can be seen as vehicle for corruption – or for both. This is once again stressed in the often cited definition of the Council of Europe:

“Manipulation of sports competitions” means an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others.

(Council of Europe, 2014)

Pies (2005, 63f.) draws a distinction between various forms of corrupt behaviour in sport, based on an evaluation of its legality and legitimacy. For example, behaviour that is legal can be labelled illegitimate (above law – below ethics), with the opposite scenario also a conceivable outcome. Match-fixing in elite sport is typically assigned to the category of corrupt behaviour within sporting competition (Kihl *et al.* 2017), since its final execution has to happen on the playing field, regardless of whether it was initiated either by players, referees, or other stakeholders on the field of play or by people outside of the match. Also, referees may abuse the power entrusted to them by the association as a “neutral party” (Simmel 2010; Rullang *et al.* 2015) for their own benefits (e.g. monetary gain). Max Weber (2019) also added a social perspective, claiming that corruption is a dense net of reciprocity constructed in the first place for the forms of exchange which is typical of communitisation (*Vergemeinschaftung*), where relationships are characterised by a subjective feeling of belonging together and not by rational agreements (Swedberg and Agevall 2016, 59f).

One way to monetise match-fixing is through sports betting, which is why betting fraud is often closely linked to match-fixing. Such behaviour is comparable to cases of vote buying in host city selections (e.g. for the Olympic Games), which is another case of corruption in sports, where the power entrusted to the people in question for the relevant period is used for personal gain. Such cases also include people outside of sporting organisations, such as politicians, and range from simple bribery to multinational crime syndicates seeking to manipulate sporting events all over the world (Kihl *et al.* 2017).

Behaviour is considered illegitimate from a moral perspective if it violates a culture's norms of exchange and "sells" high-order cultural assets, i.e. exchanges them for goods (usually money) on a (black) market (Emrich 2006). As a result of market socialisation (on market socialisation, in general, see Weber 2019), not everything – neither public safety, health, education nor sports results – are tradable commodities within markets. They cannot be acquired, bought, or sold at a given price. In this market environment, however, the monetised economy is constantly pushing the market boundaries, setting at risk higher cultural assets such as integrity and openness of competition to become commodities. This is the reason why, in a social market economy in the ordoliberal sense, the market ought to be delimited by clear regulations to prevent such intrusion, as the market cannot develop these from within. The criteria for assessing match-fixing as corrupt and/or illegal, therefore, refer not only to the rules of sports disciplinary law or the penal code but also to the market's moral boundaries.

In general, sport organisations can be seen as a pre-modern organisational form (Emrich and Papathanassiou 2003) in which traditional forms of rule (e.g. deciding for one alternative because it "has always been done this way", leaving decisions to (charismatic) authorities' discretion) co-exist with legal and rational ruling patterns (Rubinstein and Maravić 2010), causing normative tensions at its governance level. Decisions made in accordance with traditional or charismatic forms of rule, such as positions awarded only to long-standing loyal supporters based on opaque criteria of trust, might be considered corrupt from a legal and rational perspective which focus more on qualifications. Given this classification, it is no surprise that corruption, in general, and especially match-fixing are not new to sport organisations (Huggins 2018).

The extent and scope of the issue

Perception of match-fixing may be biased by the media interest in highly corrupt and large-scale events. Therefore, public, (sport) policy-related, and social scientific interest in this phenomenon may also be misguided by this distortion between subjective perception and inter-personal reality. On the other hand, it is mostly the public perception and discussion which triggers activities to deal with this threat.

A Google analysis of the keywords "match fixing" and "match-fixing" resulted in 6.47 million pages within 0.59 seconds. For results of such size, the Google trend analytics also reveal that the interest in this topic is highly fluctuating over time. Compared to "doping", the occurrence of "match-fixing" as a keyword during the last 12 months was by the factor 14 lower (leaving aside the time span of the Olympic Games in 2021), while the highest numbers of occurrences can unanimously be attributed to events or accusations of match-fixing in first national professional leagues such as allegedly fixed matches in the Indian first Cricket league or in the match India vs. Afghanistan on the 3rd of November 2021.

Although public attention and academic interest are mainly focused on large-scale events of match-fixing (Boeri and Severgnini 2008, 2011; Duggan and Levitt 2002; Manoli and Antonopoulos 2015; Marchetti *et al.* 2021; Yilmaz *et al.* 2019), there are less distinct and less known forms of match-fixing which should be considered. In non-professional sport competitions, there are situations where a behaviour which simply shows civility falls within the scope of the definition of match-fixing given above (e.g. when a dominant table-tennis player does not disgrace his/her opponent and wins a set with a score of “only” 11:1 instead of 11:0). For sure, this person deliberately underperforms and benefits from his/her opponent’s future benevolence. The same holds for widespread fairness norms. A football player who kicks the ball outside the field of play when a player from the opposing team is hurt and needs treatment also deliberately underperforms. The relating fairness norm can be understood as an arrangement and the team benefits from the opponents’ future obligingness. In both cases, individuals weight other sport norms like civility and fairness higher than an intervention in the unpredictable nature of sports competition, also because the effect of the interventions is moderate.

There is a whole dimension of more or less legal and more or less legitimate behaviours which falls under the definition of “Manipulation of sports competitions”. Zaksaitė (2013) has well described the shifting interplay between different forms of match-fixing with different utilities for the various groups involved but also the effects which match-fixing has onto the result of a competition taking into account its legal and moral assessment.

The example of fixed draws in chess sheds a light onto the effect of the fix in relation to the openness of the competition. Chess tournaments are physically and emotionally extremely demanding events for the players and it is usually at least exhausting if not impossible to fully compete in every single game. Players react to this demand by agreeing to play a “peaceful” game during the first moves. This agreement would normally fall under the definition of match-fixing. However, this behaviour is not only widespread and accepted among (elite) chess players but also not prohibited by the rules of the sport. Additionally, it is not understood as an unfair advantage to a player as his/her opponent gains the same advantage. Beyond this, it can be understood as supporting the integrity of the competition as its result will depend more on players’ chess expertise than on their physical and emotional resilience. Similar forms of match-fixing can be found in the agreed actions of “sister teams” in Formula 1 (Zaksaitė and Raduševičius 2017).

When used as tactics, such arrangements can, nevertheless, become illegitimate if not illegal. This holds for Russian chess players at least from 1940 to 1978. There is strong statistical evidence that at international tournaments, Russian chess players drew more often against other Russians than against opponents from other countries (Moul and Nye 2009). This increased the chance for some Russian players to finish first. This behaviour, therefore, falls under the above definition although there is no specific “other” who gains an advantage from it; thus, it is more a generalised exchange of advantages among the players from one nation than a specific exchange.

Much closer to a specific exchange of advantages comes the badminton doubles scandal that occurred during the Olympic Games in 2012 where all in all four teams deliberately underperformed since the losing team in the match expected a more favourable draw for the next round (Blair 2018). The scandal became apparent after both teams in those matches tried to perform worse than their opponents. In cases where one team performs at its best while the other deliberately underperforms, this would most likely not have been detected.

These cases of match-fixing show that such behaviour is not only related to betting-related organised crime activities but that there is a variety of forms and benefits. This ranges from sheer courtesy and obeying to fair-play norms (Kalb *et al.* 2015), easing participation in competitions in chess via tactics such as supporting the progress of other competitors from the same nation and via benefits in the form of easier to beat competitors in future rounds of a tournament to monetary benefits for players or officials.

While in this sense, the scope of match-fixing is much wider than often discussed in the literature, there is also only limited knowledge about its empirical prevalence. Gorse and Chadwick (2010) analysed cases of betting- and non-betting-related match-fixing in a “database of 2,089 cases of proven corruption from across the sport industry” from 2000 to 2010. While match-fixing added up to only 2.73% of all events, doping accounted for more than 95%. One might, nevertheless, suppose that there is a high number of unrecorded cases since there is no institutionalised testing and detection scheme for match-fixing as there is in anti-doping efforts. Additionally, this analysis by Gorse and Chadwick (2010) limited the scope of the phenomenon only to cases of doping or match-fixing which were proven and sanctioned according to sports disciplinary laws.

The rate of athletes which has been involved in match-fixing activities or which has at least been asked to take part in such behaviour can provide insights into the question to which extent match-fixing is a mundane phenomenon in sport. By using the Randomised Response technique, Frenger *et al.* (2019) interviewed German elite athletes using an indirect questioning technique. This technique allows respondents to answer honestly even to embarrassing or even threatening questions by providing a further level of anonymisation and, thus, enables more reliable prevalence estimates compared to the use of direct questioning (Lensvelt-Mulders *et al.* 2005). It turned out that (minimum estimates of the lifetime prevalence) 8.42% of the population had already been approached to get involved in a competition manipulation, while 7.47% had already been involved. 32.99% had already experienced attempts to influence referees and 4.90% had already actively exerted an influence onto a referee. In this study among elite athletes, the level of financial independence from sport yielded a significant influence onto the prevalence of match-fixing.

With the same method, Pitsch *et al.* (2015) studied the prevalence of match-fixing in German amateur football (soccer) both for the players’ lifetime and for the previous season. They estimated a lifetime prevalence for the question “have you ever been confronted with a match-fixing incident” of 31.6% by maximum. Even

more interesting, the rate of honest “no” responses to this question was 46.8%, indicating that match-fixing in amateur football is a rather common issue which many players have already experienced themselves. The minimum rate for the last season was 13.4%. For the additional question, if the players have themselves been involved in match-fixing, the last season question evidently was too threatening, even for an indirect questioning method as it yielded 0% of honest “yes” responses. For the lifetime question, the rate of players who were involved in match-fixing was 14.6% with a rate of honest “no” answers of only 36.1%.

These figures indicate that match-fixing is maybe not as uncommon as one would think. Moreover, given the fact that match-fixing looks rather stable in history, one might wonder why sport organisations are that vulnerable to this kind of corrupt behaviour.

Thoughts on sport organisations’ vulnerability to corruption in general

Sport organisations are structured as intermediate forms between a formal organisation and a communion one based on sports-specific values (Sombart writes about “Gewertschaft”: Sombart 1959, 34f, e.g. “we football players”) including specific camaraderie ideologies (e.g. “my teammates”, “my sport comrades”). Shared memberships, in local clubs as well as in international federations, are often tried and tested over the years. This renders sport organisations often as dense and homogeneous networks, in which the trust-based delegation of authority via voting (on trust, see Luhmann 2017) often takes on the character of a pseudo-democratic acclamation and favours people to stay in office for many years. At the same time, communitisation also comes with an aversion to formal mechanisms of organisation, in particular, to written and documentary forms of administration (for managerial roles in sport organisations, see Emrich 1996).

The growing economic penetration of sport organisations increasingly operating on the market within processes designated as commercialisation is impinging upon the original communitisation to draw on Weber’s (2019) terminology. The monetary economy and its cool practicality are, thus, not just penetrating the structures of communitisation that are actually based on reciprocity, but there is also a developing trend towards calculability and economic rationality. The International Olympic Committee, for example, organises major sporting events every two years, which goes hand in hand with a consequent market orientation, while they also cannot neglect the Olympic idea as their value foundation.

The normative tensions between internal values through communitisation and an external market orientation frequently result in organisational hypocrisy (Brunsson 2019) leading to systematically uncoupling of decision, talk, and action. This allows organisations to meet the divergent requirements of resource mobilisation via the market and the solidarity-based norms within the organisation, separation between the voluntary officials who make decisions and talk while the management does the acting. In this organisational structure with tradition-oriented communitisation

alongside a de-emotionalised and market-oriented operational management (see above), money develops its power to undermine morals, as described by Simmel (2010).

Between communitisation and socialisation: Sport organisations' particular vulnerability to the dark side of social capital

The character of sport organisations as being located somewhere between a formal organisation and a specific type of communitisation is also evident in their self-perception, articulated, for example, by Joseph S. Blatter, President of football's world governing body FIFA (cited in Weinreich 2006, 33, own translation):

If we have problems within the family, we will solve the problems within the family rather than go to another family. Everything that happens in football, and all the difficulties involved with football should be solved within football's jurisdiction – and not brought before ordinary courts. They are not part of our family.

This, therefore, addresses the dark side of social capital and the negative external effects of strong social relationships that Emrich *et al.* (1996) described in organisations, in general, using the term “Seilschaft” (literally “rope team”, here meaning “clique” or “old boys network”) for a special form of closed social relationships. Numerato and Baglioni (2012) examine this dark side of social capital in sport organisations on the basis of ethnographically oriented qualitative interviews in Italy and the Czech Republic. They are building on the hypothesis that the trust acquired in networks can be strategically used and evaluated in primarily micropolitical arenas. Numerato (2016) as well as Tzeng and Lee (2021) additionally stressed the importance of close social relations for match-fixing which become even more influential in the context of sociocultural patterns of super- and subordination (Lee 2017). In addition, Numerato and Baglioni (2012) address the fact that organised sport can be used as a vehicle for pork barrel politics (Ferejohn 1974) and aiming for personal goals that fall outside the actual world of sport.

On the one hand, sport associations are egoistic resource pools (Emrich and Gassmann 2019) whose members combine their resources to produce or consume their sport based on shared value orientations and with a specific sense of unity. On the other hand, the structure of sport organisations is susceptible to being preyed upon by people seeking to gain office, power, or prestige. For this purpose, those members arrange opportunities for power and status, dividing and distributing it for their own ends, regardless of whether this is the organisation's best interest.

According to Coleman (1988), social capital is primarily formed in structurally closed cohesive networks with dense relationships between homogeneous stakeholders. Such networks (such as families or sports associations as discussed

before) typically display high levels of solidarity and willingness to cooperate. They are built on the norm of reciprocity where give and take go together, even if the obligation to return a benefit does not have to coincide in time, with the confidence that the reciprocation happens a later date. Taking the model of families as a specific form of a dense network, Coleman proposes two indicators: physical presence (the parents) and attention (that they give to their children). Both indicators are an expression of the social capital available, where an increase lowers the cost of trust and a decrease raises the likelihood or risk of opportunistic behaviour. Those who do not display cooperative behaviour are “gambling away” the others’ solidarity and willingness to cooperate and can expect to leave or be removed from the network.

According to Coleman (1988), social capital is self-reinforcing, with actions to boost the collective identity of stakeholders becoming more likely, while actions that reduce collectivity become increasingly less likely. Shared values reinforce the identification process for network members while also excluding non-members and thus resulting in even more frequent cooperation within the group, with the longevity of the collaboration additionally strengthening and stabilising the community. Furthermore, people’s similarity in terms of origins, education, and socioeconomic status, symbolised in similar preferences and in shared value orientations, also strengthens the community. The resulting strong trust could turn into “dark side of social capital” which enables to acquire and distribute income, power, and status within an exclusive social relationship (Emrich *et al.* 1996; Gargiulo and Benassi 1999).

Emotional and ethical supercharging, and sometimes also the excessive elevation of the goodness of sport, means that sport organisations are the subject of high moral and social obligations. Hence, it is not just active athletes who have an obligation, as, for example, demonstrated by the normative self-commitment of the Olympic oath and the Olympic charter, in general (see Emrich *et al.* 2015; Emrich and Gassmann 2019), but also the responsibility of sport organisations in their handling of economic, environmental, and social resources because individual consumers are unable or unwilling to separate this from the activity of sports itself.

Summary and discussion

Match-fixing as corrupt behaviour within sport can be viewed as a sub-category of deviant behaviour, which is considered illegal under the rules of sport and/or the penal code and/or illegitimate based on prevailing ethical and moral views. Such actions, therefore, breach institutional expectations or violate collective norms, and generally result in negative sanctions once uncovered (Papathanassiou 2002, 662).

Nevertheless, the aforementioned definition by the council of Europe also covers forms of deliberate underperforming which are, in fact, neither illegitimate nor illegal. The decision if a certain behaviour is a “manipulation of competition” in the sense of the definition thus depends on the decision if there was an *intentional* arrangement if the alteration of competition is *improper* or if there is

an *undue* advantage. Deliberate underperformance in sport competitions ranges from acts merely performed for the sake of civility for fairness norms and tactics as well as for match-fixing in a betting-related context. This wide scope explains why drawing clear distinctions in everyday life can be challenging for individuals who were socialised in sport.

The empirical reality of the extent of match-fixing in sport does not always tally with public perception, which can be explained by the excessive elevation of the moral requirements regarding sports. These requirements are embedded in a specific form of communitisation, created by formal and informal elements of sport organisations. Trust plays a greater role in sport organisations than it does in many commercial companies, as sport as a product is only in great demand if consumers have a certain level of trust that sporting competitions are being conducted in an undetermined and therefore open fashion. Trust bridges the gap between knowledge and its opposite counterpart non-knowledge and enables processes of exchange that cannot be covered by contracts and laws (Emrich 2006; Weber 2019).

Illegal forms of match-fixing are thus facilitated by close social relationship within sport organisations and the level to which legal and legitimate forms are common within a sport. Delimiting between still legal and already illegal forms of underperforming in sport competitions is a challenging task. Accordingly, the statement that match-fixing is a threat to sport can be questioned at least in terms of its generality. Fixed draws in chess, sister teams in motor sport, sticky bottles in cycling, all these examples indicate situations where deliberately underperforming is not only common in some sports but is also understood as legitimate. In this sense, they are rather an integral aspect of modern sport than a threat to it.

Nevertheless, match-fixing, and especially illegal forms of match-fixing, can, indeed, threaten honest athletes and sport organisations, viewers and fans, and certainly those who monetarise sport in secondary sport-external markets. Match-fixing in the context of betting – at least discovered, sometimes already alleged cases of match-fixing – lower the trust of bettors in the openness of the competition. These cases for sure threaten those who gain their income in the betting market, but it threatens honest bookmakers as well as it threatens organised criminal organisations which engage themselves in match-fixing. Both can only rake in maximum profits if the belief in non-manipulated sport is preserved (for a parallelism in doping, see Frenger *et al.* 2013).

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Match-Fixing as a Commercial Solution

Match-Fix or Perish?

Argyro Elisavet Manoli and Georgios A. Antonopoulos

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present an account of how match-fixing can at times emerge, not as a threat to sport clubs but, in fact, often as a commercial solution that can assist them in their survival and even commercial and financial success. In particular, the Greek Super League, the top division of professional football in the country, presents us with the ideal context to examine match-fixing from a commercial viewpoint, while stressing the pathogens of modern-day commercial football that could be identified in other similar or less similar leagues around the world. Our decision to focus on European football leagues in this chapter stems from their similarities in terms of their financial and commercial structures, operating as open leagues, with promotions and relegations at the end of each season, without salary restrictions or revenue sharing clauses, with a common overarching governance structure by the same international federation, UEFA, and with the opportunity for some of the clubs of each league to participate in European competitions where they receive exogenous prices simply for their participation.

This chapter has three sections: firstly, we will briefly present football clubs' sources of income and associated financial and commercial problems. We will then present a short account of match-fixing in Greece, which involved a mechanism of fixing matches (e.g. selecting specific referees for specific matches) in order for specific clubs to benefit, something that has had immense financial consequences for Greek clubs. Finally, we will discuss match-fixing in Greece as a commercial solution to both the opportunities and the adverse financial conditions put forward in the context of commercialised football, in order to offer an alternative and rather unorthodox theoretical appreciation of match-fixing as a result of the structural and financial constraints of the system of modern-day commercial sport.

Football clubs' sources of income, and financial and commercial challenges

Professional (and semi-professional) football clubs, in Europe and beyond, operate as commercial organisations that aim to maximise profit and limit any losses they

might be faced with. As such, they aim to limit their potential costs (playing and non-playing staff salaries, rents, operating expenses, etc.) and increase their income. The latter, in fact, appears to be the main focus of most professional football clubs nowadays, since their expenses appear to be on an often uncontrollable increase, with playing staff salaries, in particular, raising a number of questions regarding their viability and relevance to the wider economic crisis faced by many countries worldwide (Deloitte, 2020a; Financial Times, 2021). As a result, increasing the clubs' revenue often appears to be the best solution in ensuring that clubs avoid making losses annually, or in most cases, it assists in limiting the losses made. As the Deloitte (2020a) report suggests, such losses can be observed in most leagues around Europe, even the financially 'healthiest' ones. For example, the operating losses of the French and Italian top football leagues appear to be around 306 million euros and 36 million euros annually, respectively, while bearing in mind that both these leagues include some of the biggest, richest and most commercially successful clubs of Europe (Deloitte, 2020b). While similar data are not available for all leagues around Europe, the increasing debts due to accumulating losses of numerous clubs in less commercially successful leagues, such as the Greek Super League, the top division of Greek football, have been also noted by the national press and previous research on the issue (see, e.g. Dimitropoulos, 2010).

Therefore, in order to respond to these losses, football clubs concentrate their efforts on increasing their income by focusing on their revenue sources, namely, (a) broadcasting rights, (b) commercial/sponsorship deals, (c) ticketing/match day and (d) merchandise. While particular clubs might also have additional income coming from other sources, such as player transfer fees from other clubs and gains from financial market trading, these four sources represent the main sources of income of professional football clubs in Europe and beyond (Deloitte, 2020a).

Broadcasting rights represent the newest of the main sources of income for European football clubs. As football became professionalised throughout Europe, the relationship between football clubs and the media developed rapidly into the close, inter-linked and symbiotic relationship we can currently observe in most leagues (Manoli, 2020). Today, the media is considered a powerful key stakeholder in the football ecosystem, boosting leagues and clubs with substantial income and allowing for live football to reach millions of fans, acting as a source of natural advertising for the clubs. As such, media outlets are broadcasting live football and transmitting football brands often beyond the regional and national borders, in exchange for – at times – significant amounts of money.

The amount of money the broadcasting rights account for each club depends on a number of factors, including the club's playing success and fan base as well as the league's overall competitive balance and outcome uncertainty that will be discussed below. A key factor that has also been shown to influence the income generated through the selling of broadcasting rights is the way in which the selling is done, i.e. individually by each club or collectively as a league. In the former case, each club is responsible for identifying, approaching and signing deals with individual broadcasters, allowing them to broadcast the

club's home matches. In the latter case, the league acts as a representative for all clubs, 'collecting' their individual broadcasting rights and selling them as a package to one or more broadcasters. Through this method, the broadcasting medium that buys the rights can broadcast home matches from multiple clubs for some or all the match days of a season, depending on the agreed deals. While the former way of selling broadcasting rights might appear as more lucrative for the bigger and more popular clubs within each league and substantially less profitable for the smaller and less popular clubs, research suggests that the latter method of collective selling might even result in better deals for all the clubs involved and a wider increase in the competitive balance of the league (see Falconieri et al., 2004).

The current situation in broadcasting rights presents a wide disparity among football leagues and their respective clubs within Europe, with three broad patterns identified. In the case of successful leagues, such as the top tier in England, Spain, Germany and Italy, the broadcasting revenue received collectively by each league for the 2018/2019 season was approximately 3.4, 1.8, 1.4 and 1.4 billion euros, respectively (Deloitte, 2020a). Simultaneously, less successful leagues in Europe, such as the ones in Poland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, received 39, 39, 43 and 51 million euros, respectively, according to the same report (Deloitte, 2020a). In the case of countries with less successful leagues that have not opted for a collective sale of their broadcasting rights, the amounts reported are even lower, with Greek reports suggesting that the total income for all clubs involved in the top league for the 2020/2021 season is not exceeding 55 million euros (Pliatsikas, 2021). A similar disparity appears to exist not only in the practices of the leagues but also in the trend of the income source as a whole. As such, the very successful leagues that have enjoyed lucrative broadcasting rights contracts have observed a fluctuation in the income generated over the past years, with the previously significantly increasing trend slowing down and, at times, even showing signs of a slight decrease. Such signs of a potential decrease are more evident in the less successful leagues that opt for a collective selling of their rights, while in the leagues whose clubs sell their rights independently, this decrease is evident in the deals signed for the 2019/2020 season, with a notable 40–50% decrease observed between the seasons.

Commercial and sponsorship deals represent a fast-growing source of income for professional football, with the revenue generated through them often exceeding that of broadcasting rights. Sponsorship and commercial deals allow professional football clubs to extend their brand, by aligning it with other, often non-sport-related organisations, as part of usually lucrative financial agreements. Through these agreements, organisations are allowed to showcase their brand through the football clubs, in order to increase their brand awareness (by exposing the brand to more people who follow the club), and improve their brand image by aligning it with the brand image of the club (and thus 'borrow' elements of it). At the same time, through sponsorship agreements, a more targeted approach to advertising and sales towards the football audience can be achieved for the sponsor

organisation, thus justifying the high interest these companies have shown in engaging in such agreements with football clubs (Manoli and Kenyon, 2018).

The intense commercialisation of football has led to the quick multiplication of the types of sponsorship and commercial agreements available, with existing forms including the official shirt sponsorship, in-kind sponsorships (i.e. partnership which entails providing a service in exchange for promotion of one's brand), in stadium advertising and even naming rights (i.e. paying for the right to add the sponsor's name in a football organisation's property, such as an event or, on a wider scale, their stadium). These, and a large number of other types of sponsorship and commercial deals, appear to be a growing and rather steady source of income for a number of football clubs, with their size and popularity being analogous to the number and amount of money collected through the respective deals. As a result, in some of the biggest football leagues in Europe, the commercial and sponsorship-related income accounted for more than 1 billion euros in the 2018/2019 season (1.616 billion euro for the top division of English football, 1.023 billion euro for the Spanish and 1.342 for the German – Deloitte, 2020a). Interestingly, in these leagues and despite the large sums of money originating from commercial deals, sponsorship income represents the second and substantially smaller revenue source, ranking far behind the quickly growing broadcasting rights income. At the same time, less popular leagues within Europe earned a maximum of 70 million euros (e.g. Sweden earned 70 million euros and Poland 65 million) for the same season, with the commercial and sponsorship income representing the lion's share of the income generated for the season (Deloitte, 2020a). Once again, smaller and even less popular leagues fail to reach these numbers, with the main sponsorship of the top division of Greek football accounting for a total of 10.5 million euro for the 2015/2016 season, while representing the main income source for most of the teams involved.

Interestingly, even though a steady increase has been historically noted in this income source, with more and bigger non-sporting organisations being gradually involved as sponsors of football clubs, changes have been recently noted. These changes were mainly due to the wider austerity within Europe and the at times limited proof of Return-On-Investment provided to the sponsors by smaller, less successful and less popular clubs. As a result, smaller leagues, like the Greek Super League, have witnessed multiple sponsors to withdraw their interest and subsequent funds from supporting football clubs, and instead of being replaced with a single, league-wide sponsor which can have a bigger bargaining power in controlling the negotiations and the accompanying revenue generated from the commercial and sponsorship deals made. This, in turn, has resulted in less commercial deals and, subsequently, less and declining sponsorship income (Chelmis et al., 2019).

Ticketing and match-day income represents possibly the oldest source of revenue for football clubs. From the purchase of a single ticket to enter the stadium and attend a match, to a season ticket purchased before the season starts in order for access to be allowed and for a particular seat to be reserved in all home matches of

a club, ticketing has long represented an important source of income for the clubs and a habit or even a sacred ritual for the fans (Richardson, 2004). Match-day income, then, refers to any additional income generated in association with one's visit to the stadium on a match day. For example, through the purchase of the match-day programme, or food and drinks before, during and after the match within the premises of the club's stadium (Terekli, 2018). Collectively, this source of income attracts considerably less attention in bigger and more financially and commercially successful clubs, as the Deloitte (2020b) report indicates. Indeed, commercially successful clubs appear to be relying less on ticketing and match-day income, with an overall decreasing trend noted over the past few seasons. When examining less commercially successful leagues, the number of tickets sold appears to be in a significantly decreasing trend, with the price of the tickets also noting a similar decrease. In the case of Greek football, this decrease appears to be in an alarming trend, reaching an all-time low with a decrease of more than 48% for the 2014–2015 season (when compared with the season before – Serdaris, 2018).¹ This, in turn, presents us with two dissimilar outcomes. In the case of successful clubs participating in commercially successful leagues, the decrease of importance placed on ticketing is based not necessarily on the lower amount of income it brings, but mostly on the fact that the income brought by other sources is increasing exponentially and faster than any possible increase in the ticketing and match-day income. As such, ticketing and match-day income can be regarded as a 'dying' source of income for football clubs operating within them since it represents a less profitable source than others. In the case of less successful clubs participating in less commercially successful leagues, despite the decreasing trend in the income brought in by ticketing and match day, it still appears to represent one of the most profitable sources of income, primarily due to the limited income other sources are able to bring in. As it will be discussed below, less commercially successful leagues, such as the Greek Super League and the clubs that participate within it, are able to earn substantially less income through broadcasting rights and commercial deals, making ticketing and match day, often their main sources of income throughout each season (Chelmis et al., 2019).

Merchandise revenue refers to the income that is comprised of the sale of products licensed with a football club's logos, symbols and/or trademarks. These products are sold primarily by the football club in question and, sometimes, also by the licensee (i.e. the company that manufactures them). Nowadays, official clubs' merchandise products range from football shirts and footballs, to pet clothes, decorative items and even expensive jewellery. Through the sale of these products, the football clubs are aiming to further build their brand awareness and enhance the identity building of their fans, while using their logo on the items sold can further enhance its role as a symbol of alliance, raising the value of the products sold and, thus, resulting in income for the club, and even achieving lucrative deals with non-sport companies that manufacture the products. Buying such products has been a consistent source of income for the clubs that have capitalised on their fans' high identification with their club since as studies suggest, very involved fans tend to be 'serial buyers', who

purchase more than one product per season and often wear and use the said product beyond match days and club events (Apostolopoulou et al., 2012). Wearing these products has allowed fans to show their loyalty and their association to the club to others, while often helping them connect with other fans and even being considered part of a ritual that further enhances their fandom experience. However, despite the consistency in this income source over the years, it is argued that fans (consumers) are price sensitive in regard to merchandise products (Kwon et al., 2007). Even when they are highly identified fans, they are very price sensitive, with prices playing a significant role in terms of merchandise, more than they do for ticketing. As such, even though football clubs have been known for their loyal and highly identified fan base, which has allowed them to capitalise on licence deals and thus resulted in a consistent merchandise income over the years, they also operate in a wider financial crisis that has been affecting all European countries and their respective leagues. As a result, with financial crises and austerity measures being implemented throughout Europe in the past decade and a half, unemployment and underemployment have been increasing, resulting in a noticeable decrease of people's discretionary income. This, in turn, has resulted in a decrease of merchandise income for the football clubs, which are relying less on this historically stable income source. Once again, in the case of the big and commercially successful leagues, merchandise income might still show signs of continuity, due to the online *international* sale of their merchandise items, which might counterbalance a decrease of domestic sales. Nevertheless, it is reported that with match-day income, merchandise sales are not showing signs of increase similar to the ones noted by broadcasting rights and sponsorship and commercial deals (Deloitte, 2020b).

In the case of smaller and less commercially advanced leagues, with substantially less international appeal and sales, this decrease in merchandise income is more evident in their financial accounts, with merchandise income appearing to be their smaller and even disappearing source of income. For example, even in the case of the most commercially and financially successful club in the Greek Super League, Olympiacos FC, income brought in by merchandise appears to be the smallest income source, accounting for less than any 'other income source' (referring mostly players transfer fees) and showing a clear decreasing trend between seasons (Olympiacos FC, 2018).

Finally, in the case of less successful clubs, participating in less commercially successful leagues, which attract less sponsorship and broadcasting rights income and which have been historically relying on their fans and their interest in purchasing tickets and merchandise to survive, this decline in fans' income has also resulted in a significant decline of ticketing and merchandise revenue, which has made both previously vital sources of income being regarded as 'dying' and thus placing the clubs in an often inconsolable situation.

Having discussed the four main sources of income for football clubs, it is worth noting that additional sources may exist, depending on the rules of each league the football clubs participate in. For example, in open leagues where high fees are offered for winning (for example, in the case of European top division football leagues in

which the winner(s) of each national championship is/are admitted to European level competitions and rewarded financially for their participation), the exogenous fee offered can be considered an additional income source for the winning clubs. For example, each Champions League club will receive slightly more than 16 million euros *just* for making it to the group stage (up from the guaranteed 15.6 million euros for making it into the group stage in 2020/2021; Borg, 2021). However, unlike the four main sources of income discussed above, this additional fifth income source would be only available for the winner(s) of each national league, therefore, the most successful club in each country. While, such an exogenous price might not be considered a considerable income to some successful clubs in commercially successful leagues, less commercially successful leagues in which the income generated by the clubs is substantially smaller, might consider this income source important for the running of the club, even surpassing the income generated from all other sources combined. The best example to illustrate this could be a successful club in a relatively less commercially successful league, such as the Greek Super League. In this case, Olympiacos FC, the club that was admitted to the UEFA Champion's League due to their winning of the league the year before (season 2016–2017), was able to secure an exogenous price (income by UEFA) of approximately 31.5 million euros throughout the 2017–2018 season (Olympiacos FC, 2018). The importance of this amount can be better appreciated through a closer look at the financial statements of the club, which suggest that all other sources of income combined could account for 24.6 million, illustrating that the lion's share of all income the club received that year was due to this exogenous price which is highly associated with winning the national league and the automatic participation (at that time) in the group stage of the UEFA competition (Olympiacos FC, 2018). Obviously, the financial stakes are too high to be left to the game alone. We will now briefly turn our attention to the match-fixing scandals in Greece.

Football match-fixing in Greece

Football match-fixing in Greece has a relatively long history; however, from the late 1990s, it has been considered a serious problem for the sport in the country. Match-fixing (and general corruption) in football was brought to the public eye through the disclosure and extensive publicity the 'Paraga' scandal received in the early 2000s, and the more recent scandal exposure of fixed matches in 2011, also known as Koriopolis (a pun name on the Italian scandal Calciopolis and the Greek word 'korios' or phone-tap). The 'Paraga' (literally, 'The Shanty') scandal was structured around a mechanism of fixing matches by selecting specific referees for specific matches in order for specific clubs to benefit and involved a number of clubs' Board of Director members, Governing Bodies officials and professional referees (see Eleftherotypia, 2011). Data suggest that the club that benefited mostly from the 'Paraga' was Olympiacos FC, which won all national championships from 1997 to 2002 when the scandal was exposed. The 'Koriopolis' scandal concerned numerous matches played in the 2008/2009, 2009/2010 and 2010/2011

seasons that attracted UEFA's attention and which were brought into the public eye. According to UEFA's Betting Fraud Detection System (BFDS), more than 40 matches were found 'exceptionally questionable' (Proto Thema, 2010). These included Super League (first division), Football League (second division) and National Cup matches, involving more than 26 football clubs. Soon after, legal action was taken against individuals involved in the process, with a number of club officials facing lifelong bans from any football-related activity, and football clubs getting either relegated or excluded from European competitions (UEFA Europa League) and the Super League itself for their involvement in the scandal. In May 2013, the number of people facing charges exceeded 200, with some of them having already been imprisoned for their involvement in the scandal (Eleftherotypia, 2013a, 2013b).

The actors and processes involved in football match-fixing (and other corrupt practices) are not the focus of this chapter, and extensive details about these aspects can be found in Manoli and Antonopoulos (2015) and Manoli et al. (2016). However, two things are especially worth mentioning. Firstly, the Greek football governing bodies' tolerance over the last years has allowed football match-fixing to grow to an enormous extent. Individual members of Greek governing bodies have been accused of 'turning a blind eye' or even actively participating in match-fixing. For instance, one of the main protagonists of the Koriopolis scandal was both the Hellenic Football Federation's vice president and the president of Olympiacos FC (Niculescu, 2014). The fact that there has been legal action against members of the abovementioned bodies, followed by numerous accusations of favourable behaviour towards specific football clubs, raises the question of their integrity or the criteria according to which these individuals were originally chosen/elected in those positions. It is very interesting to note that Greek football is organised on the principles of 'self-governance' and 'autonomy'. Hence, the Greek government has very little – if any at all – involvement, and the football regulatory bodies are responsible for running the leagues without the fear of any regulatory actions from the Greek state.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly for this chapter, by the time the scandal was exposed, outcome uncertainty within the league had reached extreme low levels, causing significant competitive imbalance among the clubs (see Buzzacchi et al., 2004). Taking into consideration that the Greek Championship has been won by the same club (Olympiacos FC) 21 times within the last 25 years, outcome certainty has reached an extreme high level in Greek football, with the Super League often being characterised as a 'monopoly' (see, e.g., Eleftherotypia, 2013a). This imbalance did not only lead to the creation of 'big' and 'small' teams as Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) suggest but also to the formation of 'rich' and 'poor' clubs, and for many in Greece, to the demise of the Greek football altogether. According to a survey of Greek fans presented by the Greek daily, *Kathimerini*, in 2014, 91% of the 1,006 responders blamed the Greek football's negative image on *systematic bias of league club organisers for specific clubs*. Approximately, 86% of the respondents said that a government tolerance

towards criminal and corrupt practices in football was to blame for the sport's condition. More than 76% thought that a significant number of football matches were fixed, and 78.5% considered referees as an integral part of the match-fixing process (Kathimerini, 2014).

Unsurprisingly, the view that Greek football has been in a steep decline and in a state of disrepute due to corruption is reflected among actors within professional football. A report by Kovac (2014) revealed that 12.8% of Greek football players interviewed admitted that they had been approached to fix a match within the past year, and 64% of them said they were confident that matches in their league were fixed in the last year (Kovac, 2014). What is perhaps surprising is that such views, which are also enhanced by highlighting the main guilty parties for corruption in Greek football, are openly and publicly expressed by active participants in these corrupt schemes. For example, on August 10, 2021, the football club chaired by one of the main participants in the 'Koriopolis' scandal, and one of the few that served a prison sentence for this, Achilleas Beos, issued a statement following the general assembly of the Greek Super League, which encapsulated the link between the main beneficiary of the match-fixing scandals, Olympiacos FC and the low respectability of the Greek football. The statement, which can be identified with Beos' views since Greek football clubs are chairman-centric, referred not only to media that are manipulated by Olympiacos FC but also the support the particular club receives from the Minister for Sports of Greece. According to the statement, Olympiacos has been the main responsible party in football corruption in Greece:

[there have been]... terrorist and threatening manipulations that Olympiacos FC engages into in order to enforce its benefits, even if this has proven to have led professional football to an endless downhill.... As the very recent failures [of the Greek clubs] in the European matches has shown, getting us to the 21st place in UEFA's ranking, Greek football is seriously ill because of [these] arrogant and blackmailing practices and manipulations....Olympiacos is trying to create a league of 'relatives and friends' that will be controlled... The era of 'Olympiacos should take all and everyone else can go [redacted] themselves'² are long gone and the only thing they have left are open wounds to the most popular sport.

(PAE Volos FC, 2021, as quoted in Gazzetta, 2021)

Discussion: match-fixing as a commercial solution

Since the beginning of the 1980s when the sport became 'professionalised' and football clubs in the first, second and third divisions were transformed into companies, football has been used as a platform of action for extremely powerful individuals who use clubs and the popular support for them not only as an income source *per se* (e.g. season tickets, advertisements, merchandise) which is particularly the case for big clubs but also as a vehicle for tax evasion and money laundering (see Manoli et al., 2016), a protection shield against the state

and leverage towards securing state bids. From the moment football clubs are companies that are to be protected as 'investments', sport itself becomes a secondary concern.

Match-fixing consolidated the extremely high 'outcome certainty' within the Greek football causing significant competitive imbalance among the clubs (see Eleftherotypia, 2013b; Schmidt and Berri, 2001). The high outcome certainty in Greek professional football, apart from being a distinct and powerful factor reducing demand for football events (see, for example, Jennett, 1984; Peel and Thomas, 1988), has arguably led to high levels of competitive imbalance within the professional football leagues. This has created a division between 'rich' and 'poor' clubs, with the gap between these two categories being widened year after year as the clubs' financial records show (see, for example, Direction Business Reports, 2015).

The rationale for participating in match-fixing in Greece differs depending on the club, its league position and goals (e.g. winning the league and playing in Champions' League, playing in Europa League, ending up as high as possible in the Greek Super League, not being relegated) but can generally be translated in more income for the strong and a chance to survive for the weak. Greek football operating as a 'monopoly' at the top level basically allows only one club to participate in the Champions' League group stage. This has also meant that no other major clubs in the country have been able to profit significantly from such an achievement, creating a condition in which even major football clubs face deteriorating finances: a situation that could have been avoided with participation in UEFA's Champions League, the resulting income from basic allocation and performance bonuses from UEFA and TV revenue associated with it. Given the tremendous financial stake for the club that wins the Greek League and, as mentioned earlier, the participation in the lucrative group stage, the term '*willing match-fixers*' could be perhaps adopted for those clubs and actors within (or about) these clubs, who have become involved in match-fixing in order for the club to be the primary beneficiary. Match-fixing has been demonstrated to basically act as providing a comparative advantage to those structures, which do not operate according to officially established rules.

Simultaneously, match-fixing created an environment of generalised distrust in which most (smaller and less successful) clubs had to 'pick sides' if they wanted to guarantee preferential treatment, better positioning in play-offs, avoidance of relegation, increased chances of promotion or playing in European competitions. This is further enhanced by the very nature of profitability of the Greek professional football league as a whole. Dimitropoulos' (2009) remarkable empirical study has produced a number of highly interesting findings in relation to the topic. Firstly, the profitability of the league is positively affected by the *short success* of the football clubs (our emphasis). Long-term financial success, in other words, cannot be a realistic goal for most football clubs in the country. Secondly, the number of wins that a club may achieve in a football season has a significant positive effect on sales, with only one win in the season leading, on average, to

a 14% increase in the net profit margin. Unlike in other professional football leagues, in which the financial streams are more diverse, more readily available to football clubs and, perhaps, *relatively* 'democratically' administered (although there are still clubs getting the lion's share, such as the English *Premier League* or the Spanish *La Liga*), the Greek professional football league participant clubs depend highly on the short success, as this is manifested in wins especially against similarly positioned opponents.

Limited or no benefits from broadcasting rights, withdrawal of interest or no interest and funds supporting (primarily) smaller football clubs, no or less profitable commercial deals, decreasing attendance (as a result of outcome certainty), which has traditionally been the main source of income for most clubs, as well as no or significantly decreased merchandise income due to the declining income and shrinking buying power of the Greek public, leaves smaller clubs with only one option of survival in this environment of generalised distrust and corruption in Greek football: to take part in match-fixing or perish. Using the term coined by Antonopoulos and Hall (2014) in the context of their study on illegal markets in Greece, we could perhaps call these smaller clubs that had to 'pick sides' as 'reluctant criminal undertakers': (legal) actors that become involved in illegal business (match-fixing) within the context of their legal business (in this case, football) in order to simply survive. Inevitably, match-fixing in this endemically corrupt environment has become a viable, rather short-term solution or 'adaptations' for many football clubs under the enormous financial pressure that most Greek football clubs face in the current entrepreneurial and financial landscape of the country and the general low commercial value of the Greek football.

Taking all the above analysis into consideration, we argue that match-fixing can and should be now viewed not only as a corrupt activity occurring due to the interference of external actors. But instead, it should be acknowledged as an unexpected and unorthodox solution to the pathogeny of the commercial sporting world, initiated by individuals embedded in the sport system and 'encouraged' by the increasing systemic pressures in which sport organisations and individuals alike are asked to operate, function and survive. It is within these external conditions that our understanding of match-fixing can transcend beyond ethical and theoretical debates and into a more practical and simply put question that is 'imposed' on sport: match-fix or perish?

Notes

- 1 This has been further facilitated by the Covid-related lockdowns which have left clubs bereft of match-day revenue (see Financial Times, 2021). According to the Premier League, "each month without fans equates to £ 100 million in lost ticket sales across English football" (Financial Times, 2021: 2).
- 2 Referring to the words of referee, Ioannis Spathas, in a tapped conversation with another referee in 2002.

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Network Governance and Match-Fixing

Maarten van Bottenburg

Introduction

Manipulation of sports competitions can be found throughout the history of organised sports (Huggins, 2018). In recent decades, however, this problem has fundamentally changed in character. Match-fixing has grown from a relatively small-scale sport-specific problem to a transnational public policy issue.

With the rise of online betting in the 1990s, a substantial market – legal and illegal, regulated and unregulated – has developed where sports betting is organised. The size of the global betting market for all sports was recently estimated to be €1.7 trillion per year (Europol, 2020). Fixing sports competitions appears to be an attractive way for criminal groups to generate income in this betting market. Relatively high revenues go hand in hand with little oversight, low detection rates, a complicated burden of proof, and low sentences on conviction. Taking advantage of this, organised crime is increasingly penetrating the sports and betting world around the globe (Aquilina and Chetcuti, 2013; Nowy and Breuer, 2017; Tak, Sam, and Jackson, 2018).

This manipulation of sports competitions does not only damage the credibility of sport, but it also undermines society. Betting-related match-fixing is used for money laundering and is accompanied by corruption, threats, violence, and other criminal activities, such as drug trafficking. As a result, the problem of match-fixing is no longer limited to the world of sports but has grown into a public policy issue (Feltes, 2013; Manoli, Yilmaz, and Antonopoulos, 2021; Serby, 2015).

In tackling this problem, sports organisations, governments, law enforcement agencies, betting operators, and other involved actors are faced with major challenges. The phenomenon of match-fixing crosses organisational boundaries and public, private, and societal domains. Moreover, it transcends the jurisdictions of sports organisations and governments, while a globally harmonised regulatory and judicial approach to this problem is (still) lacking (Serby, 2015; Veuthey, 2014).

Sports organisations can hardly get a grip on betting-related match-fixing because their regulatory and disciplinary framework only applies to their members and member organisations. They can take action against affiliated members and member organisations if proven that they have been involved in match-fixing, but

brokers, betting operators, and external criminals involved will go unpunished. Moreover, sports organisations have very little investigative and coercive powers to detect and prevent match-fixing (Spapens and Olfers, 2015).

National governments do have these options, but worldwide they differ in the extent to which they can and will act against match-fixing. Each country has its own gambling policy, which means that there are national differences in the restrictions imposed by governments on online betting and certain types of bets, like spread betting and live betting. National governments also differ in the extent to which they are willing to intervene in sports if match-fixing is not accompanied by more generic violations of the law in their country. This is especially true for countries that do not have specific legislation on sport because this is seen as undesirable interference in the private sphere (Manoli, 2018; Serby, 2015; Spapens and Olfers, 2015; Veuthey, 2014).

Tackling match-fixing therefore requires cross-border collaboration between a multitude of actors from public, private, and societal domains at the local, national, and international level: first and foremost, governments and their regulatory, investigative, and prosecuting authorities, the betting industry, and sports organisations. To achieve that collaboration, a new governance structure must be created that fits the complexity of the problem and the multiplicity of actors involved (cf. Klijn and Koppenjan, 2012).

This is no small task because, in addition to their common goal to combat match-fixing, the organisations involved can have conflicting and opposing interests and responsibilities. For example, all actors involved may have reason to be reluctant to share information: public authorities for the purpose of judicial investigation, sports organisations in connection with their image among fans and sponsors, and betting companies because of possible deterrent effects on customers. A tension can also arise between their common goal, on the one hand, and policies that simultaneously stimulate betting behaviour, on the other hand, like the liberalisation of the gambling market by national governments and sport organisations' sponsorships with betting companies.

This chapter aims to demonstrate that network governance theory can help describe and understand how the problem of match-fixing is addressed by the actors involved. This is all the more interesting because match-fixing can be considered as a 'wicked problem'. There is little consensus regarding the definition and solution of this problem. Moreover, multiple stakeholders approach this problem with diverse and possibly conflicting interests and values. In addition to that, the problem of match-fixing is 'relentless', in the sense of never-ending, as solutions or remedies create new issues and have unintended consequences (cf. Sam, 2009; Weber and Khademian, 2008).

The chapter is continued with an overview of the background and principles of network governance theory. After that, these insights will be used to analyse the current governance approach to tackle match-fixing. Based on that, the chapter concludes with the identification of dilemmas in this approach and directions for improvement.

Network governance

Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 231) define an organisational network as 'a group of three or more legally autonomous organisations that work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal'. Such a network can be perceived as an independent entity if the participating organisations can achieve more than the sum of their parts (O'Toole, 1997).

An organisational network does not have the same steering options as the separate organisations that form the network. This raises the question of how the coordination between the individual actors in such networks is established to achieve the collective goals they pursue and how they deal with the dilemmas and issues that arise. After all, every goal-directed network requires some form of governance 'to ensure that participants engage in collective and mutually supportive action, that conflict is addressed, and that network resources are acquired and utilised efficiently and effectively' (Provan and Kenis, 2008, p. 231).

Network governance theory focuses on clarifying this issue. It sheds light on the governance of organisational networks and, thus, the structure of collective action. More specifically, network governance refers to the emergence and development of a relatively stable pattern of horizontal coordination in a network of interdependent, but operationally autonomous organisations, aimed at allocating, sharing, and connecting information, resources, activities, and competences to achieve joint actions and common goals (Kapucu and Hu, 2020; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2012; Provan and Kenis, 2008; Sørensen and Torfing, 2007, 2009). The underlying assumption is that the result of network governance cannot be achieved by the individual organisations separately, but only through their collective action, which requires cooperation and coordination.

The way in which this coordination takes place in organisational networks differs from markets, hierarchical organisations, or governments (Provan and Kenis, 2008). The invisible hand of markets, as the classical and neo-classical economic theory postulates, can be seen as a spontaneous coordination mechanism, without systemwide governance or control. Conversely, these coordination mechanisms are explicitly present in hierarchical organisations and public administration. According to classical and neo-classical organisation theory and organisational economics theory, the visible hand of management provides a hierarchical coordination mechanism in organisations with lines of authority, division of labour, decision-making processes, and accountability procedures that markets do not provide (Powell, 1990). The steering of society by the government can also be viewed from the perspective of such a hierarchical model. Classical public administration theory postulates that government provides coordination and direction in a hierarchical manner, in which policy is determined from above and implemented in a directive manner by a chain of executive organisations that are accountable to the top (Kjaer, 2004).

Sharpened by the increasing complexity of society, it has become clear that these archetypal modes of governance are often inadequate and ineffective

approaches. An alternative is based on a network mode of governance, in which relatively autonomous public and private actors try to reach consensus and goal realisation through mutual interaction and collaboration (Goodwin and Grix, 2011; Rhodes, 1996). 'In order to compensate the limits and failures of both state regulation and market regulation new forms of negotiated governance through the formation of public-private-partnerships, strategic alliances, dialogue groups, consultative committees and inter-organisational networks have mushroomed' (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007, p. 2). From that perspective, governance stands for a process of steering through coordination within networks, without the exercise of hierarchical authority (Rhodes, 2007). This entails a different role for the state. The state pursuing policy goals top-down through comprehensive planning, programmed action, and detailed regulations is being replaced by forms of pluricentric governance based on interdependence, negotiation, and trust (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007).

Entering into partnerships and networks that blur the boundaries between the public and private sectors has become a common way of addressing societal issues that cannot be solved by the invisible hand of the market or the steering capacities of public administration or hierarchical organisations. This applies, in particular, to complex public issues that transcend the boundaries of sectors and states, such as tackling climate change, cybercrime, and pandemics. The issue of match-fixing is also an example of this. All these wicked problems require intersectoral and intergovernmental collective action in which public and private, and profit and non-profit, organisations are involved. In line with transaction cost theory and institutional theory, the assumption is that network governance will be preferred over any other approach of such wicked problems as long as the coordination of this collective action is seen as legitimate and more efficient and effective than other forms of governance (Börzel and Panke, 2007; Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 1997; Williamson, 1991).

The collaboration of organisations in networks has attracted extensive interest from scholars in organisation theory, public administration, and public management. In organisation theory, the focus is on organisations (business firms, non-profits, public organisations) that engage in network collaboration for a variety of reasons, including the need to gain legitimacy, allocate more resources, reduce transaction costs, and better cope with complex problems (Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 1997; Provan and Kenis, 2008). In public administration and public management, the changing role of government forms the starting point. Network collaboration is understood here as a governance arrangement with non-state stakeholders initiated by public agencies to make or implement public policy (Ansell and Gash, 2008).

From these perspectives, several terms have been coined to characterise the governance of organisational network collaboration, including (but not limited to) network governance, governance networks, collaborative governance, public-private partnership, stakeholder governance, multi-level governance, meta-governance, and network management. The differences between these concepts are

subtle. In public administration theory, one often speaks of governance networks, which contribute to the production of public purposes (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007). The term collaborative governance is preferred if the focus is on an explicit and formal strategy by public agencies to directly engage non-state stakeholders in pursuing public goals that cannot, otherwise, be accomplished (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Multi-level governance is used when it comes to networks between local, regional, and national authorities (Back, Bartle and Flinders, 2016). Meta-governance and network management are terms from a managerial perspective: they refer to the deliberative attempt and strategies of governments and non-governmental organisations to initiate, facilitate, and mediate network processes. Their focus is on the ways in which politicians, executives, and managers can improve the overall functioning of organisational and governance networks (Hovik and Sandkjaer Hanssen, 2015; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2012; Sørensen and Torfing, 2007).

A first characteristic of the organisational networks to which these forms of governance relate is that the participating organisations are heterogeneous and unequal. This can be government organisations; companies and non-profit organisations; organisations operating nationally and supranationally; and organisations working in different sectors, branches, or fields. They may differ in size, resources, information, expertise, capabilities, reputation, and enforcement power. Their interests, assumptions, and expectations regarding the jointly experienced problems and their solutions may also differ and even conflict with each other (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Back, Bartle, and Flinders, 2016).

A second characteristic of these organisational networks is that the participating organisations take a relatively autonomous position in relation to each other and the network. Network participants voluntarily conform to rules and procedures that are agreed in the network and they typically have limited formal accountability to shared network goals (Powell, 1990).

Thirdly, these dissimilar organisations are, nonetheless, mutually dependent on each other in tackling the complex issues they are faced with. Individually, they have too little expertise, resources, or capabilities. They complement each other and need each other. Interdependence is the driving force behind their cooperation (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2012).

Multipolarity is a fourth characteristic of these organisational collaborative networks. Though governments are trying to introduce forms of meta-governance to achieve coordinated actions, there is no central authority that transcends and directs the collaborative network. No organisation can completely impose its will on another actor. These networks are not monopolistic but pluricentric and multipolistic. The cooperation between the organisations involved, therefore, mainly consists of horizontal interactions, based on commitment, trust, and negotiation (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007, 2009).

Fifthly, as in any social network with a certain sustainable character, institutionalisation processes occur in organisational networks. If certain patterns of interaction, cooperation, and negotiation develop over time, they will become self-evident. This will have regulatory effects on the network, ensure its stability

and predictability, and help cope with complexity (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2012). Institutionalisation processes contribute to the development of shared problem definitions and expectations about the approach of the shared problem and its results. They also enhance the level of trust, which is positively related to network performance (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Trust reduces strategic uncertainty because actors take each other's interest more into account and will more easily share information and develop innovative solutions. Trust, thus, facilitates investments in uncertain collaboration processes among interdependent actors with diverging and, sometimes, conflicting interests (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2012). Principles about the distribution of benefits and burdens will also become common standards so that in the event of disagreement or uncertainty, participating parties are more likely to voice than exit (Powell, 1990).

Institutional complexity and strategic uncertainty are a sixth structural feature of collaborative networks that deal with wicked problems. A fundamental characteristic of wicked problems is that there is no unambiguous vision of its nature and solution and that there is no leading institution that effectively coordinates the approach to the problem for all organisations involved. This is especially true when it comes to global problems (Geuijen, Moore, Cederquist, Ronning, and Van Twist, 2017). Institutionalisation processes will not easily solve this problem. Firstly, wicked problems can change in nature over time, rendering previous approaches ineffective. Secondly, changes can also occur in the organisational network itself: the nature and size of the actors, the problem definitions and solution directions they stand for, and their loyalty and dedication to the network approach. Free rider behaviour, lack of results, external events, and rising transaction costs can lead to frustrations and have a destabilising effect on the functioning of the network (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007).

There are different ways to deal with this complexity and uncertainty. Sørensen and Torfing (2009) distinguish different tools to enhance effective network governance:

- Network design: aiming to influence the scope, character, composition, and institutional procedures of the networks; defining policy goals, including relevant actors, setting deadlines, designing procedures for negotiation.
- Network framing: seeking to determine the political goals, fiscal conditions, legal basis, and discursive storyline of the networks; framing the mission; persuading actors; enhancing the prestige of the network.
- Network management: attempting to reduce tensions, resolving conflicts, empowering particular actors, lowering the transaction costs in networks by providing different kinds of material and immaterial inputs and resources, interacting with the network, providing support and resources, reducing tensions, adjusting goals when necessary.
- Network participation: influencing the policy agenda, the range of feasible options, the premises for decision-making, and the negotiated policy outputs; showing and building trust; identifying solutions; exerting authority.

Depending on the initial conditions and purposes, different governance designs can optimise the functioning of the network (Poocharoen and Ting, 2015). Provan and Kenis (2008) categorise network governance forms along two dimensions. Firstly, a network governance may or may not be brokered. Two extremes can be distinguished here. At one extreme, networks may be governed in a decentralised form by all organisations involved (shared governance). At the other extreme, network governance may occur by and through a single organisation, acting as a highly centralised network broker (lead organisation governance). Secondly, a network may be meta-governed by a participant or an external actor. Participant-governed networks can be based on shared governance or governance by a lead organisation. Externally governed networks are meta-governed by a unique network administrative organisation, which may be either voluntarily established by network members or mandated as part of the network formation process (network administrative organisation governance).

In shared governance, all network participants, or a significant subset of them, are responsible for managing the internal and external relations and operations of the network. Thus, in theory, the shared governance network acts collectively. No single entity represents the network as a whole. The advantage of this form of network governance is that it can be easily formed and entails a high degree of participation, involvement, and commitment. The disadvantage is that it is rather inefficient, and even more as the network becomes larger and more complex (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Moreover, meta-governance as precondition for effective governance is lacking here (Sørensen and Torfing, 2009).

In lead organisation governance, all major network activities and key decisions are coordinated through and by a single participating member, acting as a lead organisation. This lead organisation provides administrative assistance and/or facilitates the activities of the participating organisations in such a way that network objectives can be achieved. A disadvantage of this model is that the lead organisation can have its own agenda and dominate the other network members, which, in turn, can lead to resistance and resentment. In addition, because the lead organisation takes on many of the network tasks, the other network members may focus on their own goals, undermining the feasibility of the network goal (Provan and Kenis, 2008).

In a network administrative organisation, a separate entity is set up, specifically to meta-govern the network and its activities. However, unlike in lead organisation governance, this network administrative organisation is not one of the participating actors in the network. The network administrative organisation is established for the exclusive purpose of network governance. It can be modest in scale, but also formalised, consisting of an executive director and support staff. This may be useful to enhance network legitimacy and reduce network complexity. However, a danger of this model is that the network administration organisation can develop its own agenda and organisational goals. As a result, it can drift away from the organisations in the network that founded it (Provan and Kenis, 2008).

Which of these governance forms is most appropriate for addressing a joint public issue in a specific situation can be assessed on the basis of the legitimacy, efficiency, and effectiveness of these governance forms in light of the nature, size, and complexity of the network.

In the context of network governance, legitimacy relates to the network as such. On the one hand, this concerns the internal legitimacy that the network has among its participants. Is the network perceived as appropriate to reach the network goals according to their rules, values, norms, and definitions (Deephouse, Bundy, Tost, and Suchman, 2017)? This is related to the way in which the network is governed: how does the shared governance function or how do the lead organisation or network administrative organisation perform their coordinating task? On the other hand, it is about the external legitimacy of the network. Does the network meet the expectations of its environment? This is a critical issue in network governance, and the more so in participant-governed networks (shared governance), since individual organisational participants will generally not be seen by outsiders as representing the full network (Provan and Kenis, 2008). In addition, the potential tension between internal and external legitimacy must be considered. As independent, autonomous organisations with their own goals, network participants have their own legitimacy needs, which are not always compatible with the broader external legitimacy needs of the network as a whole. It is quite difficult though, to address both legitimacy needs, particularly at the same time. Whereas the shared governance form is best suited to address internal network legitimacy needs, the lead organisation governance form and network administrative governance form are more suited to address external legitimacy needs or to focus on either the internal or external legitimacy (Human and Provan, 2000; Provan and Kenis, 2008).

The efficiency of the network governance form mainly depends on whether the network organisations can achieve their joint goal with fewer resources than if they were pursuing that goal separately, or whether a greater impact would be achieved with the same resources. In the case of shared governance, this is generally inversely proportional to the number of actors in the collaborative network. After all, as the number of organisations in the network increases, it becomes more difficult to efficiently organise interaction and coordination. Lead organisation networks and network administrative organisations may then be more efficient alternatives. They make it easier to facilitate larger groups of organisations because direct interaction between all members in these forms is less necessary and even undesirable (Sørensen and Torfing, 2009).

The effectiveness of the network governance form is difficult to assess, especially because policy goals shift over time, just like the wicked problem that the policy focuses on. Nevertheless, several factors have been identified that determine the effectiveness of governance forms, such as the starting conditions, the institutional design, the density of the network, facilitative leadership, the degree of involvement, the shared motivations, and the capacities for joint action (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Douglas, Berthod, Groenleer, and Nederhand, 2020;

Sandström and Carlsson, 2008). This builds on Provan and Kenis (2008) who distinguish three factors, in addition to the number of actors, that influence the effectiveness of network governance forms: the degree and distribution of trust, goal consensus, and the need for network-level competencies.

Trust is a determining factor for the effectiveness of networks, but the distribution of trust within the network can differ between the three forms of governance that Provan and Kenis distinguish. In shared participant-governed networks, mutual trust must be present in all organisations. In a lead organisation-governed network, the participating organisations must above all have confidence in the lead organisation. And in the case of an administrative organisation-governed network, trust mainly comes down to transparency and accountability of the network administrative organisation.

Goal consensus is important in all network forms, but this differs per governance form. Self-regulatory networks are most effective when goal consensus is high. If goal consensus is lower, a lead organisation or network administrative organisation is needed to fulfil a monitoring or mediating role.

If many competencies are required to coordinate and represent the network, a self-regulating network will not be effective as a form of governance. A lead organisation and network administrative organisation are better equipped to coordinate such a network. If this organisation also has to represent the network to the outside world, for example to acquire funding or to be held accountable, a network administrative organisation is preferable to a lead organisation (Provan and Kenis, 2008).

One of the greatest challenges of network governance is to deal with complexity. Tackling wicked problems requires the involvement of many actors, but the coordination capacity is often negatively related to the complexity of the network. The challenge of network governance, therefore, increases as the number of actors grows and if their interests diverge (Hovik and Sandkjaer Hanssen, 2015; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2012).

This is further complicated by the so-called coordination dilemma: efforts aimed at increasing coordination at one level are often deemed incompatible with coordination across levels. This is especially true if there is a problem that arises under widely different jurisdictions and at both national and supranational levels. Regulations, information collection, and effect measurement in an organisational network can, for example, be geared to the individual actor's interests instead of the general network interest (Egebert and Trondal, 2016; Mele and Cappellaro, 2018).

Organisational network collaboration arises because of the benefits it potentially has. Different organisations complement each other in knowledge, resources, and capabilities to tackle a wicked problem efficiently and effectively. However, these benefits do not arise automatically. They require a well-considered network design and network governance. Mechanisms must be established that stimulate participatory organisations to contribute to shared goals and prevent free rider behaviour. The functioning of the network must also foster trust and provide legitimacy. This requires leadership and communication about the background,

working method, and successes of the network. Organisations must experience that they contribute to network success and that, conversely, network success contributes to their organisational success.

The network governance approach to tackle match-fixing

Most research into governance networks and collaborative governance in public administration deals with tackling a public problem for which the government seeks collaboration with private organisations. In fact, the opposite applies to match-fixing. This problem was initially regarded as a matter for sports organisations, while governments have become increasingly involved. As a result, a policy network has emerged of private and public organisations that jointly set the goal of preventing and tackling match-fixing without governments being in the lead.

It is important to make a distinction here between sports- and betting-related match-fixing. In the case of sports-related match-fixing, the chances are quite high that those involved are affiliated with one of the sports organisations and are, therefore, subject to their codes of conduct, regulations, and non-statutory disciplinary law. Sports organisations, thus, have various instruments at their disposal to take preventive and sanctioning action against this form of match-fixing. In the case of betting-related match-fixing, on the other hand, there is a very high chance that some of those involved are not within the reach of the sports organisations. In that case, the sports organisations depend on governmental institutions with legislative and prosecutorial power for both the investigation and possible prosecution and punishment of suspicious persons (Spapens and Olfers, 2015).

For a long time, governments have been reluctant to take an active role in this. Since the origin of organised competitive sport, national and international sport organisations have had a tradition of self-governance that public authorities strongly respect, certainly at an international level (Geeraert, 2021; Geeraert and Drieskens, 2021; Jedlicka, 2018b). As long as the sports organisations can solve their own problems, self-governance will also be beneficial for governments (Geeraert and Drieskens, 2021). But if those problems go beyond the sports world and sports organisations do not take sufficient action within their reach, a different situation arises. In the past, this has led to government interventions on issues such as hooliganism and doping (Serby, 2015). More recently, this has also occurred in match-fixing (Geeraert and Drieskens, 2021; Jedlicka, 2018a).

The criminalisation of match-fixing is an important cause of this (Tak, Sam and Jackson, 2018). Criminal organisations specialised in match-fixing have developed, ranging from hierarchical, mafia-like networks (Hill, 2010), to flat, web-type structures (Manoli and Antonopoulos, 2015) and lone wolf operators (Holden and Rodenberg, 2017), fuelled by online betting (Europol, 2020). The criminal organisations generally consist of investors, facilitators, and punters. The investors are the leaders at the top of the organisation who often manage to stay out of the reach of law enforcement agencies. The facilitators are intermediaries

who are responsible for the coordination of the match-fixing schemes and liaise with those who directly influence the competitions. Some of the intermediaries operate in several countries and continents. They are responsible for identifying and targeting specific leagues and actors that lend themselves to match-fixing. They also deal with finding the necessary resources to organise and carry out the fixing process successfully. At a lower level, intermediaries, known as the runners, are active who are responsible for identifying, recruiting, and liaising with corrupt players, coaches, referees, or club officials. These intermediaries are often former players/athletes with a considerable reputation and network in the field of sports. Player agents can also act as intermediaries. They can place players or groups of players with clubs to facilitate match-fixing (Costa, 2018; Europol, 2020).

These criminal organisations have linked themselves with illegal betting syndicates, most of which have an Asian, especially Singaporean and Chinese, background. These Asian syndicates are an 'engine' behind match-fixing, mainly due to the fact that approximately 65% of the worldwide (regulated and illegal) betting market is in Asia (Europol, 2020). The syndicates have a pyramidal structure with bookmakers, super agents, master agents, and lower-level agents. Bets can only be placed through lower-level agents. These lower-level agents are in contact with a master agent, which, in turn, communicates with a super-agent and so on upwards, with only adjacent layers in contact with each other. This tiered division of tasks ensures a high degree of anonymity and complicates traceability (Europol, 2020; Huggins, 2018).

The illegal gambling syndicates are attractive to the criminal organisations. Legal bookmakers often set limits on the amount of the bet, put restrictions on specific types of bets (like spread betting and live betting), cooperate with law enforcement during investigations, and may ban customers from betting in suspicious cases or temporarily freeze suspicious clients' accounts. Criminal organisations can avoid these restrictions through illegal gambling syndicates. In addition, the use of virtual banks by these syndicates guarantees greater anonymity in money laundering through sports betting (Europol, 2020).

Sports organisations and governments are powerless against such an opponent unless they manage to tackle the problem through cross-border and multi-agent cooperation with power that goes beyond their own jurisdictions (Serby, 2015; Spapens and Olfers, 2015; Tak, Sam and Jackson, 2018). However, the absence of an actor who can coordinate and steer this at a global level makes it difficult to enforce the required collective action (De Swaan, 1988). To overcome this deadlock, the Council of Europe has taken the initiative to establish an international, multilateral, and legally binding treaty to prevent, detect, and punish match-fixing in sport. In 2014, this led to the Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (also called the Macolin Convention) (Aquilina and Chetcuti, 2013; Council of Europe, 2014; Manoli, 2018). The Macolin Convention entered into force on 1 September 2019. It has been ratified by Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, the Republic of Moldova, Switzerland, and Ukraine and has been signed by 30 other European States as well as by Australia and Morocco (Council of Europe, 2021).

The Convention calls on public authorities to cooperate with sports organisations, betting operators, and competition organisers, to prevent, detect, and sanction the manipulation of sports competitions. It also proposes a common legal framework based on shared national approaches to fight match-fixing, with common assumptions on the roles to be played by the various stakeholders, and a more extensive, regulatory role for the state than the previous ad hoc arrangements in this area (Council of Europe, 2014).

In the implementation of the Macolin Convention, an important role is reserved for national platforms. Each member state of the Council of Europe and the other signatories of this Convention have committed themselves to identify a national platform addressing manipulation of sports competitions. The platforms, which are now active in 22 countries, serve as information hub; coordinate the fight against match-fixing; receive, centralise, and analyse information on irregular and suspicious bets placed on sports competitions; and inform sport organisations, public authorities, and sports betting operators about suspicious bets (Council of Europe, 2014). The Network of National Platforms (also known as 'Group of Copenhagen') should lay the foundation for transnational cooperation between the platforms (Council of Europe, 2021; Serby, 2015). To this end, the Group of Copenhagen has developed a betting and non-betting Alert and Surveillance System to detect and investigate the manipulation of sport competitions, in collaboration with betting operators, associations of betting operators (e.g. ESSA, Federbet, GLMS), sport organisations (e.g. FIFA, IOC, UEFA), national betting regulatory authorities, and private service providers (e.g. Sportradar). This is supported by Europol and Interpol who share information, intelligence, and best practices to support member countries. Law enforcement agencies can benefit from this work to collect, exchange, and analyse relevant criminal intelligence on major cross-border investigations on sports corruption (Manoli, 2018).

Thus, a relatively stable pattern of horizontal coordination has developed in a network of organisations, aimed at allocating, sharing, and connecting information, resources, activities, and competences to achieve joint actions and a common goal: the fight against match-fixing. It is clear to all actors involved that they cannot achieve this common goal by the individual organisations separately, but only through their collective action, which requires cooperation and coordination.

Organisational inequality complicates collaboration and coordination in this network. This inequality does not only concern the differences between sports organisations, governments, and betting companies. There are also strong differences within these types of stakeholders. For example, international sport is governed by a complex network of non-governmental organisations. In this network, several international sports organisations claim authority over a specific sport, while no organisation has ultimate authority over all of the others (Jedlicka, 2018a, 2018b) although the IOC often acts as if it has that position. On the grounds of the unique features of each sport, they oppose one standard template for tackling match-fixing and want to decide for themselves which anti-corruption programme best suits their own sport (Serby, 2015).

There are also strong differences between governments. Each country, including within the EU, has its own gambling policy. Some countries impose more restrictions than others, both in terms of the nature and number of accredited providers and the offering of certain types of (sports) bets (Van Rompuy, 2015). This ranges from banning to liberalising online betting and from giving exclusive rights to some state-controlled lotteries to opening the market for the entire gambling industry. Obtaining global agreement on combatting match-fixing must be squared with contrasting state's attitudes to betting (Serby, 2015; Veuthey, 2014).

All characteristics of organisational networks come to the fore in the fight against match-fixing. It concerns a policy network of heterogeneous and unequal organisations. In the division of tasks and responsibilities, they occupy a relatively autonomous position in relation to each other and the network. They participate in this network because they pursue a common goal for which they need each other's expertise, resources, and capabilities. Until recently, this network was loosely held together, without an overarching hierarchical guiding authority. In terms of Provan and Kenis (2008), this can be defined as a participant-governed network. In this form of shared governance, all network participants are responsible for managing the relations and operations of the network.

The Macolin Convention has created more structure in this network and a legally binding device. The initiative for this Convention was taken by one of the actors in the network, the Council of Europe, on behalf of its Member States and other signatories. It can be argued that the network design is, thus, moving from shared governance towards lead organisation governance. In such a model, all major network activities and key decisions are coordinated through and by a single participating member, acting as the lead organisation. However, the Macolin Convention does not go that far. The Convention is binding on the states that have signed it but does not give hierarchical power over non-governmental actors in the network, including the sports organisations. Nor does the Convention have an effect on states that have not signed it.

Nevertheless, the Convention can be seen as a breakthrough in the fostering of collective action by all stakeholders involved. Since 2014, the Member States have taken various measures to combat match-fixing, such as new legislation, new policy initiatives, tighter regulations, more stringent fines, organisational restructuring, educational programmes, multi-stakeholder platforms for information sharing, and whistleblowing initiatives (Manoli, 2018). The establishment of national platforms coordinated by the Group of Copenhagen has strengthened cooperation and trust (Warners, 2021). Patterns of interaction and negotiation have grown that reinforce the feeling that they work from shared values and objectives. This institutionalisation also promotes the stability and continuity of the network that is needed to deal with the complexity of the fight against match-fixing. As a result, the stakeholders advocate to broaden the cooperation and further invest in the fight against match-fixing despite the transaction costs that this entails (for the Netherlands, see for example, Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2021).

Dilemmas and directions for improvement

One of the dilemmas for the implementation of the Macolin Convention is that the network governance design does not fit well with the nature of the problem of match-fixing and the size and complexity of the policy network. There is a lack of meta-governance: a central authority that transcends the organisational network and can provide a suitable governance form, joint network framing, goal-oriented network management, and effective and efficient network participation.

Defining policy goals; developing procedures; and making decisions about the nature, composition, and operation of the network, therefore, remain diffuse processes. There is no leading actor to frame and propagate the mission, convince internal and external actors, and help increase the prestige of the network. The lack of such an actor also limits the possibilities to empower participants, increase trust, remove tensions, resolve conflicts, reduce transaction costs, and exercise authority where necessary.

This has consequences for the efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the governance network. The efficiency of shared governance is generally inversely proportional to the number of actors in the collaborative network. In match-fixing, the network of organisations involved is huge, which means that a form of shared governance leads to high transaction costs. The formation of national platforms has provided a structure to control these costs to some extent, but it remains a matter of discussion which actors should and should not be involved to work as efficiently as possible.

The effectiveness of shared governance mainly depends on high goal consensus, widely shared mutual trust, low level of interdependent task requirements, and a low need for formalisation. The Macolin Convention appears to have contributed to the goal consensus among stakeholders and the formalisation of platforms, committees, and advisory groups. Mutual trust in the network also seems to have increased. Yet, this is accompanied with transparency and accountability problems, conflicting interests, and internal inconsistencies, such as the questions of what information the actors should share with each other, how sponsorships between sport organisations and betting companies relate to the fight against match-fixing, and whether governments should legalise online betting in this context.

The legitimacy of the policy network and national platforms is not in question. The need to tackle match-fixing has broad support among the public, sports organisations, legal betting companies, and governments. Whether this also applies to the way in which the network functions is another question. Much will depend on the results that the network will achieve, but these are difficult to determine. It is hard to demonstrate to what extent preventive policies such as the Codes of Ethics and awareness-raising programmes of sports organisations are successful. Furthermore, uncovering match-fixing can be interpreted as both an example of successful detection and an indication of the magnitude and growth of the problem. Only sanctioning violators can be interpreted as proof of successful policy, but that entails the risk that the punishment of offenders will turn into gesture politics.

The fight against match-fixing shows similarities with the fight against doping. At the end of the twentieth century, national authorities got involved with the doping problem that was previously left entirely to the sports organisations. A series of scandals, most notably 'Le Tour Dopage' of 1998, led to a breakthrough, with governments and sports organisations jointly deciding to set up the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). WADA was not one of the participating actors in the anti-doping policy network, but a separate entity established to act as a global standard setter and referee agency, amidst divergent interests of sport organisations and national states (Van Bottenburg, Geeraert and De Hon, 2021). The worldwide anti-doping policy, thus, falls under the third form of network governance distinguished by Provan and Kenis (2008): network administrative organisation governance.

Several experts and representatives of stakeholders in the fight against match-fixing have called for the creation of a Global Anti-Corruption Agency or World Sports Integrity Agency, modelled on, or even linked to WADA (Hill, 2016; Veuthey, 2014). It has been advocated to do this in the form of a hybrid public–private organisation, funded and governed jointly by the Olympic Movement and governments, like WADA. It has also been argued that such an agency should be governed tripartite, including representatives of betting operators (Veuthey, 2014). Others point out that such an institution should operate independently from sport organisations and betting operators: 'If organised and staffed correctly, it would be free from the commercial agendas, professional conflicts of interests and ignorance that clog so much of today's struggle against match-fixing' (Hill, 2016, p. 305).

Calls to establish a WADA-like organisation for match-fixing have so far not received broad support. Geeraert and Drieskens (2021) explain this on the basis of two factors. Firstly, compared to anti-doping policy in the 1990s, the behaviour of sports organisations in match-fixing deviates much less from what the public authorities expect from them. Leading international sports organisations make visible investments in monitoring match-fixing and education programmes to prevent match-fixing. Even though there is little evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of these actions, the general impression is that these organisations are taking match-fixing seriously. Secondly, public authorities do not (yet) share a common belief that the actions against match-fixing by international sport lead to excessive costs that could be solved by the creation of a public–private agency to which international sport federations would transfer powers.

Two developments can change this. Firstly, the societal costs of match-fixing can increase to such an extent that the call for government intervention becomes stronger and stronger. Secondly, the same is to be expected if criminal organisations get more grip on sports organisations through illegal gambling and match-fixing, thereby threatening to undermine the private institutions that regulate the world of sports. In both respects, the support for network design revisions can be expected to increase, with an administrative organisation governance form as the most likely outcome.

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Understanding Match-Fixing from a Normalization Perspective

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Introduction

Although match-fixing has a longstanding history in sport, it is arguably higher on the political agenda today than at any point in history (Huggins, 2018; Moriconi, 2020). Simultaneously with a large number of match-fixing cases that have come to light in various sports and countries (see e.g., Carpenter, 2012; Chappelet, 2015), the research interest in match-fixing has grown steadily over the past decade (for an overview, see, e.g., Tzeng and Lee, 2021). Following Hill's (2008, 2009, 2010, 2013, 2015) pioneering work in relation to match-fixing, several scholars have attempted to better describe and classify the phenomenon (e.g., Spapens and Olfers, 2015; Numerato, 2016). Moreover, as match-fixing is considered a global threat to sports, several scholars have tried to map the prevalence of match-fixing (e.g., Van Der Hoeven et al., 2021), its causes and consequences (e.g., Kihl, 2018a; Tak, Sam, and Jackson, 2018). Additionally, possible prevention initiatives and legal enforcement to combat match-fixing have also been discussed (e.g., Abbott and Sheehan, 2013; Jones, 2013). Despite this increasing body of literature, research into match-fixing still lacks theoretical insights (Numerato, 2016; Kihl, 2018c).

Individual-level explanations of match-fixing are often merely rooted in rational-choice theory, which argues that individuals make a cost/benefit analysis before engaging in corruption (Becker, 1968). Relational models focus on the social networks in which people are integrated to explain corruption (e.g., Lee, 2017; Costa, 2018), while structural models interpret corruption in sport by highlighting external societal pressures (e.g., Forrest, McHale, and McAuley, 2008; Cashmore and Cleland, 2014). Although these models have provided significant insights into the phenomenon of match-fixing, a more holistic and multilevel approach is recommended to obtain a better understanding of the nature and scope of match-fixing (Kihl, 2018c).

As demonstrated by Van Der Hoeven et al. (2021), Ashforth and Anand (2003) have provided an interesting overarching organizational corruption model that can help explain the multilayered nature of match-fixing. More specifically, by showing how a corrupt or dubious practice can become embedded, perpetuated

and taken for granted in an organization, Ashforth and Anand's (2003) model can help clarify the socio-cultural embedment of match-fixing and how it has become normalized in (certain) sports. Moreover, by relying on the three pillars of (a) institutionalization, (b) rationalization, and (c) socialization (see *infra*), Ashforth and Anand's (2003) model also emphasizes that systems, organizations, and individuals are mutually reinforcing when it comes to corruption. As such, Ashforth and Anand's (2003) model counters the assumption that match-fixing is only a matter of individual ethical failure (Tak, 2018).

This chapter first outlines corruption in sport and match-fixing, and which theoretical models are currently used to understand corruption in sport. Subsequently, we outline how the three pillars of Ashforth and Anand's (2003) theoretical model of normalization of corruption in organizations could provide a more holistic understanding of match-fixing in sport. The chapter concludes with offering suggestions for future research to better understand corruption in sport, in general, and match-fixing, in particular.

Defining corruption in sport and match-fixing

Corruption has been a popular research topic in both sport and non-sport domains (Hwang, 2016). Treisman (2000, p. 399) described corruption as “the misuse of public office for private gain,” while Ashforth and Anand (2003, p. 2) defined corruption as “the misuse of authority for personal, subunit and/or organizational gain.” Although both definitions rather refer to a business context, they could be applied to examine sport governance corruption. However, as corruption by, for instance, athletes is more difficult to understand by using Treisman's (2000) and Ashforth and Anand's (2003) definitions, several scholars have proposed more sport-focused definitions of corruption. Maennig (2005, p. 190), for instance, distinguished between “management corruption” and “competition corruption.” While “management corruption” focuses on the decisions made by sport bodies and officials, “competition corruption” focuses on bribes that (non)athletes and/or officials receive in exchange for altering the outcome of the competition. As such, Maennig's (2005) definition and typology of sport corruption includes match-fixing or the “manipulation of sports competitions,” commonly described as:

An intentional arrangement, act, or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others.

(Council of Europe, 2014, art. 3.4)

However, Maennig's (2005) approach failed to cover other illicit practices within sport, such as doping. Therefore, Gorse and Chadwick (2010) described sport corruption as “any illegal, immoral or unethical activity that attempts to deliberately distort the result of a sporting contest for the personal material gain of one

or more parties involved in that activity” (p. 42). Gorse and Chadwick’s (2010) definition, in turn, falls short when it comes to match-fixing.

After all, match-fixing is generally classified into two major types based on whether or not the match-fixing case at hand is related to betting (Spapens and Olfers, 2015). While betting-related match-fixing aims to make profits on the betting market (i.e., material gain), non-betting- or sporting-related match-fixing focuses primarily on sporting interests (e.g., to prevent the relegation of a specific athlete or team) (Spapens and Olfers, 2015). As Gorse and Chadwick’s (2010) definition only refers to “material gain,” it fails to include sporting-related match-fixing. Notwithstanding, a recent international research project that questioned 5014 people related to sports, showed that sporting-related match-fixing appears to be much more common in sports than betting-related match-fixing (Van Der Hoeven et al., forthcoming). More specifically, of the people who indicated that they had been approached personally with a match-fixing proposal, 68% revealed that the last or only time they were approached, the proposal had a sporting-related purpose only (Van Der Hoeven et al., forthcoming). On the other hand, 9.8% of the respondents who indicated that they had been approached for match-fixing clarified that the proposal was made solely for betting-related purposes (Van Der Hoeven et al., forthcoming). In other cases, the respondents indicated a combination of motives (e.g., betting- and sporting-related), other motives, or that they had no idea of the motive of the proposal.

Following Van Der Hoeven et al. (forthcoming), we argue that sporting-related match-fixing should be given a more prominent place in sport corruption research. Therefore, this chapters uses Masters’ (2015, p. 113) simplified definition of corruption in sport, which states that “corruption in sport equates to the deviation from public expectations that sport will be played and administered in an honest manner.” Masters’ (2015) definition of corruption in sport leaves more room for interpretation and covers betting- and sporting-related match-fixing. Moreover, “honest sport” can be associated with the principles of fair play, which, in turn, is strongly linked with sporting-related match-fixing (Van Der Hoeven et al., 2020).

Current approaches to corruption in sport

As shown by the different conceptualizations and definitions, scholars who aim to understand, theorize, and explain corruption in sport continue to wrestle with its complexity and multidimensionality (Kihl, Skinner and Engelberg, 2017). To date, scholars have mainly used three theoretical models in their challenge to explain corruption (in sport) (Soebbing and Walker, 2018). First, individual (i.e., micro-) level explanations of why individuals engage in corruption have mainly focused on rational-choice theory, which argues that individuals engage in corruption if expected benefits exceed expected costs (Becker, 1968). Hill (2015) and Forrest (2018), for instance, focused on this cost/benefit analysis to explain

the motivations for match-fixing. However, as match-fixing is a social phenomenon, individual rational choices are not the sole driving forces (Numerato, 2016).

Second, several scholars have also tried to examine sport corruption by using relational (i.e., meso-level) models that focus on the social networks in which persons are integrated (Hill, 2013; Lee, 2017; Costa, 2018). In the context of match-fixing, social networks can range from highly organized and structural transnational crime networks (e.g., the *Calcioscommesse* network in Italian football, see Costa, 2018) to less organized and local, often culturally influenced, networks that arrange match-fixing (e.g., Taiwanese baseball and its Confucianism-oriented culture, see Lee, 2017). However, Tzeng and Lee (2021, p. 570) argued that “social networks per se cannot thoroughly explain match-fixing,” and therefore used a micro–meso approach to explain the links between social capital constructs and match-fixing.

Third, structural models have stressed the external societal (i.e., macro-level) determining factors in relation to match-fixing. Cashmore and Cleland (2014), for example, discussed the commercialization of the game as the main reason why corruption is often tolerated in football. Forrest, McHale and McAuley (2008) mainly highlighted the significant expansion of the betting industry to explain the increasing risk of match-fixing. Additionally, some authors have warned that policies to combat match-fixing have mainly framed match-fixing as a threat coming from organized criminals outside of sports and mostly related to illegal betting (Moriconi and de Cima, 2020; Spapens, 2021; Tak, Choi and Sam, 2021). By framing match-fixing in this way, sport governing bodies, federations, and certainly, sport betting operators have presented themselves as victims and have shifted the responsibility toward law enforcement agencies. However, given the recent prevalence figures of sporting-related match-fixing (Van Der Hoeven et al., 2020, forthcoming), and the fact that sporting-related match-fixing should rather require a disciplinary approach (Spapens, 2021), the relevance of the current match-fixing prevention policies and countermeasures could be questioned.

Following these three separately discussed theoretical models (and levels), it becomes clear that we are missing the complete picture of the different factors that can contribute to a decision to engage in corruption (Huberts, 2010). Therefore, Kihl (2018c) advocated for the use of an overarching theoretical model that examines the three interconnected levels (i.e., micro, meso, macro) together. Ashforth and Anand (2003) have provided such an overarching model that explains how corruption becomes normalized in organizations. A practice is considered normalized when it is embedded in an organization’s structures, processes, and culture in a taken-for-granted way (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). Ashforth and Anand (2003) argued that three mutually reinforcing and reciprocally interdependent pillars underlie the normalization process: (a) institutionalization, (b) rationalization, and (c) socialization. The three pillars, and their potential to explain the multilayered nature of match-fixing, are discussed in the next section.

The three pillars of normalization of corruption

Institutionalization

The first pillar, institutionalization, refers to “the process by which corrupt practices are enacted as a matter of routine, often without conscious thought about their propriety” (Ashforth and Anand, 2003, p. 3). According to Ashforth and Anand (2003), the institutionalization process consists of three major phases. The first phase consists of the initial corrupt decision or act. As shown by various studies, individuals can decide to engage in match-fixing for several reasons (e.g., from a reciprocal perspective, see Christiansen and Hjørngard, 2013; from a rational-choice perspective, see Hill, 2015; from a code of brotherhood perspective, see Tzeng, Lee, and Tzeng, 2020). In a second phase, an initial (successful) corrupt act can become embedded in an organization’s structures and processes (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). Numerato (2016, p. 711), for example, showed how bribes in exchange for fixed refereeing became an “unwritten rule,” a part of the game, in Czech local football. In the same vein, Van Der Hoeven et al. (2021, p. 5) revealed how “unwritten rules” exist in the cycling peloton. Simultaneously with the embedding of the corrupt behavior, a deviant (sub)culture may thus emerge which normalizes the behavior. As such, in the third and last phase of the institutionalization process, the corrupt acts become a habit and a matter of routine (Ashforth and Anand, 2003).

The institutionalization process of “making the extraordinary seem ordinary” is often accompanied by a lack of moral awareness (and judgment) of the issue among the actors (Ashforth and Kreiner, 2002, p. 215). After all, the casualness of routinized behavior blunts individuals’ (moral) awareness and judgment of their behavior, and vice-versa, low (moral) awareness and judgment can facilitate a dubious or corrupt behavior to become routinized and habitual (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). Van Der Hoeven et al. (2020) revealed that Flemish sport club actors who had been approached with a sporting-related match-fixing proposal were often not aware that the proposal contained a moral issue or did not consider the sporting-related match-fixing proposal as (morally) wrong. Consequently, people often mindlessly consented to the sporting-related match-fixing proposal. Contrary to this, people who were confronted with a betting-related match-fixing proposal were generally aware of the problem and judged it as morally wrong but consented to the proposal because of external inducements and/or pressures (Van Der Hoeven et al., 2020). Given the taken-for-granted nature of sporting-related match-fixing, and the fact that this type of match-fixing seems to occur more, we argue that especially sporting-related match-fixing is more vulnerable to the institutionalization process than betting-related match-fixing. Nevertheless, betting-related match-fixing could also be institutionalized, and subsequently normalized, as shown by Tak et al. (2018) and Marchetti, Reppold Filho, and Constandt (2021). Moreover, the fact that more studies have already examined the institutionalization of match-fixing in relation to betting can be attributed to the betting-related focus of the literature on match-fixing so far.

Rationalization

The second pillar, rationalization, refers to the process by which individuals (or groups) develop and use self-serving ideologies to justify, excuse or even valorize corrupt acts (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). As rationalizations refute the negative interpretations of the behavior, “corrupt individuals tend not to view themselves as corrupt” (Ashforth and Anand, 2003, p. 15). This statement certainly relates to sporting-related match-fixing, as people often do not see sporting-related (match-fixing) cases as corruption, but rather as tactics. Consequently, we argue that it is often easier for sport actors to use various rationalization strategies to justify sporting-related match-fixing than betting-related match-fixing. Van Der Hoeven et al. (2021), for example, showed how Ashforth and Anand’s (2003) eight rationalization strategies were used by road cyclists to justify cooperation with their competitors. Rationalization strategies for betting-related match-fixing, on the other hand, may be more difficult to apply by sport actors, as betting-related match-fixing seems to be less common and is considered a clear criminal offense. Nevertheless, betting-related match-fixing could also be rationalized, and subsequently normalized, certainly in cultures where corruption is more widespread (e.g., Marchetti et al., 2021).

Furthermore, it can also be argued that people rationalize their engagement in match-fixing by consciously deactivating their moral beliefs and self-sanctions, a practice referred to as moral disengagement (Bandura, 1986). Moral disengagement is considered “a set of eight cognitive mechanisms that decouple one’s internal moral standards from one’s actions, facilitating engaging in unethical behavior without feeling distress” (Moore, 2015, p. 199). Kihl (2018b), for example, described how athletes use moral disengagement mechanisms (e.g., advantage comparison, minimizing consequences, and diffusing responsibility) to justify the use of doping. However, to date, little is known about the relation between moral disengagement and match-fixing.

Socialization

The third pillar, socialization, involves the process by which newcomers are taught to accept and perform corrupt practices (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). The socialization process helps explain how ongoing corruption is sustained through the induction and absorption of newcomers and how ethically sound persons become steeped in corruption (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). Following Hill’s (2013) central thesis that rational-choice is the primary motivation for match-fixing, one could argue that mainly the mechanism of cooptation (i.e., inducing newcomers by rewards) is used to convince people to engage in (betting-related) match-fixing. However, numerous cases and studies have already shown that people also consent to match-fixing to avoid problems with their competitors or with the people who approached them (i.e., compromise). After all, it also happens that people are threatened or pressured to engage in match-fixing (FIFPro, 2012). Furthermore,

Van Der Hoeven et al. (2021) demonstrated how people do not suddenly engage in match-fixing but are gradually socialized into it (i.e., incrementalism). This is certainly the case when it comes to sporting-related match-fixing, as this is often more culturally ingrained in sport (e.g., Lee, 2017). By performing and interacting in a certain sport culture and context, people often gradually redefine their norms and values regarding certain dubious or corrupt behavior and start to see it as normal.

Conclusion

Building on the three pillars of institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization, this chapter highlights the potential of Ashforth and Anand's (2003) model of normalizing corruption to explain match-fixing and its underlying mechanisms. The institutionalization pillar helps explain how match-fixing can become a matter of routine and unconscious decision-making in sport's structures, processes, and culture. The endemic and publicly secret nature of match-fixing are often reflected in the unwritten rules that exist in certain sport disciplines. By showing that match-fixing is a property of the collective rather than that of an individual, the institutionalization pillar emphasizes the responsibility of organizations (institutions) rather than the responsibility of individuals to prevent match-fixing. Moreover, the rationalization pillar helps understand why individuals tend not to view match-fixing as corrupt behavior. Rationalizing strategies are widely used among individuals and groups, which fosters the social ties and trust between the actors at the meso-level. Certainly, when it comes to sporting-related match-fixing, people often justify their behavior as a tactical decision. In so doing, people neutralize the negative interpretations of their behavior and start to see it as normal. Rationalizations, regardless of whether these are for betting- or sporting-related purposes, also support the socialization pillar, which helps explain how match-fixing can become internalized at the micro-level. By demonstrating how newcomers are induced to and absorbed in match-fixing, socialization mechanisms clarify how match-fixing is sustained through generations of sport actors.

Additionally, by unraveling Ashforth and Anand's (2003) model of normalizing corruption, the twofold nature of match-fixing also clearly comes into view in this chapter. By explaining the link between a lack of (moral) awareness (and judgment) of match-fixing and the institutionalization process, sporting-related match-fixing seems to be more institutionalized, or at least appears to be easier to institutionalize, than betting-related match-fixing. After all, sporting-related match-fixing seems to be more common, accepted and is often enacted mindlessly. Additionally, sporting-related match-fixing also seems to be easier to rationalize and socialize, as people often do not consider it as corruption, but rather as tactics. Following this, we argue that sporting-related match-fixing seems to be more normalized in sport or that it is at least more vulnerable to the normalization process. However, sporting-related match-fixing that is considered normal in certain sport disciplines can still be considered as corruption. Just because infringements of fair play are

normalized in sports, does not mean that we may not consider them as corrupt behavior. Furthermore, also betting-related match-fixing and other forms of behavior that everyone agree is corruption can be normalized. This will certainly be the case in countries and cultures where corruption is more prevalent.

By applying a multilevel approach, including the micro-, meso-, and macro-level, this chapter may guide future sport corruption scholars to study match-fixing in a more holistic and nuanced way (Kihl, 2018c). Moreover, as the pillars of institutionalization, rationalization and socialization can help better understand match-fixing, we also call for actions targeting these three pillars. As sporting-related match-fixing may be more vulnerable for the institutionalization process, it could be necessary to change the competition format, to prevent end-of season fixes, for example. To reduce the use and development of rationalization and socialization mechanisms, on the other hand, awareness raising initiatives should be intensified (Anand, Ashforth and Joshi, 2004). However, as it is often difficult to safely report on suspicions and/or experiences of match-fixing, trustworthy whistleblowing protection programs should also be implemented in sport (Verschuuren, 2020).

Future sport corruption research should also focus on the three pillars of normalization. Regarding the rationalization pillar, for example, it would be interesting to examine how individuals morally disengage by deactivating self-sanctions to facilitate their engagement in match-fixing. Although moral disengagement has already been studied in sport (see, e.g., Boardley and Kavussanu, 2011), the explanatory potential of moral disengagement in relation to sport integrity breaches, like match-fixing, has not yet been fully exploited (Robertson and Constandt, 2021). Furthermore, Van Der Hoeven et al. (2021) illustrated the need for additional research on how various stakeholders (e.g., fans and sponsors) are involved in and look at match-fixing. After all, if match-fixing is normalized, and everyone agrees to it, should we still consider it as a form of problematic sport manipulation?

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The Macolin Convention and the Complexity of Sport Competition Manipulation

Mike McNamee and Norbert Rubicsek

Introduction

Sport integrity is a contested term (Archer, 2016; Cleret et al., 2015, 2017; Gardiner et al., 2017; Loyens et al., 2021). It is as widely used as it is widely mis/understood. In the scholarly literature, a distinction has been made between “narrow” and broad “sport integrity” where “narrow” refers to the colloquial term “match-fixing” – known properly by the official term of art “manipulation of sport competition” – mostly, but not exclusively, motivated by financial gain via betting markets – that dominates the headlines and the concerns of the policymakers of sport, and criminal agencies and criminal actors. The terrain of the everyday world is not, however, as neatly cut as the distinctions of philosophers. Meanings and usage are always situated in contexts. In the present book chapter, we intend to explore the regulatory contexts that were brought to a certain level of agreement and harmonization in the broader landscape of sport manipulation. The aim of this essay is to explain the basic elements of sport manipulation from the definition of the phenomenon, through the description of the actors and the different types of sport manipulation, using the Macolin Convention as the source reference, in order to better understand the policy landscape and its challenges.

Why do we need a definition and a typology of sport competition manipulation which is recognized by all the stakeholders of the sport domain?

The 4th of February 2013 was a very important day in the world of sport. On that day, the law enforcement agencies of five countries (Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, and Slovenia), Europol, Interpol, and Eurojust held a press conference. The subject matter revolved around a case called JIT Veto, or the Bochum case.¹ At the meeting, held at the Europol headquarters in the Hague, attended by dozens of media outlets from all around the globe, the reputation of sport as an ethical enterprise was well and truly put in the dock. Not for the first time, football (or soccer as

some prefer) was the site, if not the source, of the fall from grace. Europol Director Rob Wainwright observed:

This is a sad day for European football and more evidence of the corrupting influence in society of organised crime. But this investigation also proves the value of international police cooperation in fighting back against the criminals involved. Europol and its law enforcement partners are committed to pursuing serious criminals wherever they operate. Unfortunately, this also now includes the world of football, where illegal profits are made on a scale, and in a way, that threatens the very fabric of the game. All those responsible for running football should heed the warnings found in this case.

(<https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/update-results-largest-football-match-fixing-investigation-in-europe>)

For anyone interested in the integrity of sport, the scale of the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) Veto/Bochum case was eye-watering. A total of 425 match officials, club officials, players, and serious criminals, from more than 15 countries, were suspected of being involved in attempts to fix more than 380 professional football matches. The ensuing comprehension of manipulation by so many actors and networks defied belief. Not only did the wider public become aware of the involvement of organized crime in football, but the case also highlighted that sport manipulation was a phenomenon not simply a collection of disparate, isolated, incidents. Enabled by ever-increasing Internet possibilities, the reach of such networks spread far and wide.

Following the well-known political dictum that one should never waste a good crisis, the public exposure of Bochum/JIT Veto case became the trigger for governmental and intergovernmental organizations, sport federations, the betting industry, and other stakeholders to take targeted measures against the phenomenon of sport manipulations. The policy responses have taken many forms. Some have been structurally driven by sport federations, while others have taken on regulatory form (see Moriconi and Alemeida, 2019; Spapens and Olfers, 2015; Tak et al., 2018). Europol, for example, established its own unit, Focal Point Sports Corruption (later AP Corruption²), while Interpol Match-Fixing Task Force was brought into operation.³ In addition, national and international sports federations and the betting industry recognized their mutual need for collaboration. Many of the larger federations developed their own integrity bodies and functions. Finally, supranational bodies such as the European Union,⁴ the UNODC,⁵ IOC,⁶ and other bodies have published their own substantial documents, programs, policies, and regulations.

Substantial changes in the way of understanding, defining and fighting against the manipulation of sport competition (hereafter MSC) have been driven by Council of Europe. Under its aegis, the main stakeholders of the domain (representatives of the governmental sector, law enforcement, sports, betting and academia) drafted what is now the most widely accepted understanding of the phenomenon: the Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions,⁷ widely referred to as the

Macolin Convention (hereafter simply “the Convention”). It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this Convention for sport despite its relative infancy (see also Moriconi, 2020). Besides uniting the different stakeholders to create one tool for fighting against sport manipulations, a legal document was created to provide solutions to the issues in the field of this phenomenon. Additionally, as one of the most important results of the document, the Convention has provided a reference point for the stakeholders on the issue of manipulation of sports competitions.

Since September 2014, the Macolin Convention has been a point of reference for a series of definition of terms critical to understanding and combating MSC (Serby, 2015). These definitions relate to (i) “sport competition”; (ii) “sport organization”; (iii) “competitions organiser”; (iv) “manipulation of sport competitions”; (v) “sport betting” (of which there are three sub-variants: illegal, irregular, and suspicious); (vi) “competition stakeholder” (of which there are three sub-variants: “athlete”, “athlete support personnel”, “official”); and (viii) inside information. As with any convention document, these are what philosophers call stipulative or prescriptive definitions. They do not convey ordinary meanings but set the terms for policy and regulatory effectiveness. It is, of course, their definition of MSC itself that is our primary interest here:

“Manipulation of sports competitions” means an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others.

<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016801cdd7e>, accessed, 3.7.21

Although the Convention and the definitions helped vastly in unifying the background of the fight against MSC by – in effect – supplying a set of terms jointly understood by its signatories and adopted by stakeholders, it cannot reach a key question relating to its operationalization: “Which acts can be considered as sport manipulations?”

As an international treaty, the Macolin Convention gives the countries and the stakeholders enough space to tailor their measures on the issue accordingly. Not drafting the known type of sport manipulations in a Convention, enabling necessary changes to be made in particular contexts, offers a flexible approach to be undertaken within a broadly shared framework.

Nevertheless, since the Convention fails to guide its users about the heterogeneous species under the genus MSC, stakeholders needed to develop their own guidance and reference points on what can be considered as MSC. Thus, the Convention is something of a double-edged sword. It presents a unified set of terms that are, however, operationalized in nonharmonized ways.

Despite this lack of guidance, or perhaps better “specification”, the actors in the sport integrity domain have had to proceed with their procedures to keep sport

free from manipulation. Accordingly, at the beginning of what will doubtless mitigate this threat to sport integrity, stakeholders' cooperation has not always been smooth and productive. The domain of sport manipulation became a space where the key stakeholders, i.e., sport organizations, law enforcement agencies, government actors, and the betting industry, developed their own list of types of manipulation and they have built these based on their experience and their own particular strategic, political, and economic interests.

Unfortunately, from a legal point of view, this lack of coordination has created significant confusion in defining certain aspects of MSC. The lack of clarity and agreement are not arcane matters, of interest to philosophers and legal scholars. Rather, the attendant confusion has "real world effects". Notably, it can jeopardize criminal and sport disciplinary procedures, where a different understanding of certain points of manipulations may lead to the evidence collected in such cases not being eligible, or not being enough to prove that MSC violations have occurred. Moreover, there can be situations that certain types of MSC have simply not been listed or considered in any particular typology existing in any of the stakeholder domains. This problem led to certain acts, which are considered now as MSC, simply not being investigated.

Therefore, when the Council of Europe announced in 2017 that the Convention will benefit from an Annex on the typology of sport manipulations, the actors of the domain had hopes and expectations of receiving a united typology on manipulation of sport competitions which is in line with the Macolin Convention and helps the stakeholders to act in unison. We address ourselves now to the extent to which that has been achieved, and the remaining typological questions.

Thoughts and explanations on the direction of the typology

The terms of the convention

In order to understand the heterogeneous nature of the acts of MSC, and also the actors who are involved in such acts, we need to go back to the CoE definition on manipulation of sport competitions and derive these important items from the very text itself. Without understanding and using these vital definitions properly, both disciplinary and criminal inquiries on sport manipulation could be extremely difficult to run.

Consider again, the Council of Europe's definition of MSC in the Convention:

an intentional arrangement, act of omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result of the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others.

This definition has been widely accepted as *the* definition of the manipulation of sport competitions and has been integrated into a number of national legislative frameworks, in preparation for the entry into force of the Convention.

This definition is important for several reasons. First, there was no uniform definition on sport manipulations prior to the Convention. Secondly, the definition is the product of consensus of national and international stakeholders from the sport, betting, and law enforcement fields, and particularly from ministries of countries from all over the world. This on its own is a major international achievement and a necessary precursor to global harmonization (Serby, 2015). Thirdly, its scope is wide and flexible enough to facilitate transposition into national legislation. Fourth, it secured buy-in, and therefore legitimacy, from major international sport (e.g., International Olympic Committee) and non-sport (e.g., Interpol) agencies. Finally, in terms of scope, it covered not only the acts of MSC but also intentions to execute MSC. This latter point is not a side note in the understanding of MSC nor in efforts to combat the problem. We turn now to develop this point directly.

Determining motives

The first point to note is that sports manipulations are typically committed by financial incentives, whether or not it is for sport-motivated purposes. Financial benefit(s) can be manifested directly (e.g., accepting bribes, betting, sponsorships, transferring players) or indirectly (e.g., sexual services² and personal favors such as arranging education for a family member).

The only exception to anyone benefiting applies to those who are forced to fix a sport event under threat of harm to themselves or their close ones. Nevertheless, since they fix the sport event on behalf of somebody else, following the Macolin Convention definition, "... *obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others*", the manipulation could be considered as having been committed.

Clarifying the use of the term "match-fixing"

The genesis of MSC is a long one, whose roots go back to ancient athletic contests (Huggins, 2018; Maennig, 2005). Equally, within a long history, different terms compete in the everyday language and journalistic discourses and policy debates. These contexts do not necessarily conduce to clarity and consistency.

Given the frequency with which the terms "match-fixing" and "manipulations of sports competitions" have been used as synonyms in this domain, law enforcement approaches suggest restricting the term "match-fixing" purely to the on-venue action through which the sport manipulation is implemented. It has been noted that the term is permissively broad (Spapens and Olfers, 2015). Moreover, strictly speaking, match-fixing is the act that takes place at the sporting venue. It is a part of the manipulation of sport competitions rather than being a synonym of it. Moreover, match-fixing is inaccurate when manipulation refers only to an event (often referred to as spot-fixing) within the overall event and has no – or no significant – bearing

on the event itself. This is, sometimes, referred to as a problem of sport betting integrity rather than sport integrity itself. But the point is moot.

Nevertheless, in light of the above, it is necessary to distinguish between the phase of the sport manipulation and match-fixing. We propose that “match-fixing” is better restricted to what happens *at* the sport venue/field/court/pitch (including issues directly linked to sport venue happenings, e.g., a goalkeeper intentionally lets in a goal, or a player is not played to make the team weaker, etc.). We also propose that the broader concept of sport competition manipulation refers to what happens on the field of play (understood broadly as the location of the event) *and* away from the sport location so that it is taken to include such acts as bribes, coercion, money laundering, betting, in addition to match-fixing. For instance, an organized crime group bribes a referee away from the sport venue.⁸ The referee then actively fixes the match concerned on the field (i.e., at the sport venue) (see Moriconi and De Cima, 2021; Visschers et al., 2020). Note that both acts fall under the offense of MSC.

It is important to note that these two acts or activities (at and away from the sport venue) should have a strong and direct connection. The sequence of actions at and away from the sports field is indifferent when classifying them under the term MSC.

Identifying and classifying perpetrators

So much, then, for the nature of the acts. In order to understand the offense of MSC, it is important to distinguish the roles and actors involved in this act.

Due to the similarity of some parts or the entire act of manipulation, when more than one person is involved, notably including on-field actors (athletes or referees), as well as actors away from the sporting venue, these roles can be explained based on the definition of roles in the offense of bribery.⁹ Bribery is used as an analogy because the basic behavior is the same: person A approaches person B and convinces him/her to fix a sport event, following which person B executes the fix. The nuances are, of course, to be studied (e.g., situation of accepting to fix) in detail in every case.

In this sense, the act of sport manipulation involves two types of parties. First, there are the actors that *fix* the event (e.g., match, game, tournament); their primary activity within the MSC is, therefore, match-fixing. They are referred to in the typology as a *Passive Manipulator or Executor*^{10,11} – the person who gains, asks, and/or claims benefit from another to fix a sport event. It is important to note that where such a person is coerced into fixing they bear a responsibility for that act though it will be diminished by, *inter alia*, the degree of force, or control, or coercion visited on them by third parties. Secondly, there are those who intend to *manipulate* the event (e.g., criminals, criminal organizations, club owners for sport-related purposes) for reasons that extend beyond the event itself. Their role *includes, but is not limited to*, relations with the passive manipulator. These persons will not only approach and ensure that the passive manipulators will fix the event on the field of play but will also undertake to ensure a financial gain from the on-field fix. They are referred

to in the typology as the *Active Manipulator or Instigator*^{12,13} – i.e., the person that offers and/or gives benefits to someone to fix the sport event in order to obtain undue financial benefit for themselves and/or others.

It is possible that the same actor may enact the roles of both types of manipulators – such as an athlete fixing the game on the field (result or spot-fix) and then betting safely for financial gain.

It is noteworthy that at the moment that the on-field actor (athlete or official) or team manager/coach/trainers bets on an event fixed by him/herself for self-benefit, or who bribes another athlete, according to the standardization illustrated below, they are no longer considered in the role of passive manipulator or executor. Rather, their status becomes that of a non-sport-related criminal since he/she acts with an undue influence for him/herself (to fix the event), as an active manipulator or instigator to have a financial benefit (see Table 6.1).

The range of actors and the roles they play are both ethically and legally significant. The typology enables the understanding of the roles played and the patterns of responsibility, ethical and legal, that can be acted upon by legal and non-legal disciplinary processes.

Typology of manipulation of sport competitions¹⁴

The Council of Europe developed, together with a number of countries, a helpful framework to classify and understand the different types of competition manipulation. It articulated three main types of sports competition manipulation: (i) Direct

Table 6.1 A typology of sport manipulation¹⁵

<i>Actors involved in committing the offense of sport manipulations</i>	<i>Type of manipulator</i>
<i>On the sport venue/field/court/pitch</i>	
• Athletes	Executor
• Referees	Executor
<i>Around the venue</i>	
• Team managers/coaches/trainers ¹⁶	Executor / Instigator
• Athlete's entourage	Instigator
• Other sport officials	Instigator
• Managers of sport clubs, organizations, athletes	Instigator
• Player agents	Instigator
<i>Far from the sporting venue</i>	
• Non-sport-related criminals	Instigator
• (Organized) criminal groups	Instigator

interference in the natural course of a sporting event or competition. This refers to the manipulation of sports competitions, or elements thereof, in order to gain an unfair sporting advantage or corrupt financial benefit (e.g., athletes deliberately lose a sporting event or competition); (ii) modification of an athlete's identity or personal data, physical characteristics, or capabilities (mental or physical). This encapsulates manipulation by altering the identity of the team or competitor to alter the outcome. Common examples include age manipulation, to facilitate competition against more junior opponents; and finally, (iii) modification that is non-compliant with criminal laws or sport rules relating to playing surfaces, playing equipment, athlete physiology, or sporting venue. Examples of this kind include tampering with the playing surface, or with sports equipment used during a competition (balls, rackets, etc.), or with equipment vital to the staging of an event or competition (e.g., changing the temperature), or using unauthorized or banned equipment and illegally modifying athlete physiology (food poisoning, using drugs to sabotage performance).

These three types can then be further sub-categorized relating to the people that start an act that will lead to a manipulation (either on the field of play or somewhere else).

A. Exploitation of governance

Exploitation of governance is the abuse of a dominant position. The instigators (Agents, Sponsors, or other persons who have a direct interest in the athletes' or teams' economic rights or sporting achievements) misuse their dominant insider position (within a sports organization) to instruct or force the executors (Athlete(s), Athlete Support Personnel, and Competition Officials) to manipulate sports competitions, or element of a sports competition.

B. Exploitation of power or influence

This means the abuse of financial and contractual position. Misusing the power that comes from a financial or contractual position, the instigator (same as in A) instructs or forces the executor (same as in A) to manipulate a sports competition, or element of a sports competition.

C. External influences

Approaching, influencing, or controlling the executors (same as in A) is classified as an external influence. In this case, there is no intention to gain a sporting advantage. (That is, person(s) outside of the jurisdiction of the relevant sports organization.)

D. Opportunistic

This is when individuals (Athlete(s), Athlete Support Personnel, and Competition Officials) exploit their sports participant status to deliberately underperform or manipulate the expected outcome of a sports competition, or element within a sports competition, where this activity is considered to be non-compliant with criminal laws or sport rules.

Having set out the conceptual and manipulative social contexts and actors, we now turn to the problematic relationship between betting and MSC.

Betting and sport manipulations. Is betting-related manipulation an existing category of sport manipulation?

Although there have been several typologies offered in the literature (see, e.g., Park et al., 2019), we retain our focus here on Council of Europe's contributions to the field, supported by their Group of Copenhagen¹⁷ network of national platforms created to combat MSC. Their typology is developed from actual MSC cases from public and private regulatory discourses. That is to say, the typology covers sport disciplinary procedures and criminal investigations and proceedings.¹⁸

There is a widespread assumption that MSC is limited to sport betting integrity (Moriconi, 2020; Tak, 2018; Tak et al., 2018). This unfortunate assumption is restrictive and detrimental to efforts to attempt to combat the problem. Because of its association with economically significant activity, MSC attracts a high profile than other sport integrity matters (such as exploitation and harassment of young athletes, or discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, or gender), which helps raise awareness and may deter others from engaging in MSC. On the other hand, this fame also backfires, as the direct sport-related consequences of MSC can be pushed to the background, with significant consequences for sport integrity maintenance.

Although sport can be conceptualized without any reference to betting, elite sport has always been associated with betting practices. One very distinct motivation for the development of sport codification and rule-based frameworks was to support the integrity of betting thereon. It is well known that the ethical movements of fair play owe their history to betting-related interests (Forrest and Simmons, 2003). In recent years, this symbiosis has become even stronger as the online betting markets have grown, and bets have diversified. Despite exceptions, in most of the major MSC cases which have been revealed in the last two decades, betting has played a significant role (Dietel and Weingärtner, 2014; Forrest, 2012; IOC/UNODC, 2013; Lastra et al., 2016).

The infamous JIT Veto/Bochum case is a useful illustration of this problem. The main *modus operandi* of the crime was very simple. A Singapore-based organized crime group (OCG) recruited a retired football player from the country whom they selected to exploit. The OCG made this ex-football player their head of operations in that country. From that moment, the ex-player orchestrated the match-fixing plots in that country on behalf, and as part, of the OCG. We must ask then, what was the idea behind recruiting such people as the head of operations? We may think of this as a kind of sporting manipulation "signature": the selection of actors to play specific roles in the planning and execution of MSC is significant and detailed. In this case, the OCG chose people whose career had taken certain paths: they had started as young players in their national league(s), became national team players, played professionally abroad, moved back to their country toward the end of their career, playing for clubs in the first, second, and/or third league in their country before retiring. This pattern enabled them, over their

career, to become acquainted with many important people involved in football in their country. This knowledge is exceptionally valuable.

In this case, the head of operations knew who was having financial difficulties, anyone who was having any kind of addiction issue (e.g., alcohol, drugs, betting) and, most importantly, anyone who was approachable for fixing matches. This additional knowledge of financial vulnerability opens the door to manipulators (Boeri and Severgnini, 2013; FIFPRO, 2012; Forrest et al., 2008). The OCG used this information and fixed the football matches through the head of operations and these coerced football players or referees.

The plot itself was not complex: the head of operations of the country and the OCG in Asia agreed on which game should be fixed and what the results should be, and the head of the operation briefed the players on what they needed to do to receive their reward. Thereafter, the OCG bet on the incriminated football games. This took the benefit out of sport. There was only one reason to fix a game: to bet on it.

The OCG knew the betting market and its operations in Asia. They usually engaged with live betting, that is to say betting as the event is taking place. When the odds on the game were the most promising, they gave a sign to their accomplices in the stadia, who indicated to the corrupted players or referees when to act to have the desired results.

One of the explanations as to why the combination of MSC and betting has been identified as match-fixing is related to the perpetrators who commit it: the organized crime groups and those under their control. Where crimes are committed, especially through organized crime, greater resources and specialism will be triggered within the legal authorities. This may be heightened, where the organized criminal group infiltrates something which is very popular in society, such as sport. This could explain the fact that the JIT Veto/Bochum case has been the most visited case on the Europol website.

The mentioned *modus operandi* is very simple and straightforward. The OCG played it simple by using sport and betting as vehicles for getting money. There were no unnecessary difficulties built into this system, and the information from match-fixing was used directly to cash out.

It cannot be concluded that all serious MSC is betting-driven, or driven by illicit financial motives. Nevertheless, betting-related match-fixing is the form of MSC that draws most attention. The lack of robust evidence bases and the difficulties around data sharing are restrictive in this regard. According to the definition of MSC we have presented here, the deliberate underperformance by the executors of the sport manipulation plot either before or during the game (integrisport ref) happens typically for the purpose of obtaining financial benefit for the perpetrators and instigators of the sport event.

Sport betting manipulation by those in the sport entourage (to borrow a term from anti-doping discourses) is, of course, deeply related to MSC, i.e., the use of inside information (Preston and Szymanski, 2003). Someone who has access to privileged information concerning an upcoming sport event, which is not

common knowledge, would be an advantage to someone who would use this information for illicit purposes. This information could be that a particular actor (e.g., a striker or the goalkeeper) will not play the next game or, vice versa, that the team will play with its strongest possible line-up, threatening the interests of the betting operator who does not have access to that knowledge in setting the odds. Equally, there may be direct knowledge of the fact that the game will be manipulated. All this information can be used against the bookmakers to misuse betting and make a profit out of something that others do not know, whether the inside information is created naturally (weaker line-up) or plotted by match-fixers (manipulation will happen). Irrespective of the directness of the actions in and through which the manipulation occurs (i.e., that the manipulators subsequently place bets on it, or – to take an indirect exemplar – that more sponsorship money has been received in consequence), the outcome is that such information and sport manipulation may be the means for obtaining money through betting by those with a knowledge thereof.

The misuse of inside information has happened in several MSC cases, such as in the JIT VETO/Bochum case, even on top of the so-called betting-related *modus operandi*. The organized criminal groups obtained their money by using the Asian betting market, and the small actors of the crime scene decided to use the information (that a game will be fixed) to win more money by betting on the game themselves.

In summary, then, although there are MSC situations where the perpetrators establish the manipulation in order to gain money and they gain this money through betting, we cannot really categorize MSC as “betting-related manipulation”. Following the logic of “betting-related manipulation”, sport manipulation, there is a question raised: Does the manipulation which was committed for avoiding relegation from the first league become a “betting-related manipulation” if the actors who know or even create this insight also bet on the game? Notwithstanding international variations, the capability to place bets is almost ubiquitous. Thus, one can never be certain whether any particular information related to manipulation did not end up in a chain leading up to a bet. Sometimes, we cannot even know if the perpetrators bet on the game which was fixed. Therefore, we cannot state, other than analytically, that the distinction between sport manipulation from betting and sport-related manipulation applies in any particular case. As we see from above, the recently defined betting-related manipulation is perhaps better thought of as using inside information merely for manipulation and/or using such information to misuse betting as a vehicle for private financial gain.

Manipulation of sports competitions from the sport perspective – reasons in sport to manipulate the game

Among international sport federations, there has been much activity in response to the growing sport integrity agenda. This has been led in some quarters by

match-fixing (e.g., football) but not only there. Notably, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has developed tools and resources aiming to combat unethical activities that many of the (especially smaller) constituent member federations have adopted (Chappelet, 2015).

According to the IOC, sporting-related match-fixing is:

Where the manipulation is perpetrated to provide a sporting advantage, for example in league promotion / relegation, or a perceived advantageous competition draw or any other sporting advantage¹⁹;

Although there may exist a pattern or matrix of motivations in MSC. Secondary reasons such as the avoidance of relegation or a perceived advantageous competition draw are also more frequent than sport enthusiasts may understand. There also exists borderline practices such as third-party payments by one team in a league to have another perform to their very best in order to beat another team in the relegation-avoidance fight also exist (Triviño et al., 2021). These have produced criminal investigations in at least Finland and Portugal. Clearly, examples such as these are primarily sport-relative and a concern first and foremost for sports authorities. This is not, of course, to say they are not relevant to sport betting. In order to find the real primary reason for such fixes, we have to go back to the Council of Europe's definition of sport manipulations: sport manipulations are always committed to obtain a financial advantage.

The financial consequences of, and therefore incentives to, fix an event to avoid relegation or to qualify for an international tournament, can be very substantial if a team is relegated from the first league to the second league. Aside from a loss of benefits, the team has a significant reduction in their share of media rights, not to mention the sponsorship money, which may also significantly decrease. For example, just qualifying for the Champions' League tournament group stage, is linked with receiving 14.25 million Euros from UEFA (Goal.com, 2021). Against this vast amount of money, there is no shortage of reasons why actors may consider committing some illicit practices. Equally, if a professional athlete manages to qualify for the Olympics Games, besides the obvious privilege of participating in this great event, it could boost the career and the financial situation of the athlete. This could be a catalyst for sports manipulations. Thus, sport manipulation, in the absence of betting interests, can still be important in financial terms, whether to an individual, a team, or, indeed, others in the athlete support personnel entourage.

Conclusion

Less than eight years have passed since the Europol press conference on the JIT VETO/Bochum case and it is less than seven years since the Macolin Convention was published. In comparison to other literatures on integrity threats, anti-doping, understanding, and developing policy and law in sports manipulation are still in its infancy. Anti-doping has generated evidence and scholarly bases for practice, law,

and policy for more than 30 years, without the level of economic criminal activity that attaches to MSC. The aim of this chapter is to introduce the basic definitional and typological features of sports manipulations as an act as well as to situate the perpetrators and types of sports manipulations in those conceptual contexts. There is still much that academics and practitioners, professors, police officers, betting experts, and sport managers still need to explore and seek consensus on if robust and harmonized MSC approaches are to be secured. Key among those issues, however, will be conceptual ones, whether legal, regulatory, or “merely” philosophical.²⁰

Notes

- 1 A major investigation involving Europol and police teams from 13 European countries has uncovered an extensive criminal network involved in widespread football match-fixing. A total of 425 match officials, club officials, players, and serious criminals, from more than 15 countries, are suspected of being involved in attempts to fix more than 380 professional football matches including World Cup and European Championship qualification matches, two UEFA Champions League matches and several top-flight matches in European national leagues. The activities formed part of a sophisticated organised crime operation, which generated over €8 million in betting profits and involved over €2 million in corrupt payments to those involved in the matches. The Joint Investigation Team (JIT), codenamed Operation VETO, ran between July 2011 and January 2013. The JIT was formed by Europol, Germany, Finland, Hungary, Austria and Slovenia, and it was supported by Eurojust, Interpol and investigators from eight other European countries (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2013/20130206_01_en, accessed 3.7.21).
- 2 <https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-trends/europol-analysis-projects>, accessed 3.7.21.
- 3 <https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Corruption/Corruption-in-sport>, accessed 3.7.21.
- 4 https://ec.europa.eu/sport/policy/integrity/match-fixing_en, accessed 3.7.21.
- 5 <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/safeguardingsport/index.html>, accessed 3.7.21.
- 6 <https://www.olympic.org/prevention-competition-manipulation>, accessed 3.7.21.
- 7 <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/215>, accessed 3.7.21.
- 8 Singaporean Ding Si Yang was sentenced to three years in jail for supplying prostitutes to three Lebanese referees - <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-24/singaporean-jailed-3-years-for-prostitute-referee-bribes>
- 9 (<https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7203> <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7205>).
- 10 <https://www.coe.int/en/web/sport/typology>, accessed 3.7.21.
- 11 http://rc3sport.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Article_Exploring-the-definition-of-the-manipulations-of-sports-competitions_Norbert-Rubicsek_JD-1.pdf
- 12 <https://www.coe.int/en/web/sport/typology>, accessed 3.7.21.
- 13 http://rc3sport.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Article_Exploring-the-definition-of-the-manipulations-of-sports-competitions_Norbert-Rubicsek_JD-1.pdf
- 14 Typology of Sports Manipulations. Interactive Typology Tool. June 2020, Council of Europe, National Platforms Network – Group of Copenhagen (GoC). Available at: <https://rm.coe.int/interactive-typology-tool-final-version-june-2020/16809eb82c>

- 15 http://rc3sport.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Article_Exploring-the-definition-of-the-manipulations-of-sports-competitions_Norbert-Rubicsek_JD-1.pdf
- 16 Depending on their role in the activity they could be passive (being approached to fix the sport event) or active (approaching the athletes and/or referees to fix the game).
- 17 <https://www.coe.int/en/web/sport/network-of-national-platforms-group-of-copenhagen>, accessed 3.7.21.
- 18 One of the authors, Norbert Rubicsek, was a member of the Typology working group.
- 19 <https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/What-We-Do/Protecting-Clean-Athletes/Betting/Education-Awareness-raising/Interpol-IOC-Handbook-on-Protecting-Sport-from-Competition-Manipulation.pdf>, accessed 3.7.21.
- 20 Our thanks to Bram Constandt and Marcelo Moriconi for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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A Legal Perspective on Match-Fixing

Joanna Wall Tweedie and John T. Holden

Introduction

As long as there has been sport, there has been cheating in sport. Cheating in sport takes many forms, some, less offensive to society than others. But, match-fixing is widely viewed as sport's greatest threat (Carpenter, 2012; Moriconi, 2020). While modern match-fixing can be traced to the beginnings of societal interest in sporting events peaking, sport and cheating have been connected since some of the earliest Olympics competitions, when athletes had to run past statues designed to remind them of the virtues of competing fairly and honestly (Huggins, 2018). As sport has become increasingly commercialized, corruption has followed. The costs of match-fixing in contemporary sport have increased from the early Olympics; as investments continue to flow into even lower levels of sport, the stakes become heightened. The most valuable asset for sport is what differentiates it from other forms of entertainment is the uncertainty of outcome (Holden & Rodenberg, 2015). Protecting this valuable aspect from those who wish to predetermine outcomes, thus, becomes paramount for sports organizations and their stakeholders.

While there has likely always been some punishment for cheating within sports, there are a great variety of ways in which match-fixing is treated by various justice systems. The criminalization of match-fixing exists on a spectrum from no specifically applicable statute in some jurisdictions to highly specific and targeted laws in other jurisdictions. Many locations rely on laws of general applicability as a primary means for deterring and punishing would-be match-fixers (Holden & Rodenberg, 2017). As sport becomes increasingly valuable and a primary industry across the globe, the need to protect its integrity grows. The sports world does not exist in isolation; instead, it supports whole subsegments of the workforce, creating jobs in broadcasting, retail, services, and multi-billion-dollar gambling industry. All these industries and subsegments rely on sport being fair and honest and the outcome being unscripted. To protect these industries and the workers who rely on them, there has been a growing push, globally, to target legislation to root out match-fixers and impose punishments on those who attempt to corrupt sport (see International Olympic Committee and United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2013).

This chapter begins with an overview of the literature and examples of criminal sanctions surrounding the punishment of match-fixing, proceeding then to discuss the benefits of using narrow laws aimed at specific behavior versus the use of broadly applicable legal theories like a fraud. We conclude by discussing the areas of match-fixing that require further study and outlining principles that should guide anti-match-fixing legislation.

Defining the problem of match-fixing

Match-fixing has been defined as “an arrangement or irregular alteration of the course or result of a sporting competition or any of its particular events (e.g., matches, races etc.) in order to remove all or part of the uncertainty normally associated with competition” (IOC & UNODC, 2013, p. 13). To remove the uncertainty inherent to sport competition is to undermine a social, cultural, economic, and political institution and the many norms and ideals it is deemed to represent (Council of Europe, 2014; Forrest, 2012). Thus, even when match-fixing is not tied to gambling or organized crime, the damage to the integrity of sport has serious consequences (Holden & Rodenberg, 2015).

Preston and Szymanski (2003) recognized three situational types of match-fixing: (1) when one side pays the opposition to lose or reduce effort, (2) when one side attempts to influence the referee, and (3) when one side benefits from a particular result in the scheme of a larger competition. Although no sport discipline is immune to fixing, certain sports have proven particularly affected by match-fixing, including football, cricket, and tennis (KEA European Affairs, 2012).

Match-fixing is often (but certainly not always) tied to gambling and *irregular betting* refers to all types of betting based on match-fixing (IOC & UNODC, 2013). In contrast, *illegal betting* equates to betting that is not allowed within a specific jurisdiction (IOC & UNODC, 2013). There has been a significant rise in reported match-fixing over the last two decades, and many have argued that it is the biggest threat to the integrity of sport (e.g., Carpenter, 2012; Moriconi, 2020). The rise in incidences of betting-related match-fixing has been attributed to two specific causes: (1) the proliferation of different types of betting and (2) the development of large illegal betting markets (Council of Europe, 2014). The vast expansion of sport, and sport corruption, has not been met by adequate advancement in laws to protect sport from corruption.

Legal theories for targeting match-fixing

Match-fixing is an issue that has infected sport at virtually all levels of competition. It is a practice that is seemingly as old as sport itself (Huggins, 2018). Sport organizations have long sought to eliminate players suspected of fixing from their ranks with, arguably, mixed success. Among the most prominent historical fixes was the manipulation of the 1919 World Series between the Chicago White Sox and the Cincinnati Reds (Asinof, 1987). The 1919 event saw the eight White

Sox players who had been accused of the fix stand trial in Chicago, Illinois, the following year. The trial resulted in all eight players being acquitted. Not satisfied with the result, Major League Baseball would establish the role of commissioner the following year. The first commissioner of Major League Baseball would be a judge, Kennesaw Mountain Landis; his job was to eliminate the corruption that had invaded baseball and restore the integrity of the game (Holden & Edelman, 2020). Judge Landis began his time as commissioner with the edict:

Regardless of the verdict of the juries, no player that throws a ball game; no player that undertakes or promises to throw a ball game; no player that sits in a conference with a bunch of crooked players and gamblers where the ways and means of throwing games are planned and discussed and does not promptly tell his club about it, will ever play professional baseball... regardless of the verdict of the juries, baseball is entirely competent to protect itself against crooks, both inside and outside the game.

(Sigman, 2005, pp. 305–306).

The reality of match-fixing is that the sports leagues themselves are only able to control players, coaches, and officials within a league's regulatory purview. Rarely are these the only actors involved in modern match-fixing (Holden & Rodenberg, 2017). Instead, modern match-fixing is often perpetrated by highly organized criminal syndicates (Hill, 2009). The presence of groups operating beyond the reach of sports leagues, as well as the interconnected relationship of sport and society, has meant that proponents of fair and equitable sport are increasingly turning to the legal system for protections in the form of laws that target sport corruption. Where present, these laws typically come in one of two varieties, a broad, generally applicable, legal theory commonly associated with fraud or a narrowly tailored offense-specific to efforts to corrupt a sporting event (Holden & Rodenberg, 2017).

Broad legal theories for addressing match-fixing

Preston and Szymanski (2003) offer a characterization of match-fixing that underscores the forces that drive match-fixing behavior:

Individual contestants may be willing to reduce their effort contribution for specific matches if the rewards for so doing are large enough. Sometimes this occurs either because the opposition values the victory significantly more and is willing to pay to secure it, and sometimes it occurs because there is an opportunity to generate returns on the insider information (for example, through gambling). Match fixing is felt to violate the spirit of the game and is also perceived to undermine spectator interest, and is, therefore, prohibited by organizers.

(Preston & Szymanski, 2003, p. 613)

It follows that there are two main ways that countries can utilize their justice system against match-fixing; to both punish and ideally deter match-fixers.

The broadest sword with which to attack match-fixing is likely through existing laws that prohibit conduct such as fraud, bribery, and extortion, broadly. In many cases, these laws can be adapted to fit a typical match-fixing scenario, particularly where the match-fixing is done with the intention of profiting on the gambling market (Holden & Rodenberg, 2017). In the United States, two of the broadest categories of fraud include mail fraud and wire fraud (Holden & Ehrlich, 2017; Holden, Green, & Rodenberg, 2017). Though the example here is from the United States, the elements of fraud are widely used. In the United States, wire fraud includes four elements: (1) a scheme to defraud; (2) to obtain money or property; (3) “by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises”; and (4) the transmission of the scheme occurs through interstate “wire, radio, or television” transmission (18 U.S.C. § 1343, 2008). This type of broad statute encapsulates a broad range of activities, and the language and reach of this particular fraud statute are the subject of legend among some federal prosecutors because it is joked that it is so broad even the Pope could be indicted under the law (Holden et al., 2017).

There are many variations of fraud throughout the world, with some more tailored toward the type of behavior encapsulated in match-fixing than others. However, even broad laws can leave open gaps that some scenarios escape through. This is particularly true when attempting to apply broad statutes, like a general fraud statute, to a specific case. Sometimes, narrowly tailored statutes can be too specific in their scope and thus miss an opportunity to encapsulate behavior the statute’s authors intended to include (Holden & Rodenberg, 2017). Take, for instance, the United States’ Sports Bribery Act, this statute prohibits certain types of bribery related to corruption of sporting events (18 U.S.C. § 224, 1964). This narrow statute is the lone match-fixing specific federal law in the United States, and while it targets a particular activity, it may miss the mark in targeting match-fixing activities that do not include bribery, such as match-fixing by extortion or blackmail (Holden & Rodenberg, 2015).

While fraud is not the only broad theory that could be read to encapsulate match-fixing, it is one that appears suitable in many instances. Other laws of broad applicability that could be applied to some match-fixing incidents include extortion and blackmail. Extortion involves a threat of force if the victim does not do something. Blackmail, by contrast, is often considered a subset of extortion, as opposed to violence, a perpetrator often threatens to release some embarrassing information about a victim unless they comply with the perpetrators demands (Holden, 2018b). Though broad statutes may encompass many match-fixing incidents, there are scenarios that can escape their reach. This is especially true in an instance that may not result in a quantifiable or recognized loss of “property” to another individual or business (Holden & Rodenberg, 2017). As statutes of general applicability are not a perfect solution, many countries have sought to supplement fraud and extortion laws with match-fixing specific laws.

Narrow legal theories for combating match-fixing

With the rise in match-fixing incidents, there has been a general move to address the problem head-on with laws that target the activity directly, rather than relying on existing statutes. The use of laws with specific applicability is generally a reactive approach taken by governments to address past problems, often scandals. The use of narrow laws that specifically target match-fixing, however, may be underinclusive because it is difficult to craft a narrow law encapsulating all possible behavior. As an example, one can look at the Sports Bribery Act, the United States' lone federal statute that specifically targets match-fixing behavior, by its terms (and title), the law attacks match-fixing related to bribery, but does not appear to cover other means that a match-fixer may employ (Holden & Rodenberg, 2015, 2017). The law, which was passed in 1964, reflected conceptualizations of what was taking place at the time, but despite recent attempts at modernization, it has not caught up with modern times (Holden, 2018a). The call to modernize or adapt anti-match-fixing statutes is one that has become increasingly timely, especially with the expansion of online betting, which increases the ability of match-fixers to hide transactions (Palmer, 2011).

The COVID-19 pandemic has sent many jurisdictions looking for a new way to raise revenue, and one method being considered, particularly in North America, is to legalize single-game sports wagering. The rush to patch budget holes, however, has often come without necessary efforts to patch similar holes in criminal laws that leave sport vulnerable to match-fixers (Hill, 2020). While criminalizing match-fixing is one important step in the fight to eradicate the practice, it is but one step. Much of the effort to combat match-fixing centers on improving education, not only about how match-fixing happens but also the consequences of match-fixing, as well as improving monitoring (Carpenter, 2012).

Studying the global problem

Match-fixing remains a complex and global sport corruption problem (Carpenter, 2012; Tak, Sam, & Jackson, 2018). The problem transcends national borders, sporting disciplines, levels of competition and involves a multitude of actors (Tak et al., 2018). As a multilayer problem, it is challenging to distinguish causes of match-fixing and the relative contributions. Thus, previous academic research has been focused on understanding various contextual factors that render sport vulnerable to match-fixing, with studies addressing different geographical and sport-specific contexts. For example, several studies looked at susceptibilities to match-fixing in soccer around the globe.

Aquilina and Chetcuti (2014) provided an in-depth exploration of match-fixing in football in Malta. These authors recognized that Malta's size made football particularly susceptible to match-fixing due to inevitable parochialism, close relationships between players and administrators, and modest player salaries. Boeri and Severgini (2011) specifically examined referee

involvement in match-fixing in Italian soccer and suggested that a lack of transparency was a contributing factor. Spapens and Olfers (2015) explored the context of match-fixing in the Netherlands and identified specific risks related to match-fixing that include social relationships between criminals and people positioned to influence the outcome of a match, financial vulnerability, gambling addiction, and the availability of gambling. Others have observed that major historical match-fixing scandals have occurred when there were vast discrepancies between player salaries and the team organization's marginal revenue product (Szymanski, 2003). Additionally, the tournament structures of competitions like the World Cup are recognized as particularly vulnerable to match-fixing because situations arise where the incentives to win are imbalanced between the two teams (Caruso, 2009).

Other academic research efforts have sought to identify legislative gaps that create susceptibilities to specific types of match-fixing. Holden and Rodenberg (2017) recognized lone-wolf match-fixing as a substantive threat to sport because of inadequate statutory protections in certain jurisdictions. Lone-wolf match-fixing occurs when the fixer perpetrates the attack without communicating with others. This type of match-fixing has been largely overlooked in favor of focusing on multi-party organized match-fixing, especially that tied to organized crime (Holden & Rodenberg, 2017; Meyer, 2013). Holden and Rodenberg (2017) argued that lone-wolf match-fixing illustrates the need for sport-specific laws since lone-wolf match-fixing could not be dealt with by a reliance on bribery, fraud, and extortion statutes.

Overall, the multitude of interacting factors contributing to match-fixing ensures it remains a challenge for authorities to target, punish, and prevent match-fixing. The fight against match-fixing involves regulation at an international, national, and sport organizational level.

Fighting match-fixing at the international level

At the international level, match-fixing has historically been addressed through general instruments against corruption or organized crime. Two key frameworks are the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). More recently, a sport-specific instrument, the Convention on the Manipulation of Sport Competitions (CETS 215), was adopted by the Council of Europe (herein the "Macolin Convention"). The multilateral treaty is known as the Macolin Convention because it was opened for signature in the Swiss town of Macolin in 2014 (COE, 2014a). The Macolin Convention entered into force in September 2019 and proposed a common legal framework for an efficient international cooperation to respond to the global threat of match-fixing (COE, 2020). The Convention is intended to involve all relevant stakeholders, namely, public authorities, sport organizations, and sport betting operators and regulators (COE, 2014b). The Macolin Convention has been ratified by seven nations and signed by 30 other European States and Australia (COE, 2020).

Fighting match-fixing with national level legislation

The Macolin Convention arose in recognition of the need for a transnational coordinated response to combat match-fixing. There are, otherwise, significant discrepancies and inefficiencies across different countries in the legislative capacity to respond to match-fixing. In 2013, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released the results of a study that examined criminalization approaches to combat match-fixing around the world. Their study was focused on discrepancies and similarities in legislative approaches in 19 jurisdictions and painted an ominous picture whereby very few jurisdictions were in a position to effectively address match-fixing. A follow-up study by the IOC and UNODC was completed in 2017 and found that since the 2013 report, some national legislation has been further developed and more countries have adopted specific legislation aimed at criminalizing match-fixing (UNODC & IOC, 2017). In the subsequent section, the relevant existing legislation in a geographically diverse selection of countries is discussed. The aim is to provide an overview in order to highlight the variations between countries.

Australia

Australia has an extensive list of laws at the federal, state, and territory levels that can be applied to prevent match-fixing (IOC & UNODC, 2013). Australia's National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport (10 June 2011) is aimed at promoting consistent legislation on match-fixing in state jurisdictions. The IOC and UNODC report (2013) noted that Australia's legislative developments demonstrate an emphasis on the suppression of match-fixing and the protection of the integrity of sports.

Brazil

There are significant limitations in the Brazilian legislation's capacity to combat match-fixing with no specific criminal law provisions on match-fixing. The fraud and bribery statutes do not cover all possible forms of criminal activity related to match-fixing (IOC & UNODC, 2013). However, the legislation for fraud and main public bribery offenses does allow for the application of UNTOC (IOC & UNODC, 2013).

China

China does not have specific match-fixing law and relies on fraud and bribery statutes to prevent match-fixing. The IOC and UNODC study (2013) recognized that the fraud statutes are likely broad enough to criminalize match-fixing

in the context of gambling-related behavior. However, there is a minimal opportunity within the legislation to address non-gambling-related match-fixing. Additionally, the study by the IOC and UNODC (2013) identified significant limitations in the criminal law provisions on investigative means in the area of match-fixing. There are no criminal law provisions for the utility of the more modern investigative techniques (such as wiretapping or electronic surveillance), which seriously hinder Chinese law enforcement's capacity to detect or investigate match-fixing.

India

The Prevention of Sporting Fraud Bill 2013 was aimed at criminalizing sports fraud, including match-fixing (UNODC & IOC, 2017). However, the continued lack of specific match-fixing laws in India has been brought into light with a number of high-profile match-fixing instances involving Indian cricket players. The International Cricket Council's Anti-Corruption Unit (ICC ACU) has been vocal in urging legal reform in India (Gollapudi, 2020). In contrast, cricketing neighbor, Sri Lanka, has recently introduced match-fixing legislation in cooperation with the ICC ACU (Lavalette, 2019).

South Korea

There are a number of specific match-fixing laws in the South Korean Criminal Act which, in combination with general fraud and bribery statutes, are likely to enable an effective fight against match-fixing for pecuniary gains (UNODC & IOC, 2017). The IOC and UNODC (2013) also noted that the wide prohibitions of gambling and betting limit the opportunities for potential match-fixers to achieve large gains in Korea. However, South Korean criminal law does not provide protection for non-gambling-related match-fixing.

Italy

There have been several high-profile incidences of match-fixing in Italy, including the infamous and wide-reaching "Calciopoli" scandal in 2006 (Hefez, 2019). Italy does have a specific match-fixing statute under the classification of sports fraud in the Italian Penal Code (KEA European Affairs, 2012). Italy's sports fraud law can be applied to betting and non-betting-related match-fixing (KEA European Affairs, 2012). One potential loophole in the Italian legislation is that it only criminalizes the alteration of the results of the game or competition, but not its cause (UNODC & IOC, 2017)—these other elements (e.g., half-time result, number of corners) may be attractive to manipulators because these events can be bet on. One interesting element of the Italian sports fraud law is that it provides for the obligation to report (KEA European Affairs, 2012; UNODC & IOC, 2017). The Macolin Convention was ratified by Italy in 2019 (COE, 2021).

France

The French Penal Code was revised in 2012 to criminalize betting-related match-fixing (KEA European Affairs, 2012). France had previously relied on fraud and bribery statutes to deter match-fixing. Non-betting-related match-fixing was not criminalized in the updates despite this being advocated for in French Parliament (KEA European Affairs, 2012). The French Penal Code offers provisions against private corruption, but there are limitations to its application to lone-wolf match-fixing because of requirements to predicate agreements (Holden & Rodenberg, 2017; KEA European Affairs, 2012).

Germany

Germany's federal government had previously relied on fraud statutes to deter match-fixing (KEA European Affairs, 2012). The German government updated its criminal code in 2017 in order to strengthen coverage of cases involving betting fraud and sports manipulation (Keidel, 2017). Two new sections are now included in the German Criminal Code pertaining to betting fraud in sports (Section 265c, 2017) and manipulation of professional sports competitions (Section 265d, 2017). The updated statutes are intended to close loopholes arising from the reliance on broad fraud legislation (Keidel, 2017).

United Kingdom (UK)

In the UK, betting-related match-fixing can be punished under the offense of cheating at gambling per the British Gambling Act of 2005. The Bribery Act (2010) is the other key statute in the deterrent of match-fixing. The Bribery Act criminalizes the acceptance or solicitation of any gift or consideration for participating in a corrupt act. These statutes have been effectively applied in instances of organized rings of gamblers manipulating matches (KEA European Affairs, 2012).

United States of America (US)

The US was recognized as slow to implement laws sufficient to protect sports integrity (McLaren, 2008). The vast majority of American match-fixing has occurred in amateur sport at the collegiate level, which has caused some to speculate that, in contrast, the high salaries in American professional sport disincentivize a player from altering their performance (Moore, 2014; Shactman, 2013). Holden and Rodenberg (2017) disputed this logic and pointed out that well-paid professional athletes remain vulnerable to blackmail and extortion.

Overall, the IOC and UNODC (2013) concluded that the US has a substantial legal framework that allows effective action against match-fixing. There is one federal statute that specifically addresses match-fixing—the Sports Bribery Act

tackles attempts to manipulate sporting events through bribery. The particular legislation defines bribery in broad enough terms to cover most forms of bribe-related match-fixing at the international and interstate level (IOC & UNCODC, 2013). Match-fixing cases without bribes involved may be addressed by application of criminal offenses of fraud (IOC & UNCODC, 2013). The Sports Bribery Act was designed to address organized crime but has only been utilized sparingly (Holden & Rodenberg, 2017). One factor that can impede incrimination of match-fixing at the federal level is the division of legislative powers between federal and state levels (IOC & UNODC, 2013). Regulation of cases of match-fixing at the state-level will vary in accordance with the jurisdictional principle of territoriality.

In the following section, we discuss the considerations legislators must address in drafting legislation that is designed to deter match-fixing.

Fighting match-fixing through the legal and legislative process

One of the most important means of combating match-fixing is gaining access to information. As athletes who are engaged in match-fixing can have the feeling of being trapped—believing that they have broken the rules, so their only choice is to proceed with ongoing manipulation—hence, there is a need to allow these athletes to break free. The most straightforward way of doing this is for sports organizations to create whistleblowing protections for those who come forward with information about match-fixing (Harris & Holden, 2022; Holden & Rodenberg, 2015). Whistleblowing protections are also crucial as they can incentivize the disclosure of information that would, otherwise, be difficult to obtain. Given the immense financial and other costs associated with match-fixing, it may be worthwhile to incorporate either full or limited immunity for certain parties who come forward with information regarding match-fixing. By creating a trust issue among match-fixers and co-conspirators, the costs of match-fixing can be raised and likely deter some fixing (Holden & Rodenberg, 2015).

Another critical attribute is for the legislative and legal system to avoid getting in the way of allowing a robust monitoring system to work. One of the primary identifiers of match-fixing has been the use of monitoring betting lines. Irregular movements can, on occasion, indicate nefarious activity (Hosmer-Henner, 2010; Rodenberg & Feustal, 2014). Protecting a robust data market is imperative for identifying corrupt activity. Consolidation, or reliance on a single stream of information, has the potential to create a single point of failure, allowing corruption to go undetected (Holden, 2018c). Combating match-fixing is a never-ending game of cat and mouse; the match-fixers often have an advantage because of the slow legislative process. It is, therefore, important that jurisdictions not only pass laws that are malleable to evolutions of match-fixing but also place increased emphasis on prevention and early intervention strategies, as these are likely to be more robust than hoping that a legislature can pass an updated law to address a new variation of fixing.

In addressing match-fixing from a legal perspective, it is important that countries evaluate their laws to determine whether they encapsulate match-fixing behaviors fully. There is a need for countries to move to proactively legislate to prevent match-fixing, as opposed to the historical trend of legislating in response to a scandal. In one particular incident, Canadian law enforcement discovered too late that their laws were insufficient to address match-fixing because even though games were being fixed on Canadian soil, the wagers were being placed outside the country, which meant that the government did not have jurisdiction under existing law to prosecute the offenders (Hill, 2020). Governments must be educated on the full mechanics of modern match-fixing to understand and legislate fully understanding the multijurisdictional nature of the practice.

Conclusion

Match-fixing and sport have been connected for centuries, but as the value of global sport has increased, the costs of fixing have also risen. There is no one magic bullet to stop match-fixers. Countries across the globe have taken different approaches with no government, yet, finding the perfect solution. As countries and sports organizations continue looking for ways to fight back against match-fixers, they should turn their focus toward educating stakeholders of risks as well as lobbying for legislation that creates systems that encourage the cooperation of victims. Simply focusing on punishing match-fixers, post hoc has not seemed to arrest the problem. Thus, legislators must look for ways to disrupt the incentives to match-fix. Fundamental to disrupting match-fixers is increasingly the likelihood that they will be caught and punished. One of the most basic ways to do this is to incentivize people with knowledge of match-fixing to come forward. Creating whistleblower systems and protection for victims to come forward with information is crucial to slowing the spread of match-fixing. The evaluation of existing laws and the introduction of legislation to address shortcomings are the most important steps that lawmakers across the globe can take to create a system for stopping match-fixers. While there is a risk in being too narrow enacting match-fixing specific laws, existing statutes can also be ill-suited to address the international nature of match-fixing. In order to overcome, this apparent “Goldilocks” problem countries should address criminalizing match-fixing without too narrowly focusing on acts like bribery, and instead of prohibiting behavior via language such as a ban on efforts to manipulate a sporting event.

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Combining Criminology and Forensic Science to Detect Match-Fixing

Fiona Langlois and Stefano Caneppele

Introduction

Match manipulation in sport, popularly known as match-fixing, started to gain a momentum in Europe during the late 2000s, following a German investigation (i.e., the Bochum case) on a transnational match-fixing scandal relating to 200 fixtures, including national league games in Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Croatia, Slovenia, Turkey, Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Austria; 12 qualifying matches in the UEFA Europa League; and three in the UEFA Champions League (UCL) (BBC News, 2009). Although other fixing scandals have been uncovered before and after this well-known German case (such as the Bochum case), this investigation was of particular importance since it disclosed that football was exposed to match-fixing to a larger extent than expected by most stakeholders. Further, this case showed that non-sport affiliated members (e.g., criminal groups, even organized crime) were able to take profits from fixing by making money on sport betting. In another contribution (Caneppele, 2021), we have already discussed which dimensions make a country and a sport discipline more at risk for sporting-related match-fixing. In this book chapter, we focus on the issue of match-fixing detection and prevention. Indeed, in the Bochum case, the investigation can be classified as a spillover effect. German police forces were leading a prostitution and drug investigation when they bumped into indications of match manipulation (Talintyre, 2013). This aspect is relevant since it is also recurrent in many other investigations on match manipulations. At least when law enforcement is involved, in most of the public match-fixing cases, the persons of interests were under the police radar because of their involvement in other serious crimes such as drug trafficking, fraud, corruption, extortion, and money laundering. Unsurprisingly, one could argue that there is a simple reason for this fact: i.e., counteracting match-fixing in sport is not classified as a priority for most law enforcement agencies, at least until other serious crimes are involved. In fact, the number of police officers investigating sport crime is negligible. Still, police resources will always be lacking regardless crimes to resolve. Thus, it is not all about resources, but it is also about strategic questions and investigating methods/functioning.

To overcome these issues and help prioritizing investigations, “intelligence-led” approaches have been developed (Ribaux et al., 2010). It is important for sporting authorities (e.g., integrity officers) to develop methodologies based on those used by police, prepare, carry out good investigation and collaborate with police if necessary.

Moreover, we should also admit that, at least for international fixes, the range of difficulties linked to international cooperation, lack of training, administrative procedural burden, and access to suspects, often outnumber the good will of the few police officers implicated, leading to a failure in providing evidence that corroborates the sport fraud detection. In this chapter, we would like to provide an interpretative template that, combining criminology and forensic science, could be helpful to sport investigators. Coupling the concepts of rationality and decision-making to those of traces, we show how they can be applied to match-fixing cases to support detection. In the next paragraphs, we explain the theoretical foundation of these concepts, and then, we show, using a case study, how they can be best used.

Theoretical framework

This section presents the theoretical foundation of this manuscript. From one side, we have the criminological perspective: rational choice approach considers that offenders act to maximize benefits and minimize costs. In this sense, the concepts of maximization and minimization do not only lay in the single criminal act, but they could be useful also in the way in which offenders decide to perpetrate a crime and in the way in which they decide to do it. These assumptions remind the concept of *modus operandi* that is also discussed. From the other side, we have the forensic science perspective: each criminal action leaves a sign, a trace that should be found and interpreted by the investigators to detect and correctly reconstruct who acts and the way he or she has supposedly acted.

Rational choice approach

The rational choice approach was elaborated by Cornish and Clarke (1986), following the principle of Beccaria’s classical school. In this perspective, offenders are considered as rational humans. They evaluate their potential actions, thereby considering both potential risks (e.g., getting caught, getting hurt) and benefits (e.g., financial rewards, emotional approval). Of course, the authors acknowledge that any individual has bounded rationality, as humans act “rationally” according to what they know and how risk is perceived and accepted (knowing that can vary across individuals). Plus, every human has a limited knowledge with beliefs that may be wrong too. However, despite existing critique on this approach, the rational choice theory proved to be useful in the analysis of several crimes, especially those which are financially motivated. In

addition, since rationality could also be based on wrong beliefs, manipulating the perception of crime risk may be considered as a prevention strategy to deter potential offenders. Further, the applicability of the term “rational” proved to be useful not only to deter the decision to commit a crime but also to detect the crime template of a criminal conduct. Ideally, when facing a new event, humans experiment different adaptive behavioral responses. As soon as they established which responses work better, they tend to adopt always the same behavioral response as a standard. Routine can be defined as a set of standard behaviors that an individual develops, facing a recurrent or similar event. Routines have the advantage to require less effort compared to a brand-new behavior. Transposing this concept to criminal conducts, we assume that offenders that repeatedly commit the same offense type tend to consolidate their behaviors in a sort of offense template that applied to a concrete situation may be defined as *modus operandi*. Going into further details, a spillover of rational choice approach is the concept of crime script.

The concept of crime script

Following the idea that offenders are rational actors, Cornish (1994a) explains that an illegal act can be broken into a process of micro decisions and actions (activities) that are logically (inter)connected and lead to the crime event. The process of criminal activities can be organized in a crime script. According to Cornish, the crime script “offers a useful analytical tool for looking at behavioral routines in the service of rational, purposive, goal-oriented action” (Cornish, 1994b, p. 151). Eventually, a criminal event (match-fixing in our case) is a result of multiple causal actions that may be decomposed through scripts from the beginning to the end (Cornish, 1994a, 1994b; Leclerc and Reynald, 2017; Morselli and Roy, 2008). Crime scripts have been used for different crime types such as crimes in public transport, child sexual crimes, drug manufacturing, tobacco smuggling, terrorism, organized crime, and human trafficking (Dehghanniri and Borrión, 2016, p. 9). Table 8.1 presents the script’s aspects commonly encountered.

Table 8.1 Presentation of a general structure of a crime script, as outlined Dehghanniri and Borrión (2016)

	<i>Scenes of the script</i>	<i>Action of the script</i>
Before	Preparation Entrance Preliminary condition	Scenes’ description (specific to the case)
During	Instrumental initiation Instrumental actualization Execution	Scenes’ description (specific to the case)
After	Post execution Ending	Scenes’ description (specific to the case)

The advantage of a crime script is that it is possible to:

- Provide specific information on each scene of the criminal act (Morselli and Roy, 2008). Crime scripts allow for a greater understanding of the activity process around a criminal act. This increases the awareness of information needed for its comprehension and, consequently, for its disruption (Cornish, 1994a, 1994b; Dehghanniri and Borrion, 2016; Leclerc, 2013; Ribaux et al., 2006, 2010).
- Divide each scene of the crime act into multiple sub-scripts (such as approaching a player, placing a bet, or cashing out the win) (Cornish, 1994b; Leclerc, 2013). This could further facilitate the understanding of the crime commissioning process. For example, in arms trafficking, different methods might be used by traffickers to gather rifles and handguns for their business (Langlois et al., 2022).
- When multiple offenders are involved (like in match-fixing), identify the role(s) of different offenders in the crime process. As Morselli and Roy (2008, p. 77) suggested, “the main objective of a network analysis of scripts, therefore, should be untangle how some participants contribute in varying degrees to keeping in inherent channels of scripts in place”.
- Suggest situational prevention measures (i.e., appointing observers for end-season matches) to disrupt the ongoing criminal activities (Cornish, 1994b). A general crime script could suggest situational prevention measures which could prevent crime commission: once the key elements of match-fixing are highlighted, measures might be taken to disrupt fixers’ activities.

In our chapter, we decompose four crime events (i.e., four fixed matches) through scripts, highlighting the physical or digital traces left by perpetrators (in our case: the fixers), letting investigators and forensic scientists targeting which traces to search for in their investigation (Cornish, 1994b; Leclerc, 2013). The concept of traces deserves further explanation in the next paragraph.

The concept of trace

The concept of trace dates back to Edmond Locard, one of the fathers of the modern forensic science. In his words,

no one can act with the intensity that criminal action implies without leaving multiple marks of his passage. Sometimes the criminal has left the marks of his activity on the scene, sometimes, by a reverse action, he has taken away on his body or on his clothes the indications of his stay or his action.

(Locard, 1920, p. 134)

Then, trace is a mark of a past activity, which is left independently from the will of the individual who left it.

There are two main categories of traces: i.e., immaterial and material traces. Immaterial traces are generated in the minds of those who are eyewitnesses of human actions. They can be useful but are not always reliable. Indeed, memories can change over time and vary between witnesses. The subjectivity of memories depends on human senses, environmental conditions, witness observation, and even false remembrance (Margot, 2014). On the other hand, material traces are a

mark, signal or object, (...) not always visible to the naked eye. It is the vestige of a presence and/or an action at the location of the latter. It is this type of physical trace that is searched for at scenes by specialists trained in their detection.

(Margot, 2014, p. 3)

Having been left in an uncontrolled way, traces are imperfect and incomplete. During a criminal investigation, the experts have to search, detect, identify, and interpret traces. Indeed, if not interpreted, a trace is only an object (Margot, 2014). Under the category of material traces, we integrate now material and digital traces, as ecosystems where crime occurs now integrate computerized substrates where traces of a great variety are transferred in a new order of magnitude. The issue of gathering and preserving digital traces should always be considered carefully, while the possibility to combine traces from digital, physical, and immaterial contexts can be considered of capital importance for the robustness and consistency of current investigations.

Traces and investigation

Any investigation relies on the detection, identification, analysis, and interpretation of traces. The detection consists of recognizing the object as a trace. Once the trace is detected, it should be identified as relevant for the investigation. In fact, not all that can be observed and detected as a trace could be linked to the crime event. It should be mentioned that investigation is a retrospective activity. It provides plausible reconstructions of the past according to the traces detected, identified, analyzed, and interpreted. The reconstruction of the event is the result of a combination of deductive and abductive logical reasoning (Margot, 2014).

From an investigative perspective, traces are marks left that may help us understand how the environment has been affected by a human activity. In general, traces may provide possible evidence of (a) the source (of traces), (b) the activity that generated the trace (hence, provide indications on the *modus operandi*), and (c) the crime (showing whether or not the trace is the result of a criminal activity) (European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, 2015). For example, at the source of a red card, there is always the referee who gives it (referee decision). At the source of the foul, there is the player. The foul may or may not generate a

cardboard box. In the activity, it is the decision of the referee (possibly influenced by the context – player foul) that generates the trace. What we want to show is whether the trace is the result (or not) of criminal activity. For example, a succession of red cards (traces) can then reveal an abnormal pattern indicating either the repetitive activity of one or more referees or one or more players.

Research question and hypotheses

In this book chapter, we focus on the applicability of the criminological and forensic science concepts of crime scripts and traces to match-fixing. In particular, we would like to corroborate two hypotheses. First, a crime script approach fits well with match-fixing analysis. As this kind of fraud is usually complex and committed by multiple offenders, it is quite effective to describe the crime as a series of procedural acts. Second, it is possible to associate, for each match-fixing activity, multiple observable traces which explain whether a crime was committed, who caused the trace (source), and how the crime was carried out (activity). Please note that the source of the trace is not necessarily the perpetrator of a crime. It is the analysis of the activity that can determine the involvement of an individual at the source of a trace.

Methodology

To assess our hypotheses, we draw on the well-known match-fixing case concerning the Albanian team Skënderbeu. From 2010 until 2017, Skënderbeu was directly involved in fixing 53 matches. In 2018, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) confirmed UEFA's decision to fine Skënderbeu 1 million euro and ban the club from playing in its competitions for ten years (KF Skënderbeu v. Albanian Football Association, 2018). In this contribution, we focus our case study analysis on four matches determined to be fixed by Skënderbeu in 2015–2016 season.

Data were gathered from three main sources: documents from two Court of Arbitration for Sport reports (jurisprudence), a UEFA report on the Skënderbeu's investigation (available online), and open sources (KF Skënderbeu v. Albanian Football Association, 2018; Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v. Union Européenne de Football Association, 2016; UEFA, n.d.). CAS and UEFA documents were consulted for information about the fixing matches and open sources were consulted for the description of the four matches of interest (full-time results, match analysis, and media reports).

Data description

Two CAS reports discussed the allegation of match-fixing against the club Skënderbeu (KF Skënderbeu v. Albanian Football Association, 2018; Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v. Union Européenne de Football Association, 2016). In this study,

only the factual background and the submissions of the parties were used because it is where conclusions based on the Betting Fraud Detection System (BFDS) were described. BFDS is a system currently used by UEFA to monitor betting markets.

The UEFA investigative report (Ethics and disciplinary inspector report) was written by the UEFA Control, Ethics, and Disciplinary Body. Containing elements about the Skënderbeu investigation, this report cites the alleged fixed matches and describes how fixers fixed four matches. In this report, UEFA inspectors analyzed the network of people involved in fixes and found out that some fixers were linked with both the club and betting companies. In this study, four matches were sufficiently detailed to be analyzed and decomposed into crime scripts. Finally, we conducted open sources research through Google to obtain information about the description of the four matches (full-time results, match analysis, and media reports).

The following sections describe the four matches and their scripts. Match description starts from key moments (such as getting cards and scoring/conceding goals). All statements and allegations outlined in this study come from UEFA report and CAS jurisprudence documents (KF Skënderbeu v. Albanian Football Association, 2018; Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v. Union Européenne de Football Association, 2016; UEFA, n.d.).

Crime script analysis

The crime scripts were used to describe the *modus operandi* used by the fixers on the pitch.

The four matches were decomposed into four separate scripts, detailing the process of the fix from the planification of the fix, the placement of bets, and the manipulation of the game, to the financial advantages received through betting activities. Each phase of scripts includes different scenes, each detailing specific facets of the scene (Cornish, 1994b). Facets are modalities of scenes. For example, “placing suspicious bets” can encompass facets such as placing different types of bets (i.e., “more goals to be scored” or “the specific numbers of goals to be scored”), placing bets through online or physical betting companies, or paying for these bets either by cash, by card, or by using cryptocurrencies.

Once these scripts were completed, the researchers decided to merge these scripts into a single script. This single script contains all the technical characteristics of the four specific scripts while also including the fixing activities and conditions, the equipment and opportunities that were required to fix these matches, and the actors involved in the scheme (i.e., casts).

Results

Crime script

Results are presented by match with two corresponding tables. The first table describes the key moments of the match including players’ substitutions, yellow/

red cards, and goals. Based on the first table and its description, the researchers produced a corresponding script (i.e., the second table). For each script, three main phases were identified, i.e., (1) the precrime phase, which corresponds to all facets happening before the manipulation; (2) the manipulation phase; and (3) the final phase. We decided to illustrate some facets of the scripts by linking them to the corresponding key moments of the match.

Please note that the four scripts (Tables 8.3, 8.5, 8.7, and 8.9) are focused on specific games and do not intend to represent the only *modus operandi* used by Skënderbeu's fixers to manipulate matches. This assumption is supported by the fact that, according to UEFA experts, some other matches were fixed by Skënderbeu by winning the match for both sporting and betting purposes.

The four scripts comprise 10–13 scenes. The precrime phase corresponds to the “before” section. This phase starts from crime premeditation and finishes when the match began. The crime phase (i.e., “during” section) starts when players wrongly behave in order to lose the match. Then, the final phase, the “after” section, starts when bettors cash out their win. The precrime phase may happen either before the match or during breaks (i.e., half time).

According to both CAS and UEFA documents, all these matches were lost by Skënderbeu's team for betting purposes only. For each script, facet 5, “Placing suspicious bets (?)”, has been included as it is probable (but not certain) since some suspicious bets were placed before the match even started. If it is true, the amount of money placed in those bets seemed to be not sufficiently high to appear as “suspect” and, thus, to escalate in the Betting Fraud Detection System. The existence of this facet is supported by the fact that, in the UEFA reports (UEFA, n.d.), investigators stated that some matches were “premeditated and carefully planned scheme” (example of the match opposing GNK Dinamo Zagreb against Skënderbeu, p. 29). Plus, even if they did not explicitly mention in those four specific matches if they were affected by pre-game bets, they generally explained that “betting was either being done both before the game (Pre-Game) or live during the game (Live trading/betting). All those bets have been used in the criminal scheme in relation with Skënderbeu's matches” (p. 24).

Results are presented hereafter.

Crusaders FC vs. Skënderbeu

Played at Belfast on the 21st of July 2015, the match opposing Crusaders FC against Skënderbeu ended up with a full-time result of 3:2 (Table 8.2). This was the second leg match of the UEFA Champions League (UCL) competition. The first leg resulted in a 4:1 win for Skënderbeu on the 14th of July 2021.

After only 11 minutes of play, one defender of Skënderbeu got a red card, placing the team in a disadvantage (see Table 8.3, scene 7). Despite Skënderbeu's team having ten players on the pitch, Skënderbeu scored two goals (at t_{50} and t_{77}). By scoring these two goals, Skënderbeu obtained an aggregated score of six goals, qualifying virtually to the next round of the Champions League competition

Table 8.2 Key moments of the match – Crusaders vs. Skënderbeu

<i>Time</i>	<i>Actions</i>	<i>Score</i>
t_0	Beginning of the match	
t_{11}	Red card for Skënderbeu: one player out of the pitch	
t_{11}	Yellow card for Crusaders	
t_{33}	Yellow card for Skënderbeu	
t_{36}	Yellow card for Crusaders	
t_{45}	Half time	HT [0:0]
t_{50}	Goal (Crusaders)	1:0
t_{61}	Yellow card for Crusaders	
t_{67}	Substitution (Crusaders)	
t_{69}	Goal (Skënderbeu)	1:1
t_{71}	Yellow card for Crusaders	
t_{73}	Substitution (Crusaders)	
t_{77}^*	Goal (Skënderbeu)	1:2
t_{85}	Substitution (Skënderbeu)	
t_{90}	Substitution (Skënderbeu)	
t_{90+2}	Goal (Crusaders)	2:2
t_{90+3}	Goal (Crusaders)	3:2

Table 8.3 Script of the match Crusaders FC vs. Skënderbeu – proposition

	<i>Scenes</i>	<i>Facets</i>
BEFORE	1 Willing to fix a match	Decision from Skënderbeu representatives and/or athletes
	2 Discussing with some athletes of Skënderbeu's team	
	3 Accepting the fix	
	4 Organizing the fix	Deciding the fixing conditions (timing, actions, and so on)
	5 Placing suspicious bets (?)	Physical or online betting companies By cash or digital money
DURING	6 Beginning the match	
	7 Weakening the team	Getting a red card (defender out of the pitch – ten players remaining)
	8 Granting the qualification	By scoring one goal. Are now able to qualify to the next round of the Champions League (six goals on aggregate score for Skënderbeu)
	9 Placing suspicious bets	Physical or online betting companies Amounts of goals, by cash or digital money
AFTER	10 Starting to underplay	Some players seemed just stop playing
	11 Conceding goals	Two goals at t_{90+2} and t_{90+3}
	12 Finishing the match	Losing the game
	13 Gaining money	By cashing out the win, through physical or online betting companies; by cash or digital money

(scene 10). From this moment (t_{77}), suspicious betting patterns escalated from the international betting markets exactly while Skënderbeu's players started to underplay (scenes 11 and 12). As experts mentioned in the UEFA report, having a defender out of the pitch and then being numerically disadvantaged, gave a great excuse to Skënderbeu's team to perform poorly on the field. They also added that "considering that Skënderbeu normally faces 4.59 shots on target against on average within 90', then facing 10 situations within the last 6 minutes of the game vs. Crusaders is a significant and completely unusual fact" (p. 47). With only 16 minutes left, while Skënderbeu was still winning the game, people started to bet on their loss. Large amounts of money were bet at once on the number of goals to be scored (from t_{78}). This trend was considered suspicious as it did not follow classical betting patterns. Experts could not explain this behavior without considering Skënderbeu manipulating the game. By scoring three times, including two goals at t_{90+2} and t_{90+3} , Crusaders won the match.

GNK Dinamo Zagreb vs. Skënderbeu

The match GNK Dinamo Zagreb vs. Skënderbeu, played on 25th August 2015, ended up with a full-time result of 4:1 (Table 8.4). This was the second leg match of the UEFA Champions League competition. The first leg resulted in a 1:2 win for Dinamo on 19th August 2015.

Between the two teams, Dinamo had the best playing level. Rapidly, both Dinamo and Skënderbeu scored, respectively, two (at t_9 and t_{15}) and one times (t_{10}). Dinamo had, at this point, guaranteed its qualification. At t_{48} , right after the first half break, Dinamo lost a player: one Dinamo's midfielder received two consecutive yellow cards (t_{17} and t_{48}), expelling him from the pitch. Skënderbeu

Table 8.4 Moments of the match – GNK Dinamo Zagreb vs. Skënderbeu

Time	Actions	Score
t_0	Beginning of the match	
t_9	Goal (Dinamo)	1:0
t_{10}	Goal (Skënderbeu)	1:1
t_{15}	Goal (Dinamo)	2:1
t_{17}	Yellow card for Skënderbeu	
t_{17}	Yellow card for Dinamo	
t_{22}	Yellow card for Dinamo	
t_{27}	Yellow card for Dinamo	
t_{45}	Half time	HT [2:1]
t_{48}	Second yellow card for Dinamo: one player out of the pitch	
t_{52}	Substitution (Dinamo)	
t_{55}^*	Goal (Dinamo)	3:1
t_{57}	Yellow card for Skënderbeu	
t_{58}	Substitution (Skënderbeu)	
t_{65}	Substitution (Skënderbeu)	
t_{67}	Substitution (Dinamo)	
t_{77}	Substitution (Dinamo)	
t_{78}	Substitution (Skënderbeu)	
t_{80}	Goal (Dinamo)	4:1

Table 8.5 Script of the match GNK Dinamo Zagreb vs. Skënderbeu – proposition

	Scenes	Facets
BEFORE	1 Willing to fix a match	Decision from Skënderbeu representatives and/or athletes
	2 – Discussing with some athletes of Skënderbeu's team	
	3 – Accepting the fix	
	4 – Organizing the fix	
	5 – Placing suspicious bets?	Through physical or online betting companies By cash or digital money
DURING	6 – Beginning the match	
	7 – Starting to underplay	Conceding goals
	8 – Placing suspicious bets	Physical or online betting companies By cash or digital money – large amounts of money (betting for more goals to be scored knowing that GNK Dinamo Zagreb has ten players on pitch)
AFTER	9 – Finishing of the match	Losing the game
	10 – Gaining money	By cashing out the win (through physical or online betting companies; by cash or digital money)

Table 8.6 Moments of the match – Sporting Clube de Portugal vs. Skënderbeu

Time	Actions	Score
t ₀	Beginning of the match	
t ₁₃	Yellow card for Skënderbeu	
t ₁₇	Yellow card for Skënderbeu	
t ₂₄	Second yellow card for Skënderbeu: one player out of the pitch	
t ₃₂	Yellow card for Skënderbeu	
t ₃₈	Goal (Sporting Clube de Portugal)	1:0
t ₄₁	Goal (Sporting Clube de Portugal)	2:0
t ₄₅	Half time	HT [2:0]
t ₅₁	Yellow card for Sporting Clube de Portugal	
t ₅₉	Substitution (Sporting Clube de Portugal)	
t ₆₄	Goal (Sporting Clube de Portugal)	3:0
t ₆₅	Substitution (Sporting Clube de Portugal)	
t ₆₆	Substitution (Skënderbeu)	
t ₆₇	Substitution (Skënderbeu)	
t ₆₉ *	Goal (Sporting Clube de Portugal)	4:0
t ₇₂	Substitution (Sporting Clube de Portugal)	
t ₇₅	Substitution (Skënderbeu)	
t ₇₇	Goal (Sporting Clube de Portugal)	5:0
t ₈₈	Yellow card for Sporting Clube de Portugal	
t ₈₉ *	Goal (Skënderbeu)	5:1

was then in a numerical superiority. According to some experts, the final score of the match was premeditated (Table 8.5, scenes 1–5). From t_{55} , players started to underplay (scene 10), and numerous suspicious bets escalated. Bettors seemed aware that more goals would be scored by Dinamo, even when considering that they were in a numerical disadvantage. Betting experts consider that Skënderbeu lost the match on purpose.

Sporting Clube de Portugal vs. Skënderbeu

Played at Lisbon on 22nd October of 2015, the match opposing Sporting Clube de Portugal against Skënderbeu ended up with a full-time result of 5:1. This match was the third match for Sporting Clube de Portugal and Skënderbeu in Group H of the 2015–2016 season of the UEFA Europa League.

Both teams played “normally” during the first half of the game. However, rapidly (t_{24}), a Skënderbeu player seemed to act deliberately wrongly by “having touched the ball with his hand off a cross from his own side’s attacking corner kick” (UEFA, n.d., p. 29). This action took place on a Skënderbeu attack and was penalized by a second yellow card, expelling the player from the pitch (see Table 8.7, scene 7). Skënderbeu was then in a numerical

Table 8.7 Specific script of the match Sporting Clube de Portugal vs. Skënderbeu – proposition

	Scenes	Facets
BEFORE	1 – Willing to fix a match	Decision from Skënderbeu representatives and/or athletes
	2 – Discussing with some athletes of Skënderbeu’s team	
	3 – Accepting the fix	
	4 – Organizing the fix	
	5 – Placing suspicious bets?	
DURING	6 – Beginning the match	Through physical or online betting companies By cash or digital money
	7 – Weakening the team	
	8 – Starting to underplay	
	9 – Placing suspicious bets	
AFTER	10 – Finishing the match	Second yellow card (forward out of the pitch – ten players remaining) From t_{24} to the end of the game Conceded two goals for the opponent team Through physical or online betting companies By cash or digital money For at least six goals scored
	11 – Gaining money	
		Losing the game By cashing out the win (cash or digital money)

disadvantage. Before the half-time break (t_{38} and t_{41}), Skënderbeu conceded two goals scored on penalties (scene 8). Experts considered that Skënderbeu played at their poorest during the second half and conceded three other goals from Sporting's team. From t_{69} , numerous suspicious bets were placed for at least six goals to be scored (scene 11). In the last 12 minutes, large amounts of money were being bet at an international scale. They were particularly fruitful regarding gains of bets (scene 11). At the same time and according to betting experts, some of Skënderbeu' players underplayed and had an overall suspicious behavior.

Skënderbeu against FC Lokomotiv Moskva

The match Skënderbeu vs. Lokomotiv Moskva, played in Albania on 10th December 2015, ended with a full-time result of 3:0 (Table 8.8). This match was the final match for Lokomotiv Moskva and Skënderbeu in Group H of the 2015–2016 season of the UEFA Europa League competition.

According to experts, both teams played on a similar level. FC Lokomotiv scored its first goal at t_{18} . According to some experts, Skënderbeu's athletes played poorly, enabling FC Lokomotiv to score easily. Right after this goal (from t_{18}) and, also, particularly in the second half, suspicious bets escalated (Table 8.9, scene 8). These bets were placed to gain money for two more goals to be scored, which happened at t_{88} and t_{90} . In the last 10 minutes of the game, two different patterns of suspicious bets appeared: one “on a total of three goals being scored” and the other one “on Skënderbeu losing the match by at least a two-goal margin” (UEFA, n.d., p. 31).

Table 8.8 Moments of the match – Skënderbeu vs. FC Lokomotiv Moskva

<i>Time</i>	<i>Actions</i>	<i>Score</i>
t_0	Beginning of the match	
t_5	Yellow card for FC Lokomotiv	
t_{18}^*	Goal (FC Lokomotiv)	0:1
t_{32}	Yellow card for Skënderbeu	
t_{36}	Yellow card for FC Lokomotiv	
t_{45}	Half time	HT [0:1]
t_{50}	Yellow card for FC Lokomotiv	
t_{72}	Substitution (Skënderbeu)	
t_{75}	Substitution (FC Lokomotiv)	
t_{77}	Yellow card for FC Lokomotiv	
t_{82}	Substitution (FC Lokomotiv)	
t_{82}	Substitution (Skënderbeu)	
t_{89}	Goal (FC Lokomotiv)	0:2
t_{90}	Goal (FC Lokomotiv)	0:3
t_{90+1}	Substitution (FC Lokomotiv)	

Table 8.9 Specific script of the match Skënderbeu vs. FC Lokomotiv Moskva – proposition

	Scenes	Facets
BEFORE	1 – Willing to fix a match	
	2 – Discussing with some athletes of Skënderbeu's team	
	3 – Accepting the fix	
	4 – Organizing the fix	
	5 – Placing suspicious bets?	Through physical or online betting companies By cash or digital money
DURING	6 – Beginning the match	
	7 – Starting to underplay	Conceding goals during the match (three suspected goals)
	8 – Placing suspicious bets	Through physical or online betting companies Two types of bets: three goals to be scored and Skënderbeu, loser from at least two goals By cash or digital money
AFTER	9 – Finishing the match	Losing the game
	10 – Gaining money	By cashing out the win through physical or online betting companies; by cash or digital money

General script

Skënderbeu used roughly the same *modus operandi* when fixing all four matches. The only difference lies in the presence or absence of expelling a defender of Skënderbeu from the pitch. In all four matches, athletes underplayed in the second half to lose the match by scoring or conceding a specific number of goals. Consequently, researchers merged the four scripts into a general scrip, presented in Table 8.10.

The analysis of the data led us to define five main scenes which are (1) the planning, (2) the preparation, (3) the placement of bets, (4) the match manipulation, and (5) the disposal.

Planning a betting-related fix required several parameters including people willing to fix matches for betting purposes (i.e., cast). In this case study, three people (i.e., two insiders and one outsider from Skënderbeu) were identified by UEFA as the lead offenders. These include two high-ranking Skënderbeu representatives and one high-ranking public official. These three individuals planned, organized, operated, and led the fixing scheme. In order to fix a match, fixers need at least one athlete on the field to manipulate entirety or parts of the game

Table 8.10 Main script of the Skënderbeu scheme into the four match-fixing activities – proposition (adapted from Alonso Berbotto and Chainey, 2021).

	Planning	Preparation - Prerequisite	Placement of bets	Match manipulation	Disposal
Acts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identifying the match to be fixed Recruitment of individuals to support the activities (players, coaches, officials) Selection of the individuals to place bets Communication with the selected individuals to plan the fix 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Granting team qualification to the next round of UCL Weakening the team (red cards) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identifying betting markets Each selected individuals place their bets in specific betting markets Monitoring the betting markets during the match: ensuring profitability when placing the bets (before and/or during the match) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Underplaying Behavior adapted to the bets' specifications Conceding and/or scoring a specific number of goals Losing the match 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Retrieving money from betting companies
Activities and conditions					
Equipment and opportunities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internal structure of the club: consenting individuals for fixing matches → individuals having already been involved in fixes → individuals willing to fix future matches 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> During the match: scoring the minimum number of scores required to assure its sporting qualification (if relevant) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Before and during the match Money Betting accounts (from different betting markets) Bank accounts / Rechargeable credit cards / Debit cards / Cryptocurrency / ... 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weakened team Deliberate "wrongdoings" (inappropriate behavior on the field) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Betting accounts (from different betting markets) Bank accounts / Rechargeable credit cards / Debit cards / Cryptocurrency / ...
Cast	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lead offenders (high-ranking Skënderbeu' representatives and high-ranking official) Co-offenders (insiders from betting companies, players, high ranking public officials) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Co-offenders (players) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lead offenders (fixing managers) Co-offenders (betting partners) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Co-offenders (players) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lead offenders Co-offenders (insiders from betting companies, players, high ranking public officials)

(Caneppele et al., 2021). Some players and a coach were recruited by the lead offenders to be integrated in the club. The new coach was recruited knowing he already had a past with match-fixing activities. By taking part in the offense, players and coaches are identified as co-offenders. Some players/officials acted as key actors in a fixing scheme as they have big responsibilities in the field. By recruiting Skënderbeu's coach, the captain (a striker), defenders, and the goal-keeper, lead offenders have created a strong network of on-field and off-field fixers (i.e., co-offenders).

Finally, every individual aware of the fix and deliberately placing bets to gain money is identified as a "betting partner" which is a subdivision within the co-offender's category. Please note that one role can be assigned to several individuals and one individual can have multiple roles. For example, lead offenders can also be betting partners as they placed bets to make money.

To increase the chance of earning money by losing the match without being discovered and risking being sportingly disadvantaged (balance between potential risks and benefits), some parameters can be secured before placing bets and/or before the match begins. This scene is also called "preparation - prerequisite". For example, when Skënderbeu was in risks not to pass to the second sporting round (see the match Crusaders vs. Skënderbeu), players secured its place by scoring two goals. This achievement was possible thanks to sporting opportunities involuntary afforded by the opponents. Skënderbeu's players had then the freedom to lose the match on purpose without putting their sporting rank at risk. Getting an early red card (at t_{11} for the match opposing Crusaders and Skënderbeu and t_{23} for the match Sporting Clube de Portugal versus Skënderbeu) gave players an excuse to play poorly and concede goals. This behavior limits the risk to get suspected of fixing the game.

Once all these parameters are set, people can safely place their bets through online websites or physical bookmakers. Please note that people can bet even before the beginning of the match. Thus, by placing bets before the sports parameters are set up, bettors take the risk of losing money. In this scheme, lead offenders and co-offenders betted both before and during the match. Apart from players on the field, coaches, high-ranking Skënderbeu representatives, high-ranking public officials, and everyone being aware of the fix can bet live. Note that it is possible to bet through multiple websites in a short period of time, increasing the potential gains. Depending on the online betting platform, it can be possible to bet large amounts of money at once.

In this study, we consider that match manipulation happens when Skënderbeu's players attempted or succeeded to behave according to the instructions discussed with the lead offenders. In fact, players underplayed and adapted their behavior according to the expected outcomes.

In these four cases, patterns found in betting markets served as indicators, indicating which parts of the game were known in advance. The success of match-fixing attempts depends on sporting opportunities and is not fully controlled by co-offenders (players on field). As a result, failing fixes are possible.

In all these four matches, most of the suspicious bets escalated in the second half when players underplayed the most. Once the match was over, people who had bet (either in physical infrastructure(s) or online) collected their gains.

Traces

Match-fixing is a complex phenomenon to prove as it is difficult to determine whether specific moments and actions were intentional or unintentional. From forensic science perspective, it is not possible to conclude whether an action was committed intentionally or not. It is up to the judge (or to arbitrators from CAS) to adjudicate. However, by using a collection of traces and information, investigators can reconstruct past events, as closely related to reality as possible. In this study, we constructed tables with traces to give an overview of what traces can be encountered during investigations. The following sections are lists of traces which can be searched on match-fixing investigations.

The following tables are purely descriptive and must not be considered exhaustive. As Langlois (2018) explained, investigators must be careful about the relevance of some traces. Interpreting traces must be done with caution and even more when it comes to digital traces. In fact, one's biological identity is not equal with his/her online identity. A biological identity has attributes such as fingerprints or DNA profiles, while an online identity is a chosen identity with attributes such as pseudonym, username, or password (Koops et al., 2009). It is possible to create betting accounts using a fake identity or non-identifying pseudonyms (Langlois, 2018). While it is possible to link a pseudonym to an online activity, it remains delicate to link a pseudonym to a person without having material traces confirming the identification.

As police and integrity officers do not have the same investigative powers, some of the following traces can be legally researched by law enforcement only. Some traces and information (even concerning the public ones) are only available by using judicial procedures. Research processes must be discussed with law enforcement and/or lawyers before starting the investigation.

Tables of traces are presented hereafter (see Tables 8.11–8.16). They are adapted from the study conducted by Langlois (2018).

Table 8.11 presents some traces or information to be encountered when players are fixing the match. These traces can be encountered before, during, and after the match. However, as match-fixing happens directly during the match (all other activities are referred to as pre-phase and final phase), most relevant traces related to the match-fixing itself will be created during the match. These traces can be found in the physical world, both on field with the video of the match and off field when looking for potential court-siders. Moreover, analyzing betting markets (through odds variations, for example) can help investigators detect suspicious trends. Traces of match-fixing activities are a solid base to start an investigation and are useful for the crime reconstruction, regarding players' and/or referees' behavior.

Table 8.11 Example of match-fixing traces (and information) that could be found during the investigation

<i>Information and/or traces</i>		
Match-fixing activity (during the match)	On-field	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Video of the match (analysis of players and referees' behavior) – Recording of referee's decisions and other relevant actions – Physical movement of players (for biomechanical analysis)
	Off-field	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Video of the crowd (looking for court-siders)
	Online	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Betting markets (odds, betting operators proposing bets, not proposing bets, or getting out of the market during the match)

Table 8.12 presents the potential traces to be encountered when focusing on betting companies. By looking at a commercial register, it is possible to identify business owners and shareholders and to know sales revenues (being potentially available on legal entities' forms depending on countries' legislations). Traffic numbers, concerning online betting companies, are available through open-source research. Traffic numbers can inform whether the traffic seems logical or, on the contrary, if it seems suspicious (for example, with people consulting the website only when it comes to betting on fixed matches).

Table 8.13 presents the potential traces and information being encountered in betting activities.

The traces can be encountered while the crime has not been committed yet. By monitoring these markets (in both physical and online bookmakers), it is sometimes possible to detect suspicious betting behavior. These traces can lead to the identification of people being (directly or indirectly) involved in the fix and can help investigators understand the specific criteria of the fix (by scoring a specific number of goals, for example).

Financial transactions are very informative even if the crime has not yet been committed. Moreover, as Langlois (2018) outlined in her study, financial transactions are interesting as some payments (such as wire transfers and credit or debit card) provide direct information on the identification of bettors and/or fixers. They also provide direct links with criminal activities.

Information coming from social media is interesting in terms of identifying the networks (based on the assumption that these people are using social media). Investigators can assess whether fixers are related and how close they are (by analyzing pictures, for example). While the absence of "mediatized" relations through social media does not mean these people do not actually know each other, the

Table 8.12 Examples of traces (and information) from betting companies that could be found during the investigation

Facets	Information and traces	
Physical	Bookmakers	Information registered in commercial register information <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Legal form – Date of registration – UID – Identification number – Company name – Head office – Object of the company – Partners people having signing capability + associated functions
Online	Betting companies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Domain name – Names of the domain name' holder – Betting Registry – Phone numbers – Addresses – Email addresses – TVA ID – IP addresses – Traffic numbers (through open source)

Table 8.13 Examples of traces (and information) from betting activities that could be found during the investigation

Facets	Information and/or traces	
Physical betting company	Bookmakers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Betting tickets – Receipts (including means of payment) – Interview of the employees – Images from security cameras (if relevant)
Online betting company	Via a computer or a mobile phone	<p><u>Data available by the site provider:</u></p> <p><i>Betting accounts – Profile</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – First name and name – Email address – Phone number – Country of nationality <p><i>Account information:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Pseudonym – Count ID – Currency – Date of the account creation – Last login date <p><i>Financial transaction</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Credit card/rechargeable card information – Account balance – Betting history

Table 8.14 Examples of traces (and information) from financial transactions that could be found during the investigation

Facets	Information and traces	
Cash	No trace or information	
Credit/Debit Card^v	Copy of the receipt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Date and hour of the transaction – Geolocation of the transaction – Type of the card (Visa, SeaCard or American Express...) – Account number Authorization number – Approval Code – References – Transaction type
PayPal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Email address for PayPal – PayPal receipt (connected by the items and the purchaser's account) – Records of the purchases provided by PayPal 	
Wire transfer^b	<i>Sender information:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Name of the sender's bank – Full name – Account number 	<i>Recipient information:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Name and address of the bank – SWIFT code – ABA routing number
Cryptocurrency^c	Bitcoin Ethereum Monero Zcash	<i>Wallet information:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Blockchain – Sender and Beneficiary codes – Sent amount Smart contracts No trace or information: Monero claims to be secure, private, untraceable and fungible, using three privacy technologies. "These hide the sender, amount and receiver in the transaction" "Zcash payments are published on a public blockchain, but the sender, the recipient, and amount of a transaction remain private. (...) users can choose to send cash privately or publicly"

^aSee https://pe.usps.com/text/imm/immcl_008.htm and <https://cns.usps.com/cfo-web/labellInformation.shtml>, (2018).

^bSee <https://www.bankofamerica.com/deposits/wire-transfers-faqs/> and <https://www.currencytransfer.com/faq/bank-details-required> (2018).

^cSee <https://acheterbitcoin.pro/guide-ethereum-debutant-tutorial/>, <https://getmonero.org/get-started/faq/index.html> and <https://z.cash/technology/index.html> (2018).

Table 8.15 Example of traces (and information) from social media accounts that could be found during the investigation

<i>Facets</i>	<i>Information and traces</i>	
Online	Computer and/or phone	<p><i>Depending on settings (public or private) – profile:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Username – Name – Date of creation <p><i>Content:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Picture(s) (with date) – Posts (with date) – Shares (with date) – Relatives (including, among other social media, “friends” on Facebook and followers on Twitter or Instagram) <p><i>Data available by the site provider:</i></p> <p><i>Formal identity:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Full name – Address – Phone number – Credit card number if available – IP address

Table 8.16 Examples of traces (and information) that could be found during the investigation when focusing on means of communication

<i>Facets</i>	<i>Information and traces</i>	
Internet	Email	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Email address – Destination address – Information contained in the header – Content of the conversation – Timestamps – Return path – Source code of the header – IP
Phone	Content	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Phone numbers – Contacts – Calls: incoming number, outgoing number, call frequencies, duration of call – SMS: content, incoming number, outgoing number, text frequencies – Emails – Other chats conversations
Face to face		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Recordings (videotaping or wiretapping)

presence of pictures with two individuals together is a solid indication. However, investigators must be cautious regarding links based on people being “friends” or people “following” a specific individual. This link does not provide information of true/real relationships.

Traces created by communication can help investigators understand how people are involved in the scheme, know what gains have been obtained, how much money they made (through betting), how many matches have already been fixed, and how often. Moreover, knowing the content of conversations can help investigators identify and differentiate lead offenders from co-offenders as well as help better understand how they interact with each other.

Discussion and conclusion

This chapter suggests that bringing together criminology and forensic sciences frameworks can help develop the match-fixing investigation capacity. Based on a case study involving Skënderbeu, we analyzed four matches that were fixed, producing four crime scripts and a general script. The general script highlights the use of five main acts while fixing games (i.e., the planning, the preparation, the placement of bets, the match manipulation, and the disposal).

By analyzing the *modus operandi* used by fixers and examples of traces that could be encountered by investigators, this contribution opens new perspectives in sporting investigations by integrating criminal intelligence in the investigative process (Rossy, 2011; UNODC, n.d.). Criminal intelligence is a product of crime analysis. It improves the understanding of criminal phenomena and their characteristics, including the number of people involved in the fix, size of groups, roles of people, types of match-fixing (betting or sporting related) depending on the stage of the sporting season, and *modus operandi* used by fixers. Once these characteristics are known, criminal intelligence can support both the planning of efficient operational measures to reduce match-fixing activities and the presentation of evidence before courts in a structured way (Birrer, 2010).

The Skënderbeu case (with 53 fixed matches) was handled by the UEFA Control, Ethics, and Disciplinary Body and the sanctions were confirmed by CAS. In this study, we considered the UEFA reports and CAS jurisprudence as valuable and reliable sources. Despite the relevance of the UEFA report, its exhibits were unavailable. Among other types of documents normally present in exhibits, the investigative reports (from the national police), videos of matches, BFDS' reports, and some website articles were valuable to complete our analysis and enrich the findings (whether on scripts or by completing tables related to traces).

In this contribution, four matches have been analyzed, resulting in four specific scripts and a general script. While this research is based on four matches only, it provides a valuable basis for match-fixing analysis. By integrating criminological and forensic science perspectives to analyze fixed matches, this chapter enriches the current knowledge on the *modus operandi* used by some fixers. In particular, by combining the concept of trace, this contribution offers an interesting approach to both public and private entities when investigating match-fixing cases. This contribution showed the value of a combined perspective (criminology and forensic sciences) and it used some cases as an example. For these reasons, our findings are only partially generalizable. All the analyzed matches were fixed by

losing the game and scoring a specific number of goals. As fixing can encompass several activities including winning the game or conceding a corner to the opponent team, it would be relevant to extend this study by scrutinizing other cases. Including other fixed matches and producing further scripts would complement the research and provide a better understanding of the crime commission processes used by fixers.

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Crime Triangle Theory and Match-Fixing in Brazilian Football

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Introduction

This study aims to explore a theoretical approach widely used in criminology (i.e., crime triangle theory or routine activity theory) and its analytical potential to improve our understanding about the set of circumstances surrounding match-fixing. To do so, this study applies the crime triangle theory to the case of match-fixing in professional football (soccer) in Brazil.

Match-fixing can be defined as “an arrangement or irregular alteration of the course or result of a sporting competition or any of its particular events (e.g. matches, races etc.) in order to remove all or part of the uncertainty normally associated with competition” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013:13). The present analysis is circumscribed to match-fixing related to sports betting, understood as any type of manipulation aimed at financial profit through sports betting (Costa, 2018; Frenger et al., 2019). It occurs when a third party, usually a bettor outside the sporting event, contacts athletes, referees, coaches, or club directors to try to change the final result or some element of the football match to obtain a particular advantage.

To expand our understanding of this phenomenon, the theory of routine activities, also known as “theory of the criminal triangle”, is applied in this study. This theory investigates criminal events in their relationship with the environment in which they occur and emphasizes the macro processes that may explain them. The theory proposes to focus on large-scale patterns and the characteristics of the illegal event scenario, which brings together three elements: (a) motivated offenders, (b) available victims, and (c) a lack of surveillance. This approach seeks to deviate from the simple focus on the illegal agent and their behavior, by highlighting other nuances and patterns that generate opportunities for crimes to take place (Felson and Boba, 2010).

This study tries to screen the feasibility of this theory from an *economical* Global South example – but *Global North* in footballing terms (see Petersen-Wagner et al., 2018) – in particular, by using Brazilian professional football as a *case*. In Brazil, football has been increasingly targeted by match-fixers since the 2000s; the most famous event occurred during the 2005 Campeonato Brasileiro and became known as the *Whistle Mafia*. In 2016, the Brazilian Federal Police identified the

activity of an international group in manipulating sports results in five federal states that culminated in the outbreak of *Game Over Operation*. In 2018, four more cases were reported, involving minor state leagues. For this case study, official documents from police investigations and journalistic reports that addressed the cases mentioned above were analyzed. Seven interviews were conducted with agents in charge of preventing the manipulation of results in Brazilian football.¹

The theory of routine activities or “criminal triangle”

Match-fixing has usually been understood from an economic approach. Inspired by the economic model of crime (Becker, 1968) and using different tools and models, authors such as Caruso (2009), Preston and Szymanski (2003), Maennig (2008), Scoopa (2008), Hakeem (2013), and Boeri and Severgnini (2013) assumed that illegal activity results from a utilitarian calculation, in which the involved actors consider each alternative action and decide for the potentially most advantageous one in relation to the associated risks. In short, “the decision over investing money and energy in regular match-fixing is based on a continuous evaluation of the costs and benefits of the legal versus illegal activity” (Boeri and Severgnini, 2013: 108).

Despite the insights produced by these studies, the economic model has been widely criticized for being interesting but limited. Associated remarks mainly concern the restriction of this perspective to the motivations and behaviors of the agents involved. Moreover, based on these assumptions, proposals to tackle the problem of match-fixing would be limited to penal sanctions as ways of producing counter motivation to offending behavior.

In this section, we briefly develop the elements of the theory of routine activities, an approach from the field of criminology, also known as “theory of the criminal triangle” (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Rather than emphasizing the characteristics of offenders, it seeks to shift the focus to the circumstances in which crimes occur and the organization of the social institutions that facilitates their occurrence. This basic assumption derives from antecedent sociological theories, which studied the relationship between urban structure and criminal patterns. In short, the criminal triangle theory focuses on criminal variations that can be observed in the different spaces and environments.

The theory of routine activities is applied to a diverse criminal analysis field. However, its simplicity is rated as a limit since the theory does not necessarily try to explain the causes of criminality. On the other hand, its pragmatic inclination enabled the development of a wide range of crime prevention strategies (Felson, 2008). Traditionally, it is scoped to urban “contact” crimes, such as robbery. More recently, other coverings have allowed to explore the characteristics of different environments of criminal opportunities, such as cybercrimes and white-collar criminality. Match-fixing could be envisioned as an additional arena of possible application, as we argue here.

The theory stresses that every criminal event, despite its diversity, requires at least a potential offender, that is, an individual or group inclined to commit the action and the ability to perform it. In addition, an available target, whose position in space or time puts them at risk of suffering the “onslaught” of the potential offender. Both need to “converge” in time and space for crime to happen. The third element is the lack of surveillance, or the “absence of a capable guardian” which could prevent the occurrence of the crime. It refers to the effectiveness of surveillance and can be anyone or anything, including not only the “professionals” of security but also ordinary people who are in a position to prevent the action. The installation of a surveillance camera on a public road characterized by a large number of thefts would provide, for example, a situation of effective surveillance. As well as any kind of control provided by ordinary people present in the everyday scene (Felson, 2008).

The pattern of routine activities is also related to the attributes of the targets that generally reflect their value in terms of material or symbolic desirability, visibility, and physical access, be it a person or an object. For example, everyday activities cause the allocation of people and objects in visible and accessible places and periods. Therefore, the timing of work, leisure, and mobility activities are central to explain the concentration of criminal events (Felson, 2008).

The analytical task of this theoretical proposal is to understand the patterns and characteristics of criminal events that are related to these elements, and how illegal activities carve new niches in the broader system of social activities (Felson and Boba, 2010). Hence, in the following sections, we detail the mechanisms through which the social structure in Brazil changes the conditions of professional football scenarios and expand the creation of opportunities for the occurrence of match-fixing.

The new conditions of Brazilian football and the creation of opportunities for match-fixing

According to criminal triangle theory, criminal variation and tendencies stem from changes in trends and patterns of “routine activities of everyday life”. Their structure influences criminal opportunities, thus affecting these trends (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson, 2008; Felson and Boba, 2010). Thus, it is necessary to consider that situations and scenarios that produce illegal activities are delineated according to standards that indicate how people interact in the physical environment and provide greater or lesser opportunities for the occurrence of crimes, including match-fixing.

The nature of match-fixing in the present day arises from socioeconomic changes that have affected the sports environment since the 2000s. Although probably as old as organized sport itself, match-fixing has become much more frequent with globalization, the liberalization of markets, technological changes, and the increase in consumerism. These large-scale changes affected the sports scene and the incidence of match-fixing, favoring its occurrence in the twenty-first

century. The number of cases registered since the turn of the century point to a significant increase. As this new social structure expands the conditions for its occurrence, it sets agents and targets to meet in space and time.

According to Statista (2021), the legal online gambling market is expected to grow around 55% during the next two years (2019–2023) to over US\$90 billion, coming closer to 15% of the total gambling market (Statista, 2016). Moreover, the lack of regulation in these markets – 80% of operators are illegal (International Center for Sport Security, 2014) – coupled with the high financial volume they handle – the illegal market itself generates approximately 1 trillion euros a year² (Andreff, 2016) – attracts the attention of organized crime, which exploits the sport industry's vulnerabilities in order to influence match results. In Brazil, despite online sports betting not being legalized, it is estimated that this market moves around US\$1.32 billion per year (Gamebras, 2017). Moreover, it is important to highlight that even not being able to operate in the Brazilian market, three global online sports betting platforms have currently their brands exposed in perimeter boards across stadia during Campeonato Brasileiro's matches (see Gamebras, 2020).

Potential offenders

As considered above, potential offenders are agents with motivations to commit illegal actions. In the cases of match-fixing analyzed in Brazilian football, we identified two different types of potential offenders: i.e., local bettors who seek out sports professionals in order to fix matches to obtain personal gains related to betting and organized international groups (i.e., syndicates) specialized in match-fixing.

Local gamblers emerged in only two of the six cases studied. In the *Whistle Mafia case* (2005), a gambler approached two referees in order to fix football matches in the top two divisions of Brazilian football.³ In the *Rio Branco Team case* (2018), one of the club's athletes was approached by a local bettor to fix a match against Londrina EC, in the Paraná State League. This athlete then passed the offer to four teammates, who communicated to the president of the club. The amounts offered were up to US\$1,600 for each athlete who would collaborate with a defeat of their club.

International syndicates appear in the other four cases analyzed in this study, evidencing that large organized groups responsible for fixing football matches around the world are present in Brazil and operating in Brazilian football. The emergence of this type of offender can be credited to aforementioned changes in the sports environment that took place during the last decades. They usually operate from South Asian countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and China and boast sophisticated ways of acting, as we show in the following paragraphs (Costa, 2018; Hill, 2013; Interpol, 2014).

In *Game Over Operation* (2016), the participation of an international syndicate in three states in the country was identified.⁴ The group offered between US\$10,000 and US\$20,000 per match for teams to lose by elastic scoreboards.⁵ The investigations from the Public Attorney Office of the State of São Paulo

discovered the adoption of typical methods of organized crime, such as intent to profit, hierarchy, and division of tasks on national and foreign soil (Ministério Público do Estado de São Paulo, 2016). Also, they have uncovered that the syndicate was related to Asian groups who would act as intermediaries (brokers) in connecting them to people involved in Brazilian football to present their proposals, especially former athletes with a history of working in Asian football. Two Malaysian citizens were considered the heads of the organization in Brazil, one of them previously accused of involvement in match-fixing in Indonesia. They were, however, subordinated to an international mafia group not identified by the Brazilian authorities (Tempo, 2015).

In *Estanciano Team case* (2018), the team's coach was approached by the club's president and two other men who presented themselves as former football players and representatives of a group that controls a Chinese gambling website. The amount of US\$2,200 was offered to the coach and an additional US\$700 to each athlete who would collaborate for the team to lose in the debut match of the São Paulo U20 Football Cup of 2018. The club would receive an extra US\$9,000 in the agreement. The coach claimed not to have accepted the proposal and resigned hours before kickoff. The athletes recorded audios of the conversations with the match-fixers that were delivered to São Paulo football state federation. After disclosing the contents, the club president asked for leave of absence.

In *Barra Mansa Team case* (2018), the football manager and the club president were denounced for offering the club's athletes a financial advantage (i.e., approximately US\$1,000 for each) to lose by a difference of more than three goals in two matches played in the second division of the Rio de Janeiro state league. The athletes refused the offer. The criminal complaint cites a combination "according to the interest of the international gambling *mafia*" but did not identify the organization in charge (Ministério Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2018).

Finally, in *America Team case* (2018), six athletes were contacted by recruiters to fix two results for the fourth division of the São Paulo state league. The match-fixers promised US\$1,600 to US\$3,200 to anyone who contributed to a defeat for the team by conceding at least three goals. According to the athletes, the bribes were proposed through a video call by three unidentified Chinese men.

Similarly, as uncovered by Costa (2018), the cases under study demonstrate the existence of a complex network of transnational actors who are also operating within different levels of the Brazilian professional and U20 men's football pyramid. This is better evidenced in the *Game Over Operation* (2016) as for those fluid transnational networks to come to fruition it was necessary that some key actors had *dark* social capital (Numerato and Baglioni, 2011; Tzeng and Lee, 2021) in order to connect potential offenders with available and suitable targets. In a way, those transnational syndicates resemble the network enterprise described by Castells (2010) by their structure and cultural dynamics mimicking

a *just-in-time* operation where potential offenders and suitable targets come into contact only for specific moments. Moreover, those *just-in-time* operations are only possible due to advances in information and communication technologies (in particular, the Internet) that enable new spaces of *flow* – and here, we can think not only of syndicate networks but also of the global betting markets – to emerge.

Available and suitable targets

In line with the criminal triangle theory, the pattern of routine activities is related to the availability of targets (Felson, 2008). The allocation of targets in exposed and susceptible environments, such as the sports field, is central to explaining the emergence and concentration of illegal events. In Brazil, according to data from 2015, there were 28,203 professional men's football athletes, working in 776 clubs regularly registered by the Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF hereafter) (CBF, 2016). Of this total, 128 clubs compete in the main national leagues organized by CBF, ranging from the first to fourth divisions. CBF is also responsible for organizing three other tournaments, played by 127 teams in total. In one season, 1,434 matches are played in these seven competitions with most of them being available on free-to-air, subscription, pay-per-view, and/or online streaming (free and with subscription) (Gazeta do Povo, 2019).

Approximately 12,500 professional matches are played in Brazil yearly. Most of the country's 776 football clubs do not compete in national competitions and focus their activities on tournaments within their states. Such competitions are organized by the 27 federations of the states and Federal District affiliated to CBF. In addition to state competitions, the São Paulo Junior Football Cup, formed by athletes under the age of 20 years, stands out as the largest grassroots competition in the country (Marchetti et al., 2021).

These indicators illustrate the magnitude of opportunities for match-fixers. Along with the fact that matches of the aforementioned competitions are available for betting on international websites, this provides greater visibility, exposure, and access to vulnerable targets in sports environment.

In addition to the characteristics of the illegal agent, the theory argues that the occurrence of illegal events is related to targets' attributes (Felson, 2008). People or objects become targets due to their "value" in terms of material or symbolic desirability and susceptibility. In the case of Brazilian football, match-fixing events seem to be concentrated in two main groups of targets, defined by different suitability and vulnerability conditions: i.e., referees who act in the first divisions of the Brazilian League and athletes who play in lower divisions.

Regarding referees, it is known that in large football matches the amount paid to bribe them is much lower than the ones paid to athletes (Boeri and Severgnini, 2013). The importance of their role in a football match and the feasibility to alter its result make them more desirable targets than football players in the eyes

of fixers. Also, referees with financial susceptibilities are more coveted by fixers. Referees who work in the two main divisions of the Brazilian League receive a lower remuneration in comparison with others involved in the game. By way of comparison, the Brazilian first division hosts the ninth competition in the world when considering the highest average salary paid to athletes, with monthly values reaching around US\$80,500 per athlete, or approximately US\$16,100 per athlete in one match.⁶ These amounts are more than ten times higher than those paid to FIFA referees.⁷ So, from a financial point of view, referees are the most susceptible professionals in the main national football competition.

Other additional vulnerability factors concerning the Brazilian elite referees are due to the country's employment law, where they are in informal employment relations with CBF or state federations. Referees are only paid when they actually work in games, meaning that they are deprived of Brazilian basic employee rights, such as vacations, health insurance, or any kind of assistance in case of injury and recovery.

Still more vulnerable are professionals working in other minor divisions. In the totality of the match-fixing cases that occurred in Brazil over the last 15 years within lower divisions, the targets sought by the match-fixers were predominantly athletes. In environments where sports professionals receive low salaries, there is a greater propensity to accept money in exchange for match-fixing (Australian Crime Commission, 2012; Forrest, 2008; Hill, 2008). This is the financial reality of most professional football athletes in Brazil as 82.4% of them receive up to US\$280 per month (CBF, 2016).⁸ Also, according to FIFPro (2016), while the average duration of football contracts in the world is 22 months, in Brazil, it is only 11 months.⁹ In addition, between 2014 and 2016, 52% of athletes have faced back wages in Brazilian football (FIFPro, 2016). In *Rio Branco Team case*, the club was experiencing financial difficulties and athletes' salaries had been delayed for three months. The illegal betting market, in return, has the capacity to remunerate them with values much higher than the salaries paid by clubs – approximately 20,000 dollars – according to the interviewed officer responsible for the police investigation.

In summary, Brazilian footballers who play in lower divisions are highly vulnerable due to conditions of financial insecurity, low wages, and informality. The susceptibility of this situation to match-fixing was also expressed during an interview by the director of the organization responsible for monitoring betting markets in Latin America:

(...) there are athletes who do not earn badly, but they are part of clubs that do not have an annual calendar. The club does not support their contract for a period of twelve months a year, they are not paid for the entire season. This can cause distress, because even though they are not earning so badly, they only have a guaranteed contract for six months.

Another condition that makes Brazilian athletes more susceptible is the lack of understanding about the topic. There is a greater propensity for the occurrence

of match-fixing when sports professionals do not have knowledge about the functioning of this type of crime (Aquilina and Chetcuti, 2013; Boniface et al., 2012). According to the interviews, most Brazilian athletes have no understanding of match-fixing – which can be mistaken for an award or “prize” – and its consequences. This leads to an underestimation of the threatening potential of match-fixing.

Absence of a capable guardian

The term capable guardian refers to effective surveillance, being provided by anyone or anything which is in a position to prevent the illegal action (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson, 2008). In the case of sports environment, surveillance can be supplied not only by professionals in charge (i.e., the police) but also by work colleagues in a position to report what they experienced (i.e., whistleblowers), integrity committees’ members, and other institutional mechanisms (e.g., betting monitoring). The organizations and institutions related to sports environment are of fundamental importance because they are responsible for establishing the conditions for the sporting performance of individuals.

In this sense, it is important to also consider the role of technology in facilitating or preventing the occurrence of illegal events, such as match-fixing. Technology affects the ability of motivated agents to reach their targets as well as affecting the ability of guardians to confront potential offenders. As surveillance cameras, indicated above, illustrate this capability, televised matches are less probable to be targeted by match-fixers.

In the present analysis, three main conditions related to the absence or ineffectiveness of surveillance have been identified to make Brazilian football more susceptible to match-fixing:

- a *Difficulties in policing and investigation:* Police forces are usually important capable guardians of sports integrity, due to the fact that they have technical conditions and legal powers to investigate match-fixing practices (Aquilina and Chetcuti, 2013). However, countries such as Brazil have an overburdened criminal system. For instance, only 27% of all lawsuits that went through between 2009 and 2016 have been resolved (Exame, 2017). Also, knowledge on the subject is not widespread, as the interviewed member of the Integrity Committee from CBF argues:

(...) public authorities care little about this issue. ‘The blanket is short’. We know that there are the many problems in Brazil, in criminal terms. Unfortunately, match-fixing is not seen as a priority (...).

- b *Matches not monitored by sports betting monitoring systems:* Monitoring systems were created to check irregular betting patterns and identify possible cases of match-fixing. These systems have different alert levels based

on volume and types of bets placed by bettors before and during a football match. For example, when a high financial amount is placed on a type of bet, the odds for that outcome will react instantly. Through these fluctuations, it is possible to monitor the movements of odds in the betting markets and identify possibly irregular patterns. However, most matches played in Brazil do not have this type of control as only three state federations and CBF monitor their markets. The main reason alleged by interviewed individuals within those organizations is the high cost of implementing and running those systems.

- c *Non-televised matches*: According to a report by the Financial Action Task Force (2009), irregular betting patterns are often observed in minor tournaments, in which the environment can be fixed more easily. In this type of competition, there are fewer people present at the stadium and matches are not broadcasted on television or via streaming. Brazil is a susceptible country in this sense, as it has the highest number of professional matches in the world.

Conclusion

This study explored the application of the criminal triangle theory – also called routine activity theory – to the environment of betting-related match-fixing, based on an empirical investigation conducted in Brazilian football. This theoretical approach allowed for outlining the presence of the following elements that are recurrent to match-fixing in Brazilian professional football: i.e., the presence of organized international criminal syndicates as main illegal agents that operate through networks; a perceived ideal economical condition of job insecurity, low wages; elite referees and athletes who play in smaller clubs and in minor leagues as the most vulnerable targets; and an environment characterized by mostly non-televised and poorly monitored games. The applied framework is not only justified theoretically by its wide application in criminal sociology but also from an empirical point of view since there is scarce literature on cases that took place in *economical* Global South – but *Global North* in football terms – countries such as Brazil (Petersen-Wagner et al., 2018).

Despite the low number of proven cases in the country so far, it can be noted that the described environment creates many opportunities for international criminal syndicates to replicate their networked *just-in-time* model. It makes match-fixing a social problem that transcends national borders – and, to some extent, reinforces the view that a national confined approach for fighting this social problem is obsolete (see Beck, 2000, for discussions on cosmopolitan turn in the social sciences) – that involves a wide range of actors and institutions following a network design (Castells, 2010). The theoretical framework used in this paper also allows for contemplating strategies and policies to face this particular social problem that are not exclusively focused on tools aimed at punishing offenders, even though legal enforcement could be understood as a fundamental deterrent. It supports the defense of reformulating

institutional and organizational standards, the development of preventive and pedagogical actions, and the development of a better system for whistleblowers to come forward (see Erickson et al., 2019 for a discussion on whistleblowing and doping in sport). All those actions coupled with sanctioning are equally important measures to promote the integrity of and in sport.

Notes

- 1 The following people were interviewed: the federal police officer and the federal prosecutor responsible for investigating match-fixing cases in Brazil; members of the Integrity Committees of Brazilian Football Federation – CBF and São Paulo Federation; the attorney of the Superior Court of Sports Justice; the director of the company in charge of monitoring the sports betting market in Brazil; and a Senator, member of the Senate Sports Chamber.
- 2 To put this figure into perspective: the General Budget of Brazil for 2018 was US\$ 1.12 trillion (Brasil, 2019).
- 3 This was the first case that received attention from media in Brazil. It resulted in the cancellation of 11 matches whistled by Edilson that were played again. None of the three agents involved were arrested because match-fixing was not classified as a crime in Brazil at that time.
- 4 Brazil is composed of 26 states and one federal district.
- 5 Scoreboards such as 3×0 or 4×0 .
- 6 Considering that the main football clubs play an average of five matches per month.
- 7 First division referees get paid between US\$ 655 (CBF category) and US\$ 910 (FIFA category) per match. Assistants receive 60% of the total amount paid to the main referee. The main VAR referee receives between US\$ 364 (CBF category) and US\$ 546 (FIFA category) (CBF, 2020) – those figures are based on the March 2021 exchange rate.
- 8 CBF states that 82.4% of footballers received up to R\$ 1,000 per month. With 2016 exchange rate (R\$1 = US\$ 0.26) that would equate US\$280 per month.
- 9 Of 8,863 football athletes who had ties to clubs, 3,863 (43.5%) have signed temporary contracts with a maximum term of six months. This is also related to the organization of the Brazilian football calendar, for most teams in the country compete in competitions for only a few months of the season. For example, of the 267 clubs that competed in the first division of their states in 2018, 190 (71%) ended their activities at the end of June and only 46 (17%) operated until the last quarter of the season.

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Psychological Perspectives on Match-Fixing in Sport

Existing Evidence and Policy Recommendations

Vassilis Barkoukis and Deirdre O'Shea

Match-fixing has been identified as a global threat to sport integrity (Holden & Rodenberg, 2017). It involves a multifaceted phenomenon that was initially related to manipulating games to obtain benefits from gambling (e.g., Hill, 2010). Still, there is ample evidence that non-gambling-related match-fixing is also highly prevalent and also poses threats to the integrity of sport (Holden & Rodenberg, 2015). As a complex phenomenon, several types of match-fixing and related definitions have been proposed (Van Der Hoeven et al., 2020). The most commonly accepted definition endorsed by sport authorities, such as the International Olympic Committee, is the one provided by the Council of Europe defining match-fixing as:

...an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others.

(CE, 2014, article 3.4)

Match-fixing undermines the ideals of sport in several ways, artificially removing the uncertainty of the outcome, betraying public support, and undermining the values of sport (Tak, Sam & Jackson, 2018). Although the academic community has recently shown an increased interest in studying match-fixing (Van Der Hoeven et al., 2020), there is still only scarce evidence on the psychological processes associated with the decision to engage in match-fixing and the associated recommendations for tackling match-fixing. The present chapter will summarize existing evidence on the decision-making processes underlying match-fixing intentions and behaviors, including a consideration of interactions between the person and the situation, and amalgamate guidelines for using this evidence to develop effective practices and policies against match-fixing.

A psychological perspective on match-fixing: the individual in context

As a science that seeks to understand human behavior and mental processes, psychology is inherently interested in how and why individuals make decisions

and behave as they do as well as the drivers of such decisions and behaviors. These drivers can be a function of the individual, the situation or context within which they find themselves, or some combination of the two (Fleeson & Nofhle, 2008; Ross & Nisbett, 2011).

As a cognitive process of the individual, the decision to engage in match-fixing may be influenced by individual, social, and/or contextual factors. These factors can either exacerbate or mitigate the likelihood of an individual making the decision to engage in match-fixing, but ultimately, these influences and this decision-making process can be explained using psychological constructs. While past research has asked the question as to why people agree to engage in match-fixing (e.g., Carpenter, 2012), much of this reasoning has adopted a case-based approach, rather than applying systematic theory and research from psychology to explain the reasons why individuals decide to engage in match-fixing. However, there are many insights we can glean from psychological science to develop our understanding of match-fixing.

In developing answers to the question as to why athletes may engage in match-fixing, many parallels can be drawn from theory and research investigating the antecedents of counterproductive behavior and organizational corruption (e.g., Ashforth et al., 2008; Martinko, Gundlach & Douglas, 2002). In particular, considering integrative theories of the causal reasoning behind counterproductive and corrupt behavior such as that by Martinko et al. (2002) provides useful insights. Drawing on this approach, corrupt behaviors, such as match-fixing, can be seen as a result of complex interactions between the person and the environment in which the individual's causal reasoning about their environment and expected outcomes influence their behavior (Martinko et al., 2002). The theory by Martinko et al. (2002) proposes that situational influences and individual differences interact to influence two forms of cognitive processing: i.e., perceptions of disequilibria and attributions. The outcome of this cognitive processing, in turn, determines whether an individual chooses to engage in corrupt forms of behavior such as match-fixing.

Individual factors in the decision to engage in match-fixing

Individual differences include factors such as personality, core self-evaluations, integrity, trait affectivity, self-control, gender, perceptions of demands, capabilities and fairness, attribution style, and attribution errors or biases. They describe a micro-level perspective reflecting the awareness that people are agents that can be involved in match-fixing even if they do not directly benefit from it (Ashforth et al., 2008).

Athletes' characteristics have been found to be related with match-fixing. For instance, athletes may participate in match-fixing because they are financially and/or ethically (i.e., endorsing a maladaptive ethical profile) vulnerable (Carpenter, 2012; Tak et al., 2018). There is more robust evidence with respect to the association between athletes' financial status and match-fixing. For instance,

Hill (2015) argued that athletes are more likely to engage in match-fixing around the end of their career in order to obtain more money before retiring from sports. In this sense, match-fixing is viewed as the last source of income for players who perceive themselves as having no further career prospects. In addition, poorly paid athletes or athletes under financial pressure are also considered at risk for match-fixing (Tak et al., 2018). In this case, athletes accept match-fixing offers in order to obtain more money either because they actually need it for their everyday living expenses or out of greed. In this sense, these athletes view match-fixing as a quick fix of their financial position. Considering that the global expansion of betting resulted in an increase in the number of fixed games (Sorbonne-ICSS, 2014), financial vulnerability of the athletes seems to be an important factor in determining decisions toward match-fixing. In fact, Hill (2015, p. 220) suggested that money is “the consistent, almost-universal, motivation for match-fixing”. Furthermore, research has demonstrated that athletes rationally engage in the decision to participate in match-fixing by calculating the costs and benefits of this behavior. In this respect, when monetary and/or career gains are apparent, athletes are more susceptible for match-fixing (Tak et al., 2020).

In terms of other person characteristics, match-fixing seems to be largely unrelated to gender, although Tak et al. (2020) provided preliminary evidence suggesting that females have been approached slightly more and demonstrated slightly more frequent involvement as compared to male athletes. This is an important finding demonstrating that female sports are also at risk for match-fixing. In addition, Tak et al. (2020) indicated that the level and type of sport involvement may be associated with match-fixing behavior. More specifically, experienced and elite athletes as well as athletes from combat sports were approached and participated more often in match-fixing. Although this evidence is based on a small number of athletes self-admitting to their engagement in match-fixing, it reveals a pattern. Match-fixing is more likely to occur in elite sports where more factors are at stake (i.e., money, contracts, betting, fame, and success). In addition, although match-fixing has infected all types of sports (Carpenter, 2012), match-fixing may be more frequent in some sports (Van Der Hoeven et al., 2020). For example, Forrest (2013) suggested that match-fixing has rapidly developed alongside developments in the betting sector, implying that match-fixing is more prevalent in sports where betting exists. In this sense, individual differences pertaining to level and type of sport participation should be taken into account when trying to understand match-fixing behaviors.

Moving to individual differences, meta-analytic evidence suggested a significant association between values and moral thought and action that is values can influence attitudes toward and susceptibility in manifesting an unethical behavior (Feldman et al., 2015). In the doping literature (doping being another example of corrupted behavior), Ring, Kavussanu, and Gürpınar (2020) indicated that athletes endorsing self-enhancement values were more likely to engage in doping. In the match-fixing literature, Van Der Hoeven et al. (2020) argued that some athletes are aware of the ethical concerns associated with match-fixing, but they

rationally decide to engage in this behavior for the benefits they expect to obtain. Thus, it can be assumed that ethically vulnerable athletes are more at risk for match-fixing. Still, further research is warranted in this area.

Lastly, there is some evidence from research into reasons for doping in sport that would suggest that factors pertaining to moral traits and values do play a role. For example, cognitive processes such as moral disengagement, self-regulatory efficacy, moral identity, and moral emotions play a role in doping likelihood in athletes (Kavussanu & Ring, 2017; Mallia et al., 2016; Ring & Hurst, 2019). Research also highlighted that similar factors can play a role in susceptibility to match-fixing (Zaksaitė, 2012). For example, athletes involved in non-betting-related match-fixing showed a lack of moral sensitivity and moral judgment, compared to those engaged in betting-related match-fixing who showed a lack of moral motivation and moral character (Van Der Hoeven et al., 2020). In addition, O'Shea et al. (2021) reported a positive association between moral disengagement and susceptibility to match-fixing. Athletes with higher self-reported moral disengagement were more susceptible to accepting match-fixing offers. Moreover, the effect of moral disengagement on match-fixing susceptibility was moderated by team internal ethical climate, referring to the athlete's perceptions of the organization's support for ethical behavior via reward systems (i.e., rewards and discipline) and the consistency between formal ethical policies and everyday practices and decision-making (Treviño et al., 2008). This finding suggests that in athletes with higher scores on team ethical climate, the association between moral disengagement and match-fixing susceptibility was stronger. This evidence implies that athletes' moral traits and values influence the decision-making process toward match-fixing. Furthermore, athletes use self-defensive mechanisms in order to justify their decision to engage in match-fixing. This way they manage to counter the negative consequences of going against their moral standards and reduce the anticipated cognitive burden (De Cremer & Moore, 2020; Martin, Kish-Gephart & Detert, 2014).

Contextual factors in the decision to engage in match-fixing

Past research suggests that contextual and social variables influence individuals' decisions to engage in match-fixing. These can be macro contextual variables, such as national culture or meso contextual variables such as the team culture (Johns, 2001, 2006). Looking at more macro contextual variables, national cultural context has been found to influence decisions to engage in match-fixing. Lee (2017) reported evidence suggesting that the adoption of a Confucian mentality promoting obedience to the authority may have been associated for a number of match-fixing scandals in Taiwan. This evidence implies that athletes endorsing such mentality develop submissive tendencies and are less likely to resist offers and pressures to fix a game from a club authority, and, thus, deny involvement in match-fixing and report it to authorities.

Lee (2017) also suggested that loyalty to friends was another reason for athletes to engage in match-fixing. Either persuaded by friends or willing to help a friend, several athletes were found in a position to participate in match-fixing although they were against such corruption behaviors. This notion was further supported by Tzeng, Lee, and Tzeng (2020) who investigated the role of loyalty to friends, the so-called Code of Brotherhood, in match-fixing behavior. This study clearly evidenced that athletes endorsing this Code of Brotherhood were more likely to engage in match-fixing if they feel obliged to help their teammates.

The evidence suggests that the normative environment and the motivation to comply with normative pressure can be a strong influence in the decision to engage to match-fixing. Barkoukis, Lazuras, and Kourelis (2020) tested the effectiveness of the theory of planned behavior in predicting match-fixing intentions and provided further support to this notion. In this study, subjective norms emerged as the most important predictor of match-fixing intentions, over and above the effect of attitudes and perceived behavioral control. Meta-analyses with the theory of planned behavior have demonstrated that subjective norms represent the variable with the least predictive ability with health-related behaviors (Hagger et al., 2016; McEachan et al., 2011; Rich et al., 2015). In the Barkoukis et al. study, the high predictive ability of subjective norms denotes that athletes with a high motivation to comply are more susceptible to match-fixing.

As already discussed, athletes may participate in match-fixing because they are financially vulnerable and/or coerced (Carpenter, 2012; Tak et al., 2018). Hence, situational variables such as organizational policies, practices, rules and norms (and violation of these), working conditions, wages, organizational ethics, peer pressure, and organizational punitive measures might play a role and are thus important to consider (Martinko et al., 2002). For example, the organizational structure of a club or sporting authority related to the policies, working conditions, salaries of the athletes, and ethics has been found to influence match-fixing behavior. There are numerous examples of athletes who engaged in match-fixing because of low salaries or delayed payments from the club that resulted in their need to obtain money to cover their expenses (Hill, 2009, 2015). Hill (2015) offers very vivid examples of players who were thinking to engage in match-fixing in order to support their families due to delayed payments from the club. In addition, a club mentality of paying incentive payments to other teams in order to perform well in indifferent games has been reported as a common practice in sport (Hill, 2009). In this case, this club practice establishes the mentality justifying match-fixing to the players; it is acceptable to offer money to another team to play strongly against its opponent (as it actually should). In addition, the lack of fair payments seems to be another club practice that may lead athletes to match-fixing (Hill, 2015).

In addition, several athletes have been coerced in order to participate in match-fixing events. As Carpenter (2012) and Lee (2017) noted, there are instances of clubs and sporting authorities who coerced athletes to fix games either by providing monetary incentives or other benefits. In this line, Boeri and Severgnini (2011) suggested that career promotion was an important benefit for

referees involved in match-fixing. In a similar vein, Moriconi (2018) reported cases of clubs offering future contracts to players in order to fix a game. Besides these and although obtaining monetary gains seems to be the main motive used by a club to convince an athlete to participate in match-fixing, criminal networks associated with the club have been also reported to put pressure on athletes. A notable example is described by Yilmaz, Manoli, and Antonopoulos (2019) involving a criminal network led by the president of a club with the aim to fix games in order for the team to win the championship.

With respect to social norms, the Barkoukis et al. (2020) study clearly indicated the important role these norms may play in the decision to engage in match-fixing. Social norms at the distal level (e.g., institutional policies and norms) and/or proximal level (e.g., social approval) seem to be important determinants of the intention toward match-fixing. This evidence supports in western societies what Lee (2017) and Tzeng et al. (2020) suggested as a major determinant for match-fixing in eastern societies, i.e., the important role of normative pressure. Han (2020) further echoed the importance of social norms in determining match-fixing behavior. In his study, the importance of the “small community of footballers” in putting pressure on athletes was highlighted. As Han (2020) advocated, it is difficult for athletes training and living in closed camps with their peers to deny offers for match-fixing.

Interactions between the context and the individual in match-fixing

As Martinko et al.' theory (2002) proposed, in reality, both individual and contextual factors play an interconnected role in the decision-making process to engage in corrupt behaviors such as match-fixing. Synthesizing evidence in the interplay of individual differences and situational variables, Ashforth et al. (2008) made similar observations while theorizing about the causes of corruption by using the metaphors of “bad apples” versus “bad barrels”. They focus on the issue of corruption more broadly, but there are many parallels to the psychological aspects of match-fixing. Inherent in this is that match-fixing entails both a behavior and a process. It is the behavior of an individual, but it is also the illicit use of one's position or power for personal or collective gains, and if left unchecked, it causes the “dangerous, virus-like ‘infection’ of a group” (Ashforth et al., 2008, p. 671).

Much of the analysis of the illegal side of match-fixing can be classified as falling into the “bad barrels” category. For example, the role of professional criminals in match-fixing is well acknowledged and the increase in the prevalence of match-fixing stemming from such causes is proving difficult to address (e.g., Abbott & Sheehan, 2013). Recent evidence suggested that these criminal networks are part of an ecosystem that influences athletes' decision to engage in match-fixing (Caneppele et al., 2020). Furthermore, previous evidence suggested that people with power (e.g., club officials, coaches, federations) put pressure on athletes in vulnerable situations to participate in this activity (Tak et al., 2018).

Experimental research by O'Shea et al. (2021) demonstrated that respondents considered those most susceptible to match-fixing when the reason has something to do with the individual themselves (i.e., when attributing their choice to internal and stable reasons). However, participants also perceived athletes to be susceptible to match-fixing when a request for such comes from someone in a position of power regardless of any perceptions of the characteristics of the individual athlete, pointing the importance of considering both individual and contextual factors. Anticipated emotions negatively predicted match-fixing susceptibility and mediated the effect of attributions and power on match-fixing susceptibility. Anticipating the negative emotions, one may experience if one engages in match-fixing is a protective factor and mitigates the effect of the above.

The role of power is inherent in the “bad barrel” perspective. Power can be defined as the ability to influence the behavior of another person with the intention of achieving specific outcomes (Turner, 2005). The exertion of power largely influences subordinates' cognition, affect, and behavior, diminishing subordinates' attitudes, job satisfaction, intentions, psychological and physical well-being, and performance (Zhang & Liao, 2015). In sporting contexts, power has been predominantly studied with respect to the organizational structure of sport organizations (Doherty et al., 2010; Schulz & Auld, 2006) and gender equity (Burnett, 2001; Burton, 2015; Sibson, 2010). However, power can be derived from a number of sources, all of which may be causes of match-fixing.

Whether stemming from the use or abuse of power, those at the receiving end are left with a sense of powerlessness. Perceived powerlessness due to a lack of control over one's environment is associated with deviant behavior (Bennett, 1998). Martinko and colleagues (2002) proposed that perceived powerlessness is an element in the cognitive processing that may result in deviant behavior, and indeed, there is evidence that athletes may engage in match-fixing for such reasons (e.g., Han, 2020; Yilmaz et al., 2019). In this sense, match-fixing fits within the broader corruption literature, which defined corruption as the illicit use of one's position or power for personal or collective gains (Ashforth et al., 2008).

The use of power can come from multiple sources, and the power of the collective also merits consideration. From a process perspective, corruption can be seen as a virus like in the sense that it can “infect” a group or entire sport and become imbedded in the culture (Ashforth et al., 2008). Power can be exerted from peers (Han, 2020; Lee, 2017), the club (Yilmaz et al., 2019), and groups external to the club/sport organization, such as criminal networks (Moriconi, 2018). The power exerted by peers and clubs has been discussed in this chapter as part of the individual differences and situational factors that can determine the decision to fix a game. However, criminal networks constitute an additional important agent influencing match-fixing behavior. Moriconi (2018) summarized evidence from police authorities suggesting that a large proportion of match-fixing is related to the activities of criminal networks aiming at laundering or gaining more money. Criminal networks influence match-fixing through two main paths. First, they directly enter sports as entrepreneurs or managers (Manoli & Antonopoulos,

2015; Moriconi, 2018). In this case, they try to alter the structure and policies of the club to turn it into a match-fixing-friendly club. Manoli and Antonopoulos (2015) clearly state that on this occasion the club officials exert their power on athletes to oblige them fix games. Second, they indirectly approach sports people (e.g., athletes, coaches, club officials, referees) and influence them to engage in fixing. Manoli and Antonopoulos (2015) reported that, besides monetary gains, the main means these networks use is to pose threats against one's physical safety, family, career, property, and possessions.

From a pragmatic point of view, it is difficult for athletes to avoid such pressure from the club authority or criminal networks. Thus, the effects of perceived powerlessness on behavior signifies an important component of the process of corruption from a psychological perspective (Bennett, 1998; Martinko et al., 2002). According to theorizing on counterproductive behavior (e.g., causal reasoning theory; see Martinko et al., 2002), deviant behavior, such as match-fixing, is determined by the person's beliefs about how the causes of the outcomes influence their behavior and affect. In this case, the pressure from criminal networks that pragmatically, to a large extent, cannot be avoided, disengages athletes from the negative anticipated emotions, and leads to acceptance of match-fixing offers. Athletes feeling powerless to resist tend to justify their choice and, thus, rationalize the ethicality of their choice. In this sense, the interplay of attributing their behavior to an external power and the associated moral disengagement seems to result in higher likelihood for accepting match-fixing offers (O'Shea et al., 2021).

Recommendations and practical implications

This synopsis of the factors that influence the decision to engage in match-fixing points to a number of practical implications that can be used by sport authorities to tackle match-fixing. First, the existing evidence on the interplay between situational factors and individual differences suggests that much can be achieved to eliminate match-fixing through good governance and institutional transparency (Moriconi & Almeida, 2019). For instance, sport organizations should remove and keep out individuals banned for corruption (Lanyon & Goodstein, 2004). Clubs and sport organizations that engage in good governance are expected to decrease the effect of individual differences on match-fixing. Athletes receiving reasonable salaries that are paid on time will be less likely to engage in match-fixing. In the same vein, transparency in the organization's administrative procedures will discourage criminal elements from being involved in the management of these clubs/organizations, and, in case they do, they will prevent them from openly putting pressure to athletes or offering payment incentives to other clubs.

At a macro level, the development of statutes denoting zero tolerance to match-fixing would convey a message that it is not an acceptable behavior in sport organizations. In addition, sport authorities should develop and implement a plan for the control of clubs' and other sport organizations' governance and transparency. Such actions are expected to increase the legitimacy of sport

authorities and give a clear message to various sport actors that match-fixing is not an acceptable behavior in sport, and thus change normative beliefs about match-fixing. Furthermore, sport authorities should also develop positive organizational cultures and effective voice mechanisms that would allow athletes to report match-fixing offers without the fear of retaliation (O'Shea et al., 2021; Verschuuren, 2020). Effective reporting systems are appropriate to tackle the feeling of powerlessness that athletes experience when pressure is put on them by club officials as they give them an alternative way to deal with the offer and, actually, give them the power to resist the offer.

At the level of the individual, education seems to be one of the most important preventive measures for corrupted behaviors, such as doping (Barkoukis, 2015). Similarly, education initiatives on match-fixing need to be developed or intensified. Van Der Hoeven et al. (2020) suggest that different sports face different challenges with respect to match-fixing (i.e., betting-related/non-betting-related) and, thus, anti-match-fixing education should be tailored to address these challenges. Furthermore, effective education should address the individual differences and situational factors that are related to match-fixing. More specifically, a focus on ethics and moral values seems to be an important aspect of education, especially when it comes to non-betting-related match-fixing. Constandt, De Waegeneer, and Willem (2019) and De Waegeneer, Devisch, and Willem (2017) suggested an emphasis on awareness raising of the moral hazards of match-fixing through education on moral reasoning and moral judgment. In addition, moral disengagement should be addressed in these educational campaigns as existing evidence suggests that sport people tend to rationalize and justify their choice to fix a game through moral disengagement mechanisms (O'Shea et al., 2021). Sport people should learn through this education that their reasoning (e.g., pressure from club officials/criminal network, monetary gains, career gains, prevalence of match-fixing) are excuses they use in order to minimize the anticipated negative affect they are about to experience from doing an unethical behavior. Last, education should focus on the sport people's ability to resist the match-fixing. It is very simplistic to assume that knowledge about match-fixing and related concerns will equip them with the necessary skills to resist the offer made by a close teammate, a club official, or a person involved in a criminal network. Especially, when the person gets significant benefits out of it. Thus, educational efforts should include targeted activities to better equip sport people with the skills to effectively address match-fixing offers and report them to the authorities.

Furthermore, sport organizations should endorse management processes characterized by transparency, accountability, and control (Geeraert, 2018). Such processes are expected to protect athletes from the pressure exerted by powerful officials. Furthermore, they would allow for a transparent accountability of incomes and expenses, thus decreasing the possibility of illegal betting, and associated match-fixing. Last, these processes would enable athletes to more easily report match-fixing offers. In this case, athletes will feel more secure that the report will be handled in a transparent fashion and that they will not face retaliation. Overall, education and good

governance of the sport organization are considered important pillars of the efforts for the development of less fixing friendly climate.

Future research on match-fixing from a psychological perspective

Psychological research on match-fixing is still in a fairly nascent stage although there are related areas which provide insights into future directions for research, including doping in sport and the study of corruption in organizational settings. Currently, we have some knowledge of the individual and contextual influences that may drive an individual to engage in match-fixing. However, there is much to do in terms of establishing an empirical evidence base for the effectiveness of strategies and initiatives to curb match-fixing. Thus, there is an urgent need for research to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions and training programs to reduce match-fixing. Crucially, we need intervention research which investigates the effectiveness of initiatives at a variety of levels of analysis, including the sporting organization, team level, and individual level of analysis. At the level of the sport organization, inspiration can be taken from the work of Nielsen and colleagues who have conducted research on evaluating organizational level interventions in workplaces for many years (e.g., Nielsen, Axtell & Sorensen, 2020; Nielsen & Randall, 2013; Randall, Nielsen & Houdmont, 2019). Key to the success of organizational level interventions is to consider process issues, including support across all levels of the sport organization and how the initiatives will be perceived by those involved.

At the individual level, past research has demonstrated that moral reasoning and ethical decision-making can be developed (e.g., Mumford et al., 2008; Seiler, Fischer & Voefli, 2011). For example, Seiler et al. (2011) examined the effectiveness of a one-week training program in moral decision-making in the Swiss Armed Forces. They demonstrated that the strategy-based moral dilemma program resulted in significant improvements in content-related (e.g., moral awareness, quality of moral information processing) and process-related (e.g., situational analysis, development and evaluation of alternative solutions, justification of decisions) aspects of moral decision-making. Furthermore, past educational efforts and interventions aiming at self-efficacy, normative beliefs, and whistleblowing have been found effective in tackling corruption in non-sporting domains (Aremu, 2021; Cailler, 2017; Kobis et al., 2019). Similar types of interventions may hold promise for tackling match-fixing in sports.

Conclusion

Psychological perspectives provide a useful lens to further deepen our understanding regarding why individuals decide to engage in match-fixing. It facilitates a consideration of the role of the individual (bad apples), the situation and context (bad barrels), as well as about the interlinkages between the two to strengthen

our understanding of match-fixing as a form of corrupt behavior. Using this conceptualization allows for practical solutions to be developed that tackle these different aspects and acknowledges how we need a variety of approaches targeted at the context and the individual level in order to successfully address match-fixing.

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Assessing Public and Sports Policies to Tackle Match-Fixing

César de Cima and Marcelo Moriconi

Introduction

Even though match-fixing has been present throughout the history of sports, with some cases even reported in the games of ancient Greece (Huggins, 2018), the phenomenon has undergone a profound reconfiguration in the last few years. The emergence of online sports betting and the creation of new types of bets (e.g. *live bets*, *side bets*, *trading*) opened a Pandora's box that amplified pre-existing ills in sport (Moriconi and Almeida, 2019). Attracted by the deregulation of online gambling markets (Moriconi and Almeida, 2021), the absence of adequate legal provisions to combat this threat in several countries (KEA, 2012), the inability of sports organisations to deal with the criminal nature of this phenomenon (Villeneuve and Aquilina, 2016), or these organisations' reluctance to admit and address the governance failures that have always existed (Andreff, 2019), organised crime saw betting-related match-fixing as an enhanced opportunity to launder money and multiply capital from illicit activities (IOC and UNODC, 2013; INTERPOL, 2013).

Therefore, the expression *threat to the integrity of sports competitions* has gained a new meaning (Anderson, 2011). Due to the strong connection with organised crime, betting-related match-fixing is no longer merely a sports ethics problem, but a problem for the overall sustainability of the sports industry (Bozkurt, 2012; Carpenter, 2012; Council of Europe, 2014; INTERPOL, 2013).

To face the gravity of the scenario and the inadequacy of existing public and sports policies in combating this phenomenon, intergovernmental sports and political organisations have coordinated efforts to reform legislative and disciplinary frameworks. In the case of UEFA, European football's governing body, the adopted solution was the implementation of a *zero-tolerance policy* (ZTP), underpinned by cognitive and normative measures (i.e. educational programmes), preventive measures (i.e. betting monitoring), generative measures (i.e. protected whistleblowing mechanisms) and punitive measures (i.e. reform of criminal and disciplinary frameworks) (European Leagues, 2013).

The zero-tolerance policies implemented by sports governing bodies have been highlighted in the scientific literature. Some authors interpret the

governance reform as a window-dressing strategy, in which sports organisations convey a merely symbolic anti-match-fixing speech. This decreases the pressure from external stakeholders after a set of sports corruption scandals (Verschuuren, 2021), but the organisations do not invest what is needed to achieve the goals inherent to these measures (Tak et al., 2018a). They also convey a confusing message in the discretionary way that they apply their disciplinary framework (Manoli et al., 2021). Consequently, these measures appear more as an attempt at institutional unaccountability (Tak, 2018), rather than as a sincere motivation to protect sports actors and the integrity of sports competitions (Verschuuren, 2021).

However, there is still no solid evidence that helps assess the effectiveness of zero-tolerance policies in inducing compliance in athletes. In this chapter, we contribute to the match-fixing literature by discussing—for the first time—the effectiveness of UEFA’s ZTP in inducing compliance in football players.

The chapter is composed of five sections. We start by framing UEFA’s ZTP within a broader policy context. We then justify the categorisation of Portuguese football as a strategic research site (SRS) to critically analyse the ZTP. We proceed with the analysis of the effectiveness of UEFA’s ZTP in changing football players’ behaviour in Portugal on three different levels: i.e. (a) betting practices, (b) reporting practices and (c) match-fixing practices. In light of Mitchell, Crosset and Barr’s (1999) taxonomic model, we discuss the (in)effectiveness of this policy while suggesting alternative answers. Finally, we will present the conclusions of our findings as well as some avenues for future research in this area of study.

UEFA approach to tackle match-fixing

The ZTP began to take shape in 2007, when UEFA introduced article 50.3 in its Statutes. The rule foresees the possibility of refusing admission to a UEFA competition for a member association or club directly or indirectly involved in match-fixing.

Aware of the criminal dimension of the phenomenon and the imminent dangers to sporting integrity, UEFA created in 2011 a network of Integrity Officers (IOs) involving all member associations. An IO is a correspondent on questions related to match-fixing denouncements and scandals among the member federations, the national law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and UEFA. IOs also play an important pedagogical role, organising and promoting educational sessions targeted at players, referees and coaches.¹

These preliminary steps led to the launch of the ZTP during the XXXVIII Ordinary UEFA Congress, organised in Astana (Kazakhstan) in 2014. The member associations unanimously adopted the resolution “European football united for the integrity of the game”, which provides an action plan to protect sporting integrity. Among other issues, the member associations committed themselves to

- a implement educational programmes to raise awareness among sports stakeholders about the dangers of match-fixing and induce compliance;
- b implement protected reporting mechanisms to report cases of match-fixing;
- c harmonise disciplinary regulations to severely sanction attempts or cases of match-fixing, forbid sports actors from betting on the competitions in which they are involved, and oblige sports actors to report attempts or cases of match-fixing.

Aware that match-fixing implies the collusion of sports actors and that players are one of those who have direct capacity to influence the game (Boniface et al., 2012), UEFA implemented a code of conduct which provides a set of obligations and prohibitions for these actors. Initially, the code of conduct was based on five principles:

- a Be Clean—Never fix an event
- b Be Open—Tell someone if you are approached
- c Be Careful—Never share sensitive information
- d Be Smart—Know the rules
- e Be Safe—Never bet on your sport

This approach would eventually be simplified into what would be called the 3R's campaign: *Recognise, Resist and Report*.

The Astana Congress also represented an important milestone in promoting cooperation and information sharing between sports organisations, public authorities, betting operators, and LEAs. It also marked a step forward in recognising match-fixing as a specific criminal offence within national legal systems. Since the political recognition of the phenomenon in 2007 (European Commission, 2007), several political initiatives have been made in this direction (European Parliament, 2009, 2013; PACE, 2008, 2012). This step would come to fruition with the “Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sport Competitions” (also called the Macolin Convention), established in September 2014. The Macolin Convention represents the first example of shared jurisdiction between sports organisations and states in terms of tackling match-fixing (Serby, 2018).

Portuguese football: An SRS to study the UEFA ZTP

Portugal was the first EU Member State to ratify the Macolin Convention in 2015. Prior to ratification, Portugal was already one of the EU Member States possessing a specific legal regime for the criminal sanctioning of sports corruption offences.² However, the Macolin Convention was the necessary impetus to expand the judicial framework for the crimes of “passive corruption”, “active corruption”, “influence peddling” and “criminal association”. It also provided the opportunity for updating the provisions which punish complicity, the sanctions for the “undue

offer or receipt of advantage” and the practice of betting between sports actors³ and for introducing the obligation for sports federations to implement prevention and education programmes on match-fixing, under penalty of being deprived of funding.⁴

The Portuguese Football Federation (FPF for its acronym in Portuguese) played a crucial part in changing the legal framework governing sports corruption. Law 13/2017 of May 2 came about following the presentation of a bill to the parliamentary groups by Fernando Gomes, president of the Portuguese sports governing body.

In fact, the FPF has been an “exemplary student” in the implementation of the UEFA ZTP. In partnership with the Professional Football Players’ Union (SJPF, for its acronym is Portuguese⁵), the FPF has implemented education and awareness programmes in all clubs of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd national divisions, the Under-23 League and National Teams. To increase their detection capacity, the FPF and the SJPF developed the “Integrity Platform”, a digital channel that allows for anonymous reporting of match-fixing attempts or cases.⁶ In parallel, the FPF signed an exclusive contract with Sportradar to monitor betting patterns in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Division, Portuguese Cup, and Under-23 League. On the disciplinary front, the FPF and the Portuguese Football League (Liga Portugal) included new prohibitions and tougher sanctions in their disciplinary regulations⁷ to dissuade sports players from manipulating results, betting on the competitions in which they are involved, disclosing or using inside information and failing to comply with the duty to report.

Given the political and sporting conjuncture, we can consider the Portuguese case as an SRS⁸ to assess the effectiveness of UEFA’s ZTP in inducing compliance in football players. We found that these actors have received training on the dangers of match-fixing. Moreover, they are aware of the new legal and disciplinary framework and have platforms from which they can anonymously report. But to what extent have these measures generated positive behavioural changes in football players in Portugal?

The effectiveness of the ZTP on behavioural change in football players

Evaluation is an important step in the policy formulation process (Howlett, 2009). It allows for comparisons to be made between the expected and achieved outcomes of a given policy. As such, it is a fundamental condition for policymakers to support decisions, whether they are continuation or readjustment decisions (Hendricks, 2012; Howlett, 2009).

To assess whether UEFA’s ZTP has partially or fully “solved” the match-fixing phenomenon in Portuguese football, we draw inspiration from Vedung’s (2012) *Relevance Model*. In this model, the merit criterion used to assess the effectiveness of policies is their ability to solve the underlying problem.

At the root of the ZTP is the consensus that match-fixing implies the players’ connivance in the manipulation and that the resolution of the problem depends

on their behavioural change. Players should be able to “Recognize” the phenomenon; “Resist” the temptation to bet, to disclose inside information or to manipulate results and “Report” any attempts or case of match-fixing.

Despite the educational and awareness programmes implemented along with the legal and disciplinary reform, we have shown in previous works (Moriconi and Cima, 2020a, 2020b) that football players in Portugal continue putting bets on their sport, on their competition and often on their own matches. They also remain reluctant to report deviant behaviours and match-fixing is a persistent problem according to their own perceptions. These conclusions arise from semi-structured interviews with players, coaches, referees and managers, which were carried out during previous national and international projects funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) and the European Commission through its Erasmus + Sport Programme.⁹

Considering this observation, it is important to explain this behavioural inertia.

Betting practices

There is a considerable gap between UEFA’s discourse and the players’ perceptions of what sporting integrity means. This dislocation helps explaining why players have not changed their betting behaviours. According to the official discourse, punishing the players who bet on their competition is a key premise to protect sport integrity. Those players who place bets on their game may be tempted to deliberately underperform with the objective of winning those bets or they can be aware of a case of match-fixing and place a bet because of this inside information.

However, the interviewed players’ perceptions go in another direction. Gambling is understood as a cultural activity that works as an interaction ritual. In general, betting behaviours are recreational. More than winning money, players have as an ultimate goal of winning internal rivalries about who “knows more about sport” in order to increase their status in the group (Moriconi and Cima, 2020a: 167).

Similar opinions can be found in other countries. After being suspended by the Football Association (FA), former British footballer Joey Barton claimed that betting is “culturally engrained” and that “if they found out everyone who has been betting and cracked down on it, you’d have half the league out”.¹⁰ According to the former player, “match-fixing is wrong”, but “culturally, betting is acceptable”. Players of Portuguese championships also make a distinction between gambling for manipulating and gambling as a recreational practice that, according to their perceptions, does not affect sport integrity. Some players also criticise the prohibition to bet in their own victory and, as Moriconi and Cima (2020a) have shown, there are cases in which this practice is used as a motivational way. The authors describe the case of a team that felt that they were devaluated by bookmakers, due to the low odds they put on its victory. While the odds for victory were unfavourable, the possible monetary gain was favourable. The players trusted in themselves and, in consequence, started to place bets on

their success. It was a motivation for performing at their best and, finally, they played a great championship. On the contrary, all the players interviewed by the authors considered that betting on an own defeat is non-acceptable, even as a recreational practice.

Nevertheless, gambling as a cultural practice can trigger pathological problems. Stillman et al. (2016) warned that players are more prone to gambling addiction than the rest of the population. Too much free time, high financial resources, the taste for sport, and the need for adrenaline are some of the explanatory variables (Lim et al., 2017). Michael Chopra, Matthew Etherington and Andros Townsend are examples of players who lost control and developed gambling problems.

According to Etherington, betting operators cannot be dissociated from the gambling addictions. The former player considers that players are ideal targets because they are *vulnerable youngsters* with “a lot of money”. In certain instances, some operators “come into the club and say ‘you can bet with us’”.¹¹ On the other hand, Joey Barton has had a Betfair account in his name since 2004, registered to his address and validated with his passport, but it was only after placing 1,260 bets that he was discovered.¹² Barton admitted to “doing *things* for betting companies” and that they were paying him “in betting account money—they weren’t informing the FA”.

In Portugal, the situation is quite similar. Several players were surprised when, as part of the prevention campaigns, they were informed that they could not bet on their sport. Some feared disciplinary and legal sanctions because they were betting with their tax data on the regulated market. However, due to the lack of audit and control capacity, it is unlikely that those practices were punished (Moriconi and Cima, 2020a).

This evidence highlights that awareness programmes are—despite their importance—somewhat ineffective in achieving their own objectives. Awareness of the new prohibitions seems to have mainly served to make players aware that they are committing a disciplinary or legal infraction and forces them to develop camouflage strategies. Betting on the unregulated market or betting through an intermediary on the regulated market are some of the options. There are also those who admit that they bet with their tax data in the regulated market because if “the winnings are small”, or “as long as they lose money”, nobody will bother them (Moriconi and Cima, 2020a).

Although cooperation among stakeholders is one of the pillars of the Macolin Convention, betting operators protect themselves with the data protection regime and only provide information on their bettors if they are requested to do so by the police, as part of an investigation. On the other hand, national regulators face a real cat-and-mouse game in the surveillance process of unregulated operators who, in the absence of scrutiny, seize on opportunities arising from several sports-related faults—such as late salary payments—to open the door for greedy players, or those in desperate need, to engage in fraudulent betting (Moriconi and Cima, 2020a).

Reporting practices

One of the biggest obstacles in the fight against (sports) corruption is the so-called “code of silence” (Numerato, 2016). The “code of silence” is an informal rule that discourages the reporting of wrongdoing among a group. Members of a team are expected to turn a blind eye to unethical practices for the perceived good of the collective (Albisu, 2018; Skolnick, 2002; Westmarland, 2005).

Considering that this practice lowers the chances of gathering proofs for investigating, the obligation to report any approach or attempt at wrongdoing has become a priority in UEFA’s integrity measures. However, the level of reporting is still very low and, in several countries such as Portugal, reporting is still considered as a dangerous action that can destroy a career (Moriconi and Cima, 2020b).

The problem of silence has been treated as a phenomenon of individual responsibility. By making players aware of the importance of reporting and by making complicity criminally and disciplinarily responsible, a “morality of principle” is sought to be introduced at the expense of a “morality of loyalty” (Uys and Senekal, 2008: 39).

However, this strategy is limited because it neglects a set of structural issues that underlie the silence. In Portuguese football, the culture of silence is not so much due to a code of loyalty, or an “omertà”, but rather to a set of “public secrets that deliberately acknowledge the existence of informal institutions who create and materialise these dangers” (Moriconi and Cima, 2020b: 55).

In other words, what explains the low number of denunciations is not the fear of psychological reprisals for exposing elements of the group or of physical reprisals for denouncing elements of organised crime, but the awareness that those who denounce may suffer professional reprisals from their own clubs or from sports organisations (Moriconi and Cima, 2020b).

The situation finds its correlation in international examples. In 2011, Simone Farina rejected an offer of €200,000 from Alessandro Zamperini, a former A.S. Roma teammate, to fix an Italian cup match between his team, Gubbio and Cesena. Farina’s report helped reveal the CalcioScommesse scandal and led to the arrest of several people. However, after exposing the dark side of Italian football, Farina ended up retiring at the age of 32 because he could not find any club willing to sign him. Farina was even appointed by FIFA as an ambassador for fair play. But how many players are willing to give up their careers to be a global example of integrity?

Farina’s example can be contrasted with the case of coach Antonio Conte. Conte was suspended for ten months by the Italian Football Federation (FIGC) (his sentence was reduced to four months on appeal) for failing to report an alleged case of match-fixing involving Siena, the club he coached in the 2010–2011 season. After serving his sentence, Conte continued to coach at the highest level of Italian and European football and was not known to have been professionally marginalised in any way.

Football players' perceptions regarding the dangers and advantages of whistleblowing are shaped and framed by real cases such as the ones mentioned above. In Portugal, the “hypocrisy and cynicism” of the official discourses on whistleblowing are admitted by the National Director of the Criminal Police himself. At the “International Conference on Sports Integrity”, Luis Neves referred that those who cooperate with justice are, in many cases, “the only ones condemned”.

Despite this reality being officially recognised, UEFA does not include these problems in its narrative. This deprives the narrative of symbolic value and legitimacy, decreases the acceptability of the formal norms that create the duty to report and decreases the players' trust in sports governing organisations. Consequently, this increases the reluctance of these actors to report on anonymous platforms run by these entities—such as the Integrity Platform. The result is an incoherent policy which, to an extent, may even generate the reverse effect and invalidate the whole awareness-raising process (Moriconi and Cima, 2020b: 63).

Match-fixing practices

In Portugal, the “Jogo Duplo” (Double Game) case is the only betting-related match-fixing case that has come to trial. This case embodies the official ZTP discourse and much of the scientific literature on the subject since it involves a transnational criminal network (Bozkurt, 2012; Carpenter, 2012). This network used national intermediaries with high social capital in football (Costa, 2018; Hill, 2010), to recruit players from secondary divisions (2nd Division) in precarious situations and playing for clubs without sporting objectives (Anderson, 2011; Gorse and Chadwick, 2011).

The “Jogo Duplo” case concerns the 2014–2015 and 2015–2016 seasons, namely, a time when the FPF, Liga Portugal and the SJPF were seeking to adjust to UEFA's recommendations promoted within the Astana Congress.

More than half a decade later, match-fixing is still a ubiquitous phenomenon in the social imaginary of players. In fact, risk factors that are at the genesis of the “Jogo Duplo” process, such as late salary payments, remain present in Portuguese football.

As part of the application process for the 2020–2021 sports season, Liga Portugal prohibited Vitória Futebol Clube—SAD¹³ and Clube Desportivo das Aves—Futebol SAD from competing in professional competitions (i.e. the 1st and 2nd divisions) for failing to meet several criteria, such as the non-existence of debts to players, coaches and staff. During the 2019–2020 season, Aves' situation was particularly serious. On April 29, 2020, an audio was published in which, allegedly, the Executive Director of Aves' SAD, Estrela Costa, argues with Wei Zhao, president of the structure, accusing him of “swindles” and uttering alarming phrases such as “Three games you sold”, “Three games you bet” and “Three games you made my team lose”.¹⁴ During that season, several players from

Aves' Under-23 and senior squads were owed several months of wages. Some even feared being evicted from their homes for having rent arrears.¹⁵

During the Covid-19 pandemic period, this was the norm in the second divisions. The SJPF president revealed the existence of “human dramas” such as “deprivation of financial resources” to meet the “most basic needs, such as food”.¹⁶

There is no evidence that any player from Aves or any other club has rigged a game. The point is that the situation they were put in increased their vulnerability to do so. Former players like Mario Čižmek went through a similar situation with an unfortunate outcome. The former Croatian player went unpaid for 14 months while playing for NK Sesvete, a club fighting to stay in the 1st division. Faced with lengthy legal procedures to terminate his contract and collect the money owed, Čižmek became involved in a match-fixing case.¹⁷

Another risk factor highlighted in the “Jogo Duplo” affair is the lack of competitiveness and interest in the matches that were manipulated. According to a key informant,¹⁸ the indictment of the case refers to a club X that had accepted to fix and drop a game but, finally, took a step back because it still needed one more point in this game to avoid relegation.

Since “Jogo Duplo”, the level of distrust in Portuguese football has increased significantly. Players admit to having experienced “strangely easy” game and to being aware of clubs from lower divisions “making a season’s worth of money” in the first qualifying rounds of the Portuguese Cup. In these cases, the involvement of organised crime is not acknowledged. It is the players themselves on their own initiative, or encouraged by managers, who agree to the manipulation. However, the high subjectivity of the game and the difficulty to build the burden of proof are obstacles to the investigation of these cases (T-PREG, 2020).

In this scenario of windows of opportunity, the slowness of the sports and criminal justice systems work in favour of the manipulators. It should be noted that it was only in October 2019 that the Disciplinary Board of the FPF applied sports sanctions to four defendants of the “Jogo Duplo” case. Furthermore, the judgement of the trial that convicted, in first instance, the 27 defendants in this case, was only read in February 2020.¹⁹ However, it is still waiting for the decision to become final since the defendants appealed the sentence.

Strategies to generate compliance

According to the collected evidence, the UEFA ZTP failed to induce compliance in football players in Portugal. Could flaws be identified in the definition and implementation of these measures? If so, what kind of readjustments will be necessary?

To answer these questions, we turned to a standard model for analysing compliance strategies. Like Roberts and Bolton (2018), we opted for the taxonomic model of Mitchell et al. (1999). These authors drew inspiration from international relations to solve the absence of a pattern of compliance strategies in the sports management literature.

Mitchell et al. (1999) developed a taxonomic model consisting of three pairs of strategy categories: i.e. punitive and remunerative, generative and preventive, and cognitive and normative.

Punitive and remunerative strategies

Punitive and remunerative strategies act on a consequential logic, respectively, punishing the adoption of deviant behaviour or rewarding desirable behaviour. Because they focus on behavioural changes, these measures are particularly effective in solving problems arising from individual ethical failures (Mitchell et al., 1999).

The UEFA ZTP has a strong punitive component. This excessive weight on the criminal and disciplinary side can be interpreted as a strategy of power hierarchisation, which shifts the onus of responsibility on sports actors and de-emphasises the institutional failures of the sports betting and sports governance model (Tak et al., 2018a).

As Ceva and Ferretti (2019) point out, an anti-corruption strategy cannot be reduced to the creation of new legal and disciplinary provisions. Punitive strategies increase the costs of the violation for potential offenders but do not prevent deviance if the actors have no alternative options for achieving the underlying objectives of the violation (Mitchell et al., 1999). Mario Čížmek exemplifies a match-fixing case in which the existence of severe sanctions did not prevent deviance due to the lack of legal alternatives to achieve the underlying objectives of the violation (i.e. getting back the money from salary arrears).

In another dimension, punitive strategies lose effectiveness by punishing complicity while not providing any sanctions for those who inflict physical, psychological or professional reprisals on whistleblowers. In conjunction with the creation of legal and disciplinary obligations, it is fundamental to guarantee the protection of whistleblowers. Portugal does not have a whistleblower protection law, but rather a directive “on the protection of people who report on violations of Union law”.

Punitive measures are useful in restraining deviant behaviour but are less effective in encouraging high standards of sporting integrity (Mitchell et al., 1999). For this reason, the introduction of remunerative strategies may be important in creating a culture of whistleblowing. These strategies encourage actors to provide information (Mitchell et al., 1999). The introduction of a “repentant statute”—“rewarded whistle-blowing” on the legal level or the creation of “fair play” rewards on the sporting level—is a possible option.

Furthermore, punitive strategies imply a capacity for detection and, naturally, sanctioning. Although Portugal has an adequate legal framework to prevent and combat match-fixing, it lacks the technological, financial and human means to put it into practice (Moriconi and Almeida, 2021). This is especially visible at the level of betting practices. Sanctioning players who bet only serves to categorise a cultural practice as criminal. In practice, those who want to place fraudulent bets can continue to do so in the illegal market where enforcement is non-existent.

At the level of sanctioning, the difficulty of constructing the burden of proof and the slowness of the justice system reinforce the feeling of impunity (Cima and Moriconi, 2019; T-PREG, 2020).

Generative and preventive strategies

Generative and preventive strategies focus on opportunity structures, opening possibilities for desirable behaviour and reducing the gaps that can lead to deviant behaviour (Mitchell et al., 1999). This category of strategies is suitable for systemic problem solving and its effectiveness lies in its ability to avoid problems (Mitchell et al., 1999).

Monitoring is both a way of preventing and fighting match-fixing. The fact that the illegal betting market, where there is no monitoring, is the main source of the problem illustrates the preventive nature of monitoring (Carpenter, 2014; McLaren, 2011). It is also an important tool to detect wrongdoing and support the application of disciplinary and criminal sanctions. The “Jogo Duplo” is an example of a case that was triggered by a Sportradar report sent by UEFA to FPF, and which culminated in sporting-related and criminal sanctions. However, the effectiveness of monitoring for preventing and combating match-fixing may be questioned. These systems are ineffective in relation to the manipulators’ new strategies, such as betting parcelling (Tak et al., 2018a), and they have no evidential value on their own (Feldes, 2013).

At the generative level, the ZTP has invested in the implementation of protected whistleblowing systems. The idea is to generate opportunities for desirable behaviour, namely, to report irregularities or illegalities. In several European countries, this measure did not have the desired effect (T-PREG, 2020). In Portugal, the Integrity platform is managed by the FPF, but due to the lack of trust in sports organisations, its effectiveness has been reduced. A solution for increasing the trust of whistleblowers would be to introduce an automatic forwarding of the complaint to other entities such as the criminal police (Cima and Moriconi, 2019).

The emphasis on individual morality at the expense of structural failures helps explain the ineffectiveness of the UEFA ZTP at the preventive and generative level. Rather than sanctioning individuals for deviant behaviour, it is crucial to restructure the entire system which creates the vulnerabilities that lead to such behaviour (Tak, 2018). This implies acknowledging the dangers of the “institutionalised relationship” between betting and sports as soon as possible (Tak et al., 2018b: 81).

Sports betting is just one point of the big picture that is responsible for gambling. Gambling is a practice that causes addiction in the population, especially in sport actors such as football players (Brownrigg et al., 2018). This addition, usually, results in financial problems that could be exploited by fixers to manipulate matches.²⁰ In this sense, it is crucial to rethink the limits of betting sponsorships at sporting events and in the media to prevent gambling addiction in the population, in general, and in football players, in particular.

The illegal market is another aspect that it is important to fight. One possible option is forbidding banking institutions to transfer money to certain unlicensed betting operators. Unfortunately, these mechanisms could not be very effective, either because of the data protection issue or because of the need to legislate for the purpose. The latter could violate principles of market freedom or of regulation of the banking sector.

It is equally important to fight the unregulated market. Currently, gambling is regulated on a state-by-state basis.²¹ This represents high costs for betting operators who must conform to different licence applications. Introducing generative measures such as harmonising activity licences at the international level can help attract betting operators to the legal market, which would be beneficial for club revenues.

Another critical factor that must be acknowledged relates to the failures in sports governance. At this level, avoiding wage arrears is imperative. The “Liga Portugal” (Portuguese League) licensing system was effective in punishing clubs with salary arrears but was unable to prevent the problem from occurring. In Portugal, financial controls are done four times a season. Making controls every month and sanctioning non-compliant clubs with loss of points could increase the effectiveness of this system. Another option could be to introduce a system of budgetary guarantees. This system consists of pledging a part of the club’s initial budget, which would be activated in the event of salary defaults, to meet the immediate needs of players. However, the liquidity difficulties of clubs in Portugal are an obstacle to this system.

In parallel, the announcement of the centralisation of television rights in Portuguese football as of 2028–2029, although not aimed to represent an anti-corruption measure, may also reduce this risk factor in the sense that it will allow for a better distribution of the television revenue. Equally positive is the existence of the “salary guarantee fund” in national professional and amateur competitions, which allows players with late salary payments to receive part of their salary, thus being less susceptible to manipulative approaches.

Cognitive and normative strategies

Educational programmes are one of the strategic pillars of the UEFA ZTP. Educational programmes can be analysed from both a cognitive and normative perspective.

The cognitive perspective consists in disseminating complete information about a phenomenon and the consequences of deviant behaviour, guiding the individual towards desirable behaviour (Mitchell et al., 1999). From this perspective, educational programmes seek to dissuade players from manipulating results by warning them of the dangers of match-fixing and by highlighting the criminal and disciplinary consequences of manipulation.

The normative perspective seeks to raise collective consciousness following a moralistic logic (Mitchell et al., 1999). Specifically, educational programmes

convey the narrative that match-fixing is an individual ethical problem and that manipulating is morally unacceptable.

The content of educational programmes has some limitations that help explain the ineffectiveness of the ZTP.

Much of the cognitive aspect boils down to an “informational component of a punitive strategy” (Mitchell et al., 1999: 226). In the case of betting practices, rather than informing players of the criminal and disciplinary sanctions they incur if they bet on their competition, it is important to alert players to the risks of gambling addiction to their mental health and financial stability (Feltus, 2013).

Cognitively, educational programmes are limited and lack profound content (Moriconi, 2018). The emphasis that match-fixing is an organised crime problem is reductive. Not only in Portugal but also in countries like Greece or Turkey, the corruptors are often the actors of the sport themselves. For this reason, these programmes should also be mandatory for sports officials and presidents and should emphasise the opportunity structures for corruption that arise from failures in sports governance (Moriconi and Cima, 2020a). They should also emphasise the sometimes-promiscuous relationships between politics and sports (Manoli et al., 2019).

The normative aspect is reflected in “paternalistic discourses”, defined in a “top-down” perspective, which guide players to “adopt institutionally modelled attitudes and behaviours, usually determined by sports industry stakeholders” (Moriconi and Almeida, 2019: 79).

This approach fails for three main reasons. Firstly, cognitive strategies are effective with the disinclined individual but ineffective with the recalcitrant (Mitchell et al., 1999). Educational programmes can be useful in dissuading deviant behaviours when it results from a lack of information—for example, gamblers who place bets but do not know it is forbidden—but are ineffective in changing deviant behaviours of recalcitrant individuals (Mitchell et al., 1999).

Secondly, changing deep-rooted beliefs is a slow process. The normative and cognitive perspectives both presume that players can obey the rules and only need to be encouraged to do so (Mitchell et al., 1999). As evidenced in this study, this does not apply to whistleblowing practices. In Portugal, reporting illegalities or irregularities in sports is a legal and disciplinary obligation, but there is no law that protects whistleblowers. In the case of betting practices, normative strategies may be a good option to shape behaviour in the younger age groups but are not very effective in inducing compliance in senior players.

Thirdly, the evidences collected in Portugal show that the institutional discourse is discredited because of a series of corruption scandals that have shaken sports organisations such as UEFA and FIFA. Players pay attention not only to information from educational programmes but also to the credibility and trustworthiness of the organisations that promote the official discourse. Therefore, it is very important to increase transparency and scrutiny in international sports governing organisations so that they can generate more trust in players and other sports stakeholders. Consequently, their policies will be more credible and successful (Cima and Moriconi, 2019; Moriconi, 2020; Moriconi and Cima, 2020a, 2020b; T-PREG, 2020).

Conclusions

There are problems in the agenda setting, formulation and implementation of the UEFA ZTP that help explain its ineffectiveness.

The arrival of match-fixing to the top of the sporting and political agenda is recent, but match-fixing is a historical problem in sports. Herein lies the first flaw. With the infiltration of organised crime in sports, UEFA has outsourced the problem of match-fixing, overlooking pre-existing governance failures in the sport which provide windows of opportunity for organised crime.

Secondly, match-fixing is not the result of a “neutral and value-free scientific assessment” (Tak et al., 2018a: 74), but rather an assessment in which certain (sports) actors are blamed for the problem. The determination of the problem and the perpetrators is a power phenomenon (Chalip, 1995), and the institutional unaccountability and transfer of responsibility to individual failures is a tendency of powerful actors (Ross and Staines, 1973). In the case of match-fixing, this happens for two reasons. Holding sports actors accountable is easier than restructuring the entire sports system, “because they are paradoxically the last resort against match-fixing” (Tak, 2018; Tak et al., 2018b: 79).

However, “compliance initiatives alone do not establish a governance structure” (Jones, 2013: 207). It is unlikely that compliance strategies defined along these lines will promote positive behavioural changes in football players without first implementing a structural reform which reduces opportunity structures that enable corruption (Henne, 2015). By building a narrative around individual ethical failures, the ZTP is more likely to “instrumentalize solutions, amounting to symbolic gestures rather than meaningful reforms” (Henne, 2015: 17), thereby neglecting reforms that address deeper sports governance problems.

UEFA and FIFA are two examples of how governance failures, such as over-concentration of power, lack of scrutiny and the resulting lack of transparency, can give rise to corruption cases (Roberts and Bolton, 2018).

For this reason, compliance strategies should be part of a broader governance structure. This requires complementing these strategies with checks and balance procedures (Jones, 2013), specifically mechanisms that oversee power within football and that are independent from football’s own governance structures.

In this sense, it is important to have a strong intervention in the regulation of football. The regulation should transit from a logic of mere compliance to enforcement, meaning that sports organisations are not so concerned with complying with a checklist of measures (i.e. checking the boxes), but rather with verifying if the objectives they set are being achieved (i.e. walk the talk).

For example, FIFA has implemented a reform process and established an internal body to regulate its activities, the Independent Governance Committee. However, the effectiveness of the self-regulatory model has been questioned due to the lack of external scrutiny and the absence of sanctions for the prevaricating sports federations (Geeraert, 2019; Roberts and Bolton, 2018). The criticism voiced by Poiares Maduro after stepping down as chairman of FIFA’s Governance

Committee after eight months in office reinforces this perspective. According to Maduro, self-regulation is not possible in football because there is “a ‘cartelisation’ of the system, associated with a huge centralisation of power” and a lack of “scrutiny”.²²

Consequently, more research is needed to develop the discussion on new models of regulation. The creation of an independent supranational entity is a possibility (Chappelet, 2018). The question that arises is who will have the negotiating capacity to impose this type of regulation model. Some work has shown that it is possible to expand the role of the EU in monitoring, sanctioning and coordinating FIFA and UEFA (Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015). The Council of Europe has played an important role in raising public attention for the problem of match-fixing, but it depends on the willingness of the states to ratify its provisions as well as on the willingness of the domestic institutions of those states to implement them. Furthermore, the Council of Europe keeps member states in a weak position vis-à-vis UEFA and FIFA. These bodies, for preventing state intervention, can argue their right to self-regulation since they can exclude the state and their football teams from their competitions. As a consequence, if the independent body comes under the aegis of the EU, it might be difficult to get the support of the football governing bodies. After all, while it is easy to exercise this “blackmail” vis-à-vis an individual state, it will not be so with the EU as a whole.²³

There is still much to learn and to do in terms of safeguarding sports competitions from manipulation. But one thing is clear: the creation and implementation of measures in a top-down perspective, without considering the opinion, ideas, practices and attitudes of the in-field actors (or even defining the problem as their moral failure) is a limited strategy that, rather than generating zero tolerance, generates little effectiveness.

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Notes

- 1 There are specific sessions for players and for referees. They are the only actors obliged to attend the trainings. Generally, the coaches accompany their players. Sports officials may also participate, but they rarely do it.
- 2 Law 50/2007 of August 31, amended by Law 30/2015 of April 22.
- 3 Law 13/2017 of May 2, second amendment to Law 50/2007 of August 31.
- 4 Law 101/2017 of August 28.

- 5 Sindicato de Jogadores Profissionais de Futebol.
- 6 Available in <https://integridade.fpf.pt/>
- 7 Liga Portugal and the FPF have their own disciplinary regulations, which apply to the competitions under its aegis. The first ones apply to the 1st and 2nd Division and to the League Cup. The FPF regulations apply to Portugal Cup, 3rd Division and U23 League.
- 8 According to Merton (1983:1), there are “strategic research sites, objects, or events” which, by reflecting or enabling advantageous study of concrete phenomena, enable significant advances in the investigation of existing problems, as well as the discovery of new problems for further investigation.
- 9 “A theory of corruption in a complex system: the case of match-fixing” (funded by FCT) and T-PREG and AMATT (funded by the EC).
- 10 BBC Sport (2018). Joey Barton claims 50% of professional footballers bet on matches. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/42783527> [Accessed 10 mar. 2021].
- 11 BBC Sport (2017), Gambling companies prey on ‘vulnerable’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/39726468> [Accessed 10 March 2021].
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Sport Integrity Australia and Match-Fixing

Exploring the Work of a National Agency

Catherine Ordway and Lisa A. Kihl¹

Introduction

Recognising the wide-ranging threats to sport integrity, in 2017, the Australian Government initiated a review of national sport integrity. The resulting report, “The Review of Australian Sports Integrity Arrangements”, is known as the “Wood Review” (2018). To lower the risks of corruption, focused on match-fixing, safeguarding of children and doping, the Wood Review recommended the establishment of a central integrity body and the implementation of a national regulatory framework. This resulted in the formation of Sport Integrity Australia on 1 July 2020. This chapter analyses the regulatory mechanisms adopted to tackle match-fixing in Australian sport. Using the regulatory and integrity systems literature, the catalyst for the adoption of the *National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport* in 2011, and the events that led up to the Wood Review, will be contextualised. Secondly, Australia having been instrumental in the development of the Council of Europe *Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions* (known as the “Macolin Convention”), the implementation of the Convention in Australia will also be discussed. It will be outlined how the national sport integrity regulatory and policy framework has been developed through the individual sport policies and the state legislation, leading to the National Integrity Framework and the implementation of the Wood Review recommendations in relation to the manipulation of sporting competitions. The chapter concludes by discussing implications and recommendations for future research, both in assessing the effectiveness of these policy measures and how these regulatory changes can be incorporated into practice and educational materials.

As identified throughout this volume, cheating in sport has been a feature since the Ancient Olympics (Hellenic World, n.d.). Australian cricketing enthusiasts may be familiar with the “Sydney Riot of 1879” but may not have appreciated that the pitch invasion and assaults are alleged to have been incited by illegal gamblers who had bet heavily on the home side (Sengupta, 2016). Less well known is the race walking or “pedestrianism” races of 1840 which also appear to have been fixed for gambling purposes (Essam, 2020). Although indigenous sports have been

played on the continent for millennia (Williams, 2018), the Australian (usually male) obsession with gambling in both animal racing and “colonial” sports can be traced directly to the country’s convict and gold mining past (Cashman, 1995; Lei and Yi, 2020). The fact that betting was banned, and occasionally enforced, has also not been a deterrent to what is increasingly an embedded part of Australian sport (O’Reily, 2019).

Early signs that cricket was becoming corrupted for gambling purposes were ignored. For example, the Australian complaints about the Pakistan umpiring decisions in the tour of 1988 were assumed to reflect national bias and not investigated as match-fixing (Halbish, 2003, pp. 138–139). The solitary reference in the 1983 player contracts to “not bet” naively remained the crepe paper protection against manipulative forces even after batsman, Dean Jones, was given a cake tin filled with cash in Sri Lanka in 1992 (Thomas, 2020, 16:58). The then ACB CEO observed that: “Corruption was so alien to Australian thinking that this was considered an oddity rather than an attempt to corrupt the game” (Halbish, 2003, p. 134). This naivety was further reflected by both the players and the ACB in the 1995 decision² to fine Mark Waugh and Shane Warne, but not make it public. The players had provided: “basic cricketing information: the weather forecast, team changes, state of the pitch” (Hopps and Baum, 1998) on several occasions in 1994 to an Indian bookmaker “John” (later identified as Mukesh Gupta³: Piesse, 2018, p. 37). Warne claimed that:

If something similar happened to a player today the bells would ring immediately. But in 1994 none of us imagined how aspects of the game might be corrupt. There were no whispers of anything untoward occurring in the world of cricket. The idea that bookmakers might be trying to buy up cricketers could have come from a work of fiction.

(2001, p. 65).

Even when the Australian players complained to the ICC in 1994 of bribes made by the Pakistan captain, Salim Malik, for them to underplay (Warne, 2001, pp. 66–69; Halbish, 2003, p. 137; Knight, 2003, pp. 186–189; Piesse, 2018, pp. 38–41), and the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) set up the Qayyum inquiry into: ‘widespread allegations that the Pakistan team had underperformed at the direction of the bookmakers and gamblers for a period of years’, these bribes were initially seen as isolated opportunism, rather than evidence of a sport-wide disease. This assumption was blown out of the water when the PCB imposed a life ban on Malik (Qayyum, 2000), and South African cricket captain, Hansie Cronje, admitted to the South African independent inquiry that he had received hundreds of thousands of dollars for fixing matches throughout his international career (1992–2000). The ICC’s King Report, released in October 2000, detailed the extent of the duplicity and prompted several national investigations. While there was no evidence to sustain a finding of wrong-doing against any of the Australian players (ACB, 2000), the ACB instigated O’Regan report in 1999 was

described as: 'a very significant wake-up call' for Australian and international cricket in combating match-fixing.

By 2007, fixing in international tennis was 'common knowledge' according to then men's number #1 player, Andy Murray (Brasseur, 2012, para. 24, p. 9). Major football scandals had also been making headlines around the world (Husting et al., 2012, p. 11). The network of fixers involved in the Hoyzer-Bochum scandal uncovered by German investigators in 2005 was astounding:

323 suspicious matches (75 in Turkey, 69 in Germany and 40 in Switzerland). The persons involved in match-fixing were spread all over Europe: among the 347 suspects almost half of them were living in Germany (150), in Turkey (66), in Switzerland (29) and others in Croatia, Hungary, Austria, Belgium and Netherlands.

(Husting et al., 2012, p. 12)

The Council of Europe estimated the scale of the money involved in the Bochum scandal, which was not limited to European betting markets:

Around €12 million was paid to referees, players, coaches and officials of sports federations in order to influence the results of the targeted matches. The match-fixers placed over 6,000 bets in Asia totalling tens of millions of euros (including €32.5 million from one single punter), making a profit of approximately €7.7 million.

(Brasseur, 2012, para. 18, p. 9)

The seriousness of these cases was not lost on Australian administrators. Even before the Australian Football League (AFL) appointed its first Integrity Officer in 2008 (Ford, 2018), the AFL took a hard line on minor rule infringements relating to betting and insider information, fining four players in 2007 (Macgugan, 2011). Tennis Australia's (TA) Anti-Corruption Policy was first drafted in the lead up to the 2008 Australian Open. Both TA and the AFL signed Memorandums of Understanding with the Victorian Police (VicPol) and developed cooperation roles with other state policing agencies. Until the Sporting Integrity Intelligence Unit (SIIU) was established by VicPol in 2013, to support the new *Crimes Amendment (Integrity in Sports) Act 2013* (Vic), the sports primarily relied on working cooperatively with the betting agencies, national police forces outside of Australia and the international sport federations.

The research by Declan Hill (2008) into match-fixing into football was presented at the Australian and New Zealand Sports Law Association 2009 annual conference. Hill called on lawyers and policymakers to take the risk of match-fixing seriously, warning that:

Australian sporting codes and events are vulnerable to match-fixing for several reasons, including: the perception that Australian sport is uncorrupted,

the close time zone to Asia and the huge volume of online betting, particularly originating from the Asian region.

(Ordway, 2018a, p. 172, 2018b, p. 19, F/N 60)

Those remaining in doubt about the potential reputational and uncertainty of outcome risks to Australian sport were given two further shocks to promote an urgent response in 2010. The first was in rugby league (known as the Tandy case), and the second again involved the Australian men's cricket team playing Pakistan.

Rugby league match-fixing (Tandy) case

Those of the view that the existing criminal legislation could be easily applied to the sport spot-fixing context were tested via an incident arising in the national professional men's rugby league competition (the NRL). Over three days in August 2010, more than \$30,000 AUD was bet on the North Queensland Cowboys to open the scoring with a penalty goal (when a try is the usual scoring mechanism) in their match against the Canterbury-Bankstown Bulldogs. In the first 90 seconds, Ryan Tandy's "clumsy" tackle gave away the Bulldog's possession of the ball and conceded a penalty. The Cowboys, apparently unaware of the penalty goal bets, declined the opportunity and instead scored a try (Massoud, 2014, pp. ix–xii). The bets were therefore lost, but as noted by Anderson (2013), it led to "tortuous" proceedings where the criminal law required the: "unsatisfactory premise of charges based on analogous fraud, attempting to gain financial advantage through deception or generalised prevention of conspiracy to corrupt/bribe, which did not always fit the nature of the misconduct." Tandy was the first athlete to be convicted in October 2011 (upheld on appeal) of the New South Wales criminal offence of "attempting to dishonestly obtain a financial advantage by deception" (detailed chronology and background in Ordway and Lenten, 2021, pp. 194–195). This experience led to a range of sport and policing bodies to call for "specific cheating at gambling statutory provisions" to be introduced nation-wide (Anderson, 2013).

Pakistan cricket sting by *The News of the World*

Cricket was back in the news in 2010 with a wide-ranging scandal, primarily involving matches against Pakistan (detailed in Radford, 2012, pp. 83–112). To add further fuel to the fire, the Australian national broadcaster's investigative programme, *Four Corners*, aired the allegations of corruption and match-fixing from an Australian perspective, asking why Pakistan had lost the "unlosable" test to Australia in Sydney (ABC, 2010). As it was clear that Australian sports administrators and policymakers had under-rated the threat posed by online and illegal gambling markets, journalist Marian Wilkinson exposed the vulnerabilities in the Pakistan team open for exploitation by fixers: "torn by internal politics, unable to play other teams at home because of terror threats and shunned in other parts of the world by fellow cricketing nations" (ABC, 2010).

For some time, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) had been tracking the expansion of organised criminals beyond animal racing, into professional and Olympic sports, particularly through the illicit and performance-enhancing drug markets (ACC, 2012, pp. 95–102; ACC, 2013a, 2013b). The two scandals above pressured the Federal Government to meet with peak sports bodies and gaming agencies to discuss how best to protect the integrity of Australian sport. This work also prompted the ACC investigation that found that many of the conditions necessary for organised crime to infiltrate professional sport, such as associations between criminal individuals and athletes, had been developed or were being cultivated (ACC, 2011, pp. 69–70). As will be discussed below, this collaboration between sport and the ACC (and its successor, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC)) has continued.

Regulation and regulatory regimes

In this chapter, regulatory regimes theory (Black, 2002, 2008) is drawn to outline and explain the development and implementation of Australia's match-fixing regulation and broader sport integrity regulatory framework. Black (2002) defined regulation as:

the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour modification.

(p. 20)

Black (2002) conceives regulation as intentional and a systematic approach to problem-solving. Regulation requires a variety of relationships and involves complex interactions between society, law, and the state to control behaviours.

In contemporary regulatory space, arguably there is a pluralism of regulators encompassing both state and non-state actors who engage in various regular mechanisms, which Black (2008) labels regulatory regimes. Regulatory pluralism stems from legal pluralism where laws exist alongside normative policies (Grabosky, 2013). The Australian sport sector is an example of a regulatory regime where the state is not the sole locus of authority over sport corruption and, in particular, match-fixing. Griffiths (1986, p. 4) argued that regulatory regimes potentially are an “unsystematic collage of inconsistent and overlapping parts” that are often complex, fragmented, and necessitate an interconnection among actors. Black (2008, p. 137) describes it as: “State and non-state actors are both regulators and regulated, and their boundaries are marked by the issues or problems which they are concerned with, rather than necessarily by a common solution”. Thus, the regulatory space is often contested where non-state initiatives are often the result, if not triggered, by state apathy. In this setting, however, the state can be argued

to have been the driving force behind the initiatives to combat match-fixing, certainly in the last decade.

Some of these issues are focused on accountability and legitimacy where countermeasures for crime syndicates engaging in sport corruption focus on developing systems of accountability, enhanced democratic governance, adopting Constitutional structures of accountability, or heightening the role of auditors, the Commonwealth, and their respective states and territories. Legitimacy concerns are posed in determining which organisations are acceptable and credible to govern (Black, 2008). Within regulatory regimes such as in Australian sport sector, there can be several organisations who serve as regulators and can claim legitimacy, and as explained next, may perform specific actions, and have entered relationships in order to attain legitimacy. Problem can arise in federated systems of governance and the numerous non-state actors aiming to develop policies to minimise sport integrity risks. The essential consideration is that harmonising various actor regulatory activities and ensuring their control mechanism are open to orchestration and coordination.

Sport gambling under a federated system

One very important legal and structural concept must be explained to understand the Australian legal regulatory and sport policy frameworks – that of federalism. At the national level, the Commonwealth Parliament can only legislate on those topics set out in the Australian Constitution known as the heads of power. All other issues are left to the states and territories to cover as they wish. In the event of an inconsistency between state and Commonwealth legislation, the Commonwealth law takes priority. Not surprisingly, the Constitutional drafters in the lead up to 1901 did not consider issues relating to threats to sport integrity, such as doping or match-fixing. One of the mechanisms for establishing a national approach then is via the “external affairs” power (Australian Constitution s.51 (xxix)). That is, where Australia has ratified an international convention, the Commonwealth Parliament is authorised to implement that treaty by enacting national legislation (Parliament of Australia, n.d., para. 4.5). For example, the external affairs power was relied upon to implement the *International Convention against Doping in Sport* (UNESCO, 2007) in Australia and establish the National Anti-Doping Organisation (now Sport Integrity Australia [SIA]). SIA’s legislative basis will be set out below.

In the sport policy setting, the federated system means that National Sport Organisations (NSOs, e.g. Cricket Australia) set the policy framework federally. In some cases, the work the Australian NSOs have done to combat match-fixing has also been influential internationally (e.g. in cricket, netball, and rugby league). In other cases, the NSOs must implement rules in line with an international policy and require that the state and territory sport bodies (SSOs, e.g. Cricket Tasmania) do the same. Some sport organisations complete the chain by promoting key elements in the policies at the regional and community club levels. As incorporated, or unincorporated, associations, the NSOs, SSOs, clubs, and other umbrella bodies in the

sport ecosystem are private bodies. They, therefore, do not automatically implement national, state, or local government policies unless these requirements are directly linked to funding arrangements and/or access to facilities. As explained by Pagé and Taylor, sport organisations are:

not state agencies, licensed by the state to implement its policy objectives; instead they are wholly private bodies. As a result, the authority of the [NSOs] is not derived from statute or other government mandate. Instead, a [NSO's] legitimacy and authority as the governing body of its sport is entirely consensual, derived from the agreement of its members to be bound by its rules and regulations.

(Pagé and Taylor, 2021, p. 17)

At the national (federal) level of government then, there is a Minister with sport as one or more of their portfolios, and a department that sits underneath to provide the policy support, currently, the Commonwealth Department of Health. At the state and territory level, the Sport Minister may also have responsibility for (animal) racing and gambling (gaming). Following the decision to deregulate the gambling industry in the 1980s, the states and Territories adopted vastly inconsistent approaches to gambling regulation generally and sport gambling, in particular. *The Economist* (2017) declared that Australia has “The world’s biggest gamblers” and related this finding directly back to the decision to deregulate the industry, observing that “courting government regulators appears to be just as important as luring bettors for the bottom line.” By 1998, it was clear that the horse had bolted, so as to speak, and then Federal Treasurer, Peter Costello, authorised the Productivity Commission to conduct an inquiry into Australia’s gambling industries with a focus on the economic and social impacts of the rapid growth in gambling (Productivity Commission, 1999, p. 1). The resulting report found that gambling was having a major negative impact on the community. Despite that acknowledgement, both the punters, and the governments reliant on the income derived, were hooked.

The sports betting income available to betting operators and sports organisations was exponentially expanded following the 2008 High Court of Australia *Betfair* decision. Menz and Skene (2017) describe the state of Tasmania issuing Australia’s first betting exchange licence to an overseas operator (*Betfair*) in 2006 as “a pivotal development” (p. 27). *Betfair* promptly began operations throughout Australia. The objection to this lodged by the state of Western Australia was thrown out by the High Court based on a freedom to trade argument. This decision allowed betting operators to accept customers outside of their state or Territory of registration (*Betfair v WA*: Australasian Legal Information Institute, 2008). By 2014, Craig Nugent, then head of Wagering and Media at Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (TAB), gleefully reported that the TAB had “grown from a \$42 million business in our first year to \$4.2 billion in 16 years” (Rothfield, 2014).

Australian sports administrators and policymakers began to seriously take note of the threat posed to Australian sport through organised criminals, both domestically and offshore, particularly utilising unregulated or under-regulated gambling operators. The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly also recorded the danger posed by illegal sports betting and manipulation of results in 2008, which led to a 2010 resolution calling on: “member states to adopt effective policies and measures aimed at preventing and combating the manipulation of sports results in all sports” (Council of Europe, 2020a, p. 4). The incidents of alleged match-fixing in Australia and overseas as well as various reviews of the regulation of sports betting promoted the development of a national policy.

National Policy On Match-Fixing In Sport (NPOMFIS) development

In 2010, two processes commenced simultaneously: one through the Sport and Recreation Ministers’ Council (SRMC) and the second by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC).

i SRMC Process

In 2010, the Commonwealth Minister for Sport was Mark Arbib, supported by the Office for Sport, which, at that time, fortuitously reported directly to the Prime Minister’s Department. This had the effect of immediately elevating the National Policy On Match-Fixing In Sport (NPOMFIS) to the highest level. To achieve a consistent government approach, Minister Arbib brought together his state and territory sport ministerial counterparts (whose portfolios often also included animal racing). Originally known as the Recreation Ministers’ Council (and renamed the Sport and Recreation Ministers’ Council (SRMC)), this regulatory mechanism fostered partnerships and collaborations and: “provide[d] a forum for Australian governments to discuss sport and recreation issues. The SRMC operated from 1973 to 2011 and was supported by the Standing Committee on Recreation and Sport (SCORS) and the National Elite Sport Council (NESC)” (Australian Sports Commission, 2020).

This forum assisted Minister Arbib and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Deputy Secretary, Richard Eccles, to negotiate a national consensus with State Sport Ministers and their Departments. Gaining this consensus required both the right structure and the power of personality and influence, particularly driven by the younger Ministers and advisors understanding the urgency in the influence sport betting was having on integrity internationally. While the NSWLRC process was underway, the SRMC adopted the NPOMFIS at their meeting on the Gold Coast, Queensland, on 10 June 2011. The Council quoted from their previous Communiqué observing that “Corruption in sport is an emerging and critical issue facing

Australian and international sport... the integrity of sport must be protected” (Sport and Recreation Ministers’ Council Communiqué, 2011 quoted by Australian Government, 2011, cover page; see also Ordway, 2018a, p. 173). The Policy was underpinned by the following principles:

- A nationally consistent approach to deterring and dealing with match-fixing;
- Information sharing and highly efficient networks between governments, major sports, betting operators, and law enforcers;
- Consistent national code of conduct principles for sport; and
- Active participation in international efforts to combat corruption in sport including an international code of conduct and an international body.

ii NSWLRC Process

In January 2011, the NSWLRC received a referral to review the criminal law relating to “cheating at gambling”. The cheating at gambling project had its origins in the NSWLRC’s review of the law on “complicity”. As part of the recommendation to abolish the common law offence of conspiracy to cheat and defraud, the NSWLRC considered whether any gaps would be created in the law that would not be covered by existing fraud provisions. The Chair of the NSWLRC, the Honourable James Wood AO QC,⁴ having seen the influence of organised crime and gambling on horse racing, gave the NSWLRC process a broad scope to include sports gambling. Wood ensured that the NSWLRC specifically considered conduct directed at fixing results or individual events in the course of sporting and other activities which may be the subject of spot or spread betting. The NSWLRC report was tabled on 26 August 2011, and cheating at gambling was identified as an area that was not adequately covered (see the NSWLR Report, 2011, p. xiii and [6.233]–[6.248]; Consultation Paper, 2011, [1.1]).

Implementation of the NPOMFIS

The NPOMFIS defined match-fixing in these terms:

Match-fixing involves the manipulation of an outcome or contingency by competitors, teams, sports agents, support staff, referees and officials, and venue staff. Such conduct includes

- a *the deliberate fixing of the result of a contest, or of an occurrence within the contest, or of a points spread;*
- b *deliberate underperformance;*
- c *withdrawal (tanking)⁵;*
- d *an official’s deliberate misapplication of the rules of the contest;*
- e *interference with the play or playing surfaces by venue staff; and*
- f *abuse of insider information to support a bet placed by any of the above or placed by a gambler who has recruited such people to manipulate an outcome or contingency (Australian Government, 2011, para. 1.1, p. 2).*

This early and decisive start in reforming its laws and government policies means that Australia has been regarded as a “world leader” in the field (Hallmann et al., 2019, p. 5; Balsam, 2020, pp. 29–30; Silalahi, 2020). However, the development of these regulatory measures was only the first step in developing a robust framework.

Sport match-fixing policies

For match-fixing “offences”, prior to any sport-specific legislation being enacted, sports bodies were reliant on state policing authorities using generic criminal laws, such as fraud, to prosecute “cheating to lose” behaviour (such as in the Tandy case above). Sport policies were limited to applying sanctions, such as bans, under contractual “bringing the sport into disrepute” provisions.

Appreciating these limitations, the members of the Coalition of Major Professional and Participation Sports (COMPPS), namely, CA, TA, AFL, Australian Rugby Union (ARU), the Football Federation Australia (FFA), the National Rugby League (NRL), and Netball Australia (NA), identified one of their first priorities in early 2010 was to form an anti-corruption working party to address the match-fixing threat. This Working Party included representatives of each of the COMPPS sports, the major betting operators, players’ associations, and the Australian Sports Commission (now Sport Australia) (COMPPS, 2015). The Working Party, and what became the COMPPS Integrity and Security Committee (CISC), advocated for the criminalisation of match-fixing and tighter regulation of sports gambling and advertising. In its *Submission to the NSW Government’s Review of NSWLRC Report Crimes Amendment “Cheating at Gambling” Bill 2011 (NSW)*, COMPPS made specific reference to the form of cheating exposed by the 2000 Qayyum Report. COMPPS reiterated the Working Party 2010 recommendation that “nationally consistent criminal legislation be enacted creating an offence of cheating in connection with sports wagering” (COMPPS, 2012, p. 2).

Legislative and contractual arrangements between NSOs and betting operators – combining the two approaches

The SRMC met again on 30 September 2011 and agreed on a legislative and administrative model for approval of betting on sports, the sharing of information between betting operators and integrity controls within sports. The resulting “Approval Pathway for Betting on Sport Events” was based on pre-existing Victorian legislation (*Gambling Regulation Act 2003 (Vic)* ss, 4, 5, 12–4.5.28). Subsequently, also adopted by the state of New South Wales, this state regulatory legislation has national effect, as it requires that betting operators enter into an agreement with a national sporting organisation to both share information and specify the betting products to be offered on their events, for a share of the revenue received (Menz and

Skene, 2017, p. 29). As will be set out below, in early 2018, a Sports Betting Integrity Unit (SBIU) was established within the ACIC in partnership with the National Integrity of Sport Unit (NISU) to provide such a central clearinghouse for betting information between sport organisations and law enforcement bodies.

Accepting the recommendation from the NSWLRC report, arrangements were also put in place for state and territory ministers with responsibility for law reform to develop nationally consistent criminal laws to deal with cheating at gambling. Match-fixing and corruption in sport were further canvassed by the Commonwealth Parliament Joint Select Committee on Gambling Reform (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, Ch13). One resulting amendment to the *Interactive Gambling Act, 2001* (Cth) is that “Australia is the only nation that permits online sports wagering but prohibits in-play wagering” (Menz and Skene, 2017, p. 28), as in-play betting heightens the risk of spot-fixing.

The National Integrity of Sport Unit (NISU)

The NISU was established in October 2012 as part of the Office for Sport but had its own dedicated reporting line. NISU’s role was to implement the NPOMFIS coordination role recommendation through the following objectives:

- *oversee the implementation of the [NPOMFIS] including the introduction of criminal offences across all jurisdictions;*
- *develop a Code of Conduct and National Policy for use by national sporting organisations [NSOs]; and*
- *establish a website with access to education and integrity tools* (Godkin, 2013).

In developing an anti-match-fixing code of conduct and template for NSOs, NISU had the benefit of a number of policies already in place, including Netball Australia (15 June 2013) and the AFL (AFL, 2013).

In relation to the first objective, “introduction of criminal offences across all jurisdictions”, unfortunately, the framework remains fractured, “incomplete and perhaps stalled”. Despite the responsible state and territory ministers all agreeing to introduce standard sanctions and wording to criminalise match-fixing throughout Australia, as set out above, the regulatory challenges with Australia’s federated legislative system means that the NPOMFIS has not been uniformly implemented. “Perhaps it is no coincidence that Senator Mark Arbib, the energetic Commonwealth Minister for Sport who championed the Policy [NPOMFIS], departed politics before the process of implementation could be completed”. The result is neatly summarised by the IOC and UNODC (2017, p. 24):

match-fixing offences have been created in New South Wales [NSW], Victoria, South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and the Northern Territory. These laws criminalize engaging, facilitating and/or concealing conduct that would corrupt a betting outcome on a sport or

racing event and the use of corrupt conduct or inside information for betting purposes. The maximum penalty for these offences is 10 years (seven years in the Northern Territory). The use of corrupt conduct or inside information incurs a maximum penalty of two years.

(See also UNODC, 2021, pp. 6, 24, 31, 37, 48, 50, 52–56, 60, 62–63)

The analysis demonstrated that the states took quite different, and often contrary, approaches to implementing the NPOMFIS. For example, NSW and Victoria were the closest in approach, as they linked match-fixing to gambling. The Queensland legislation relates to “events” and is not limited to gambling outcomes. The Governments of Tasmania and Western Australia determined that their existing fraud legislation did not require amending. The differences in the NSW and Queensland approaches will be detailed below in the context of recommending a national approach.

Law enforcement combating organised crime risks to sport

Meanwhile, the risks of organised crime infiltrating sport and utilising sport gambling markets to fund criminal enterprises were identified in reports by the Office of the Racing Commissioner (Victoria) and Australia’s national criminal intelligence agency, the ACC [now the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC)] (ACC, 2013c). The ACC delivered: “the findings of a 12-month investigation into the integrity of Australian sport and the relationship between professional sporting bodies, prohibited substances and organised crime” (Project APERIO; ASADA, 2013). The report *Organised Crime and Drugs in Sport: New Generation Performance and Image Enhancing Drugs and Organised Criminal Involvement in Their Use in Professional Sport* highlighted the need for law enforcement agencies to provide a greater focus and commitment to investigate issues and concerns with integrity in the sport industry due to the risk of infiltration by organised crime and money laundering via gambling markets (ACC, 2013a). This convinced the state of Victoria to both introduce specific match-fixing amendments to the *Crimes Act (Vic)* and fund the establishment of the Sporting Integrity Intelligence Unit (SIIU) inside VicPol the same year.

Driven by the then Deputy Commissioner, Specialist Operations, Graham Ashton AM, the Victorian sport-specific approach has achieved a great deal of success and “international recognition” justifying dedicated resources (Victoria Police, 2014, p. 20). Australia’s first successful match-fixing investigation was conducted by the SIIU in their first year. “Operation Starlings” involved a sophisticated, international match-fixing operation centred on a team, the Southern Stars Football Club, playing in low level (first division state league) competition in Melbourne, Victoria. Police were alerted by suspicious betting patterns involving UK players who had been imported by a global match-fixing syndicate. This successful prosecution was followed by “Operation Outshouts”

in Futures and Challenger-level tennis tournaments in regional Australia (2013) and “Operation Lumberjacks” in regional horse harness racing (2014). Other law enforcement agencies have also had some involvement in this area, including the NSW Police who recently made international news by uncovering a match-fixing ring on fixed Ukrainian table tennis matches (McKenzie and Chung, 2020; Brown, 2021).

The SIIU sits within the state intelligence unit under the Intelligence & Covert Support Command at VicPol (Victoria Police, 2021). The SIIU prosecuted a locally grown Esports scam where Counter-Strike: Global Offensive (CS:GO) players were betting against themselves (Bucci and Curnow, 2019; Bucci, 2020). As recognised by Ordway and Anderson (2022), “This investigation continues the important collaborative work that the SIIU has been doing with a number of sports” warranting the claim made by Graham Ashton in 2014 that “Victoria Police is increasingly being recognised as a global leader in the sporting integrity sector” (Victoria Police, 2013–2014, p. 20). The only other sport focused integrity unit was the AFP Integrity in Sport team, which was established on 1 July 2014 in preparation for the major sporting events held in Australia and New Zealand in 2015 (see Ordway, 2018a). Since the AFP resource was reallocated, the SIIU remains the only sport-specific crime unit within any of the state policing bodies (Hall, Masters, and Ordway, 2021, p. 8).

Australia has also been represented through the global network of investigators attending operational meetings of the INTERPOL Match-Fixing Task Force (IMFTF). The IMFTF creates an opportunity for “the sharing of information, intelligence and best practices” (INTERPOL, 2018). Australia attended the following IMFTF meetings through a range of stakeholders:

- December 2013 in Lyon, France – Participants: VicPol and ACC
- November 2014 in Rome, Italy – Participants: AFP
- September 2015 in Lyon, France – Participants: Australian High Commission
- April 2017 in Bangkok, Thailand – Participants: VicPol, Queensland Police, AFP, and TA
- September 2018 in Lyon, France – Participants: AFP, Sports Betting Integrity Unit (SBIU), and VicPol
- December 2019 in Singapore at INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation – Participants: SIIU and ACIC
- July 2020 on the INTERPOL-IOC-UNODC Pacific Region Integrity in Sport Webinar – Participants: ACIC, AFP, Queensland Police, VicPol, NSW Police, SIA, and other Australian stakeholders

This collaboration with INTERPOL has also directly supported Australia’s capacity building: in 2017, INTERPOL delivered Law Enforcement Investigators Training for Queensland Police, presented at a national conference on match-fixing, attended a Partnership Development Meeting in preparation for the Gold Coast 2018 Commonwealth Games, and made a submission to the Wood Review.

Macolin (2014): Australia’s international policy role

The NISU experience in leading the on-going harmonisation process across legislative jurisdictions and through national sport policies was crucial in the development of the Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, known as the “Macolin Convention” (Council of Europe, 2014a). In much the same way that Australia had supported the early development of the anti-doping in sport standards, including as a signatory to the Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention, 1989 (see Ordway, 2001), as set out above, Australia was represented at a range of forums to combat match-fixing. NISU was particularly active on the intergovernmental Drafting Group set up by the Governing Board of the Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport (EPAS) (Council of Europe, 2014b, para. 226, F/N 1, p. 33, 2020a, p. 12). The Council of Europe EPAS promotes intergovernmental sports cooperation.

As explained by Divitcos, the Macolin Convention was designed to provide a “more direct link between the national and international actors” through the creation of the: “National Platforms (NP) and the Group of Copenhagen (GoC). NPs are peak national bodies which coordinate law enforcement authorities, betting operators and sporting organisations within their jurisdiction. The GoC is the international network of NPs” (Divitcos, 2019–2020, pp. 2–3). NISU continues to represent Australia in forums including the IOC’s International Partnership Against Corruption in Sport (IPACS; IOC, 2017). Along with NISU, the SBIU within the ACIC is an active participant in the GoC (Hall et al., 2021, p. 8). Coming into force on 1 September 2019, the Macolin Convention is the “worldwide legal instrument seeking to contribute to greater national and international co-operation” (Council of Europe, 2020a, p. 3).

Macolin (2014): influence on Australia’s regulatory response

The NPOMFIS links match-fixing to betting to ensure that breaches of sport rules, such as tanking, are not criminalised (see above). By way of comparison, the Macolin Convention approach is as follows:

Manipulation of sports competitions” means an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others

(2014, Art 3.4)

Although technically “manipulation of sports competitions” also includes “cheating to win” or doping (Ordway and Opie, 2017), the “Typology of Sports Manipulations – Resource Guide” clarifies that “doping in sport is dealt with, appropriately, through long-standing and established conventions” (Council of Europe, 2020b, para c., p. 4).

The Macolin definition can be compared with the Queensland approach which is extremely broad. The *Criminal Code*, 1899 QLD s.443A *Engaging in match-fixing conduct* states that

- 1 *A person who engages in match-fixing conduct in relation to a sporting event or the happening of a sporting contingency for the purpose of*
 - a *obtaining or receiving a pecuniary benefit for any person or*
 - b *causing a pecuniary detriment to another person;*
commits a crime (attracting a maximum penalty of ten-year imprisonment) (Queensland Consolidated Acts, 2021, s.443A).

“Match-fixing conduct” in relation to a sporting event or the happening of a sporting contingency is then defined in the Queensland Act as:
conduct that:

- a *affects, or if engaged in could reasonably be expected to affect, the outcome of the event or the happening of the contingency and*
- b *is contrary to the standards of integrity that an ordinary person would reasonably expect of persons in a position to affect or influence the outcome of the event or the happening of the contingency (Queensland Consolidated Acts, 2021, s.443, ch43).*

This can be further compared with the more limited NSW approach, which is focused on the corruption of a betting outcome. While also attracting a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment, the NSW *Crimes Act 1900* s.193N makes an offence to “Engage in conduct that corrupts betting outcome of event” meaning:

A person who engages in conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event

- a *knowing or being reckless as to whether the conduct corrupts a betting outcome of the event and*
- b *with the intention of obtaining a financial advantage, or causing a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event (NSW Consolidated Acts, 2021, s.193N).*

“Corrupting a betting outcome of an event” is further defined in NSW *Crimes Act* s.193H:

if the conduct

- a *affects or, if engaged in, would be likely to affect the outcome of any type of betting on the event, and*
- b *is contrary to the standards of integrity that a reasonable person would expect of persons in a position to affect the outcome of any type of betting on the event (NSW Consolidated Acts, 2021, s.193H).*

These alternate approaches were considered through the national review into sport integrity, *Report of the Review of Australia's Sports Integrity Arrangements* (known as the Wood Review) and the subsequent government response. Most crucially in this context, the Wood Review Recommendation 2 was “that the Australian Government establish national match-fixing offences similar to those in New South Wales, while continuing to encourage national consistency in relevant criminal provisions introduced by state and territory governments” (Wood Review, 2018, p. 13). The government response, however, did not commit to adopting the NSW approach, stating instead: “The Government agrees to establish match-fixing offences at the Commonwealth level, while continuing to encourage national consistency in relevant criminal provisions and arrangements in states and territories” (Australian Government, 2019, p. 10). It remains to be seen which approach is ultimately preferred by the legislature.

Wood review (2018)

On 5 August 2017, the then Commonwealth Minister for Sport, Senator the Hon Greg Hunt, announced that the Honourable James Wood AO QC would “lead a specific review into the integrity of Australian sport”. The Terms of Reference set out that the key threats: “the rise of illegal offshore wagering, match-fixing and doping in sport”. Mr Wood is a former Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and had been the Chair of the NSWLRC in 2010 which was so influential in the development of the NPOMFIS. The Review was supported by David Howman CNZM, former Director General of the World Anti-Doping Agency, and Ray Murreihy, former Racing New South Wales Chief Steward. Two adjunct panel members were also appointed: Ms Jo Setright, nominated by COMPPS, and Court of Arbitration for Sport arbitrator, the Honourable Dr Annabelle Bennett AO SC nominated by the Australian Olympic Committee, Australian Paralympic Committee, and Commonwealth Games Australia (Hunt, 2017).

By the time the Wood Review was made publicly available on 1 August 2018, the Commonwealth Minister for Sport was Senator the Hon Bridget McKenzie. The Wood Review made 52 recommendations across five key themes, including those relating to match-fixing:

- 1 A stronger national response to match-fixing
- 2 Australian Sports Wagering Scheme
- ...
- 5 A National Sports Integrity Commission

Proclaiming the Wood Review as “the most comprehensive analysis of Australia's sports integrity arrangement ever undertaken” (Australian Government, 2019, p. 2), Minister McKenzie also launched the new strategic plan for sport in Australia,

Sport 2030: National Sports Plan, and a name change for the Australian Sports Commission (to Sport Australia) (McKenzie, 2018). Having received the Wood Review in March 2018, supported by the Sports Integrity Review Taskforce and NISU, the government prepared its formal response to the myriad of recommendations. In the resulting report, *Safeguarding the Integrity of Sport* (Australian Government, 2019), it was agreed that to protect children and counter the risks of match-fixing and doping, a central integrity body should be established. This body, Sport Integrity Australia (SIA), tasked with the implementation of a national regulatory framework, was formed on 1 July 2020.

Sport Integrity Australia (SIA)

An enormous amount of work was required in a short space of time to bring the key Wood recommendation to life. Rather than creating new fit for purpose legislation, given the time constraints on establishing the new agency through legislation in just over 12 months, the Australian Government Solicitor and the Office of Parliamentary Counsel proposed amending the existing legislation. This solution, the *Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority Amendment (Sport Integrity Australia) Act 2020*, effectively turned the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA) into SIA. The Explanatory Memorandum to the amendment Bill set out that ASADA, NISU (including the Sports Integrity Taskforce), and the national integrity functions of Sport Australia would be merged to become SIA. To create stability ahead of the SIA's establishment, in May 2020, the new Minister for Youth and Sport, Richard Colbeck, appointed the ASADA CEO, David Sharpe, as the inaugural SIA CEO. Minister Colbeck stated that "David's done a really good job with ASADA. Australia has a very good reputation globally with respect to sports integrity and we wanted that to continue" (Australasian Leisure Management, 2020).

The SIA Corporate Plan for 2021–2025 sets out eight primary areas of focus (Key Activities) that broadly reflect the Wood Review recommendations. Those that relate to match-fixing are the following:

- 1 *Provide a transparent, independent assessment, and review process to address integrity issues*
- 2 *Ensure Australia ratifies the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (Macolin Convention)*
- 3 *Develop and implement the Australian Sports Wagering Scheme for Australian Sport*
- 4 *Advocate for NSOs to adopt and implement a comprehensive National Integrity Framework*
- 5 *Establish a National Platform for information sharing with all partners to address integrity threats/risks*
- 6 *Establish a Whistleblower Scheme to enable confidential reporting of integrity threats.*

Key activity 3: Macolin ratification

Accession of an international treaty that has come into force is a two-step procedure: “the first step is the signature, notably demonstrating a political willingness to be a Party to the Convention. The second step is to ratify the Convention, thus adopting its principles and engaging to follow its articles” (United Nations, 2021). Having signed the Macolin Convention on 1 February 2019, it was initially assumed that the Australian ratification process would be a simple “rubber stamp” process. However, some of the complexities in the Australian regulatory system outlined above leading to the challenges faced by NISU in attempting to achieve a nationally harmonised legislated response are hinted at in the SIA Corporate Plan: “We will continue to work with partners to determine whether Australia meets the thresholds required to ratify the convention”. One important precursor for ratification is for SIA to work with the state and territory Attorneys-General to understand how each jurisdiction can implement the Convention under their sport, gambling, and other relevant legislation.

From a regulatory perspective, forging a pathway for agreement appears even more challenging since the National Cabinet October 2020 decision to disband the regular Meeting of Sport and Recreation Ministers (MSRM) (the MSRM was a 2011 development replacing the SRMC). The MSRM had

provided a forum for cooperation and coordination on matters relating to the development of sport and recreation in Australia, with a particular focus on match fixing, sport integrity, sport participation, and water safety. MSRM was supported by the Committee of Sport and Recreation Officials (CASRO) and the National Institute Network group (NIN).

(Australian Sports Commission, 2020)

The CASRO was also disbanded, so only the high-performance focused NIN remains.

There are different heads of power the Commonwealth can rely on to criminalise match-fixing, and match manipulation, at the national level. To the extent to which the Commonwealth relies on the Constitutional external affairs power, the Macolin Convention needs to be ratified. At the time of writing, no date for ratification or introduction of the Bill has been set.

Key activity 4: The Australian Sports Wagering Scheme (ASWS)

The Wood Report recommended the continuance of the work of the SBIU as part of the “National Platform” required by the Macolin Convention. It also recommended an Australian Sports Wagering Scheme (AWSW) to replace the Approval Pathway process. The AWSW was open for feedback until 20 December 2021. To help SIA develop and refine the AWSW operating model, SIA circulated

a Discussion Paper (May 2020) and then a Strategy Paper and Operating Principles document (August 2021) to encourage stakeholders to provide their views on the various options presented. SIA then compiled a Consultation Regulatory Impact Statement (November 2021) which will then be replaced with: The final Regulatory Impact Statement, “which will be used to identify a recommended form for the AWSW” was released on 1 December 2021 (Whybrow, 2021 at 1:42).

Key activity 5: National integrity framework for NSOs

The SIA Corporate Plan states that for any framework to be effective: “Good governance, easy-to-understand rules and an integrity-first culture” are required. Sport Australia remains responsible for assisting the NSOs to build their governance capacity through the “Sport Governance and Organisational Enhancement team” (Australian Sports Commission, 2021). SIA provided the NSOs with the template policies making up the National Integrity Framework in March 2021. Many NSOs had policies in place for a number of elements of the Framework, including for match-fixing.

For example, Cricket as discussed above had an established policy (Cricket Australia, 2020), while, by way of comparison, the Football Federation of Australia (renamed Football Australia [FA]) Code of Conduct (2007, c1.4) has been updated and new FA Sports Betting and Match Manipulation Guidelines have been published (September 2021). What is more difficult to find is evidence that the NSO policies demonstrate that the culture of integrity has been integrated within the sport. Reflecting the templates provided, many NSOs take a very legalistic approach (e.g. Tennis Australia, 2021), while others take the opportunity to expressly set out the link between the sport’s values with the aims of the policy. Acknowledging that policies alone cannot protect sports from threats to their integrity, the early Triathlon Australia approach, following the release of the 2013 ACC Report referred to above, is one example that helps explain to members both “why” and “how” an integrity framework supports the sport of triathlon. The purpose of the Triathlon Australia Integrity Framework is set out clearly, and in relation to match-fixing, states that it aims to “Enable our stakeholders, media and general public to be spectators at events which are genuine contests, free of race-fixing and illegal betting” (Triathlon Australia, 2013).

Key activity 6: National platform for information sharing

This activity does not relate to the Macolin Convention requirement for a National Platform referred to above but is a much broader strategy to coordinate information across all integrity threats. In so far as this strategy relates to match-fixing, an important information-sharing partnership for SIA is with the ACIC. The same day SIA was established, SIA entered into a formal agreement with the ACIC

to “deliver a broad range of intelligence capabilities and information sharing to ensure the protection and integrity of sport is maintained”.

The SIA Corporate Plan also sets out that “the agreement with the ACIC includes the secondment of ACIC personnel to the agency for a 2-year period to support the ACIC in developing the framework, policy and potential regulation around match-fixing, betting and wagering”. The Organisation Chart features the ACIC Liaison Officer reporting into the “Operations” arm.

The embedding of a law enforcement officer into a sport organisation (or in SIA’s case, an “enforcement body” under the *Privacy Act*) reflects a successful mechanism used in a number of settings, including during the 2015 Major Sporting Events (Ordway, 2018a). Any intelligence that was missed through having animal racing excluded from the Wood Review Terms of Reference may now be covered through the SIA-ACIC cooperation agreement. Similarly, the link between organised crime, gambling, and racing prompted the newly appointed Commissioner to immediately arrange for both a Victoria Police investigator and an analyst to be embedded into the Office of the Racing Integrity Commissioner for six months to explore the possible criminal connections in Victorian racing (Ractliffe, 2021).

Conclusion and further considerations

As observed in the “Sport Integrity and Corruption – Best Practice Australian and International Policy & Program Delivery Approaches” Report:

by establishing a national sport integrity authority, Australia has the opportunity to continue to be a world leader in protecting the sport industry. Throughout our international consultations, Australia’s commitment and efforts in this context were consistently praised, particularly in regard to [its] willingness to collaborate with other governments and international organisations working to promote integrity in sport.

(Hall et al., 2021, p. 8)

The development of the national match-fixing policy (NPOMFIS) in 2011 and the establishment of Sport Integrity Australia (SIA) almost a decade later (in 2020) have been extremely influential internationally. The benefits set out in this chapter may give cause for other nations to consider whether a similar governmental body would assist to lower the risk of match-fixing in their jurisdiction.

However, the fractured nature of the state and territory regulatory framework noted above is causing Australia to falter in its leadership role. As outlined above, ratifying the Macolin Convention and the establishment of offences addressing the manipulation of sporting competitions at the Commonwealth level are key outstanding components of the national sport integrity regulatory and policy framework. Also, although SIA has been designated the umbrella body for sport integrity, there remains some overlap and demarcation confusion within the sports community in relation to governance and member protection particularly.

There is an opportunity to clarify how SIA, Sport Australia, and the National Sports Tribunal can work together more effectively in relation to policy development, advocacy, “prosecuting” sport policy breaches, managing complaints, and conducting inquiries or investigations.

There is also an opportunity for greater involvement of athletes to both support these organisations and initiatives. Now that law enforcement agencies can investigate and prosecute match-fixing in Australia, athletes may be subject to two parallel procedures: sports disciplinary procedures and criminal proceedings. It is even more crucial that athletes have a say in protecting their fundamental procedural rights.

The SIA Corporate Plan sets out a roadmap for the future direction of the organisation and suggests a number of recommendations for future research. Most significantly, this research could include evidence that the NSO policies demonstrate that the culture of integrity has been integrated within the sport, including assessing the effectiveness of these policy measures and how these regulatory changes can be incorporated into practice and educational materials. Looking forward, SIA will need to continue to embrace new approaches (Ordway, 2021, p. 237) and encourage greater transparency, accountability, and inclusivity measures throughout the whole sport ecosystem.

Internationally, stakeholders must continue to examine whether an international equivalent to the World Anti-Doping Agency, with responsibility for match-fixing, would be of assistance. Considering the transition that ASADA has undertaken in Australia to expand its functions into sport integrity more generally to become SIA, a broader “World Anti-Corruption Agency of Sport”, howsoever named, could have its benefits in leading on policy harmonisation and education. Not only would that better reflect the international nature of match-fixing but would also allow whistleblowers to refer a range of threats to sport integrity, including corruption in event bidding, procurement, ticket scalping, and better protect athletes/officials from mistreatment and/or and human rights abuses. That, however, is a discussion for another day.

Notes

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- 2 The ACB fines did not become public until 1998.
- 3 Dean Jones stated that he believed that it was the same man, Mukesh Gupta, involved in both 1992 and 1994 incidents: Thomas (2020) [from 14:26]. Gupta was also named by Cronje in 2000: Ramchand (2000).
- 4 James Wood is also the lead author of what is known as the ‘Wood Review’ (The Report of the Review of Australia’s Sports Integrity Arrangements) presented to the Australian Government in March 2018. Wood conducted the 2013 review into

Australian Cycling and was the Chair of the World Anti-Doping Agency Compliance Review Committee in 2020–2021.

- 5 ‘Tanking’ means deliberately losing towards the end of the season to be in a stronger position to select players in the following season draft process. See the discussion in Ordway and Opie (2017, pp. 42–43 and 55).

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A National Approach against Match-Fixing

The Case of Austria

*Severin Moritzer, Niklas Neudecker and
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Introduction

Fixing sporting competitions has been evident since the ancient Olympic Games and continued in the ancient Roman empire (Huggins, 2018). For instance, at the ancient Olympic Games, Eupolos of Thessaly bribed three opponents in boxing during the Olympic Games of 388 BC (Huggins, 2018; Maennig, 2014). In ancient Greece, the athletes who received the bribe and those paying the bribe were prosecuted (Huggins, 2018). Fixing sporting competitions is still prevalent. It has also become a recurrent social problem (Tak et al., 2018). Fixing competitions or match-fixing threatens the integrity of sport competitions as the uncertainty of outcome is violated (McNamee, 2013). Match-fixing includes the improper and intentional alteration of the results or the course of a sport competition in exchange for material and/or symbolic goods, thereby attaining an undue advantage (Moriconi, 2020; Moriconi and Almeida, 2019; Numerato, 2015). Thus, a pre-determined course is followed (Park et al., 2019). Huggins (2018) suggested differentiating between match-fixing for personal gains of one or more actors and sport-motivated match-fixing such as avoiding relegation.

Due to its omnipresence and long-lasting existence, several procedures and policies for the fight against match-fixing have been developed. Based on the Council of Europe's Convention on Manipulation of Sport Competitions (hereafter Convention), numerous measures for the fight against match-fixing have been derived (Chappelet, 2015; Serby, 2015). Generally, the Convention aims to avoid disputes, promotes the battle against dishonesty in sport, and fights against forbidden forms of sports betting (Chappelet, 2015). Serby (2015) emphasized the need of an international framework uniting several national approaches and aligning roles for the different stakeholders. Furthermore, a regulation of sports betting may be necessary on a national, European, and global level (Chappelet, 2015). When enhancing the Convention's effectiveness, it could be helpful to shift the focus to countries that offer suitable conditions for betting and consequently trying to integrate those countries into the Convention. Additionally, there is a danger of neglecting the illegal betting market when focusing exclusively on the legal betting market, which could benefit the former. Nevertheless, even if the

Convention discloses a few deficiencies, sticking to the Convention should be prioritized compared to establishing the World Sports Integrity Agency, as the Convention offers a superior framework (Serby, 2015).

Moreover, various scholars have highlighted the need for training and education programs to restrain the expansion of match-fixing in sports, as those programs could be efficient (Feldes, 2013; Moriconi and Almeida, 2019; Tak et al., 2018). This refers to the number of programs as well as their scope, as different stakeholder groups should be targeted, including athletes, managers, and referees (Feldes, 2013). Conveying the values of ethics and alerting potential abuse of ethics in the context of sports betting can be considered as one of the main objectives of these educational programs (Tak et al., 2018). Van Der Hoeven et al. (2020) extended this approach by stating that it is vital to alter processes and programs to the particular challenges or types of match-fixing.

In addition to the demand for training and education programs, raising public awareness and increasing general knowledge is another recommendation in the fight against match-fixing. Without specifically focusing on match-fixing, but rather on the integrity of sports in general, the public and media communications are key drivers in sharpening public perception. Hence, current policies and promotions of sport should be adjusted to showcase the system of sport positively (Manoli et al., 2020). In the particular case of match-fixing, it is specifically important to raise awareness about ongoing investigations to promote the population's knowledge (Feldes, 2013). To guarantee the sport's sustainability, Nowy and Breuer (2017) argued that there is a need to disrupt the current non-disclosure of match-fixing of the public. Interlinked with public awareness is the topic of whistleblowing, which refers to people reporting cases of match-fixing. Several researchers emphasized the importance of increased protection of whistleblowers by utilizing precautionary measures, such as safeguarding (Moriconi, 2020; Singh, 2011; Webley and Werner, 2008).

The fight against match-fixing in sport thus demands an independent organization monitoring non-integer actions in sports, providing educational programs for various stakeholders, and increasing the public's awareness of non-ethical behaviors in sports. In Austria, the Play Fair Code, a non-profit organization, has taken on this role since its inauguration in 2012. This chapter will outline the emergence and history of the Play Fair Code; its strategic and tactical objectives; and their implementation, effectiveness, and efficiency. The theoretical contribution of this chapter is that we outline how a non-profit organization can facilitate a better understanding of match-fixing in the sports world and how efficiently this can be executed. Finally, an outlook into the future will be provided.

History of the Play Fair Code and its work in Austria

Following an initiative by the Austrian Ministry of Sport, the Austrian Football Association (ÖFB), and the Austrian Football Bundesliga, the Association for Protecting the Integrity in Sport was founded in 2012. It operates under the brand

of the Play Fair Code (hereafter PFC). The main objective of the PFC is to ensure competition without manipulation and protect the integrity of sport. Stakeholders of the PFC include athletes, coaches, employees of clubs and federations, and a member network (Play Fair Code, 2013). Figure 13.1 provides an overview of PFC's main activities since its inauguration.

The PFC launched its operational work one year after the inauguration. Since then, the PFC offers workshops, lectures, and seminars to players, members of sports clubs and federations, and media representatives to educate and train them about match-fixing. These workshops are based on the six core messages of the PFC: spirit, credibility, awareness, responsibility, prevention, and monitoring (Play Fair Code, 2013). Besides, in 2013, one of the biggest match-fixing scandals in Austrian history emerged. This scandal was related to Dominique Taboga and Sanel Kuljic, who were involved in fixing 18 Bundesliga matches (Holzer, 2020; Mohnhaupt, 2013), demonstrating that Austrian football is not spared from cases of manipulation and, thus, enforcing the need for institutions like the PFC.

In the following year, 2014, the PFC expanded their educational workshop activities to youth football and referees and simultaneously provided the second round of workshop activities for all football Bundesliga teams in Austria. Moreover, structural partnerships with Tipico, Admiral Sportwetten, Wettpunkt, and the Austrian bookmaker federation were established. Besides football and skiing, ice hockey was included in the portfolio as the third sport discipline through cooperation with the Austrian ice hockey league. The introduction of an ombudsman's office for betting fraud, to create a contact point for athletes to report cases and receive a consultation, was another milestone for the PFC (Play Fair Code, 2014).

Like in the previous campaign, the year 2015 once again saw an increase in training activities. Amateur sports clubs in lower leagues, such as the football




Figure 13.1 Emergence and history of the Play Fair Code (own visualization).

Regionalliga and the top ice hockey league clubs, were subject to these educational workshops. Following the strategic approach, two new betting providers (Tipp3 and Cashpoint) and one new sponsor (Coca-Cola) were acquired as new partners. On the international level, PFC was involved in Erasmus+ funding and served as a partner in the “Fix the Fixing” project. PFC also actively contributed to the working group on match-fixing led by the IOC (Play Fair Code, 2015).

With Austria’s signing of the Convention on Manipulation of Sports Competitions in 2016, the basis was provided to set up a National Platform with the help of the PFC. Additionally, the PFC put in several efforts to promote global cooperation, such as participation in the international sports conference (Play Fair Code, 2016). To increase visibility and awareness, a sponsoring campaign of referees in the Austrian Football Bundesliga was started, building on previous annual actions in stadiums of the Bundesliga (Play Fair Code, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016).

Besides celebrating the fifth anniversary, the year 2017 also saw the addition of the Basketball Bundesliga as the fourth sport discipline. Furthermore, a partnership with bwin added another betting provider to the portfolio and several international projects, such as “Fix the Fixing” and the “European Rookie Cup”, were successfully concluded (Play Fair Code, 2017). After the conclusion of these projects, various new projects were initiated. In 2018, the new Erasmus+ project “Against Match Fixing” and the PFC’s first eSport project were kicked off (Play Fair Code, 2018).

In 2019, the respective national federations of tennis (ÖTV) and handball (ÖHB) partnered with the PFC, bringing the total number of sport disciplines up to six. Just like in previous years, new structural partnerships with betting providers were established with the addition of HPYBET. In reaction to current trends, the PFC also emphasized their focus on digitalization and online presence, creating and disseminating the hashtag #NoManipulation (Play Fair Code, 2019).

The year 2020 followed a similar pattern as the years before, demonstrating the steady and effective approach of the PFC. Bet-at-home, Interwetten and OVWG (Austrian Association of Betting and Gambling) joined as new partners. At the same time, volleyball was incorporated as an additional sporting discipline. The international cooperation of the PFC was enhanced once again with new projects funded from Erasmus+ and a cooperation with the IOC. As a novelty in 2020, workshops were targeting women specifically for the first time in the women’s football Bundesliga (Play Fair Code, 2020) followed by the women’s volleyball and handball league in 2021. Generally, workshops which targeted women started in 2015 within the Erasmus + project “European Rookie Cup” and the ongoing cooperation with UEFA and the Austria Football Federation. PFC provided educational workshops with youth national teams.

Covering close to nine years of history since the first training session in 2013, the PFC conducted more than 650 workshops with more than 18,000 participants in total. Those participants were distributed between the seven sporting disciplines that the PFC currently covers. Every year, several conferences and educational workshops are provided, organized, hosted, or contributed on the international

Table 13.1 Play Fair Code – overview of educational trainings (Play Fair Code, 2019, 2020)

Category	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Professional sport	20	20	14	6	8	54	36	36	194
Amateur sport	/	/	37	10	2	/	18	33	100
Youth sport	/	21	39	38	35	4	3	21	161
Associations	1	9	2	1	/	1	4	6	24
Referees	/	1	/	/	1	/	2	/	4
Seminars	1	/	1	2	1	3	2	3	13
B2B	6	2	2	3	/	2	3	/	18
Conferences	2	3	1	4	/	1	2	3	16
All categories	30	56	96	64	47	65	70	102	530

stage to promote the fight against manipulation in sports worldwide (Play Fair Code, 2019, 2020). Table 13.1 provides a detailed overview of the workshops of the PFC, excluding various kinds of industry events.

Strategic and operational objectives of the Play Fair Code: an analysis of strategies, their effectiveness, and efficiency

The PFC offers approximately 100–120 integrity workshops annually. Ninety percent of these workshops are held for sport clubs and associations in Austria. Training is primarily facilitated for actors in the following sports: football, ice hockey, basketball, handball, skiing, tennis, and volleyball.

For each sport and every workshop series, a customized and specialized training module containing video sequences and case studies is developed and tailored to the characteristics and needs of the respective sport. The modules were designed to be face to face and interactive to achieve the highest possible degree of engagement among the participants. From an experience point of view, this cannot always be taken for granted. Much more, securing attention is key for the potential success of awareness-raising and an educational impact.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent protection measures over the recent past, new approaches for online training modules and outdoor educational training sessions were developed. Exemplarily, some of the contents of workshops are described. Each workshop starts with a general introduction to the phenomenon of match-fixing and betting fraud. Also, the PFC as an organization and its network are introduced (see Figure 13.2 for an overview of the PFC network).

The workshops often start with a striking case example (not yet necessarily from the respective sporting discipline). This provides a general idea of the workshop contents for the participants. An essential part of each workshop is also a



Figure 13.2 Play Fair Code network 2021.



Figure 13.3 Stakeholder approach.

discussion of credibility in sport. A closer look is taken at the stakeholders affected by a possible manipulation in a further step. Thus, the workshops include an overview of all stakeholders (see Figure 13.3).

The different manipulation types are then presented, explained, and illustrated using appropriate examples from the respective discipline. For instance, Andreff (2018) distinguishes between “minor” (e.g., infringing rules during a game) and “major” (e.g., doping and online-betting-related match-fixing) manipulations.

The path to manipulation is shown (see Figure 13.4) and explained in its single and decisive steps using interactive role plays.

An emphasis is placed on the admissibility of sports betting among athletes, sports betting, in general, and the legal framework. After that, the workshop participants have a closer look at the disciplinary regulations of their respective sport. These vary immensely, as indicated by previous research (Hallmann et al., 2019). Within the workshop, the goal is to derive clearly formulated and easily memorable key recommendations. Figure 13.5 provides an overview of basic disciplinary rules.

Finally, attention is drawn to the numerous, varied, and serious consequences of match-fixing. Thereby, a distinction between criminal law, labor law, sport federation law, on the one hand, and financial consequences and social reputation, on the other hand, is made. These are outlined in Figure 13.6. Thereby, the jurisdictions in different countries vary immensely (Hallmann et al., 2019).

To recap, the workshop is closed with a discussion on the important “3Rs”, also used in the UEFA’s integrity framework (see Figure 13.7). First, any form of manipulation must be recognized. Athletes, referees, or coaches have to reject



Figure 13.4 Steps to manipulation.




Figure 13.5 Basic disciplinary rules.



Figure 13.6 Consequences of match-fixing.



Figure 13.7 UEFA 3 R's.

any form of manipulation and report when they were approached in this matter. Manipulation is multi-faceted (Andreff, 2018). Manipulation can occur between sport insiders (e.g., members of the two opposing teams or any two contestants). Manipulation can also occur between sport insiders (not only athletes but also umpires or managers) and sport outsiders including, for instance, cronies, occasional bribers, or criminals (Andreff, 2018). Thus, it is essential that those who are approached understand the mechanism of manipulation and also whether they are targeted from sport insiders or outsiders.

Naturally, each workshop provides information on the various options for making contact aiming for athlete support and advice, be it via the ombudsperson attached to the PFC, the integrity officers of the respective federations or leagues, or directly with the PFC as a competence hub, and not only in the event of an actual suspicion report.

The educational contents are core messages distributed to all stakeholders. A distinction between B2C (athletes, coaches, referees) and B2B recipients (sport

organizations, managers, sponsors) has to be made. With the former drawing the attention more on concrete, real cases, and the direct consequences for the ones involved and the latter presenting a broader picture of effects and implications toward stakeholders and economic interest groups in sport, be it sponsors, federations, leagues, or TV broadcasters. Therefore, the strategic focus in terms of an educational approach of the PFC lies on the stakeholders on and off the pitch.

Besides this, and equally important, is the following question: Is there an impact on the betting markets? And if yes, which relevance has this impact in a certain sporting discipline with the relevant betting markets and vice versa? If a sporting discipline is offered on betting markets (domestic or international), approach scenarios to athletes, referees, and coaches are much more likely than in sporting disciplines not offered on betting markets. In other words, the probability for potential match-fixing activities is higher in sports available on the betting markets than sports lacking this criterion.

The Austrian betting markets – as is also the case for other European markets – have grown rapidly worldwide in recent years. Betting providers are major sponsors of the sport industry. Austrian betting customers have many betting providers with whom they can place their bets at their disposal, both online and through physical betting shops based within Austria (offline), in gastronomy and tourism venues, at petrol stations, or in tobacco shops. In 2018, about two billion Euro were bet on sports events in Austria. Sixty percent of the 2 billion Euro were placed in the offline sector and 40% in the online sector – and there is a continuing upward trend.

Austrian sport is represented on the international betting market on a large scale. There is no significant difference compared to other European countries of comparable size. Global betting providers generally offer the two highest divisions and/or leagues of the prominent men's team sports in their betting programs. Austrian women's sport is increasingly included in the betting programs and is gaining volume in the betting markets. The increasing digitalization of sport combined with a low-threshold access to sports data is effectively reflected in lower-level (amateur) competitions and youth competitions offered in international betting programs.

Apart from this and given the special geographical location, the long-standing tradition of alpine winter sports disciplines (alpine and Nordic skiing, biathlon, etc.) also plays a specific role in the national betting market. Something peculiar to Austria is the fact that sports betting is not defined as a gambling activity. The nine federal states specify the legal framework of the sports betting industry in Austria. Consequently, nine different legal norms have to be followed within the federal territory. These nine norms differ substantially. Therefore, sports betting providers operating throughout Austria need to undergo a licensing procedure in each federal province to offer sports betting in Austria legally. At present, there is no law or regulatory system in Austria for the online betting market. National and international betting providers operate with licenses issued in other EU

countries (i.e., Malta). However, several providers in Austria also offer (according to the effective Austrian legal framework) illegal online gambling, in addition to their sports betting offers, which at least results in a certain imbalanced situation for the market actors.

A draft law dealing with online gambling, including blocking systems, licensing modalities, gambling advertising and sponsoring, gambling and player protection, and addiction prevention, is currently being negotiated by the political and industry actors with a clear intention of passing a respective law that would be effective at the beginning of 2022. Legal frameworks and regulations have a certain and, sometimes, considerable impact on the potential willingness to cheat. Therefore, strengthening legal frameworks and governance environments sends strong signals from a general and special preventative point of view. It is also a useful awareness-raising tool in educational approaches.

Besides the betting-related match-fixing elaborated above, another important aspect is sporting-related manipulation dealing with the influencing and/or alteration of the outcome of games or competitions for sporting reasons. There are various types of sport-related manipulation, such as losing on purpose to avoid a stronger opponent in a later stage of a competition or collaborating with another team to avoid relegation to a lower league mutually. As an intermediate result, it has to be stressed (which happens always within the educational workshops of the PFC) that no matter which type of manipulation appears, it remains to be manipulation with serious consequences, may it be on a criminal law level, disciplinary law level, or both.

With regards to sporting-related manipulation, one of the aforementioned international project participations of the PFC, the Erasmus+ project EPOSM (Evidence-based Prevention Of Sporting-related Match-fixing) aimed not only to raise awareness with a special focus on sporting-related match-fixing but to find new concepts and approaches to tackle this specific version of manipulation in sport. For Austria, the PFC analyzed the following sports disciplines using an in-depth international, target group-specific survey: football, basketball, and handball. Close to 700 individuals from the target groups were interviewed across the country, and about 550 were involved in football.

About 11.5% (only half of the total international sample), that is 78 individuals, of the Austrian sample stated that they “knew” one or more individuals who had already been contacted/approached for match-fixing. Eight of the individuals surveyed in Austria stated that they had actually been approached themselves directly. Two of those Austrian participants, who had already been approached for match-fixing, indicated that the proposal was made solely for the purpose of making money by betting on the manipulated match. All actors were athletes and involved in football. Four of the approached Austrian participants (also involved in football as players and/or coaches) indicated that the proposal had only a sporting-related purpose. The remaining two Austrian participants who had already been approached for match-fixing stated other (not further identified) motives for the manipulation.

While the overall international figures (without going into specific details) of the EPOSM survey appear to be rather challenging, the national figures from an Austrian perspective are comparatively positive and encouraging. These figures reflect and underline the prevention work of the PFC for a decade. These figures are most probably the consequence of a long-term and far-reaching strategy to tackle the problem holistically.

Nevertheless, there are shortcomings and consequently potential to improve, such as the expandable horizon of the reporting practice of athletes and coaches in Austria. As an intermediate observation based on the survey, the educational message of the “obligation to report” must be emphasized even more intensively alongside very clear guidelines on whom to report to, when, and how.

Conclusions

The PFC reaches out to those groups in sports that are vulnerable to match-fixing or affected by match-fixing in any form. These groups include federations, athletes, or umpires, for instance. In the communication, education, and training, the PFC highlights the dangers and risks about also consequences of match-fixing. Thus, one entity lobbies for the integrity of sports and ensures that this message is transmitted in the Austrian sports world. The PFC functions as a catalyst and sets own impulses so that the topic remains on the agenda of all stakeholders. This is of particular value for the sports world in Austria. The Austrian approach has set up a competency skill embracing all stakeholders (see Figures 13.2 and 13.3) in the country. Since sport organizations, sports betting providers, monitoring institutions, and public authorities collaborate, executed prevention is perceived as highly authentic and credible.

While education and training are at the core of PFC’s operations, national and international collaborations and projects are also valuable. Through these collaborations in a systemic way, new knowledge is generated and shared. Moreover, best cases are shared, and thereby, the efficiency and effectiveness of the prevention work in Austria benefit as the understanding of what is done right and how it is done can be better shaped and accentuated.

The phenomenon of the manipulation of sport competitions is subject to constant change. Several factors play a role here, including the availability of sports betting providers, digitalization, or easy approaches to athletes via social media platforms. Sports betting providers develop new products for betting customers, which also opens up new opportunities for fixers. One example is the rapid expansion of online and live betting, which impacted the betting market in recent years (Newall et al., 2021). The digitalization of sports betting goes hand in hand with the digitalization of sport itself. Movement data, performance data, and health data of the sports actors play an increasing role in sports (Lopez-Gonzalez and Griffiths, 2018). It will be critical to observe to what

extent such data will play a role in the field of sports betting and match-fixing in the future.

Digitalization also creates new sports like esports, which are increasingly covered by the sports betting industry. Without further valuation of whether esports qualifies or does not as a sport *sui generis* (Hallmann and Giel, 2018; Pizzo et al., 2018), these entertainment disciplines, which are often not yet properly covered by institutions and regulations, are particularly susceptible to manipulation, and require a great deal of attention.

It is becoming increasingly easy to get in touch with sport players and actors through social media. In recent years, the number of contacts and offers to players made by often anonymous people through instruments such as Facebook, Instagram, or WhatsApp is constantly increasing. This problem has to be observed and taken into account accordingly in the athletes' training so that they behave correctly in the event of such approaches (disclosure of inside information, obligation to report) to avoid damage to their careers. Therefore, it is paramount that all stakeholders (sport organizations, sports betting providers, monitoring institutions, and public authorities) collaborate jointly and help protect the athlete. All stakeholders are aware of their responsibilities to foster the integrity of sports. The PFC steers the collaboration.

Several implications for future research can be derived. First, it could be beneficial to focus on single practical cases in sport. This has the potential to deliver more in-depth knowledge and information, which could be adopted for future workshops. Furthermore, the National Platforms of the different countries could serve as objectives for future research. This would allow to draw comparisons between the countries and establish best-practice models. Esports, as a relatively new phenomenon, constitutes another horizon that asks for research in the future. Here, the goal should be to detect the peculiarities of esports and verify the applicability of existing measures from other sports.

Numerous stakeholders in Austrian sports, particularly the PFC, strive to strengthen and further develop the national integrity approach. One element is ratifying the Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (the Macolin Convention). Discussions at various political levels are currently taking place to initiate and strengthen a political decision-making process. Ratification also implies that the measures described in the Convention will definitely be implemented. An essential instrument of the Convention, as stated above, is establishing National Platforms to strengthen national coordination and international cooperation.

The integrity framework implemented in Austria in recent years anticipates the essential cornerstones of the Convention. The National Platform has been efficiently created *de facto*, but in a still informal construction in the form of the PFC. However, adaptations in the PFC's structure and, above all, legal refinements, such as an Austrian Anti-Match-Fixing Act, are necessary to transform the PFC into a National Platform in accordance and compliant with the Convention.

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Conclusion

The Present and Future Understanding of Match-Fixing: Exploring the Building Blocks of Match-Fixing Theory

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An enhanced theoretical account of match-fixing

As all the previous chapters have illustrated, while match-fixing appears to be a clearly defined phenomenon describing the complete or partial manipulation of sporting competitions, fully capturing its complexities is a considerable and challenging task. As we discussed in the beginning of this book, match-fixing has been viewed through various lenses over the years, with some prevailing more than others (Moriconi & de Cima, 2021; Tak et al., 2018; Van Der Hoeven et al., 2020). These examinations have allowed for some intricacies to be captured, permitting for a deeper appreciation of the phenomenon of match-fixing to be achieved. However, to this day, and as with any phenomenon that is inextricably socially embedded, it could be argued that considerably more research is needed before we are confident that we have more fully grasped it.

The central aim of our book was to offer a better understanding of match-fixing. Hence, we ensured that all chapters contribute to theory by bearing clear scientific and/or practical utility (Corley & Gioia, 2011). In the following paragraphs, we try to structure and summarize some of the chapters' main insights. We thereby draw from the four core elements or building blocks of theory development, focusing, respectively, on the relevant *what?*, *how?*, *why?*, and *who*, *where*, and *when?* questions related to the social phenomenon under study (Whetten, 1989). We believe that this book's chapters help get a clearer picture about all four building blocks when it comes to match-fixing, enabling the development of an enhanced theoretical account.

What?

The *what?* question targets the fundamental factors of a given phenomenon (Whetten, 1989). This book offers insights in the conceptualization of match-fixing, both in the past and the present. The continuous and growing inquiry on the phenomenon of match-fixing is a clear indication of both its prevalence and its potentially

damaging significance in the sport ecosystem not only nowadays, but as it was argued earlier in the book, throughout the existence of sport. Indeed, as Huggins discussed in his chapter, match-fixing should be perceived not as a response to the modern commercialization and growth of the sport sector but, instead, as a widely practiced norm within the existing sporting culture. As such, the often accused “bad wolves” of modern sport might be, in fact, used as scapegoats for a broader issue that modern sport “saviours” and policymakers might be ignoring.

Moreover, challenging current conceptualizations of match-fixing requires us to further push its examination beyond the already taken paths within academic inquiry and into novel accounts that can allow for such a wide phenomenon to be captured more accurately. Such a call was also made in the chapter authored by McNamee and Rubicsek who emphasized and elaborated on the heterogeneity and complexity of match-fixing – in a narrow sense – and sport manipulation – in a broad sense – nowadays, while indicating the spillover effects this has on policy and as a result in (unsuccessful at times) response to it.

How?

The *how?* question focuses on relevant patterns and links between the different factors of a given phenomenon (Whetten, 1989). When investigating the details of what match-fixing entails, we are often also surprised to see that it can occur in different ways, with novel and previously unexplored avenues, actors, and processes involved. As a result, it is not surprising to say that rather simplistic explanations are offered around and for match-fixing, which further highlight the need to explore how the phenomenon develops more thoroughly, as Langlois and Caneppele argued. In their chapter, they offered an alternative examination of match-fixing, integrating rational choice theory with the concept of trace, to attempt to provide the *modus operandi* used by the fixers in the cases analyzed, indicating the need for a less myopic and one-sided view to be adopted in future prevention policies, monitoring activities, and investigative research on match-fixing.

Policy responses to match-fixing also reveal how match-fixing is viewed and how reactions to counteract it are developed. Examining the practices of the policymakers in response to and in an attempt to combat match-fixing exposes how it is perceived by sport governing bodies, intergovernmental institutions, and national governments. As De Cima and Moriconi suggested in their chapter, the promotion and implementation of existing practices based on the widely promoted “zero tolerance” against match-fixing have done little to show that a full grasp of the phenomenon has been achieved. On the contrary, it has shown that a top-down approach in policy decision-making, which ignores the knowledge and perceptions of individuals who are directly involved and affected by the phenomenon and is based instead on a pre-conceived and potentially mistaken or incomplete understanding of match-fixing, can result in close to zero success.

Through a similar focus on policy implementation, Ordway and Kihl offered insights in how different structures in the sport ecosystem of a country can help us better understand match-fixing and identify ways in which it can be dealt with more holistically. Similar threads of policy design and implementation can be found in her chapter, with a more optimistic view however, that a national integrity body could, indeed, be better positioned to drive any change on the matter forward.

Moritzer, Neudecker, and Hallmann offered an alternative approach in dealing with match-fixing, through the examination of the course followed in Austria. Their chapter provided new knowledge on the use of a non-governing body that focuses on said actors potentially involved or more vulnerable to match-fixing, in order for education and training to be provided. In other words, by focusing on enhancing the understanding of match-fixing on some key actors in order to fight match-fixing, the approach described allows for a potentially bottom-up alternative to be established.

On the same line of thought, van Bottenburg outlined an account of how network governance can help not only in better grasping the phenomenon but also in understanding how the issue is addressed by the actors involved. His analysis allows for insights to be offered to the current governance approach against match-fixing, which further highlights the pitfalls and predicaments of such an approach, potentially justifying the pushback a network governance course might face. His chapter, while offering a systemic level overview of the phenomenon, allows for light to be shed on yet the same “elephant in the room”, our lack of understanding of match-fixing has a direct effect on any efforts to tackle it. His chapter thus helps showcase how exactly our understanding of both match-fixing and anti-match-fixing is limited and too narrow.

Why?

The *why?* question broadens the scope of the theorization about the phenomenon and helps better understand and explain it, in addition to merely mapping its core factors (Whetten, 1989). This can be applied to both match-fixing and anti-match-fixing. For instance, Tweedie and Holden examined the legal responses to match-fixing, highlighting the legal challenges in dealing with the complexities of the phenomenon of match-fixing worldwide. In their chapter, it is made clear that despite the multiple and diverse legal strategies that have been designed and are implemented, the intricacy of match-fixing, which has yet to be fully appreciated, makes it to this day elusive to a “legal remedy”. What this chapter helps underline is that our lack of understanding of match-fixing can be considered one of the key reasons why challenging it has so far been insufficient and ineffective.

Its continuous scrutiny proves that match-fixing is, indeed, a wider and more multifaceted phenomenon than previously envisaged, and as such conceptualizing and understanding it (more) fully requires us to look beyond our pre-conceived ideas of why does it occur now or who is to blame. That is to say that while it is, in fact, initiated by individuals in various roles and with differing motives, in

reality, it extends beyond the mere fault or weakness of individuals that are often blamed. As Barboukis and O'Shea argued in their chapter, there is a plethora of psychological factors to be considered when examining why individuals are involved in such actions, which should be also taken into consideration when policy to combat it is designed. Alongside those psychological factors, lie social aspects, influencing individuals and their decisions directly, or indirectly, by allowing for the conditions of perfect storms or fertile ground for match-fixing to occur.

Likewise, match-fixing is also not a mere repercussion of the involvement of "organised crime", a blanket narrative often adopted in an attempt to unsuccessfully present the phenomenon as a consequence of the infiltration of external actors who exploit and spoil the purity of sport. As the research presented in this book has illustrated, match-fixing transcends the previously mentioned accounts and as such it is to be appreciated as a wider phenomenon embedded in sport, reflecting a broader systemic inefficiency or failure of the system. As Manoli and Antonopoulos presented in their chapter, match-fixing can, in fact, present itself as a solution to the ferocious pressures and market dynamics of modern sport, in which sport clubs and individuals are forced to "do what it takes" to "make ends meet". As such, match-fixing can be viewed not as a threat but as a solution to succeed and even survive, by sporting individuals and sport organizations.

Who, where, and when?

The *who?*, *where?*, and *when?* questions expose the conditions, boundaries, and limitations of the scrutinized social phenomenon (Whetten, 1989). Does our understanding of that phenomenon hold for different stakeholders and geographical contexts? Concurrently, and as with any social phenomenon, the occurrence of match-fixing is a consequence of the wider underlying macro processes and conditions. As a result, in order for our understanding of match-fixing to improve, the need to pay close attention to the systemic issues surrounding and allowing match-fixing to take place emerges once again. The chapter by Marchetti, Godinho, Reppold Filho, and Petersen-Wagner responded to this need, by exploring the circumstances surrounding match-fixing, in an under-studied geographical context (i.e., Brazil). They thereby used the theory of routine activities. In their chapter, it was suggested that our often narrow or incomplete view of when match-fixing is more likely to occur might have misled some of its responses which act as deterrents but in a rather unsuccessful way, while neglecting the more systemic and institutional issues that need to be addressed before any progress is made. They help not only shed light on relevant *why?* and *how?* questions but also show the limitations of our current understanding of both match-fixing and anti-match-fixing.

While examining all the above, we can see that the presentation and discussion around match-fixing and anti-match-fixing have been at times falling short from offering a full view of its organization, manifestation, and repercussions. This could be due to how under-theorized and under-studied the issue is, or possibly due to our inclination to examine such complex phenomena in a rather

compartmentalized manner. It is, therefore, that Van Der Hoeven and Willem suggested that when match-fixing is viewed through the lens of normalization, a better-rounded picture is offered regarding its multifaceted nature and actual magnitude. They argued in their chapter that if we keep examining match-fixing on separate levels (i.e., micro, meso, and macro) or in other words only as on the individual, group, or system level disparately, then, we will continue to fail in truly grasping the phenomenon. They help envision the conceptual boundaries of match-fixing, by posing questions such as: “where does tactics end and match-fixing begins” and “does our understanding of match-fixing hold for all sports?”

A similar progressive way to understand match-fixing was offered by Emrich, Gassmann, Koch, and Pitsch, who argued that the reality of the extent of match-fixing differs from what the public perceives it to be. In their chapter, it is highlighted that match-fixing can take both legal and illegal forms, with the former being “accepted” or considered common practice within sport. As such, any attempt to progress our understanding of match-fixing needs to incorporate both forms and appreciate that the public and other key sport stakeholders might ignore or forgive the often undiscussed other side of the coin and, instead, focus on the incomplete picture of the “demonised” illegal match-fixing. Their work helps grasp the contextual limitations of our current understanding of match-fixing. Indirectly, they also point to an important issue: if we conceptualize match-fixing as broadly as any form of (attempted) sport manipulation, are we then not undermining the concept of match-fixing and shifting the attention away from its truly problematic expressions?

A polyphony of views on match-fixing

This book provides much-needed additional research in an attempt to offer further, novel, and valuable insights to our comprehension of match-fixing. As social scientists who appreciate the plurality of viewpoints leading to various and differing interpretations of the same phenomenon, we have ensured that the edited book highlights contributions that illustrate the individual contributors’ understanding of the phenomenon. We have, thus, ensured that we as editors would refrain from influencing their work, ensuring that the polyphony of viewpoints is included uninterrupted. This is because we strongly believe that in the study of social phenomena, multi-perspectivism and the polyphony of views can help progress our collective understanding and individual appreciation (Bhaskar, 1978, 2013).

As such, the book offers a platform for their work and their understanding to be showcased, in order to assist in the collective appreciation of the phenomenon to progress. We believe that through the multi-disciplinary and international contributions included in this edited book, our collective understanding of the phenomenon of match-fixing and its practical complexities has progressed, pushing further the boundaries of existing knowledge on the matter.

While, as with any socially embedded phenomenon, we cannot claim that we have fully and wholly grasped it in this book, we believe that the contributions

included have progressed our appreciation of match-fixing, offering novel and alternative perspectives on this ever-developing phenomenon. We also believe that through them, we have pushed the agenda for more perspectives from differing contexts, backgrounds, and theoretical standings to be examined in the future, while offering through the individual chapter's suggestions of areas that could be explored in future studies.

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