

THE ROOTS OF RACISM

THE POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN THE US AND EUROPE

TERRI E. GIVENS

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Dedicated to both of my families – the
Givens Family and the Scott Family

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Preface

The seeds for this book started back in the late 1990s when I was conducting research in France on the radical right vote in Europe. I remember seeing a large protest for the release of Mumia Abu Jamal, who had been on death row in the US after being convicted for the 1981 shooting death of a Philadelphia police officer. A protest in Paris seemed ironic to me at the time, given that many of the French people marching to save this African American man rarely considered the plight of Algerian immigrants who lived in poverty in the Parisian *banlieues* (suburbs). This despite the fact that the movie *La Haine* had done much when it debuted in 1995 to lay bare the life of immigrants in those suburbs and the police violence and oppression they faced.

This book is informed by my experience conducting research on issues related to immigration and race in Europe since the 1990s, as well as my experiences as an African American woman growing up in the post-civil rights era US. My experiences as a researcher and academic frame the way that I approach this analysis of the connections between the US and Europe, particularly the way that ideas and policies have developed around race, and their impacts on the African Diaspora. I'm embarrassed to say that although I studied international relations at Stanford University and political science at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), I didn't understand the significance of pioneers in my field, like Merze Tate and Ralph Bunch, until much later in my career.

My experiences in doing research in Europe over the next 15 years would provide me with regular opportunities to observe the difficulties that politicians there had dealing with issues of race. I remember attending an "equity summit" in Berlin where an official in Angela Merkel's administration told me that Germany didn't have much experience dealing with issues of racism, this despite the fact that Germany has had a significant ethnic minority presence since at least the 1970s. Many of those immigrants only got access to citizenship in 1998 when the citizenship policies were liberalized.

Exploring history in the US

I was born in 1964, a significant year for the civil rights movement. The 1964 Civil Rights Bill ended segregation in public places and was a major component of a series of laws that would change the lives of not only African Americans, but many other minorities who faced discrimination in the US. Along with the changes that would come with the 1965 Immigration Act, the face of politics and the demographics of the country were going to change dramatically in the next 50 years.

Policies aren't neutral carriers of governing content; they enable certain actions that framed differently or pursued differently would be flagrantly immoral or unconstitutional. For example, Voter ID laws, which present a public concern over voter fraud. Is it wrong or misguided to care about the integrity of the electoral process? Obviously not. Yet this policy can be operationalized toward different aims.

The roots of racism run deep in the US and Europe. As I conducted research in Europe over the last 25 years on issues related to race, immigration, and antidiscrimination policy, I became very aware of the ways that ideas around race and White supremacy were very similar across the Atlantic. I also bemoaned the fact that there was little collaboration going on between political scientists studying the politics of race in the US and those of us studying the politics of race in places like Europe, Latin America, and other parts of the world.

Europe and the US have a particular connection when it comes to racism, because of the history of slavery beginning in the 1500s that led to the development of a structure of racism that sought to justify the enslavement of Africans. It is my argument in this book that those ties have continued and are playing out in the current politics we are seeing in the US and Europe today.

As I considered the fact that there was a lack of literature that made the connections between racism in Europe and the US, it became clear that my own experiences as an African American woman and a scholar of European politics put me in a unique position to make that connection. The history of race in the US, as exemplified in the work of authors such as Ibram Kendi, made it clear that the connections between the US and Europe on these issues goes back to the origins of the slave trade. It also became clear that the origins of my own discipline, political science, were also steeped in the racism of the late 1800s and early 1900s as I explain in detail in Chapter 1.

Although I have been a relatively successful academic, I am still very aware of the ways that my research and my career have been circumscribed by the fact that I am an African American woman. I was the first Black woman to get tenure and promotion to full professor at the University of Texas at Austin. I was the first Black woman vice provost at the University of Texas

at Austin and the first woman and Black person to become provost at Menlo College. Academe, particularly political science, has not been a welcoming place for women and people of color. The percentage of Black faculty in academe has actually declined since the early 2000s, going from 7 percent in 2006 to 6.6 percent in 2016 (Krupnick, 2018).

It was this awareness that led me to look at the issue of race in the US and Europe. The topic of race was for the most part invisible in political science on both sides of the Atlantic until the late 1980s. This is due to a great extent because those of us who have been impacted by the politicization of race have also been given limited access to the prestigious universities that define what is important research. As I will describe in more detail in Chapter 2, political science has only recently become a locus for research on issues related to race and ethnicity.

The historical development of racist ideas and policies have led to policies today that have created a system of oppression on both sides of the Atlantic. Maintaining political control as well as economic aims were a two-pronged approach for leaders and politicians who saw the advantage in oppressing the groups they considered inferior. Even when ideas of inferiority had been undermined after World War II, these policies were perpetuated by those who found ways to maintain White power, not only in the South, but across the US and in Europe. My unique understanding of the development of anti-immigrant radical right parties in Europe, the rise of Donald Trump in the US, and the Brexit vote in the UK is combined with a focus on the historical connections with politics and policies in the US to develop a politics of White supremacy that guides policy to the present day. As I will describe in Chapter 3, the US and Europe have been bound together since before the founding of the US by slavery and the creation of race which has been used to justify colonialism, genocide, chattel slavery, segregation, and immigration restrictions.

Exploring history and politics in Europe

On March 16, 1986, France held a legislative election in which the Front National (FN), a radical right party, won 9.8 percent of the vote and 35 seats in the French Assembly. It was my junior year as an undergraduate at Stanford University, studying international relations. That spring was my first trip abroad for a study abroad program in Tours, France. I arrived in France on April 1, only two weeks after that election. I didn't know at the time that election would be a focal point for the dissertation research I would be conducting 12 years later as a graduate student in political science at UCLA.

In 1992, when I applied to graduate school at UCLA, I wrote about an article I had seen in *Newsweek* magazine about the Republikaner Party in Germany. I could see that the issue of immigration and race was going to

be an important topic in the upcoming years. On a whim, I wrote that this was a topic I would be interested in researching. Little did I know that this would actually become the topic of my dissertation three years later.

That election in 1986 was illustrative of the argument I would make in my dissertation, and eventually my first book, that electoral systems play a key role in the success of the radical right. For that election, President François Mitterrand had changed the electoral system from a two-vote majority system, to proportional representation, which he knew would give his Socialist party more seats than they could win in the regular electoral system. However, this change also opened the door to a party that hadn't been able to win seats, except in European Parliament elections, which also used proportional representation.

I moved on to study the politics of immigration in the European Union, and in the meantime, the radical right most definitely did not go away. The influence of radical right parties and politicians would continue to grow in Europe. In the meantime, my research for my next book would be influenced by the success of the Austrian Freedom Party in 1999 – it was their electoral success that led to the passage of the European Union's Racial Equality Directive in 2000. My book, *Legislating Equality*, would trace the development, passage, and implementation of the Racial Equality Directive, starting with the role of the European Parliament in the 1980s through the unenthusiastic implementation of the directive in the member states in the early 2000s.

My research managed to cover a time period when anti-immigrant sentiment, racism, antisemitism, and the rise of the radical right were combining to create a hostile environment for anti-racist efforts, and also saw the decline of left parties, like the Social Democrats in Germany and the Socialist Party in France that had hopes in the early 2000s that immigrants would become a new constituency for them, as they began to lose votes from working-class voters to radical right parties.

Meanwhile, in the US, race and immigration were highly salient issues. In California, I watched the protests prompted by the passage of Proposition 187. The 1994 ballot initiative would have established a state-run citizenship screening system and could have prohibited undocumented immigrants from using non-emergency health care, public education, and other services in California. Although the ballot initiative was passed by a majority of voters, it never went into effect, and was invalidated by the courts in 1997. The mobilization that came after the passage of Proposition 187 would change California forever – but it also gave politicians on both sides of the Atlantic a playbook for pursuing an racist anti-immigrant agenda that would ultimately lead to the successes of politicians like Donald Trump in the US, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, and Marine Le Pen in France.

As I continued my research on the issues around race and immigration, it occurred to me that collaboration across the Atlantic on these issues wasn't new. In fact, ideas about race in the US had their origins in Europe. It became important to me to develop a better understanding of the linkages between race and immigration in the US and Europe over time. In 2008 I convened a group of scholars to discuss the rise of anti-Islam sentiment that was happening on both sides of the Atlantic.

Experiencing a violent history

In March of 2018, I joined my son's 8th grade class trip to Washington, DC. I had been to Washington many times, and as a political scientist I hoped to provide some context to the monuments and institutions they would be visiting. I was pleasantly surprised that our tour guide, a veteran, was willing to take the adult chaperones to the National Museum of African American History and Culture (NMAAHC). The museum wasn't part of the itinerary, but we had set the 8th graders loose in the other Smithsonian museums, so we had a few hours on our own. Our guide told us it was best to start in the history section in the lower levels of the building.

Since I didn't know that I would have the opportunity to visit the museum, I hadn't had time to prepare myself emotionally for the visit. As we took the elevator down to the lower levels, I could feel the weight of history around me. When we entered the historical exhibits on the bottom floor, I knew I had found what I had been looking for when I was considering writing this book.

On one side of the hall was the history of European trade with Africa and the development of the slave trade, on the other was the history of Africa – as we walked through the displays, the two strands converged in the Americas with the development of sugar cane plantations in the Caribbean, the plantation system in the American colonies and the redefining of these humans from the African continent as possessions. The systems developed culminated in the laws and customs of chattel slavery which would define the lives of most Africans in the US until the end of the Civil War.

While the colleagues I was with went for an overview of the museum, I spend most of the two hours I had there on the first level, engrossed in the stories of the European and African sides of the slave trade. The more I learned, the more I wanted to learn – how race became defined, and slavery justified, which then turned into a lifelong sentence not only for the initial person enslaved, but for their offspring. As I continued to explore the exhibits in the museum, I felt gratitude and anger – gratitude for the researchers who had pulled together this information, and anger at the educational system which had denied me the knowledge of most of this history. I draw on the examples from the NMAAHC throughout the book.

University campuses are often seen as "liberal bastions" or places where the free flow of ideas is at least tolerated. Many university campuses have been at the forefront of protest movements, particularly since the 1960s. However, as institutions they have been slow to take on anti-racism, or to promote civil rights in terms of providing opportunities for academics. Academe remains a space where African American faculty are rare, and my own discipline of political science is an exemplar of the lack of progress for faculty in the social sciences. In 1990 Blacks were 4.35 percent of all political science faculty, and many top research institutions had no Black faculty, including Dartmouth, Brown, Vanderbilt, and Berkeley. Most institutions have remedied this situation (with the exception of Berkeley), but the overall percentages remain low. Overall, Black faculty in 2017 were 6 percent of all faculty, while Hispanics were also 6 percent, while being one of the fastest growing ethnic groups in the country.

The lack of growth in the percentage of Black faculty occurred during a time when a great deal of attention was being placed on diversity in academe. New positions were created to focus on gender and racial diversity at universities and colleges across the country. However, this was also a time when court cases and state level propositions disavowed "affirmative action."

As an American, I had no shortage of examples of racism in my own country, the study of the politics of race has a long and rich history, and the UK has also had a long research tradition in this area. My research in Europe was focused on trying to establish the boundaries of race and the ways that politicians and NGOs were dealing with anti-immigrant sentiment, and the ways that they would define racism. For example, when I would visit France, in some ways I became more aware of my Blackness – when I learned that the police in Paris would be checking identity cards and passports, I became more conscious of the fact that I could be perceived as an immigrant, rather than an American. I started keeping my passport and driver's license with me at all times, although I was never stopped by the police. However, I did learn from many of the people from the *banlieues* that I spoke with that they were regularly stopped when they were heading home from Paris on the metro. These experiences exemplified the ongoing need to account for the impact of racism, and the work goes on.

1

Introduction: Structural Racism is the Problem of the 21st Century

On Memorial Day, May 25, 2020, George Floyd's life slipped away as he said, "I can't breathe." Derek Chauvin, a Minneapolis, Minnesota police officer knelt on his neck for 9 minutes and 29 seconds (Levenson, 2021). Floyd's crime was allegedly using a fake $20 bill at a convenience store. The video of his murder was shared millions of times on social media which allowed the world to see his life taken away. It would become a seminal moment with protests against police brutality and in support of the Black Lives Matter movement developing around the world. The demonstrations were historic in that they drew in not only Black protestors, but people from all backgrounds and nations.

The conviction of officer Chauvin almost a year later was a relief, but it also came with the recognition that there would be much more work to do to end anti-Black police brutality and discrimination in the post-Trump era. Voter suppression measures were on the ballot in many US states, and in the UK, a report commissioned by the Conservative government after the 2020 protests denied the existence of structural racism, flying in the face of evidence provided by many who had participated in the study (Cassidy and John, 2021).

In his seminal 1903 book, *The Souls of Black Folk*, W.E.B. DuBois states, "The problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line"(p 3). Although much has changed since that time, as we enter the second decade of the 21st century structural racism remains an intractable problem, not only in the US, but in Europe. Norms around the idea of Whiteness are embedded in our societies. The groups who are the targets of racism and violence may be different in these countries, but the impact on equality is the same. Whether it's people of Muslim background, African descent, or newly arrived Asian immigrants, the norms around White supremacy and political power come into play. Ideas around race and ethnicity

that developed hundreds of years ago still define our social and economic relations. Non-White people are denied entry to countries, are segregated into low-income neighborhoods with low performing schools, and have to fight for their basic civil rights. As Thompson concludes in her overview of the transnational stratum of race:

> The global color line is not only a means of maintaining the vestiges and reincarnations of imperial hierarchies but also a phenomenon that can itself be analysed. The assertion that race is a transnational idea that exists in excess of national boundaries is only a controversial claim at present … The discourse of race was conceived in the encounters between European and non-European modernities. (Thompson, 2015, p 55)

We are in an era where racism, protest, and a pandemic have collided to create a new awareness of the divisions that have impacted politics, policy, and society for hundreds of years. It is the goal of this book to examine the history of transatlantic racism in the context of the history of political science and other social sciences, illuminating the ways racism has persisted, leading to the racial divides that were the focal point of the global protests that followed the death of George Floyd.

Ongoing discrimination toward ethnic and racial minorities

The issue of race is not only transnational, but also very much a current issue. Black Lives Matter protests grew during the summer of 2020, at the same time that the vulnerability of African Americans had become apparent due to the COVID-19 pandemic – Blacks and Hispanics in the US were more likely than Whites to contract and die from the virus (Neuman, 2020). In the UK, Black people were four times more likely than Whites to die from COVID-19 (Booth and Barr, 2020), and in France, death rates for Black immigrants doubled during the height of the pandemic in March and April of 2020 (Associated Press, 2020b). As will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 3, the lack of statistics on race and ethnicity makes it difficult to track the disparate impact of disease and discrimination.

Despite the participation of so many people in the Black Lives Matter protests, many Americans and Europeans are unaware or dismissive of the impact of systemic racism in their societies. They are often ignorant of the history that connects the US and Europe on these issues. Systemic racism is prevalent across the Atlantic and is directly connected to a long history of White supremacy that goes back to the era of the transatlantic slave trade.

In March 2011, at a conference in Brussels for the Transatlantic Inclusion Leaders, I met ethnic minority elected officials from across Europe who

discussed their experiences in politics with young leaders from the US. As ethnic and religious minorities, most were non-White, and all were either immigrants or descendants of immigrants. They had spent most of their lives in European countries with few (if any) non-White elected officials as role models. The fact that there were now enough non-White politicians to hold a conference was a positive sign that barriers for representation were beginning to fall. Yet, many expressed frustrations at the slow pace of progress and the lack of access to high-level political power for non-White ethnic minorities in contemporary Europe.

Even if there are few non-White elected officials in Europe, non-White immigrant-origin communities are at the center of many political debates. In particular, many native Europeans are concerned that non-White immigrants and their descendants are failing to integrate. One of the most contentious examples is the debate over how to accommodate Muslim religious practices to a largely secular and historically Christian Europe. At times, this has led to legislation that limits the ways in which Muslims can practice their religion. In 2009 a Swiss referendum banned the construction of new minarets atop mosques and along with several countries, Switzerland has more recently considered passing restrictions on wearing headscarves, veils, and burkas (Abdelhafidh, 2019).

Another point of concern is whether non-White immigrants and their descendants suffer intractable discrimination. This has led some European governments to debate whether official forms of "affirmative action" should be adopted or discouraged (Calvès, 2008). Other political actors claim that the problem lies with non-White ethnic minorities who have failed to sufficiently adopt European norms. This has prompted some governments to restrict access to citizenship and more actively promote assimilation or "civic integration."

All of these concerns generate intense policy debates. The fear that ethnic minority immigrants are ruining European society has provided fertile ground for xenophobic far-right political parties to insert themselves into the mainstream agenda (Givens, 2005). In some countries, these far-right parties have claimed up to 30 percent of the vote and become part of the national government. However, on the other side of the debate, there is relatively little ethnic minority representation, particularly in national parliaments. This raises questions about whether the interests of ethnic minority immigrant-origin communities are being adequately represented in contemporary European politics.

Most non-White communities in Europe are the result of post-World War II immigration. Most of these immigrants arrived without citizenship and could not vote in European countries. Moreover, in the early years of migration European governments were not very aggressive about incorporating these immigrants into the mainstream political system. In

part, this was because most non-White immigrants who arrived in Europe during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were temporary workers. They were not expected to stay so most governments did not plan for their integration. Yet by the 1980s and 1990s it became clear that these were permanent communities and since then West European governments and societies have become more focused on promoting their full inclusion (Castles and Miller, 2009).

It is important to note that European societies have dealt with the difficult issues of immigration, integration, and diversity for centuries. Yet prior to World War II those migration flows were primarily within Europe. European migrants usually faced intense discrimination after arrival but over time and across generations were able to blend in with their fellow Christian Europeans. The new non-White immigrant communities in Europe challenge this trajectory because they are unable to physically blend in, even across several generations. Racial diversity is now a social and political issue in Europe in ways that are fundamentally different from the past.

Yet despite this increasing importance of racial diversity, issues of racism and discrimination have only recently gained the attention of policy makers in many European countries. Even throughout the centuries of colonialism, slavery, immigration, and ethnic conflict, European policy makers have consistently avoided addressing the issues of racism and discrimination. Britain is the one exception, where policy makers began developing race relations policies in the 1950s and 1960s. But from the more general legal architecture of the EU, it would appear that until recently most Europeans felt that race was not an important issue. For example, it was not until the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam that the European Council empowered the European Commission to "take appropriate action to combat discrimination" based upon "racial or ethnic origin."

One main reason why European countries have been so reluctant to address the issue of race is the legacy of the Holocaust. During World War II, the concept of race was used to exterminate entire communities and people at all levels of society were complicit. After the war, Europeans understandably wanted to prevent such atrocities from occurring again. Many countries responded with formal restrictions on the collection of racial data and informal taboos on using race as a concept in social life.

Another reason for Europeans' hesitancy to embrace the notion of race is their criticism of American race-conscious policies that legitimize the (mistaken) notion that biological differences divide the population. In addition, even when Europeans acknowledge that the Black–White racial divide is a real social issue in the US, they claim that cultural differences – that cut across supposed racial categories – are more relevant in European societies. Moreover, European critics claim that because Americans' focus

on race reifies the category it makes it more difficult to fight any racism that does exist.

French politicians have historically rejected the very concept of "race." Thus, the French government has consistently rejected the idea of recognizing and classifying individuals in terms of race and ethnicity, preferring instead the concept of a French people comprised of French citizens. This view is reflected in its constitutional law. Article 1 of the 1958 Constitution, which provides for "equality before the law of all citizens without distinction of origin, race, or religion," and has been interpreted to prohibit the drawing of distinctions. As a result, the French government does not collect data on racial or ethnic groups. In fact a 1978 law on data storage prohibited the maintenance of data on racial and ethnic origins without the individual's express consent or formal permission by a national commission (Geddes and Giruadon, 2004, p 339).

All of these factors created the tricky situation in which non-White ethnic minorities in many European countries could not use race as a basis for political mobilization despite facing racial discrimination that impeded their integration. For decades, this reinforced the poor political integration outcomes for non-White ethnic minorities across Europe (Messina, 2007). However, there is evidence that things may be changing. France is often considered the European country with the most intense and ideological opposition to using racial categories, and in particular to collecting statistics on racial differences in the population. Yet even in France there is increasing pressure to find some way of accounting for the experiences of non-White ethnic minorities that cannot be reduced to class or national-origin-related factors (Maxwell, 2010).

More broadly, across Europe there is a recognition that long-term racial and ethnic cleavages may be emerging and that something must be done to combat this trend. In part this is because the rise of radical right anti-immigrant parties forced Europeans to become serious about dealing with the divisions. In addition, riots by ethnic minority youth in the British Midlands and France's *banlieues* have provided dramatic examples of the dangers of not addressing racial disadvantages.

From a theoretical perspective, Balkenhol and Schramm argue,

> it is not sufficient to simply abandon race from our analytical vocabulary, but rather we need to draw careful attention to the heterogeneous, fluid and often surprising ways in which race may surface in concrete practices. Through this ethnographic focus, the concept of race as an absent presence also helps us to make distinct contributions to understanding the multi-fold resurgence of race in the current rise of populism and racist sentiment across Europe. (Balkenhol and Schramm, 2019, p 587)

This perspective on race helps to inform our understanding of racism in the context of the development of policies toward immigrants and ethnic minorities, as well as the ways that race plays into gaining political support.

The politics of White supremacy versus White nationalism

It is important to understand how scholars approach the term White supremacy. For many, it is considered a broad systemic issue, as defined by Frances Lee Ansley:

> By "white supremacy" I do not mean to allude only to the self-conscious racism of white supremacist hate groups. I refer instead to a political, economic and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and social settings. (Ansley, 1989, p 993)

On the other hand, White nationalism focuses on a type of nationalism that is based on a racist ideal of a homogenous country: "A 'white nationalist' generally wants a nation of white people. Whether that means creating a separate nation of just white people or pushing those who are not white out of their current nation depends on which branch of 'white nationalism' is talking" (Perlman, 2017). For the purposes of this book, the focus is on White supremacy because it is clear that long-standing citizens of different colors and ethnicities will continue to be part of societies on both sides of the Atlantic, and although there are many White nationalists in Europe and the US, White supremacy has more broadly impacted norms, policies, and politics since the era of transatlantic slavery.

Since the year 2000, the US has moved dramatically toward becoming "majority minority" and we have had a Black president. Migrants from parts of the world that had been unable to come to the US prior to 1965 such as India and South America added to the multicultural mix of our country. We have also seen the backlash to the growing diversity. The terror attacks of 9/11 and numerous attacks in the UK, France, and Belgium by Islamic terrorists triggered an increase in anti-Muslim sentiment. They are not the only targets, in 2016 we saw the election of Donald Trump whose administration implemented cruel policies to impede immigrants and asylum seekers. Trump was hesitant to condemn neo-Nazi marches in places like Charlottesville, Virginia, and there was a significant increase in antisemitic attacks after his election, including the murder of 11 worshippers in a synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

It is no secret that race is a highly charged concept in Europe. While race is clearly a social and cultural construction, it is useful in understanding key contemporary social and political dynamics, particularly discrimination. Although not a biological fact, race is a "social fact" (Durkheim, 1964). In the case of Europe, there is also the fear of loss of cultural homogeneity, which plays into the issue of race and religion. Since most minority groups are not large enough to present a threat to privilege, attitudes could also be considered a form of xenophobia.

In Europe, the 21st century started with the passage of the Racial Equality Directive (RED) which required EU countries to enact laws against racial discrimination. The RED was designed as a repudiation of the ascent of the far-right Austrian Freedom Party and its leader Jörg Haider. However, the 9/11 attack on New York City's World Trade Center was one of many terror attacks in the US and Europe that would shift the focus away from antidiscrimination policy and less restrictive immigration policies, to greater support for anti-immigrant politicians and more restrictions on immigration.

Despite the election of Barack Obama, which many thought heralded a new post-racial era, not only anti-immigrant sentiment, but White supremacist ideals were hiding just below the surface and sprang into life, personified by not only Donald Trump, but Boris Johnson in the UK with the passage of the Brexit referendum, and leaders of far right parties like Geert Wilders of the Netherlands and Marine Le Pen in France. As Howard Winant points out,

> the future of democracy also depends on the *concept* of race, that is, the meaning that is attached to it. Contemporary threats to human rights and social well-being – including the resurgent dangers of fascism, increasing impoverishment, and massive social polarization – cannot be managed or even understood without paying new and better attention to issues of race. (Winant, 2008, p 41)

Perpetuating White supremacy versus a multicultural future

Today, in the first part of the 21st century, race has gained acceptance as a legitimate, if still controversial, social and political issue in Europe. Even if it is clear that race is not a biological fact but rather a social and cultural construction, it is useful for understanding how racism and discrimination operate in our societies today. As Frederickson argues, "Race…is commonly used as a criterion to justify a dominant and privileged position – 'accompanied by the notion that "we" are superior to "them" and need to be protected from real or imagined threats to our privileged group position that might arise if "they" were to gain in resources and rights. Here we have

"racism" in the full and unambiguous sense of the term'" (quoted in Foner, 2005, p 12). This perspective highlights the power relations that influence Europeans' fears of losing cultural homogeneity to non-White immigration.

Even if Europeans are more willing to speak openly about racial issues, the conversations are not always amenable to ethnic minority political empowerment because of the implicit struggle for how Europe will be defined in the future. For example, one might imagine that Germans' open atonement for the sins of the Holocaust would make them especially sensitive to potential discrimination against contemporary immigrant-origin ethnic minorities. Yet there is a deep reluctance to completely abandon ethnic conceptions of German identity. As Michelle Wright notes:

> The Americans, French, and British, to one degree or another, most often pretend to (and to some degree do) overlook race in determining national belonging, instead bringing in a different set of signifiers such as political beliefs, cultural mores, and economic status … Germany, on the other hand, while not prohibiting all non-Germans from becoming citizens, nonetheless has trouble viewing those who do not share a specific racial heritage as "true" Germans. (Wright, 2004, pp 184–185)

Discrimination directly affects the ability of minorities to participate politically. Although many European countries have only recently begun to grapple with racial discrimination, it became an important issue during the 1980s in the European Parliament (EP), where efforts were made to counteract the influence of racist anti-immigrant political parties who had won seats in the 1986 EP election. Although the parliament itself still has a small number of recognizable ethnic minorities (eight were elected in the 2009 EP election), the EP took the lead in addressing racial violence and anti-racism, which led to the RED in 2000. This type of legislation may eventually impact the ability of ethnic minorities to address issues of discrimination in society and in politics.

White Europeans' resistance to the growth in ethnic minority political presence will likely continue for the foreseeable future. Even in Britain and the Netherlands where non-White ethnic minorities have the highest levels of political representation in Europe (often equal to the ethnic minority percentage of the population), there are still significant barriers to ethnic minorities' full acceptance in mainstream politics.

In addition, despite well-developed sensitivity to multiculturalism and racial difference in both Britain and the Netherlands, those discourses of diversity often marginalize non-White communities by not allowing them to operate on the same playing field with mainstream political actors (Small and Solomos, 2006) Terrorist attacks and the general international political climate have intensified Islamophobia, which some argue is an example of

"cultural racism" against Muslims whose values are considered incompatible with European society (Modood, 2005). At the same time, immigrant-origin Muslims are increasingly likely to get elected to political office and engage in productive ways with mainstream European politics (Modood, 2005). All of these trends suggest that the incorporation of non-White ethnic minority migrant-origin communities in Europe will remain a central political issue for years to come.

Although African Americans have been stigmatized throughout their time in this country, they are not like migrants who can be detained en masse or turned away at the border. We are the ultimate insiders yet outsiders, most brought to this country in chains to toil in Southern fields. Upon gaining freedom, there wasn't the option of returning to a homeland to which there was no longer a connection.

Defining comparative race theory

Historically, the social sciences have seen the issue of racism as a global phenomenon, as I will examine in more detail in Chapter 2. However, the study of these topics in recent times has tended to remain divided between different parts of the world. It is my argument in this book that the links that developed between the US and Europe around ideas, policies, and practices that maintain power for "Whites" persist to this day. I focus on the US and Europe because they have a disproportionate impact in practices around the world, from China, to South Africa to Australia. Although I will not focus on these countries, I do believe that we must do more to develop an ongoing research agenda that tracks these connections on an ongoing and consistent basis. This will require change in academe, as I discuss in Chapter 2.

An important component of this book is a dive deep into the history, trying to find some answers to explain the institutional structures that have developed over time. We are still grappling with brutal beatings and murders that continue to happen in the America of the 21st century. Internal strife can divide us, as it did in the America of the 1860s. Of course, it all comes down to power, but slavery and racism is a deep, bitter poison that is still infecting the bodies politic of both sides of the Atlantic today. As I will describe in the chapters of this book, it is exemplified in the approaches to citizenship taken by the US and European countries before, during, and after World War II. It is the brutal system of incarceration that preys on brown bodies, attempting to maintain the racial hierarchy that fueled industry and the growth of this country for centuries.

Countries like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have also faced issues related to job discrimination, housing segregation, and policing of minority communities. Although the racial hierarchies may vary, the outcomes are similar. People from ethnic and religious minority

backgrounds are disadvantaged economically and politically across Europe. As in the US, I argue that much of the approach taken toward these groups is built on ideas around race going back hundreds of years, despite the fact that countries in Europe, particularly Germany, disavowed racism after the Holocaust.

There is a great deal of concern as we enter the third decade of the 21st century that White supremacy is focused on maintaining power as ethnic and racially defined communities continue to grow in countries that were formally majority "White." The rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic has become bolder and directed at refugees, immigrants, and even citizens of color, including those from Muslim backgrounds. As I have laid out in the previous section, I will examine the development of ideas about race, the ongoing impact of racism over time in Europe and the US, and the ongoing impact of White supremacy on our lives and our politics.

Since the mid-1990s, my research has focused on the politics of race and immigration in Europe. I have also promoted the idea that issues of race don't necessarily follow boundaries, and there should be more collaboration between Americanists and Comparativists in political science. I am not the first to focus on this lack of connection, for example, in 1976 Ira Katznelson wrote the following:

> It is an unfortunate irony that despite the considerable gains in methodological sophistication, and despite a growing recognition that the issues of race are of global significance, to date, to their mutual impoverishment, race relations scholars have usually operated within the relatively closed world of the traditional literature on race, while students of comparative politics remain largely uninformed by that literature. Comparative politics and race relations scholarship would be enriched by an exchange of ideas, research foci, and methodological orientations. (Katznelson, 1976, p 11)

Over 40 years later, we still see clear divisions between scholars who study race and ethnicity at the national level, those who do comparative politics and those who study immigration policy. Ira Katznelson's book examined the nature of racialized politics in British and American cities. He demonstrated that British officials created institutional structures that limited immigrant political participation, cutting them off from political power. This led to difficulties in race relations, a conclusion shared by Freeman (1979) in the British case. He found similar results in his comparison with Chicago, where machine politics ruled. Meanwhile, New York was dominated by White party politics, and Blacks were left without access to the main levers of power. In this situation, "race relations" policy was not enough to quell political unrest in minority areas (Katznelson, 1976).

The comparative approach can be fruitful for a variety of reasons. In his analysis of the Black experience in the US and England, Stephen Small notes that "comparison makes it indispensable for us to consider the paradigms, models, theories and concepts we utilize when we explore patterns of racialized and ethnic group relations" (Small, 1994, p 16). He goes on to point out that although scholars in England are influenced by the work of scholars in the US, the converse is not true. Small's analysis contends that a comparative approach is vital to understanding policy, noting that "Comparison generates concrete policies which can be examined and evaluated – especially regarding the obstacles to implementation – and it challenges us to think more carefully about the criteria by which we judge what is viable, desirable, achievable or otherwise" (Small, 1994, p 19).

It is also true that political scientists need to look outside their own field to pull in theories that may inform their research. There are many differences in the ways that countries approach issues of race, but Small settles on the idea of "racialisation" in his comparison of Blacks in the US and England, stating that:

> When we examine the process of "racialization" we find that our beliefs about "races" and "race relations" have more to do with the attitudes, actions, motivations and interests of powerful groups in society; and less to do with the characteristics, attitudes and actions of those who are defined as belonging to inferior "races." (Small 1994, p 34)

I would argue that Small is getting at the impact of White supremacist structures and structural racism which have common foundations in the US and Europe. Even though people of African descent have lived in the US for hundreds of years, unlike many Blacks in England, they have dealt with similar racialized systems that have kept them in a disadvantaged position since the era of empire, colonization, and slavery. I will use a variety of frameworks, including examining historical linkages across the Atlantic, to make clear the ongoing connections that create similar outcomes.

In the book *Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK: State of the Nation* (2020), Shankley and Rhodes share their key findings on racism in Britain:

- Racisms are embedded in historically and politically determined systems of domination and work to exclude, marginalise and inferiorise groups on the basis of purported physical, cultural, and symbolic differences.
- The UN Special Rapporteur, reporting in 2018 found "striking" levels of "structural socio- economic exclusion of racial and ethnic communities in the UK" as well as "growth in the acceptability of explicit racial, ethnic and religious intolerance".
- Racism and prejudicial attitudes and practices, while improving in some ways persist, with Muslims and Gypsy-Traveller communities in particular

facing high levels of prejudice. Acts of bias, discrimination and racial violence remain a pervasive feature of everyday life for ethnic and religious minority groups, evident in hurtful statements, and forms of aggression, bullying and harassment.
- There have been increases in reported hate crime every year since 2013.
- The shift from recognition of institutional racism to a concern with "unconscious bias" risks excusing governments, institutions and organisations from tackling structural and social causes of racism and inequality.
- Religion has become central to contemporary articulations of racism, impacting most markedly on Muslims. Counter-terrorism policies, including Prevent, have introduced state surveillance in which Muslims are positioned as "suspect" communities, exacerbating Islamophobic sentiment.
- There has been an increasing political mobilisation of racism and xenophobia in fringe parties and the political mainstream. This affected the Brexit campaign and its social and political aftermath. (Shankley and Rhodes, 2020, p 203)

In the French case, Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall point out that, "the question of race in France also differs significantly from its American manifestations, in particular with regard to the size of nonwhite populations and the role played by the overseas empire. The French case thus provides an excellent reference for all those interested in developing a transnational, global perspective on this history of race" (Peabody and Stovall, 2003, p 3) and, I would argue, not only the history of race but the impact of policy on non-White populations.

Another clear example of those connections is the French development of negative stereotypes for people of African descent. As William Cohen points out, "in examining the historical record, I found that in regard to blacks the tradition of racial inequality was dominant in French history" (Cohen, 2003, p xvi). My experience studying immigration and race in France confirms this observation, which is also supported by the work of Herrick Chapman and Laura L. Frader, who point to the French Revolution as a source of much of the ideology around assimilation that drives much of French policy to this day, noting that:

> In legal terms, then, revolutionaries insisted on the irrelevance of religious, ethnic, or racial difference in the exercise of rights. At the same time, they made citizenship the crucial legal status and loyalty to the nation the key virtue in the new Republic, thus creating a framework for assimilating outsiders *as individuals* into membership

> in the national community or excluding them by denying access to citizenship. (Chapman and Frader, 2004, p 2)

However, even the avowal of a "color-blind" approach has not led to equality for non-Whites in France.

Racism in Germany must be understood in the context of the horrific genocide of the Holocaust, and it's short but violent experience with colonialism. The idea of who is German is linked to citizenship as well as race, as Michelle Wright points out, "the guidelines for German citizenship routinely exclude both whites and nonwhites born and raised in Germany, perhaps even after several generations, but welcome people of 'German ancestry' who have never lived in Germany and do not speak German" (Wright, 2004, p 184). She later points out that "Black Germans, despite having been born and raised in Germany and belonging to no other culture or nation, are often read not as German but rather as 'African' (as if a continent of 750 million people and 1,000 languages is a homogenous community)" (Wright, 2004, p 185).

In my own work I have been able to draw on theories from comparative politics, American politics and critical race theory (CRT) to study the relationship among race, racism, and policy. CRT emerged in the 1970s as scholars from legal studies like Kimberlé Crenshaw and Derrick Bell helped to popularize the theory. More recently, as Bonilla-Silva has argued, racial inequality is seen as a natural process rather than the by-product of a system of racial domination (Bonilla-Silva, 2015). He describes the tenets of CRT as the following:

1 Racism is "embedded in the structure of society."
2 Racism has a "material foundation."
3 Racism changes and develops over different times.
4 Racism is often ascribed a degree of rationality.
5 Racism has a contemporary basis.

These tenets of CRT will help guide my approach to the roots of racism, particularly the focus on the way that racism has impacted societal structures and policies to the detriment of ethnic, racial, and religious minorities.

In pulling together the tenets of critical race theory, comparative politics, and immigration politics, I propose a new approach to studying issues of race that I call Comparative Race Theory (CoRT). It adds to the tenets of CRT with the following components:

1 Those who pursue policies that perpetuate racism, inequality, and White supremacy are not bound by national borders. From the beginnings of

the transatlantic slave trade, people in countries from the US to Latin America and Europe have shared ideas and policy approaches that now appear in countries around the globe.
2 Racism can extend to those who may share different national origins or religions, even if they are not phenotypically distinct from the dominant society.
3 Xenophobia is similar to racism in the types of policies that are pursued, and the inequalities it creates.
4 There is value in comparing approaches to race and racism around the globe, as White supremacy impacts domestic politics in many countries, as well as the relationships between countries and migration flows.

It is my goal to make the connections between the work of scholars in the US, my own work, and that of others who have focused on race and immigration in the US and Europe. It is my contention that there are similarities in the ways that policies around race and immigration have been institutionalized, and that those ideas have been shared across the Atlantic, leading to similar outcomes in terms of political and economic power for groups of citizens and immigrants who are considered inferior.

Outline of chapters

This book cannot do a complete review of the development of racism in North America and Europe. Rather the focus is on specific times and events that have come to define the development of racism. I begin this book with an examination of the history and transatlantic connections which define the approaches taken in both the US and Europe to race. I draw on historical events, political events, and policy developments for my examples, mainly focusing on the UK, France, and Germany in Europe. However, I also believe it is important to understand how researchers have approached these issues within our disciplines. I begin in Chapter 2 with an examination of the role of race in the beginnings of political science as a discipline, and how race has been problematic for the discipline throughout its history.

In Chapter 3 I examine the social constructions of race and the role of geography in defining various types of racism and the ways that those constructs impact politics. In Chapter 4 I reconstruct the history of racism, beginning with the development of the African slave trade in the 1500s, the colonialism and empires that followed, up to independence after World War II. In Chapter 5 I examine the post-World War II transition in the US and Europe, with immigration becoming a focal point for the politics of race. In Chapter 6 I discuss citizenship and the ways that it has become connected with race.

Chapter 7 examines the similarities in policing that have led to protests on both sides of the Atlantic. From the civil rights movement in the US to the global movement, Black Lives Matter, the push for the rights of immigrants and minorities share similar roots, and the conflation of immigration and race has led to similar impacts in terms of discrimination and the lack of civil rights. In Chapter 8 I examine party politics, including the rise of the radical right and the decline of the left, particularly in Europe. I go on to discuss the events surrounding the Brexit vote, Black Lives Matter, and policing, along with the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in Chapter 9, and in Chapter 10, I conclude with a discussion of the ways that we can move forward and create the change that can help to bridge racial divides.

Understanding the history of the transatlantic relationship and its impact on ethnic and racial minorities today is an important step toward developing empathy and understanding why racism has persisted. It is truly unfortunate that the deep-seated racism that has been ingrained in our institutions is mostly taken for granted. Over the course of the next chapters, I will examine these institutional forms of racism, describing their impact, both from a review of the literature and the research I have conducted, and how racism has negatively impacted the prospects for minority communities overall. In the words of political philosopher Charles Mills, "we live in a world which has been foundationally shaped for the past five hundred years by the realities of European domination and the gradual consolidation of global White supremacy" (Mills, 2014, p 20). It is imperative that we address these issues as a persistent component of politics.

2

Political Science, International Relations, and the Normalization of White Supremacy

The discipline of political science should be uniquely placed to understand the role of racism in politics and policy. However, the history of the discipline indicates that the study of racism and discrimination has been marginalized, despite the centrality of race in politics and societal relations. In this chapter, I examine more closely the history of political science and race since the discipline was founded in the late 1800s. The way that race has been handled in my own discipline provides lessons for other disciplines, particularly those in the social sciences, but it is also an indicator of how society has dealt with issues of race over time. We are entering an era of greater awareness of the role of racism in the development of policy and politics, and it is clear that the lack of diversity in political science has had a major impact on the types of research that have been done over time and in many ways the quality of that research was impacted by the lack of taking into account racial biases.

The discipline of political science has been a latecomer to the study of race and politics. Other fields, including sociology, have been engaged in examining race issues since at least the 1950s. What is curious is that the study of race was an important component in the founding of the discipline, as I will examine in the next section of this chapter. Then race disappeared from the agenda beginning in the 1920s through the 1960s. An examination of that time period indicates that the lack of focus on race had to do with our ahistorical approaches that didn't take into consideration long-standing structures that came out of the eras of slavery and Jim Crow.

Sociology had W.E.B. DuBois as one of its founders who put Black America at the center of his research beginning in the late 1800s. Many scholars have focused on the role of DuBois, and how he was erased from the discipline of sociology, as explained by Saint-Arnaud and Feldman:

> Consider Du Bois's accomplishment: far from lagging behind the social science of his time, he anticipated methods and practices still two decades in the future with his detailed 1899 empirical study *The Philadelphia Negro*; it would not be until 1918 that a similar approach would be taken by William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, the first great work of Anglo-American empirical sociology. Yet he faced implacable institutional ostracism from his earliest publications onward. (Saint-Arnaud and Feldstein, 2009, pp 3–4)

Howard Winant notes in his overview of the history of race in sociology that at the time of the founding of the field of sociology in the US, DuBois was marginalized:

> in 1905 and for a long time thereafter, the sociology of race took shape almost exclusively as a conversation among whites, even though this required the marginalization of W. E. B. DuBois, who was not only the founder of the field in its modern, empirical, and theoretically sophisticated form but also arguably the founder of modern American sociology tout court. (Winant, 2007, p 538)

Aldon Morris, who has worked to bring W.E.B. DuBois back into the center of the field of sociology and the study of race, notes:

> Thus there were obvious reasons why white sociologists suppressed Du Bois's scholarship. To embrace Du Bois's sociology, they would need to acknowledge that their theories proclaiming the biological and cultural inferiority of blacks could not be supported scientifically. Such an admission would have placed white social scientists at odds with the racial views of the white majority and those of white elites in particular. That would have been too ideologically jarring for them because they shared the white racist consensus and were not willing to distance themselves from the white privileges that sustained their "science". (Morris, 2015, p 4)

Although sociology has been in the forefront of the study of race and racism in the past few decades, the field is also reckoning with the lack of diversity that has affected research, as it has in political science.

> From the vantage point of a century's intellectual experience, we can see that each of these three politically oriented "perspectives"—the mainstream, insurgent, and reactionary approaches—has proved inadequate in the face of a set of racial conditions (not problems but

> fundamental structures) endemic not only to the United States but to the "modern world system" as a whole. (Winant, 2007, pp 543–542)

Anthropology is another discipline which has been reckoning recently with its history as a discipline and the impact on research, as Balkenhol and Schramm note: "early 20th-century anthropology also re/produced racialised understandings of bodily and cultural difference with lasting effects. The recent political and academic debates about the fate of ethnographic museums and collections in Europe are but one expression of this spectre of race and colonialism at the foundation of our discipline" (Balkenhol and Schramm, 2019, p 586).

The impact of racism early in the development of the field of anthropology and archeology was often the looting of artifacts and cultural treasures during the era of colonialism. A high-profile example of this is the "Benin bronzes," a collection of artifacts from the ancient Kingdom of Benin, which were taken by British soldiers in 1897. The artifacts were scattered through museums around the world, but a recent movement to repatriate the artifacts has led to the return of many of the brass plaques to Nigeria (McGreevy, 2021). As I will explore in Chapter 3, racism is linked to colonialism, particularly in Europe.

Interdisciplinary approaches to the study of race and ethnicity began in the late 1960s, in the wake of the civil rights movement. These programs started with San Francisco State University in 1969 and spread across the US as students and faculty demanded an interdisciplinary approach to the issues faced by Black communities, in particular. The international journal, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, was founded in 1978 and has been an important space for the publication of interdisciplinary and transnational work on race. However, it was only in 2017 that the first Black Studies undergraduate degree in Europe was started at Birmingham City University (Andrews, 2018). Race scholar Paul Gilroy (author of *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack*) became the founding director of the Sarah Parker Remond Centre for the Study of Racism & Racialisation at University College London in 2019. The center was part of a response to student-led demands for a transformation of the curriculum, with an emphasis on the role of the college in the colonial and imperial history of Britain.

The complexities of the study of race in Britain are described by Alexander:

> The increasing complexity of Britain's social and cultural ethnoscape is, in part, reflected in the explosion of racial and ethnic studies, which has seen a rapid expansion of its borders, across disciplines and spanning terrains from the diasporic to the microcosmic … The growth of what has been termed the Ethnic and Racial Studies "journalplex" (Winant 2015, p. 2176) across the past forty years is one marker of this increase

> globally, as well as nationally, while the British Sociological Association's "race, ethnicity and migration stream" is the largest and one of the most active in the discipline. (Alexander, 2018, p 1044)

There were many competing approaches to the study of race, as sociologist Caroline Knowles points out, "At the height of 1960s' and 1970s' concern with social structure, Marxists … and Weberians … debated whether race was a subordinate form of inequality to class; the connections between Black struggle in Britain and anti-colonial struggles in developing countries … and whether racism was an autonomous ideology from its referent, race" (Knowles, 2010, p 25). These different approaches have led to rich academic debates, while still struggling to acknowledge an intellectual history that has been influenced by racism.

Rogers Smith, a prominent political scientist from the University of Pennsylvania and former president of the American Political Science Association (APSA), has been an important contributor to the examination of the racist roots of the discipline of political science. As he noted in a 2004 article, "One can debate how deeply racist the American profession of political science was at its inception, but no one can deny that there was a great deal of explicit racism in the writings of many of its key figures" (Smith, 2004, p 41).

This sentiment was revisited in the aftermath of the Black Lives Matter protests over the summer of 2020. As the attendees grappled with the combination of unrest and a pandemic that led to a virtual annual meeting, APSA President Paula McClain stated in her address, "This is an inflection point in our national dialogue, and it is critical that our discipline acknowledges and confronts the racist origins of American political science. This soul searching is necessary because understanding and acknowledging our origins should help us move the discipline forward in a more productive fashion" (McLain, 2021, p 7).

Race was an explicit part of the founding of the political science, disappeared in the 1920s and began to return as an accepted topic of research in the late 1960s. Much of the early, racist history of political science and international relations has only recently been examined by authors in international relations such as Randolph B. Persaud (2002, 2015) and Robert Vitalis (2005, 2017). In the book *The Spectre of Race: How Discrimination Haunts Western Democracy*, Michael Hanchard (2018) takes on the sub-discipline of comparative politics, while Jessica Blatt's book, *Race and the Making of American Political Science*, takes on the entire discipline (2018). n order to understand the context for the study of race and racism, I examine the history and how it has impacted our understanding of the role of racism, not only here in the US but in other parts of the world, particularly in Europe where ideas around race were developed and shared across the Atlantic as political science developed as a field.

In this chapter I review the literature that examines the development of the discipline of political science, and the ways it was informed by racist ideas of the times. Unfortunately, these ideas continue to play a role in the way that "race" is used as a variable in the study of politics. Political science was formed in the late 1800s, a time when ideas around eugenics and the superiority of the White race were gaining currency. As I will discuss in Chapters 3 and 4, ideas around race grew out of the need to dehumanize and objectify others, particularly Africans who were eventually enslaved, as Europeans began to explore the world.

The normalization of White supremacy in the discipline of political science began in an era of eugenics, imperialism, and brutal colonialism. In the next section I begin with an examine of the impact the lack of diversity in political science on examining this history, as well as the way that the study of race has been marginalized. I then rely on the work of authors including Blatt, Vitalis and Smith, to describe the ways that political science as a discipline has perpetuated White supremacy. Within political science, the sub-discipline has become particularly cognizant of the way that race was connected to eugenics as it developed in the early 1900s and I examine this literature in some detail. In the concluding section, I examine more recent transatlantic connections on the study of race and immigration.

The impact of the lack of diversity in political science

Vitalis points out that political science/international relations in the early 20th century,

> imagined two fundamentally different logics and processes at work and thus different rules that applied across the boundary dividing Anglo-Saxons, or Teutons, and the inferior races found in Indian Territory, New Mexico, the Philippines, the Caribbean, Africa and Oceania. Here was the original and signal contribution of international relation to the theory and practice of hierarchy, a theory that W.E.B. Du Bois challenged in his continuing argument about the global color line. (Vitalis, 2017, p 26)

Race would become a genetic construct that defined those who were "inferior" and the political origins of the definition of race would be subsumed into a discipline that would focus on the levers of power held by White men. As pointed out by Smith, "American racial identities have gained much of their practical reality from their institutionalization by political elites in laws, public policies and governmental programs" (Smith, 2004, p 42).

This sense of inferiority has been perpetuated in the discipline, sidelining scholars as eminent as DuBois, but also ensuring the Black scholars' work

was not considered part of mainstream research. As Michael Hanchard notes, "The dearth of scholarship on slavery and colonialism, or on the relationship between colonialism, imperialism, and comparative politics, reveals more than just neglected subject matter, but an aversion to phenomena whose most important lessons are difficult to quantify" (Hanchard, 2018, p 169). However, this aversion often goes beyond marginalizing the topics, it can amount to an actual silencing of scholars of all backgrounds who have tried to engage in these topics, as Henderson notes:

> In fact, the "norm against noticing" white racism is so intense that it engenders a "silencing" of those who would raise it; or it ensures against publication in mainstream outlets for such work except that it provides appropriate euphemisms for the atrocities associated with white racism – especially against blacks – or the requisite "balance" to emphasise the role of non-whites in their own subjugation. (Henderson, 2015, p 39)

From a comparative politics perspective, Thompson finds that "Race is typically and uncritically perceived as an apolitical force and a wholly domestic issue: so domestic, in fact, that even comparison between countries is difficult" (Thompson, 2015, p 44). This understanding of race has influenced perspectives on race around the world, particularly in Europe. A lack of a political understanding of race led to race disappearing from scholarship from the 1920s until the 1980s. As noted by Hutchings and Valentino in 2004:

> At the beginning of the twentieth century, questions of the role of race in national, state, or local politics received scarcely any attention in major political science journals (Walton et al. 1995). This occurred even as the states of the former confederacy cemented into place the destructive doctrine of Jim Crow. Myrdal's (1944) groundbreaking treatise on the fundamental cleavages of race in America, and the danger those cleavages posed for the long-term stability of our democracy, received fairly little attention in the war-torn decade in which it was published. (Hutchings and Valentino, 2004, p 383)

It is critical to my analysis of the roots of racism that we understand why race was not a focus for political science, even while it was a regular subject of research in the fields of sociology, anthropology, and history. The lack of scholarship on race is not due to the fact that race is not relevant. The lack of scholars of color in any significant numbers has had an impact on the study of race. Many White scholars have been important proponents for the study of race, but it would take significant change in political science,

including the civil rights movement and upheaval of the late 1960s and early 1970s, for race to become an important factor in the study of politics. This has led to blind spots in the literature, and a lack of understanding of the way that institutional racism has impacted every aspect of our society and political system. It is important, for example, to understand the ways that voting rights have been suppressed in order to conduct research on electoral outcomes. Policy development is rife with discriminatory impacts and yet it is often treated as neutral.

The discipline of political science exists in a social, political, and geographic context. As an American political scientist, it is a critical component of this book to acknowledge the role that my own discipline has played in perpetuating White supremacy and racism. As Rogers Smith notes:

> If it is true that race has been a deeply political construction in the US, then it is likely in its period of explicit racism, and perhaps as much or more in its long period of neglect of racial topics, our profession has contributed historically to the political construction of race in America as a vast system of unjust inequalities. (Smith, 2004, p 45)

We cannot claim to understand politics and policy without acknowledging the ways that the research conducted in political science has and still can perpetuate discrimination and inequality.

Political science and the perpetuation of White supremacy

When political science was formed in the late 1800s it was steeped in the ideas around race that existed during the time of Reconstruction. As noted by Jessica Blatt in her book, *Race and the Making of American Political Science*, "Much of the credit for establishing the study of politics as a distinct learned discipline in the United States goes to John W. Burgess" (Blatt, 2018, p 13). Political science's founders focused on a "Teutonic" approach to governance that "saw political progress as the expression of a racially specific national soul (which he called 'the state')" (Blatt, 2018, p 14).

Those who would start the discipline of political science were of the time. Coming out of Reconstruction, "Burgess described the black-led Reconstruction legislatures of South Carolina and Louisiana as 'the most soul-sickening spectacle that Americans had ever been called upon to behold,' and the legislators themselves as 'ignorant barbarians'" (quoted in Blatt, 2018, p 13). Blatt goes on to note that "Burgess, his students, and his colleagues also invoked the seemingly scientific status of 'race' to bolster the most basic claim to intellectual authority they made in this period" (Blatt, 2018, p 15).

One of the first journals dedicated to the study of politics was the *Journal of Race Development* (*JRD*) founded in 1910. In addition to political scientists, authors ranged from psychologist Stanley Hall to the president of the American Eugenics Society, and, as the journal's title indicates, they were interested in the betterment of the so-called primitive races. In the first issue, editor George Blakeslee described the *JRD*'s objectives as explaining and theorizing "the methods by which developed peoples may most effectively aid the progress of the undeveloped" (quoted in Blatt, 2004, p 694).

However, this time period was also the beginning of the end for the study of race. Political scientists began to explicitly exclude race from their analyses following World War I. In 1919, the *JRD* would become the *Journal of International Relations*, and the name was changed again in 1922 to its current title, *Foreign Affairs*. However, it can be argued that political scientists' earlier writings that focused on race formation, racial characteristics, and race-related policies had already justified eugenic practices such as segregation, marriage laws, and selective immigration. For example, Vitalis points out that many social scientists in the early 1900s believed that "race mixing" would lead to "degenerate offspring" and he notes that, "The basic point behind all of this social science was the idea that race mixing between blacks and whites was wrong, a norm that white social scientists clung to long after the scientific scaffolding for it collapsed" (Vitalis, 2017, p 48).

Blatt goes on to highlight the commentary of leaders in the political science discipline like Rogers Smith who points out that by the early 1920s race "drops out of political science" and there is no acknowledgment of the fact that race was in many ways a social and political construct,

> As he puts it, understanding race as pre-political contributes to political scientists' failure 'to explore fully the role of politics in creating racial identities and racial conflicts' and, by extension, "the role of racial politics in shaping many political patterns, identities, institutions and developments that do not appear to have much to do with race". (Blatt, 2018, p 146)

Along with Vitalis, Smith was proceeded by important figures like Mack Jones and Alex Willingham, who Blatt points out made similar observations about the absence of race in political science in the 1970s (Blatt, 2018).

Political science has much work to do to develop an understanding of race as a political construct. This is despite the fact that scholars are beginning to acknowledge that Whiteness was a construct that allowed various immigrant groups to shift their identity from being discriminated against (for example, Italians and Irish) to becoming accepted as White. Shifting identities have impacted many ethnic groups in this country, but "as Michael Dawson and Cathy Cohen observe, even as the mainstream of political science increasingly

addresses the political lives of racialized groups and the dynamics of racial exclusion, the focus is still overwhelmingly on 'individual manifestations of political differences' that correlate unproblematically with 'visible and self-identified racial differences'" (Blatt, 2018 p 146).

International relations, race, and immigration

One of the more important contributions to understanding the role of race in the development of the field of international relations has been the work of Robert Vitalis. His discovery of the early journals in the field identified the focus on race that initially drove much of the research, and the subsequent move away from a focus on race that would leave the field to be dominated by studies that ignored an important component of statecraft and diplomacy.

> Political Scientists typically understand the tradition of international relations scholarship to be race blind. States, not races, have always been the discipline's basic unit of analysis. The "security dilemma" leaders confront is the timeless problem that constitutes international relations as a discipline, based on the ideas the practitioners routinely trace back to the ancient wisdom of Thucydides and Machiavelli, unaware that the genealogy is an invention of the Cold War years. The specialists contend further, that if people of color are not read or taught it is because they have not written books and articles that shaped the field or that matter to others working in it now. It cannot be because the hierarchical structures Americans have built, including the discipline itself, using the biologically false idea of race, are to blame. (Vitalis, 2017, p 19)

When I was in graduate school at UCLA in the mid-1990s, I had a very vague understanding of who Ralph Bunche was and his significance for political science. The building that housed the department of political science was named after Bunche, but his career as a political scientist was never mentioned in the halls of that department during my time there. Bunche Hall was constructed in 1964, the year I was born. It wouldn't be until 55 years later that I would begin to understand the connection of Ralph Bunche to the field of international relations, and how his forgotten legacy exemplifies the need for more scholars to understand the role of race in political science and international relations.

Bunche's *A World View of Race* focused on issues related to racism, imperialism, and economic exploitation. In this treatise from 1936, one of Bunche's aims is to debunk the idea that racialized groups presented a threat to Whites in America and Europe. As Vitalis notes,

> he showed how all the essential and frequently contradictory claims that made up racial "science," for example, claims about the reality of superior and inferior kinds and the dangers of miscegenation, had been falsified. The puzzle that emerged was the nonetheless increasing visibility of national policies in the name of race. (Vitalis, 2017, p 97)

Bunche states that,

> In a world such as ours some such creed of inequality is inevitable and indispensable. For it furnishes a rational justification for our coveted doctrines of blind nationalism, imperialism, and the cruel exploitation of millions of our fellow-men. How else can our treatment of the so-called "inferior races" and "backwards peoples" be explained and rationalized. (Bunche, 1936, p 2)

He goes on to state, "Race itself has become an effective instrument of national politics" (Bunche, 1936, p 3).

Bunche went on to become involved in the creation and development of the APSA. Named president in 1954, his speech to the annual meeting focused more generally on the development of the discipline. However, he was prescient when he stated,

> the striking evidence of fear, suspicion, intolerance, and confusion in the society, providing fertile ground for demagoguery, imperil our traditional freedom, and pose a stern challenge to the political scientist. These are phenomena which surely demand our most urgent concern, on behalf of the nation at large, as well as our own professional and personal interest. (Bunche, 1954, p 970)

These words still present a challenge to political science today. Bunche went on to work in the UN and was an important figure in the fight for civil rights in the 1960s, marching with Martin Luther King.

Another key African American figure at the time of Bunche was Merze Tate, who wrote a 1943 article, "The war aims of World War I and World War II and their relation to the darker peoples of the world," which was part of an issue of the *Journal of Negro Education* focused on the American Negro in the two world wars (Tate, 1943). Tate was the first African American woman to earn a PhD in government and international relations from Harvard University (then Radcliffe College), and later became one of the first women in the Department of History at Howard University. Tate's work on issues such as slavery and racism in the South Pacific was groundbreaking, even by today's standards.

Since the time of Bunche and Tate, authors such as Roxanne Doty, Randolph Persaud, and R.J. Vincent have all attempted to bring the issue of race into the realm of international relations. Vincent pointed out in a 1982 article in *International Affairs,* that "it is broadly true to say that the affluent and hungry worlds stand on either side of the colour line, that the chances are that if you are white you are rich and non-white, poor" (Vincent, 1982 , p 670). In a 1998 article, Doty argues that race is relevant in studying international relations, stating that, "it is a matter of discerning how race has worked in the past, constructing various aspects of global politics" (Doty, 1998, p 135). In his 2002 analysis of race in international relations, Persaud, in citing work by Roxanne Lynn Doty, finds that in a "survey of five leading IR journals spread over some fifty years, only a handful of articles have been published on race and international relations" (Persaud, 2002). As Zvobgo and Loken point out, the dominance of White scholars in international relations means that issues that are relevant for a large part of the world do not receive the attention they deserve:

> Because mainstream IR does not take race or racism seriously, it also does not take diversity and inclusion in the profession seriously. In the United States, which is the largest producer of IR scholarship, only 8 percent of scholars identify as Black or Latino, compared with 12 percent of scholars in comparative politics and 14 percent in U.S. politics. And that's despite the fact that the issues that IR scholars study – such as war, migration, human rights, development, and climate change--have a disproportionate impact on Black people, Indigenous people, and people of color. (Zvobgo and Loken, 2020, p 13)

Immigration has also been marginalized in international relations, although the number of articles on immigration in international relations journals seems to be increasing in recent years. There is a strong connection between immigration and race, which connects, in particular, to issues of identity and security. In connecting race to immigration, Persaud argues that "The control of borders through immigration policy has been and continues to be the official instrument used to achieve what I would like to call *civilizational sovereignty*" (Persaud, 2002, p 59, emphasis in original). Although Persaud does not go on to elaborate on this concept, civilizational sovereignty can be considered the approach which many developed countries have taken as immigration from the developing world (mostly ethnic minorities) has increased over time. Once it became clear that most immigrants, who had mainly been recruited as temporary workers, were there to stay, policy makers began to look at ways to integrate these workers and avoid racial conflict. With family reunification, it became clear that these populations

would grow, and concerns were shifted to assimilating the immigrants into the dominant culture and away from multiculturalism (Givens, 2007).

Race and color are often connected to particular attributes of immigrants. For example, as Persaud argues, "Being a native speaker of Spanish in the United States is almost tantamount to having a certificate of low status … Spanish in itself is not the problem for the nativists" (Persaud, 2002, p 64). However, other immigrants who speak other languages, such as Hindi-speaking Indians, are often considered "model minorities" and Persaud finds that this is "Because their *attribute in dominance* is constructed around science and technology. They are hi-tech Indians!" (Persaud, 2002, p 64, emphasis in original).

Another factor which is equally important for attitudes toward immigrants is religion, particularly Islam. In a seminal article from 1999, Zolberg and Woon examine the similarities in responses to immigrants who speak Spanish in the US and Muslim migrants in Europe. In describing the perceived similarities regarding integration of the two groups, the authors ask, "Why does the principal focus of contentious debates over immigration and its sequels center on religion in Europe and language in the United States?" (Zolberg and Woon, 1999, p 7). In the US, Spanish speakers are seen as being resistant to speaking English, which some feel is critical to their integration into American society. In Europe, Muslim migrants are seen as being resistant to integration in Europe because of their religious differences. The authors explain how different types of integration may play out for both natives and immigrants, and how that changes with succeeding generations. For politicians on the right, these groups have become the focal point of political rhetoric and campaigns to attract White working-class voters.

In the next section, I begin by examining how race in Europe has been handled in the literature, and the issues that arise from the problematic of race, that can also be translated to the issue of Islam in Europe, although it has its own pathologies related to conflict in the Middle East and terrorism. I then examine the issue of immigration and security and conclude with a discussion of the convergence of these issues.

Transatlantic ideas and connections: immigration, race (and religion) in Europe

Political science has lagged behind fields like sociology in studying the politics of race more generally, but particularly in Europe (Givens, 2014b). The growth of ethnic minority groups in the last 50 years in Europe is directly related to immigration flows. These flows are generally dependent on colonial histories, and the workers who were recruited from countries like Turkey during the post-war economic boom. These flows are also related

to international relations and asylum policies. What is consistent across all of the European countries, however, is the fact that they are or have become multi-ethnic societies and multiculturalism has become a catchword for attempting to integrate these groups into societies that may be resistant to their inclusion (Ireland, 2004). It is important to note that new arrivals are not the only targets of discrimination. Many ethnic groups have lived in these countries for generations and national minorities, such as the Roma, have faced discrimination for centuries.

Politicians and researchers have struggled to deal with the issue of race in Europe, particularly because of the history of the Holocaust, when millions of Jews and other ethnic, racial, and religious minorities were victims of genocide. However, race and religion have come to the fore as countries have begun to see immigrants and the development of ethnic and racial minority communities as a threat to national identity. This is similar to the US response to immigrant integration in the early 1900s. However, in the case of Europe, the situation is also complicated by the fact that immigrants were considered temporary until the 1980s and family reunification led to a shift from a workforce of single males coming into these countries, to the entry of entire families as the men gained the right to family reunification and permanent residence.

The French case is illustrative of some of the issues arising from the experience of genocide in World War II. French social scientists Valerie Amiraux and Patrick Simon note that studies of racism in France "remained marginalized in the academic 'field' until the early 1990s" (Amiraux and Simon, 2006, p 191). As young people became more frustrated with living in the *banlieues* or suburbs of major cities in France, with little access to economic opportunity, protests and riots flared, particularly after the deaths of young men in police custody. However, it was difficult to quantify the impact of discrimination on minority groups since there was no collection of data on race or ethnicity in France.

The collection of racial statistics has become a hot topic in France with researchers like Patrick Simon arguing for the need to face up to indirect discrimination by collecting data that would allow researchers to test for group discrimination (Simon, 2008). The British case is nearly the opposite of France, in that "there is now a massive catalogue of publications on [immigration and race relations]"(Small and Solomos, 2006, p 249). Britain was also an early adopter of "race relations" policies that focus on antidiscrimination policies for ethnic minorities. Those policies also impacted the development of antidiscrimination policies at the EU level (Givens and Evans Case, 2014).

Germany's history of the Holocaust and the country's ethnicity-based citizenship has made the issue of race a difficult topic. It wasn't until the late 1990s that Germany politicians (particularly from the conservative

Christian Democrats) were willing to admit that Germany was a country of immigration. Citizenship policies were changed in the late 1990s which allowed more immigrants, particularly Turks, to naturalize and take on German citizenship at birth. However, I have encountered many public officials in Germany who still consider issues around immigrant integration and discrimination "new" issues that they find difficult to manage.

As authors like Foner (2005) and Modood (2005) note, in the case of Europe, "immigrants are more likely to be stigmatized on the basis of culture than of color-coded race" (Foner, 2005, p 216). Foner also notes: "In Fredrickson's conceptualization of racism, culture and even religion can become essentialized to the point that they can serve as a functional equivalent of biological racism – culture, put another way, can do the work of race, when peoples or ways of life are seen as unchangeable as pigmentation" (Foner, 2005, p 216). For example, as Muslims have become more defined as a group, rather than as part of their respective nationalities and ethnicities, they have become the focus of restrictive immigration policies, punitive integration measures, and citizenship tests designed to test for "anti-liberal" values. Although much attention goes to the issue of Muslims in Europe, many groups face issues of racism and political exclusion. Antisemitism continues to be an issue in Europe, despite the history of the Holocaust and efforts to recover from that period of genocide. The basis for discrimination is often perceived as race, as well as religion and culture.

In the 2009 introduction to a special issue on whether race counts in fighting discrimination in Europe, the authors note that, "As opposed to the American and British reality, most European countries have adopted a position towards ethno-racial discrimination which could be summarized as attempting to fight 'racism without races'" (Grigolo et al, 2011). Despite this approach, scholars are now exploring the different ways that race is impacting groups in Europe. For example, Gokce Yurdakul has studied racial discrimination in Germany and how it has impacted Jews and Muslims. In a 2006 article, she notes that the 9/11 attacks "cast a dark shadow on all Muslims in Germany and at the same time, paradoxically perhaps, intensified anti-semitism" (Yurdakul, 2006, p 51). Yurdakul goes on to argue that Turks in Germany draw upon the experiences of Jewish communities in creating narratives that allow them to develop common ground to fight discrimination.

In general, there has been a reluctance to study issues of race in Europe outside of the UK. The literature is lacking a broader understanding of the structural impacts of racism and xenophobia despite clear indicators of bias in housing, employment, and rates of incarceration. As I will examine in the next few chapters, these are areas that have many similarities to the situation in the US, and as I will argue, many of the policies were designed at a time in the past when approaches to race in the US and Europe were

very similar. As I examine various policies and the impact of race, I will draw on the work not only of political scientists, but also historians, sociologists, and many others to explain the development of structural racism.

Conclusion

The normalization of White supremacy in political science has impacted the way that we study politics and society. Although we now recognize the marginalization of scholars like W.E.B. DuBois in sociology as well as political scientists like Ralph Bunch and Merza Tate, we still need to do more to ensure that the legacy of these pioneers is passed on to future students in these fields. Although issues of race have played a central role in the development of societies across the Atlantic, the study of race and racism has not been considered a part of mainstream research in the social sciences. History is important, not only in understanding the way we have approached the study of race, but also in the way that race has impacted the development of the structures that have perpetuated White supremacy for hundreds of years. In Chapter 3, I go back to the start of the African slave trade to examine the ways that racism was developed to dehumanize those who would become an important source of labor on the plantations throughout the "new world."

3

The Social and Geographical Construction of Race: A Transatlantic History

In the first decade of the 21st century, many hoped that that election of Barack Obama in the US and the growing political activism of minority communities in Europe was leading to an era of post-racial politics. However, those hopes were dashed as racism showed itself to be resilient with the rise of leaders like Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, and the success of racist, anti-immigrant parties across Europe. Even in 2008, at the time of Obama's first term as president, Howard Winant was arguing that, "far from becoming less politically central, race defines and organizes the world and its future, as it has done for centuries. I challenge the idea that the world, as reflected by the national societies I compare, is moving 'beyond race'" (Winant, 2008, p 42).

First, it is important to examine what is meant by the term race. As noted in the previous chapter, many disciplines have struggled with defining race as a concept and an issue for research. In a recent example, the American Association of Physical Anthropologists (AAPA) put together a committee to develop a statement to address the concept of race and racism. The authors note in the summary of their statement that:

> the Western concept of race must be understood as a classification system that emerged from, and in support of, European colonialism, oppression, and discrimination. It thus does not have its roots in biological reality, but in policies of discrimination. Because of that, over the last five centuries, race has become a social reality that structures societies and how we experience the world. In this regard, race is real, as is racism, and both have real biological consequences. (AAPA, 2019)

The authors point out that race is a social construct, while acknowledging that racism is a very real response to people who are not considered White.

In this book, I use a variety of terms to describe those who are impacted by racism, including Black, person of color, immigrant, and under-represented minority. Since this is a comparative study, these terms have different meanings in different countries, and I will attempt to be careful in my use of these terms in this broader context.

In the US, we tend to talk about increasing diversity in the context of creating more opportunity, particularly in the workplace. While conducting research in Europe in the late 1990s and early 2000s, I found that there was a focus on a form of immigrant integration referred to as multiculturalism. Sociologist Tariq Modood has defined multiculturalism as a mode of integration that accommodates difference and has more recently focused on Muslim migrants. Policies are defined for groups as well as individuals and allow for the political accommodation of minorities (Modood, 2013). This approach also focuses on opportunity, but tends to be more amorphous and often relies as much on accommodation from immigrants themselves as it does from employers or landlords.

As terror attacks sharpened the focus on Muslim immigrants, conservative politicians in Europe began to reject the idea of multiculturalism. For example, in October 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel would declare that "multiculturalism had failed utterly" in Germany, blaming social unrest on immigrants who were unable to assimilate into German society (Connolly, 2010). In a seemingly coordinated effort, Merkel's fellow conservative allies, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron, would follow in her footsteps in February of 2010 and 2011, also declaring multiculturalism a failure.

In response to the critiques of multiculturalism, Modood argues that:

> multiculturalism is a mode of integration, which can be contrasted with other modes such as assimilation, individualist-integration and cosmopolitanism, and like the others it is based on the core democratic values of liberty, equality and fraternity/unity. While multiculturalism involves a respect for minority identities, this is not at the expense of national identities, as long as the latter are re-made to include minority as well as majority identities. (Modood, 2014, p 202)

In many countries the discourses have preceded the actual death of multiculturalism despite a shift to a focus on "civic integration" which focused more on language acquisition and assimilation. Banting and Kymlicka pointed out in 2013:

> Although there has been a retreat from MCPs [multicultural policies] in a few countries, this is not the dominant pattern. The larger picture in Europe is one of stability and expansion of multicultural policies in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Second, the persistence

> and even growth of MCPs are not inherently incompatible with civic integration. Multiculturalism programmes are being ripped out to make room for civic integration programmes in the Netherlands. But once again, this is not the norm. In many countries, civic integration programmes are being layered over multicultural initiatives introduced in earlier decades, producing what can be thought of as a multicultural version of civic integration. (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013, p 579)

Although the terminology and policies have been going through a transition, the reality of immigration has led politicians to focus on the ethnicity, race, and religion of these newcomers as being a threat to the culture of their society, including some community members who have been long-term settlers.

Although I was discouraged from using terms like "race" and "racism" in the European context, it became clear that the focus on immigration has become a proxy for race and racism. Many of those who were referred to as immigrants or foreigners had lived in France and Germany for generations. They have been subject to the same forms of segregation, job discrimination, and economic inequality that African Americans experienced in the US.

I observed that the idea of what it meant to be "Black" was much different in the UK, where the concept of "political Blackness" developed in the 1970s and included South Asians and other groups that were subject to similar forms of discrimination. Kwame Anthony Appiah notes that, "There's a reason that 'political Blackness' never gained much purchase in the US. In Britain, what matters most is whether or not you're white; in America, what matters most is whether or not you're Black" (Appiah, 2020). This broader conception of Blackness is being challenged as Asian and Muslim organizations move to the fore, but the concept remains important for organizations like the National University Students (NUS) and Operation Black Vote (OBV).

Our understanding of race has developed over time, and today science has the tools of genetic testing to show that humans share 99.9 percent of our DNA. In fact, "geneticists haven't devised a test that can conclusively determine a person's race" (Herrera, 2019). Despite these facts, race continues to define social and economic relations in the US and Europe. As Michelle Wright point out, "Blackness only became a racial category with the forced removal of West Africans to the Western Hemisphere" (Wright, 2004, p 1).

In order to understand the impact of racism, we must understand that there are a variety of factors that play into social relations, but the way we define particular groups is often dependent on ancestry, phenotype (particularly skin color), and culture. The social position of people of African descent and

"White" people must be understood in the context of time and place, with an understanding that goes beyond biology. My approach to race follows that of scholars like Stephen Small who states that "a focus on 'racisms' and 'racialised relations' questions the existence of 'races', looks at how groups not previously defined as 'races' have come to be defined in this way, and assesses the various factors involved in such processes" (Small, 1994, p 30). Small builds on the work of scholars including Carl Hiaasen and Michael Banton (1977) as well as Robert Miles (1982) to examine the experience of race in the US and UK. The idea of race underlies structural racism in these countries.

We know that race is a function of geography exemplified by the link to Africa and other parts of the world including Asia that define particular races, and the way that Whiteness is considered to come from Europe. Ideas about race emerged in the context of trade, conquest, and imperialism. However, in today's conception, the chattel slavery that emerged in the Americas in the 1600s was one of the most important factors in defining race. In this chapter I draw on the work of historians to examine the structural factors that led to a form of racism that defined people of African descent as less than human and that would create the categories that would limit the movement of immigrants throughout the 20th century.

The question of immigration and race has always been complex, particularly in the American context. It has generally been overshadowed by the Black/White divide, but issues related to religion and culture, as well as race, have played an important role in the development of capitalism and politics. In comparing Europe and the US, it is important to take a historical and institutional approach in order to find similarities and differences.

The development of race: a transatlantic history

The creation of race, particularly that of "White" and "Black," is a function of both geography and commerce that evolved from the institution of slavery that was developed in the 1400s.

Although we know today that race is a social construct, not a biological fact, the social construct of race continues to define our social relations. Phenotype has been a focus for defining difference throughout human history. However, racism, as Nell Painter points out, is "the belief that races exist, and that some are better than others" (Painter, 2010, p xii).

Geography has played a role in a variety of ways over time. Racism can be linked to tribalism, and as people have become more mobile, the need to be able to define oneself as part of a group has shifted from a particular location to being able to define oneself as part of a racialized group. However, there has been a long-standing process of centering Whiteness as the norm in society.

Nell Painter's *The History of White People* examines the history surrounding the development of Whiteness, starting with the way the Greeks and Romans were portrayed, noting that, "not a few Westerners have attempted to racialize antiquity, making ancient history into white race history and classics into a lily-white field complete with pictures of blond ancient Greeks" (Painter, 2010, p x). She also notes that:

> Slavery has helped construct concepts of white race in two contradictory ways. First, American tradition equates whiteness with freedom while consigning blackness to slavery. The history of unfree white people slumbers in popular forgetfulness, thought white slavery (like black slavery) moved people around and mixed up genes on a massive scale. (Painter, 2010, p xi)

Our understanding of antiquity mainly comes from the Greeks whose writings survive to this day. Painter points out that the Greeks did not think in terms of race, but they did recognize difference, particularly in terms of geography. "Mostly, Greek scholars focused on climate to explain human difference. Humors arising from each climate's relative humidity or aridness explained a people's temperament" (Painter, 2010, p 5).

Painter goes on to describe the ways that Greeks described what would become Europe and the trade network around the Black Sea region that provided slaves for wealthy Greeks, going back as early as the 7th century BCE. Slavery was the norm and there was no apparent ambivalence coming from the traders or the owners. Refugees from the many wars in the region were regularly enslaved. "Indeed, this slave trade from the Black Sea region (of people later considered white) continued for more than two thousand years, ending only with Ottoman modernization at the turn of the twentieth century. Such was the lot of masses of Europeans in ancient Greece" (Painter, 2010, p 15).

The Roman path of conquest led them into regions of Europe that included much of what is now Europe, including Gauls, Celts, and *Germani*. As Painter notes, "For Roman purposes, politics and warfare defined ethnic identities" (Painter, 2010, p 19). Any regions not under Roman control were considered full of Barbarians. The *Germani* provide a good example of the ways that so-called ethnic groups mixed and mingled in the Roman empire, "In truth, it simply is not possible to tie those whom the Romans called Germani to modern Germans securely. Humanity moves around so much that no clear lines of descent trace back over two millennia" (Painter, 2010, p 30). The term *Germani* went into disuse and German speakers embraced the term *Deutsch* by the 11th century. The term "German" didn't appear in English texts until the 16th century. There is a great deal of controversy over the origins of various groups throughout

Central Europe. It is important to keep in mind that there were various empires and movements of people that makes it difficult to identify one origin for those who currently live in what would become Germany in the mid-1800s. Pointer argues that, "When we speak of 'Germany' before the late nineteenth century, we can only mean a cultural idea and a linguistic grouping" (Painter, 2010, pp 30–31).

Geography has defined "race" and difference going back to antiquity. Africa, with its dark-skinned inhabitants, for some was seen as being the home of inferior peoples. For example, as Cohen notes, "Although the ancient Greeks and Romans may not have revealed race prejudice in their social relations with blacks, in their geographic descriptions of Africa, they developed a number of negative stereotypes about the inhabitants of what was commonly called either Libya or Ethiopia" (Cohen, 2003, p 1). The impact of skin color would play out in religious contexts as well, with Black skin being associated with death, dirt, and danger, and Blacks were even depicted as the devil. Cohen notes that the 12th-century *Song of Roland* speaks of Ethiopian warriors as part of a "cursed race that is blacker than ink and that has nothing white except its teeth" (quoted in Cohen, 2003, p 14).

The connection between skin color and evil would persist as immigrants from Europe traveled to what they considered the "New World." In an article describing the history of a dark-skinned Satan, Banks notes that "European folklore described Satan as a black man, and the Puritans imported these notions, and raised them during the Salem witch trials of the 1690s" (Banks, 2013). Smedley and Smedley (2011) also note:

> The peoples of the conquered areas of the New World, and the other "colored" peoples of what is now called the Third World, did not participate in the invention of race or in the compilation of racial classifications imposed upon them and others. To the extent that these peoples utilize the idiom today and operate within its strictures, they have inherited and acquiesced in the system of racial divisions created for them by the dominant Europeans. (p 14)

This focus on the evil of Black skin and the purity of White skin would become an important component for the justification of the slave trade, and the need to protect the purity of White women.

Becoming Black

Nell Painter notes that "The eighteenth century created the now familiar equation that converts race to black and black to slave" (Painter, 2010, p 42). It is during this time that skin color and the institution of slavery become

inextricably connected. In the broader literature, the focus on skin color often begins with the insights of W.E.B. DuBois, and his article, "The Souls of White Folk" and his book, *The Souls of Black Folks*, in which he states, "The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line, … the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia in Africa, in America and the islands of the sea" (DuBois, 1903, p 16). In his 1920 article he writes:

> The discovery of personal whiteness among the world's peoples is a very modern thing – a nineteenth and twentieth century matter, indeed. The ancient world would have laughed at such a distinction. The Middle Age regarded skin color with mild curiosity; and even up into the eighteenth century we were hammering our national manikins into one, great, Universal Man, with fine frenzy which ignored color and race even more than birth. Today we have changed all that, and the world in a sudden, emotional conversion has discovered that it is white and by that token, wonderful! (DuBois, 1920, p 33)

The connection with slavery is central to our understanding of what it means to be Black and the forms that racism takes today. However, as historian Ibram Kendi notes, the term "slave" came from the fact that

> most of the captives sold in Western Europe were Eastern Europeans who had been seized by Turkish raiders from areas around the Black Sea. So many of the seized captives were "Slavs" that the ethnic term became the root word for "slave" in most Western European Languages. By the Mid-1400s, Slavic communities had built forts against slave raiders, causing the supply of Slavs in Western Europe's slave market to plunge at around the same time that the supply of Africans was increasing. As a result, Western Europeans began to see the natural Slav(e) not as White, but Black. (Kendi, 2016, p 23)

History shows that slavery was a regular source of laborers and wasn't linked to race, rather it was often the result of wars, conquest, and the subjugation of refugees. As Nell Painter notes, "The race narrative ignores early European slavery and the mixing it entailed, leading today's readers to find the idea of *white* slavery far-fetched. But in the land we now call Europe, most slaves were white, and that fact was unremarkable" (Painter, 2010, p 33).

The Vikings were another group that traded in slaves and were also responsible for the movements of people throughout Northern Europe. "It is said that Dublin was Europe's largest slave market during the eleventh

century. The Viking slave trades, eastern and western, carried northern European slaves to neighboring localities or into wealthy Mediterranean lands" (Painter, 2010, p 35). Later, the Britons would become embroiled in the beginnings of the African slave trade, "As late as the mid-seventeenth century, some three thousand Britons per year endured involuntary servitude in North Africa, even as the trade from Africa to the Western Hemisphere was gathering momentum" (Painter, 2010, p 38).

Europeans, in particular the Portuguese, as I will describe in more detail in Chapter 4, were the first to begin exploring what would be called the "Gold Coast" of Africa in the 1400s. As Kendi points out, "The Portuguese became the primary source of knowledge on unknown Africa and the African people for the original slave-traders and enslavers in Spain, Holland, France and England" (Kendi, 2016, p 25). Painter points out that it was sugar that would create the need for labor in the Americas. As the production of sugar shifted from the Europe to the Americas, so did the source of slave labor, "the Americas, especially the Caribbean islands, proved so productive that sugar making became synonymous with American – and with African slaves" (Painter, 2010, p 40).

The Enlightenment would bring a more scientific approach to the study of biology, although not necessarily a more enlightened approach to the enslavement of Africans. Fredrickson points out that:

> The scientific thought of the Enlightenment was a precondition for the growth of a modern racism based on physical typology. In 1735, the great Swedish naturalist Carl Linnaeus included humans as a species within the primate genus and then attempted to divide that species into varieties. This early stab at the scientific classification of human types included some mythical and "monstrous" creatures; but the durable heart of the schema was the differentiation Linnaeus made among Europeans, American Indians, Asians, and Africans. (Fredrickson and Camarillo, 2015, p 56)

Although these ideas didn't initially create a hierarchy, they would lead to the classifications that would open the way to scientific racism (Fredrickson and Camarillo, 2015).

Eighteenth-century scholars explored ideas of beauty in Roman and Greek art, seeing the sculptures of the time as the ideal. Although many of the sculptures were originally painted, 18th-century scholars saw the white marble as a symbol of beauty, and as Painter notes, "color came to mean barbarism" (Painter, 2010, p 61). White was considered to be the natural medium of Greek sculpture, leading museums like the British Museum to attempt to "clean" works like the Parthenon marbles, as Painter points out: "The alarming history

of European marble 'cleaning' includes a chapter on this statuary describing a drive to make ancient Greek art white that nearly destroyed the art itself" (Painter, 2010, p 63). To this day, the public is often surprised to discover that Greek statuary was often dark and painted (Talbot, 2018).

Race science focused on these ideals of beauty, but also returned to ideas about geography. It was clear that darker-skinned people lived in hotter climates, while light-skinned people live in cold climates, but it was also believed that "certain groups maintain their distinctive physical and cultural characteristics over successive generations" (Painter, 2010, p 77). It was at this time in the late 1700s that the term *Caucasian* came into use as a synonym for White. Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, an anthropologist and star in German academic circles, would write several editions of his book, *On the Natural Variety of Mankind*, that would ultimately link the term Caucasian to Whiteness, taking it out of the geographic context of the Caucasus mountains. He developed five human varieties, with a focus on the Caucasian:

> *Caucasian variety.* Colour white, cheeks rosy; hair brown or chestnut-colored; head subglobular; face oval, strait, its parts moderately defined, forehead smooth, nose narrow, slightly hooked, mouth small … To this first variety belong the inhabitants of Europe (except the Lapps and the remaining descendants of the Finns) and those of Eastern Asia, as far as the river Obie, the Caspian Sea and the Ganges; and lastly, those of Northern Africa. (Blumenbach, 1795, pp 229, 264–265)

This created a shift from Linnaeus' focus on geography to a focus on phenotype. This was also a time when the measurement of skulls to determine race became commonplace, a practice that would continue into the 20th century.

The definition of Whiteness created by Blumenbach would become widely accepted and connected to slavery by one of his colleagues, Christoph Meiners. Although Blumenbach and others saw Meiners as a sloppy writer, and criticized his many contradictory claims, his ideas about race were popular. As Painter notes, "Meiners made no bones about it – inferior people's inferiority justified, even required, their enslavement and the use of despotism for their control" (Painter, 2010, p 87). Painter goes on to note that Meiners' take on inferiority would lead him to become

> the Nazis' favorite intellectual ancestor, for he knew his Tacitus and built castles upon it. In phrases characteristic of nineteenth-century Teutomania, Meiners describes Germans' possession of the "whitest, most blooming and most delicate skin," the "tallest and most beautiful" men not only in Europe, but in the entire world, and a "purity of

> blood" that made them the physical, moral, and intellectual superiors of everyone. (Painter, 2010, p 90)

German scholars of the 18th century would have a lasting impact on the definition of race. Their ideas would play an important role in the development of ideas about race in Britain and the US. The sharing and building on ideas of academics in the "new world" and Europe is a common theme as scholars worked to develop the ideas around race that still impact thinking on both sides of the Atlantic.

Historians Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds examine the work of 19th-century thinkers like James Bryce who were influential not only in the US but around the world. His ideas were a precursor to the eugenicists who considered the races as distinct and unequal. Lake and Reynolds describe the work of Bryce as seeing people of African descent as beneath those he described as "Caucasian," with his statement, "Since the Negro was well behind the white man in evolutionary development, many thousands of years must pass before he would reach 'the pinnacle of modern wisdom and knowledge upon which the Caucasian stands today'" (Lake and Reynolds, 2008, p 62).

The work of Bryce was used to justify policies that would lead to the disenfranchisement and continued oppression of Blacks in the South: "During the revolutionary project of Radical Reconstruction, between 1865 and 1877, the freed Negro, Bryce declared in an interpretation that would soon become orthodoxy, had proven himself completely unfit for the responsibilities of democratic citizenship" (Lake and Reynolds, 2008, p 49). Jim Crow laws, segregation, and limits on voting were all part of the ongoing dehumanization of Blacks in the US. The Nazi Party in Germany was paying close attention to these developments, as well as the historians and politicians who were developing the rationales to continue seeing Blacks as less than human.

James Q. Whitman's book, *Hitler's American Model*, provides a clear analysis of the ways that lawyers in Nazi-era Germany drew inspiration from the laws developed in the US to perpetuate segregation and oppression, not only in the American South, but across the country. Whitman notes that, "From the late nineteenth century onward the United States came to be regarded as 'the leader in developing explicitly racist policies of nationality and immigration,' and American immigration and naturalization practices were attracting plenty of notice in Europe well before the emergence of the Nazi movement" (Whitman, 2017, p 36).

One of the key areas that Whitman highlights is anti-miscegenation laws, which in Germany became the focus of "Blood Law" in the early 1930s – laws which would ban race mixing in sex and marriage. Jews were seen as "vectors of mongrelization," tainting the pure Aryan race. The leaders of

Nazi Germany looked to the US body of law for ways to define Jews, given that there were many Jews who were married to non-Jewish Germans. As Whitman notes:

> America's role is clearest in the case of the criminalization of racially mixed marriages, but the American example also mattered for Nazi discussions of the classification of racially inferior "mongrels." American law was concerned with defining "Negroes" just as German law was concerned with defining "Jews," and Nazi observers were well aware that the United States offered a possible model. (Whitman, 2017, p 127)

In some instances, even the Nazi policy makers thought that American laws went too far. For example, in examining the "one-drop" rule adopted to fight mixed marriages or miscegenation, Whitman quotes racist Southern Senator Theodore Bilbo who stated, "one drop of Negro blood placed in the veins of the purest Caucasian destroys the inventive genius of his mind and palsies his creative faculty" (Whitman, 2017, p 77). As the Nazi government contemplated how to deal with race mixing and intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews in Germany, they had to determine what would be enough Jewish blood to "indelibly taint a child of part 'Aryan' descent." American law, "the only body of foreign jurisprudence offering an extensive corpus of doctrine that Nazi policy makers found to investigate and exploit," was useful, however, the Nazis considered the one-drop rule to be too extreme (Whitman, 2017, p 80).

Nazi policy makers were also concerned by protests from countries like Japan and India that complained that the legislation disfavoring "colored" races went too far and could impact foreign relations with those countries. Policy makers in the US had no such compunctions although racist immigration laws would at least initially be tempered by concerns about relations with Japan. The first immigration control laws in the US targeted Chinese laborers in the 1870s. Over the next few decades, the connection of race and immigration policy became more clearly defined, with immigrants from Asia, Southern and Eastern Europe defined as undesirable, and restricted from entry by the National Origins Act of 1924 (Givens et al, 2020).

Historian William Cohen's examination of *The French Encounter with Africans*, published in 1980, notes the long-standing bias held by the French toward Africans, not only because of their color, but also because of their religions. As I found in my own research in France, there is a mythology in France that they have "a record of unparalleled racial egalitarianism" and Cohen states, "To my surprise, in examining the historical record I found that in regard to blacks the tradition of racial inequality was dominant in French history" (Cohen, 2003, p xvi).

> If in their physical shape Africans had struck Frenchmen as being different, their religion also drew much attention. Europeans came into contact with Africans at a time when religious feeling ran especially high as a result of the controversies caused by the advent of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation of the Catholic Church … The Africans' animism piqued Europeans' interest, as perhaps their most prominent feature, next to coloring. (Cohen, 2003, p 15)

As Crystal Marie Fleming asks in the case of France, "*To what extent do the French make the connections between the history of slavery and race relations today*?" (Fleming, 2017, p 5, emphasis in original). The subject of race is considered taboo, and the government sees itself as "race-blind." Although the issue has become more prominent since the early 2000s, and President Holland urged that the country create a slavery museum in May of 2016, it seems to have fallen by the wayside with the end of his presidency. There is a National Day of Remembrance of the Slave Trade, Slavery and Its Abolition every year on May 10, but the focus is on the abolition of slavery, enshrined in the French constitution in 1848.

Becoming White: race and immigration

As the slave trade took hold in the Western hemisphere, a new dichotomy was created between White and Black skin, obscuring the longer history of slavery and creating a new conception of what it meant to be White. If the idea of Blackness emerged from the systematic subjugation and enslavement of Africans, by the early 1900s the idea of Whiteness came from the fear of not only Blacks, but other racial groups who were "everywhere in revolt," as DuBois declared: "Do we sense somnolent writhings in black Africa, or angry groans in India, or triumphant 'Banzais' in Japan? 'To your tents, O Israel!' these nations are not white. Build warships and heft the 'Big Stick'" (DuBois quoted in Lake and Reynolds, 2008, p 2).

Lake and Reynolds examine the transnational circulation of ideas around race in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They point out that:

> The idea of the "white man's country" emerged in the context of nineteenth-century imperialisms and the great modern migrations that saw some 50 million Chinese, the same number of Europeans and about 30 million Indians migrate to new homes around the world. A large proportion of these voyagers went to South Africa, the Americas and Australasia, to lands taken by force from their indigenous inhabitants, who were systematically displaced or destroyed. Migration rested on and required Aboriginal dispossession. (Lake and Reynolds, 2008, p 6)

Lake and Reynolds argue that:

> the assertion of whiteness was born in the apprehension of imminent loss … This book charts the spread of "whiteness" as a transnational form of racial identification, that was, as DuBois noticed, at once global in its power and personal in its meaning, the basis of geo-political alliances and a subjective sense of self. The emergence of self-styled "white men's countries" represented whiteness in defensive, but defiant, mode, a response to the rising power of … "the black and yellow races". (Lake and Reynolds, 2008, pp 2–3)

Although the idea of race in terms of Africans and Blackness became clearly defined in the 1500s, a nationalistic idea of Whiteness would not come into play until the 1700s and would become fully entrenched in ideas about White supremacy in the 1800s.

James Bryce would bring these ideas into the American national context in his three-volume survey of US political development, *The American Commonwealth*, published in 1888. As Lake and Reynolds point out, after the Civil War and the emancipation of Black slaves, a new orthodoxy was developed to proclaim White supremacy, and point to "the risks a democracy runs when the suffrage is granted to a large mass of half-civilized men" (Bryce quoted in Lake and Reynolds, 2008, p 49). Bryce's influence went beyond the US and Britain, as he "became a key interpreter of southern white thinking for English-speaking peoples in Britain, North America, South America and Australasia" (Lake and Reynolds, 2008, p 49).

These ideas would have a major impact on the way that Indigenous peoples were dealt with in places like South Africa, Australia, and other parts of the world where skin color became a proxy for determining who could be considered human and worthy of being part of the polity. These processes of dehumanization would lead to genocide in many instances. The justification of slavery would play a role in the way that racism impacted people of African descent in both the US and Europe. Over time, religion would become a proxy for race, leading to horrific war crimes and discrimination against immigrants in the 20th century.

The role of religion in defining the other

Religious strife has been an ongoing component of human history. At the time that academics were exploring issues of race in the 19th century, building on the work of theories developed in the 18th century, they focused on differences between Celts and Anglo-Saxons, often defined as Catholics and Protestants. The Protestant reformation created divides between the Catholic church and Lutherans during the 16th century. Wars were fought,

monarchies were challenged, and many lives were lost over the form that Christianity would take in Europe.

There was also strife between Christians and Muslims, as noted by medieval scholar Geraldine Heng:

> Muslims in medieval Europe were transformed from military enemies into non-humans. The renowned theologian, Bernard of Clairvaux, who co-wrote the Rule for the Order of the Templars, announced that the killing of a Muslim wasn't actually homicide, but malicide—the extermination of incarnated evil, not the killing of a person. Muslims, Islam, and the Prophet were vilified in numerous creative ways, and the extraterritorial incursions we call the Crusades coalesced into an indispensable template for Europe's later colonial empires of the modern eras. (Heng, 2018)

Fear of the Ottoman empire would also play a role in attitudes toward Muslims well into the 20th century. For example, during my research into anti-immigrant parties in Europe in the late 1990s, Austrian politicians in particular would link the need to stop Muslim migrants with the imagery of Ottomans being stopped at the gates of Vienna.[1]

> Indeed, there is ample evidence that religious culture and biology are deemed as co-constitutive of a racial category prior to its articulation in Atlantic slavery and Enlightenment-informed colonial encounters, even prior to the Reconquista. For example, when Islam is first encountered in Europe, "the Prophet Mohammed (with his Jewish parents and Nestorian/heretical teacher)" is embodied as a dark skinned, satanic menace. (Meer, 2013, p 387)

Although one of the founding myths of the US was that it was a haven for a variety of religions, certain groups were not welcomed, particularly those from countries that were predominantly Catholic. For example, by the mid-1800s Irish Catholics were seen as being racially distinct and beneath Anglo-Saxon Protestants. As explained by Painter, "According to nineteenth-century popular wisdom and anthropological science, the Irish were Celts, a particular race separate from and inferior to the Anglo-Saxon English" (Painter, 2010, p 134). The Irish were compared to Africans, portrayed with the features of apes in cartoons and as Catholics experienced discrimination, but this led them to try to differentiate themselves from enslaved Africans rather than find common cause.

As Painter notes, "Anti-Catholic legislation had long existed in the British colonies, inherited from the anti-Catholic struggles of England led most notably

by Henry VIII … Until 1821 New York denied citizenship to Catholics unless they renounced allegiance to the pope in all matters, political or religious" (Painter, 2010, p 133). The rise of the anti-immigrant Know-Nothing party was also based on anti-Catholic sentiment. "Such frequent mob violence made riot the signature Know-Nothing activity: against Irish people, against Catholic churches, and against other parties' voters" (Painter, 2010, p 148).

Jews were a target during this time with luminaries like Ulysses S. Grant playing a role in defining Jews as undesirable immigrants:

> During the Civil War, seizing a chance to legalize his prejudices, Grant enacted one of the rare nineteenth-century anti-Semitic policies. Called General Orders No. 11, it expelled all Jews, including families with children, from the Department of Tennessee in December of 1862. Grant's excuse? He insisted that he had to control Jewish peddlers. (Painter, 2010, p 149)

These attitudes would have a major impact on immigration policy in the US, particularly at the beginning of the 20th century as immigration restrictions were put in place, many designed to keep out people from predominantly Catholic countries, and anti-Semitism would lead to Jews being kept out of the US as they tried to escape Nazi Europe. I examine the era of eugenics in more detail in Chapter 5.

Attitudes about religion, particularly Islam, would have an impact on immigration flows in Europe as well. Colonial experiences would define the ways that people were given access to the "motherland" and citizenship. The important point is that people who are part of religions such as Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam have all been racialized and discriminated against at different points in history, with Muslims becoming the most recent target in the US and Europe.

Conclusion

As many scholars have shown, race as a concept became important to defining power relationships on both sides of the Atlantic. Although science has shown that "races" do not exist, the social construct of race remains a powerful way to define people from different parts of the globe, whether it is Africans, Asians, or many other ethnic groups. As we will see in Chapters 5 through 8, race is used as a category to define rights and access to societal benefits. The way that race was defined in the past clearly has an impact on housing segregation, employment, and access to education. The way we look at race has also been deeply impacted by the history of slavery and colonialism, as I will examine in Chapter 4.

Note

[1] The Ottoman empire covered much of southeastern Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. "In 1529 the Ottoman Empire made a determined effort to capture Vienna, the capital of the Hapsburg Austrian Empire. The failure to take Vienna marked the end of Turkish expansion into Europe and was followed by the diversion of Ottoman effort toward Asia and the Mediterranean" (https://www.britannica.com/event/Siege-of-Vienna-1529).

4

Ties that Bind: Slavery and Colonialism

I have traced the intellectual development of ideas about race in the previous chapter, but along with the ideas came the actions. Defining Africans as sub-human was necessary to legitimate the slave trade. Colonialism was based on similar ideas but added to it was the idea that the subjugated peoples were barbarians that needed to be taught how to be civilized. Underlying those "ideals" were the need for land, power, raw materials, and labor. The original sin of slavery is the beginning point for the roots of racism and the connections that have been built across the Atlantic Ocean since the 15th century. European explorers would begin the trade that would ultimately define a new nation and bind the two sides of the Atlantic in a trade that would destroy lives and souls in Africa, Europe, and the Americas.

Race relations today reflect the ongoing impact of the mass enslavement of millions of Africans, not only in the US, but in the Caribbean and Latin America. The brutality of the slave trade is clearly described in much of the historical literature, but it becomes clearer when one visits the National Museum of African American History and Culture (NMAAHC) in Washington, DC. Leg irons and other implements, pieces of a slave ship, and historical artefacts bring home the cruelty, confinement, and death that met the slaves who survived the middle passage and made it to America.

Colonialism (and imperialism) were part of the driving force behind the slave trade. In order to understand the transatlantic connections between what would become the US and those in Europe who sought their fortune through trade, it is important to understand the linkages between slavery and colonialism. Slavery would lead to a large population of people of African descent in North and South America, while colonialism would eventually lead to the migration of many of the formerly colonized to the lands where

they could speak the language but were mainly wanted for manual labor. This connection between forced migration and the labor migration that followed World War II is an important component of the roots of racism in the US and Europe.

In the last few decades, American and European countries have been reckoning with their pasts of slavery and genocide. Formal apologies have been made for the treatment of Indigenous peoples, Africans and others who were murdered, killed by disease, enslaved, and pushed off their land in the name of capitalism and empire. In this chapter, I examine colonialism and slavery as the beginnings of the bonds that would tie together the US (and to some extent, Canada) and Europe in developing a long-lasting approach to the world that would create a divide between "Whites" and others. These ideas are still impacting the policies and discrimination faced by these groups today as they have tried to find their place in these societies.

The slave trade, whether of Africans or American Indians, was developed by Europeans, many of whom would end up settling in both North and South America as colonizers. The impact of that trade and settlement would lead to a dehumanization of Indigenous and African peoples. That logic would play out around the globe as European powers fought over not only human labor, but the raw materials that could be extracted from those regions. The logic of empire is inextricably bound up with the logic of racism.

In the US, the focus in terms of the era of slavery begins with the arrival of the enslaved Africans in 1619. However, the developments that led to that enslavement and the development of the plantation system throughout the New World began almost 200 years earlier. In order to understand the connections between the ways we understand race today and the way those ideas, as discussed in the previous chapter, began, I begin by examining the broader context of the relationship between Europe and Africa. The era that is most critical to this analysis begins in the 1400s when Europeans began to explore the west coast of Africa, a region that would become the main source of slaves taken to the "New World."

A timeline of slavery and colonialism

To provide an overview of important historical events, I have compiled a timeline starting in the 1400s with the Portuguese explorations into Africa, up to the start of the 20th century (dates drawn from the following sources: ABC News, 2006; History World, 2012; Wise and Wheat, 2016; Brain, 2021; Carey, 2021, except where otherwise noted). During this time period, events related to the development of the African slave trade are clearly intertwined with European colonialism. Much of the history described in the timeline is not common knowledge on either side of the

Atlantic. In his book on the Atlantic slave trade, Herbert Klein notes that, "the Atlantic slave trade remained one of the least studied areas in modern Western historiography until the past quarter century … it was ignored because of its close association with European imperialism and a resulting lack of interest in a morally difficult problem" (Klein, 2010, p xv).

This timeline provides the context for the broader impacts of the movements of people, and ultimately the policies and politics that were developed to either control those who had been forced from their homelands and restrict the movement of those who were hoping to flee to safety and opportunity.

1400–1550: laying the foundations for the slave trade

The timeline begins with Portuguese explorers and traders who began the development of a series of forts and bases along the African coast between 1400 and 1550. The Portuguese slave trade coincided with the beginning of settlement of the Brazilian subcontinent, creating the first market for African slaves in the Americas (Klein, 2010, p 11).

1441: Start of European slave trading in Africa. The Portuguese captains Antão Gonçalves and Nuno Tristão capture 12 Africans in Cabo Branco (modern Mauritania) and take them to Portugal as slaves.

1452: Start of the "sugar-slave complex." Sugar is first planted on the Portuguese island of Madeira and, for the first time, African slaves are put to work on the sugar plantations.

1481: A Portuguese embassy to the court of King Edward IV of England concludes with the English government agreeing not to enter the slave trade, against the wishes of many English traders.

1481–86: Diogo da Azambuja builds the castle at Elmina (modern Ghana) which was to become the most substantial and the most notorious of the slave-trading forts in West Africa.

June 24, 1497: John Cabot, an Italian sponsored by King Henry VII of England, makes landfall on the northern tip of the island of Newfoundland (modern Canada). This discovery became the basis of subsequent English claims to North America.

1505: First record of sugar cane being grown in the New World, in Santo Domingo (modern Dominican Republic).

January 22, 1510: The start of the systematic transportation of African slaves to the New World: King Ferdinand of Spain authorizes a shipment of 50 African slaves to be sent to Santo Domingo.

1513: Juan Garrido becomes the first documented African to arrive in what is now Florida, when he accompanied Juan Ponce de León in search of the Fountain of Youth.

1522: A major slave rebellion breaks out on the island of Hispaniola. This is the first significant uprising of African slaves. After this, slave resistance becomes widespread and uprisings common.

November 1528: a slave called Esteban (or Estevanico) becomes the first African slave to set foot on what is now the US as one of only four survivors of Pánfilo de Narváez's failed expedition to Florida. He and the other three took eight years to walk to the Spanish colony in Mexico. After their return in 1536, the group's leader, Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, published an account of their journey through modern Texas and Mexico (1542) (other accounts show African slaves arriving in present-day South Carolina in 1526).

1530: Juan de la Barrera, a Seville merchant, begins transporting slaves directly from Africa to the New World (before this, slaves had normally passed through Europe first). His lead is quickly followed by other slave traders.

May 30, 1539: Hernando de Soto, following reports from Cabeza de Vaca, lands on the coast of Florida. Of about 1,200 men in his expedition, around 50 were African slaves. After exploring modern Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina, the expedition ended in disaster.

1560–1600: the English enter the slave trade

1562: The English naval commander John Hawkins becomes involved in the slave trade between West Africa and the New World. Hawkins, alongside Francis Drake, is given permission to conduct raids against Spanish ports in the Americas showing the determination to catch up with the success of the Spanish and Portuguese. Hawkins trades slaves illegally with Spanish colonies, and others soon follow.

January 29, 1579: With the Union of Utrecht, the northern provinces of the Low Countries unite to create a Calvinist republic free from Spanish rule. The United Provinces (modern Netherlands) soon becomes an important slave-trading nation and an aspiring colonial power.

1580: Following the death of King Henry of Portugal, and a short campaign by the duke of Alva, Spain and Portugal are united under Philip II of Spain. Spain thus becomes the most important colonial power – and the largest participant in the slave trade.

January 11, 1586: Sir Francis Drake sacks the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo (modern Dominican Republic). He goes on to sack Cartagena (modern Columbia) and St Augustine (modern Florida). These acts of piracy are among the factors that precipitate war between England and Spain.

1600: King Philip III of Spain outlaws the use of Native American slaves in Spanish colonies.

1607–1700: slavery in America

May 14, 1607: Jamestown, the first permanent British colony in North America, is founded in modern Virginia.

August 1619: First records of slaves in Virginia. Governor George Yeardley, with his head of trade Abraham Piersey, bought 20 Negroes at Point Comfort, Virginia, from the White Lion, an English privateer commanded by John Jope.

June 3, 1621: Dutch West India Company chartered and granted a monopoly to trade in the Caribbean. (Dutch slave traders had been operating with varying degrees of success since about 1600.)

February 25, 1644: A group of 11 enslaved people in New Amsterdam (modern-day New York) successfully petition the government there in what is the first group manumission in a North American colony.

1655: The island of Jamaica was taken by the British from the Spanish and annexed.

1660: King Charles II of England charters the "Royal Adventurers into Africa," the first English state-sponsored slave trading company.

March 4, 1681: Pennsylvania Colony is founded by a grant to William Penn by King Charles II.

February 18, 1688: The Germantown Protest, sometimes also referred to as the German Mennonite Resolution against Slavery, the first formal protest against slavery to be made in the British American colonies, is delivered in Germantown, Pennsylvania.

1693: The pamphlet, "An exhortation and caution to Friends concerning buying or keeping of Negroes" becomes the first printed pamphlet explicitly denouncing slavery and the slave trade. Arising from political controversies in early Pennsylvania, it is directed towards Quakers in Philadelphia. The pamphlet is ascribed to George Keith but is considered to have been a communal effort (Gerbner, 2011).

1700–1800: the beginning of the end of the slave trade

April 1712: An uprising of enslaved people takes place in New York. Eight White colonists are killed, and many buildings burned down.

June 7, 1712: The Pennsylvania Assembly passes an Act to prevent the importation of Negroes, arguably the first piece of antislavery legislation

in the British empire. It is overturned by the Privy Council the following year.

May 1, 1713: Spain awards the British South Sea Company the Asiento de Negros for 30 years – effectively giving Britain control of the Atlantic slave trade. The South Sea Company works with the Royal African Company to transport tens of thousands of enslaved people across the Atlantic in the coming decades.

November 23, 1733: A group of at least 150 enslaved Africans on the Danish Caribbean island of St. John take control of the colony's sugar plantations. The Danish authorities take almost a year to regain control of the island, making the event one of the longest uprisings of the 18th century.

April 19, 1775: The battles of Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts mark the start of the American War of Independence.

July 4, 1776: The American Continental Congress ratifies its declaration of independence, omitting the antislavery passages that had been included in earlier drafts.

October 17, 1781: British forces surrender to American forces at Yorktown, Virginia, effectively ending the American Revolutionary War.

July 14, 1789: In Paris, the storming of the Bastille marks a new radical phase in the ongoing French Revolution. The revolutionaries' demand for "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" would be taken up by enslaved people throughout France's colonies and beyond.

January 1791: An uprising among the enslaved population of the British Caribbean colony of Dominica is brutally suppressed by the authorities. When news of the uprising reaches London in March, proslavery lobbyists use the news to put public pressure on abolitionists as they draw up legislation to abolish the slave trade.

August 21, 1791: The enslaved people of the French Caribbean colony of Saint-Domingue rise up in revolt. Over the coming months, more than 4,000 White colonists are killed and hundreds of sugar plantations destroyed. The uprising marks the beginning of the 13-year-long Haitian Revolution, which culminates in the creation of the independent nation of Haiti in 1804.

March 16, 1792: The Danish government passes the *Forordning om Negerhandelen* (Ordinance on the Negro Trade), making Denmark the first nation to outlaw the slave trade. The law, however, only applies from January 1, 1803, and over the next ten years Danish slave-trading activity increases.

February 1, 1793: France declares war on Great Britain, commencing the Revolutionary Wars that would continue, in various forms, until 1815. As well as land conflict in Europe, the wars extended across both countries' colonies, with serious implications for enslaved people.

1793: Fugitive Slave Act – the US outlaws any efforts to impede the capture of runaway slaves. Eli Whitney's (1765–1825) cotton gin increases the need for slaves.
1794: France emancipates all slaves in the French colonies. In the US, Congress passes legislation prohibiting the manufacture, fitting, equipping, loading, or dispatching of any vessel to be employed in the slave trade.

1800–1900: abolition to Civil War

February 23, 1807: British parliament votes to abolish the trade in slaves.
1807: The US passes legislation banning slave trade that will take effect the following year.
1810: British negotiate an agreement with Portugal calling for the gradual abolition of the slave trade in the South Atlantic.
1815: At the Congress of Vienna, the British pressure Spain, Portugal, France, and the Netherlands to agree to abolish the slave trade. However, Spain and Portugal are permitted a few years of continued slaving to replenish labor supplies.
1823: The US issues the Monroe Doctrine to preserve newly independent Latin American states; issued in cooperation with Britain, whose goal is to prevent French and Spanish influence and allow British merchants access to the opening markets. The American goal is to prevent the New World becoming a battlefield among European powers.
1833: Slavery Abolition Act 1833 frees slaves in British empire; the owners (who mostly reside in Britain) are paid £20 million.
1836: Portugal bans the slave trade.
1848: Slavery is formally abolished in France and all slaves are freed.
1849: America's first anti-immigrant political party, the Know-Nothing Party forms, as a backlash to the increasing number of German and Irish immigrants settling in the US.
1850: In exchange for California's entering the Union as a free state, northern congressmen accept a harsher Fugitive Slave Act.
1857: Dred Scott Decision – the US Supreme Court decides, seven to two, that Blacks can never be citizens and that Congress has no authority to outlaw slavery in any territory.
1860: Abraham Lincoln of Illinois becomes the first Republican to win the US presidency. South Carolina secedes from the Union in December. More states follow the next year.
1861–65: The US Civil War brings four years of brutal conflict claiming 623,000 lives.
1863: Emancipation Proclamation President Abraham Lincoln decrees that all slaves in rebel territory are free on January 1, 1863.

1865: Slavery abolished – the 13th Amendment to the US Constitution outlaws slavery.
1868: 14th Amendment – ratified in 1868 to secure equal treatment for African Americans after the Civil War, the 14th Amendment guaranteed birthright citizenship for all persons born in the US. It also provided for equal protections and due process for all legal residents. This overturns the Dred Scott decision.
1870: The 15th Amendment is ratified, giving African Americans the right to vote.
1875: Following the Civil War, some states passed their own immigration laws. In 1875 the Supreme Court declares that it is the responsibility of the federal government to make and enforce immigration laws.
1877: The "Jim Crow" ("separate but equal") laws begin, barring African Americans from equal access to public facilities.
1880: As America begins a rapid period of industrialization and urbanization, a second immigration boom begins. Between 1880 and 1920, more than 20 million immigrants arrive. The majority are from Southern, Eastern, and Central Europe, including four million Italians and two million Jews. Many of them settle in major US cities and work in factories.
1882: The Chinese Exclusion Act passes, which bars Chinese immigrants from entering the US. Beginning in the 1850s, a steady flow of Chinese workers had immigrated to America.
1896: *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* case: racial segregation is ruled constitutional by the Supreme Court.

Europe encounters Africa: 1400–1599

As described in Chapter 3, the concept of White supremacy was developed in part to justify the development of the slave trade in Africa. As early as the mid-1400s, racist ideas were being developed to justify the trade in African slaves. A book by Gomes Eanes de Zurara described Africans brought to the Portuguese kingdom as "beasts, without any custom of reasonable beings" (Kendi, 2016, p 24). As Ibram Kendi points out:

> The Portuguese became the primary source of knowledge on unknown Africa and the African people for the original slave-traders and enslavers in Spain, Holland, France and England. By the time German printer Valentim Fernandes published an abridged version of Zurara's book in Lisbon in 1506, enslaved Africans – and racist ideas – had arrived in the Americas. (Kendi, 2016, p 25)

The story of Europe's interactions with Africa begins with the Portuguese who began to explore the west coast of Africa with slave-seeking

expeditions in the 1440s. By the early 1600s the slave trade had begun in earnest with the Dutch, English, Spanish, and French taking part in the trade for human lives that would lead to at least 12.5 million people taken from Africa to the Americas. As noted by historian David Blight, many African chiefs facilitated the slave trade, but the involvement of Africans was complicated by warfare and the need to trade for munitions with Europeans (Blight, 2016).

The first Africans arrived in what would become the US in the 1500s. Although most US history courses focus on the arrival of African slaves in Jamestown in 1619, Africans had been in America for much longer than that. For example:

> In 1526, enslaved Africans were part of a Spanish expedition to establish an outpost on the North American coast in present-day South Carolina. Those Africans launched a rebellion in November of that year and effectively destroyed the Spanish settlers' ability to sustain the settlement, which they abandoned a year later. Nearly 100 years before Jamestown, African actors enabled American colonies to survive, and they were equally able to destroy European colonial ventures. (Guasco, 2017)

Africans and Muslim traders had practiced slavery, but it was mainly focused on those who were captured in warfare. When the Portuguese came to trade on the west coast of Africa, the calculation changed, and the combination of money and coercion eventually led to a trade in people that would last until the mid-1800s. Many European countries became involved in the slave trade, including the Dutch, the French, the British, and the Spanish. As they fought and traded with African tribes, the boundaries from where the slaves came branched out from the coast into the interior of the country.

The competition between European kingdoms and the quest for empire led to the various governments pushing to find gold, and eventually labor in Africa and to bring that labor to their colonial holdings across the Atlantic. Sugar grown in the West Indies would be the initial focus of trade, leading to the triangular trade (African slaves to the islands, sugar to Europe, back to Africa) that would fuel an era of human suffering.

Slavery and colonialism

Up to the time of the founding of the US, the development of slavery was an integral component of the colonies in the Southern part of what would become the US. The human cost of slavery and colonialism and imperialism are still visible on both sides of the Atlantic. It is impossible to understand

why we have policies which negatively impact people of African descent, Indigenous people, and those from former colonies without understanding the history that led to the dehumanization of so many.

The Spanish were the first to bring African slaves to the Southeast region of what would become the US, "In 1565, for example, the Spanish brought enslaved Africans to present-day St. Augustine, Fla., the first European settlement in what's now the continental U.S. In 1526, a Spanish expedition to present-day South Carolina was thwarted when the enslaved Africans aboard resisted" (Waxman, 2019).

As the British laid claim to territories to the north, enslaved people would become part of the manpower used to develop the land, as Indigenous peoples were pushed out and decimated by diseases for which they had no time to develop immunity. In August 1619, when 20 Africans arrived in Jamestown, Virginia, they were not the first Africans to arrive on the continent, but their arrival would signal a turning point for the colony:

> something did change in 1619. Because of the central role of the English colonies in American history, the introduction of the transatlantic slave trade to Virginia is likewise central to this ugly and inescapable part of that story. In addition, the type of race-based chattel slavery system that solidified in the centuries that followed was its own unique American tragedy. (Waxman, 2019)

Virginia was an important part of the British colonial empire in the 1600s. As the colony developed, plantations became part of a landscape that would become a primary source of trade with England, particularly in tobacco (Suttell, 1965). Slaves were needed to maintain the plantation system, and to keep the trade profitable.

The link between the US and Europe during the slave trade is emphasized by Klein, who argues, "Without question, American labor market conditions most influenced the growth of the Atlantic slave trade" (Klein, 2010, p 18). The growth of agriculture, particularly in the American South, would become dependent upon enslaved labor. Those agricultural products would be sold to European traders who would take them to Europe, head to Africa to purchase and enslave more people, and bring them to the Americas. David Blight describes the slave ships as "the creation of cold, capitalist calculations, the reeking white-sailed messengers of Europe's ambitions. They fed the American colonies with labor and then brought the lucre of the Indies back to Europe" (Blight, 2016, p 27).

The US didn't receive the largest number of enslaved people from Africa, around 400,000 enslaved Africans were brought to North America out of the more than ten million people that were disembarked by slave ships in the Americas between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, with

more than five million enslaved people brought to Portuguese territories in South America, including Brazil (Marques, 2016). However, the fact that slavery became not only a lifelong sentence, but also a state that was passed on to their children meant that the actual numbers of slaves in the US grew over time, even with the ending of the transatlantic slave trade in 1808.

Another characteristic of textbook histories of Africans in America is a lack of focus on the agency of those who were enslaved. There were many communities created by Africans during the era of slavery, including Fort Mose in Florida: "Some built distinct communities amid the cities of the early republic; others moved toward the promise of freedom on the western frontier or in the isolated marshes of the Great Dismal Swamp of Virginia and North Carolina" (Gardullo, 2016, p 42). In general, abolitionists around the country would fight for the end of slavery as the US became more divided on the issue: "Resistance against slavery was pivotal to crafting the broader redefinition of political rights for which early advocates of democracy yearned and fought" (Winant, 2008, p 43).

During and after the American Revolution, many slaves and former slaves pressed for freedom, and some, particularly in the North, obtained it. However, the divide between North and South wasn't necessarily about the humanity of Africans, rather it was more that the abolitionists felt human enslavement was wrong on moral grounds. This did not mean that abolitionists felt that Africans were their equal. Disputes between the North and South would ultimately lead to the Civil War and the end of slavery, but discrimination against people of African descent would always be an issue in the North as well as the South.

Colonialism and empire: the foundations for future migration

Many of the practices that were connected to slavery were also incorporated into the functions of the colonial possessions that were the source of enslaved people, including forced labor and the extraction of raw materials that enriched capitalists. In this section I explore the colonial histories of Britain, France, and Germany. These countries have long histories of colonialism, and interactions with the developing world that helped not only define the modern nation-state, but those colonial ties would lead to longer-term connections with countries that would ultimately be a source of immigrant labor.

As described in Chapter 3, prior to the 20th century, colonialism played a key role in the development of ideas around race, particularly for France and Britain. The fact that Germany had a very brief colonial history meant that there was no natural source of immigrant labor, but also that there

was no sense of responsibility or need to welcome foreigners as potential citizens, as I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 6. However, as Freeman notes in the case of Britain and France, "The most important aspects of the political landscape on which immigration and race emerged were linked to the colonial heritage" (Freeman, 1979, p 47).

Britain

The development of the British empire began in the late 15th century with open confrontation with Catholic Spain. The competition between the two powers spilled over from Europe into a race to claim territory in the New World, with Britain looking to acquire possessions in North America and the Caribbean that had not already been claimed by France or Spain. Concurrently, but in particular after the loss of the original Thirteen Colonies in the late 18th century, Britain began expanding into Asia, especially India which became an official colony under direct control of the British Crown in 1858.

The first serious expansion into Africa came when Britain occupied what was known as the Cape Colony in 1795 during the Napoleonic Wars as an assurance that France would not be able to circumnavigate the Cape and threaten India. Britain followed this up with an occupation of Egypt in 1882 (in order to secure the Suez Canal) and subsequent invasion of Sudan in the late 19th century. This expansion culminated in Britain taking part in the late 19th century "Scramble for Africa." However, for Britain, Ireland served as the main source of migration for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries (Panayi, 1999). Issues of immigration and discrimination surfaced early in the British empire, with efforts to restrict Indian immigration into South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia around the beginning of the 20th century (Boyce, 1999).

The British colonial period was marked by a strong paternalism toward the colonized. For example, in India, the approach emphasized that Indians were simple peasants, corrupt, and having a norm of "chicanery and lying" (Metcalf, 1997p 24). These people could certainly not be considered the equal of Britons, as Thomas Metcalf describes the British attitude in the 18th and 19th centuries: "As childlike peasants, Indians stood in sharp contrast with the Britons who were then fighting for their liberties against the tyranny of Napoleon" (Metcalf, 1997, p 25). This attitude extended to other parts of the empire and British traders were actively involved in the African slave trade, at least through the mid-1800s. Colonialism would continue into the 20th century, but the World Wars would have a major impact on the ability of the UK to maintain control over the distant territories, and even one as close by as Ireland would gain independence after World War I.

France

France, similar to Britain, has a colonial past that figured prominently in its immigration policies after World War I. The French colonial experience began in the 16th century with exploration of the American and Canadian Northeast and with a number of attempts to establish a foothold in South America (around present-day Rio de Janeiro) and Florida. However, the more established Spanish and Portuguese empires forced France to focus on the St. Lawrence and Mississippi river basins at the beginning of the 17th century.

Following the late 18th century expulsion of France from North America by the British and the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, France was left with nothing but a few Caribbean and Indian Ocean islands in the early 19th century. The expansion began anew in the 1830s with the invasion of Algeria, a move motivated as much by domestic politics as by pretensions of an empire under Charles X and followed by Louis-Philippe (1830–48), the "citizen king," who moved into Egypt and the Pacific. However, it was not until Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte (1848–70) that France expanded its colonial empire. Under Napoleon III France expanded into West Africa (1850s), Indochina (Southern Vietnam, "Cochinchina," in 1867 and Cambodia in 1863) and even Mexico, an attempt to take advantage of the American Civil War and establish a French empire in North America (Quinn, 2000, pp 107–110). North African territory was expanded with a protectorate over Tunisia in 1881 and further expansion during the European "Scramble for Africa" into present-day Benin, Chad, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Republic of Congo, and Senegal. Other notable gains were made after the end of World War I with League of Nations' mandates in Syria, Lebanon, Togo, and Cameroon.

The strong sense of a "civilizing mission" meant that the French were open to awarding citizenship to colonial subjects who embraced the French culture, especially language and religion. This was particularly the case in Algeria, which was considered more than just a colony, as French territory. However, the French were also continually embroiled in a repressive action against Indigenous insurrection in Algeria and furthermore had to place the interests of the colonists (who in 1872 numbered 250,000 out of the total population of 2,416,000) above those of native Algerians (Quinn, 2000, pp 121–123).

Germany

The German colonial effort was motivated primarily by the post-unification (1871) efforts of Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck and subsequently Emperor William II, to establish Germany as a dominant world power. Bismarck was

at first highly skeptical of overseas entanglements, as he was fully focused on consolidating domestic political power and obsessed with balancing his European adversaries, mainly France and Russia. He once remarked to a German Africa explorer: "Your map of Africa is very fine, but my map of Africa is in Europe. Here is Russia and here … is France, and we are in the middle; that is my map of Africa" (Feuchtwanger, 2001, p 91). Nonetheless, with the establishment of the Colonial Association in 1882 and with the declaration of a German protectorate at Angra Pequena through lobbying of Adolf Luderitz, a tobacco trader from Bremen, Germany entered the colonial race in the 1880s (Feuchtwanger, 2001, p 91).

German entry into the colonial fray led to the "Scramble for Africa" that carved up the continent into zones of European control, leaving only Liberia, Ethiopia, and (extremely briefly) Sudan as independent countries on the continent. German colonies in Africa included German Kamerun (1884), German East Africa (1885 – including present-day Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanganyika, which is a part of Tanzania), German South-West Africa (1884 – present-day Namibia) and German Togoland (1884 – present-day Togo). Germany also had possessions in Southeast Asia (northeastern corner of New Guinea, Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshall Islands, and Samoa) (Feuchtwanger, 2001, p 91).

Germany's colonial era was brief, but brutal. An exhibit at the German Historical Museum in Berlin documented what was finally labeled a genocide by the German government in 2015: "When the Herero and Nama people rebelled against German colonial rule in 1904, a campaign of racial extermination was launched. By 1908, up to 80 percent of the Herero population had died – about 80,000 people. Some 10,000 Nama were also killed, practically half of the people's population." Another 100,000 are estimated to have died fighting German settlers in present-day Tanzania.

Unlike France and Britain, the German empire ceased to exist with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The remaining German territories were split among the winners of World War I (including Japan with territories in China and Australia in the Pacific). The German empire therefore ended before any significant immigration from colonies to Germany proper could occur. Nonetheless, considering the nature of German citizenship (exclusionary) and the turn of German politics in the 1930s, it is doubtful that any significant immigration would have happened regardless of the discontinuity between the German overseas empire and post-World War II era.

Conclusion

Although slavery officially ended in the mid-1800s, the era of colonialism that followed was no less violent for Africans. The end of slavery and ultimately independence did not end the subjugation endured by many people of

African descent in the US or in former colonies. The ideas and practices developed during those times also impacted those who found their way to Europe and the Americas in the 20th century. The treatment of immigrants to Europe is a clear example of the ongoing impact of colonialism as I will discuss in the next chapters.

5

Post-War Transitions: The Conflation of Immigration and Race

The development of the idea of race was mainly associated with people of African descent (in conjunction with the development of Whiteness) up until the late 1800s. As immigration policy developed in the US and Europe, a new era of racialization would begin. The conflation of immigration and race is often seen through the impact of immigration policies. For example, the first restrictions on immigration in the US were the Chinese exclusion acts passed between 1882 and 1888 (Givens et al, 2020). The racialization of different waves of immigrants after the US Civil War is echoed in the racialization of ethnic and religious minorities who migrated to Europe after World War II.

Although racism is often based on color in Europe, it is also important to look at issues of cultural racism (Modood, 2005, p 7). As Muslims have become more defined as a group, rather than as part of their respective nationalities and ethnicities, they have become the focus of restrictive immigration policies, punitive integration measures, and citizenship tests designed to test for "anti-liberal" values. Although much attention goes to the issue of Muslims in Europe, many groups face issues of racism and political exclusion. The basis for discrimination is often perceived race, as well as religion and culture. These perceptions lead to policies that impact the ability of immigrants to not only enter and settle in a country, but also whether they can thrive, as noted by Castles et al: "Immigration policies have consequences for immigrants' future status. Policies designed to keep migrants in the status of temporary mobile workers make it likely that settlement will take place under discriminatory conditions … Visible differences – for instance dark skin color or Islamic dress – can attract suspicion and social exclusion" (Castles et al, 2014, p 271).

In this chapter I focus on three critical transitions that had a major impact on transatlantic race relations. The first was the early 1900s and the era after the Civil War which would define the ongoing inequalities for African Americans and the first race-based restrictive immigration policies in the US. The second is the post-World War II era of labor migration in Europe, when immigrants from former colonies in the developing world found themselves the focus of anti-immigrant sentiment and restrictive immigration policies in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in the UK. The third period is the era of immigrant settlement in Europe, when family reunification and asylum seekers fueled an ongoing migration flow, despite the stop placed on labor recruitment in France and Germany.

This chapter begins with an examination of the interaction of immigration and race in the US after the Civil War. The early 1900s began an era of restrictions on immigration in the US, the end of empire in Europe, and by the 1950s, a post-war labor regime on both sides of the Atlantic (guestworkers in Europe, braceros from Mexico in the US). As Tichenor and Law note, "it is impossible to explain the arc of American immigration policy over time save for recurrent battles over racial and ethnic criteria" (Tichenor and Law 2019, p 1).

After World War I and the ravages of the so-called Spanish influenza, the US shifted to an isolationist mode that coincided with new efforts to oppress Blacks, particularly in the South. However, it was also a time when immigration restrictions were designed to keep those from undesirable countries out, or if they were allowed in, to keep them from gaining citizenship. A similar approach has been seen in many European countries, and policies developed at the EU level as we enter the 21st century. My research on the EU in the early 2000s indicated a preference for restrictive immigration and asylum policies that would limit flows from developing countries. Along with Brexit, which was in many ways a response to immigration, the racist treatment of migrants from former colonies in the UK led to the Windrush scandal, which led to people, mostly from the Caribbean, who should have had citizenship being deported. In effect, immigration policies have been a tool for keeping those considered undesirable out, and in general, that has had the most impact on immigrants of color.

Immigration control, race, and eugenics

Although the South lost the US Civil War, the strategies that Southern politicians pursued after Reconstruction had a major impact on race relations for the entire country. Historians like Heather Cox Richardson have been taking a very different approach to what happened after the Civil War than what is typically taught in the US. In her book, *How the South Won the Civil War*, she examines the alliances developed between Southern Democrats and Republicans in the West:

> The new American West was fertile ground for preserving and propagating a vision of society based on hierarchies. Mythology tells us that the theme of the American West was freedom, but the opposite was true. Like the antebellum South, society in the West was hierarchical according to race, class, and gender. When Americans moved there after the Civil War, they kept alive the same vision of the world that had inspired Confederates. (Cox Richardson, 2020, p 202)

Structures based on race rose in the South in order to maintain cheap sources of labor, and as immigrants came from the East, similar structures to limit rights arose in the West. The alliances between the West and the South would also lead to support for immigration controls that focused on race and religion, initially with Chinese migrants. When Teddy Roosevelt became president in 1901, he faced a Congress that was primed to be more restrictive on immigration. "We cannot have too much immigration of the right kind, and we should have none at all of the wrong kind. The need is to devise some system by which undesirable immigrants shall be kept out entirely while desirable immigrants are properly distributed throughout the country" (President Roosevelt after passage of 1903 Immigration Act, Congressional Record, 38:3, quoted in Hutchinson, 1981, p 134). Ideas around eugenics that arose in the late 1800s and early 1900s (see Chapter 3) would become justification for the divisions developed and maintained between the "races" that were defined around White supremacy. Those ideas around White supremacy and the "Aryan race" would ultimately play out in the Holocaust, a genocide that would lead to the deaths of millions of Jews and others considered undesirable.

At the start of the 20th century, Chinese immigrants were already excluded from both entry and naturalized citizenship in the US. An increase in Japanese migration led to what became known as the "Gentleman's Agreement" in 1907. Japan agreed to limit labor emigration, and the US government agreed to avoid discrimination against Japanese, including exempting Japanese students from segregation in San Francisco, and a prohibition on Japanese entering the continental US from Hawaii. The US government was concerned about Japanese military power and the potential for getting into a conflict over the treatment of Japanese in the US.

In the meantime, Southern and Eastern European migration continued. Polish, Italians, and others, particularly from Catholic countries, were clearly seen as different "races" than Western and Northern Europeans. These migrants did not fit in with the desire of many groups to maintain Anglo-Saxon dominance and to increase the homogeneity of the US. Immigration restrictionists and many members of Congress wanted to implement a literacy test that would screen out immigrants with low intelligence. President Theodore Roosevelt was against the literacy test, and the Immigration

Act of 1907 instead created a head tax (screening out poor immigrants), and created a new commission, which would come to be known as the Dillingham Commission.

As noted by Givens et al:

> The Dillingham Commission is often seen as coming at a major turning point in U.S. immigration policy. The Commissioners went to great lengths to gather information, including a fact-finding tour of Europe to determine why some immigrants were returning to their home countries as well as conditions at ports of departure to the U.S. (Givens et al, 2020, p 43)

Although the members of the commission weren't necessarily restrictionists, Tichenor notes, "The recurrent theme of its forty-two reports was the vast contrast between immigrants from traditional European source countries and those from southern and eastern Europe" (Tichenor, 2002, p 129). The report emboldened organizations like the Immigration Restriction League (IRL), unions, and members of Congress to push for more restrictive measures.

The main goal of the measures that were passed in the wake of the Dillingham Commission were to keep undesired immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe from entering the country. Congress passed a literacy test in 1917, and the passport control Act of 1918 allowed for screening of immigrants before they left their home country. However, it was the Immigration Act of 1921 and the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 that would lead to the restrictive measures that would impact the immigration flows into the US until the 1960s. As King notes, "The First World War increased racial animosity in the United States and stimulated the Americanization movement. The years after 1918 were fertile ones for eugenic arguments about inferior and superior racial stocks, and how the former could be eliminated or controlled" (King, 2000, p 169).

The 1921 Immigration Act created quotas based on the 1910 census that limited immigration to 3 percent per year of each European nationality already residing in the US with the hope that this would limit the number of Southern and Eastern Europeans entering the country. The 1924 Act reduced that to 2 percent per year of each nationality, based on the 1890 census. With Chinese exclusion already in place, the exclusion of Japanese immigrants in 1925 cemented in place a restrictive immigration regime geared toward maintaining a homogenous flow which institutionalized racial bias in US immigration policy. As King notes:

> For eugenists the legislation of the 1920s was a triumph. Writing at the passage of the 1924 law, the committee's Eugenics Expert, Harry Laughlin, declared that, as a consequence, the American nation, "unless

> it takes a very great backward step, is now committed to the biological or eugenical basis for its immigration policy". (King, 2000, p 194)

These laws also had implications for African Americans, and immigrants from Africa and the Caribbean. As King notes, "African Americans and American Indians were the two invisible communities whose political position was affected detrimentally by the immigration legislation of the 1920s. The former group had their second-class citizenship reinforced" (King, 2000, p 163). King also states, "Not only did legislators construct an immigration regime that both assumed a white American society, an assumption powerfully reinforced by eugenists, but also their measures limited the number of blacks who immigrated" (King, 2000, p 288).

As Saenz and Douglas note, "the mythos of the United States as a 'nation of immigrants' conflates the very different experiences of immigrants of color with white European immigrants" (Sáenz and Douglas, 2015, p 177). Over time, immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe who were racialized in the 1920s have been able to become identified as White, while immigrants and other citizens of color continue to face discrimination, as highlighted by Sáenz and Douglas, "scholars are undecided about when Southern and Eastern Europeans officially became 'white.' What is clear, however, is that over time, the color line between nonwhites—Asians, blacks, and Mexicans—and whites became more important than the division between old and new European immigrants" (Sáenz and Douglas, 2015, p 168).

As the world hurtled toward another world war, ideas around eugenics would be disavowed after they were adopted by the Nazis to justify genocide. The war would have a major impact on immigration flows, and despite the end of scientific racism, new forms of racism that revolved around culture and religion would join race as discrimination continued to play a role on both sides of the Atlantic.

Immigration and the development of marginalized communities in Europe

After World War II many European countries began to import labor, initially from Southern Europe, and later from former colonies and other developing countries. Ethnic and racial conflict has accompanied the development of new minority communities in Europe. Riots have occurred on a regular basis in Britain since the 1950s. Despite the media frenzy surrounding the Paris "riots" (aka "uprising") in 2005 and again in 2007, these events were only the most recent incidents in which police violence had touched off a response in the suburbs. These realities point to shortcomings in the development and implementation of policies designed to integrate and deal with issues of discrimination against ethnic minorities.

In Britain there was an early recognition of the impact of race in relationship to immigration, given the migration from former colonies in South Asia and the Caribbean. In France there was an avoidance of the issue of race, since the government considered themselves "color-blind," while Germany ignored the issue until the 1990s, since immigrants from Turkey in particular were considered temporary. As I will discuss in the next chapter, citizenship policy also played a major role in the status and approach to these populations. In Britain, the fact that many of the immigrants had citizenship, or they and their children could acquire citizenship, created a potential pool of voters. This potential was not as critical in France, given the nature of the political system which made it difficult for ethnic minorities to gain political clout, despite having citizenship, and was non-existent in Germany where it was very difficult for immigrants to get citizenship until recently.

Despite these differences in the emphasis placed on race, the outcomes for immigrants and ethnic minority citizens have been similar in each of these countries. They face high unemployment, residential segregation, and difficulties with the educational systems in each country. During the time period in question, it is clear that economic priorities drove the policies that led to the importation of labor in France and Germany. It was after that labor was no longer needed that the social issues related to these groups became more of a priority.

From temporary labor to settlers

Hundreds of thousands of immigrants arrived to take up jobs in Britain between the late 1940s and early 1960s. Initially, many came from Ireland and the "Old Commonwealth" (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) and other non-Commonwealth countries. Later groups came from "New Commonwealth" countries comprised primarily of non-White populations. As a result of colonial migrations flows, immigrants to Britain come primarily from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Caribbean. Christian Joppke argues that:

> The logic of British immigration policy is thus determined by the devolution of empire. Immigration policy has essentially been about restricting the entry and settlement of the former subjects of empire … Accordingly, the peculiarity of British immigration policy is that it is directed not against aliens, but against former co-nationals. (Joppke, 1999, p 100)

When outlining the usual pattern in migratory recruitment, Aristide Zolberg notes that "importing" countries first tap into neighboring labor pools, such as the Bretons in France and the Irish in Britain in the 19th

century, and only then expand into the more distant pools. The case of British immigration following World War II is one where the "neighboring" pools were geographically distant lands of the former (or still in some cases constituted a part of) British empire and were thus geopolitically convenient. This geopolitical convenience, however, soon became a social problem, as many Commonwealth migrants were not in fact White.

As race and color became a part of the public consciousness, immigration increasingly became a subject of public and political debate. As the numbers of ethnic minority immigrants rose, the balance shifted between those who favored an inclusive policy toward members of the Commonwealth and colonies and those who argued for restrictions (Bleich, 2003, p 39) The electorate began to put more pressure on mainstream politicians to halt the influx of immigrants (Money, 1999). Therefore, unlike in France and Germany where the 1970s oil shocks were the main catalyst, the issue of restricting or somehow curbing immigration became part of the political agenda much sooner in Britain, mainly due to race, which is clearly delineated by Freeman (1979).

During this time, fear of a clampdown on labor migration generated a surge of ethnic minority immigrants, as individuals from former colonies rushed to Britain to "beat the ban" announced by the Conservative government in 1961. New Commonwealth immigration rates in 1960 were 57,700 and increased in 1961 to 134,600. During the Queen's Speech on October 31, 1961, the Conservative government introduced legislation to control immigration from the Commonwealth. The Labour Party resisted the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (CIA), saying that the bill was embodying pure race restrictions not only because it came in response to public statements about preserving British "Whiteness" but also because it exempted the Irish from immigration control (even though hundreds of thousands of them were entering during the same era) (Bleich, 2003, p 45). As Hansen concludes in his analysis of immigration policy in Britain:

> The UK's approach to immigration policy in the 1960s appears, in large measure, so unproblematically racist because it applied entry restrictions to its own citizens. What is often overlooked is that it did so because the country lacked what every other liberal democracy possessed: a definition of citizenship that distinguished those who belonged from those who did not … In restricting the entry of third world migrants, the UK did in 1962 what every other European nation did approximately a decade later. (Hansen, 2000, p 262)

Unlike most other European countries, France has been a country of immigration since the late 1800s. As industrialization took hold in the country, and without an influx of labor from the countryside, French industrialists

turned to foreign workers. The French concept of Republicanism had a strong impact on French policies toward immigrants, encouraging them to settle and become citizens. Hollifield explains the French approach: "The acceptance of foreigners as potential citizens is part and parcel of a republican tradition, which stems from the French Revolution. Republicanism is strongly egalitarian, anti-clerical (laïque), and opposed to monarchy, instead stressing popular sovereignty, citizenship, and the rights of man" (Hollifield, 2014, p 157).

Despite this Republican tradition, the racialization of immigrants from North and Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Muslims, has led to discrimination and restrictive immigration policies. As Hollifield notes, "The liberal side of the history of immigration in postwar France cannot be told without reference to decolonization and the Algerian War, which created ethnic and racial fault lines in French society that persist today" (Hollifield, 2014, p 160).

The history of French immigration policy indicates a trend toward migration restrictions that tend to impact migrants and asylum seekers from former colonies and the developing world. For example, Hargreaves (1995) argues that by the late 1960s the government was already becoming worried about the "ethnic composition" of the migrant population and that the roots of the 1970s reassertion of control therefore were not purely economic. Immigrants from North Africa who had arrived as temporary laborers began to settle in the country. This coincided with the development of the low-income housing structures in the suburbs of major cities in France.

After World War II, Germany struggled to recover from the devastation wrought by the war. Germany has received over 20 million immigrants, refugees, and expellees since World War II. However, most of these immigrants were never perceived as foreigners because they were ethno-cultural Germans. At the peak of labor migration in 1973, the 2.6 million "guestworkers," many of whom eventually became permanent settlers, were perceived as foreigners.

Labor shortages led the Adenauer government to pursue labor recruitment agreements with Italy in 1955, but this was only a stop-gap measure. Germany also signed treaties with Spain and Greece in 1960. When the Berlin Wall went up in August of 1961, it cut off a ready supply of German laborers from the East. New labor laws reduced work hours and set a lower pension age, leading to even more shortages. Although the labor recruitment signed with Turkey in 1961 was of the greatest import, in terms of eventual numbers, they also signed agreements with Portugal in 1964 and with Yugoslavia in 1968.

The conservative government concluded all of these recruitment agreements, with the exception of the agreement with Yugoslavia that was concluded under the Grand Coalition. The Social Democratic Party of

Germany (SPD) and the trade unions (DGB) remained skeptical, mainly because of the obvious labor competition with native workers, particularly around wages, but their fears were allayed when the government expanded the welfare state arrangements and guaranteed wage levels and preference in hiring for German workers. The influx of unskilled labor allowed about three million Germans to become white-collar workers between 1961 and 1973 (Chin, 2007).

Although Germany wanted to appear open to non-Germans, they did not consider non-European workers potential settlers. In the treaty signed with Turkey, there was in fact a clause stipulating rotation of laborers (no work visas would be issued for longer than two years). This was only negotiated with Turkey, and never appeared in the Italian, Spanish, or Greek treaties. The idea of rotation quickly fell out of favor with industry, which would have had to pay for the return of laborers and the importation and re-training of new ones. Therefore, the German government allowed the imported workers to stay indefinitely, maintaining a large pool of foreign laborers to allow for the growth of manufacturing and to maximize profits.

Up until the 1970s, officials and policy makers continued to stress that migration was temporary. The *Ausländerpolizeiverordnung* (Foreigner Police Regulation), promulgated by the Nazis in 1938, continued to govern labor migration until 1965, when a new Foreigners Law (*Ausländergesetz*) was introduced. This gave even more discretion to the state in determining who received residence permits and was therefore, in fact, even more restrictive than the 1938 Foreigner Police Regulation. With the no-immigration policy, a local administrator in charge of issuing permits could take continuous residence as a sign that the foreigner had overstayed their welcome. There was some negative reception of the 1965 law, particularly from the government of the state of Hesse, however there was almost no debate when the Bundestag voted on the law in 1965. It was only in 1978 that Germany introduced a "permanence regulation" (*Verfestigungsregelung*), which made continuous residence a positive step in gaining permanent residency (Joppke, 1999).

Criticism of labor importation policies increased due to an economic slowdown in 1966, foreshadowing the effect of the oil crisis of 1973. The number of unemployed increased because of a recession. Due to the "ideological consolidation" between the SPD and the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) under a grand coalition government, a new party, the National Democratic Party (NPD), made surprising gains in state elections in Hesse and Bavaria, and nearly overcame the 5 percent electoral threshold in the 1968 parliamentary elections with 4.3 percent of the vote. One of their main positions in the campaign was that German labor should have priority over migrants. The NPD was one of the first post-war European parties to capitalize on anti-immigrant sentiment (Givens, 2005).

Family reunification and the beginning of the backlash

Family reunion was an important factor in the development of French immigration policy. A circular by the Ministry of the Interior offered a window between February 1, 1989 and February 1, 1990 for the spouses of French citizens to legalize their status. They had to have been married for longer than a year. Parents of French citizens were also allowed to legalize their status, if they could prove that they still contributed to the support of their children and could establish residency of over a year in France. The law of August 24, 1993 introduced the right to family reunion (*regroupement familial*). Between 1982 and 1990, "approximately 100,000 immigrants continued to arrive" despite the supposed stop on immigration,

> this was mainly due to family reunion from Morocco and Tunisia, as well as both family reunion and the arrival of refugees from Africa and South-East Asia. According to the INSEE census (National Institute of Statistics) carried out in 1999 4,310,000 people living in France (7.4% of the population) were immigrants and 3,260,000 (5.6% of the population) were foreigners. (Schnapper et al, 2003, p 20)

By the mid-1970s, the German government was designing policies to curtail the number of immigrants, including a policy from the Ministry of Labor which made children of foreigners entering Germany after November 13, 1974 ineligible for work permits once they came of age. The Labor Ministry also decreed that from January 1, 1975 childcare compensation would be decreased for foreigners. The ministry designated neighborhoods in cities with a high percentage of foreigners as "off-limits" to any future non-German inhabitants. Chin notes that all of these policies were undertaken under the heading of "Labor policy" since West Germany did not see itself as an immigration country and therefore did not have an immigration policy (Chin, 2007).

These policies did not have the effect they intended; family reunions increased as immigrants feared further laws preventing immigration. Due to the ineffectiveness of this "labor" approach, "integration" became the main strategy of the government by the late 1970s. However, this required a considerable ideological shift in orientation from a labor policy to a more social one. The government began to fuel social science research in the realm of "guestworkers" in order to come to terms with social aspects of the program. All the information it had up to that point was focused on the economic aspects of the guestworker program, not the people (Chin, 2007).

Interestingly, all major parties began to favor integration in the mid-1970s, but with considerably different meanings. Ironically, the CDU was in favor of an integrationist policy which allowed the workers to maintain

and preserve their cultural identity, but with the ultimate goal of sending the migrants back to their countries of origin: "the Christian Democratic party, in other words, emphasized a program of provisional integration that sought to ensure a conflict-free society, but clung to the possibility that foreigners would ultimately leave" (Chin, 2007 p 121). The keyword of the CDU's program was "coexistence" with the ultimate goal of repatriation. The Free Democratic Party (FDP) advocated a classical liberal approach of equal rights and protections.

Meanwhile, the SPD, as the most dominant party from 1969 to 1982, had the greatest impact on immigration policy. "In the 1975 platform, the party posited integration as a dual process: on the one hand, foreigners needed to become familiar with and accept the customs of Germans; on the other hand, Germans had to adjust to the permanent presence of foreigners and find out more about them" (Chin, 2007 p 122). Therefore, the FDP stressed the need for foreigners to accept the German liberal democracy, while the SPD saw integration as a two-way street. In 1978, under the leadership of the SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the Bundestag passed the *Verfestigungsregel* (Stabilization Statute), which allowed for unrestricted residence permits. A new government position was created, the *Ausländerbeauftragter* (Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs), to be in charge of migrant interests and to oversee integration efforts.

These changes were largely administrative and did not undergo a legislative examination. Joppke notes that it was only in 1990 that Germany finally passed a new law related to foreigners at the federal level. Another problem with the legal void was that most of the administrative rules were in fact subject to federal jurisdiction of the Länder and therefore varied according to the political entity in power. As Joppke illustrates:

> the CDU/CSU governed southern states of Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg have pursued a restrictionist line, for instance, imposing tougher family reunification rules than recommended by the federal government, while SPD-ruled Hesse and Bremen have followed a liberal line, allowing more foreign family members to join their relatives in Germany than recommended by the federal government. (Joppke, 1999, p 68)

The void left over by the state was filled by activist groups and civil society, as well as the courts that have over time defended the individual rights of immigrants over those of the state (see in particular Isensee, 1974 and Schwerdtfeger, 1980).

After the election of the CDU/FDP coalition, the new government began drafting a new foreigner law immediately. The first draft of the Foreigner Law of September 1983 proposed that children could only come to reside

in Germany if they were under six years old and that no second-generation foreigners could bring foreign spouses to Germany whatsoever. The government also proposed a voluntary repatriation program, which offered a direct cash payment to each eligible returnee. Overall, these proposals created a rift between the coalition which ultimately led Chancellor Kohl to suspend any further reform (Chin, 2007).

In 1988, a new proposed law denied any form of permanent residence to all non-EU foreigners who had come after labor recruitment. It proposed a rotation system with a maximum stay of eight years in Germany. The law did provide for very generous proposals for integration, but only because it treated the labor migration as a singular non-recurring event. The leaking of the 1988 draft led to the development of a coalition of both political and social actors against the legislation, including church leaders. Ultimately the government decided to depoliticize the foreigner question by organizing support from the churches and the FDP to push a new law – it was approved quickly, from first draft in September 1989 to final legislation in April 1990.

The result of the government's efforts was the 1990 Foreigner Law which did not encourage the return of foreigners to their home countries. The law ratified and put into law the Constitutional Court decisions on the rights of immigrants and the one-year waiting period for family reunification for second-generation marriages was ended. Spouses and children received their own residency rights, while second- and third-generation foreigners who had temporarily left Germany had the right of return. It also established the relationship between foreigners and Germans as one of a "partnership." The policy did not extend as far as accepting foreigners as potential Germans.

The fall of the Berlin Wall led to a new influx of workers from the East. Germany began new guestworker schemes designed to assist the developing democracies in the East, particularly focusing on seasonal Polish workers. With reunification, the country had to focus on the re-integration of the Eastern Länder, at great cost to the budgets of the Western Länder. Germany also made efforts to moderate the influx of *Aussiedler* (immigrants from former German territories who could provide proof that they were ethnic Germans) in the early 1990s. The German government enacted a quota system that set the number of returnees at 225,000 people per year between 1993 and 1999, reducing it to 103,000 in 2000. Ever since then, a steady decrease in ethnic German migrants has continued. From 1993 onwards all ethnic Germans from countries of Eastern Europe not part of the former Soviet Union have had to prove that they face discrimination because of their origin in order to return to Germany.

One of the most important changes in immigration policy in Germany occurred with the election of an SPD-Green coalition government in 1998. The Kohl government had hung onto the concept that Germany was not a country of immigration, fearing a resurgence of radical right parties like the

Republikaner that had begun contesting elections in 1990. However, the new government, led by Gerhard Schröder, would end this discourse. The Green Party in particular was in favor of more inclusive policies for foreigners. The change in discourse led almost immediately to a change in policy, particularly in terms of citizenship.

Germany was not considered a land of immigration because of the idea that first and foremost Germany is a homeland for all the Germans (wherever they may have settled), something that goes back to the time of Bismarck. This was reflected in the policies toward *Aussiedler*. However, between 1950 and 1994 immigration accounted for 80 percent of Germany's population growth (Joppke, 1999). Although race rarely entered the discourse on immigration explicitly, the emphasis on German nationality allowed the government to pursue restrictive policies toward foreigners until citizenship policies were eased in the 1990s, as I will discuss in Chapter 6.

Conclusion

It is clear that immigration policies became more restrictive in the US after World War I and in Europe after World War II because of the changing source countries of those immigrants. As these groups became racialized, they were considered undesirable. Some of those groups in the US eventually became assimilated, but later, immigrants from south of the border would become the target of more restrictive immigration policies. Although US race-based quotas would end in the 1960s, this did not end racist attitudes toward immigrants. The policies pursued by the US in the early 1900s put into place a set of laws that would impact the country's demographics for most of the 20th century.

In Europe, the flow of immigrants from former colonies and guestworkers led to immigration controls, but also impacted approaches to citizenship, as I will examine in Chapter 6. Although there is a tendency to use terms like xenophobia and Islamophobia to describe attitudes toward immigrants flowing into Europe from developing countries, the reality is that the actions taken by these governments are often designed to address concerns about different races and their impact on the culture and homogeneity of a society. The rise of anti-immigrant, racist parties in Europe has clearly been a response to the growth in ethnic and racial minorities in these countries, as we will examine in Chapter 8.

6

Immigration, Race, and Citizenship

Citizenship is one of the defining features of a sovereign nation-state. Who is allowed to enter and settle helps to define the nature of a country. The concept of the nation-state was developed in Europe, but it has been refined as democracies like the US have come to the fore. Founding myths, at least in the case of the US, have played an important role in helping define who we are as a country and as a people. As Woodard notes:

> Maintaining a shared sense of nationhood has always been a special challenge for the United States, arguably the world's first civic nation, defined not by organic ties, but by a shared commitment to a set of ideals. The U.S. came into being not as a nation, but as a contractual agreement, a means to an end for 13 disparate rebel colonies facing a common enemy. Its people lacked a shared history, religion, or ethnicity. They didn't speak a language uniquely their own. Most hadn't occupied the continent long enough to imagine it as their mythic homeland. They had no shared story of who they were and what their purpose was. In short, they had none of the foundations of a nation-state. (Woodard, 2021)

In the case of the US, immigration has become an important part of our founding myth, and we have an ideal that citizenship is open to all. France has had a similar approach to citizenship, with an ideal that anyone can be a French citizen, as long as they agree with Republican ideals of liberty, equality, and brotherhood. Germany, on the other hand, had a long-standing commitment to an ethnic version of citizenship, while the UK has had a focus on the broader commonwealth. Each of these founding myths and forms of citizenship has clashed with and been challenged by immigration.

After the US Civil War, citizenship was guaranteed to former enslaved men, yet other groups would be denied citizenship, including Chinese immigrants who would begin arriving after the war to help build the frontier in California and other parts of the West. For Black Americans, although they were theoretically free, Whites found a variety of means to restrict the ability of Blacks to participate in the most fundamental aspects of citizenship, including voting. Unfortunately, those legacies of voter suppression remain a part of our institutional legacies to this day.

The history of voter suppression in the US has often been violent. From lynching and massacres at the end of Reconstruction, to less direct forms of suppression such as mass incarceration, to most recently, the disenfranchisement of minority voters through more sanitized rules and regulations. Today, it is Republicans who adopt the latter strategies. Of course, during and after Reconstruction, it was the Democratic Party that focused on keeping newly freed Blacks from voting. They successfully scared away "carpetbaggers" who were working with Black communities to improve education and ensure that they had voting rights.

As noted in Chapter 5, immigration and citizenship has been a challenge in the UK for those who came from former colonies. The "Windrush" scandal, which came to light in April of 2018, highlighted the precarious situation of many who came from the Caribbean to work in the UK after World War II. The generation of people from the Caribbean who arrived in between 1948 and 1971 was named after the ship, the HMT *Empire Windrush*, which brought the first group of workers. Later, many people from this generation were denied citizenship, and as many as 83 people were deported, due to lack of paperwork confirming their right to remain in the UK, as described by the BBC:

> The Home Office kept no record of those granted leave to remain and issued no paperwork – making it is difficult for Windrush arrivals to prove their legal status. In 2010, it destroyed landing cards belonging to Windrush migrants. Because they came from British colonies that were not independent, they believed they were British citizens. (BBC, 2020)

The Conservative government's push to control immigration extended to many who had arrived long before citizenship should have been an issue. A connection between race and citizenship seems to have been at play. Gilroy points out the linkage between race and citizenship, stating, "Race formation also includes the manner in which 'races' become organized in politics particularly where racial differentiation has become a feature of institutional structures – legal subjectivity of citizenship – as well as individual interactions" (Gilroy, 1987, p 38).

Germany's history of the Holocaust and the country's ethnicity-based citizenship has made the issue of race a difficult topic in Germany, but this did not stop restrictions on citizenship for Turkish immigrants and other non-Germans up until 1998. As Michelle Wright notes:

> The Americans, French, and British, to one degree or another, most often pretend to (and to some degree do) overlook race in determining national belonging, instead bringing in a different set of signifiers such as political beliefs, cultural mores, and economic status … Germany, on the other hand, while not prohibiting all non-Germans from becoming citizens, nonetheless has trouble viewing those who do not share a specific racial heritage as "true" Germans. (Wright, 2004, pp 184–185)

France, with its republican traditions, has had a more liberal approach to citizenship policy, as Hollifield notes:

> the republican tradition found its expression in a more open and expansive notion of citizenship, similar (but not identical) to the birthright principle enunciated in the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States"); it is in stark contrast to the narrow, ethnocultural vision of citizenship that evolved in Germany of the Second Reich. (Hollifield, 2014, p 157)

Joppke's analysis of citizenship policy in Europe finds that there has been a general trend toward liberalization of citizenship policy. However, his summary of the theoretical approaches indicates differences in defining these citizenship regimes:

> Brubaker's "national citizenship," which turned attention to citizenship's external boundary-setting functions, held that such boundaries lastingly varied according to distinct nationhood traditions, being exclusive and permeable in "civic" France. Soysal's "postnational membership" claimed the opposite, that national citizenship was an anachronism, because immigrants now had rights irrespective of their citizenship status. And Kymlicka's "multicultural citizenship" stayed aloof from the question of resilience or decline of citizenship, arguing instead that cultural pluralism required a modification of the rights accrued to citizens (which did not thereby become moot, as claimed by Soysal). (Joppke, 2010, p 28)

In general, citizenship policies in the US were more focused on immigration and naturalization, while most European countries have had to liberalize their policies to account for non-ethnic citizenship. Joppke also finds that,

> the liberalizing trend has been especially drastic in Europe, whose citizenship regimes were not originally built for a world of migration, and where the adjustment to the immigration challenge was accordingly of a taller and more difficult order … European states are moving into the American direction of inclusive and non-ethnic citizenship. (Joppke, 2010, p 31)

In this chapter I focus on citizenship policies, and how they have impacted people of color and immigrants. There are two factors at play in these processes, and it is important to start off with a discussion of how citizenship policies have targeted people of color to in some instances encourage and in others to prevent them from becoming full participants in the political life of the countries in which they live. Politicians have pursued policies that restrict access to citizenship in part to delay the impact of demographic shifts we are seeing on both sides of the Atlantic. These policies have the effect of limiting access to those who would undermine the power of White-dominated political arenas. Conservative and far-right politicians have clearly influenced these policies, while politicians on the left have been more likely to support and encourage citizenship and voting rights for people of color.

The concept of citizenship is central to politics and the development of political power. Citizenship for people of different races and religions was a contested issue in the US from the time of the country's founding until the end of slavery led to citizenship for previously enslaved people of African descent. Despite this legal shift, the period after Reconstruction would lead to a systematic attempt to deny access to the benefits of citizenship to those who had been freed, particularly in the former Confederate states. Citizenship would also be denied by statute to immigrants from Asia. This approach connected citizenship to race in a way that would reverberate into the 20th century.

Reconstruction and the development of violent voter suppression in the US

At the end of the US Civil War, the government moved to pass constitutional amendments that would change the status of previously enslaved Americans, although the Emancipation Proclamation had already ended slavery in the South. The 13th Amendment, ratified in 1865, enshrined the end of slavery in the constitution (with the dubious exemption of prison labor): "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction" (US Const. amend XIII, sec. 1). The 14th Amendment, ratified in 1868, conferred citizenship on those born

or naturalized in the US, that is, both *jus sanguinis* (citizenship by blood) and *jus soli* (citizenship by birthright) became the law of the land.

> All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (US Const. amend XIV, sec. 1)

When Black men gained the right to vote it became clear that Black voters, who were a large part of the population in the South, could easily sway elections, and in fact, many freed Blacks were elected to Congress and state legislatures, "In all, 16 African Americans served in the U.S. Congress during Reconstruction; more than 600 more were elected to the state legislatures, and hundreds more held local offices across the South" (History.com, 2021a).

Reconstruction was never going to be an easy transition for those who had been enslaved, but it was clear that Whites in the South were going to do everything they could to keep former slaves from gaining political power, and to keep them working in conditions similar to slavery. Former "night riders" who had hunted down slaves became members of organizations like the Ku Klux Klan, that terrorized those who attempted to register to vote or exercise their new rights. Constitutional amendments and laws did little to stop the terrorism experienced by Blacks in the South. As Whitman notes, "to have a common-law system like that of America is to have a system in which the traditions of the law do indeed have little power to ride herd on the demands of politicians, and when the politics is bad, the law can be very bad indeed" (Whitman, 2017, p 159).

Violence from lynching to massacres kept Blacks from having any impact on elections after federal troops left the South in 1877, part of a compromise that paved the way for the election of Rutherford P. Hayes as president. This defined the end of Reconstruction, and the violence that ensued ultimately led many Blacks to leave the South as part of the Great Migration to the North and West of the US. The lack of reparations left most Blacks in poverty. Even when thriving communities arose, some were attacked and destroyed by Whites, such as Rosewood, Florida (History.com, 2021b). In 1923, when a White woman claimed that she had been attacked by a Black man, White gangs, hunting for the culprit, killed many Black residents and ultimately burned down most of the town.

The era after Reconstruction was a time when forms of slavery were imposed by other means. Sharecropping and the incarceration of Black men for minor crimes such as "vagrancy" were used to develop a labor force

through incarceration. Many of these men did back-breaking work in the fields and the mines without pay or were put on chain gangs that did hard labor building roads or working in the fields.

Despite the fact that the US has always considered itself a beacon for democracy, the history of voter suppression belies that claim. The history of voter suppression after the Civil War is very well documented and persists to this day (DuBose, 2021). Violence, intimidation, and even death met those brave formerly enslaved people who tried to vote, or to register their communities to vote. Voter ID laws are proliferating across the US in states where Republicans control state legislatures. In North Dakota, ID laws have been passed making it more difficult for tribes on reservations without street addresses to vote. The American Civil Liberties Union has had to issue a warning that the Republican Party's efforts in certain states constitute a legitimate threat to be the decisive factor for which party gets to have power. And this is not just happening at the state level but at the national level.

As immigration flows grew from Asia, another group became the focal point for oppression on the West coast of the US. As noted in the introduction, Chinese immigrants were denied citizenship in the state of California, and they were ultimately declared ineligible for naturalization in the US with the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 which was designed to curb the influx of Chinese immigrants to the US. As discussed in Chapter 4, this act began the connection of immigration to race, and the connection of race and citizenship would become an ongoing issue in Europe as well, despite the disavowal of the idea of race after the Holocaust and World War II. As Whitman notes: "From the late nineteenth century onward the United States came to be regarded as 'the leader in developing explicitly racist policies of nationality and immigration,' and American immigration and naturalization practices were attracting plenty of notice in Europe well before the emergence of the Nazi movement" (Whitman, 2017, p 36). The blatantly racist policies of the US would lead to the development of second-class citizenship for Blacks, who would have their access to voting and other rights restricted. These ideas would also influence intellectuals in Europe who were against an egalitarian approach to citizenship (Whitman, 2017).

Citizenship and immigration in Europe

The concept of the nation-state was developed in Europe although countries have different conceptions that are linked to their political development. There is much truth to the conventional wisdom which speaks of two archetypes, the "cultural nation" and "state-nation," which are exemplified by the two polar opposites, France and Germany. Rogers Brubaker illustrated this in his seminal book, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Brubaker, 1992). Germany's long-standing contention that it is not a country

of immigration is linked to the idea that there is a need to foster an ethnically German nation. However, even in republican France, the Revolution resulted in the enforcement of the Parisian identity over the rest of the country, despite the Revolution's appeals to a unifying idea over ethnicity.

Britain

Britain has birthright citizenship (*jus soli*), but unlike the US, persons born to parents in the country illegally are not automatically granted citizenship. There is a great deal of overlap between Britain's citizenship, immigration, and race relations policies. British citizenship policy is derived from the relationship with its empire. It was only when the empire began to break down and immigration from former colonies to the motherland increased that Britain began to reform its citizenship policy. Britain lacked a coherent citizenship policy until it was forced to decide on one by the influx of Commonwealth immigrants after World War II and the subsequent public outcry that such immigration elicited.

Britain's colonial past has had a major impact on immigration and citizenship policy. During the development of the empire, the concept of British "subject" became the way to handle geographic and demographic diversity. The goal of hanging onto the Commonwealth as a tool for political and foreign policy ends delayed the development of British citizenship policy. As Rieko Karatani argues,

> Previous works on post-war immigration policy in Britain have mainly focused on the way in which it became racially discriminatory. They have not asked why British governments delayed until 1981 before creating the status of British citizenship and have remained silent about the fact that the status of British citizenship, unlike the citizenship of other Western democratic countries, is still not defined by nationhood. (Karatani, 2003, p 106)

Karatani emphasizes the point that it was the "global institution," that is, the British empire followed by the Commonwealth, which was the focal point for British citizenship policy and not only the domestic impact of immigration that led to the development of British citizenship in 1981.

The 1948 British Nationality Act created a British citizenship synonymous with Commonwealth citizenship, thus allowing "some 800,000,000 subjects of the crumbling empire, inhabiting a quarter of the earth's land surface, with the equal rights of entry and settlement in Britain" (Joppke, 1999, p 101). This policy came under scrutiny as the race riots of 1958 in Nottingham and Notting Hill, combined with the Civil Rights unrest in the US, brought forward the issue of race. Commonwealth citizenship and immigration

were greatly curtailed in the 1960s and 1970s (with the passing of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act and the 1971 Immigration Act) with fears that immigration from the colonies, especially the Caribbean and former British India (including Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan), would overflow in Britain (Boyce, 1999, pp 249–251).

The 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act introduced the concept of patriality, which was meant to allow overseas British subjects with demonstrable links to the British Isles – such as those who had at least one parent or grandparent born in the UK – to receive entry into the UK. The policy was strengthened in the 1971 Immigration Act which officially created the distinction between the patrials, "people with a parent or grandparent born in the UK" (Hussain, 2001, p 24), and non-patrials. Patrials were allowed to enter the UK and were free of immigration control, but non-patrials were asked to obtain a 12-month work visa.

The British Nationality Act (BNA) of 1981 created a category of "British Citizenship," although it also expanded it to include the "British Dependent Territories Citizenship" (BDTC) and "British Overseas Citizenship" (BOC). Asifa Maaria Hussain (2001) argues that the Act provides the strongest proof that citizenship and immigration are highly linked in Britain. The point of the act was essentially to control immigration by defining "nationality narrowly" (p 26). The Act superseded the liberal Commonwealth British Nationality Act of 1948 with the three categories, of which the last, BOC, was not useful to its holders in the Commonwealth for entry into the United Kingdom. The second category, BDTC, entrenched the concept of patriality hinted at by the 1968 Immigration Act and entrenched by the 1971 Immigration Act.

As noted in the introduction, the Windrush scandal brought the issues with these policies into sharp relief. Unfortunately, the negative impact was clearly racialized, based on those who had come into the country from former Caribbean colonies. Historian David Edgerton puts the scandal in context:

> To make empire the dominant story in British history is to misunderstand the nature of Britain, its elite and its exploitative power, and its persistent racism. The racism of Oswald Mosley and Enoch Powell, for all its roots in the past, was a self-consciously post-imperial nationalist one. Imperialism reluctantly granted British Caribbean people UK citizenship. These rights were stripped away by nationalists, right down to Theresa May – this was the essence of the Windrush scandal. People voted for Brexit not because they were imperialists, but because they were nostalgic for a national Britain. They were certainly not voting for the return to free immigration from the old imperial territories. (Edgerton, 2020)

British citizenship today remains a complicated concept, given the fraught relationship with former colonies.

France

In comparison with Britain and Germany, France has a unique conceptualization of citizenship, it being political rather than ethnic (Germany) or pseudo-territorial (Britain). The French approach to citizenship lies in the French understanding of the concept of citizenship as one that is inherently political in nature. As Brubaker posits, Germany and France – in their primordial forms of early statehood – essentially understood that citizenship was separate from nationhood and – "paradoxically" as Brubaker characterizes it – more firmly so in early Prussia than France. The French Revolution was intensely national, and it essentially created modern nationalism. However, Brubaker explains how it was the novelty of the act of creating the concept of citizenship that left those involved in the process intensely aware of its political nature:

> It is true that nation and state, nationality and citizenship have always been more closely integrated in France than in Germany. Yet precisely the early and stable fusion of nation and state shaped the French understanding of nationhood as an essentially political fact, unthinkable apart from the institutional and territorial framework of the state. French citizenship has been national, even nationalist, since its inception … the specifically political and statist quality of French nationalism has permitted, even required, a citizenship law that would transform migrants into Frenchmen. (Brubaker, 1992, p 51)

The first French Constitution of 1791 extended all French laws to foreigners and the subsequent 1793 Constitution even extended them some political rights. The counterrevolutionary period and its xenophobic paranoia drew back many of these cosmopolitan privileges (Brubaker, 1992).

France originally adopted the *jus soli* principle in the late 19th century to transform its second-generation migrants into citizens. Ironically, *jus soli* came to be the law exactly because of resentment against migrants. As Brubaker recounts, citizen resentment in frontier departments of France rose as non-citizens were excused from universal conscription and military service. The policy that was adopted in this context – *jus soli* – therefore flowed from the already established assimilationist conception of the state. As Brubaker posits, "The decisive extension of jus soli in 1889 can be explained only with reference to a distinctively state-centered and assimilationist understanding of nation-hood, deeply rooted in political and cultural geography and

powerfully reinforced in the 1880s by the Republican program of universal primary education and universal military service" (Brubaker, 1992, pp 85–86).

The influx of migrants, particularly of those from its former colonies, has had a profound impact on the French conception of citizenship much as it did with the British. Brubaker argues that the reconstitution of French citizenship, and particularly the "challenge to jus soli," came about due to the following:

> the emergence of a large population of second-generation North African immigrants, many possessing dual citizenship; increasing concern about the emergence of Islam as the second religion of France; a Socialist government perceived as "soft" on immigration; the emergence on the left of a "differentialist", cultural-pluralist discourse on immigration [and] the rise of the National Front. (Brubaker, 1992, p 138)

In the mid-1980s the principle of *jus soli* came under considerable attack from the anti-immigrant Front National. In part as a response to this attack the right-wing Rally for the Republic (RPR) governments of Édouard Balladur and Alain Juppe made it mandatory that French-born persons between 16 and 21 make a special request known as the demonstration of the will (*manifestation de la volonte*). The new socialist government of Lionel Jospin rescinded this law on September 1, 1998. Therefore, unlike the pure *jus soli* principle of the US, the French place great emphasis on socialization. One must become socialized, a Jacobin principle, through education, in order to become French. Schools are therefore an integral part of becoming French.

The National Front (FN) also played a role in agenda-setting when the RPR/Union for French Democracy (UDF) government became concerned about the impact of anti-immigrant sentiment.

> Anxious to staunch the loss of their supporters to the FN, the traditional centre-right parties hardened their policy platform on immigration and related issues. After gaining a narrow election victory in March 1986, they formed a government … who announced that the government would introduce legislation ending the automatic acquisition of French nationality by people of foreign origin. (Hargreaves, 2007, p 155)

The center right in France not only incorporated the rhetoric of the FN, but they also pursued legislation to require those who had previously been able to naturalize automatically to apply and go through a process where they had to request citizenship. In his analysis, Hargreaves argues that the change in French citizenship law in 1993 "was designed to appeal to the

sizeable minority among the electorate which was tempted by the more exclusionary arguments of the FN" (Hargreaves, 2007, p 176). The 1993 law was abrogated by a law passed in 1998, but children born of foreign parents do not get automatic citizenship until they are 18.

A law passed in November 2003 further introduced restrictive conditions to obtaining French nationality for the foreign spouses of French citizens. The minimum length of marriage before one could apply for French citizenship was extended from one to two years, plus the married couple had to prove that they were living together and that they had a good knowledge of the French language. Nonetheless, as the OECD report on global migration illustrates:

> the number of foreigners obtaining French nationality has significantly increased in the last two years. This is mainly due to the implementation since January 2003 of the Action Plan for the simplification and acceleration of the process to obtain French nationality. As a consequence, the average time taken to examine an application has been reduced to one month. (OECD, 2006, p 98)

French nationality laws continue to go through change, but the main idea of *jus soli* remains a key component of French policy although it is not as generous as the US. For naturalization, France, along with many other European countries has shifted to a model that focuses on civic integration, that is, requiring those who want to naturalize to be able to speak the French language and, as of August 11, 2020, to also take a written language exam.

French citizenship policy continues to be a point of contention in French elections. Marine Le Pen, who has fallen out with her father and renamed the FN to the Rassemblement National (National Rally), has had more success in gaining seats in the French Assembly, and still has her eye on the presidency. Immigration and citizenship were on her mind in an interview with the *New York Times*, where she stated, "Acquiring French citizenship should be made harder … and contingent on respecting French 'customs' and 'codes'" (Onishi, 2021). Her focus on Islam and the wearing of the Muslim headscarf highlights issues around what it means to be French and the ongoing debates in France about who can have access to citizenship.

Germany

Germany's conception of citizenship focuses on the idea that only people with German blood can be German citizens. This approach was also influenced by the view that Germans had of the "temporary" workers who ended up becoming settlers. Back in the early 20th century

Germany's policy makers did not consider the possibility of *jus soli*. Brubaker concludes: "The new law marked the nationalization, even the ethnicization, of Germany citizenship. While late nineteenth-century French nationalism, state-centered and confidently assimilationist toward foreigners, permitted, even required, the transformation of immigrants into citizens, turn-of-the-century German nationalism, ethnoculturally oriented and 'dissimilationist' toward immigrants from the east, required their civic exclusion" (Brubaker, 1992, p 114).

The emphasis on *jus sanguinis* came from the way that the German state was formed almost 100 years following the French Revolution. The French Revolution created both the citizenship and the nation in a comprehensive manner, while the German nation was to a large extent already developed as a principle by 1871, in part due to the influences of the French Revolution. Since the nation came before the state it is only natural that it is prime in the conceptualization of citizenship. In France, citizenship became a political concept that could change over time, while in Germany, it was an inherent component of the nation-state, and thus much more resistant to change (Brubaker, 1992).

Germany's limited colonial history meant that the German conception of the nation-state based on *jus sanguinis* was never truly challenged by a large pool of migrants until well into the 1970s. In fact, much more important for the eventual conceptualization of its citizenship policy is the fact that Germany is considered the "Fatherland" of all Germans and as such open to migration of Germans, particularly from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Germany constitutionalized a right to return for all individuals (*Aussiedler*) of German descent who lived in communist Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union after World War II.

Germany's post-war guestworker program was considered temporary and was framed in the terms of a labor policy. Compared to the *Aussiedler* who could easily qualify for citizenship despite never living within Germany's post-war borders, the children of Turkish immigrants were often denied citizenship. However, there was also the consideration that many of them didn't want citizenship because they didn't consider themselves "German" and often didn't speak the language or feel integrated into German culture.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990 led the conservative government to reform Germany's naturalization law, with reunification in mind. Under this new law non-ethnic Germans could naturalize and acquire German citizenship after 15 years of residence. This reform forbade dual citizenship, an element of the policy that was strictly enforced. Dual citizenship was an important issue for Turkish immigrants who wanted to maintain property rights in Turkey. Political elites have attempted to modify these rules over many years and in 1999, the naturalization law was amended to accord children born in Germany dual citizenship until the age of 23, at which

time they had to choose one nationality. To qualify, a child had to have one parent who had resided in Germany for at least eight years.

Another major shift in policy occurred with the election of the SPD/Green government in 1998. Gerhard Schroeder campaigned on a pledge to move away from the idea that that Germany was not a country of immigration. A change in the citizenship law (the Nationality Act) was proposed in October 1998 and became law on January 1, 2000. The new naturalization law introduced a limited form of *jus soli* citizenship and reduced the requisite length of legal residency from 15 to eight years. Children born in Germany to parents who had lived in the country for eight or more years automatically obtained conditional German citizenship, which could be held alongside citizenship in another country. However, between the ages of 18 and 23, the child had to choose citizenship in Germany or their parent's country. By failing to declare their German citizenship by age 23, they could automatically lose it. In addition, children under the age of ten, upon their parents' application, were eligible for German citizenship so long as their parents satisfied the legal requirements and applied before December of 2000. A number of additional requirements and responsibilities accompanied these reforms. These reforms acknowledged that Germany is a country of immigration and that foreigners were eligible to join the political community. The Nationality Act was amended in 2014 to significantly reduce the number of children who had to choose one nationality, expanding access to dual nationality. With these changes to citizenship and naturalization policy, Germany joined other countries like the UK and France in making it possible for children of foreign parents to gain citizenship. Although the new nationality laws dealt with the procedural issue for gaining citizenship in Germany, it did not necessarily deal with the underlying issues that many Turks had with becoming German.

Islamophobia and xenophobia have become a growing problem in Germany, particularly with the rise of the anti-immigrant Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. As noted in a 2018 article, Turkish-German soccer star Mesut Özil who was born and educated in Germany, resigned from the national team after he claimed that he had experienced racism at the hand of soccer officials, stating "I am a German when we win, but I am an immigrant when we lose" (Smith and Eckardt, 2018). Citizenship is not a shield from discrimination.

Conclusion

The prospects for inclusive citizenship in the US and Europe remain problematic as issues of racism, anti-immigrant sentiment, and Islamophobia impact the approach that politicians take to change in citizenship policies. It is true that citizenship policy has become more liberal in many ways, but it

has also remained problematic, particularly in Europe for people from non-ethnic European backgrounds. These policies are echoed in the changes in citizenship policy in the US after the Civil War, but as we will examine in the next few chapters, exercising the rights of citizenship can be difficult when discrimination is at play.

7

From the Civil Rights Movement to Black Lives Matter

From its founding, race and law have been integral components of state- and nation-building processes in the US. Slavery, in effect, transformed people into property, and elaborate rules governed the existence of Blacks, free and slave, in the North as well as the South. Even after the institution of slavery was destroyed by a bloody civil war, Whites continued to use law as a means of subjugating African Americans. As a result, an array of state and federal legal systems, often known by the euphemism "Jim Crow," codified various racial distinctions, often limiting the capacity of African Americans to vote or to enter into contracts, the two fundamental elements of participation in a Lockean democracy. In addition, under the common law, owners of property and capital essentially possessed a right to discriminate. They could thus refuse services, accommodations, and employment to individuals on any grounds. This right gave Whites, particularly White men, considerable non-state power to shape communities.

Citizenship, civil rights, and voting rights are closely intertwined. In the US civil rights leaders fought for the right to vote after voter suppression laws made voting nearly impossible for Blacks in the American South. Ethnic and racial minorities face similar challenges relating to discrimination on both sides of the Atlantic, but they also have fought for their rights, learning from the various protests and civil rights movements. Although civil rights and human rights movements have been part of the political landscape from a transatlantic perspective since the founding of the League of Nations, policy developments were slow to develop until after World War II. The US took the lead with policy, followed by the UK. It would take action at the EU level for most European countries to focus on racial antidiscrimination policy.

In this chapter I begin with an examination of discrimination in practice in the US and Europe, particularly in terms of housing, labor rights, and cultural practices. I then examine the development of civil rights legislation

in the US and its impact on policy and movements in the UK. In the 1990s, antidiscrimination policy shifted to the EU level, with the pursuit of antidiscrimination policy in the form of the Racial Equality Directive, and I conclude with a discussion of developments in political participation and representation for immigrants in Europe.

Discrimination in practice

Antidiscrimination policies were always at the forefront of the US civil rights movement, with efforts to open public schools to Black students, for example. In Britain, antidiscrimination policy was the price that the Labour Party exacted from the Conservative Party in order to support limits on immigration. Although incidents like the uprisings in the Paris suburbs in Fall 2005 did force the government to make some moves toward improving job prospects for disadvantaged young people, there is still little movement toward effectively dealing with job discrimination.

Many ethnic minorities in European cities are clustered in industrialized, urban areas within clearly defined, if not self-encapsulated, poorer neighborhoods. Examples are London's Tower Hamlets and the *banlieues* surrounding major French cities. Many of these communities have experienced riots as a result of police violence and years of social disenfranchisement. The suburb of Seine-Saint-Denis, outside of Paris, is the poorest department in metropolitan France. In the town of Aubervilliers, unemployment in March of 2018 was double the national average at 24 percent and youth unemployment was at 38 percent (Piser, 2018).

Many scholars have pointed out that immigration patterns have contributed to the poor labor market position of ethnic minorities in Europe. Labor migrants first came to Europe as unskilled workers. For example, many South Asian Muslim men had no qualifications and worked in the least desirable jobs when they first came to Britain. Generations later, many are still in the same occupations. For minorities in Britain and France, this work is often the lowest-paying, unskilled industrial work, especially in textiles and manufacturing. The mobility of employees had improved by the early 1980s, but men of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin stagnated in manufacturing and non-skilled labor. In fact, the movement of some Bangladeshi employees in Britain between 1982 and 1994 was into lower-skilled jobs (Modood, 2005, p 60).

In Britain, unemployment within Black communities, especially in areas with high Caribbean, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi Muslim populations, is consistently above the national average. A 2015 study by Wilf Sullivan of the Trades Union Congress states:

> data shows that 5.3 per cent of white people were unemployed compared to 10.1 per cent of black and minority ethnic people. For

> young people, who face higher levels of unemployment, there are similar levels of disproportionality, with 12.5 per cent of white workers aged between 18 and 24 unemployed, compared to 24.1 per cent of young black and minority ethnic workers. (Sullivan, 2016, p 3)

Minorities in France face similar difficulty in gaining quality education and employment. According to a survey in France in 1997, the immigrant workforce does not have the same career progression as their French fellow workers. After 20 or 25 years, almost 75 percent of immigrants are still manual workers compared to less than 30 percent of people who were born in France (EUMC, 2003, p 13). There are also prevalent differences within the immigrant workforce. Whereas the Spanish are more likely to climb up the professional ladder than the average immigrant, Turks or Moroccans tend to have the same jobs throughout their lives (EUMC, 2003, p 13).

Discrimination in the labor market begins with hiring practices. Direct discrimination in the form of hiring pre-screenings is a major reason why minorities are unemployed or underemployed in low-skilled and low-wage jobs. A recent study by the Growth, Equal Opportunities, Migration and Markets project, in which equally qualified Whites and minorities respond to the same job advertisement, prove that many employers discriminate against ethnic minorities (Di Stasio and Heath, 2020). Even when the prospective applicant and the interviewer don't meet face-to-face or talk on the telephone, employers base discrimination on biographical data from a résumé or application, or simply an interviewee's last name, to confirm that they are not White. The study also found a strong anti-Muslim bias.

> In spite of relatively strong laws prohibiting discrimination on ethnic, racial and religious grounds (the MIPEX index ranks Britain among the countries with the most favorable antidiscrimination policies, together with traditional countries of immigration like Canada and the US), the level of discrimination recorded in Britain, and its pervasiveness across occupations and groups, is not any lower than that found in the other European countries included in the GEMM study (Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Spain). (Di Stasio and Heath, 2020, p 2)

As Begag (2007, p 100) notes: "In France recruiters have long engaged openly or secretly in discriminatory practices that have nothing to do with judging the skills, merits, or strengths of individual candidates. Such practices are now public knowledge, following considerable media exposure." One approach to dealing with these issues is to allow applicants to submit "blind" résumés that do not indicate a person's ethnicity or religion. This is emphasized in the words of France's Minister for Equal Opportunities, who states that for immigrants from the Maghreb, "no matter how French

they became, their swarthy skins and Arabic names made them targets of widespread discrimination by members of the majority ethnic population" (Begag, 2007, p xxvii).

French journalist and activist Rokhaya Diallo notes that:

> Many people [in France] have accepted the fact they are not treated as citizens, especially Muslim and black people. A lot of young people are used to being stopped and frisked, they don't even consider whether it is legal or not. They should not be searched in this way. Most have not done anything wrong. (Safdar, 2017)

The various headscarf affairs in France, where Muslim girls were banned from wearing the veil in public schools and women more generally have been banned from wearing the burka in public spaces, are another indicator of anti-Muslim bias (Beardsley, 2019). Other countries like Belgium and Denmark have banned the burka, or full body covering, but these bans have only been suggested by leaders in the UK and Germany.

In recent years, terror attacks in France have increased the sentiment that immigrants are difficult to assimilate and Islamophobia. In particular, the attack on the offices of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*, in which cartoonists at the publication and others were killed in a series of attacks by Muslim extremists over three days in January of 2015 (BBC, 2015). Antisemitic attacks that have been connected to Islamist preachers versus prior attacks by neo-Nazis have also raised alarm along with a focus on home-grown terrorists (Baker, 2019).

Racism and xenophobia have been an ongoing issue for ethnic and racial minorities, as well as immigrants in Germany. After the murder of George Floyd, officials from the German Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency reported that the number of cases of racial discrimination rose from 545 reported cases to 1,176 (Bosen, 2020). Immigrants and refugees have been the target of far-right extremists, but more generally, people of color in Germany have difficulty finding housing, getting jobs, and have difficulties when shopping or being served in bars and restaurants.

The civil rights movements in the US and UK

After the Civil War, antidiscrimination laws were adopted as part of an effort to incorporate free Blacks into state and national polities. The political demise of the Radical Republicans, a party that was focused on Reconstruction in the South, was preceded in 1875 by Congress' adoption of "An Act to Protect All Citizens in Their Civil and Legal Rights" (Foner, 1990). The Act prohibited discrimination on grounds of race, color, or previous condition

of servitude, and violators were liable to criminal and civil penalties in the federal courts. Aggrieved individuals retained the prerogative to seek redress under the common law or according to state statutes, where those existed. In the reactionary period of post-reconstruction, the Act was struck down by the Supreme Court, "holding that Congress had exceeded the scope of the federal government's powers under the Constitution … No further congressional action on racial discrimination was taken until 1957" (Givens and Evans Case, 2014, p 133).

In 1954, the US Supreme Court's landmark decision in *Brown* v. *Board of Education* made headlines around the world. In its wake, a newly galvanized civil rights movement emerged, culminating with the contrasting images of police brutality in Selma, Mississippi in 1965 and a peaceful gathering on the Washington Mall in 1963. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 consolidated a patchwork of judicial and state-based reforms and articulated national civil rights standards enforceable through the federal courts.

Although the focus tends to be on how these laws impacted African American communities, the overall impact of the Act went far beyond the South and the African American community. A year later, the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act (also known as the Hart-Celler Act) was passed and this Bill would have a dramatic impact on the make-up of immigration flows into the US up to the present day. The Bill ended a decades-long set of racially discriminatory policies and was seen as an extension of the civil rights movement. President Johnson characterized the Bill at its signing as follows, "For it does repair a very deep and painful flaw in the fabric of American justice. It corrects a cruel and enduring wrong in the conduct of the American Nation" (LBJ Presidential Library, 2021). Immigrants from Asia, Latin America, and Africa allowed to enter the US because of this important change in the law couldn't know it at the time, but the struggle for civil rights would have a profound impact on their ability to organize politically and become an integral part of the democratic processes.

It isn't a coincidence that some of the most important civil rights legislation in the US was passed in the same time period as immigration legislation that would end 40 years of racist immigration quotas designed to favor White Europeans. In 1963, after the death of President John F. Kennedy, President Johnson focused his legislative agenda on civil rights reform: "Johnson linked immigration reform to foreign policy and civil rights goals to move the country away from national origins quotas toward a more balanced policy that was based on a series of categories that were no longer race-based" (Givens et al, 2020, p 46). At this time in the rest of Europe, the focus was still on recruiting temporary labor and guestworkers, but the UK was experiencing a push to control immigration from Conservative Party politicians.

Gary Crystal (2021) notes that:

> Racial discrimination in Britain during the postwar period was rife. Many of the immigrants were skilled workers but racism and discrimination meant that semi or unskilled work was the only option. By the 1960s the economy in Britain was declining and Black workers were the first to lose their jobs. Those that did manage to keep jobs usually did double the work for less pay. The racism and discrimination in Britain echoed that felt in America at the time, although on a smaller scale.

Crystal goes on to note, "It was not uncommon to see signs in Britain during the 1960s proclaiming, 'No Blacks, no Irish, no dogs'" (Crystal, 2021). As the Conservative Party focused on immigration control in the 1950s, the Labour Party focused on immigrant integration with several individual members of parliament introducing racial antidiscrimination in the 1950s (Givens and Evans Case, 2014).

Policy makers in Britain were influenced in many ways by US policy in the 1960s, as noted by Bebber:

> Anthony Lester … remained one of the most influential race relations legal experts in Britain. He had served as Legal Secretary of the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD), an umbrella group of ethnic organizations mobilized after Martin Luther King, Jr's visit to the United Kingdom in 1964 … His chief aim was to construct diligent and complete anti-discrimination law patterned after statutory commissions in the United States and Canada and to convince Labour of its necessity. (Bebber, 2019, p 83)

British race relations laws

- 1965 Race Relations Act—created a criminal offense related to incitement of racial hatred and outlawed discrimination in access to premises.
- 1968 Race Relations Act—outlawed discrimination in employment, housing and services.
- 1976 Race Relations Act—established the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). Scope included employment, education, housing, provision of goods, and services.
- 2000 Race Relations Act—1976 Act amended to include all functions of public authorities. (Givens and Evans Case, 2014)

The US and the UK took major steps to pass antidiscrimination laws in the 1960s and 1970s, and those efforts have led to better opportunity for

some, but there are still grave disparities that have led to further movements calling for racial equity. In Europe, more broadly, these issues were taken up by the EU in the 1980s and 1990s as right-wing violence was on the rise.

Antidiscrimination policy in Europe

I first became aware of efforts to develop antidiscrimination policy in Europe when I was conducting research on the radical right in Austria in the late 1990s. In the spring and summer of 1999, I had spent time in Austria following the electoral campaign for the upcoming legislative elections. I met with representatives from the mainstream parties and the far-right Austrian Freedom Party, that was led by Jörg Haider at the time.

Haider's party would end up coming second in the 1999 legislative election and would ultimately negotiate a coalition with the conservative Austrian People's Party. This arrangement was unacceptable to other EU member states, given Haider's strong anti-EU and anti-immigrant stances. Although Haider did not join the government himself, the other EU countries decided to impose diplomatic sanctions on Austria. Another component of the response was to pursue the passage of antidiscrimination legislation, the EU's Racial Equality Directive (RED).

The passage of the RED would become the basis for my book *Legislating Equality*, and I was able to link the development of antidiscrimination policy in the EU to the efforts of politicians like Glynn Ford, a member of the European Parliament (MEP) from the UK, and others in the European Parliament and civil society who had an interest in responding to far-right violence by developing protections for ethnic and racial minorities. As I note in the book:

> The development of the Equal Treatment directives (ETDs) closely mirrored European deepening in the 1990s, but its roots lie in developments during the 1980s. Although European integration stalled during the 1980s, actors in the European Parliament saw a political opening for action with the rise of the radical right in places like France and Germany. In the 1980s and early 1990s, racist acts of violence and the stunning success of radical right political parties across Europe catapulted the issues of immigration, xenophobia, fascism, and racism to the forefront. The European Parliament was only beginning to take on a more important role in the supranational structures that were under construction during the 1980s, but it would play a key role in the development of anti-racist and what would ultimately become racial antidiscrimination policy for the European Union. However, it is also important to note that the focus on anti-racism goes back to the civil rights era of the 1960s in the U.S. and the impact it had on policy in Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom. (Givens, 2014b, pp 1–2)

In the US, strong civil society organizations had developed around the issue of race. The Starting Line Group (SLG) was similar in some ways to the coalition of American interest groups that lobbied for US civil rights legislation in the early 1960s but the SLG did not have the same kind of large-scale support from a social movement. Although immigrant rights groups were involved with the SLG, immigrants and ethnic minorities were not mobilized in the same way African Americans and their White supporters were in the US. The RED was more of a top-down exercise in policymaking.

With the rise of radical right parties like the French Front National, the European Parliament put EU-wide action on the agenda in 1986 with its creation of the Parliamentary Enquiry Committee, charged with examining the rise of fascism and racism in Europe. However, at that time, the European Treaty did not provide a legal basis for the adoption of a legislative instrument addressing those phenomena. In 1992, the SLG began campaigning for both antidiscrimination legislation and the inclusion of an antidiscrimination provision in the European Treaty. There were two key factors that motivated policy in Europe, which was different than the US where social movements had put antidiscrimination policy on the agenda. First, violence and discrimination against ethnic minorities was on the rise and, second, the development of anti-immigrant political parties motivated policy developments in the EU.

The SLG had developed a directive that fit the bill for action the commission could take in the face of concerns raised by Haider's party. In February 2000, as the Austrian coalition government was forming, the Commission began discussion on the passage of the RED. It was expected that Austria's new government "would not dare oppose the Race Directive out of fear that this would legitimize the reproach by the governments of the other fourteen member states that the Austrian government cannot be trusted because it includes a racist party" (Niessen, 2000, p 212). Governments felt obliged to pass the directive in light of their criticism of Austria and Haider's racism. France and Germany had serious difficulties to overcome in adopting the directive in terms of the impact on their legal system, but the RED was adopted on June 29, 2000 by the Council of the European Union, "implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin" (Directive 2000/43/EC). By the time the RED was being implemented across the EU, new governments that were more conservative were being influenced by the nationalist, anti-immigrant perspectives of radical right leaders like Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders.

Immigrant and minority political participation

In his analysis of immigrant participation in the US, Louis Desipio finds that "When asked about the most important reasons for naturalizing,

immigrants cite the right to vote" (Desipio, 2012, p 177). Voting is an important act for many immigrants who want to integrate into their new countries, although naturalized immigrants, at least in the US, are less likely to vote than natives.

Research on minority political participation in Europe often focuses on why voter turnout rates for immigrants and ethnic minorities are lower than among the majority population. One standard explanation is that minority communities often suffer from socioeconomic disadvantages that dampen turnout rates. In addition, migrant minority communities may face cultural barriers that inhibit their full participation in mainstream society, including language barriers. However, research by Rahsaan Maxwell also suggests that minority and migrant communities can benefit from co-ethnic networks that provide unique resources for political mobilization, at times leading to turnout rates higher than those of the majority population (Maxwell, 2010).

In a study that examined the impact of voter registration policies in France, Braconnier et al conducted an experiment that examined the impact of providing information and support for potential voters in France, as a means of increasing voter registration and participation:

> This project examined the effects of a series of canvassing and home registration interventions targeting unregistered and misregistered citizens in ten French cities. The experiment found that the self-initiated registration system excludes a large fraction of the citizenry which is otherwise prepared to vote. Lack of information and the cost of going through the administrative registration process are equally important impediments to registration. These obstacles decrease registration and voting disproportionately for some segments of the population, including younger and less educated citizens, as well as immigrants. (Braconnier et al, 2017, p 601)

It can be difficult to understand the disproportionate impact that registration processes have on communities in France, since France doesn't track race and ethnicity in its census data. Younger, less educated citizens of immigrant background are more likely to be Black or Muslim, thus creating impediments to representation for these groups.

Besides participation, the literature on migrant and minority representation in Europe also tends to focus on the way that their interests can be represented. One of the main insights is that minority communities have small population numbers by definition, and when that is compounded with socioeconomic disadvantages and low participation rates it will be very difficult to obtain significant descriptive representation (having elected officials who look like their constituents). In addition, there are debates

about whether descriptive representation is necessary for substantive representation, that is, allocating political resources in the best interests of certain constituents. As Mansbridge notes,

> Descriptive representation is particularly crucial in the context of "uncrystallized interests," where political parties have not formulated stances on an issue that might affect a group's interests, the issue has not been debated in the media, and neither citizens nor their representatives have well-articulated positions for and against particular policies on the issue. (Mansbridge, 2015, p 262)

Across Europe, many ethnic and racial minorities were inspired by the election of Barack Obama as US president in 2008. Right after the election, *New York Times* reporter Steven Erlanger wrote: "In the general European euphoria over the election of Barack Obama, there is the beginning of self-reflection about Europe's own troubles with racial integration. Many are asking if there could be a French, British, German or Italian Obama, and everyone knows the answer is no, not anytime soon" (Erlanger, 2008).

Particularly in the case of France, although Obama was very popular, his support was unlikely to lead to change, as noted in the same article by Rama Yade, the Senegal-born state secretary for human rights in President Nicolas Sarkozy's government, "'As for the political elite's embrace of Obama,' she said, 'The enthusiasm they express toward this far-away American, they don't have it for the minorities in France'" (Erlanger, 2008).

In its long history, the British parliament included a few visible minorities, but the growing number of racial and ethnic minorities has not led to an increase in representation, as noted by Hampshire, "However, during the postwar decades, minorities were conspicuous by their absence, despite the fact that there were no legal obstacles to Commonwealth immigrants standing for Parliament.[1] Indeed, it was not until 1987 that the first BME MPs of the postwar era were elected" (Hampshire, 2012, p 35). A variety of factors are at play in Black representation, but by the mid-1990s activists decided to come together to not only ensure representation, but also to ensure that Black communities voted.

Operation Black Vote (OBV) was launched in July 1996 by Black volunteers at Charter88, an organization focused on human rights, and activists at the 1990 Trust, an organization created to protect the interest of Britain's Black communities. Their website identifies some of the factors motivating the creation of the organization: "The challenge was to persuade the Black community to recognise that power and inspire them to participate – and to serve notice on the political parties that they ignored the Black electorate at their peril" (Operation Black Vote, 2021). Since that time, Black representation in the UK has increased, although issues around

participation remain. For example, a 2016 study of the Brexit vote found that, "Though some were ambivalent towards the EU, ethnic minority Remain voters were more likely to be positive about Britain being part of the EU, and to have had more positive contact with EU migrants" (Begum, 2018). The Brexit vote was an indicator of anti-immigrant sentiment in Britain, although surveys show that immigration has declined as a concern of voters.

French journalist Rokhaya Diallo has been at the forefront of a new awareness developing among various groups including Muslims and those who now consider themselves Black and French. I have written about the impact of racial equality legislation on Blacks in France in the book *Invisible Minorities*. These groups have the potential to develop as voting blocs and to impact politics in France, as well as other European countries. These political developments can be important to the integration of minority groups and may ultimately create a new outlet for the frustrations that can lead to radicalization.

One of the high-profile organizations to bring together French persons of African descent is the Council of Black Associations of France (CRAN). As noted on its website: "CRAN is the Representative Council of Black Associations. Launched in November 2005, the CRAN aims to fight against discrimination suffered by black populations in France" (CRAN, 2021). As noted by Geisser and Soum, the 150th anniversary of the abolition of slavery was also a catalyst for mobilization (Geisser and Soum, 2012).

The CRAN was central in the debates around the collection of ethnic statistics, and in 2007 moved forward with a survey "to evaluate the social and demographic size/influence of France's blacks" (Alzouma, 2011, p 62), which was unprecedented in French history. The survey indicated that 77 percent of respondents had experienced racism and 52 percent did not believe that the government would fight discrimination. These finding were reported in all the major media outlets in France, referring to the respondents as "les Noirs de France" ("France's Blacks") and Alzouma notes that "the main result of the survey was to render France's Blacks 'visible' for the first time" (Alzouma, 2011, p 62).

This visibility was enhanced in 2007 with the creation of the organization "les indivisibles." The organization's *Y'a Bon* awards (a reference to a racist caricature) used humor to identify high-profile French commentators who use racist language. The organization was founded in 2007 by Rokhaya Diallo and others who were concerned about racist discourses, particularly in the media. Since 2008 the group has had an annual "award" ceremony which chooses the most egregious racist comment from the past year. There are many other organizations which have raised the visibility of issues around race and discrimination in France, like the Alliance Noire Citoyenne (ANC)/Brigades Anti-Négrophobie, Association des

Travailleurs Maghrébins de France (ATMF), and Collectif des Musulmans de France (CMF).

In France, non-European immigrants have faced more challenges in becoming politically involved and are less likely to vote than other immigrants. Studying the voting behavior in France is difficult because of the lack of data, but Rahsaan Maxwell has been able to pull together data from a set of surveys that provide the appropriate information. His conclusions support the low turnout propensity of non-European immigrants:

> Caribbeans and Maghrebians consistently had turnout rates that were 15 to 20 percentage points lower than those of native metropolitans. Logistic regression analysis suggested that the turnout gaps between non-European-origin minorities and native metropolitans could not be explained by socio-economic or age differences among the groups or as a result of specific political contexts. However, once variables for neighbourhood effects were added to the model, the group turnout differences were no longer statistically significant … low turnout rates among Caribbeans and Maghrebians in France are primarily the result of their tendency to live in disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods that suffer from a number of constraints on full participation in mainstream society. (Maxwell, 2010, p 439)

These issues in France continue as Muslims are targeted in the wake of terrorist attacks, but Muslims have also been the target of attacks. As Rokhaya Diallo has pointed out, French authors like Renaud Camus have inspired Islamophobia and attacks by extremists who believe that "Islam and migrants are supposedly subverting the purity of the 'European' identity" (Diallo, 2019). This hostility toward immigrants, Muslims in particular, will continue to impact participation and define the boundaries of citizenship in France.

As Karen Schönwälder notes in the case of Germany, "the situation is different [from the US and the UK] in all three crucial respects. Neither the settlement structures, nor the consciousness and mobilization of the immigrant population suggest that the driving forces of immigrant political representation could be similar" (Schönwälder, 2012, p 71). Although Germany has seen more immigrant and ethnic minority representation in recent years, racism has also become a more visible problem as noted by Germany's only Black member of the Bundestag, Karamba Diaby: "Debate on racism in Germany is often diluted to discussion of discrimination against 'foreigners,' implying that those from other ethnic backgrounds are not truly German" (Morris, 2020). The rise of the far right in Germany is another indicator that issues of racism and xenophobia will continue to be a problem, an issue I explore further in the next two chapters.

Conclusion

As political scientist Adam Getchow notes:

> The European Union recently avowed that "Black lives matter," but its policies deprive Black people of equal rights, imprison them in camps and drown them in the Mediterranean. Overseas imperialism was once believed to be a political necessity for European states; today, anti-immigrant politics plays the same role. In either case, European policymakers disavow responsibility for the misery they bring about. (Getchow, 2020)

There is still much work to do to ensure the rights of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Europe.

As we entered the second decade of the 21st century it was clear that neither representation nor antidiscrimination policy was a priority for policy makers in Europe, at the same time that the US was being led by a Black president. In hindsight it was clear that a backlash was developing, but it was also clear that social media was starting to play an important role in identifying cases of discrimination and police violence. The Black Lives Matter movement would build on the civil rights movements on both sides of the Atlantic, but also faced challenges from a political system that was contending with far-right extremism and an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment. In Chapter 8 I examine political parties and politics surrounding race in the US and Europe.

Note

[1] Then, as now, citizens (then subjects) of colonial and Commonwealth countries could vote and stand for election to the British parliament.

8

Party Politics, the Radical Right, and Race in the 21st Century

Donald Trump's election to the US presidency in 2016 was a triumph for far-right, populist politics in the US. Many voted for him simply because he was the Republican candidate, but his extreme positions couldn't be ignored. He launched his campaign in 2015 with a racist attack on Mexican immigrants and his profoundly misogynistic language and violence toward women was revealed in a leaked video from an appearance with *Access Hollywood* (Fahrenthold, 2016). Despite these revelations, Trump managed to win the electoral college, defeating Hillary Clinton, who won the popular vote by 2.9 million votes.

One of the most prominent issues during the election was immigration, in particular undocumented immigrants. Trump consistently called for the building of a wall on the Southern US border (and claimed that Mexico would pay for it). He played into the fears of working-class White voters who feared the flow of immigrants coming from Mexico and Central America. Trump's approach to immigration was in line with many of his compatriots on the other side of the Atlantic, not only on the far right, but also many conservative politicians like Boris Johnson of the British Conservative Party, and the Bavarian Christian Democrats who wanted to set up detention centers on the southern border of Germany.

The politics of White supremacy were on full display in the second decade of the 21st century. The success of far-right parties, increased violence toward ethnic, racial, and religious minorities, and more restrictive policies on immigration were impacting politics on both sides of the Atlantic. In this chapter, I discuss my ongoing work on radical right parties in Europe, the shifting discourses that have impacted mainstream right parties, and the impact on left parties. Political participation by ethnic and racial minorities has also been an important factor in the development of new political coalitions. Since the early 2000s, there have been new organizations that have

arisen for Black and Muslim communities in Europe, many with the aim to encourage voting, similar to the efforts of Operation Black Vote in the UK.

The study of anti-immigrant radical right parties in Europe in the mid-1990s wasn't always considered a good "long-term" project. In fact, as I conducted my research some people told me that these parties were a "flash in the pan" and wouldn't be around long enough for me to finish my dissertation. Despite the naysayers, I completed my dissertation in 1999, and my book on the radical right, now considered a classic in the field, came out in 2005. Since that time, the radical right, aka far-right parties, have not gone away, and have increased their influence on policy, particularly immigration policy. Conservative politicians, in order to compete with far-right politicians, have taken increasingly extreme positions on immigration policy.

Radical right parties in Europe tend to use a populist appeal, arguing that they are for the "common man" and against the elite. They often lean authoritarian in their call for security to protect against outsiders and blind loyalty to the party or leaders. Another component is the racism and fear of minorities and immigrants that is being used by politicians both in the US and in Europe to mobilize voters who fear the loss of privilege and ultimately political dominance.

I have been following the development of the radical right in Europe since the mid-1990s. In my first book, *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*, I argued that these parties were more likely to be successful when voters felt they had a chance to win seats in parliament – but often mainstream parties coordinated to ensure that far-right candidates would be unable to win seats. Voters are more likely to vote for candidates and parties that will have an opportunity to govern. Voters may also be encouraged to vote strategically for a candidate that goes against their preferences, seen most clearly when left voters in France ensured that the conservative Jacque Chirac was elected president over Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2002.

In the 1980s and 1990s there existed an elite consensus to fight the far right at the ballot box by maintaining a "cordon sanitaire" (barrier) that kept right politicians from cooperating with far-right candidates, and encouraging left voters to support mainstream candidates. This consensus collapsed as conservative governments came into power across Europe after 9/11 and terrorism shifted the focus around immigration from labor policy to security issues. The participation of the Austrian Freedom Party, the Danish People's Party, and various other far-right parties in coalition governments has opened the door to greater success for these parties. Geert Wilder's Netherland's Party for Freedom polled strongly in advance of the legislative elections in March 2017, winning 20 seats in the Dutch parliament. Support for far-right parties in Europe was particularly strong in the 2014 European Parliament election, foreshadowing the successful Brexit vote in the UK in the summer of 2016.

Since the early 2000s, researchers have noted that far-right candidates have seen increasing support from working-class left voters, although most of their support comes from voters who consider themselves conservative. Mainstream left parties like the UK Labour Party and the French Socialists have been struggling to connect with disaffected voters. Much has been written in the US media about the need for the Democratic Party to connect with Trump voters who feel left out in an era of globalization, and it has been clear in France, for example, that many former left-wing voters have shifted to supporting the far right. The loss of manufacturing jobs, the impact of technology, and the shift to a more service-oriented economy have had an impact, and it's also clear that race and immigration are playing an important role in attitudes. Many White voters feel that they are losing out to immigrants, or that they are being discriminated against in favor of other ethnic groups. They see the economy as a zero-sum game, and as women and minorities begin to play a more visible role, they see themselves losing ground.

In the past few years, even before the 2016 elections in Europe and the US, it was clear that a growing number of nativist voters were willing to support more extreme politicians. There is no doubt that immigration and demographic shifts are having an impact on the willingness of nativist, nationalistic voters to choose political parties that represent a challenge to existing norms and democracy itself. I often refer to Ruth Wodak's book *The Politics of Fear* (2015) as an important resource for understanding the discourses of the radical right, but underlying those discourses are an undermining of many of the norms that have undergirded the path toward equality for ethnic minority groups in the US and Europe.

Although many were focused on the daily onslaught against norms under Donald Trump, from a broader perspective, norms around issues of race and the politics of immigration have clearly shifted since I began studying the radical right in the mid-1990s. In 1999, when Jörg Haider's Freedom Party came in second place in the Austrian legislative election, the other 14 EU countries at the time considered his positions on immigration and the EU to be beyond the pale. Although they could not change the outcome of the vote, they took measures to indicate their stand on these issues, including passing the RED in 2000, as a show of support for antidiscrimination policy.

There was clearly a norm up to that point that called for the condemnation of racist appeals. However, those norms began to crumble as conservative parties took over from the left-leaning governments that had supported the passage of the RED in the early 2000s. As voters began to increase their support for anti-immigrant parties like the National Front in France, conservative politicians shifted strategies from a norm of condemning anti-immigrant, and often racist appeals, to using "dog whistles" of their own.

This trend accelerated after the 2008 fiscal crisis. Austerity measures soured many voters on the role of the EU, with the ensuing hardship in countries

like Greece and Spain, while those who were less impacted felt burdened by the bailouts these countries needed. In Britain, frustration with immigration was on the rise. Concern about keeping his more anti-EU party members in line led British Prime Minister David Cameron to call for a people's vote on EU membership if his party won the general election in 2010. Cameron had been unable to keep promises to hold intra-EU migration to a low level.

In October of 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel would declare that "multiculturalism had failed utterly" in Germany, blaming social unrest on immigrants who were unable to assimilate into German society. Of course, it was not clear what she meant by multiculturalism in this context, given that Germany had few policies one could consider "multicultural." In a seemingly coordinated effort by the conservative politicians, both Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron would follow in Merkel's footsteps in February of 2010, also declaring multiculturalism a failure. Many in France were confused by Sarkozy's declaration, since France had never really pursued a policy of multiculturalism.

It seemed clear that these politicians were concerned about the appeal of the radical right and hoped to undermine their support by taking tough positions on immigrant integration and in the case of the EU to take positions that would appeal to voters who were beginning to sour on the broader project of European integration. Another component is the racism and fear of minorities and immigrants that is being used by politicians both in the US and in Europe to mobilize voters who fear a loss of privilege and ultimately political dominance.

A political backlash to increasing diversity

Two important trends constitute the political response to Europe's increasing racial and cultural diversity. First, many countries have been part of a worrying trend, the rise of right-wing, anti-immigrant political parties (Givens, 2005). France's Marine Le Pen and the Netherlands' Geert Wilders have attained the greatest international notoriety, but across Europe reactionary political figures have enjoyed increasing degrees of success over the past several years. Second, as discussed in the previous chapter, the EU's racial equality directive has led European countries to enact laws that prohibit racial discrimination comparable to what is commonly known in America as "civil rights" legislation. These two trends appear to be interrelated. For example, Erik Bleich suggests that in the mid-1960s British political elites sought to "defuse" the race issue, stoked by MP Enoch Powell among others, "by pursuing Parliamentary consensus over an antidiscrimination law" (2003, p 49). Likewise, my own research shows that the entry of Jörg Haider's Freedom Party into a governing coalition in Austria fueled the EU consensus on the RED (Givens, 2014a).

The fear that ethnic minority immigrants are ruining European society has provided fertile ground for xenophobic far-right political parties to insert themselves into the mainstream agenda (Givens, 2005). In some countries, these far-right parties have claimed up to 30 percent of the vote and become part of the national government. However, on the other side of the debate, there is relatively little ethnic minority representation, particularly in national parliaments. This raises questions about whether the interests of ethnic minority immigrant-origin communities are being adequately represented in contemporary European politics. This has been exacerbated by the decline of left-wing and social democratic parties.

Many politicians, like Donald Trump, have used anti-immigrant rhetoric to tap into the fears of voters who see increasing immigration and societal change as a loss of status and privilege. Despite ongoing structural racism and restrictive immigration policies, White voters have been attracted to a narrative that defines them as the ones being victimized by those who would come to not only take their jobs, but would change their culture, and left-wing parties have not yet found a winning strategy to address these fears.

Radical right parties: racism repackaged

The 1980s saw the dramatic rise of racist, nationalist radical right parties, particularly in France, Germany, Austria, and Denmark. Paradoxically, these parties pushed European governments to take on the issue of racial discrimination at the European Union level. In general, the literature on radical right parties has tended to focus on their electoral successes, but these parties have also had an impact on policy. With the rise of anti-immigrant parties and increases in popular anti-immigrant sentiment, government leaders increased their emphasis on immigration control. Whether that actually led to decreases in immigration is debated, but certainly the salience of the issues increased (Givens and Luedtke, 2004), which led to more restrictive policies. However, the rise of the radical right is not only linked to restrictive immigration control policies, it can also be linked to measures that were designed to improve the situation for immigrants and ethnic minorities who had already settled in European countries. A clear example of this is the EU's RED.

Right-wing politics casts immigrants as foreign objects within the body politic and blames them for a litany of social ills, including high rates of crime and unemployment. In his quest for the French presidency in 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen of the National Front won enough votes to propel him into a runoff election against Jacques Chirac. Although he ultimately lost by a wide margin, he was for a two-week period the second most popular politician in France. In October 1996, Austria held its first direct election for members of the European Parliament, and Haider's Freedom Party gained

27.6 percent of the vote. In 1999, Haider's Freedom Party entered into a national coalition in Austria, after garnering 26 percent of the vote. More recently, Haider's new party and the Freedom Party won a combined score of 29 percent of the vote in the 2008 federal elections. These relatively recent successes serve to underscore the persistence of these parties.

One can argue that the popularity of the radical right, along with an increase in terror attacks, also led many countries to abandon more multicultural approaches to immigrant and ethnic minority communities. However, multiculturalism and immigrant integration can be approached in many ways. Perhaps one of the more important factors in integration is an acknowledgment of discrimination and measures to address access to the workforce, fair housing, and equal opportunities more generally. Certainly, the activists who pursued the passage of the RED felt that this was an important step in the development of equal rights.

Barack Obama and immigrant politics

Pro-immigration activists expected that Barack Obama would be the key to getting comprehensive immigration reform passed in the US. Obama promised to put immigration reform at the top of his agenda and he received over 60 percent of the Latino vote. Hopes were high in 2009 as he began to implement his legislative agenda. Many also thought that the 2008 election heralded a new era of post-racial politics in the US. Unfortunately, the opposite was true. Racist acts would rise due to the backlash created by Obama's election, but also, immigration would be a topic that would partly fuel the racism that elected Donald Trump in 2016.

Obama became the so-called "deporter-in-chief" during his first term in office when the number of deportations increased dramatically with the expansion of the secure communities program that target undocumented immigrants in the interior of the country, rather than at the border.

> Although the administration delayed pushing a comprehensive immigration reform package, it engaged in a significantly expanded enforcement effort that drew sharp criticism from pro-immigration activists. In embracing this hardline approach on immigration enforcement, the White House hoped to gain credibility with skeptical conservatives and thereby lay the groundwork for a broad legalization push later. In order to carry out this ramped-up enforcement effort, the Obama administration turned to deportation tools initially established under President Clinton and enhanced under the second Bush administration. President Obama's efforts at deportation fit neatly into a two-decade trend toward greater enforcement. (Coleman, 2018, p 183)

Republicans also had an opportunity in 2013 to pass immigration reform, something that they hoped would stem their losses with Latino voters, but they were also unsuccessful, given the highly charged partisan environment in Congress. In an interview with Republican congressman Raúl Labrador in 2016, reporter Alec MacGillis notes:

> I didn't bring up Trump in my conversation with Labrador, but Labrador did. In the midst of talking about the collapse of the immigration-reform effort he had been part of, he broke off and said, matter-of-factly: "The reason we have Donald Trump as a nominee today is because we as Republicans have failed on this issue". (MacGillis, 2016)

Although Obama was not successful in getting comprehensive immigration reform passed during his time in office, his executive order on Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals allowed approximately 800,00 young undocumented immigrants who arrived in the country as children to receive work permits and protection from deportation (Lopez and Krogstad, 2017).

Obama's election reverberated across the Atlantic. Activists in countries like the UK, France, and Germany wondered aloud if it would be possible to elect an Obama-type figure in their countries. However, Laurence and Maxwell noted in 2012 that despite the growth in the immigrant-origin electorate and increasing voter participation, "Most West European countries have increasing numbers of immigrant-origin local councilors, members of Parliament, and in some cases a few cabinet members. However, while the number of immigrant-origin elected and appointed political representatives and members of government is not trivial, it is still modest" (Laurence and Maxwell, 2012, p 15). There was some hope that Obama's election in the US would lead to more support for ethnic and racial minority candidates in Europe, but the backlash against Obama that saw the rise of Donald Trump was mirrored by the reaction to increased refugees and asylum seekers in Europe which would also impact the increase in support for anti-immigrant politicians in Europe.

Transatlantic connections on the right

After the 2009 European Parliament election, where parties like the British National Party won seats for the first time, to the success of Geert Wilders' Freedom Party in the Netherlands in June of 2010, there was a noticeable and disconcerting rise of support for anti-immigrant and Islamophobic politicians throughout Europe. At the same time, in the US, anti-Islam sentiment was on the rise, and many politicians were calling for anti-Sharia law (aka Islamic Law) Bills, mostly in places where Sharia law was not a

concern. However, it also became clear that collaborations were developing between anti-Islam organizers in the US and politicians in Europe.

In January of 2011 I hosted a conference with the Center for European Studies titled "Transatlantic Intolerance: The Rise in Anti-Islam, Anti-Immigrant and Racist Sentiment in Europe and the U.S." Scholars from the University of Texas at Austin and other universities around the country gathered with policy makers and journalists to discuss the connections we saw developing between politicians like Geert Wilders and American anti-Islam activists like Pam Geller. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, Geller became interested in the connection between Islam and terrorism after the 9/11 attacks in New York City:

> Pamela Geller is currently one of the most flamboyant anti-Muslim activists in the United States. Geller relentlessly pushes her Muslim-bashing on her blog, "Atlas Shrugs," and is also a contributor to the far-right Breitbart News. Geller's 2010 campaign in opposition to the Park 51 Islamic Center project in Manhattan, which she deemed the "Ground Zero Mosque," brought her to prominence. (SPLC, 2021)

Concerns have been raised about the funding Geller has received from Jewish organizations despite the fact that she has been denounced by organizations like the Anti-Defamation League.

Immigration has had a high degree of salience since the fiscal crisis of 2008–9, and that combined with a series of terror attacks in Europe has fueled anti-Islam sentiment. In general, the EU experiences a flow of 1–2 million legal immigrants per year, which is similar to flows of legal migrants into the US. More recently, war and unrest in Africa and the Middle East has led to a very significant increase of refugee flows, again. For example, from 2014 to 2015 over a million refugees entered Germany alone. However, the overall number of foreign-born residents in Germany has been consistent around 11 million people since 2005, while France has seven million and the UK has gone from around six million in 2006 to almost nine million in 2015, many of these are also refugees.

In Germany, the media reported that 3,500 far-right attacks on refugees and refugee homes were carried out in 2016, leaving hundreds injured. The party, Alternative for Germany, won 13 percent of the vote in the 2017 German parliament elections. The party went from being Euroskeptic, calling for a return to Germany's national currency, the Deutschmark, to an anti-immigrant party, calling for the detention and deportation of immigrants. They have capitalized on growing anxiety that immigrants – especially Muslim immigrants – could fundamentally change German society.

Governments that once condemned the radical right discourses of the Austrian Freedom Party have now seen those discourses move into the

mainstream. But it is not only the discourses that matter, it is the changing norms that have a negative impact on the acceptance of people from different cultures and religions. It will be difficult to find support for the kinds of antidiscrimination policy that would help with the process of integration, ensuring that racial and ethnic minorities have access to jobs, housing, and educational opportunities. These approaches will need to find support if there is hope for the kind of equality that is expected in a modern democracy.

In general, the rhetoric of the far right has steadily become more mainstream, in the US and Europe. Also, since the terror attacks of 9/11 and the series of attacks in Europe, including the 7/7 attacks in London and various other attacks by Islamic extremists, there have been increasing connections between far-right politicians in Europe, and activists and politicians in the US. The rise of anti-Muslim sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic has led to both financial and political support developing between conservatives in the US and far-right politicians in Europe, and, a growing connection to Russia (Butt and Byman 2020).

The connection with conservative politicians in the US has been emphasized by a series of tweets by the Netherlands' Geert Wilders, showing him with Republican Party politicians, including a tweet showing Wilders with senior Republican Senator Lindsay Graham on September 7, 2019 (Cole, 2019). Although Wilders has been a fixture in Dutch politics since the early 2000s, he hasn't made much of an impression in the US outside of far-right, anti-Muslim circles. However, Wilders was invited to the US by the head of the Center for Security Policy and David Horowitz, a conservative activist, to attend the 2009 CPAC convention to promote his anti-Islam movie *Fitna*, and he has reportedly received financial support from several sources in the US (Hosenball, 2009).

Geert Wilders is a far-right politician who has developed a following by opposing immigration to the Netherlands and has been put on trial for inciting hatred against Muslims. Like Donald Trump, Wilders has called for banning immigration from Muslim countries, and has connected with like-minded politicians such as Steve King in the US. Wilders attended the Republican National Convention (RNC) in the summer of 2016 and Representative Steve King encouraged communication between Wilders and Trump after his election, in the hope of boosting Wilders' standing in advance of elections in the Netherlands, as described in an article in *Politico*. Wilders' party received a substantial share of the vote in the Spring 2017 election, but not enough to win a majority in parliament over the conservative party. In February of 2018, Wilders visited Russia, speaking to the Russian Duma and drawing criticism from the family members of victims of the downed Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 for tweeting a picture of himself wearing a Russian-Dutch friendship pin.

Congressman Steve King of Iowa has been working with radical right politicians like Geert Wilders of the Netherlands for many years, including inviting him to the 2016 RNC, and joining him for a meeting with the US Ambassador to the Netherlands. King was stripped of his committee assignments in 2019 for blatantly racist statements in the media. The fact that a controversial figure like Wilders is welcomed to a US embassy and is meeting there with a US Congressman is more than troubling. It provided Wilders with the publicity he craved and the stamp of approval from the Trump administration.

Wilders is part of a wave of far-right leaders and parties in Europe, which includes Marine Le Pen of the National Rally (formerly the National Front) in France that won 8 seats in the 2017 Assembly election, and the AfD in Germany that won 13 seats in the 2017 *Bundestag* election. I argued in my book on the Radical Right that one of the factors that has kept far-right parties from being more successful in Europe is the fact that people would vote against them strategically because the mainstream parties would make it clear that they could not be part of government (Givens, 2005). This is often referred to as a *cordon sanitaire* or a barrier to the far right making their way into government. For example, most radical right parties had difficulty gaining enough votes in the 1990s to win any seats in national parliaments.

The Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) did become part of the Austrian government in 2000, partly because they were seen as the only alternative to a grand coalition government, but the party has been through many changes since then, which complicates an analysis of where they are now. Being part of government seemed to moderate at least the leaders of the party at the time, but it has shifted back to a more strident tone in recent years. When the FPÖ candidate, Norbert Hofer, was defeated by independent candidate Alexander Van der Bellen in the Austrian presidential election in December of 2016, it was an indication that support continues for the EU, but Brexit and support for far-right presidential candidate Marine Le Pen in France indicate that there is much work to do.

The 2018 Italian election sent a strong message on immigration with its populist government asking the EU to take migrants rescued at sea to other countries. As the US government took a harder line on immigrants crossing the border, Chancellor Angela Merkel had to take a harder line on immigration and refugees due to the position taken by her coalition partner, the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), and the success of the far-right AfD party.

The connection between far-right populists in Europe and Donald Trump became particularly clear on Friday, January 27, 2017 when the US president announced his temporary ban on refugees and immigrants from seven predominantly Muslim countries. Netherlands politician Geert Wilders praised the ban, and leaders from the French National Rally said

that France could implement a similar ban if Marine Le Pen is elected president. European politicians like Wilders have been pursuing links with populist, anti-Muslim elements of the US political scene for many years, but Trump's success provided them with an opportunity to reach more mainstream audiences.

The refugee flows from Syria and other parts of the Middle East and Africa have been a challenge for Europe, as have the growing populations of ethnic minorities, in particular Latinos in the US, as well as African Americans and Asians. Left parties in Europe and the US have been proponents of more expansive immigration policies, and have tried to appeal to minority voters, but have not done as well in maintaining the support of their traditional middle- and working-class bases. Right politicians have also tried to reach out to these groups, appealing to conservative religious groups, but have also pandered to the xenophobic sentiments of their far-right competition.

Mainstream politicians on both the left and right must walk a fine line as they try to appeal to these voters. Mainstream politicians like Germany's Angela Merkel have often responded to the far right by taking on the issues or rhetoric of these parties in areas such as immigration (for example, statements that "multiculturalism" has failed). Although Merkel has been a supporter of Syrian refugees in Germany, she also announced support for a headscarf ban in Germany. It has been clear that positions that the far-right were taking in the 1990s have moved into the mainstream, as politicians attempt to gain back support from voters who were attracted by the anti-immigration, nationalist, and xenophobic (particularly anti-Muslim) positions of far-right parties.

The decline of left-wing parties

Across Europe and the US, mainstream left parties are in retreat. Far-right populism has been quietly ascendant in these countries since the 1990s, but since the 2016 Brexit vote, the American election of Donald Trump, and the candidacy of Marine Le Pen for the French presidency, populism has dominated the media spotlight. Some, like Bernie Sanders and Frank Bruni (2016) of the *New York Times*, have faulted the left for not focusing on the White working-class voters who have been attracted to these anti-immigrant, anti-globalization parties and candidates. But others have argued that ignoring or deriding diversity isn't the answer; countries are multiracial and multi-ethnic, and parties need to – and ought to – attract a broad spectrum of voters to win elections and govern responsibly.

As birth rates declined in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many politicians, economists, and social scientists argued that for Europe to maintain its generous welfare system, particularly its pay-as-you-go pensions, Europe would have to open its doors to more young immigrants. This emerging

academic consensus came just as anti-immigrant far-right parties were gaining traction in countries like Austria and Denmark.

Another important development in the mid to late 1990s was the success of center-left politicians like US President Bill Clinton, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. These leaders embraced a neoliberal approach to economic policy that supported a more individualistic approach to governance. They cut welfare benefits and encouraged those who had relied on benefits to find work, as in Clinton's "welfare to work" scheme, which limited benefits to a maximum of five years and required welfare recipients to work, depending on requirements that were determined at the state level (Weissmann, 2016).

These policies contributed to economic growth as a whole, but they did little to improve wages or benefits for the working class and widened wealth inequality. If the center left's economic policies had improved the standard of living of working-class voters, it is likely that they would not have been as open to the messages of the radical right. Instead, wages have remained stagnant, and union membership has continued to decline in the US, along with manufacturing jobs, from nearly a third of workers in the 1960s to only 10 percent today (Bui, 2015).

In France, many were surprised in the late 1990s that former communist party strongholds became fertile ground for the National Front when they won control of four municipalities. However, it is important to keep in mind that populist parties tend to characterize themselves as the parties of "the people" against "the establishment." For those who are against the status quo, the far right offers an alternative, particularly for those who are concerned about the cultural shifts that are occurring in countries where immigration has grown. An example of these shifts is the increase in grocery stores in France run by Muslims which only sell Halal foods that are permitted under Islamic law. In August of 2015, a Muslim store owner was ordered by his municipality to sell pork and alcohol, with the mayor's chief of staff Jerome Besnard stating, "We want a social mix. We don't want any area that is only Muslim or any area where there are no Muslims" (Osborne, 2016). In the town of Calais, where residents were concerned about a nearby migrant camp, an August 2016 poll found that the former communist stronghold, once led by a popular communist mayor, had seen a 20 percent increase in support for the National Front (McGuinness, 2016).

The pandering to intolerance by even mainstream right parties is poisoning community relations in exchange for short-term political gains. Conservative politicians like UK Prime Minister Theresa May thought that the solution to the challenges facing her country was to turn inward, proposing new restrictions on immigration in the Brexit process, leaving in limbo the right of over three million EU migrants to stay in the country (Parker, 2017).

Under Prime Minister Boris Johnson, this will likely leave a toxic legacy for future generations.

In the US, states like California and New York are exemplars of one direction that part of the country is heading in, and politicians have pursued Bills that help undocumented students attend college, protect LGBT rights, and increase the minimum wage. These policies take into account the demographics that are driving the politics and economies of these states.

On the other hand, politicians and candidates in Europe and the US have rejected the virtues of a multicultural society and described the presence of immigrants and foreigners as a threat to their nations. President Trump justified his executive order calling for a wall along the Mexican border stating, "We are in the middle of a crisis on our southern border: The unprecedented surge of illegal migrants from Central America is harming both Mexico and the United States" (Ainsley, 2017). The night of the 2016 US presidential election, Van Jones famously called Trump's victory a "whitelash," that, a backlash by White voters against the legacy of Barack Obama and the Democratic Party (Ryan, 2016). The available survey data bears this out. One statistical analysis of the US election concluded, "We find that while economic considerations were an important part of the story, racial attitudes and sexism were much more strongly related to support for Trump; these attitudes explain at least two-thirds of the education gap among white voters in the 2016 presidential election" (Schaffner et al, 2018, p 10).

Since 2016 center left parties, including the Democrats in the US and social democrats in Europe have been working on building broad-based support for a multi-ethnic approach to governance. They understand that the focus must be on addressing inequality with an inclusive approach that goes beyond race, strengthening unions and developing immigration policies that address burden-sharing for refugees and support for those caught in conflict areas. If the left concentrates on these three areas, it may be able to push away the threat of far-right populism.

The accommodation of racism by center-right parties leaves an opening for mainstream left parties. Pursuing policies like a guaranteed minimum income and regulating corporations to avoid the sharp disparities between workers and high-level managers would deal with some aspects of the growing inequality issue. Second, strengthening unions would give workers more leverage to negotiate for better wages and benefits, and this would mean putting a stop to policies which undermine unions, like "right to work" policies, which discourage employees from starting or joining unions (Ungar, 2012). It will take some work for politicians and union leaders to get past the barriers that have led to the decline in union membership, but the push for a US$15 minimum wage is an indication that there is potential support for organizing low-wage workers, even in the US. Common-sense

immigration policies, like increasing the number of visas available for needed workers, rather than relying on undocumented workers, would go a long way to improving the situation for both immigrant and native low-wage workers. Countries need to reaffirm their commitment to refugees, but also acknowledge potential impacts and mitigate them with appropriate support like language and job training to ease the transition into a new society.

Social democratic parties, including the Democratic Party in the US, have been losing White working-class voters to right-wing populists, who see declining prospects for themselves and their children. Populist politicians scapegoat migrants and ethnic minorities as the cause of the decline, rather than the decline in manufacturing and other industries. In contrast, ethnic minority working-class voters have not responded positively to these populist appeals. According to the author John Judis, "Rightwing populists champion the people against an elite that they accuse of favoring a third group, which can consist, for instance, of immigrants, Islamists, or African American militants. Rightwing populism is triadic: It looks upward, but also down upon an out group" (Judis, 2016, p 10).

Support for populist politicians is not inherent to having a large immigrant population. The Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde has noted, "Rising numbers of immigrants do not automatically translate into increasing extremism in a country; immigration has to be translated into a political issue, which has not happened everywhere" (Mudde, 2012). The fact that Joe Biden was able to defeat Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential election is a sign that the majority of voters rejected his anti-immigrant and racist appeals, but it is clear that his incompetence was a major factor in the outcome.

Conclusion

Immigration has been a clear factor in support for populism in the US and the UK, particularly under Trump's presidency and Brexit in the UK, however, it is not a given that European countries like France and Germany will inevitably move in the same direction. It will take smart leadership and grassroots support for progressive policies that will unite people across classes and races. French politician Benoit Hamon has said that "I believe that faced with a conservative right that represents privilege and a destructive extreme-right, our country needs a left that thinks of the world as it is, and not as it was, a left that can bring a future people want" (Chrisafis, 2017).

Support for a multicultural society that is welcoming to migrants and refugees is not antithetical to economic success – as Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau stated in a speech to the UN, "In Canada, we see diversity as a source of strength, not weakness. Our country is strong not in spite of our differences, but because of them" (Trudeau, 2016). These approaches

can be appealing to voters if they can see a better future for themselves and their children. It is imperative that the left refocus their efforts on finding commonalities between the White working class, ethnic minorities, and immigrants. This kind of effort will not only help redefine the future for the left parties, but hopefully lead to a more equitable future for all.

9

Elections, Protest, and Insurrection

"We can't breathe" – a cry heard around the world in the summer of 2020. One of the more egregious forms of discrimination against Black people on both sides of the Atlantic is police violence. In May of 2020 protests broke out around the world after the horrifying death of an African American man, George Floyd, in police custody in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Mr. Floyd had been apprehended after being accused of passing a counterfeit US$20 bill. It's not clear that he knew the bill was fake. Outrage came as a viral video of a policeman kneeling on Floyd's neck while he was asphyxiated flew around social media.

Although all four police officers involved in the murder were immediately fired, only one of them was arrested for murder a few days after the incident. Frustration with the situation only grew as a coroner's report tried to place blame for Floyd's death on underlying health conditions. This did not mollify community members who noted that Floyd was pleading for his life, telling the officer that he could not breathe and calling out for his mother.

The ensuing riots came in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, with many cities having been under shelter in place orders since mid-March. Given that African Americans were getting sick and dying at disproportionate rates, many in the community were frustrated with the lack of access to health care and the fact that many of those who were considered "essential" workers came from minority communities. That frustration played into the protests, and in some instances, violence that played out from London to Los Angeles.

It should be noted that much of the violence that ensued in the weeks after the death of George Floyd came from the police themselves. Dressed in riot gear and using rubber bullets and tear gas, the police in many cities were the instigators of violence. It is well known that policing in the US has a long history of systematic racism. In fact, some argue that the police were created in order to enforce racial codes and segregation from the time of slavery through the Jim Crow era.

The protests were tied to the Black Lives Matter movement which was founded in July of 2013 in the wake of the murder of a Black teenager, Trayvon Martin in February of 2013, by a man who was ultimately acquitted in the case – although his death wasn't related to police violence, it was part of a long pattern of murders of unarmed Black people (Pearson and Botelho, 2013). Since then, there has been a focus on the deaths of unarmed Black men and women that have been brought to light by social media. Most often, the focus is on murders committed by police officers, particularly when the victims have been unarmed, or appeared to be no threat when killed. A long list of victims has kept the issues related to violent policing in the spotlight. The murder of George Floyd, along with the COVID-19 pandemic, punctuated a time period from 2015 to 2021 that has seen a series of protests related to police violence.

This has also been a time when election outcomes were impacted by issues of immigration and race. I could not have imagined in the late 1990s that we would still be talking about a Le Pen running for president in 2022. The far-right resurgence has continued and grown more serious as politicians like Marine Le Pen continue to grow in influence and support. Ongoing inflows of refugees and asylum seekers in the US and Europe has been the focus of attention, while police violence has touched off a global wave of activism that rivals the late 1960s in scope and intensity. For example, protests after the election of Donald Trump in 2016, like the Women's March, drew hundreds of thousands of participants in cities from Washington, DC to Chicago, Seattle, and San Francisco, "unifiying demonstrators around issues like reproductive rights, immigration and civil rights" (Hartocollis and Alcindor, 2017).

Overshadowing all of the politics and protest, the global COVID-19 pandemic laid bare inequality both inside of countries like the US, UK, and France, as well as between developed and developing countries. Ethnic and racial minorities were more likely to be infected and die from the virus. As vaccines became available, these same groups were less likely to have access. The combination of events as we enter the 2020s has reinforced the fact that race still plays a role in politics and society across the Atlantic.

Brexit and the politics of immigration

Prior to Donald Trump's election in 2016, UK Prime Minister David Cameron had promised a referendum on EU membership if he and his party were re-elected. Despite misgivings, the referendum moved forward and in 2016, a few months before the US presidential election, UK voters chose to leave the EU. The result would lead to massive protests in London and other parts of the country on both sides of the issue.

It's clear that immigration played a key role for the 51.9 percent of voters who supported the option to leave the EU. As Goodwin and Milazzo note:

> Public support for Brexit was strongest in communities that had experienced higher rates of ethnic change in immediate years prior to the 2016 vote. Second, at the individual level, we then show that while citizens who felt the most strongly negative about immigration and its effects were most likely to vote to leave the EU, it appeared to have been perceptions regarding changes in immigration—and the ability of a "post-Brexit Britain" to reign in those changes—that were the strongest drivers of support for Brexit. (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017, p 452)

The role of race and immigration is ambiguous in this case, since most of the immigrants that were of concern come from Central and Eastern Europe. However, refugee flows across Europe were a concern, with France being an important transit point for asylum seekers trying to get to the UK. Goodwin and Milazzo also point out that Leave supporters used the claim that Turkey would join the EU as a means of rallying support, and there are certainly echoes of racism in their conclusion that "Public support for leaving the EU was significantly stronger in local communities that had experienced higher rates of ethnic change in the period preceding the vote, underscoring how relatively sudden demographic shifts can trigger significant political reactions among voters" (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017, p 462).

Prime Minister David Cameron would resign after the vote and Theresa May would step in as prime minister, trying to manage what would become a nearly untenable situation between vocal protests across the country and difficult negotiations with the EU. In the end Theresa May would be unsuccessful in her efforts, leading to her resignation and new elections in 2019. The Conservative Party would win the election, but this time, Boris Johnson, the former mayor of London, became prime minister. Donald Trump was one of the first to congratulate Johnson on his win.

In 2017, France would hold its presidential election in the shadow of Brexit. Emmanuel Macron was the young upstart who created a new party (En Marche! – now rebranded La Republique en Marche) to face off against Marine Le Pen. Macron was seen as a centrist candidate, compared to the traditional left and right politicians who failed to make it into the second round. Although Le Pen lost the election, she won over 33 percent of the vote, far outpacing her father's result in the 2002 election, when he only won 18 percent of the vote. The election was also marred by a high rate of abstentions – a third of voters abstained from voting or spoiled their ballots. With over 11.4 million voters abstaining, the null vote was higher than the vote for Le Pen (Mackintosh and Vonberg, 2017).

The discontent voters felt during the election would follow Macron into the presidential palace. Initially, many felt that Macron wasn't supportive of the working class, given his former career as an investment banker. During the next year, the so-called "Yellow Vest" movement would take to the streets in November of 2018 to protest a hike in the fuel tax. The idea for the protest came from the fact that French motorists are required to carry a yellow safety vest in their car in case of a breakdown.

The Yellow Vest protests continued through 2019, and often were met with force from the police, as Dodman notes:

> Throughout 2019, fierce clashes between riot police and Yellow Vest protestors shed light on the fearsome weaponry and tactics used by law enforcement in France. More recently [August 2020], the focus has shifted back to the festering issue of police racism and brutality in the immigrant-rich suburbs of France's largest cities, on the heels of the global protest movement triggered by the George Floyd killing in the U.S. (Dodman, 2020)

Despite the pandemic, the Black Lives Matter movement would be an inspiration on both sides of the Atlantic in the summer of 2020.

Black Lives Matter and policing

There is a clear connection between racism and police violence on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, Willem Roper reports that data shows the disparities in police killings: "In 2019 data of all police killings in the country compiled by Mapping Police Violence, black Americans were nearly three times more likely to die from police than white Americans. Other statistics showed that black Americans were nearly one-and-a-half times more likely to be unarmed before their death" (Roper, 2020). A survey of 40,000 Americans by YouGov in May of 2020 indicated that "White people are four times more likely than Black Americans to say police use the right amount of force" (Sanders, 2020). However, the public in the US is starting to pay attention to these facts, as reported in a story by *Marketwatch* in July of 2020:

> More Americans than in 2015 say police in most communities are more likely to use deadly force against a Black person than a white person, 61% today compared with 49% in 2015. Only about a third of Americans say the race of a person does not make a difference in the use of deadly force, compared with roughly half in 2015. (Associated Press, 2020a)

Religion is also playing a role in the violence against minorities, with gunmen in the US targeting Sikh temples, and mosques targeted with vandalism,

arson, and other criminal acts not only in the wake of 9/11 but in more recent incidents (ACLU, 2021). Muslims in the US were also impacted by the travel ban imposed by the Trump administration in 2017. Despite a commitment to allowing humanitarian exceptions, very few people from the five banned countries have been able to get a waiver for a visa (Hauslohner, 2019). People from a variety of backgrounds have a stake in reducing the hostility that has grown over the last few years.

On the other side of the Atlantic, police violence and discrimination have also impacted ethnic and religious minorities, including Muslims. From OBV, which was founded in 1996:

> Between 1994 and 1996 Black communities were subject to severe social and political pressure … There were deaths in police custody for which no one was held accountable. The Immigration & Asylum Bill seemed to many to be a state-sanctioned policy that criminalised Black people looking for sanctuary in Britain … The New York-based Human Rights Watch identified Britain as the country with the highest incidence of racial attacks in Europe. Research at Southampton University by law Professor Lawrence Lustgarden showed that Britain jails more Black people per head of population than the USA. (Operation Black Vote, 2021)

Since the 1990s, OBV has worked to increase voting in Black communities to improve the responsiveness of politicians to the concerns of Black citizens. I met Simon Wooley at a conference in Berlin in 2014 that was part of the development of a transatlantic network of "inclusion" leaders. Lord Woolley discussed the power of the Black vote and his efforts to increase political participation in the UK. Police violence remains an issue in Britain, as Member of Parliament (MP) David Lammy has also emphasized the research that shows that Britain jails more Black people per head of population than the US (Kentish, 2017).

On November 4, 2020, the British House of Commons and House of Lords released a report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), "Black People, Racism and Human Rights." As in the US, the initial focus of the report is on police violence and the protests that spread from the US to the UK and beyond, becoming a global response to police violence.

> In response to the awful killing of George Floyd in the US, Black Lives Matter protests in the UK have highlighted once again the racism and inequality that exists here. Racial inequalities in the protection of human rights raised by the Black Lives Matter movement led this Committee to commission polling which found that over three quarters of Black people in the UK do not believe their human rights

> are equally protected compared to white people. (Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2020)

The report goes on to reference a series of reports since the MacPherson report in 1999 that uncovered institutional racism by the Metropolitan Police in the wake of the murder of Stephen Lawrence, a young Black man who was killed by a gang of White youths. The key point from the report is that they are not reporting anything new. These issues have been reported over and over again, and little or no action has been taken to mitigate the problems perceived by Blacks and other ethnic and racial minorities.

Public opinion in the UK shows a clear divide on police behavior as well, as noted in a survey done by CNN:

> an exclusive CNN/Savanta ComRes poll reveals a divided nation, where Black people are twice as likely as White people to say they have not been treated with respect by police. Black people are also about twice as likely as White people to say UK police are institutionally racist – among White people, just over a quarter believe it. (Smith-Spark et al, 2020)

As in the US the perceptions of Whites and Blacks related to police violence are an ongoing indicator of racial divides.

France has had a long history of police violence turning into violent protests. The police have the right to ask for identity papers at any time, often targeting young men when they are taking the train to their homes in the suburbs. In 2005, some of the worst protests in France in 40 years broke out after two young men were electrocuted while fleeing the police. Over the years, protests have broken out on a regular basis in response to police violence, which often begins with the police stopping young men for identity checks.

> A study conducted by France's National Centre for Scientific Research has shown that blacks are 11.5 times more likely to be checked by police than whites, and those of Arab origin are seven times more likely. In a landmark 2016 case, France's highest court ruled for the first time that police had illegally stopped three men based on racial profiling, setting more specific rules to ensure ID checks are not discriminatory. (Dodman, 2020)

Youths took to the streets after a young Black man, Adama Traoré, was killed in police custody on his 24th birthday in July 2016. Police initially claimed that he had died of a heart attack, but an autopsy requested by the family indicated that he had died of asphyxiation, and there was no sign of alcohol or cannabis in his system (Amrani and Chrisaftis, 2017). Protests led

by Traoré's sister have continued over the years as the investigation of her brother's death has continued with no resolution.

Protests against police have continued in France, including after a video was released of an incident in November of 2020 which showed a Black music producer beaten up by the police. In November of 2020, French protestors also decried a new law that would restrict the filming of police officers and measures that would restrict the ability of journalists to cover protests (Goillandeau, 2020).

In the Fall of 2020, a French reporter published a book describing the six months he spent as a police officer in a suburb of Paris where relations between the police and residents have been strained:

> "They don't see a youngster, but a delinquent … once this dehumanisation is established everything becomes justifiable, like beating up an adolescent or a migrant," he writes, adding: "What astonishes me … is at what point they feel untouchable, as if there's no superior, no surveillance by the hierarchy, as if a police officer can choose – according to his free will or how he is feeling at that particular moment – to be violent or not." (Willsher, 2020)

The story is reminiscent of the famous story of German journalist Günther Wallraff who went undercover as a Turkish worker for two years and in 1985 published the book titled *Ganz Unten* (*The Lowest of the Low*), which exposed the difficult conditions for Turkish migrant workers in post-war Germany. The book was an international bestseller and opened the eyes of many Germans to the issues of discrimination, but even 20 years after the book was published the author found the country still had more work to do, as quoted in a 2005 article in *Deutschewelle*:

> "Germany still has to rid itself of its prejudices," he said. "I feel the majority of German society is still unaware that immigration brings with it a number of advantages, that in fact it helps society survive. Even the conservatives have to acknowledge that society is condemned to die out because it's hostile to children and outsiders. It thinks it's better than everyone else, and for as long as that's the case, it will stagnate, it will remain in a steady decline." (DW Staff, 2005)

Like other European countries, Germany has struggled more recently with issues of police violence. Stories about police violence in Germany tend to be anecdotal, but a recent study by researchers at the University of Bochum found that ethnic minorities are more likely to experience police violence, stating that "The central conclusion of the study is that people from ethnic minorities are structurally disadvantaged by the police" (Grundmann, 2020).

In her examination of riots and police violence, Cathy Lisa Schneider points out that:

> we see strikingly similar interactions between policy and minority populations in Paris and those in New York. The structure of inequality at large and the demands placed on policy by powerful social classes, dominant racial groups, and the state are more important than the culture and organization of the institution. (Schneider, 2014, p 9)

This perspective on policing is an indicator of the depth and persistence of these issues across the Atlantic. It is a topic that will continue to play an important role in race relations going forward.

COVID-19 and race

When COVID-19 began to spread around the world, the initial thought was that it would be an "equal opportunity" virus that could impact anyone. Although that is true in theory, in practice study after study showed that ethnic and racial minorities were at higher risk of contracting the virus, being hospitalized, and had much higher mortality rates compared to Whites. Analysis of this novel virus is ongoing, but in a study published in September of 2020, researchers found that:

> The infection rate for Hispanic patients was over three times higher than the rate in White patients (143 vs. 46 per 10,000), and the rate among Black patients was over two times as high (107 per 10,000). The hospitalization rate for Hispanic patients was more than four times as high as the rate in White patients (30.4 vs. 7.4 per 10,000), and the rate in Black patients was over three times as high (24.6 per 10,000). Death rates for both groups were over twice as high as the rate for White patients (5.6 and 5.6 compared to 2.3 per 10,000). Asian patients also faced significant disparities in these measures. (Rubin-Miller et al, 2020)

These data reflect health disparities that have been persistent for Blacks as well as other racial and ethnic minorities. They are exacerbated by the fact that many of those who fell victim to the disease were frontline essential workers, lived in substandard and/or crowded housing conditions, and often put off getting help because they lacked insurance or couldn't afford the cost of health care.

In the UK, the impact on frontline workers was another indicator of racial disparities. The first 11 doctors to die in the UK from the virus were from Black, Asian or minority ethnic (BAME) background, and mortality

rates of Blacks was 3.5 times higher than Whites in English hospitals (Otu et al, 2020).

In general, data by race aren't easily available, and the impact of COVID-19 has raised the issue once again, as noted in an article from Reuters: "Many European countries avoid breaking down data along racial or ethnic lines out of concern over privacy or discrimination, but COVID-19's outsized impact on Black and Asian people has exposed flaws in the approach, some scientists and activists said" (Waldersee, 2020). The underlying factors are similar in the US and Europe – including whether ethnic and racial minorities, as well as immigrants (particularly those who are undocumented) "trust hospital staff to treat them fairly or have equal access to healthcare" (Waldersee, 2020).

US election 2020 and the Capitol insurrection

Tensions were high in the US as the 2020 election campaign continued despite the ravages of the pandemic. While the Democratic candidate Joe Biden wore a mask in his appearances and the nominating convention was held virtually, President Trump continued to call for large rallies where many of his supporters eschewed the wearing of masks. Despite COVID-19 restrictions, voters were motivated and a record number of voters took part in the election. Although many voted by mail, many others stood in long lines to cast their vote in places like Atlanta, Georgia.

Joe Biden's win allowed many in the country to breathe a sigh of relief that we had avoided the re-election of a president who had clear disregard for the health and safety of the country, but Trump immediately called the election fraudulent, and his lawyers crossed the country filing lawsuits to overturn the result. Trump would ultimately lose every one of those lawsuits (over 40) even with a Supreme Court that was dominated by conservative judges. However, he could never admit that he had lost, and his followers weren't willing to give up, either.

On January 6, 2021 US democracy faced one of its greatest challenges since the Civil War. Tens of thousands of protestors marched to the Capitol building at the behest of defeated President Donald Trump to disrupt the counting of the electoral votes that had given incumbent Joe Biden the victory. Although this was just a procedural action that couldn't change the outcome of the election, a long campaign of disinformation from Trump and others in the Republican Party had given the insurrectionists the idea that they could "stop the steal." Horrified citizens watched in real time as Trump supporters stormed barricades, beat on Capitol police officers, and threatened our Congressional representatives with death.

For many African Americans this was the culmination of decades of trauma related to voting, given that the votes they were trying to stop from counting were mostly ours. A noose hung outside of the Capitol building

was a symbol of the thousands of African Americans who were lynched after the Civil War for having the audacity to organize, educate themselves, and try to vote. The wounds from that day are likely to fester, despite the hundreds of arrests made, and the impeachment of former president Trump for his role was bound to fail given the partisanship which has defined this era.

Black Lives Matter protestors couldn't help but compare the police response on January 6, 2021 to the violence met by mostly peaceful protestors around the country. As one commentator noted, "The Capitol riot showed a group demonstrating raw power, while Black Lives Matter protesters were asking for power" (Young and Raphelson, 2021). As Joe Biden and Kamala Harris took office on January 20, 2021, there were high fences protecting the Capitol building. Although there was no violence, it was a sad testament that the divisiveness that had become entrenched in the US during the Trump era could reach into a celebration that so many had worked toward, peacefully.

Conclusion

Political divides, police violence, and a pandemic have marked a difficult time for citizens on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, it had taken an intense mobilization of minority voters to overcome attempts at voter suppression in the 2020 presidential election which ranged from the closing of polling places in minority neighborhoods to cutbacks at the post office that were an attempt to impact the delivery of absentee and mail-in ballots. In Europe, far-right politicians continued to spread fear and disinformation as Brexit moved forward. With the ongoing pandemic, it seems that crisis is the mode for the foreseeable future. It will take vigilance and strong efforts at mobilization to allow the full exercise of citizenship on both sides of the Atlantic.

10

Conclusion: Finding a Path Forward

Politics, demographics, and White supremacy

In February of 2019 I was invited to record a talk for the PBS show "Blackademics," and I titled my talk, "Can Democracy Survive Racism?" At the time, my concern was that anti-democratic elements in our societies were using issues of race to divide and in some cases radicalize parts of the electorate. For now, I believe democracy will survive, but this conclusion gives me the opportunity to explore some answers to the dilemmas we are facing for democracy.

The success of far-right politicians in Europe, including Poland and Hungary, has clearly led to an undermining of the free press and judicial oversight. Countries like France and Germany are not currently in danger, as the support for radical right parties there has remained around 15–20 percent of the electorate but it will be important for under-represented minorities in these countries to feel that they have a voice if democracy is to survive.

The saying goes that demographics is destiny. It is clear that demographic change will continue on both sides of the Atlantic. It is important to acknowledge that racism exists and that it will continue to be a challenge as we struggle with the cultural and economic challenges that will strain the bonds that have held these societies together since World War II. I don't believe that we will face war, but societal upheavals have and will continue to occur whether they come from terror attacks, pandemics, or economic crises.

It was clear to me from my first visit to Europe in 1986 that the issue of race was just as compelling there as it was in the US. As I have shown in this book, many of the ideas that have developed around race were first developed and institutionalized in Europe. The history of racism that led to slavery, genocide, and the Holocaust continues to play a role in attitudes and policies that impact ethnic and racial minorities. These attitudes have

continued in new forms, focusing on immigrants from Africa and the Middle East, Muslims in particular, and a willingness to vote for anti-democratic parties who focus on economic and cultural threats.

Far-right politicians focus on issues like so-called uncontrolled immigration to marginalize growing communities, and in some cases they are gaining in political power. However, as I wrote in my book *Immigrant Politics*, there is growing support for politicians of immigrant background, and I have worked with organizations like the German Marshall Fund to support young people from ethnic and religious minorities in Europe who are interested in running for office. There are many individuals and organizations that I have highlighted in this book that are working to create change. In the rest of this chapter, I explore possibilities for creating change through research, policy, and individual action.

Toward a sub-discipline of comparative race theory

One of the purposes of this book is to begin to define a new approach to the study of the politics of race. Although many researchers have examined the global impacts of race politics, it is important to see the connections across the Atlantic from a historical perspective and the ways that they continue to impact the politics of race. This comparative work needs to expand and grow, given the sharing of information across borders, we can no longer see policy developments or social movements as being confined to national borders.

In the first chapter, I called for a new approach, comparative race theory, that acknowledges the historical linkages that led to the development of the idea of race, but also takes into account the impact of immigration, in particular the impact on policies in countries like Britain, France, and Germany since the end of World War II. In a Thanksgiving address, President-elect Joe Biden stated that, "we are finally going to root out systemic racism in this country," after four years of blatant racism, violence toward immigrants and people of color, many of us had hope for "A nation made whole again" (Biden, 2020). The cynic in me would note that we have never been a nation that was "whole." However, the election of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris, the first African American, South Asian, and woman Vice President, signaled a clear course correction for a country struggling with a pandemic and the fallout from a season of protests against racism and violence. The US remains a country divided, and in Europe, issues like Brexit and police brutality continue to play a role in the politics of race.

It's clear that academe, and in particular my field of political science, has much work to do to start producing research that can address the broader issues around immigration and race. In academe we are dealing with structures that have not adjusted to the demographic realities of our country and globally. There has been much talk about interdisciplinary research, but

we still divide ourselves along the lines of American politics and everything else, as if the rest of the world plays no role in our domestic politics. Change is coming slowly but we need to support students and researchers who are interested in moving beyond our traditional disciplinary boundaries to understand a world that is changing quickly. One major example is that we can't ignore the impacts that climate change is having and will continue to have on immigration and race.

Creating change

One of the first issues for creating change is reckoning with the concept of White identity. In order to dismantle racial hierarchies, it is important to understand them, and the ways that they are shifting as ethnic and racial minorities grow in both demographic and political terms. Ashley Jardina's book *White Identity Politics* (2019) provides an important lens for understanding the development of White racial solidarity and the politicization of White identity. She uses this development to explain the success of Donald Trump, who played into the fears of Whites who saw themselves losing their privilege in the face of growing ethnic minority and immigrant communities. As Jardina explains, "White Americans are losing their numerical majority, their stronghold over elective offices, and, perhaps, their ability to define the nation's identity in their image" (Jardina, 2019, p 260). This same dynamic can be seen playing out in Europe, as immigration has been at the top of the agenda for politics for at least the last 20 years.

Jardina's work is important because it shifts the focus from relying solely on antidiscrimination policies to focusing on the factors that play into support for racism and anti-immigrant structures. For example, she finds "that white identity and white consciousness are one of the strongest and most consistent predictors of immigration opinion" and she goes on to point out that it is also crucial to vote choice (Jardina, 2019, pp 263–264). It is clear that these perceptions are impacting vote choice not only in the US but in Europe as well, where immigration and declining birth rates are highly salient. An interesting component of her finding is that White identity isn't directly linked to racial animus. This doesn't mean that racism isn't an issue, protecting their status as a group is more important to those who identify as White in a multiracial world. They also see themselves as victims of discrimination in a zero-sum world. As the quote from an unknown source goes, "When you're accustomed to privilege, equality feels like oppression." As Jardina argues, creating change will require "reframing white privilege" (Jardina, 2019, p 274).

What does reframing White privilege mean in practice? In my book, *Radical Empathy: Finding a Path to Bridging Racial Divides* (Givens, 2021), I argue that we must start with understanding ourselves before we can

understand others, and that developing the kind of empathy that can lead to change is something that requires practice. It is my hope that by developing a greater understanding of the context of our lives and how institutional racism has impacted us all, we can find better ways to deconstruct those policies and practices that have divided us.

Education is another important component for creating change, although it can be difficult given the decentralized nature of our education systems. Across Europe and the US, teachers and academics are grappling with the idea of decolonizing curriculum and approaches to education.

As political scientist Adam Getchow notes:

> Now, partly riding the global surge of Black Lives Matter mobilizations, calls for decolonization have swept Europe's former imperial metropoles. In Bristol, England, last month, protesters tore down the statue of Edward Colston, the director of the Royal African Company, which dominated the African slave trade in the 17th and 18th centuries. Across Belgium, protesters have focused on statues of King Leopold II, who ruled the Congo Free State (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) as his personal property from 1885 to 1908. King Phillipe II of Belgium recently expressed "regret" for his ancestor's brutal regime, which caused the death of 10 million people. (Getchow, 2020)

It will take more than tearing down statues to create change, but the acknowledgment of the crimes of the past is an important step in breaking away from a long history of denial.

Politics is one of the main arenas for creating policies that can begin to break down structural racism. Although Donald Trump was not re-elected it's likely that other politicians will use his rhetoric and policies as a blueprint for attracting White voters. There will be much work to do to encourage voters that we aren't in a zero-sum game, and that economic prosperity can lift all boats. The inequality that grew in the US is being replicated in Europe, and if progressive parties and politicians are going to have any influence, they will have to hone their messages and policies to reach traditional left voters. Taking on the rhetoric and policies of the right is not a winning strategy and plays into racist tendencies of some voters.

As individuals, it is important to understand that we live in a world that has created long-standing divisions that we did not create, but that we may be harmed by or benefit from. It is important to be aware of the way that structural racism impacts our lives, and how we must be intentional to avoid perpetuating the systems that disadvantage others. At least in the US the end of World War II seemed to be an opportunity for change, as noted by Myrdal who predicted that "there is bound to be a redefinition of the Negro's status in America as a result of this war" (Myrdal, 1944, p 997). It

would take another 20 years to get major legislation passed, but that effort was buttressed by a civil rights movement made up of many individuals who were dedicated to the cause.

Europe is facing similar challenges, and it will be important for individuals there to continue the fight for equality, but I would argue that the first step is acknowledging the issues. Efforts to undermine research on race and discrimination will only serve to push the issue down the road. As we have seen the global engagement around issue of discrimination and police violence continue in various forms, it raises hope that we can reach out our hands across the Atlantic and work toward a world where we can develop the collaborations that will lead to more equality and a better world for our children.

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"In this important, timely and much needed comparative analysis, Terri Givens successfully brings together the personal, professional and political, and the different, overlapping and shared sites, forms, histories and legacies of racism and white supremacy in the US and across Europe."
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"To our ongoing dialogue about race relations and racial justice, *The Roots of Racism* offers a rare comparative angle that contextualizes today's challenges in the course of transatlantic history. A showcase of Terri Givens' unique expertise, it connects the bitter divide over immigration to the lingering politics of prejudice."
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Terri E. Givens *is a Professor of Political Science at McGill University.*

Racism has deep roots in both the United States and Europe. This important book examines the past, present, and future of racist ideas and politics. It describes how policies have developed over a long history of European and White American dominance of political institutions that maintain White supremacy.

Givens examines the connections between immigration policy and racism that have contributed to the rise of anti-immigrant, radical-right parties in Europe, the rise of Trumpism in the US, and the Brexit vote in the UK. This book provides a vital springboard for people, organizations, and politicians who want to dismantle structural racism and discrimination.

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