NEW DEMOCRACY AND AUTOCRATIZATION IN ASIA

Edited by
Kuyoun Chung and Wonbin Cho

New Democracy and Autocratization in Asia

This book examines the quality of democracies in Asia and determines why current democracies—especially during the so-called "new normal" era following the 2008 financial crisis—have become less stable and less resilient to increasing authoritarianism.

Based on the assumption that the concept of democracy consists of three elements—procedure (participation, competition, and distribution of power); effectiveness (representation, accountability, and responsiveness); and performance (social welfare, inequality, and trust)—the contributors to this book determine which elements are responsible for diverging trajectories within the Asian democratic recession. Examining South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Myanmar, and China, the authors employ different research methods—quantitative, comparative, or individual case studies—to explore the conditions under which democratic rules and norms erode over time, and which type of governance is preferred by citizens in this region as an ideal type. The book puts forward the argument that a procedure-oriented concept of democracy is not sufficient for understanding the source of democratic recession and develops a new concept of "new democracy" based on procedure, effectiveness, and performance. It also demonstrates to what extent the experience changes and how the countries respond to these changes.

A novel contribution on the state of democracy in Asia written by experts from the region, this book will be of interest to academics in the field of political science, especially comparative politics and international relations, regional study of East and Southeast Asia, sociology, public policy, economics, and social science methods. Also, this book will appeal to think tanks and policy-oriented researchers.

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Contents

Figures

Tables

Abbreviations

ABS	Asian Barometer Survey
ADR	Association for Democratic Reforms
CBI	Central Bank Independence
CC	Central Committee
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CPF	Central Provident Fund
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CSDS	Center for the Study of Developing Societies
CSES	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
CSSTA	Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement
DIU	Data Intelligence Unit
DPI	Democratic Performance Index
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
EI	Employment Insurance
EU	European Union
GAD	General Administration Department
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRC	Group Representative Constituencies
IACI	Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISSP	International Social Survey Program
JOD	Journal of Democracy
KMT	Kuomintang
LAI	Law on Access to Information
LDI	Liberal Democracy Index
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LIP	Labor Insurance Program
MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policy Index

NA	National Assembly
NDSC	National Defense and Security Council
NHI	National Health Insurance
NLD	National League for Democracy
NPS	National Pension Scheme
NT	New Taiwan
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
PAP	People's Action Party
PAPI	Public Administration Performance Index
PII	Political Inequality Index
QOG	Quality Of Governance
SC	Scheduled Castes
SEM	Structural Equation Model
SGI	Sustainable Governance Indicator
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council
SNTV-MMD	Single Non-Transferable Vote in Multi-Member Districts
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
ST	Scheduled Tribes
SWIID	Standardized World Income Inequality Database
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
US	United States
USDP	Union Solidarity and Development Party
VCP	Vietnamese Communist Party
WDI	World Development Indicator
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators
WJP	World Justice Project
WTO	World Trade Organization
WVS	World Values Survey

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Preface

This book offers a systemic analysis of political development in Asia. Through it, we hope to reactivate the study of Asian politics into the mainstream of comparative political study, from which it has been marginalized for too long. Existing studies on political development have yet to become fully comparative. Although most contemporary studies on political development focus on Latin America, Eastern Europe, and latterly Africa, Asia has received far less attention. In this book, we examine a series of political changes across many Asian countries having various regimes such as democracy, hybrid regime, and autocracy. While scholars of political regimes have developed concepts that travel quite well, Asian cases challenge some aspects of political development theories. We argue that the quality of democracy is not only a matter of elites but also a matter of the citizens.

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Wonbin Cho
Kuyoun Chung

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1 The State of Democracy

Wonbin Cho

Is democracy really in crisis? If so, will the crisis of democracy we are facing now lead to the rise of an authoritarian system, or will it lead to criticism and improvement of the existing democratic system? To this question, this book seeks an answer by evaluating the level of democracy in various countries in Asia not only in the quality of the process but also in the quality of the outcome. Authors argue that a democracy with a high level of procedure does not necessarily raise the level of performance. For example, although democracies in East Asia have achieved relatively successful economic development as well as democratization, they have not been able to solve problems such as economic inequality. Accordingly, Asian citizens recognize economic performance, including resolving income inequality, as an important factor in consolidating democracy, regardless of the level of democracy in their countries.

Democracy is losing its momentum worldwide. In the past decade or so, there has been a marked trend in many new democratic countries gradually transitioning to non-democratic or authoritarian regimes. At the same time, even in some advanced democracies, authoritarian and xenophobic populist movements are becoming powerful enough to threaten stable democratic systems. Does this change mean the stagnation of democracy or the decline of democracy or the emergence of a new system?

Freedom House reports that there is currently little increase in the number of countries with electoral democracy compared to when the twenty-first century began. Many new democracies are struggling to take root, and advanced democracies such as the United States are also facing challenges to the stability of their systems. The arguments so far that democratic transitions will naturally develop in a positive direction and that the consolidated democratic system will not regress are now being put to a fundamental test. This is a result of the fact that the existing economically wealthy and advanced democracies are unable to find a way to address inequality and manage the information revolution.

The COVID-19 pandemic has not only made the debate about "big government vs. small government" in our society meaningless, but rather raises concerns that the expansion of state power could lead to "resurrection of authoritarianism". For the time being, "state intervention in the market" and "financial expansion"

will not be an option, but will become a global topic of discussion. The United States has already passed a US$2.2-trillion economic stimulus package bill to respond to COVID-19, and Europe, the second most affected region after the United States, is preparing a pan-European stimulus package worth at least 500 billion euros. Governments around the world are intensively investing their finances in the direction of preserving household income and maintaining jobs in response to COVID-19.

The "big state" brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic has rekindled the debate over the extent to which state intervention in individual liberty should be allowed. In South Korea, for example, restrictions such as tracking the movement of confirmed cases, disclosing limited personal information about confirmed cases, and banning rallies, demonstrations, and religious gatherings and restrictions on store operation are being implemented without much resistance. Authoritarianism has reemerged in countries where the democratic system is not firmly rooted in the government's coercive measures that restrict individual freedom and may violate human rights. In an authoritarian state, it may be an opportunity for the dictator to further consolidate his power.

Since the beginning of the third wave of democratization, countries and their citizens that have transitioned from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes around the world have shared, to some extent, consistent and humane expectations for liberal democracy. Citizens of countries that have experienced the transition to democracy are attracted to liberal democracy not only because of the norms and values of liberal democracy, but also because of the high level of economic development and geopolitical success shown by existing liberal democracies. It cannot be ignored that free political rights and civil liberties contributed to the formation of trust in the democratic system by citizens within these authoritarian regimes. In addition, the phenomenal economic development of Western European countries in the 1950s and 1960s, the end of the Cold War resulting in the victory of liberal democracies, and the collapse of powerful authoritarian states that competed with democracy all favored transition to a democratic system. It was one of the important factors that made it happen.

The Quality of Democracy

In his book, Fukuyama ruled out the possibility of the existence of an alternative and valid political system to Western-style liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992). According to him, we can no longer expect democracy to develop. In fact, there is no mention of the quality level of democracy in his work, but Fukuyama also mentions the issue of equality or inequality in his thesis (Fukuyama 1989). It is undeniable that the present democracy will face new problems over time. These newly emerging problems demand alternatives to democracy, or demand that the current democratic system adapt and evolve while solving the continuing problems.

Liberal democracy shows its strength in terms of the fundamental principle of freedom. However, it is also true that it shows a weakness that cannot be ignored in terms of another fundamental principle of democracy. For example, issues of

gender equality, sustainability issues of social and economic development, and environmental issues are issues that are understood as limiting equality. In addition, the development of information and knowledge caused by scientific and technological innovation leads to changes in the current society and economy, and such changes can lead to changes in democracy.

Lijphart (1999) divides the types of democracy into majoritarian democracy and consensus democracy. Majority democracy concentrates power on the majority of a society and has a strong competitive nature, whereas consensus democracy has various interests reflected in the policy-making process through negotiations, making compromises so that various parts of society can reach consensus. There is a strong tendency to emphasize. Sodaro (2004) classifies the democratic system of Western Europe according to the degree of development of the social welfare system. In his classification, American democracy is more liberal democracy oriented, whereas many democratic countries in Europe are classified as more social democracy oriented.

Among the attempts to conceptualize democracy theoretically, there are various arguments, such as a "minimalist" approach and a "maximalist" approach. Buhlmann and his colleagues (2008) introduce three types of democracy. The minimalist approach defines democracy in an elite-centric way, focusing on the government of the people and effective governance. The medium definition of democracy is not only the government of the people, but also government by the people, and the emphasis is on how high the political participation of the people is and whether the interests of the people are well represented. Finally, the maximal definition of democracy refers to the government for the people, and the realization of social justice with the highest level of representation and high level of political participation.

Sodaro (2004) conceptualizes the minimum and maximum definitions of democracy from a different perspective. He categorized democracies into "representative democracy" and "direct democracy" according to the degree to which national sovereignty is realized. He also categorizes democracies into "laissez-faire" and "councils and participatory democracy" according to the decision-making process of economic policy. Finally, in terms of democratic values, Sodaro classifies "non-discrimination" as a type of minimum democracy and "affirmative action" as a type of maximum democracy.

In summarizing the various viewpoints on the definition of democracy that have been examined so far, the minimalist definition of democracy focuses on a specific issue and theoretically conceptualizes a narrow aspect of democracy. In contrast, the maximal definition of democracy is a somewhat comprehensive and broad theoretical conceptualization. In other words, while minimalist democracy is an attempt to define democracy based on the characteristics of the political system, maximalist democracy attempts to define democracy by relating the political system to the social context that encompasses the economy and environment.

Diamond and Morlino (2004), who summarize studies focused on the qualitative aspects of democracy, describe "quality of results", "quality of content", and "procedural quality" as three qualitative aspects of democracy. The quality of

results means how much the political system satisfies the expectations of the people, and the quality of the content means how much freedom and political equality is enjoyed by the citizens or the communities they constitute within the political system. Finally, procedural quality means how the political system provides citizens with a way to assess the achievements of government through mechanisms such as elections and to clarify accountability among various government agencies. In addition, Diamonds and Morlino (2004) present the eight aspects that constitute the quality of democracy: (1) rule of law, (2) participation, (3) competition, (4) vertical accountability, (5) horizontal accountability, (6) freedom, (7) equality, and (8) responsiveness. Among these, (1) through (5) are classified as "procedural dimensions" of the quality of democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2004). Such a multifaceted framework of analysis exceeds the minimum criteria for electoral democracy and is sufficient to satisfy all the essential elements required by liberal democracy. This qualitative expansion of the concept of democracy means that the theoretical conceptualization of democracy shifts from a low-quality electoral democracy to a high-quality liberal democracy. It also means that the quality of democracy is no longer a consensual concept that conceptualized electoral democracy or a low-level liberal democracy, but rather a more complex concept.

O'Donnell (2004) conceptualizes the quality of democracy based on two principles: human development and human rights. He defines human beings as beings with autonomy in decision-making, as having cognitive abilities based on reason, and as subjects who are responsible for their actions. Thus, O'Donnell's concept of human development encompasses a social and economic context that conditions individuals to act as subjects. O'Donnell's human development is directly linked to the concept based on the Human Development Index, one of the main contents of the annual Human Development Report published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). O'Donnell argues that in evaluating the quality of democracy, as the UNDP's Human Development Index shows, not only the level of social development but also the level of economic development should be included as a key factor.

Another key principle O'Donnell used in conceptualizing the quality of democracy is human rights (O'Donnell 2004). Basically, human rights are not only political rights, but also civil rights and social rights. In order for human rights to be established in society, the role of the legal system to protect them is important. The legal system that protects human rights not only regulates the balance between the powers of the state but also serves to limit state violence that may occur against citizens. In addition to the need to protect various rights in this formal aspect, O'Donnell emphasizes the "social dimension" and the environment in which these formal rights can be converted into real freedoms improves the quality of democracy (O'Donnell 2004). He said that the three essential elements for social conditions to improve the quality of democracy are (1) free and pluralistic information; (2) a social context based on a diversity of values, lifestyles, and opinions; and, (3) a public sphere with a pluralism of debates and discourses. In summary, O'Donnell's concept of quality of democracy is also more comprehensive than that of electoral democracy.

Democracy vs. Autocracy

In the twenty-first century, many liberal democracies have not succeeded in enriching the lives of their citizens. In addition, populist movements that ignore liberal democracy have begun to emerge in these countries. According to opinion polls, the people of these countries no longer accept the importance of living under a democratic system as meaningful. For example, two-thirds of Americans aged 65 and older think it's important to live in a democratic system, while less than one-third of Americans aged 35 and younger think so. Although still a minority among citizens of Western European countries, a growing proportion of respondents say they prefer a military dictatorship as an alternative to a democratic system. According to the recent election results, groups with critical feelings toward established forces in liberal democracies are expanding, and these critical forces have been easily mobilized by extremist parties or candidates.

Over the past 20 years, authoritarian populists who ignore the basic rules or norms that underlie democratic systems have gradually expanded their power in Western Europe and North America. At the same time, strong authoritarian rulers in Asia and Eastern Europe are slowing the progress of democracy. Even at the end of the 1990s, when the third wave of democratization reached its peak, most countries in the Middle East maintained a non-democratic system, and the former Soviet Union was transitioning to an authoritarian system rather than a democratic system. In addition, in the African continent, Rwanda's President Paul Kagame and Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni welcomed the emergence of a "new leader" with undemocratic and powerful power. In East Asia, many countries, such as China, Vietnam, and North Korea, maintained strong dictatorships.

Emphasizing material-based success as a major reason for the so far dominant global liberal democracy is very important for understanding the current state of democracy in crisis. A country experiencing economic growth can achieve not only power and influence, but also system stability. By empirical analysis, Przeworski and his colleagues have shown that democracies with low economic standards are prone to collapse. Their study empirically shows that democracies with per capita GDP above US$14,000 in present values are relatively safe (Przeworski et al. 2000).

Existing Western-centered democracies could use their economic strength to pressure newly independent and developing countries to implement reform policies to introduce a liberal democracy. They used to influence the political situation within developing countries by promising invitations or threatening to exclude them from the global economic system. In the 1990s and early twenty-first century, these democracies demanded democratic reforms from Eastern European countries and developing countries such as Turkey and Asia's Thailand and South Korea, in exchange for official membership of the European Union (EU) or the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, sanctions led by these Western democracies have rejected certain developing countries from entering the global economic system, often leading to the resignation of their governments.

In order to properly explain the period when democracy enjoyed a dominant position, it is essential to understand the role of economic power that was able to spread the idea of liberal democracy around the world. Likewise, it is impossible to develop a meaningful discussion about the future of liberal democracy without considering the consequences of the relative weakening of the economic influence of the upcoming democratic alliance.

The argument that economic prosperity leads to political stability makes it easy to predict the future of countries with the most robust liberal democratic political systems, such as those in North America and Western Europe. Even if the powers of the countries belonging to these groups decline relatively, it is very unlikely that the economic conditions of these countries will fall below the level at which the democratic system will collapse. In addition, these stable democracies were able to occupy a dominant position because, in addition to economic prosperity, they maintained a relatively egalitarian society, most citizens shared the experience of steep income growth. It was also because the economic conditions of authoritarian countries as rivals of democracy were very low.

The prospect that it will be difficult to sustain the dominant position in which the solidified democracies that have achieved a high level of economic development so far have formed an alliance with each other is becoming more prevalent. At the same time, as democracies no longer occupy the dominant positions, the proportion of economic output produced by authoritarian countries in the global economy is growing faster than expected. While countries rated as Not Free in the 1990 Freedom House survey accounted for 12 percent of global income, now countries rated as not free account for 33 percent of global income. China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia are representative countries (Freedom House 2021). In the next five years, it is predicted that the share of global income in authoritarian countries will be greater than that of liberal democracies. In the first quarter of a century, liberal democracies, which possessed unprecedentedly strong economic capabilities, are experiencing a relative decline in their economic capabilities that has never been experienced before. Considering the difficulties that North American and Western European countries, which played a key role in liberal democracy, are experiencing internally in their democratic systems and their diminishing influence on the global economy, the chances of them regaining the superiority they have enjoyed seem to be gradually decreasing.

It is a particularly important and new phenomenon that authoritarian countries have the ability to compete with liberal democracies for the achievements of economic growth. Throughout the twentieth century, communist countries engaged in ideological confrontations with liberal democracies, but failed to provide their people with the economic prosperity that Western capitalist countries had provided. Moreover, not a small number of emerging authoritarian capitalism countries are experiencing significant economic development. While maintaining a strong state, these countries not only embraced a relatively free market economy, but also ensured somewhat stable private property rights. These are mainly countries located in the Middle East and East Asia. Among the top 20 countries by GDP in 2017 are China, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.

Even in authoritarian countries that have not achieved relative economic success, such as Iran, Kazakhstan, and Russia, per capita income exceeds US$20,000. Although China's per capita income level is relatively low, the pace of economic growth is very fast. While average income levels in rural areas are still low, high income levels and the rate of increase in urban and suburban areas show that China's authoritarian regime has the capacity to provide economic prosperity. More than 400 million Chinese live in coastal areas, with average incomes in the region exceeding US$23,000 and growing. In other words, hundreds of millions of people live in a situation called "authoritarian modernity". In the eyes of the leaders of these countries with more difficult economic conditions, the economic success stories of these authoritarian countries will no longer be the only alternative to economic growth through liberal democracy.

While Western democracies face serious problems internally about the liberal democratic political system or the democratic legitimacy of the political system, authoritarian countries are showing some confidence in their systems and ideologies. Russia even intervened directly in the political process of Western democracy. Russia's attempt to influence the outcome of the 2016 US presidential election has been a major issue within the United States for the past four years. It leads to the discussion of the democratic legitimacy of elections in the United States, a representative example of liberal democracy. In fact, Russia has long exerted influence directly or indirectly on Western European politics. For example, Russia has been known to provide political funds to political parties in Italy and France for more than a decade, both left and right.

Attempts to intervene in the political process of democracies that are experiencing serious internal conflicts are not limited to Russia. Although there is no evidence that China attempted to directly intervene in the political process like Russia did, China has already promoted its language, culture, and ideology to major regions around the world through an institution called Confucius Institute. Saudi Arabia has also increased the number of lobbyists in the United States to represent its interests in the past two years. As such, the gap between the level of economic influence and technological development between Western democracies and authoritarian countries is rapidly decreasing, and authoritarian countries are spreading their values through soft power. These soft powers include academia, popular culture, overseas investment, and development assistance. In particular, state-owned media supported by authoritarian states, such as Al Jazeera in Qatar, CCTV in China, and RT in Russia, have secured numerous viewers worldwide through abundant resources and technology accumulation. The news content and perspective they provide are clearly different from those provided by media organized by Western democracies in the past.

Can new democracies contribute to the spread of democracy by spreading democratic values in solidarity with existing liberal democracies? The foreign policy directions shown by Brazil, India, and South Africa did not always agree with the pursuits of Western democracies. For example, these countries abstained from voting on a UN resolution condemning the crisis in Crimea caused by Russia, and they also expressed opposition to sanctions against Russia. A number of emerging

democracies also sympathize with authoritarian states' attempts to tighten state regulation of the Internet. The recent regression of democracy in Turkey and the decline of democracy in Argentina, Mexico, and the Philippines can make these countries a flawed democracy, and over time they are more likely to become overtly authoritarian ones.

The State of Democracy in Asia

In Asia, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Mongolia experienced a democratic transition from an authoritarian system. The Freedom House Index (FHI), which has been evaluating the level of democracy of countries every year, shows that the level of democracy in the Asian continent has improved somewhat over the past 15 years. Freedom House attempts to assess the current state of civil liberties and political rights on a scale from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). States where the average for political rights and civil liberties differed from 1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free. State with values from 3.0 to 5.5 are considered Partly Free and those with value between 5.5 and 7.0 are considered Not Free. Figure 1.1 shows that the political rights average score has improved from 3.95 in 2007, the lowest score, to 3.4 in 2017, the highest score. After 2017, the political rights score gradually decreased in the region. Unlike the political rights score, there has not been any significant change in the civil liberties score over the last 15 years. The average score of 3.53 in 2020 was the lowest one.

Figure 1.2 shows trends in the number of Free countries in Asia from 2005 to 2020. In 2020, the number of Free countries in the region was 17 and the number of Not Free countries was 12. Since the beginning of a 15-year period of global democratic decline, those numbers have not significantly changed in Asia.

Figure 1.1 Trends in democracy, Asia, 2005–2020. *Source:* Freedom House (https:// freedomhouse.org).

Figure 1.2 Trends in the number of free countries in Asia, 2005–2020. *Source:* Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org).

Freedom House reported that India's status declined from Free to Partly Free due to a multi-year pattern in which the Hindu nationalist government and its allies have presided over rising violence and discriminatory policies affecting the Muslim population while India is a multi-party democracy (Freedom House 2021). Harassment of journalists, NGOs, and other government critics has increased significantly under the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. Freedom House also reported that Thailand's status changed from Partly Free to Not Free in 2020. Protests in Thailand requesting for democratic reforms were faced with arrests and use of water cannons against demonstrators. The military's violent crackdown on dissent and the abolition of a popular opposition party reversed previous democratic progress in Thailand (Freedom House 2021).

This book attempts to evaluate the state of democracy in Asian countries from multiple perspectives. It also includes nine countries with various political systems, such as consolidated democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), emerging democracies (India and Indonesia), hybrid regimes (Myanmar and Singapore), and authoritarian countries (China and Vietnam) in the region. Chapter 2 empirically examines the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation with a particular focus on East Asia. The results show that women's cabinet representation has a significant impact on infant and child mortality in

East Asia. This chapter suggests that we should distinguish between different types of formal representation and explore specific contexts under which each type of women's representation can be more important. Chapter 3 quantitatively analyses how the level of income inequality affects the East Asian citizen's priority over the elements of democracy. The results show that they generally value the elements of procedural democracy, while regarding economic performance of democracy as important as well. This seemingly mixed result suggests that citizens of East Asian countries value both procedural and substantive democracy, and both economic and political performance, in their understanding of democracy. This result implies that economic performance of democracy should not be overlooked even in consolidated democracy in East Asia. Chapter 4 argues that the development pathways of welfare systems in five East Asian countries after their own democratization have been diverse. Over the last three decades, South Korea and Taiwan adopted more inclusive and redistributive welfare systems during a period of intense political competition. On the other hand, in Japan, less political competition has brought about welfare retrenchment. While democratization has yet to fully reach Singapore, it has retained the minimal welfare provisions among the five East Asian countries.

Chapter 5 argues that Japan's current democracy faces a few challenges. The citizens' political efficacy and participation has significantly declined. Due to Japanese complicated and restricted electoral regulations, its voters' preference has not been well represented through elections. Social discrimination against women, social minority, and ethnic minority are persistent in Japan. Chapter 11 evaluates Taiwan's democratic development focusing on the youth movement and its connection to anti-establishment sentiments. Using the five waves of the Asian Barometer Taiwan Survey, Huang shows that Pan-Green supporters, especially the youth generation, will give very strong support whatsoever to the Pan-Green leadership. This trend can easily guarantee the Pan-Green camp an overwhelming political advantage in future electoral competition. Huang's finding implies that when partisan interest conflicts with public interest, more and more social groups abandon their lone-term pursuit of ideal goals but choose to capitalize political gains and side with the incumbent government. Chapter 7 empirically explores the relationship between public perceptions of democratic quality and political support for democracy in Taiwan. The result demonstrates that Taiwan citizens' evaluation of the democratic government's policy outcomes such as economic growth and income distribution may make a significant contribution to raising their satisfaction with the performance of Taiwan's democracy.

Chapter 8 evaluates the state of democracy in Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country. It argues that Indonesian democracy is taking a different course of development of liberal democracy along with the constitutional ideology of Pancasila. It shows that the deepening of economic inequality should be the most important factor for undermining democracy in Indonesia. The Indonesian case helps us to better understand how to realize the universal values of democracy such as freedom and equality in a Muslim-majority society. Chapter 9 attempts to assess the quality of democracy in India. It argues that procedural dimensions of

democracy such as the rule of law, political participation, and electoral competition are positively associated with the quality of democracy in India. The chapter also indicates that the rampant corruption and a persistently low level of participation by women and youth in the decision-making process should be addressed for improving the quality of Indian democracy. Chapter 10 empirically shows that Singapore citizens' views of government effectiveness and perceptions of procedural justice and ethical reciprocity are significant predictors of values-based legitimacy. This result implies that the more a government is effective, the more legitimacy that government is likely to attain, the more likely it can elicit compliance from its citizens without excessive monitoring or coercion.

Chapter 6 explores the relationship between individuals' civic characteristics and their propensity to support public policies in Vietnam. It empirically shows that Vietnamese who actively participate in civic affairs are more likely to support pro-poor public policies. Civic engagement and political participation bound participants to norms of reciprocity and help them develop trust in others and public authority in Vietnam. Chapter 12 analyzes the features of the Chinese political system focusing on Xi Jinping's regime and predicts whether the "Chinese-style" political system can be developed into an attractive model that will help the rise of China as a great power. Chapter 13 evaluates the nascent democracy of Myanmar focusing on its democratization process and the 2015 general election. The case of Myanmar shows us that democratic transition is not a linear process, but one with frustrations as well as triumphs.

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2 Women's Descriptive and Substantive Representation in East and Southeast Asia

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Introduction

In recent decades, women have broken ground in accessing decision-making power around the world. Women hold nearly or more than half of legislative seats in countries such as Iceland and Rwanda. Globally, female presence in national legislatures tripled from 8.1 percent in 1979 to 23.4 percent in 2019. The number of countries where women constitute more than 30 percent of members in the national parliament is 47 in 2019. Similarly, the number of countries having at least one woman in their cabinets was 26 in 1970. Nowadays, most countries include at least one woman in their cabinets, and only some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran, have all-male cabinets. The growth of women's descriptive representation is observed even in East and Southeast Asia where cultural obstacles have posed a challenge to women's political inclusion. Both women's legislative and cabinet representation in the region have steadily increased, although women are still poorly represented compared to other regions.

Representation is one key component of the effectiveness dimension that constitutes "New Democracy". It refers to the extent to which various members and groups in a society participate in the policy-making process and representatives are responsive to their interests. Descriptive representation, one dimension of representation, implies the compositional similarity between representatives and constituents, while substantive representation, another dimension of representation, refers to the congruence between representatives' actions and the interests of constituents (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). As Pitkin (1967) emphasizes, standing for women is not the same as acting for women. Thus, many studies examine the effect of improvements in women's descriptive representation on women's substantive representation. They find that once females obtain decision-making powers in a country, it has contributed to not only women's own lives but also citizens' quality of life. Higher percentages of women in parliament are associated with greater levels of female citizens' political engagement (Alexander 2012; Barnes and Burchard 2013; Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010) and higher levels of social policy spending and improved public health outcomes (Bolzendahl 2009; Clayton and Zetterberg 2018; Swiss, Fallon and Burgos 2012).

However, these studies mostly focus on industrialized democracies, such as the United States and Western European countries. Fewer studies investigate the effect of women's representation on policy outcomes reflecting women's policy priorities in the context of developing countries.[2] Particularly, East and Southeast Asia have been to some extent ignored in this line of research. Furthermore, the effect of women's cabinet representation has received much less attention. This is problematic because policy-making power is often concentrated in the executive in developing countries. Given that ministers exercise considerable control over states' resources and bureaucracies, it is important to explore the effect of women's cabinet representation on women's substantive representation. This is particularly true in East Asia where executive power is strong due to the nature of authoritarian regimes and the institutional arrangements of developmental states.

This chapter empirically investigates the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation with a particular focus on East and Southeast Asia. Following the existing studies (e.g., Swiss, Fallon, and Burgos 2012; Mechkova and Carlitz 2021), infant and child mortality are used to capture polity outcomes that matter to women. Using statistical analyses of 150 developing countries from 1960 to 2018, it shows that as more women are appointed to cabinet positions or elected to the legislature, infant and child mortality decline. These results show that the descriptive representation of women is not just symbolic but also substantively important to policy outcomes in developing countries, which provides support for the argument for gender equality in political decision-making bodies. However, when it limits the analysis to East and Southeast Asia, only women's cabinet representation is significantly associated with reduced infant and child mortality. It suggests the importance of distinguishing between different types of formal representation and exploring the context under which each type of descriptive representation is more effective in improving women's substantive representation.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section describes improvements in female descriptive representation across the globe and in East and Southeast Asia. The third section theoretically discusses the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation and the limitations with existing studies. The fourth section explains the data and methodology of the analysis. The fifth section presents empirical results, and the final section concludes the discussion.

Growth of Women's Descriptive Representation

In recent decades, women have broken ground in accessing decision-making power around the world.[3] Despite women's long-time struggle for equality in political decision-making, they have been underrepresented in positions of political power for much of the twentieth century. Since the beginning of the 1990s, more women have been appointed to important political positions in governments and elected as legislators in local and national parliaments.

The recent growth in women's political representation is promoted by the rise and diffusion of a new global norm emphasizing women's political inclusion (Bush

2011; Jacob, Scherpereel, and Adams 2014; Towns 2012). Traditionally, wife and mother have been considered women's primary role. Men have been responsible for affairs in the public sphere, and politics has been viewed as a "male domain". Women leaders have been perceived to be less competent than their men counterparts. Prior patterns have their roots in gender norms, assigning primary responsibility for affairs in the public sphere to men and a central role in the private sphere to women. Negative stereotypes about women in politics and traditional beliefs about women's roles prevented women from participating in politics (Paxton and Hughes 2017).

However, a global norm of women's political inclusion became visible and salient since the mid-1970s (Dahlerup 2006; Krook and O'Brien 2012). The international women's movements have made great efforts to create and spread the norm across the world (Finnemore 1993; Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006). Together with international organizations and national governments, transnational activists generated the new global norm for gender equality in politics and successfully set new standards of behavior for states. At the same time, domestic women's movement has strived to internalize such a norm into domestic contexts, at both elite and mass levels (Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006).

Particularly, the United Nations (UN) was critical to the effort to generate a global norm of gender balance in politics. It sponsored a series of international conferences for women's political inclusion and empowerment. The UN held the first UN World Conference on Women in Mexico City in 1975 to celebrate the International Year of the Women and launched the UN Decade for Women (1976–1985). It was the first to call for women's inclusion in national-level decision-making. The norm of gender equality in politics became stronger in the 1980s and 1990s. After the Second and Third World Conferences on Women, the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, resulted in another major declaration, "the Platform for Action". The Beijing Platform for Action calls for the inclusion of women in public life at all levels with concrete action plans. Other international organizations, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union, African Union, the European Union, and Organization of American States, joined the effort to promote gender equality in politics. Subsequently, the importance of increasing women's political participation and power has been recognized by the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals and its new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

To illustrate the spread of the global norm stressing women's political inclusion, I calculate the proportion of countries that have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in a given year. As the global pressure for gender equality increases and spreads, the number of countries ratifying the CEDAW also increases. The left panel of Figure 2.1 displays the percentage of countries having ratified the CEDAW. It demonstrates the rapid growth in the number of countries ratifying the CEDAW in the mid-1980s. By 1985, more than 50 percent of countries had ratified the CEDAW. After the end of the Cold War, another jump occurred since many

Figure 2.1 Growth in CEDAW ratification (*left*) and gender quota adoption (*right*).

of the former Soviet states ratified the CEDAW after the independence. Today almost all UN member-countries have done it.

Following the increase of global pressure for women's political inclusion, many countries across different contexts have adopted gender quotas. Parliamentary gender quotas are considered as one of the most significant contributors to the improvement in female legislative representation in the last 30 years (Jones 1996; Tripp and Kang 2008). The right panel of Figure 2.1 presents the proportion of countries that have adopted gender quotas.[4] In the 1970s, only a few countries had gender quotas. However, the 1995 Beijing conference played an important role in spreading the adoption of gender quotas. After the conference, the number of countries with gender quotas sharply increased. By 2019, more than 70 countries had altered their constitutions or electoral laws to mandate that a certain proportion of women be included as candidates or legislators. Due to the spread of the global norm, many countries have adopted gender quotas to appear "modern" in the international community (Dahlerup 2006).

Reflecting the global shift in gender norms, the corresponding growth in women's descriptive representation has occurred. The left panel of Figure 2.2 displays the temporal changes in the number of female legislators (solid line) and female cabinet members (dotted line).[5] Both numbers have steadily grown over time but increases more rapidly since the 1990s, particularly after the Beijing conference. The average percentage of women in national parliaments was 5 percent in 1970 but jumped to approximately 23 percent in 2019. Similarly, women's share of ministerial positions has increased from 2 percent in 1970 to 20 percent in 2016. Of course, merely focusing on the number of women in cabinet positions does not give a full description of women's appointments to ministerial positions, since women tend to be overrepresented in less prestigious positions related to feminine issue domains, such as family, health, youth, and education, and underrepresented in positions perceived as a male domain, such as defense, finance, and foreign affairs (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009; Krook and O'Brien 2012; Reynolds 1999). In addition, leaders may use female ministers as "window-dressing" (Krook and O'Brien 2012, 841). For example, Jacob, Scherpereel, and Adams (2014) show that the global diffusion of gender norms affects appointments of low-prestige cabinet positions more than those of high-prestige positions. Nevertheless, increasing women's representation in cabinets can contribute to women's political inclusion and empowerment by expanding state bureaucracies for gender mainstreaming (True and Mintrom 2001) and improving people's perception of female executives (Jalalzai 2013).

These improvements in women's descriptive representation led to gradual improvement in women's political empowerment, although women are still underrepresented in important decision-making positions. The right panel of Figure 2.2 presents the overtime change in the women's political empowerment index, as measured in the V-Dem data (ver. 10). Women's political empowerment is defined as "a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making" (Sundström et al. 2017, 322). This multidimensional variable measures the extent to which women are politically

Growth in female legislators and cabinet members

Growth in female political empowerment

Figure 2.2 Global trends in female legislative representation (*left*) and political empowerment (*right*).

empowered by focusing on fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions. The figure shows that the women's political empowerment index, averaged over countries, also has gradually increased since 1960 and made a substantial improvement since 1995. This suggests that the spread of global norms stressing women's political inclusion translates into growth in women's political inclusion and empowerment.

Women's Descriptive Representation in East and Southeast Asia

Figure 2.3 shows which countries have increased the number of women in the legislature or the cabinet during the period 1985–2015. In this figure, countries above the diagonal line improved on women's descriptive representation over the 30 years, while countries below the line deteriorated. There are only 11 countries experiencing a decline in female legislative representation over the period. Almost all of them are former communist countries, such as Albania, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Russia, that already achieved a high level of female legislative representation. When it comes to the proportion of female cabinet members, the amount of growth is greater. In 85 percent of the countries (126 out of 149) in the data, the share of female cabinet members was lower than 10 percent in 1985. However, only 30 percent of them (47 out of 171) remains below 10 percent in 2015.

East and Southeast Asian countries are not an exception to this global trend. They, on average, lag behind other regions in women's descriptive representation (Bauer and Tremblay 2011; Paxton and Hughes 2017; Prihatini 2019). Even though many countries have successfully achieved economic modernization, which is considered as one important contributing factor to women's political representation, economic modernization does not translate into women's representation (Jayaweera 1997; Joshi and Kingma 2013). Scholars point out cultural barriers to women's political inclusion in the region. Confucianism and Buddhism, highly influential in the region, are considered to stifle women's political participation by placing women in a subordinate position to men or in marginal roles (Paxton and Hughes 2017, 360–362). Nevertheless, as Figure 2.1 illustrates, the regional temporal patterns in the CEDAW ratifications and the adoption of gender quotas are quite similar to the global pattern. Most countries in the region have ratified CEDAW by 2010, and 40 percent of the countries in the region have adopted gender quotas.[6] Consequently, countries in East Asia, depicted in black, have seen increases in the number of women both in the legislature and the cabinet over the last decades[7] (see Figure 2.3).

Notwithstanding the recent growth, the average level of women's political representation in the region is lower than the global average. Only two countries, Indonesia and Japan, have more female cabinet members than the global average in 2015, and five countries have more female legislators than the global average. Many countries that have relatively high levels of women's legislative

Female legislators (%)

Female cabinet members (%)

Figure 2.3 Changes in female political representation between 1985 and 2015.

representation are current or former communist regimes, including Cambodia, China, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam, that promoted gender equality as a part of communist ideology. Women's legislative representation in communist regimes does not reflect genuine levels of women's political inclusion and empowerment (Bjarnegård and Melander 2013; Paxton and Hughes 2017).

Additionally, a significant amount of variation exists in the region. The share of female legislators ranges from 6.1 percent to 32.7 percent from 1959 to 2019, and the share of female ministers in the period ranges from 1.5 percent to 21.1 percent. Figure 2.4 presents a detailed look at changes in female descriptive representations in East and Southeast Asia.[8] Most countries except North Korea include more women in the legislature in 2019 than in 1989. As of 2019, seven countries—China, Indonesia, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam—have implemented gender quotas, although China and Vietnam do not apply sanctions in case of non-compliance. These countries tend to have

Figure 2.4 Changes in female political representation in East Asia.

higher numbers of women in the legislature than countries without quotas. On the other hand, Japan, Myanmar (Burma), Malaysia, and Thailand are located at the bottom in 2019, although they are much different from each other in political regime types and level of economic development.

On the other hand, the proportion of female cabinet members, illustrated at the bottom panel of Figure 2.4, reveals a different pattern. Countries with a high number of women in the legislature such as Taiwan, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste are also at the top of the ranking in 2019. However, a significant mismatch exists between the percentage of women in cabinet positions and the percentage of women in the legislature (see also Bauer and Tremblay 2011). Like other communist regimes, very few women are included in the cabinet positions in communist regimes. This shows that levels of legislative representation in communist regimes do not indicate women's political empowerment of women. However, laggards in legislative representation, such as Japan, Thailand, and Malaysia, perform better in the proportion of female cabinet members. The picture of women's formal representation in East and Southeast Asia is quite complicated and mixed.

Descriptive and Substantive Representation

Given the substantial increase in descriptive representation of women, an important question is whether the improved descriptive representation makes a difference. One argument for improving women's political representation is that gender imbalances in political power and decision-making create poor representation of women's interest and concerns in the society. Thus, it is important to examine whether an increase in women's descriptive representation improves their substantive representation.

As Paxton and Hughes (2017) discuss, answering this question is related to the following questions. First, are female politicians more likely to see female voters as an important constituent group? If female politicians and policymakers do not view female constituents more important than male politicians and policymakers do, an increase in the numerical representation of women does not necessarily translate into better substantive representation of women. Previous studies provide positive evidence. They find that female politicians are more likely to consider women as an important constituency, compared to male politicians, and speak directly on behalf of their women constituents' well-being (Reingold 1992; Schwindt-Bayer 2006).

The next relevant question is whether men and women are different from each other in their political attitudes and policy priorities. If they do not have different political attitudes and policy priorities, incorporating more women in the legislature or the cabinet would not contribute to women's substantive representation, even though female politicians pay more attention to female constituents than male counterparts. The expectation that female politicians will better represent the concerns and interests of female constituents requires that men and women diverge to some degree in terms of their policy priorities and preferences. Again, existing scholarship provides a great deal of evidence that women have different policy preferences than

men. For example, several studies find that women are more likely than men to prioritize issues related to women, children, and family (Kittilson 2008; Schwindt-Bayer 2006). Other studies find that women tend to favor redistribution more than men, even controlling for political ideology (Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006). Additionally, different policy preferences produce different voting patterns between female and male legislators. Scholars find that female legislators are more likely to propose and vote for women's issue bills (Grey 2006; Reingold 2003; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Swers 1998).

Accordingly, existing scholarship provides the theoretical and empirical foundation for the link between women's descriptive and substantive representation. In line with the aforementioned studies, empirical studies show that a rise in women's legislative representation has been correlated with an increased spending on social policies (Bolzendahl 2009; Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007; Clayton and Zetterberg 2018; Miller 2008). They provide strong evidence that women's descriptive representation translates into women's substantive representation.

However, two limitations remain. First, scholars have paid relatively less attention to developing countries than to developed countries. The studies discussed above mostly focus on industrialized democracies, such as the United States and Western European countries. A small number of studies examine women's substantive representation in developing countries, but many of them are based on specific country cases (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). Few studies conduct a cross-national study for developing countries. Only a handful of studies examine health outcomes such as infant and child mortality to explore the relationship between women's descriptive representation and policy outcomes that matter to women. For example, Swiss, Fallon and Burgos (2012) present cross-national evidence that women's legislative representation is positively associated with immunization rates and infant and child survival in developing countries. Similarly, Mechkova and Carlitz (2021) find that in sub-Saharan Africa, women's legislative representation is correlated with reduced infant and child mortality and increased health spending.

Furthermore, the effect of female representation in the cabinet has received much less attention. Most existing studies only examine the effect of legislative representation on substantive representation.[9] It is not surprising given the critical position of the legislature in representative democracies. Nevertheless, this is problematic for several reasons. First, ministers are often responsible for the implementation and management of policies. "Ministers control disproportionate shares of states' resources, managing vast bureaucracies, overseeing the disbursement of funds, and projecting state power domestically and internationally" (Jacob, Scherpereel, and Adams 2014, 322). Second, in the context of developing countries, political power is often concentrated in the executive, and thus the cabinet may be more important to policy-making than the legislature. This is particularly true in East Asia where many countries are still authoritarian, and authoritarian developmental states have promoted economic development. Finally, women tend to be overrepresented in cabinet positions related to "feminine policy" domains such as children, family, and health. These positions are most related to infant and

child mortality. Thus, it is important to explore whether women's cabinet representation as well as their legislative representation relate to women's substantive representation in developing countries, including East and Southeast Asia.

I follow previous studies (Kittilson 2008; Swiss, Fallon, and Burgos 2012; Mechkova and Carlitz 2021) and examine how women's descriptive representation affects infant and child mortality. I expect that an increase not only in women's legislative representation but also in cabinet representation is associated with a decreased number of infant or child deaths. If women's cabinet appointments influence infant and child mortality, the relationship should be more pronounced in East and Southeast Asia.

Data and Method

For empirical analysis, I construct a cross-sectional, time-series data where the unit of analysis is the country-year. I use two samples. One is a global sample covering 145–147 developing countries from 1961 to 2017, while the other is a sample of countries in East and Southeast Asia. To construct the sample of developing countries, I excluded 32 high-income members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).[10]

To explore how women's descriptive representation affects outcomes that matter to women, I follow previous studies (Swiss, Fallon, and Burgos 2012; Mechkova and Carlitz 2021) and look at two health outcomes: infant and child mortality. Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching 1 year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. Similarly, child mortality rate is the number of newborn babies dying before reaching age 5 per 1,000. These variables are obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicator (WDI) dataset (World Bank 2019).

The key independent variable is women's descriptive representation. To measure women's descriptive representation, I focus on the percentage of women in national legislatures and cabinet positions. I obtain the percentage of seats held by women in the lower or single house of each country's national legislature from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem, version 10) data (Coppedge et al. 2020). The percentage of female cabinet members is obtained from the recently developed WhoGov dataset (Nyrup and Bramwell 2020) that contains information on cabinet members between 1966 and 2016 in all countries with a population of more than 400,000. Following Nyrup and Bramwell (2020), I focus on core cabinet members that include cabinet ministers, prime ministers, presidents, vice prime ministers, vice presidents, members of the politburo, and members of a military junta. This number does not consider unoccupied positions, positions held by the same person, and positions that are not considered core positions (e.g., deputy and junior ministers, governors of the central bank, ambassadors to the United States, and Permanent Representatives to the UN). Given that I focus on non-democracies as well as democracies, positions in the politburo or a military junta should be considered. To ensure the robustness of the result, however, I also limit cabinet positions to cabinet ministers. Results remain similar.

For potential confounding variables, I include control variables as suggested by the existing scholarship. First, more economically developed countries tend to devote a greater share of resources to health and have lower infant and child mortality. Similarly, a greater economic growth rate produces more resources for health expenditures. Economic development, as a part of the modernization process, can influence the descriptive representation of women. Thus, I include a natural log of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, the proportion of urban population, and an annual economic growth rate. To obtain these variables, I use the World Development Indicators data. Second, democracy may affect both human development outcomes and female legislative representation. I include the electoral democracy index from the V-Dem data (scaled 0–1) (Coppedge et al. 2020). The electoral democracy index intends to measure the degree to which the ideal of democracy is achieved in the country, focusing on whether regular electoral mechanisms make rulers responsive and accountable to their citizens. Accordingly, as a country is more democratic, it may be more responsive to the public's demand for better human development outcomes. Finally, internal armed conflict can impede government services and negatively influence human development outcomes. Thus, I control for a binary indicator for civil conflicts that is taken from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

I estimate the following linear regression model:

$$y_{it} = \alpha \, y_{it-1} + \beta Women_{it-1} + \mathbf{X_{it-1}}\delta + \phi_i + u_{it} \tag{1}$$

where y_{it} is a human development outcome. I include the lagged dependent variable to capture the persistence in the outcome. $Women_{it-1}$ is either the percent of women's seats in the lower or single house of the national legislature or the share of women in the cabinet in country i at time $t-1$. $\mathbf{X_{it-1}}$ is a vector of control variables that we introduce above. I include country fixed effects ϕ_i to control for time-invariant country-specific factors, such as culture, colonial history, or geography, that may drive the relationship between democracy and gender inequality in politics. I use robust standard errors clustered by country. I also attempt to include year fixed effects to control for common shocks to infant or child mortality. The last question to address is how long it will take for the effect of female descriptive representation to be realized. It is not reasonable to assume that the effects of female descriptive representation on health outcomes contemporaneously occur. I lag covariates by one year in the main specification but also explore different temporal structures below.

Results

Table 2.1 presents the fixed-effects estimates. The results are based on the global sample including 145–147 developing countries. As explained above, I use two different human development outcomes and examine the effect of women's political representation on infant and child mortality. The first four columns present the results of the infant mortality model, while the next four columns display the

Table 2.1 Women's Descriptive Representation and Health Outcomes (%)

	DV: Infant mortality				DV: Child mortality			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Female legislators	−0.010 (0.010)	−0.011 (0.011)			−0.021 (0.015)	−0.010 (0.014)		
Female ministers			−0.015* (0.006)	−0.012+ (0.006)			−0.039** (0.012)	−0.028* (0.011)
Democracy index	−0.007 (0.401)	−0.218 (0.396)	−0.186 (0.395)	−0.376 (0.375)	−0.321 (0.747)	−0.408 (0.806)	−0.444 (0.720)	−0.710 (0.705)
GDP per capita (log)	0.324 (0.217)	0.334 (0.231)	0.164 (0.221)	0.257 (0.250)	0.695+ (0.392)	0.920** (0.472)	0.461 (0.413)	0.782 (0.508)
GDP growth	−0.018** (0.006)	−0.015** (0.006)	−0.021** (0.006)	−0.019** (0.006)	−0.025* (0.011)	−0.019 (0.013)	−0.033* (0.013)	−0.028* (0.014)
Urban population	0.014 (0.010)	0.019 (0.012)	0.033* (0.013)	0.035* (0.015)	0.015 (0.026)	0.036 (0.023)	0.054+ (0.031)	0.063* (0.030)
Armed conflict	0.074 (0.181)	0.081 (0.182)	−0.047 (0.180)	−0.061 (0.175)	0.117 (0.333)	0.152 (0.341)	0.072 (0.382)	0.044 (0.381)
Lagged DV	0.986** (0.003)	0.982** (0.004)	0.986** (0.004)	0.982** (0.004)	0.984** (0.006)	0.977** (0.008)	0.985** (0.006)	0.980** (0.008)
Constant	−3.755* (1.703)	−3.744+ (1.931)	−3.262+ (1.760)	−3.788+ (2.088)	−6.811* (3.090)	−9.101* (3.851)	−6.702+ (3.535)	−9.124* (4.267)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Long-run effect	−0.73	−0.58	−1.04	−0.66	−1.32	−0.43	−2.55	−1.38
N	147	147	145	145	147	147	145	145
R-squared	5,008	5,008	5,100	5,097	5,008	5,008	5,100	5,097

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

results of the child mortality model. Odd-numbered columns only include country fixed effects, while even-numbered columns include both country and year fixed effects.

Columns 1 and 2 use the proportion of female legislators. As expected, the coefficient estimates on female legislators are negative. However, the evidence is weak since the coefficients are not statistically at any conventional level of statistical significance. On the other hand, Columns 3 and 4 show that an increased proportion of female cabinet members are significantly associated with decreased infant mortality. The magnitude of the coefficients on male cabinet members is similar to that of the coefficients on female cabinet members. However, only female cabinet members are statistically significant.

Due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, the coefficient estimates only capture the immediate impact of the independent variables on infant mortality. The immediate impact does not account for lasting effects of each covariate in future time periods. Thus, I calculate and present the long-run cumulative effects of each female legislator or cabinet member variable at the bottom of the table. The coefficient estimates on the lagged dependent variables are about 0.986 and are statistically significant. This implies that the impact of a one-time shock to a variable at time t takes about 34 years to dissipate by one-half, demonstrating that the level of health outcomes is highly persistent. According to Column 3, the calculation of the long-run effects shows that if the proportion of female legislators increases by one standard deviation (≈ 9.87), the number of infants dying before reaching 1 year of age per 1,000 live births decreases by 10.27 ($\approx 9.87 \times -1.04$) in the long run.

The models of child mortality report a similar pattern. The coefficient estimates on female legislators are negative but statistically insignificant, while those of female cabinet members are negative and statistically significant. Additionally, the effect of female cabinet members on child mortality is greater than its effect on infant mortality. The calculation of the long-run cumulative effects, based on Column 7, indicates that if the number of female cabinet members increases by one standard deviation (≈ 8.3), the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age per 1,000 live births decreases by 21.17 ($\approx 8.3 \times -2.55$) in the long run.

I attempt to use different temporal data structures. It may take more time for the effect of women's descriptive representation on policy outcomes to be realized. Instead of the annual panel data, I use lower frequency panel data: two-, four-, and six-year data. For example, to construct panels of two years, I take the observation every two years and lag the explanatory variables by one two-year period. I apply the same method to four- or six-year panels. Table 2.2 presents the estimation results. With lower frequency data, the effect of female legislative representation is statistically significant. Particularly, when I use the four-year panel, it is significant and increases in magnitude. Meanwhile, the effects of female cabinet members remain robust across different data frequencies and lag structures.

Table 2.2 Using Alternative Data Frequencies

	Infant mortality		Infant mortality	
	Two-year panel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female legislators	−0.033		−0.084	
	(0.025)		(0.051)	
Female ministers		−0.038**		−0.110**
		(0.014)		(0.037)
Constant	−6.523+	−5.475	−12.123+	−11.170
	(3.795)	(3.601)	(7.131)	(7.376)
Long-run effect	−1.05	−1.14	−2.17	−2.88
N	147	145	147	145
R-squared	2,280	2,457	2,280	2,457
	Four-year panel			
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Female legislators	−0.130+		−0.267*	
	(0.068)		(0.121)	
Female ministers		−0.085**		−0.214**
		(0.031)		(0.058)
Constant	−14.279	−8.961	−33.556*	−25.269+
	(8.803)	(7.483)	(15.883)	(14.747)
Long-run effect	−1.78	−0.99	−4.59	−2.99
N	141	124	141	124
R-squared	974	1,046	974	1,046
	Six-year panel			
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Female legislators	−0.133		−0.275+	
	(0.085)		(0.164)	
Female ministers		−0.184*		−0.426**
		(0.075)		(0.143)
Constant	−5.837	−4.446	−24.951	−25.629
	(12.241)	(11.415)	(21.642)	(21.629)
Long-run effect	−0.93	−1.21	−2.08	−3.17
N	116	118	116	118
R-squared	519	612	519	612

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$. All models include control variables and country and year fixed effects.

These results show that a growth of women's descriptive representation has a significant impact on women's substantive representation in developing countries. When more women are appointed to important political positions in the government or elected to the legislature, women can make a difference in policy issues that women prioritize. The descriptive representation of women is not just symbolic but also substantively important.

Given these results, I turn to East and Southeast Asia and limit the analysis to them. Bjarnegård and Melander (2013) argue that female legislative representation poorly captures genuine gender equality in East Asia. They posit that the meaning of legislative representation varies much across different settings. The results, presented in Table 2.3, provide mixed support for their argument. In East and Southeast Asia, there is little relationship between women's legislative representation and numbers of infant and children deaths. On the other hand, the effects of female cabinet members are negative and statistically significant. As I conjecture, women's cabinet representation matters to substantive representation more than women's legislative representation in East and Southeast Asia.

Table 2.3 Restricting the Sample to East and Southeast Asia

	DV: Infant mortality		DV: Child mortality	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female legislators	0.006		0.003	
	(0.006)		(0.009)	
Female ministers		−0.026**		−0.049**
		(0.007)		(0.012)
Democracy index	−0.027	−0.098	−0.048	−0.415
	(0.295)	(0.270)	(0.559)	(0.680)
GDP per capita (log)	0.237*	0.216*	0.438**	0.292
	(0.102)	(0.089)	(0.158)	(0.247)
GDP growth	−0.029**	−0.023*	−0.041**	−0.033+
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.020)
Urban population	0.006	0.010+	0.006	0.015
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.016)
Armed conflict	0.442**	0.562**	0.652**	0.936*
	(0.136)	(0.142)	(0.228)	(0.437)
Lagged DV	0.981**	0.979**	0.978**	0.972**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Constant	−2.533**	−2.180**	−4.086**	−2.670
	(0.765)	(0.732)	(1.148)	(1.713)
Long-run effect	0.30	−1.20	0.14	−1.76
N	12	12	12	12
R-squared	496	516	496	516

Note: Panel corrected standard errors are in parentheses. $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$. All models include control variables and country fixed effects.

Finally, I examine the possibility that women's general empowerment, not their political representation, is driving the relationship between descriptive representation and better health outcomes. To this end, I use women's civil society participation, as measured in the V-Dem data. This variable measures women's ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups. It focuses on the extent to which women can openly discuss political issues, can form and participate in civil society organizations, and are represented in the ranks of journalists. Thus, I explore whether the inclusion of this variable weakens the association between descriptive representation and better health outcomes and whether this variable is significantly associated with lower numbers of infant or child deaths. Table 2.4 indicates that women's civil society participation is not significantly associated with infant or child mortality. The coefficient estimates on women's civil society participation are negative, but none of them are statistically different from 0 at any conventional level of statistical significance. This suggests that a growth in women's civil society participation may not be enough to exert a real impact on substantive representation of women. Increasing women's formal political representation is necessary to improve women's substantive representation.

Table 2.4 Women's Civil Society Participation and Health Outcomes (%)

	DV: Infant mortality			DV: Child mortality		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Global sample						
Female legislators	−0.008			−0.016		
	(0.008)			(0.012)		
Female ministers		−0.013*			−0.034**	
		(0.005)			(0.011)	
Women civil society	−0.007	−0.008	−0.012	−0.013	−0.018	−0.023
participation	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.019)
N	147	145	147	147	145	147
R-squared	5,008	5,100	5,684	5,008	5,100	5,684
Only East and Southeast Asia						
Female legislators	0.006			0.005		
	(0.006)			(0.009)		
Female ministers		−0.027**			−0.050**	
		(0.007)			(0.012)	
Women civil society	−0.002	0.004	0.002	−0.006	0.003	−0.001
participation	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.011)
N	12	12	12	12	12	12
R-squared	496	516	552	496	516	552

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level (*top*) and panel corrected standard errors (*bottom*) are in parentheses. $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$. All models include control variables and country fixed effects.

Conclusion

This chapter focuses on representation, one component of effectiveness, which is the second dimension of "New Democracy". It presents a descriptive look at the growth of women's descriptive representation in East and Southeast Asia as well as across the globe. More importantly, it shows that a growth in women's descriptive representation, here defined as an increase in the number of women in the legislature or the cabinet, leads to better policy outcomes that women prioritize. It finds that a greater level of female formal representation is associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality in developing countries. However, when it restricts the analysis to East and Southeast Asia, only women's cabinet representation is significantly associated with reduced infant and child mortality.

Future study should examine specific contexts under which women's legislative or cabinet representation produces improved policy outcomes for women. For example, Mechkova and Carlitz (2021) find that only the number of women in the legislature, not in the cabinet, is significantly associated with decreased numbers of infant and child deaths. This contrasts with this chapter's finding. Women's cabinet representation exerts more robust effects on infant and child mortality, particularly in the regional setting of East and Southeast Asia. This result suggests the need to distinguish between different types of formal representation and explore specific contexts under which each type of women's representation can be more important. Additionally, democracies should be better able than non-democracies to channel an increase in descriptive representation into a corresponding increase in substantive representation by producing tangible policy outcomes. This should be particularly true of legislative representation rather than cabinet representation. The difference between the two types of representation deserves more research.

Notes

1 Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea. Email: namkkim1@gmail.com. Nam Kyu Kim was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2020S1A3A2A02092791) and a Korea University Grant (K2107701).
2 Swiss, Fallon, and Burgos (2012) and Mechkova and Carlitz (2021) are notable exceptions.
3 Part of this section draws on the author's unpublished co-authored paper (Hong and Kim 2021).
4 I examine whether a country has any national-level gender quota that either reserves national legislative seats or mandates candidate nominations for women through statutory law. I record all quotas without considering whether there is a sanction for non-compliance. The information on gender quotas is obtained from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data (Coppedge et al. 2020).
5 See the data section for information on both variables.
6 See Tan (2016) for the reform in gender quota in East Asia.
7 Lee and Park (2018) provide an important qualification by showing that only the share of women among professional ministers, not among political ministers, has increased over time.

8 Years are selected based on the most recent year available in each dataset.
9 One important exception is Mechkova and Carlitz (2021), but they find little relation-ship between women's cabinet representation and infant and child mortality.
10 I use the World Bank's classification of a high-income economy.

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3 East Asians' Understanding of Democracy

How Income Inequality Prioritizes Components of Democracy[1]

Kuyoun Chung

Introduction

This chapter quantitatively examines how income inequality affects East Asians' preferences over the components of democracy. It begins with a discussion on the characteristics of the so-called "new normal era", with particular attention to the trend in which income inequality leads to political inequality. Indeed, income inequality has given rise to a skeptical evaluation of democracy's performance in reducing income inequality and constrained the opportunities for political participation and representation, which subsequently created political inequality within East Asian states. Ultimately, such inequality is leading to citizens' dissatisfaction with liberal democracy and to the spread of anti-establishment stances, authoritarianism, and populism, which raise concerns regarding potential deconsolidation of democracy (Foa and Mounk 2017). The rise of populist parties and politicians observed in consolidated democracies of North America and across Europe before and after the 2016 US presidential election can be understood in this context. Not only the former US President Donald Trump but also populist leaders such as Marine Le-Pen of France, Viktor Orbán of Hungary, and Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines represent this trend. These leaders were probably the alternatives to whom citizens increasingly turned as their negative evaluations of political effectiveness grew in their own democratic system (Jesuit et al. 2009; Pepinsky 2017). Against this backdrop, this chapter investigates the components of democracy that income inequality—the primary characteristic of the new normal—makes citizens of East Asian countries prioritize through a quantitative analysis of the Asia Barometer Wave IV data.

Income inequality exists in any market economy with a varying degree. For instance, an income gap may exist between highly educated skilled workers and others. The problem is that the current income inequality has soared to the extent that it is leading to political inequality in a number of democratic capitalist countries. In theory, all individuals, regardless of income level, are equal before law and government in a democratic system in which procedural equality is maintained (Hacker and Pierson 2010). The democratic system must ensure that all individuals have equal influence on the political process and only when such procedural equality

is upheld, can a political environment that allows individuals' full participation in the political process exist. According to the theory that addresses an equalizing effect of democracy, which is premised upon this logic, income inequality does not cause political inequality in a democratic system due to the existence of the middle class that includes median voters (Meltzer and Richard 1981). However, within the consolidated democracies with increasing income inequality, political inequality is growing with declining political participation and political representation.

Against this backdrop, this study discusses how East Asians understand and evaluate their democracies by empirically analyzing the Asia Barometer Wave IV survey data. In particular, this study aims to explore which components of democracy are prioritized and what factors determine these prioritizations as East Asia experiences income inequality amid the new normal era.

This study serves as an opportunity to understand how East Asians evaluate their own political systems as well as to anticipate the qualitative changes of East Asian democracies in the future. To this end, this study first examines the current status of income inequality and political inequality in East Asia and then examines East Asians' priorities over the components that constitute democracy, and the corresponding determinants of such priorities.

Income Inequality and Political Inequality as the New Normal

Income Inequality and Equalizing Effect of Democracy

The idea of "new normal" has not been clearly defined yet in academia. The term was first used by Roger McNamee in the United States in his book *The New Normal: Great Opportunities in a Times of Great Risk* (2004) and it has been used to refer to the phenomenon of normalizing what used to be abnormal and has come to mean an alternative that emerges with change by questioning the past standard. In this context, the term "new normal" was used to indicate the new international order after the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001, but it began to be used extensively to refer to the long-term recession that started in advanced economies after the 2008 global financial crisis (Cobham and Sumner 2013; Gomstyn 2009; Wysong and Perruci 2018). As the low-growth, low-consumption, and low-yield trend that the 2008 financial crisis initiated continued, economic inequality and polarization began to emerge in an unprecedented degree. This change also resulted not only from the increase in financial regulation after the financial crisis, but also from an industrial shift to a sustainable decarbonized economy, polarizing distribution of power in the international economic order, weakened US dollar as the world's reserve currency, and competition in procuring natural resources. In this context, it has been argued that the current new normal economy is not simply a problem from the 2008 financial crisis or technological innovation, but is unfolding with the changes in the structure of the international division of labor and geopolitical changes, and that these changes are causing the low growth and inequality at the global level (Lee 2017).

Mainstream economists suggest that technological innovation in the post-industrial society caused income inequality as skill-oriented technological development increased the wage gap between highly educated skilled workers and less educated unskilled workers (Kim 2016). In other words, as the post-knowledge economy marginalized those less educated unskilled labor amid the information technology revolution, workers who have struggled in self-innovation lost their own competitiveness, which has consequently polarized the entire labor market. Koo and Lee (2016) underline a more fundamental change in the labor sector, suggesting that a decline in the long-term potential growth rate of the economy is caused by the decrease in supply in the labor market due to low birth rate and aging population. Meanwhile, scholars who stress governments' failures in active market intervention have pointed out that the financial sector's rent-seeking caused by the relaxation of financial regulations has led to market failure, or that the failure to redistribute wealth—for example, via welfare systems—is the cause of income inequality (Atkins 2015; Stiglitz 2012).

Among various demographic brackets, millennials have been found to be most affected by the increasing income inequality. This generation that was about to enter the labor market in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis has had to experience income inequality most severely due to multiple challenges, including stagnant income levels due to low growth, a shrinking middle class, weakening population mobility, and the influx of immigrants that provide cheap labor.

In short, income inequality is a phenomenon that has become more salient as ushered in the new normal era, which is likely to trigger political change. In fact, the issue of increasing income inequality since the 2008 financial crisis changed the previous understanding of income inequality (Seo and Kim 2014). First, the trickle-down effect of economic growth does not reduce income inequality. Second, the capacity of democracy to correct income inequality, which has been taken for granted for a long time, appears to vary depending on the level of democratic consolidation or the context in which each democracy operates (Nam and Mah 2019). Then, why does the equalizing effect to correct its own income inequality not appear in current democratic systems?

The capacity of democracy to reduce income inequality (i.e., equalizing effect) requires the presence of a middle class that includes median voters (Meltzer and Richard 1981). According to Meltzer and Richard (1981), the policy preference of middle-class voters that include median voters is important to sustain a democracy because policy decisions are made according to the principle of majority vote. In particular, with regard to income redistribution policies, if the median income of the median voters is lower than the average income of the country's economy, they will prefer income redistribution and will vote for policies that support this position; they will oppose the policy otherwise. As a result, as income inequality increases, median voters will try to correct this income inequality and the democratic system will not experience extreme income inequality and economic polarization. However, Figure 3.1, which demonstrates the level of income inequality of democracies, does not show the equalizing effect.

Figure 3.1 shows the level of income inequality between 2008 and 2018 in the 168 democratic countries in the Polity V dataset. As shown in Figure 3.1, income inequality actually increases, although slightly, as the level of democracy increases, and highly democratic countries also varied widely in their income inequality. Although the graph shows descriptive statistics only, the equalizing effect of democracy is not as clear as the theory suggests. In other words, even when income inequality increases, the middle class is not playing a role in correcting it, while the high-income class might actively participate in politics to represent their interests than the low-income class. It can also be inferred that the middle class may have shrunk due to increasing income inequality (Blanchard and Willmann 2016).

Regarding such trends, research has recently been conducted on the political effects of income inequality. According to such studies, income inequality widens the gap in policy preferences between income classes by allocating more resources to the relatively high-income class while it reduces the political participation of the middle class and weakens their support for democracy (Han 2016; Houle 2018; Lee and Kwon 2016; Levin-Waldman 2016; Park 2015; Weatherall et al. 2018). In fact, it has been found that the level of civic involvement varies

across income brackets. In a democratic system, policy preferences of the high-income class are better reflected in government policies than are those of the low-income class, leading to political inequality (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008; Acemoglu et al. 2013; Bonica et al. 2013). Various forms of civic involvement, such as voting, participation in civic organizations, meetings with public officials, and participation in protests and rallies, were found to be more common in higher-income classes (Levin-Waldman 2013). In the United States, for example, during the 2012 presidential election, donations of the top 0.01 percent income bracket to the presidential campaign accounted for more than 40 percent of all donations, and 75 percent of the high-income class participated in various political activities, while only 13 percent of the low-income class did (Bonica et al. 2013). In addition, the level of political organization also varied across income groups. In the United States, as the influence of labor unions is sharply diminishing, union membership was only around 11 percent in 2012. Even the Democratic Party of the United States, which used to represent workers' interests, began to represent corporate interests as the funding from labor unions dropped. According to Bartel (2008), in the United States, neither the Democratic nor the Republican Parties had legislated policies that represent the interests of the poor, resulting in legislation of policies that are more favorable to the high-income class.

In sum, income inequality leads to political inequality, which in turn weakens the sense of unity among people due to the diminishing sense of shared interests among them (Stiglitz 2012), and ultimately erodes their support for democratic system. That is, as income inequality increases, the low-income class is more likely to feel marginalized, and the high-income and the low-income classes might conclude that it is impossible to have shared goals and visions in a state (Uslaner 2008). The weakening of unity among people ultimately leads to a negative evaluation of the function and role of the democratic government, generating distrust of the political system of which they are a part, and diminishing the commitment to political participation (Haveman et al. 2004; Solt 2008).

Such assertions are in line with the existing findings that citizens' support for democracy is determined by its economic performance (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Mishler and Rose 1997). There certainly were some who argued that economic performance is unlikely to be a significant determinant in explaining support for democracy unless economic inequality is significantly prolonged (Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Kang, 2012). However, long-term economic recession and systemic income inequality under the new normal are likely to make people stress on the economic performance of democracy more and, therefore, declining economic performance can threaten their democracy's legitimacy.

In fact, such a change in political attitudes may manifest as people's increasing support for authoritarian leaders, populism, and anti-establishment, as observed in the 2016 US presidential election (Weatherall et al. 2018). Against this backdrop, the next section discusses the level of income inequality and political inequality in East Asia.

Income Inequality and Political Inequality in East Asia

The region of East Asia shows contradictory trends in terms of income inequality and economic growth. At the regional level, East Asia has achieved sharp economic growth faster than any other region, contributing to eradication of poverty and reducing income inequality. In particular, China and India could be considered to have driven this change as they scored average economic growth rates of 9.7 percent and 6.7 percent during 1990–2017, respectively. However, at the country level, income inequality has been increasing in East Asian countries.

Of course, it is true that the level of income inequality in Asia is relatively low compared to other regions. As of 2013, the mean Gini indexes for Asian countries were between 26 and 46, with a median of 37. Meanwhile, the mean Gini indexes for the region of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America for 2013 were between 31 and 63 (median: 43) and 40 and 58 (median: 47), respectively. Within East Asia, the mean Gini indexes for Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian countries were 38.06 and 38.23, respectively, indicating no significant difference.

However, Palma ratios show a different picture about income inequality in East Asia. The Palma ratio indicates a more specific level of income inequality as it reflects the two tails of the income distribution, i.e., changes in the income level of both the low- and high-income classes. Figure 3.2 shows the trend of income inequality between Northeast Asian countries and Southeast Asian countries with Palma ratios. This ratio is calculated by dividing the income shares of the top 10 percent by those of the bottom 40 percent; the larger the ratio, the greater the


Figure 3.2 Palma ratios in East Asian countries, 2000–2017. *Source:* UNU-WIDER, World Income Inequality Database (WIID). WIID dataset, accessed March 14, 2020, http://wider.unu.edu/database/wiid.

inequality. In East Asia, Southeast Asian countries have a much higher level of income inequality than Northeast Asian countries, as shown in Figure 3.2.

Although the heterogeneous nature of East Asian countries makes it difficult to find a single variable that explains the varying degree of income inequality across those cases, previous research categorizes East Asian countries into advanced states, countries undergoing rapid social revolution, and post-colonial Southeast Asian countries and then traces the following causes of income inequality (Haggard 2017). For advanced states in East Asia, such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, existing research found similar causes of income inequality that was identified in advanced industrial countries outside of East Asia—growing marginalization of unskilled labor due to globalization and technological innovation. For instance, for less-educated skilled workers in Taiwan, income inequality is worsening due to the influx of labor from China, which is also observed in South Korea. Meanwhile, in countries that have undergone rapid social revolution, such as China and Vietnam, rapid industrialization has increased income levels but also caused spatially different income inequality. For example, data analyses suggest that income inequality grows faster in coastal cities, which is strongly influenced by globalization, while it grows slower in inland cities. Moreover, the removal of the social safety net that existed in the socialist system has worsened income inequality. Finally, for Southeast Asian countries—although a large variation in trajectories of national development after World War II and post-colonialization makes it difficult to generalize the pattern—studies suggest that the level of income inequality was determined by the characteristics of nationalist leaders, land reform, industrial policies, and the development of a party system of each country.

The primary concern is presumably how the distribution of income inequality is affecting preferences regarding democracy in this region. As discussed earlier, many studies argue that increasing income inequality may lead to dissatisfaction with democracy or a fall to authoritarianism; however, data on East Asian countries have not shown clear signs of this phenomenon yet (Haggard and Kaufman 2016). Data, however, suggest that income inequality has an effect on the quality of democratic governance. Studies argue that symptoms of the so-called deconsolidation of democracy, such as populism, vote-buying, and clientelism, can be clearly observed in the gradually shrinking middle class and the expanding low-income class in this region. Then, these phenomena may end up weakening civic involvement and political organization, as mentioned earlier, as well as political inequality among the people in the democratic system.

Figure 3.3 shows the yearly distribution of political inequality in East Asian countries. The Political Inequality Index (PII) includes participation and representation subscales of the Democratic Performance Index (DPI) in the measurement of political inequality and expands the existing indicator of political inequality, which used to be measured simply by voting. A political inequality index value of 0 does not mean absolute equality, and a value of 100 does not mean absolute inequality. They should rather be understood as relative positions among observed cases. The changes in the median in the boxplot in Figure 3.3 suggest

Figure 3.3 Political inequality indices of East Asian countries, 2000–2016. *Source:* Choi,
   Gwangeun, "Political Inequality Index", Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university
   Consortium for Political and Social Research, December 1, 2019. https://doi
   .org/10.3886/E101268V3

that political inequality has generally been on the rise and that the variation has
grown among Asian countries since the 2008 financial crisis. However, it would be
a conjecture to analyze these results simply as indicating that political inequality
is growing, and it would require more contextual understanding and analyses of
subcategories of inequality. Moreover, the focus of this study is the perception of
citizens in East Asian countries rather than the current state of affairs. The next
section offers a quantitative analysis of the survey data on what kind of democracy
the citizens in East Asia prefer, or what components of democracy they prioritize,
based on the theoretical discussions.

Preferences of East Asians on Democracy

Components of Democracy and Preferences

As discussed so far, income inequality can lead not only to political inequality but
also to dissatisfaction with the democratic political system. While voters who are
susceptible to authoritarian regimes or populism have been observed in certain
countries, but not noticeably in East Asian countries. Nevertheless, as changes
in the quality of democracy are anticipated, this section examines how income

inequality and political inequality would affect preferences of citizens of East Asian countries regarding democracy.

This research acknowledges that democracy is a very controversial concept and that the concept of democracy consists of connotations that vary across individuals (Chu et al. 2013). As citizens have different concepts of democracy, policymakers and scholars are bound to have difficulty in measuring the quality of democracy. National leaders sometimes manipulate the concept of democracy to disguise their authoritarian governance (Zakaria 1994). In this respect, understanding how citizens conceptualize democracy is presumably a crucial step in predicting their preferences regarding democracy and improving the quality of democracy.

This study analyzes the Asian Barometer Wave IV dataset to determine the relationship between the level of income inequality and the preferred components of democracy among East Asian citizens.[2] The Asian Barometer Wave IV data were collected by face-to-face surveys of 20,667 respondents from 14 countries in East Asia during 2014–2016. The survey data measures both respondents' demographic characteristics and perceptions of their political and environmental environment. It is acknowledged that a survey data-driven statistical analysis may have omitted variables because it is difficult to investigate variables that were not included in the survey. However, this dataset is regarded to be appropriate for conducting a quantitative analysis on the preferred components of democracy, as it includes questions on income redistribution and political effectiveness.

Figure 3.4 shows preferences regarding components of democracy in East Asian countries based on Asian Barometer Wave IV data. In this dataset, the components of democracy (i.e., "freedom and liberty", "social equality", "norms and procedure", and "good governance") were created by categorizing the responses to an open-ended question on meanings of democracy in the Asian Barometer Wave III survey.[3] While this categorization is not exactly equivalent to the conceptualization of "new democracy" introduced in Chapter 1 of this volume, each component of the new democracy—procedure, effectiveness, and performance—can be paralleled to the other in Asian Barometer Wave IV data. First, the variable of "freedom and liberty" in Asian Barometer Wave IV data refers to political freedom and civil liberty, such as freedom of expression, association, and religion, which is the core value that democratic institutions attempt to realize. Unfortunately, it does not have any exact parallel in the concept of new democracy. Second, the variable "social equality" refers to meeting the minimum living standards and protecting the socially underprivileged, which might be equated with the component of "performance" in the concept of new democracy. Third, the variable of "norms and procedure" refers to democratic norms and systems such as free and fair elections, open political competition, responsibility to the people, and separation of powers. It is partly overlapped with "freedom and liberty" itself, but it is also equivalent of the "procedure" component in the concept of new democracy. Fourth, "good governance" in the Asian Barometer Wave IV data refers to the capacity of the government, particularly its performance in the provision of economic and political public goods. Hence, this variable is more

Figure 3.4 Preferences of components of democracy in East Asian countries. *Source:* Asian Barometer Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development (Wave IV), Taiwan National University, Taiwan.

likely to be equated with the component of "effectiveness". But as stated earlier, each variable in the Asian Barometer Wave IV data is not exactly equivalent to a component of the new democracy. However, categorizing the components of democracy is still worth analyzing how East Asians are prioritizing different components of democracy.

According to the Asian Barometer Wave IV survey results, on average, East Asians understand democracy the most commonly in terms of "norms and procedure" (37.89 percent), followed by "social equality" (24.27 percent), "freedom and" liberty" (23.93 percent), and finally "good governance" (13.90 percent). Figure 3.4 shows the preferences over components of democracy by each country in East Asia. As shown in Figure 3.4, citizens of East Asian countries varied in their ideas about key components of democracy. This indicates that the forms of democratic governance that citizens of East Asian countries expect from their own governments vary. "Norms and procedures" and "freedom and liberty" mean procedural democracy and the input for political legitimacy, while "social equality" and "good governance" mean performance and quality of democracy, and the output for sustaining political legitimacy (Easton 1963; Pan and Wu 2016). These results suggest that East Asians generally recognize the importance of and give priority to procedural democracy while also valuing the quality of democracy.

In other words, individuals who prioritize quality of democracy likely emphasize political and economic performance that provides trust, welfare policy, and economic equality, whereas those who prioritize procedural democracy likely value democratic norms and institutions. Theory predicts that individuals who prioritize procedural democracy are likely to find it difficult to endure an authoritarian regime, even if it shows high economic performance. In contrast, individuals who prefer substantive democracy are satisfied with their own system if it is capable of delivering high economic performance even in an authoritarian regime.

When asked to choose between reducing income inequality and protecting political freedom in the Asian Barometer Survey Wave IV, East Asian citizens generally chose the former. Table 3.1 shows a summary of the results on this question.

Figure 3.5 shows the perceptions of citizens' economic situation and the degree of satisfaction with democracy in each country in East Asia. The results provide further details on citizens' attitudes toward economic performance of democracy.

In Figure 3.5, the X-axes of the graphs indicate how citizens of East Asian countries assess their own economic environment on a scale of 0 (good) to 10 (poor). The Y-axes indicate the degree of satisfaction with democracy the citizens experience in their countries on a scale of 1 (very satisfied) to 10 (very dissatisfied). Figure 3.5 reveals that the assessments of economic environment and democracy are in a positive relationship in East Asian countries with a fitted line of 95 percent confidence interval, although the degree of the slope varies across countries. This can be interpreted as that despite the priority given to procedural democracy, citizens give positive evaluation to democracy only when it shows economic performance. Based on these descriptive statistics, the next section analyzes the determinants of preferences of citizens of East Asian countries regarding democracy.

Table 3.1 Priorities between Income Inequality and Political Freedom

Survey question: *"If you had to choose between reducing economic inequality and protecting political freedom, which would you say is more important?"*

Survey Item	Frequency	Percent
Reducing economic inequality is definitely more important	3,747	36.68
Reducing economic inequality is somewhat more important	2,265	22.17
Protecting political freedom is somewhat more important	1,288	12.61
Protecting political freedom is definitely more important	1,280	12.53
They are both equally important	861	8.43
Do not understand the question	168	1.64
Can't choose	470	4.6
Decline to answer	129	1.26
Missing	8	0.08
Total	10,216	100.00

Source: Asian Barometer Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development (Wave IV), Taiwan National University, Taiwan.

Figure 3.5 Relationship between economic satisfaction and satisfaction with democratic system in East Asian countries. *Source:* Asian Barometer Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development (Wave IV), Taiwan National University, Taiwan.

Analysis of Determinants of Preference Regarding Democracy

This section discusses the results of multinomial logistic regression analyses to identify determinants of preferences of East Asians regarding democracy. It adopts the Asian Barometer Wave IV survey data. The dependent variable is preference of citizens of East Asian countries regarding democracy, as shown in Figure 3.4. Independent variables are respondents' own (family) economic situation (1: very good–5: very bad), political interest (1: very high–4: very low), satisfaction with their democracy (1: very high–4: very low), priorities between political freedom and income inequality (1: priority on income inequality–4: priority on political freedom), and level of political empowerment (1: very high–4: very low). Demographic variables include gender (1: male, 2: female) and education level (1: low–10: high).

Table 3.2 shows the results of the multinomial logit analysis in which base outcome is "norms and procedures". To discuss statistically significant results, the most important factor in the change in priorities between the base outcome and "social equality" in citizens of East Asian countries is their perception of their (families') economic situation, which is statistically significant. In other words, the more one perceives one's economic situation as worsening, the more likely it is one would choose "social equality" as a major component of democracy over "norms and procedure". In addition, lower political interest is associated with higher probability of choosing "social equality" over "norms and procedures".

Table 3.2 Results of Multinomial Logit Analysis

변수	Social Equality		Good Governance		Liberty and Freedom	
	Coefficient	*Risk Ratio*	*Coefficient*	*Risk Ratio*	*Coefficient*	*Risk Ratio*
Perception of economic situation	**0.1473***	**1.1587***	0.0871	1.0910	0.0453	1.0463
Political interest	**0.0726***	**1.0753***	-0.0125	0.9874	0.0111	1.0112
Satisfaction with democracy	0.0303	1.0308	**0.0722***	**1.0749***	**0.0587***	**1.0605***
Prioritizing income inequality	0.0310	1.0315	0.0091	1.0091	0.0129	1.0130
Political empowerment	0.0508	1.0521	0.0440	1.0450	-0.0150	0.9851
Gender	0.1285	1.1372	**0.1764***	**1.192***	0.0397	1.0405
Education level	-0.0060	0.9939	0.0053	1.0053	-0.0024	0.9975
Constant	-1.4095***	0.2442***	-1.5302***	0.2164***	-0.7766***	0.4599***
Log likelihood			-3134.73			
Pseudo R^2			0.0683			
N			10,216			

Note: Base outcome is Norms and Procedures; among the dependent variable values, coefficients and risk ratios for "Missing", "Can't choose", and "Decline to answer" are not included in the table.
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.

This suggests that citizens with low political interest and in poor economic situations are more likely to prioritize the components of the quality of democracy over procedural democracy. Another notable result shows that the lower the level of respondent's satisfaction with democracy in his or her country, the higher the possibility of their changing the priority from "norms and procedures" to "good governance" and "liberty and freedom". This may suggest that the lower one's satisfaction with democracy in one's country, the more one values other components of democracy—procedural and substantive democracy. However, it would be worthwhile to perform analysis at more specific level (i.e., country level) and examine the contexts that led to this conflicting result rather than interpreting these results as they are. Finally, the results show that women were more likely to choose "good governance" over "norms and procedures". This result on the relationship between gender and preferences of democratic elements also requires further investigation in the future. It is noteworthy that the results on the prioritizing income inequality variable were neither statistically significant nor consistent with theoretical prediction or the survey results shown in Table 3.1. This would also be a worthy subject for further investigation on specific contexts of individual countries.

Conclusion

This study conducts a quantitative analysis of the understanding of democracy and what component of democracy is favored by citizens of East Asian countries. The results suggest that they generally value the components of procedural democracy, while also considering economic performance of democracy as important. In particular, in terms of the relationship between income inequality and political freedom, which characterizes the new normal era, the majority prioritizes addressing income inequality. The seemingly mixed results suggest that citizens of East Asian countries value both procedural and substantive democracy, and both economic and political performance, in their understanding of democracy. It is notable, however, that the citizens are likely to emphasize the performance of democracy if they perceive their economic situation to worsen, which suggests that economic performance of democracy should not be overlooked in consolidating democracy in East Asia.

Despite many significant findings, the study revealed multiple areas for further investigation. In particular, the inconsistency between respondents' responses on prioritizing income inequality and the results of the multinomial logit analysis should be further studied. Specifically, while respondents answered that income inequality is more important than political freedom, the prioritizing of income inequality variable as an independent variable was not statistically significant in the actual multinomial logit analysis. This inconsistency needs to be explained using a more in-depth analysis of the data and a qualitative analysis that incorporates the contexts of individual countries.

Meanwhile, the current new normal is characterized by economic polarization and income inequality, as discussed earlier. With the reorganization of the

industrial structure of the twentieth century and the global division of labor, workers' adaptability may offset the effects of income inequality. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has created another phase of the new normal, further obscuring the future international order. It remains unclear what kind of new normal will come about in the democratic countries with a high priority of health security. The COVID-19 pandemic in Western liberal democracies, in which individuals' liberty is emphasized, revealed a high likelihood of conflict between the democratic state and health security crisis. However, the course of change may depend on how a given government meets the demands of the people and manages the democratic system. For East Asian countries, as people stress democratic performance as shown in this study, research needs to examine how externally driven crises such as COVID-19 would affect substantive democracy, that is, quality of democracy, in a country.

Notes

1   The initial version of this chapter was published as an article with the title "Priority of Democracy among East Asian States in the New Normal Era (in Korean)", *National Strategy* 26, no. 2 (2020): 123–146. This chapter has since been revised and updated.
2   Asian Barometer Wave IV data, http://www.asianbarometer.org/. This data is based on the results of a face-to-face survey conducted in 14 East Asian countries: Korea, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, China, Taiwan, Singapore, Mongolia, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Indonesia.
3   This information is available in the following paper: Yun-Han Chu, Min-Hua Huang, and Jie Lu, 2013, "Understanding Democracy in East Asian Societies". Paper prepared for the Asian Barometer Conference on Democracy and Citizen Politics in East Asia, Taipei, Taiwan (June 17–18, 2013).

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4 Democratic Competition and Welfare Development in East Asia

Case Studies on Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore[1]

Yunmin Nam

Introduction

East Asian countries had long been excluded from comparative welfare state studies. From the Western perspective—which was a result of a capitalist-democratic project—East Asian countries did not qualify as welfare states (Walker and Wong 2004). Export-oriented strategies in East Asia—which required highly skilled but poorly paid workers—did not encourage social expenditure on welfare provisions other than for public education (Haggard and Kaufman 2008). Low unemployment rates combined with constant economic growth also reduced workers' demand for social programs during industrialization. In Western democracies, the organizational resources of labor unions and left-wing political parties played a significant role in the development of welfare states (Korpi 2006). However, in East Asia, anti-communist regimes repressed working-class mobilization and left-wing political parties. Rapid industrialization and regime transitions during the 1980s facilitated the introduction of welfare programs in East Asian countries. Additionally, globalization and the financial crisis during the late 1990s radically extended their welfare provisions. In response to the development of welfare systems in this region, literature on East Asian welfare states has also gradually increased.

Inspired by the regime approach of Esping-Andersen (1990), many observers have attempted to construct an ideal type of welfare regime in East Asia. These include Jones' "Confucian welfare states" (1993), Holliday's "productive welfare states" (2000), Aspalter's "conservative welfare states" (2001a), and Kwon's "developmental welfare states" (2005). They have competed to introduce a fourth model which can be potentially incorporated into Esping-Andersen's tripartite typology. However, none of these welfare regime studies have successfully accounted for the evolution and the diversity of East Asian welfare states. Even though they employ varied terms, their arguments are not significantly different. They all characterized East Asian welfare states as possessing underdeveloped public service provisions, with low levels of government intervention and investment in social welfare. Additionally, they emphasized the fundamental importance of the family

and voluntary sectors in providing social safety nets. For example, the original regime approach developed by Esping-Andersen (1990) analyzes the institutional arrangement of welfare states. Esping-Andersen also pays attention to the divergent paths of welfare state restructuring and how various institutional configurations bring about different results. However, the new regime approaches focus on the distinct characteristics of East Asian countries such as Confucianism or developmentalism, while only superficially examining the institutional designs of welfare schemes. Therefore, new regime approaches have missed the linkage between the institutional welfare arrangements and their developmental path—thus failing to explore the evolution and diversity of East Asian welfare states.

This chapter critically examines existing East Asian welfare regime approaches in the first section. However, the main purpose is neither to confirm one of the models proposed by new regime approaches nor to suggest a new ideal type. Rather, this chapter attempts to explore the diversity and evolution of East Asian welfare regimes as a result of democratic competition. "New Democracy" is conceptualized both by the procedural quality of democracy and by the quality of its results. To measure the quality of results, "New Democracy" focuses on the performance of a democratic system with regard to welfare provision (Cho 2014). To assess the performance of East Asian democracies, this chapter investigates recent reforms and development of East Asian welfare states using brief case studies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore in the second section. Single-country-based case studies on recent welfare developments show that some East Asian countries have succeeded in shifting from developmental states to welfare states, but have utilized varied pathways according to performance of democratic competition. In the last section, this chapter identifies theoretical frameworks suitable for the comparative study of East Asian welfare regimes.

Discounting East Asian Welfare Regime Approaches

Initial attempts to identify East Asian welfare states were impacted by the most influential book in comparative welfare studies—*The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* by Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990). Taking the power resource approach, Esping-Andersen analyzes different class coalitions within the context of inherited institutions, and their impact on the patterns of welfare regime development. Historically contextualizing different welfare regimes and their different welfare outcomes measured by decommodification, he categorizes 18 advanced countries within three welfare regime types: social democratic, conservative, and liberal. His framework provides the opportunity to categorize other unexamined regions within these three categories, or to construct a fourth category. However, his framework has faced many criticisms. A major criticism is the range of countries used to categorize the three welfare regimes. Scholars (Bonoli 1997; Castles and Mitchell 1993; Ferrera 1996) argue that if other countries were analyzed through this framework, it would become apparent that some countries do not fit his tripartite typology—necessitating the creation of additional suitable categories. Furthermore, some countries among the 18 countries in his analysis

would logically have to be placed in a new regime category. For example, Bonoli (1997) and Ferrera (1996) find that Italy—which was categorized as a conservative regime in Esping-Andersen' typology—would be better grouped with Southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece as part of a separate "Southern" world.

This criticism may also apply to Japan—the only non-Western country in Esping-Andersen's analysis—and other East Asian countries. Esping-Andersen (1990) initially identifies Japan as a conservative welfare regime without scrutinizing its institutional arrangements and its historical development. Based on the Japanese decommodification index scores, he simply concludes that Japan is close to a conservative welfare regime. Esping-Andersen's approach has generated heated debates regarding which other East Asian countries belong within his "three worlds" model.

Analyzing features of the Taiwanese welfare systems, Ku (1997) suggests the possibility that other East Asian countries could also be classified as conservative welfare regimes. However, other studies—which attempt to identify East Asian welfare states within Esping-Andersen's typology—find that the East Asian welfare model cannot be placed within his typology. Kwon (1997, 477) acknowledges that the conservative welfare regime is the closest model to East Asian welfare states in terms of the structure of compulsory social policy, the function of familial obligations in guaranteeing minimum welfare provision, and statist privilege. However, he also finds significant differences between East Asian welfare states and the conservative welfare regime (1997, 478). First, there is a substantial gap in the level of welfare provisions between European conservative welfare states and East Asian welfare states. Japan and South Korea have much lower standards of welfare provisions than Germany and Austria. Second, while familial obligations in Germany are supposed to be responsible for public welfare provision such as childcare, residential care for old people, and some social work, East Asian families play more discreet roles in welfare provision. Lastly, the nature of class politics underlying the development of the welfare state are dissimilar. In Germany, Bismarck introduced social policy to maintain social order and consolidate the authority of the central government against the rapid emergence of the working class and the Social Democratic Party. Governments in Japan and Korea also implemented social policy to consolidate their political power, but the working class and left-wing parties were too meager to catalyze the introduction of social policy (Takegawa 2005, 172). In response to claims that his typology was unfit to examine East Asia, Esping-Andersen (1997, 187) finally revised his classification of the Japanese welfare system—categorizing it as a hybrid of the conservative and the liberal welfare regime instead. In addition, he contended that any attempt to apply his typology to nascent welfare regimes requires circumspection (1997, 179). At present, the dominant studies on East Asian welfare regimes have shifted toward searching for a new category which emphasizes regional uniqueness.

Focusing on shared experience and common traits which distinguish East Asian welfare states from Western welfare states, new models have been subsequently suggested in literature on welfare states. One of the attempts to identify

East Asian welfare regimes emphasizes the distinctive cultural heritage of East Asia—Confucianism. The "Oikonomic welfare state" or the "Confucian welfare state" was proposed by Jones (1993) in this context. Jones (1993, 213) emphasized that social security within this region has been largely dependent on voluntary or informal actions of families and communities. In addition, she considered Confucian tradition as the underlying reason motivating East Asian countries' minimal state commitments in social welfare (1993, 201–202). She suggested that volunteer "social steward consultants" in Japan, networks of local residents' committees in Singapore, mutual housing block-level aid committees in Hong Kong, and the principle of self-help and cooperation in South Korea are typical examples of Confucian welfare systems (1993, 208–209). Goodman and Peng (1996) and Goodman et al. (1998) also agree that the fundamental role of non-state agencies such as family and community in social welfare is the distinguishing characteristic of East Asian welfare systems.

It is worth considering how the political priorities governed by Confucian heritage have framed social order in the initial stages of East Asian social development. The concept of Confucian welfare state seems to be plausible, and it captures the distinctive features of East Asian welfare systems. However, the Confucian welfare state by itself is insufficient to explain all features of East Asian welfare states. As other criticisms on cultural approaches (Ross 1997) have pointed out, the culture-centered approach of the Confucian welfare state finds it difficult to link Confucian heritage to all welfare provisions and account for the development of welfare systems. What remains ambiguous is whether Confucian ideas are the determinant ones, or if they are merely symptomatic of social policy in this region. The concept of Confucian welfare states only depicts premodern East Asia. In recent years, East Asian societies are not as intensely dominated by Confucian tradition as they once were (Bonoli and Shinkawa 2005, 20). The family structure has changed, and the number of elderly people has rapidly grown in the wake of industrialization (Tang and Wong 2003). This led East Asian governments to revise their welfare provisions and assume the management of public social services, which were previously predominantly family responsibilities (Jacobs 2002; Peng 2003). Even though the cultural approach of Confucian welfare states lost its theoretical usefulness in accounting for East Asian welfare regimes, it inspired consecutive efforts to devise an ideal type for East Asian welfare states.

At present, prominent welfare regime approaches in East Asia focus on the political economy or institutional arrangements rather than culture, and argue that the nature of developmental states is the most important factor in understanding these states. Successful economic growth in this region has spurred academic discussion on developmental states (Amsden 1989; Appelbaum and Henderson 1992; Deyo 1989; Johnson 1982; Skocpol 1985; Wade 1990). East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong ranked economic development as the top priority of their governmental agendas and regarded social policy as both the requirement and the subordinate outcome of real economic development. Therefore, universal education was mainly promoted in the early stage of development, and other social policies were deferred.

As developmental states, East Asian countries possessed not only "state capacities"—which formulate and implement developmental policies—but also "state autonomy". This resulted in an efficient economic transformation and a subsequent intervention against indifference or resistance from strong political forces like the working class (Skocpol 1985). The Cold War also allowed East Asian countries to render left-wing political parties and working-class movements insignificant in influencing social policy-making. In addition, their constant economic growth promoted low unemployment rates and high real wages. Therefore, despite rapid industrialization, significant working-class movements did not occur in this region (Deyo 1989). Tang (2000) argues that East Asian welfare states possess shared features owing to their nature as developmental states. According to him, this was reflected through East Asian countries' opposition to governmental spending on social insurance, working-class mobilization, and universal welfare commitments (Tang 2000, 139–140).

Drawing from the concept of developmental states, Holliday (2000) came up with the notion of "productivist welfare states" to refer to East Asian welfare states. Focusing on political rationale and the economic function of social policies in developmental states, Holliday contended that during development, governments in this region concentrated on economic growth, and all state policies were geared toward the facilitation of productive activity. Similarly, Kwon (2005) proposed the concept of "developmental welfare states". He argued that the term "developmental" instead of "productivist" is more appropriate to depict East Asian welfare systems, because the term

> allows us to examine the political, economic and social context of the welfare state in East Asia and [partly] because it enables us to draw on the rich literature of development studies that have elaborated the concept of the developmental state.
>
> (Kwon 2005, 21)

With a small variant of the developmental approach, Aspalter (2001a) identified East Asian welfare systems as "conservative welfare state systems". Rather than the nature of developmental states, he focused on the impact of the conservative state structure and party politics in this region. Aspalter (2001a, 3) differentiates his conservative welfare state systems from Esping-Andersen's conservative welfare regimes—which described Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. According to Aspalter, the term "conservative"—which connotes anti-welfare conservative social politics—corresponded more with East Asian welfare systems than continental European welfare states—who aligned themselves with pro-welfare Christian democratic social politics.

Although new regime approaches employ different terms, the distinct features of East Asian welfare states are not all that different. They agree that East Asian welfare states have certain common characteristics. These include minimal social policy and low welfare expenditure; minimal government-financed social policies and an expectation from families or the market to take more welfare responsibility

for its individual members; weak working-class mobilization and strong state inter-vention in economic development as root cause; and high stratification on social insurance rather than universalism (Aspalter 2005; Holliday 2000; Kwon 2005).

Beyond cultural explanations of Confucian welfare states—which emphasize informal and voluntary welfare provisions—new regime approaches based on the nature of developmental states present a more substantial analysis. Subsequent research has verified these new regime approaches in East Asia. They confirm that governments in this region have played a significant role in creating a growth-friendly welfare system based on the preferred relationship between economic policy and social policy. Focusing on the relationships between states, markets, and families, Gough (2004) contended that East and Southeast Asian countries (except for the Philippines) can be described as "productive welfare states". Using factor analysis, Lee and Ku (2007) found that South Korea and Taiwan can be grouped as a new category—named "developmental welfare states"—which are different from Western welfare states.

Nevertheless, new regime approaches have suffered from a lack of theoretical usefulness and empirical evidence. The concept of productive or developmental welfare states originated from an awkward combination of two different perspec-tives—developmental studies and social policy studies. Doubts prevail concerning the ability of the statist approach of developmental states to provide a comprehen-sive explanation for the development of welfare states. In developmental studies, states play a more significant role in shaping economic policy and the nation-building process as opposed to social policy. Therefore, the statist approach of developmental states overestimates the top-down and bureaucratic way of welfare policy-making, and underestimates the bottom-up welfare state building led by civil society (Kim 2008, 112). Furthermore, all welfare states—which promote social cohesion, peaceful class relationships, well-educated manpower, and large domestic demands through redistribution—ultimately improve their productiv-ity. Improving productivity is also one of the important reasons for all develop-ment of welfare states (Goodin et al. 1999). Esping-Andersen (1999) states that the Swedish welfare state was always considered productivist because of its work–welfare nexus. Such arguments focusing on the productivist or the developmental functions of East Asian welfare states cannot substantively distinguish East Asian countries from Western welfare states.

New regime approaches based on the nature of developmental states also have failed to account for the recent social policy reforms in this region, despite provid-ing a theoretical lens for understanding the initial construction of welfare systems. Holliday (2005) and Kwon (2005) contended that their perspectives remain valid with respect to understanding the recent welfare development of East Asian coun-tries, because recent reforms still followed the productivity-based economic devel-opment strategy. However, East Asian countries, South Korea and Taiwan in particular, have experienced a substantial expansion of their welfare systems and have achieved fundamental socioeconomic and political changes—consequently rendering them as more universal types of welfare states. These expansions and reformations of welfare systems have changed the nature of developmental states

in East Asian societies. In addition, the economy-centered perspective of new regime approaches only provided a mono-causal explanation for social policy development—which did not explore the possibility that varied institutional arrangements or political conditions produce diverse paths of welfare development. The development paths of East Asian welfare states are not the same. Their varied stages of social, economic, political, and social policy development ensured that their welfare systems were reorganized differently or remained unchanged.

Empirically, new regime approaches in East Asia have been confined to conceptual clarification, but have not been fully investigated. Using the decommodification index, Esping-Andersen (1990) empirically confirmed different welfare outcomes of the three clusters within advanced welfare states. However, due to the lack of reliable cross-national data, a statistics-based quantitative and comparative research has not yet been conducted. It is still necessary to confirm whether East Asian welfare states have significantly low welfare outcomes compared to Western welfare states—especially liberal welfare states. Arguments of new regime approaches have relied on miscellaneous and unsystematic data, and have often used biased selection in social policy dimensions (Kim 2008, 112). Although all social insurance programs are not productively or developmentally designed in East Asian countries, new regime approaches have narrowly interpreted some dimensions, failing to account for the complete picture.

In sum, existing regime studies focusing on the similarities of East Asian welfare states have failed to offer a consistent theoretical and comparable framework with regard to the evolution and diversity of East Asian welfare states. To understand the divergent evolution of welfare systems within East Asian countries, this chapter discusses brief case studies pertaining to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. These case studies will explore their welfare development in relation to their political, economic, and social conditions. As advanced capitalist economies in East Asia, these four countries underwent rapid economic development—during which they were transformed into industrial economies. Now, they are transforming into more comprehensive welfare states. However, they still have somewhat different welfare provisions, while their transitions into democracies have taken distinct paths and are at varied phases. Thus, this chapter pays attention to their democratic transitions to illustrate the divergent evolution of welfare states among these four East Asian countries. Democratic politics are highly related to welfare state development, because parliamentary democracies, competitive elections, and interparty competition create the possibility for the public to mobilize against the elites and ask their government to share the social surplus. In fact, high voter turnout promotes implementation of new welfare programs, because increases in turnout imply an increase in participation by previously excluded lower status groups (Iversen 2001). Political competition also provides an incentive for politicians to expand welfare provisions. In democracies, parties compete against each other to win an election. To extend their appeal to voters and avoid political blame, parties are more likely to propose generous welfare commitments and less likely to cut welfare expenditure (Hicks and Swank 1992). The case studies examined in this chapter particularly explore how different paths of democratization

and economic rationales (i.e., economic growth and crisis) bring about divergence in institutional development of social insurance programs within these four East Asian countries. This would potentially facilitate the construction of comparative frameworks better suited to contemporary East Asian welfare states.

Case Studies of Four East Asian Welfare States

Japan

While social insurance systems in other East Asian countries have begun in the last two decades, the welfare system of Japan has a relatively long history. The first social insurance was the Health Insurance Law (HIL) implemented in 1922. After World War II, Japan began to introduce primary social insurance such as the Basic Unemployment Insurance Law of 1947, the Livelihood Protection Law of 1950, and the National Pension Law of 1959. However, its social spending and benefit levels remained insignificant (Shinkawa 2005). In the early 1970s, Japan entered into a new phase in social policy. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, a growing threat from the political opposition created the political incentive for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to extend welfare provisions. To expand the support of the urban and non-aligned constituencies, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei of the LDP declared that the course of governmental policy had shifted from growth-oriented to welfare-oriented. This led Japan to become a more comprehensive welfare state (Park 2011, 142–143). From 1972 to 1974, the Tanaka government carried out various important welfare expansions. Wage revaluation for pension benefits were introduced, minimum benefits for employee pensions sharply increased, free medical care for the elderly was implemented, and family allowances were introduced (Aspalter 2001a, 12; SSPTW 2017, 123–130). Despite an economic recession after the 1973 oil crisis, the Tanaka government did not stop expanding its welfare commitment, because it presented a political risk to the Tanaka government—which barely maintained a majority in the lower house and the upper house (Aspalter 2001a, 18). Thus, in the 1970s, social spending gradually increased. Japanese social expenditure as a percentage of nominal GDP was less than 10 percent in the early 1970s, but had climbed to 17 percent by the early 1980s (Tajika and Yui 2002, 5).

Unfortunately, the welfare expansion of the 1970s did not last in Japan. After the LDP became a stable majority in both houses of parliament in the 1980 general election, the LDP reconstructed welfare provisions and legitimized welfare cutbacks. Even while the economy was booming in the 1980s, the LDP government abolished free medical care for the aged, introduced co-payment in employees' health insurance schemes, and tightened the relationship between contribution and benefit in the 1985 pension reform (Kasza 2006, 196). The most significant in a series of welfare retrenchments was the establishment of a fiscal adjustment across different schemes to reduce the governmental fiscal burden. On the abolition of free medical care for the aged, health insurance associations agreed to equalize fiscal burdens to a certain degree by contributing

to a financial pool for elderly medical care. In addition, in the process of public welfare retrenchment, the importance of corporate welfare as a complement to public welfare was reconfirmed and reinforced (Shinkawa, 2005). However, these retrenchments did not face serious resistance from civil society due to lack of interparty competition and labor unions—which fragmented independently in a company (Estevez-Abe 2008).

The roots of democracy are relatively weak in Japan. Competitive democratic elections and parliamentary decision-making are considered less important than in the West, and the possibility that left-wing parties can come into power at the national level is marginal. The 1994 electoral reform—which combined the small-constituency system and the proportional representation system for the lower house—created a competitive party system and consolidated the accountability of the ruling party. The new electoral rule was expected to shift the path of welfare policies to universalistic features, but did not bring about bold changes in the Japanese welfare system (Estevez-Abe 2008). Therefore, Japan forfeited the opportunity to reverse the direction of welfare cutbacks after the 1970s. Coping with an aging population and a budget deficit on social insurances, the LDP government introduced a consumption tax in 1989, and raised the pension entitlement ages and contribution rates in the 1990s—all while they reduced the levels of benefits provided. After the Asian financial crisis, Japan continued to retrench their welfare provisions through the 2004 reform. In the 2009 general election, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which is a left-leaning liberal party, won 308 seats in the 480-seat lower house and ended the LDP's rule—which lasted for 54 years. Despite the landslide victory, the DPJ could not carry out its welfare expansion pledges. The DPJ promised to introduce universalistic welfare programs such as a comprehensive non-means-tested children's allowance, unemployment insurance and benefits for the self-employed, and greater public subsidies for pension. However, the welfare expansion efforts of the DPJ soon faced bureaucratic resistance by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, and critical publicity from all major newspapers and TV networks (Estevez-Abe 2010). Moreover, to finance the welfare spending, the DPJ promised to trim wasteful government spending rather than to increase the tax burden on citizens. This particular type of promised welfare expansion could not be realized. Later, the DPJ tried to raise consumption tax to balance the budget, but it was politically unpopular. Ultimately, the DPJ lost voter confidence and the conservative LDP regained power in the 2012 general election. Although social expenditure has repeatedly increased, the institutional provisions of major social policies—which is measured by the welfare generosity index—has remained virtually stagnant over the last three decades (Scruggs et al. 2017).

South Korea

In its nascent stage of welfare development, the South Korean government used welfare programs as a political tool for bureaucratic mobilization and economic development (Holliday 2000). South Korea only had public pension schemes

such as the Government Employees Pension (1960), the Military Personnel Pension (1963), and the Private School Teachers Pension (1975). The Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (IACI) (1963) and the National Health Insurance (NHI) (1967) were also implemented, but they only covered workers employed in large firms with more than 500 employees. Such development-oriented features of welfare programs were not problematic, but were reinforced during the authoritarian rule. This was because economic development—and not social policies—facilitated social mobility, poverty reduction, and income distribution (Kwon and Yi 2009).

South Korea's democratization in the late 1980s ushered its welfare development into a new phase. After the first free presidential election in 1987, the newly elected government finally carried out the National Pension Scheme (NPS). The NPS was enacted through the National Welfare Pension Act in 1973, but its enforcement had been postponed under the rule of authoritarian governments. At its initial stage, the NPS covered only those working in workplaces with ten or more full-time employees. Since then, the NPS has been continuously extended to cover workplaces with five or more full-time employees (1992), farmers and fishermen (1995), urban citizens (1999), and workplaces with one or more employees (2003)—eventually becoming a pension scheme for the entirety of the general public (2006). As a general pension scheme, the NPS has covered all occupational groups regardless of whether they are white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, farmers, or the urban self-employed. Through the 2015 pension reform of the Government Employees Pension, the gap in benefits between public pension schemes and the NPS was also reduced.

The NHI's coverage was extended to the entirety of the general public in 1989, but the NHI had different contribution rates, and was managed independently by multiple health insurance societies according to occupational groups and geographical areas. However, after the financial crisis, the government incorporated the occupation and region-based criteria into a national single-payer system managed by a public agency. The IACI also extended its coverage further in 2000 to encompass all firms with at least one employee. Democratization brought about a dramatic increase in labor union movements, and reshaped industrial relations to be more favorable to labor unions. This led the South Korean government to implement the Employment Insurance (EI) in 1995. The EI only covered firms with 30 or more employees at first, but its coverage was extended rapidly within a year due to a rapid increase in unemployment during the 1998 economic crisis. In 1998, the EI covered companies with ten or more employees by January, five or more employees by March, and finally covering companies with one or more employees by October. Like the NHI, the IACI and the EI are also not divided into different occupational categories, but are instead occupationally inclusive. These features of social insurance programs—which were reformed (the NHI and the IACI) or introduced (the EI) after South Korea's democratization—are different from those of productivist or developmental welfare states (Kim 2006).

Compared to other advanced welfare states, the welfare programs of South Korea remain underdeveloped, and social expenditure is concentrated within

major social insurances, such as pension and healthcare (Yang 2013, 458). However, South Korea has made a critical move toward becoming a more comprehensive welfare state since democratization. The late 1990s financial crisis did not stimulate a substantial retrenchment of welfare provisions. The economic crisis and subsequent demographic changes have inspired attempts by the Korean government to retrench social insurance systems. However, the reform plans proposed by the government have faced strong political resistance from civil society and the working class. Thus, this retrenchment has not been fully accomplished. Immediately after the 1997 economic crisis, the government tried to reform the NPS into a contributory basic pension and reduce the benefit level from 70 percent to 40 percent. However, the radical NPS reform plan proposed by the government was revised to incorporate only a 10 percent reduction, while simultaneously scrapping the introduction of a contributory basic pension. The 2003 reform plan, which tried to reduce the benefit level of the NPS from 60 percent to 50 percent, was also completely abandoned due to civil resistance. In addition, when business leaders came out strongly against the integration of the medical societies and the insurance funds of the NHI, the government received strong support from labor unions and civil society. Thus, the government was able to shift the NHI to the single-payer system in 2000 (Kim 2006).

One of the challenges facing South Korea is how to finance welfare programs. Without increasing tax rates, it is hard to continue expanding welfare provisions. In order to appeal to their constituency, parties and politicians have prioritized generous welfare commitments. However, they have been silent on the issue of taxes, because increasing taxes is unpopular with the public and poses a risk to their electoral support. In fact, under the slogan "Welfare without More Taxes", the Park Geun-hye government pushed for welfare expansion by introducing a life cycle health and welfare program, but did not increase the tax burden on the public. Rather, the Park government tried to reduce inefficient government spending and tax the informal sector indirectly. Such politics of welfare and taxation has made it difficult for South Korea to shift its policy orientation toward becoming a more universalistic welfare state.

Taiwan

Until 1986, Taiwan had maintained a one-party system led by the Kuomintang (KMT). During the one-party dominance period, social insurance systems remained underdeveloped. The first social insurance programs were introduced in the 1950s, but they covered only military servicemen, government employees, and their families. The Labor Insurance Program (LIP) was established in 1960 to provide old-age pension benefits. However, the LIP was far from a social security provision. The LIP had provided only a one-time lump-sum cash benefit and free medical treatment to people above 60, provided they had worked for at least 15 years (Tang 2000, 72).

During the democratization period, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was established in 1986 without governmental recognition. In 1990s, going

against the KMT—who emphasized Chinese value and growth-oriented national policy—the DPP proposed *Taiwanization* and a pro-welfare ideology. The DPP's pro-welfare ideology appealed to voters in several elections through the 1990s. During this time, the KMT maintained the majority in the legislature, but the gap between the KMT and DPP gradually reduced. In the 1989 legislative election, the DPP first emerged with a small share of the seats (16 percent) in the Legislative Yuan. However, its share increased to about 31 percent in the 1998 legislative election. This unprecedented political competition enhanced the development of social insurance systems. In response to the social policy agenda raised by the opposition, the KMT broke down the civil servant-centered welfare system, and introduced National Health Insurance (NHI) in 1995 and unemployment benefits in 1999 consecutively. Similar to South Korea, any attempts to retrench social insurance faced political resistance. In 1997, the KMT government proposed the NHI reform plan to privatize the health insurance system. However, civic groups organized the "National Health Insurance Coalition" to hold out against the privatization plan of the NHI. As a result, the KMT government failed to privatize the NHI (Wong 2003).

After the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, power peacefully transitioned from the KMT to the DPP—ending over 50 years of KMT rule. In the 2000 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP was elected as the new president. The KMT's defeat was not a result of economic failure because Taiwan was not significantly hurt by the regional economic slump. The main issues of the 2000 presidential election were about social welfare reforms (Ku 2004). The newly elected DPP government introduced several universal social insurances—which provided flat-rate benefit welfare allowance for aged people who do not receive any pension, free medical care for the children below three years old, and a low-cost mortgage with a 3 percent interest rate only for young first-time buyers of a house (Ku 2003, 187). In the early 2000s, an economic recession pressured the DPP government to retrench social expenditure on welfare programs. Nonetheless, the government continued to expand welfare commitments. In 2001, active labor market policies such as vocational training, subsidies, loans, and community grants were initiated. A national pension reform was also proposed to cover those that were not protected by the existing pension program. In 2002, the DPP government introduced a mean-tested old age allowance. Under the new scheme, people aged 65 years and above who were not covered by the old age payment could claim a flat-rate benefit of 3,000 New Taiwan (NT) dollars per month. In 2004, the DPP government abandoned an employee-specific, non-portable defined-contribution benefit plan and introduced a government-regulated, portable defined-contribution scheme (Haggard 2005). In 2005, the Taiwanese labor pension system was finally reformed from lump-sum benefits to a monthly pension approach. In 2008, the DPP government also introduced a universal pension scheme—the National Pension program—which covered those who were excluded from other pension systems (SSPTW 2017, 234–236).

Due to democratization and interparty competition, Taiwan experienced welfare expansion and entered a new era in social policy during the 2000s. However,

its expansion was limited, and democratization did not necessarily pave the way for an inclusive welfare system. The DPP government avoided increasing citizens' tax burden to finance welfare provision, but implemented tax deductions or exemptions. In the 2008 presidential election, the KMT returned to power with the victory of Ma Ying-jeou. The KMT government lowered the corporate income tax rate from 25 percent to 17 percent, and the inheritance tax rate from 50 percent to 10 percent (Lin 2018, 406). The tax reliefs reduced the government capacity to carry out the policy reform required to transition into a more inclusive welfare state. The DPP again won the 2016 presidential election in a decisive victory for Tsai Ing-wen. However, over the last decade, there have not been major changes in welfare provisions. Taiwan's party competition is dominated by identity politics pertaining to its relationship with China, rather than tax and welfare (Lin 2018, 410–411). Now, Taiwan faces new challenges such as a low birth rate, aging society, an influx of immigrants, and so on. This has been pressuring the Taiwanese government to adjust its welfare commitments.

Singapore

Singapore's main social insurance scheme was established during the British colonial period. In 1955, the British implemented the Central Provident Fund (CPF) in Singapore to provide retirement security for workers, and to minimize the colonial government's financial responsibility in social welfare. Since the British felt no obligation to provide social security for colonial workers, they designed the CPF as a self-funding reserve based on contributions by both employers and employees. Singapore became independent from the British in 1963 and was separated from Malaysia in 1965. However, the People's Action Party (PAP) government did not abolish the CPF, but instead upheld it as the main welfare provision of the newly independent state. After the British withdrew its stationed troops from Singapore in the 1970s, it had to spend a large portion of its budget to build up its own armed forces. The Singapore dollar was also fully backed by foreign reserves when Singapore changed its currency from the Malayan dollar in 1967. Given the concern for national security and the currency issue, the PAP government was unable to initiate universal social insurances which required governmental social spending (Lee and Qian 2017, 920–921).

Since the 1960s, the PAP government has gradually expanded the CPF to provide not only an old age pension, but also funds in the case of sickness, accident, death, home purchase, and enrollment in higher educational institutions. However, the basic principle of the CPF has not changed. Since its domestic market and industry were not competitive, Singapore adopted a foreign investment-led growth strategy. To allure foreign investment, the PAP government tried to maintain a low tax rate and low social spending on welfare programs. The CPF has been financed entirely by employees and their employers, and its benefits have been entirely dependent on one's contribution, without scope for redistribution and social insurance (Ramesh 2003, 90). The coverage rate under the CPF is very high (about 97 percent). In 2017, 3.84 million residents

were members of the CPF among the 3.97 million total residents (CPF 2017, 30). However, its contribution rates are high in comparison to other East Asian welfare states. The contribution rate for an insured person is 20 percent of the monthly earnings greater than S$750, if they are 55 years old or younger. Employers also contribute 17 percent of the employee monthly earnings greater than S$50 to the CPF (SSPTW 2017, 213). Individuals use funds of their CPF accounts to finance education expenditure, health expenditure, housing expenditure, and other social welfare benefits. In the CPF system, welfare benefits are marginal—targeting assistance at those who need help the most. The Singaporean government has a low financial burden to finance social expenditure, and acts as a regulator of the welfare system rather than a provider of welfare benefits and services (Aspalter 2001b). On the other hand, the CPF plays an important role for economic growth by increasing capital accumulation. The CPF accounts for a large share of the gross national savings. During the rapid economic growth between 1974 and 1985, the funds of the CPF contributed to about 17–27 percent of the national savings (Lee and Qian 2017, 922).

Economic downturns and inflation in the mid-1980s and the late-1990s gave the PAP government opportunities to rethink and expand their social provisions. However, unlike other East Asian countries, the PAP government did not introduce non-contributory welfare programs of risk pooling, but just reduced employer and employee contributions to stimulate economic development (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 243). In spite of a steady increase in unemployment, the PAP government has not established unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance, but encouraged "workfare"—forcing the unemployed to participate in the labor market. The PAP government has maintained a self-help approach. Singaporean social assistance schemes are still based on individual and family self-reliance and on community support, rather than on the government (Aspalter 2001a, 53; Teo 2015).

As one of the affluent capitalist countries, the reason for minimal welfare provisions is not due to a lack of fiscal strength, but rather is inspired by an ideology which favors an approach of workfare and self-help (Asher and Rajan 2008; Mendes 2009). In addition, the lack of interparty competition has enabled the government to maintain its opposition toward the expansion welfare provision. The PAP has been solidly supported by the majority of the voters since the first general election in 1963. Therefore, the government has enjoyed instrumental autonomy from both the business class and the working class. Furthermore, the government has maintained a close relationship with civic groups to shape pro-government public opinion (Ramesh 2003, 93–94). Recently, the Singapore welfare state has faced new challenges such as deindustrialization, an aging population, and the emergence of working poor families. This has increased the public demand for generous welfare commitments. Accordingly, the PAP government introduced the Pioneer Generation Package for elderly healthcare in 2014, and a universal health insurance in 2015 (Lee and Qian 2017, 928–931). Since the 2006 general election, the opposition share of the popular vote has increased by over 30 percent. In the 2011 and 2015 general elections, one of the opposition

parties called the Workers' Party won five and six parliamentary seats, respectively. Although the PAP still dominates the political system, it has lost its political monopoly. The current change in the political climate has increased the possibility of social policy reform aimed at more protective and redistributive provisions in Singapore.

Conclusion

The logic of industrialism underlines the changes in social needs and class structures. Industrialization weakens traditional social institutions such as families or community, and fortifies the functions of the capitalist market. Since the market itself is not able to accommodate the new needs of the public, the state turns to developing its social welfare provisions. Empirical studies have shown that capitalist development is accompanied by welfare expansion among Western welfare states (Cutright 1965; Wilensky 1975). However, in contrast to the experiences of Western welfare states, East Asian countries had maintained minimal welfare provisions and spent poorly on social welfare during industrialization. Thus, the logic of industrialism seems to be inappropriate in accounting for East Asian welfare states. To account for the underdeveloped nature of East Asian welfare states, scholars have proposed new welfare regime theories based on the uniqueness or exceptionalism of East Asian countries, such as the Confucian belief system, and the nature of developmental states. The thesis of "productivist" or "developmental" welfare states is more effective in explaining the uniqueness of East Asian welfare states than welfare theory developed to explain the golden age of Western welfare states. Nonetheless, these perspectives have lacked a consistent theoretical and comparative framework for understanding the evolution and diversity of East Asian welfare states. Their perspectives have missed the effects of democratization, the impact of economic globalization, and the pressures of demographic change on late-blooming welfare states in East Asia.

Democratization in the 1980s changed the socioeconomic structures of East Asian countries, leading them to rethink their welfare commitments. Additionally, the financial crisis in the late 1990s and globalization accelerated the reorganization of their welfare systems. Although East Asian welfare states have limited experience of welfare development during industrialization, post-industrial phenomena such as the aging of their population, the polarization of the labor market, and the transformation of family structures are factors which have generated opportunities for these countries to build more comprehensive welfare regimes. This implies that existing regime approaches which emphasize minimal social spending and underdevelopment of the welfare systems of East Asian countries should be revised. Pierson (2004) finds that late industrialized countries—like those in East Asian and Latin America—follow a similar pattern to Western welfare states in their welfare development process. As with Western welfare states (Flora and Alber 1981), East Asian countries have adopted accidental injury insurance as the first social insurance program during industrialization, and they have introduced health and maternity insurance, pensions for the old-aged and

disabled, unemployment insurance, and family allowance after democratization (Pierson 2004, 233).

Existing regime approaches categorize East Asian countries as one single welfare regime. Through successful industrialization and democratic transitions during the 1980s, East Asian countries introduced welfare systems similar to the Western welfare state. Post globalization and the late 1990s' financial crisis, their welfare provisions have radically extended. However, as this chapter discussed, the development pathways of welfare systems in this region have been diverse according to the different democratic performance. Over the last three decades, South Korea and Taiwan adopted more inclusive and redistributive welfare systems during the period of intense political competition. On the other hand, in Japan, less political competition has brought about welfare retrenchment. Democratization has yet to fully reach Singapore. Even though it started social insurance systems earlier than others, Singapore has retained the most minimal welfare provisions among East Asian democracies. Therefore, it is significant to investigate whether despite the pressure of globalization, different democratic practices continue to play a critical role in shaping the divergent welfare development pathways of the late-blooming welfare states among East Asian countries.

Note

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5 Uncommon Democracy of Japan

Consolidated or Pseudo Democracy?

Seongjo Kim

Introduction

This chapter aims to investigate the quality of Japanese democracy. Japan has achieved the consolidated democracy after World War II, which was characterized by fair and competitive elections and inclusion of all citizens in the electoral process. Moreover, Japan has granted its citizens the rule of law and civic freedom. While Japanese democracy has distinctive features compared to its counterparts, there are some underlying problems in Japan democracy. Inoguchi and Jain (1997, 2011) describe it as "Karaoke Democracy" and "Kabuki democracy". Pempel (1990) has analyzed a distinctive democratic regime in which a single party retained long-term political dominance, characterizing as "*uncommon democracy*".

It has shown the weak competitiveness in electoral politics. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had long controlled state institutions since 1955 except for short periods while the opposition forces were quite weak and fragmented in general. In 1955, the separated conservatives join to form the single party, LDP, in response to the pressure from the formation of the coalition in left-wing. Over the next four decades, the LDP has consistently secured the majority in the Diet, Japanese parliament. During the electoral supremacy of the LDP, Japan achieved economic success by leading the so-called "East Asian economic miracle" across this region. The dominance of LDP was justified by practical success and the left-wings were satisfied with taking veto power against the constitutional revision.

During the 1990s, Japan underwent a significant transformation in its political system as well as its economy. The collapse of the economic bubble and the end of the Cold War opened a new arena in domestic politics. The long ruling party suffered an internal split and finally various opposition groups formed the non-LDP government. Although the non-LDP coalition was short-lived, it had a great impact on Japanese politics. The electoral reforms in this period have shaped a different political landscape in Japan. Based on the electoral reform, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) swept to a landslide victory in the House of Representatives election held in August 2009, which was the first meaningful regime change by popular election. Yet the LDP returned to preeminence in 2012 due to the DPJ's mistreatment following a natural disaster and diplomatic issues. The Abe administration paid more attention to the economic resurgence,

characterized as "Abenomics". It is often mentioned that his regime had undermined the freedom of press in several ways and reoriented the state institutions toward more right-wing ideology.

Recently, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic is having a huge impact on political systems across the globe. In general, a lot of countries have undergone a decline of their democratic system. The rapid spread of COVID-19 has demonstrated how fragile democratic norms and systems were. Japan has relatively not only marked lower infection and mortality rates but also sustained its democratic institutions amid the COVID-19 pandemic; the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2020 shows that Japan with South Korea and Taiwan upgraded to full democracies from the "flawed democracy" category. However, Japanese democracy is still struggling with traditional problems such as weak competition and low satisfaction coupled with new concerns on the observed social exclusion and discrimination.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. It examines how experts evaluate the quality of Japanese democracy. It also examines the mass perception and the level of satisfaction with the democratic system. The next part analyses the quality of democracy by breaking down its components such as election, rule of law, participation, accountability, freedom, and equality. The last section summarizes the arguments of this chapter.

Overview of Experts' Reviews on Japanese Democracy

Of late, an increasing number of finely grained indices to evaluate democratic systems are on offer to experts (Christmann 2018). The Freedom House rankings are widely reported in the media and cited by researchers. The Freedom House report released in 2020, *Freedom in the World 2020*, generously evaluated the Japanese democratic system compared to other experts' evaluations.[1] It rated Japan as "free state" with a score of 96 out of 100 in 2020, which is the highest score in Asia. Japan received full score in the Political Rights Index and 56 points out of 60 in the Civil Liberties Index. According to this report, political rights and civil liberties in Japan are generally well respected while there are some challenges including ethnic and gender-based discrimination and claims of improperly close relations between government and the business sector. In the Polity IV project, Japan received the highest score of +10 in each year from 2000 through 2014, as well.

Other indicators such as V-Dem Index, Democracy Index, and Sustainable Governance Indicators gave Japan's democracy lower scores than Freedom House. The 2020 edition of the Annual Democracy Report of the Varieties of Democracy Institute, which analyses the situation of 179 countries, well known as the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Index, ranked Japan 26th among the nations studied on its summary Liberal Democracy Index (LDI). While Japan was placed 8th in the Egalitarian Component Index, it was at 96th place in the Participatory Component Index. Japan was ranked 27th in the Electoral Democracy Index, Liberal Component Index, and Deliberative Component Index.

The 2020 Democracy Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranked Japan 21st out of 165 countries, with a score of 8.13 out of 10. The overall score and its score on this measure increased by 0.14 points from last year. According to this organization, Japan with two other Asian democracies, South Korea and Taiwan, moved to "full democracies" this year; while Japan was very close to attaining "full democracy" status, but for now they remained "flawed democracies" last year. The sector of civil liberties (8.53), electoral process and pluralism (8.75), and functioning of government (8.21) was assessed positively, while the grade of political participation (6.67) remained weak.

In another study, the Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGIs) published by the Bertelsmann Institute has covered Policy Performance, Quality of Democracy, and Governance. In the Quality of Democracy index among SGIs, the scores of Japan's democratic system fared relatively poorly in international comparison.[2] Japan was placed 34th among 41 countries with a score of 5.7 out of 10. Its score on this measure has fallen by 0.5 points since 2014. While the grades of electoral processes (6.6) and civil rights and political liberties (6.7) in Japan were relatively high, access to information (4.7) and rule of law (4.8) were poorly graded.

Satisfaction and Mass Perception

Several comparative survey projects asked how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with the way democracy worked in their country. The World Values Survey (WVS), Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), and Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) provide a solid comparative investigation on political and social values across the world. In the WVS Wave 7, 81 percent of Japanese tended to support having a democratic political system. This figure was higher than that of Korea, and lower than that of Germany, Sweden, and Taiwan. The supportive attitude to a democratic political system is decreasing since 88 percent of Japanese tended to support having a democratic political system in the previous investigation. In contrast, when it comes to support for various types of authoritarian rules, fewer Japanese now prefer rule by the authoritarian systems. In the previous survey, 56 percent of Japanese showed support for having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country. In the Wave 7 conducted in 2019, only 39 percent of Japanese showed support for expert rule, which was lower than the United States, Canada, and Australia. While 36 percent of Japanese showed support for having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections in the previous survey, only 27 percent of Japanese did in this survey. This figure is much lower than Korea (67 percent) and Taiwan (66 percent). In addition, only 2 percent of Japanese showed support for military rule, and support on military rule in Japan was lower than most of the major Western democracies.

The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) is one of the assessments of democratic quality based on Diamond and Morlino's (2004) research. In general, democratic norms and expectations are well-entrenched in Japanese society, according to the ABS. Among Japanese voters, the level of satisfaction with democracy has

increased from 50 percent in Wave 1 to 65 percent in Wave 4. We also found that a great majority of citizens in Japan reject authoritarian alternatives. About 76 percent of Japanese respondents felt that "democracy is suitable for their country". When the ABS asked citizens to evaluate the democratic development of their governments on a 10-point dictatorship–democracy scale, Japanese citizens rated the country's democratic progress at 6.3, a value similar to Korea (6.7) and Taiwan (6.5).

However, people's sense of political efficacy of democracy was significantly low and had declined in Japan. Political efficacy in Japan measured through the various international surveys was lower than not only Western democracies but also Asian new democracies. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and Asian Barometer Survey provides a solid comparative investigation on the level of external political efficacy, which refers to one's belief that one has an influence in what the government does. Only half of the Japanese respondents reported that vote makes a big difference in the CSES Module 4, while three-quarters of Korean and American respondents held it did. In the ABS Wave 4, only 65 percent of Japanese respondents said that democracy is desirable, while about 90 percent of Korean and Taiwanese citizens held it desirable. This figure in Japan declined from 87 percent in the first wave to only 65 percent of our respondents by decades.

Procedural Quality of Japan's Democracy

Democracy has different meanings and the concept of "quality of democracy" is even more contested. Diamond and Morlino (2004) distinguish between three aspects of democratic quality (procedural, substantive, and results) and identify eight dimensions: rule of law, participation, competition, vertical and horizontal accountability, freedom, equality, and responsiveness. This chapter assumes that the concept of democracy consists of three elements: procedure (participation, competition, and distribution of power); effectiveness (representation, accountability, and responsiveness); and performance (social welfare, inequality, and trust). Further, the text seeks to determine which elements are responsible for diverging trajectories within the East Asian democratic recession.

Competition and Electoral Regime

The lower house electoral system was used from 1947 to 1993, known as the SNTV-MMD (single non-transferable vote in multimember districts). Under SNTV, each voter could cast just one vote, for an individual candidate, but in a district that would send multiple winners to the national legislature. Japan adopted the mixed system where voters cast two different ballots in an election. Voters cast one ballot for their preferred party, and those ballots decide the winners of 180 seats. These seats are allocated proportionally, based upon the percentage of the vote that a party won. Seats are allocated in each of the 11 different regions in Japan (Christensen 2011, 61–63). Japan's electoral laws are generally fair and well

enforced. Campaigning is heavily regulated, which typically benefits incumbents, although the rules are applied equally to all candidates.

In terms of formality, Japan had achieved the electoral democracy. Universal suffrage of elections for public office is guaranteed to all Japanese nationals 18 years of age and older. Universal Male Suffrage Law was enacted in 1925 and women gained voting rights after the defeat in World War II. The legislature and administration formed by free election and periodic elections was guaranteed. In general, the Japanese electoral system guaranteed participation and competition by allowing the political right to organize in different political parties and groups. Citizens enjoy equal rights to vote and run for elections. In 2017, for example, the Party of Hope was formed led by Tokyo governor Yuriko Koike. There are frequent and periodic elections held at national and local levels. There is a realistic opportunity for democratic transfers of power, although power transitions did not commonly happen compared to other democracies. The landslide victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in August 2009 has been dubbed a regime change and LDP took back control with a national swing in 2012. In addition, the electoral reform in 1994 changed the political landscape of Japanese election. While the SNTV promoted intraparty competition within the LDP, the new electoral system has encouraged pragmatic competition in electoral politics (Catalinac 2016).

According to various experts, however, Japan has shown some problems such as low competition among political parties, low proportionality, and voting process. First, elections in Japan are still far less competitive than other democracies due to the rebirth of one-party dominance. Opposition parties failed to coordinate their candidates against LDP candidates. After the dissolution of the DJP, the opposition lost its focal point and became fragmented by numerous ideological and relational factions (Nemoto 2018, 828). They would rather exploit the list component, especially the dual candidacy provision, by running more candidates in the first-past-the-post first election. The absence of alternation and competition between two major parties, or between political coalitions, diminishes the importance and the efficacy of vertical accountability. Moreover, the predictability of elections is low since the lower house can be dissolved by the prime minister at any point. When the ruling party sustained its popularity and opposition parties were in disarray, prime ministers often dissolved the Diet and called a snap election. In this way, the ruling party was able to exploit the electoral timing. By contrast, the opposition parties were often faced by a snap election with little coordination.

Second, the Japanese electoral system shows low proportionality, which means the distortion between share of popular vote and seat allocation is quite large. Japan uses a semi-proportional mixed electoral system to elect members of the House of Representatives—289 seats are elected from single-seat constituencies and the remaining 176 members are elected by the party list system of proportional representation in 11 regional blocs. These two components are not linked and operate in parallel, which are opposite to the German mixed electoral system (Nemoto 2018, 828).

The third issue is the malapportionment of Japan's election districts to overrepresent rural populations. This problem has been caused by the number of voters who assign a single member of parliament being different for each constituency. The different ratio of the largest and smallest constituencies per seat has caused inequality in the value of votes. There was a huge population outflow from rural areas to urban areas during the era of rapid economic growth, and this brought about an imbalance of the value of votes for assigning one member of parliament. In 2011, the Supreme Court recognized the unconstitutional situation with a gap of 2.30 times and demanded that the Diet correct it. In 2017, a new redistricting law designed to reduce the voting weight disparities between urban and rural districts took effect. Malapportionment in favor of the rural districts from which the LDP draws significant support has been a persistent problem.

The gap of vote values between rural areas and urban areas has caused several critical issues in Japanese electoral politics. It is often pointed out that policies adopted by the government were biased benefiting smaller-populated rural areas, as these areas are relatively overrepresented (Rosenbluth and Thies 2010, 59). There are several empirical studies to demonstrate the argument that underrepresenting urban representatives and overrepresenting rural representatives led to pork-barrel politics for rural areas (Horiuchi and Saito 2003). Moreover, malapportionment has given the LDP an electoral advantage by overrepresenting rural strongholds of this party. Traditionally, LDP's electoral machine has been efficient in mobilizing rural votes since the ruling party continued to provide protection for agricultural sectors and government subsidies for farmers (Rosenbluth and Thies 2010, 118).

Fourth, a unique voting method in Japan has created various problems. There are various ways how a voter casts one's vote, such as "categorical" or "nominal" method (Rae 1971). Categorical ballots compel the voter to choose one candidate or party, while ordinal ballots allow the voter to express a more sophisticated range of choice. Japanese voters are supposed to write candidates' names down the ballots in their own handwriting (Sunahara 2015, 204). This way of casting citizens' votes is supported by political conservatives, who argue that only those voters who firmly recognize supporting candidates are eligible to cast their votes since democracy requires sophisticated citizens. There are, however, several problems behind this system. Basically, voters have difficulty in delivering their intentions exactly. There is a possibility of misspelling a supporting candidate's name or confusing it with other candidates. There may be multiple candidates with the same name (particularly surname). Moreover, the standard of the judgment on whether votes are valid or not is not necessarily uniform across the country (Sunahara 2015, 205–206). Public officials in the field have discretion on the decision on validity of votes. These practices can undermine the legitimacy of the election as shown in Figure 5.1.

Fifth, a critical aspect of Japan's electoral process is its tight regulation on political campaigning (Christensen 2011, 65–66). Formal campaign periods are quite short and Japan's Public Offices Election Law overwhelmingly limits the methods of electoral campaign. For example, television commercials, pamphlets, posters,

Figure 5.1 Comparison of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Index. *Source:* Perceptions
of Electoral Integrity (PEI) 7.

and postcards are all regulated by this stipulation. Moreover, candidates are pro-
hibited from contacting voters door to door. They are allowed to hang campaign
posters in only a few designated locations. Direct mail, fliers, campaign offices,
and campaign cars are also severely restricted both in number and in content.
These strict campaign regulations were legitimized by citing the need for ensur-
ing "equality" among candidates. However, strict regulations make it difficult for
voters to access information to evaluate candidates (Sunahara 2015, 173). These
regulations can cause another problem at the same time. It is often pointed out
that incumbent politicians may be at an advantage over the challengers who have
had limited opportunities of presenting themselves to voters (Rosenbluth and
Thies 2010, 67).

Rule of Law

The crucial procedural dimension to evaluate the quality of democracy refers
to the rule of law. Law and courts are essential to the modern state to exercise
control over society. The Meiji regime adopted the European-style legal system
(Marshall 2011, 92). Although Japan's legal institutions play less of a role in poli-
tics than counterparts of other democratic states, the rule of law has operated well
in postwar Japan. The "Rule of Law Index 2020" report prepared by the research

team of World Justice Project (WJP) placed Japan at 15th rank out of 128 countries, with a score of 0.78 out of 1.[3] The WJP Rule of Law Index 2020 presents a portrait of the rule of law by providing scores and rankings based on eight factors: constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice. These indicators are an effort to strike a balance between what scholars call a "thin" or minimalist conception of the rule of law that focuses on formal, procedural rules and a "thick" conception that includes substantive characteristics, such as self-governance and various fundamental rights and freedoms.

The minimalist conception of the rule of law is more pronounced in Japan than the substantive one. Order and security, civil justice, and criminal justice are highly rated, while constraints on government powers and open government are poorly assessed in Japan. The reported level of confidence with the judicial system and the courts is relatively high (OECD 2019, 177). In 2018, 63 percent of Japanese citizens and 56 percent of OECD citizens reported having confidence in their respective country's judicial system and courts.

Constitutional guarantees of due process are generally upheld, although observers sometimes complained that trials often favor the prosecution. Particularly, Carlos Ghosn, the former chief executive of Nissan, prompted domestic and international criticism of Japan's legal and judicial system, with observers questioning the country's high conviction rates and prosecutors' dependence on confessions allegedly obtained by placing heavy pressure on defendants.

In general, civil and human rights are guaranteed under the Japanese Constitution. The country's civil liberties measured by Freedom House and 2020 Democracy Index were significantly high. However, there is criticism on free speech and the Japanese media. The controversial anti-conspiracy/anti-terror legislation of 2017, passed in preparation for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, threatens to undermine civil liberties. The 2020 World Press Freedom Index placed Japan 66 out of 180 countries.[4] Its rank on this measure has fallen from 22nd to 66th since Shinzo Abe became prime minister again in 2012. While Japan respects the principles of media pluralism, journalists find it hard put to fully play their role as democracy's watchdog. In 2014, the government passed the "Act of the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets", under which journalists can be in prison if convicted of publishing information specially designated by the government. Moreover, the government has managed to manipulate the media through the control of ownership and relationship with managers. Conservative businessman Katsuo Momii was appointed as NHK's president in 2014, which was seen as one of the attempts to control news coverage. In February 2019, the cabinet sent a memo to managers in a press accusing a journalist of asking a series of critical questions and requesting her shift due to "factual errors".

Political Participation

One of the most striking features in a democratic society is that citizens tend to actively take part in public affairs. Robert Dahl (1971) put "participation" as one

of his two crucial dimensions of polyarchy. Political participation includes electoral participations, campaigning, protest activities, signing petitions, contacting officials, striking, and boycotting. In Japan, civil society has a long history of mobilizing political activities. Since the US occupation period, labor unions had been highly mobilized. In the 1950s and 1960s, Japanese civil movements focused on the movement against the US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty, standing for the Cold War containment strategy. Recently, civil movements organized the political campaign against the new security legislations led by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.

However, the level of political engagement in Japan is relatively low. Several international surveys, including the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and World Values Survey, provide a systematic comparison across the world by measuring overall participation index—voting, contributing money, contacting, protest, and online activity. This measure shows the general level of participation was significantly lower than other democracies, including two Asian neighbors (Dalton 2017, 34). The relatively weak civic participation is highly related to the low political efficacy of its citizens, as mentioned above.

Voter turnout in Japan has consistently been much lower compared to that in other democratic countries. The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) provides the electoral turnout data across the world (Solijonov 2016). For national presidential and parliamentary elections, average turnout from 2010 to 2014 in "free" countries based on the Freedom House Index was 72 percent on a registration population basis and 65 percent on an age-eligible population basis (Vowles 2018, 58). By contrast, average turnout in the same period in Japan was 54.9 percent (Figure 5.2).

Voter turnout has been declining across the globe since the beginning of the 1990s. In Japan, turnout in the 2000s had increased from 59.1 percent in the 1990s to 61.5 percent due to high political competition between the two major parties and electoral swings. However, turnout in the 2010s had declined significantly to


Figure 5.2 Trend of turnout in Japanese national elections from 1990 to 2017 (%). *Source:* Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. https://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/senkyo_s/news/sonota/ritu/index.html (accessed May 26, 2021).

Figure 5.3 Turnout of the 2017 lower house election by age groups. *Source:* Calculated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. https://www.soumu.go.jp /senkyo/senkyo_s/data/shugiin48/index.html (accessed May 26, 2021).

54.2 percent. The 2014 lower house election recorded the lowest turnout (52.7 percent) since the end of World War II. Turnout in the 2019 upper house election, the most recent national election, was 48.8 percent across the country—the lowest turnout of upper house elections since 1995. At the individual level, we find that young voters in Japan tend to participate far less in elections compared to the elderly. As Figure 5.3 shows, only three in ten in their 20s took part in the 2017 lower house election, while seven in ten aged 60 and more did (Figure 5.3). The striking difference of turnout by ages may make politicians more sensitive to older voters' needs and less responsive to young voters' voices.

In terms of non-electoral participation, it is weak in Japan compared to other democracies. In the WVS 6, Japanese tended to participate less in demonstration, boycotting, and industrial actions than the others, while they tended to join signing petitions more than those in the other countries. Japanese participation in the public arena was not high, with 3.6 percent joining demonstrations, 3.5 percent joining strikes, and 1.4 percent boycotting commodities. By contrast, 28 percent of the respondents had experiences of taking part in signing petitions, which amounted to almost three times the average of all the other countries. The low level of political participation in Japan is related to the level of social groups' activity. The ISSP compares the level of overall social group activity across the world by using "group membership index". This index shows that no other democracies have lower level of civil society activity than Japan (Dalton 2017, 69).

Effectiveness and Performance of Japan's Democracy

Accountability

Accountability is the obligation of elected political leaders to answer for their political decisions when asked by citizen-electors or other constitutional bodies

(Morlino 2004, 17). Accountability can be either vertical or horizontal. Vertical accountability is that which electors can demand from their elected official, that the governed can require of the governor in the light of certain acts that he has executed. The voter makes the decision, either awarding the incumbent candidate or slate of candidates with a vote in their favor or punishing them by voting for another candidate, abstaining from the vote, or by nullifying the ballot. As mentioned above, however, elections in Japan are still significantly uncompetitive.

Horizontal accountability is the responsibility governors have to answer to other institutions or collective actors that have the expertise and power to control the behavior of those in power (Morlino 2004, 18). The functioning of horizontal accountability primarily depends upon mutual constraints of constitutional powers (Park 2018, 351). Particularly, the executives are constrained by parliament, Supreme Court, constitutional courts, state-accounting offices, central bank, and other state institutions.

Traditionally, it was often said that legislatures in Japan were considered as "rubber stamps" (Johnson 1982). That was because the LDP took a majority for long time and the elite bureaucrats managed to tackle details of policies. Most of the important decisions were made outside of the Diet. Intraparty debates in the ruling party, interparty bargaining, and negotiations between politicians and bureaucrats had marginalized the roles of the legislature. However, Mochizuki (1982) challenged this conventional view and argued that the legislative process systematically promotes cooperation between political parties and the legislative process is "more than viscous" than it appears. Masuyama (2000) also argued that although the influence of the Diet looks ostensibly weak, it is latently exercised.

Second, the Supreme Court has been restrained and the check and balance among branches remain weak. The court tends to avoid conflicts with the government and politicians, as these might endanger its independence in the long term. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the LDP's position on the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, although district courts sometimes saw it unconstitutional. In addition, the Supreme Court was reluctant to directly intervene in the malapportionment in House of Representatives' elections. Even when the Diet did not stick to the rule for population deviation among electoral districts the court presented, the Supreme Court has never voided any election results. In this regard, the courts are not as politically active in Japan as they are in the United States or Canada.

Third, although Japan dramatically increased *de jure* central bank independence (CBI) in the 1990s, *de facto* independence was not fully guaranteed because politicians tried to manipulate monetary policy through the power of appointments, threats of legal reform, and public suasion (Dwyer 2012). Particularly, politicization had been exceedingly intense and ostensive when Abe took the office in 2012. He put pressure on the Bank of Japan to set a 2 percent inflation target immediately in order to push for his economic agenda, the so-called "Abenomics". Finally, the Abe administration secured massive economic stimulus

to create jobs and investments by mobilizing public criticism and posing threats to limit *de jure* central bank independence.

Equality

Although Japan had been famous for the achievement of rapid growth with social equity, inequality in Japan has been gradually increasing after the 1990s. The burst of the bubble economy, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and the introduction of neoliberal economic policies have increased the inequality. The *Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID)* provides Gini index of SWIID, ranging from 0 to 100: 0 represents perfect equality and 100 means perfect inequality. The Gini index of SWIID in Japan has gradually increased from 28.1 in 1990 to 32 in 2015, which ranked 31st out of 133 countries in the dataset (Solt 2020).The Gini coefficient often used to measure income inequality ranges between 0 in the case of perfect equality and 1 in the case of perfect inequality. The Gini coefficient of Japan (disposable income, post taxes, and transfers) was 0.334 in 2018, slightly higher than the OECD average level. Palma ratio is the share of all income received by 10 percent people with the highest disposable income divided by the share of all income received by 40 percent people with the lowest disposable income. The Palma ratio of Japan in 2018 was 1.28, which ranked 25th out of 35 countries in the OECD.[5]

Although women's rights and opportunities are improving, prospects for women in Japan still remain limited. Despite the postwar constitution guaranteeing equal rights for women, the emphasis on social hierarchy and order constrained the social roles of women. Japan ranked 121st out of 153 countries in the World Economic Forum's 2020 gender gap report. Japan ranks second-to-last in the Glass Ceiling Index 2021 measured by the Economist, which focuses on the equal treatment of women at work in the OECD countries.[6]

Social discrimination is also reflected in the same surname rule for married couples. For the past two decades, women's surname change has been at the heart of public debates in Japan (Shin 2008). This move has faced strong opposition, mainly from a group of conservative lawmakers who champion traditional views toward the family. Moreover, Yoshiro Mori's resignation as president of the Tokyo Olympics organizing committee has unveiled the deep-seated gender bias in Japan. His resignation followed unrelenting international criticism of his sexist remarks and unleashed the demand for women's inclusion in the cabinet and party's high positions. The representation of women in government is still the lowest among industrialized democracies at just 2 of 20 cabinet posts and only 47 of Japan's 463 lower house seats.

Societal discrimination against minority groups persists. The *burakumin* (descendants of feudal-era outcast class), ethnic minority groups, migrant, and LGBTQ+ people are limited in access to employment and housing. According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), to measure policies to integrate migrants across the world, Japan scores 47 out of 100, ranked 34 out of 52 countries. While Japanese policies go halfway to guarantee them equal opportunities

such as on health and education for foreigners, it still denies them several basic rights, most notably protections from discrimination.[7] Moreover, Japan-born descendants of colonial subjects (particularly ethnic Koreans and Chinese) also experience discrimination. A 2016 hate speech law calls on the government to take steps to eliminate discriminatory speech against ethnic minorities, but it does not carry any penalties for perpetrators.[8] Japan does not have a comprehensive and dedicated anti-discrimination law.

Trust

Social trust is one of the most important factors that contributes to the citizens of a society attaining a sense of community, and political trust is related to the confidence that political institutions will act in their interest. In general, the level of social trust and trust in government is little lower in Japan than in Western democracies, according to the World Value Survey. Japanese are divided on the following question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Some 33.7 percent of respondents in the WVS Wave 7 conducted in 2019 say the former, while 61 percent say the latter. This figure is lower than the level of trust in the Western democracies, while it is similar to two other Asian democracies, as shown in Figure 5.4. The level of general trust has been decreasing since it peaked at 39.8 percent in the WVS Wave 3 conducted in 1995.

   Trust in government refers to the proportion of citizens who have confidence in their governments. About four in ten Japanese citizens trust in their government. While this is higher than that of the United States, it was lower than other two Asian democracies, as shown in Figure 5.5. Trust in government has significantly increased compared to the previous survey where only one in four Japanese citizens say they can trust their government.


Figure 5.4 Levels of general trust. *Source: World Values Survey Wave 7.*

Figure 5.5 Levels of trust in government. *Source: World Values Survey Wave 7.*

Conclusion

Japan has a relatively long history of democracy. And Japan's democracy has achieved competitive and fair elections and granted its citizen the rule of law and civic freedom. The Freedom House rated Japan as "free state" and the 2020 Democracy Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) also rated it as "full democracy". In general, the quality of procedural democracy such as rule of law and free and fair election is relatively high. Civil and human rights of Japanese citizens are guaranteed under the Japanese Constitution. The country's civil liberties measured by Freedom House and the 2020 Democracy Index were significantly high. Political competition in Japan has become more programmatic as a result of the 1994 electoral reform. In addition, most of the Japanese tended to support having a democratic political system rather than various forms of authoritarian rules such as army and string leaders. It implies that democratic institutions and practices are deep-seated in the country.

Although Japan has a solid democracy after the end of World War II, it also faces various pressing challenges. First, political efficacy and participation in Japan's democracy has significantly declined even though democratic institutions pervaded the country. Citizens have low confidence that they can make a difference in the political arena. This has led to lower civic electoral and non-electoral forms of civic engagement as the general level of participation is significantly lower than other democracies.

Second, Japan's electoral politics has shown some problems such as low competition among political parties, low proportionality, and voting process. The single party, LDP, retained long-term political dominance in Japan. The voters' choices were effectively restricted in their ballot box since competitive

opposition parties were short-lived. In general, electoral regulations are comprehensive and restrictive, which are favorable to the incumbent. Moreover, Japanese voters are supposed to write candidates' names on the ballots in their own handwriting. This unique practice has distorted the voters' expression of their preference.

Third, democracy in Japan has difficulty in handling social equity and trust. The level of social trust and trust in government is little lower than Western democracies. In addition, inequality in Japan has significantly increased since the 1990s due to the end of the bubble economy, the Asian financial crisis, and introduction of neoliberal reforms.

Fourth, social discrimination against women, social minorities, and ethnic minorities persists in Japan. Women and minority groups are significantly underrepresented in the political arena. The deep-seated gender bias has limited access for women to higher positions in government and corporations. The *burakumin*, ethnic minority groups, migrants, and LGBTQ+ people are restricted in the access to employment.

Notes

1 https://freedomhouse.org/country/japan/freedom-world/2020 (accessed May 20, 2021).
2 https://www.sgi-network.org/2020/Japan/Quality_of_Democracy (accessed May 20, 2021).
3 https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_RuleofLawIndex_2019_Website_reduced.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
4 https://rsf.org/en/japan
5 https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed April 23, 2021).
6 https://www.economist.com/IWDay (accessed May 16, 2021).
7 https://www.mipex.eu/japan (accessed April 23, 2021).
8 https://freedomhouse.org/country/japan/freedom-world/2020#CL (accessed April 29, 2021).

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6 Grassroots Democracy as a Social Base for Pro-poor Outcomes in Vietnam[1]

Yong Kyun Kim

Introduction

Vietnam has undergone sea changes since "Doi Moi", or renovation, a brave policy turnaround to embracing market-oriented reforms in 1986. Once seemed hopelessly trapped as one of the poorest countries in the world, Vietnam has seen its real income grow more than five times for the past 35 years. Having achieved per capita GDP of US$2,750 in 2020, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) just declared its goal to make its nation an upper-middle income country by 2025. During those reform years, Vietnam has transformed itself from a predominantly agrarian society with agricultural production accounting for as much as 45 percent of GDP and 90 percent of its people living in rural areas into one of the fastest growing and most dynamic industrializing economies in the world. Now the urbanization rate has surpassed 35 percent, and secondary and tertiary industries combine to account for 82 percent of GDP. By and large, Vietnam has so far succeeded in transitioning "from plan to market" (Fforde and de Vylder 1996).

Despite these dramatic changes in the social and economic sphere in Vietnam, its political system remains stubbornly intact. The VCP, the only legal political party in the country, still remains in power as firmly as ever before, residing over its well-functioning party-state system. With the VCP showing no sign of erosion in its power to control nearly every aspect of society, the authoritarian nature of Vietnam's political system has been a constant during the reform era as reflected in its Polity IV score graph drawn as the straight line at ×7 with no changes since 1975 (Marshall et al. 2018).

Such a seemingly evident standstill of Vietnam along the regime-type spectrum, however, disguises as much as it reveals the extent to which Vietnam's party-state system has actually evolved over time. True, the VCP has maintained its firm grip on the country, and has no intention, whatsoever, of letting go of it. Notwithstanding, the past three decades have also seen some incremental progresses, small in each itself yet not insignificant taken as a whole, toward greater democratic accountability, both vertically and horizontally.

More specifically, Vietnam's political system has moved slowly but surely in the following four respects. First, the electoral system for the National Assembly (NA)

was reformed several times in such a way that makes the election of deputies to the NA more open and competitive. As a result, the numbers of non-VCP members and of independents who went through the Party's stringent vetting processes to be able to run for a seat in the NA have consistently increased, especially with regard to the former whose number reached 133, about 14 percent of the total candidates, in the 2011 elections. In addition, the VCP has made the elections more competitive by stipulating that the number of candidates exceed the number of seats in a district at least by two. As such, now on average about 1.7 candidates compete over a seat, but in some districts, the actual competition rate can go as high as three candidates per seat.

Second, the VCP has taken measures to empower the once rubber-stamp NA to become a more meaningful player in Vietnamese politics. Before the reform, NA deputies worked only as a part-time job, taking part in couple-weeks long regular plenary sessions twice a year. Now more than 30 percent of the NA deputies are full-time, professional lawmakers working year-in year-out in various special committees during off-sessions. With the increasing professionalization of its deputies, the NA has been better equipped to fulfill its role as a legislative branch. Moreover, the NA has begun to exert increasingly more effective checks and balances on the executive. Query sessions in which deputies get to grill the Prime Minister and other high-ranking officials in the government on-air have made the NA a forum where on behalf of people, their representatives can hold the government responsible for its acts or the lack thereof (Malesky and Schuler 2010). Also, a vote of confidence, first introduced in 2013, has raised the NA's profile even more. With this highly innovative initiative in the context of one-party rule, the NA gets to rate high-ranking government officials on a scale of low to high confidence, and under certain circumstances, it even can remove them from power at least in theory (Malesky 2014). Thanks to the empowerment of the NA, the prestige of its chair, head of the NA, has also been raised to the very top-notch leadership of the VCP, the so-called "four pillars".

Third, there has been an unmistaken tendency toward decentralization by which the balance of power between the center and the provinces has tilted in the latter's favor. On the one hand, the Central Committee (CC) of the Party has gained an upper hand at the expense of the Politburo, and in so doing, it has enlarged its size to 180 (plus 20 alternates) members, more than a majority of whom are now from 63 provincial party committees. As such, key decisions cannot be made without building a winning coalition in the CC, which means that gaining support from the provinces as a voting bloc is imperative in getting a resolution passed. On the other hand, a good deal of policy-making authority has been devolved to provincial governments (Provincial People's Committees), especially in the areas of economic management. In addition, the provinces have also been granted greater fiscal autonomy by way of a series of tax law reforms. As a result, economically strong provinces, in particular, where large surpluses are generated, have gained relative power vis-à-vis the center (Kim 2019).

Last, but not least, the VCP has launched a campaign to promote "grassroots democracy" as a means to shore up its declining legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The party's appeal to socialism has all but evaporated due to the success in market transition, and at the same time, corruption has become so prevalent and widespread across the party-state to the point where the party had no choice but to swear to fight corruption lest it would lose all legitimacy. Against this backdrop, the party conceived promoting grassroots democracy as a way to control local cadres by empowering ordinary citizens in the decision-making process at local levels under the slogan, "people know, people discuss, people do, and people supervise". Various efforts to improve governance performance at local levels have been made, with a special attention given to people's active engagement in local-level public affairs (Hong 2016).

In sum, Vietnam's political system as a party-state regime remains largely intact, but not without subtle changes. It has evolved into one with more competitive elections, more effective checks and balances, greater decentralization, and more grassroots participation. What real outcomes, if any, have these changes toward greater democracy brought to Vietnam? One of the areas where those effects can be felt most is inclusive social policies such as public health and education provisions and redistributive tax and transfer policy. Indeed, in terms of eradicating abject poverty and keeping income inequality in check, Vietnam has clearly outperformed China, which is very similar in a number of respects with one notable exception that its political system has evolved in the opposite direction. It is quite plausible that Vietnam's superb records in reducing poverty rates and maintaining relatively equal income distribution compared to China's have resulted from the relatively open, plural, inclusive, and participatory nature of the former's political system that the latter's lacks (Malesky et al. 2011).

Against this backdrop, the purpose of this chapter is to identify one possible channel through which Vietnam's political system with such characteristics leads to pro-poor policy outcomes. Specifically, I ask if and how citizens' engagement in public affairs at grassroots levels shape their preferences for the government's redistributive policy, thereby laying a social basis for pro-poor outcomes in Vietnam. To answer the question, I analyze the 2017 Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) individual-level survey dataset (CECODES and VFF-CRT 2017), which includes questions about respondents' willingness to pay some percentage of their incomes for the poor as well as a battery of questions relating to their civic engagement, or grassroots-level public engagement and political participation. The statistical analysis shows that eight indicators of "civicness" of respondents, or the degree to which they engage in public affairs at local levels, prove strongly significant in explaining the variation in their willingness to pay for the poor in Vietnam.

The chapter is organized as follows. After introduction, I will elaborate on the theory linking individuals' civic characteristics to their propensity to support income transfers to the poor. A section describing the data and the results of regression analysis will follow. Last, discussions of the implications of the findings will conclude the paper.

Civicness, Trust, and Support for Redistribution

What makes people more willing to pay for fighting hunger and poverty, to give to charity, and to transfer a portion of their incomes to poorest regions? Sources of citizen support for redistributive efforts aimed at helping the poor have received a great deal of scholarly attention (e.g., Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011; Córdova 2011; Daniele and Gyes 2015; Fong 2011; Kumlin and Svallfors 2007; Piketty 1995; Yamamura 2012). If only narrow self-interest is what drives people's attitudes toward such targeted income transfers, then the would-be net tax payers who are relatively richer than the median-income earner would not be supportive of such redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981). There is ample evidence to the contrary, however. People seem willing to pay a tax to help the poor despite the fact that they themselves would not be direct beneficiaries (e.g., Alesina et al. 2004; Gilens 1999; Kumlin and Svallfors 2007). What then can explain the relatively well-to-do's willingness to give to the poor? What sorts of characteristics at the individual level are associated with one's attitude in favor of redistribution?

In this chapter, I argue that the active participation in civic life that nurtures civicness in one's mind reinforces the "habits of the heart" (Tocqueville 1969) and instills a sense of solidarity and empathy toward less fortunate co-members of the community, thereby shaping preferences over social issues in favor of redistributive policies. On the one hand, citizens who engage in community activities and get involved in public affairs tend to develop a sense of trust in others as well as in public institutions. This then helps them surmount the cynicism often associated with policies supporting the poor due to concerns about free riding of others and public corruption. On the other hand, civic-minded people are also more likely to be bound by cooperative social norms, norms of reciprocity in particular, which enable them to act altruistically in the short term in the expectation of eventual self-interests. As trust and norms of reciprocity further instill a mindset of solidarity and a feeling of sympathy toward others residing beyond one's immediate neighborhood, those who lead a civic life are more inclined to support pro-poor, redistributive policies even at their own expense. In short, as a sign of "civic virtue" (Walzer 1980), there is an element of civic solidarity, the spirit of companionship with others in difficulty that is engendered and reinforced by active civic engagement.

The literature on the welfare state has identified trust as a key non-material source of public support for redistributive tax-and-transfer policy. Two kinds of trust matter in shaping one's preferences over welfare provision: trust in others, or social trust, and trust in public institutions, or political trust. First, social trust, also referred to as interpersonal trust, is one's expectation of "honest and cooperative behavior … on the part of other members of community" (Fukuyama 1995, 26).Trusting in fellow citizens underpins one's willingness to contribute to a common good of society, such as eradicating poverty and hunger. For it helps alleviate concerns over others' opportunistic behaviors, such as free riding, tax evasion, and cheating that can undermine the chances of achieving the common cause of reducing poverty (Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011; Daniele and Gyes 2015). Furthermore, interpersonal trust, which rests on the principles of equality and

solidarity (Seligman 1997; Uslaner 2002), enables trusting individuals to interact with others with a sense of mutual respect, reinforcing over time feelings of sympathy and solidarity as well as other-regarding preferences (Córdova 2011).

Second, "political trust" or trust in public institutions is also an important aspect of the trust that fosters citizens' support for redistributive public policies (Hetherington 1998). Successful provision of a public good not only requires overcoming the dilemma of collective action among citizens, it also presupposes the existence of impartial and effective public authority, which regulates and coordinates the production and distribution of public goods. Without it, citizens' willingness to contribute would be undermined as they suspect that their contributions will not be used properly. Perceived procedural justice, or citizens' trust in the fairness and effectiveness of public institutions, therefore, constitutes an essential element in shaping one's attitude toward welfare policies (Rothstein 1998; Rothstein et al. 2012; Svallfors 2013).

While trust is a "cognitive dimension" of social capital, which has the attitudinal and behavioral implications noted above, it itself is nurtured in one's mind over time as one gets involved in social networks and participation reflects the "structural dimensions" of social capital (Uphoff 2000). Thus, without denying the possibility that a high level of trust inclines one to participate in civic activities, I argue that active civic engagement and political participation instill in the participants' minds trust, both in others and in public authority, thereby making them more likely to support redistributive public policies.

First, social trust can arise from norms of reciprocity, the development of which is likely to be encouraged by the repeated social exchange embedded within dense networks of civic engagement (Granovetter 1985; Putnam 1993). Reciprocity refers to "a continuing relationship of exchange" with "mutual expectations that a benefit granted now should be repaid in the future" (Putnam 1993, 172). Critically, reciprocity enables self-interested people to embrace solidarity as it is "made up of a series of acts each of which is short-run altruistic … but which together typically make every participant better off" (Taylor 1982, 29). Thus, where norms of reciprocity prevail, acts of opportunism are effectively restrained, promoting interpersonal trust among the members of the community (Becchetti et al. 2008). At the same time, as Bowles and Gintis (2000) argue, a generalized form of reciprocity applies to large-scale redistribution such that it can lead taxpayers to prefer redistribution. In particular, wealthy people bound by norms of reciprocity tend to be willing to support those in need, "provided that others would do the same for them if necessary" (Fong 2001, 226).

Second, civic engagement within dense social networks not only leads, mainly by fostering norms of reciprocity, social trust to be instilled in people's minds; active participation in public affairs also helps participants to develop a sense of political efficacy, and thus trust in public authority. Active participation in public affairs enlightens citizens and instills in their minds important values, such as the obligations of citizenship as well as "interest in public issues and devotion to public causes", "the key signs of the civic virtue" (Walzer 1980, 64). It, in other words, nurtures a "virtuous, public-spirited citizenry" (Putnam 1993, 87), who recognize and pursue the public good. Better informed of public issues and better equipped

Figure 6.1 Relationships between civicness, trust, and willingness to pay for the poor.

to participate in public affairs, such public-spirited citizens are less likely to feel alienated, much less to feel impotent. The more actively they participate in self-governing public deliberations, the more they feel efficacious. As public-minded citizens take charge of the common issues of their community, trust in public institutions grows in their minds over time (Krishna 2007).

The argument is summarized in Figure 6.1. Those who are more actively involved in civic engagement and in public affairs are likely to have higher levels of trust in others and in public authority, thereby expressing a greater willingness to support public policies for helping the poor. In what follows below, I will test whether a higher level of civicness is associated with more willingness to give to the poor.

Empirical Analysis

For empirical analysis, I used the original individual-level dataset of the 2017 PAPI survey. The 2017 survey includes questions that ask respondents whether they would be willing to pay for the poor. Each respondent was randomly assigned to answer one of the following three questions: (1) whether to pay for fighting hunger and poverty; (2) whether to pay to transfer to poor provinces; or (3) whether to give to charity. Then each respondent was also randomly asked to pay for the given purpose one of the following percentages of his or her income: (1) 1 percent; (2) 3 percent; or (3) 5 percent.

Table 6.1 reports the descriptive statistics of these questions, which I use as the dependent variables. Regardless of the purpose of transfer, about 71 percent of respondents said that they would be willing to pay on average, with more than 78 percent willing to pay 1 percent of their incomes. When asked to pay 3 or 5 percent, however, the percentages declined rather sharply to 69 percent and 67 percent, respectively. Disaggregated into different purposes, the shares of those who said yes do not differ greatly with a partial exception of the case of transferring to poor provinces. For that purpose, about 73 percent said yes on average, about two percentage points higher than for the other purposes, and about 72 percent responded positively for giving away 3 percent of their incomes, which is about four percentage points higher.

To measure respondents' levels of civicness, I constructed eight indicators of civic engagement and political participation. Table 6.2 provides the summary statistics of the composite index of civicness as well as each of the eight individual indicators.

Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variable

	Willingness to pay			
	1%	*3%*	*5%*	*Combined*
Observations	4,523	4,410	4,518	13,451
Mean	0.78	0.69	0.67	0.71
Std. Dev.	0.42	0.46	0.47	0.45
	Fight poverty			
	1%	*3%*	*5%*	*Combined*
Observations	1,446	1,450	1,514	4,410
Mean	0.78	0.68	0.67	0.71
Std. Dev.	0.41	0.47	0.47	0.45
	Transfer to poor provinces			
	1%	*3%*	*5%*	*Combined*
Observations	1,594	1,485	1,504	4,583
Mean	0.78	0.72	0.68	0.73
Std. Dev.	0.42	0.45	0.47	0.45
	Charity			
	1%	*3%*	*5%*	*Combined*
Observations	1,483	1,475	1,500	4,458
Mean	0.77	0.68	0.66	0.71
Std. Dev.	0.42	0.47	0.47	0.46

First, for civic engagement, three indicators are used: (1) whether they were a member of a mass organization other than the Communist Party (Mass orgs); (2) whether they contributed their time and efforts to constructing public buildings (Contribute); (3) whether they proactively tried to solve public issues by making a proposal to authorities, by lodging a complaint, or by denouncing public agencies (Proactive). While 54 percent of the respondents participated in one or more mass organizations, about 47 percent said that they contributed to a communal work of their communities. Yet only 27 percent proactively pursued civic goals. Second, to measure levels of civic awareness of public affairs, I also used two indicators: (1) whether they were aware of the Law on Access to Information (Know LAI); and (2) whether they read, listened, or watched news (Read news). Only about 37 percent said that they followed up news about public affairs on a regular basis. Even a lower percentage of people, 11 percent, turned out to know about the Law on Access to Information. Third, three indicators are used to capture levels of political participation: (1) whether they voted (Vote); (2) whether they met with their representatives

Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variable

	Composite index			
	Civicness			
Observations	14,097			
Mean	0.37			
Std. Dev.	0.22			
	Civicness components			
	Know LAI	Mass orgs	Contribute	Proactive
Observations	13,832	14,097	13,090	13,983
Mean	0.11	0.54	0.47	0.27
Std. Dev.	0.32	0.5	0.5	0.44
	Contact gov	Meet reps	Vote	Read news
Observations	14,038	8,778	10,678	14,097
Mean	0.32	0.48	0.82	0.37
Std. Dev.	0.47	0.5	0.38	0.48

(Meet reps); and (3) whether they contacted public officials, either village head, commune People's Committee, People's Council, or a mass organization (Contact gov). More than 80 percent of people reported that they voted in the last national or local elections; but less than a half said that they participated in a meeting with People's Council representatives, and about a third declared that they contacted public officials. The composite index, Civicness, created by simply taking the average of the eight indicators, ranges from 0 to 1, and has the mean of 0.37.

Results of Regression Analysis

To test the hypothesis that citizens with higher levels of civicness are more willing to give to the poor, I run a number of logistic regressions with a host of control variables. First, I used two sorts of economic variables to control for one's ability to pay: (1) objective income levels (low, low-mid, mid-high, and high income); and (2) subjective evaluations of economic conditions. For the latter (Economic condition), I combined the self-evaluations of how good the current economic condition is, how much better it is today compared to five years ago, and how much better it will be in five years compared to today. To facilitate the comparison of the effects that it and the main independent variable have on the dependent variables, I standardized it so that it varies from 0 to 1 as does Civicness. Second, to account for respondents' public bias, two indicators are included: (1) whether they themselves hold a public office; and (2) whether they are a member of the Communist Party. Third, to capture and control for respondents' perception of

public corruption, the extent to which they believe government officials use public funds for private purposes is also included. Finally, key demographic character-istics that deem relevant to preferences over redistributive policies are controlled for, including education level, urban or rural residency, age, sex, and whether they belong to an ethnic minority.

Table 6.3 reports the results of the logistic regressions with the aggregated will-ingness to pay as the dependent variable regressed on the composite Civicness

Table 6.3 Civicness and Willingness to Pay

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	1%	3%	5%
Civicness	2.14	1.34	1.27
	(0.25)***	(0.21)***	(0.19)***
Economic condition	2.26	1.89	1.96
	(0.29)***	(0.25)***	(0.24)***
Public office	0.08	0.12	0.21
	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Party member	0.37	0.41	0.02
	(0.19)*	(0.16)**	(0.14)
Perceived corruption	−0.05	−0.16	−0.11
	(0.07)	(0.07)**	(0.06)*
Urban resident	−0.07	−0.13	−0.22
	(0.12)	(0.1)	(0.10)**
Education	0.13	0.03	0.05
	(0.03)***	(0.03)	(0.02)**
Low-mid income	−0.15	0.17	0.05
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Mid-high income	0.04	0.06	0.07
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)
High income	0.08	0.43	0.03
	(0.14)	(0.12)***	(0.12)
Female	−0.21	−0.22	0.02
	(0.09)**	(0.08)***	(0.08)
Age	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01
	(0.00)***	(0.00)***	(0.00)***
Minorities	0.09	0.21	−0.02
	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.23)
Constant	−0.73	−0.05	−0.33
	(0.40)*	(−0.35)	(−0.34)
Observations	3,671	3,617	3,705

Note: Logistic regressions with standard errors in parenthesis. Results for 9 dummies for occupation fields and 62 dummies for provinces are dropped for space reason. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

index along with other control variables. Separate regressions were run for the three different percentages at which their incomes would be given up.

As a whole, the models explain a great deal of the variation in the respondents' willingness to pay with most variables registering significance in at least one of the models. Specifically, as people get older, they tend to be less willing to give to the poor while men are more willing than women to pay 1 or 3 percent, if not more, of their incomes. Also, more educated people show a greater willingness to share to help the poor; so are people residing in rural areas as opposed to urban areas. Party members are more willing to give up to 3 percent than non-party members while those who believe government officials use public funds for their own purposes tend to exhibit reservations about redistributive public policies.

Civicness and the subjective economic conditions are the two variables whose effects on the likelihood of being willing to pay are greatest. Figure 6.2 depicts and compares the changes in the probability of the willingness to pay as the two variables increase from 0 to 1. The effects of Civicness are comparable to those of Economic condition, especially if only 1 percent of income is what is asked for. For both variables, as they rise from to 1, the probability that the respondent would say yes increases from about 0.5 to about 0.9, an almost 80 percent increase. As expected, when greater percentages of income are required, the effects of both variables on the probability of positive response decline. Yet, the degree to which the independent variable's effects on the willingness are reduced is greater for Civicness than for Economic condition. For the former, its effects decrease by


Figure 6.2 Civicness and the probability of willingness to pay.

37–41 percent, whereas for the latter they drop only by 13–16 percent. It implies that the willingness driven by civic solidarity seems as strong as that led by one's good economic situations so long as the required income transfers are as small as 1 percent of income, but the former is subject to a steeper depreciation than the latter once more than the minimal percentage of income is asked to give away.

Table 6.4 provides the results of the three separate regressions with specific purposes of transfer: (1) to fight hunger and poverty; (2) to transfer to poorer

Table 6.4 Effects of Civicness by Different Purposes

	Fight poverty		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	1%	3%	5%
Civicness	2.88	1.04	1.05
	(0.49)***	(0.39)***	(0.36)***
Economic condition	2.37	2.24	2.74
	(0.54)***	(0.46)***	(0.45)***
Constant	−1.19	−0.01	−1.38
	(0.80)	(0.62)	(0.61)**
Observations	1,107	1,167	1,252
	Transfer to poor provinces		
	(4)	(5)	(6)
	1%	3%	5%
Civicness	1.72	1.8	1.61
	(0.43)***	(0.40)***	(0.36)***
Economic condition	2.91	1.63	1.46
	(0.52)***	(0.48)***	(0.43)***
Constant	−0.49	0.08	0.27
	(0.69)	(0.65)	(0.62)
Observations	1,239	1,190	1,201
	Charity		
	(7)	(8)	(9)
	1%	3%	5%
Civicness	2.26	1.45	1.18
	(0.44)***	(0.38)***	(0.34)***
Economic condition	2.24	1.91	1.83
	(0.54)***	(0.44)***	(0.44)***
Constant	−1.13	−0.29	−0.17
	(0.74)	(0.63)	(0.60)
Observations	1,144	1,224	1,232

Note: Logistic regressions with standard errors in parenthesis. Results for control variables as well as for 9 dummies for occupation fields and 62 dummies for provinces are dropped for space reason.*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

provinces; and (3) to give to charity. If we limit ourselves to the case when only 1 percent of income is asked for, different pictures emerge across different purposes. When the purpose of the giving is to fight poverty, the effect of Civicness is even greater than that of Economic condition; its effect is 1.2 times higher than the latter. By contrast, when the purpose is to transfer to poor provinces, the former is much smaller compared to the latter, only 60 percent. For the purpose of charity giving, there is no difference in effects between the two variables. And Civicness' effects by themselves vary in such order—largest for fighting poverty, next for giving to charity, and smallest for transferring to poor provinces.

Interestingly however, the effects of Civicness decline more rapidly for fighting poverty than for other purposes as greater percentages of income are requested. Indeed, it is for the purpose of transferring to poor provinces that Civicness' effects are the greatest when 3 or 5 percent of income is asked to give away. Figure 6.3 compares changes in the probability of willingness to give with increases in percentages of income transfer across the three different purposes.

Next, instead of using the composite index, I fit the models with each of the components of the index one by one to gauge their relative contributions. As reported in Table 6.5, while all of the eight components are significant at least at the 0.10 level, there is a great deal of variance in the magnitudes of the estimated effects of the components, ranging from 0.21 to 0.79. Know LAI has the largest


Figure 6.3 Impacts of civicness across different purposes.

Table 6.5 Effects of Different Aspects of Civicness on Willingness to Pay 1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Know LAI	Mass orgs	Contribute	Proactive
Civicness component	0.79	0.55	0.54	0.5
	(0.20)***	(0.10)***	(0.10)***	(0.12)***
Economic condition	2.46	2.46	2.47	2.47
	(0.28)***	(0.28)***	(0.29)***	(0.28)***
Constant	−0.57	−0.9	−1	−0.65
	(0.41)	(0.40)**	(0.42)**	(0.40)
Observations	3,606	3,671	3,483	3,653
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Contact govt	Meet reps	Vote	Read news
Civicness component	0.43	0.35	0.23	0.21
	(0.10)***	(0.12)***	(0.14)*	(0.10)**
Economic condition	2.49	2.33	2.41	2.5
	(0.28)***	(0.39)***	(0.32)***	(0.28)***
Constant	−0.77	0.28	−0.15	−0.67
	(0.40)*	(0.54)	(0.48)	(0.40)*
Observations	3,662	2,456	2,912	3,671

Note: Logistic regressions with standard errors in parenthesis. Results for control variables as well as for 9 dummies for occupation fields and 62 dummies for provinces are dropped for space reason. *$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

effect, followed by Mass organizations, Contribute, Proactive, and Contact government. If a response changes from no to yes to any of these, the probability of being willing to pay would increase from about 0.5 to at least 0.6, about a 20 percent increase. Meet representatives follows closely, leading to a probability increase from 0.5 to about 0.58. Vote and Read news, while still significant, are least related to the probability of respondents' saying yes to paying 1 percent of their income.

Figure 6.4 shows those changes in the probability as the value of each component increases from 0 to 1. Know LAI, the component with the largest effect, leads the probability to increase from 0.5 to nearly 0.7.

Robustness Tests

I performed additional tests to address the issue of endogeneity, or the possibility that some unobservable characteristics may lead both to higher levels of civicness

Figure 6.4 Civicness components' effects on willingness to pay.

and to a greater willingness to pay for the poor. First, I split the sample into three subsamples according to the lengths of current residence: (1) people with residence of 12 years or less (less than the 10th percentile); (2) people with residence of 57 years or more (greater than the 90th percentile); and (3) people with residence between 12 and 57 years. If there is a certain unusual individual trait that make one both more (or less) civic and willing to pay, and if that trait is more likely to be present among those who moved relatively recently or those who have lived very long, then results of those subsamples should look quite different from those of the full sample. Table 6.6 reports the results.

It turns out that for those who have lived only less than 12 years or lived longer than 57 years, the effects of Civicness are 1.4 to 2.2 times greater than the average, suggesting that those relatively new and old residents may have some unusual characteristics that make them both prone to civicness and to will-ingness to pay. What is assuring, in this regard, is the fact that the subsample that excludes those residents produces somewhat weaker, yet equally significant effects for Civicness.

Second, I used the instrumental variables method to take into account the fac-tors that affect the levels of Civicness. Civicness was instrumented by urban resi-dency, years in residence, holding a public office, gender, minorities, permanent residency, and income levels. As shown in Table 6.7, the effects of Civicness in the main equations remain largely intact.

Table 6.6 Subsets of Respondents by the Lengths of Residence

	Residents 12 years or less only		
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*
	1%	*3%*	*5%*
Civicness	3.08	2.37	2.09
	(1.09)***	(0.96)**	(0.95)**
Economic condition	0.28	1.97	2.77
	(1.28)	(1.18)*	(1.24)**
Constant	−0.53	−1.61	1.12
	(1.64)	(1.57)	(1.51)
Observations	253	280	277
	Residents 57 years or more only		
	(4)	*(5)*	*(6)*
	1%	*3%*	*5%*
Civicness	4.61	1.59	1.67
	(1.03)***	(0.82)*	(0.70)**
Economic condition	3.06	2.37	2.19
	(1.08)***	(0.84)***	(0.80)***
Constant	−1.24	4.9	−0.6
	(2.26)	(2.58)*	(2.38)
Observations	286	351	323
	Residents more than 12 years, less than 57 years		
	(7)	*(8)*	*(9)*
	1%	*3%*	*5%*
Civicness	1.97	1.26	1.25
	(0.27)***	(0.23)***	(0.21)***
Economic condition	2.55	2.14	1.94
	(0.32)***	(0.28)***	(0.26)***
Constant	−0.93	−0.12	−0.28
	(0.46)*	(0.39)	(0.37)
Observations	2,963	2,941	3,049

Note: Logistic regressions with standard errors in parenthesis. Results for control variables as well as for 9 dummies for occupation fields and 62 dummies for provinces are dropped for space reason.*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

Table 6.7 Instrumental Variables Regressions

		(1)	(2)	(3)
		1%	3%	5%
Willingness to pay	Civicness	1.71	1.82	1.22
		(0.56)***	(0.45)***	(0.48)**
	Economic condition	1.16	0.97	1.08
		(0.21)***	(0.19)***	(0.18)***
	Party member	0.15	0.18	−0.06
		(0.09)	(0.09)**	(0.08)
	Perceived corruption	−0.02	−0.08	−0.07
		(0.04)	(0.04)**	(0.04)**
	Urban resident	0	−0.08	−0.14
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)**
	Education	0.06	−0.01	0
		(0.02)***	(0.02)	(0.02)
	Age	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01
		(0.00)***	(0.00)***	(0.00)***
	Constant	−0.37	0.03	−0.06
		(0.22)*	(0.20)	(0.20)
Civicness	Economic condition	0.2	0.21	0.2
		(0.02)***	(0.02)***	(0.02)***
	Party member	−0.01	0.02	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)*	(0.01)
	Perceived corruption	−0.01	0	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)*
	Urban resident	−0.02	−0.01	−0.02
		(0.01)*	(0.01)	(0.01)**
	Education	0.03	0.03	0.03
		(0.00)***	(0.00)***	(0.00)***
	Age	0	0	0
		(0.00)***	(0.00)***	(0.00)***
	Years in residence	0	0	0
		(0.00)	(0.00)***	(0.00)
	Public office	0.1	0.1	0.11
		(0.01)***	(0.01)***	(0.02)***

(Continued)

Table 6.7 Continued

		(1)	(2)	(3)
		1%	*3%*	*5%*
	Female	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06
		(0.01)***	(0.01)***	(0.01)***
	Minorities	0.05	0.07	0.04
		(0.02)***	(0.02)***	(0.02)*
	Permanent residency	0.06	0.03	0.05
		(0.03)**	(0.03)	(0.03)*
	Low-mid income	−0.01	−0.02	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)**	(0.01)
	Mid-high income	−0.02	0	0.01
		(0.01)**	(0.01)	(0.01)
	High income	−0.01	−0.01	0
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
	Constant	−0.1	−0.08	−0.01
		(0.04)	(0.04)**	(0.04)**
athrho	Constant	−0.1	−0.21	−0.1
		(0.12)	(0.10)**	(0.10)
lnsigma	Constant	−1.67	−1.65	−1.61
		(0.01)***	(0.01)***	(0.01)***
Observations		3,659	3,598	3,688

Note: Maximum likelihood IV estimations with standard errors in parenthesis. Results for 9 dummies for occupation fields and 62 dummies for provinces are dropped for space reason.*p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01.

Conclusion

This chapter argues that in Vietnam those who actively participate in civic affairs are more likely to support pro-poor public policies as civic engagement and political participation bound participants to norms of reciprocity and help them develop trust in others and public authority as well as a sense of empathy. Given the limited scope of questions in the survey and the cross-sectional nature of the dataset, I was able neither to test every aspect of the theory nor to unequivocally show that Civicness causes willingness to help the poor. Nonetheless, all in all, the statistical analysis taken together with additional robust tests provides strong support for the main argument of the chapter.

Over the past three decades, Vietnam's political system has undergone subtle, yet not insignificant changes. Elections have been made more open and competitive, mechanisms of checks and balances enhanced, and more policy-making powers devolved to provinces. At the same time, and in conjunction with these changes, the party also launched the grassroots democracy reform drive, by

which citizens at the local levels are empowered to hold their local governments accountable. Though within the confines of the party-state regime, those changes in political procedures have made the political system a little bit more competitive, responsive, accountable, and democratic than would have otherwise been the case.

There is little doubt that all these reform measures were adopted by the party in order to shore up its faltering regime legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. Nonetheless, they have made a difference in outcomes that matter to the lives of ordinary people. Public goods provisions in Vietnam such as basic infrastructure, health, and education tend to be more equitably distributed than in China where little such reforms were introduced (Malesky et al. 2011). This chapter has provided one possible link between procedural reform and outcome performance. The more empowered the citizens are to actively engage in their local public affairs, the greater willingness they express to paying their due share to help less fortunate neighbors. This has laid the social base for the pro-poor policy outcomes in Vietnam.

Note

1 This chapter is a revised version of an article, "Civic Solidarity: Civicness and Willingness to Pay for the Poor in Vietnam", originally published in *Korean Social Science Journal*, 46(2).

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7 The Perceived Quality of Democracy and Political Support in Taiwan

Su-Jeong Kang

Introduction and Background of Research

Taiwan is often cited among the successful cases of democratization and democratic consolidation in Asia. It transitioned from authoritarian rule to democracy amid the third wave of democratization that spread around the world. Subsequently, it stabilized and consolidated its democracy within a short period of time by carrying out regular elections, institutional reforms, and peaceful transfers of power (Chi 2016). Before the 1980s, Taiwan was an authoritarian state characterized by a one-party dictatorship under the Chinese Nationalist Party or the Kuomintang (KMT). From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, Taiwan's transition to democracy went remarkably smoothly without political violence. Following the first nationwide legislative election held in 1992, the first democratic direct election of the president was held in 1996 when the KMT-nominated Lee Teng-hui became Taiwan's first democratically elected president.

However, in the early 2000s, victories of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), an opposition party at the time, in both the presidential and parliamentary elections drastically changed Taiwan's political landscape, having brought an end to the KMT's more than 50-year rule and marking the first-ever transfer of governing power between political parties in Taiwan. For the first time, the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, won the presidency in the 2000 presidential election, and then the 2001 legislative election resulted in the KMT losing its majority and the DDP to emerging as the largest party in the legislature. As a result, the DPP became the ruling party by forming the first non-KMT government in Taiwan since 1949.

The KMT gained a majority of seats again in the legislative election in 2008 when the KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, was elected as president of Taiwan. The second peaceful transfer of power between the KMT and the DPP through the re-election of the KMT in 2008 marked an important achievement for Taiwan's democracy. It is believed that Taiwan's democracy settled down and entered the stage of consolidation following this, since it passed Samuel Huntington's two-turnover test in a democratic and peaceful manner, through free and fair competitive elections (Huntington 1991, 266–267).

Unlike the DPP which insisted on Taiwan's independence and created tensions in cross-strait relations, the KMT which took power in 2008 attempted to

promote economic growth through a pro-China policy of expanding economic exchanges and cooperation with mainland China (Moon 2008, 106–107). As a result, Taiwan's dependence on China in bilateral trade sharply intensified with growing concerns about its economic subordination to China which may lead to economic slowdown and concomitant recession in Taiwan's economy (Park 2010). In addition, as Taiwan's leading companies migrated to China, Taiwanese fears of being hollowed out by China in industrial sectors intensified. On the other hand, as a consequence of Taiwan's economic opening, income inequality rapidly deepened and emerged as a serious social problem (Chi 2012).The economic slowdown and the ensuing increase in income inequality heightened social dissatisfaction. In this domestic context, hundreds of Taiwanese students occupied the national legislature's assembly hall in 2014, holding protests against the then ruling KMT's railroading of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, excessive pro-China policy, and economic subjugation. With the support of the public, these student movements led to the Sunflower Movement, resulting in large-scale demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of people (Chung 2016).

Consequently, the KMT suffered a devastating defeat in the local elections of December 2014. The DPP candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, became the first female president of Taiwan by defeating the then ruling KMT's presidential candidate, Eric Chu, in the 2016 presidential election. In the same year, the DPP claimed an overwhelming victory in the legislative election by gaining its first legislative majority. The DPP's landslide victories in both the presidential and legislative elections led to another horizontal transfer of power from the ruling party to the opposition (Kuk 2016; Lee 2016). This marked a milestone of democratic progress in Taiwan because it achieved the third peaceful transition of power between political parties through a democratic process since its democratization in the early 1990s (Chi 2016). Currently, Taiwan's incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen was re-elected and the ruling DPP won a majority of seats again in the combined presidential and legislative elections in 2020.

In Taiwan, the transition of power between the ruling party and the opposition party through democratic elections has continued steadily without overthrowing democracy. In this sense, Taiwan is known for having been able to maintain a more stable democracy than other countries that have experienced a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system in a similar period. It is also regarded as enjoying a relatively high level of democracy in terms of various democratic indicators. For example, according to the Polity IV index, one of the indices commonly used to assess the level of democracy in countries, Taiwan has been evaluated as a "consolidated democracy" since 2004, as shown in Figure 7.1. To measure the level of democracy in a given country, Polity IV uses democratic indicators such as the regulation, competitiveness, and openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, competitiveness and regulation of political participation, etc.[1]

However, as these objective indicators of democracy tend to focus on the evaluation of democratic institutions and procedures, the effectiveness and performance of democracy have not been sufficiently addressed in their assessment (Cho 2014; Cho and Lee 2015). Furthermore, many democratic indicators have not reflected

Figure 7.1 Changes in Taiwan's Polity IV index value by year. *Note:* Polity IV index value (range: −10 to 10): −10 = hereditary monarchy, −10 to −6 = autocracies, −5 to 0 = closed anocracies, 1–5 = open anocracies, 6–9 = democracies, 10 = consolidated democracy. *Source:* Polity IV Project Dataset, 1950–2018.

the perception and evaluation of social members on their political systems. A good democracy requires a high quality of democracy in terms of its procedures, effectiveness, and performance. Moreover, for a democracy to be sustainable in a society, it needs to continuously garner political support (Claassen 2020). The perception and evaluation of citizens on the quality of democracy can have an impact on their overall satisfaction with and political support for democracy. Thus, aimed at seeking a "good and sustainable democracy", it is necessary to pay attention to the perception and evaluation of citizens on the quality of democracy (Logan and Mattes 2012). Furthermore, the evaluation on the quality of democracy needs to consider the practical effectiveness and performance of democracy as well as its procedures and institutions (Cho 2014; Cho and Lee 2015; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Kim 2014; Ma and Lee 2014; Morlino 2004a). When the procedure, effectiveness, and performance of a democracy in practice meet democratic values and demands of citizens, a better democracy is more likely to be achieved and sustained.

The legitimacy and sustainability of political systems are significantly dependent on political support for the systems. Thus, the increase in political support for a regime is likely to enhance the regime's legitimacy and stability. In this sense, the level of political support for democracy can be an important indicator of its legitimacy and sustainability. As the level of political support for democracy is higher, the democratic system is likely to be more legitimate and stable.

However, as recent studies suggest, the problem of democratic backsliding and deconsolidation that is spreading around the world has shown that the deterioration in the quality and stability of democracy is not limited to new democracies, but also occurs in consolidated democracies (Diamond 2015; Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017). These recent phenomena reveal that the consolidation of democracy does not mean that a high quality of democracy has been acquired, nor does it guarantee the stability of the system forever. A consolidated democracy also carries the risk of de-consolidation if it cannot continue to secure regime legitimacy through the maintenance and further improvement of democratic quality and political support for it. This suggests that the issue of legitimacy and sustainability of democracy is no longer a concern limited to fledgling democracies, but a universal concern for all democracies. Taiwan's democracy has been regarded as consolidated at the institutional level. However, rising dissatisfaction with the quality of democracy may undermine the legitimacy and stability of the democratic system. Although the definition and requirements of a good democracy are fiercely debated, most scholars agree that even a democratic system with essential democratic institutions may not be sustainable unless the system consistently gains political support by satisfying its citizens' needs (Kim 2014; Ma and Lee 2014; Morlino 2004b). From this point of view, political support may not be a sufficient condition for a good and sustainable democracy but it is a necessary condition. The perception and evaluation of citizens about the quality of democracy can significantly influence their political support for democracy. Therefore, a democracy needs to secure political support by continuously maintaining and improving its quality to be sustainable in a society.

In this sense, to identify some key features for a good and sustainable democracy in Asia, this chapter explores the relationship between public perceptions of democratic quality and political support for democracy in Taiwan which is regarded as one of successful cases of democratic transition and consolidation in Asia. In addition to passing Samuel Huntington's two-turnover test of democratic consolidation in 2008, Taiwan's democracy peacefully underwent the third transfer of power between political parties in 2016. As various democratic indicators show, the country seems to have enjoyed a relatively high level and stability of democracy. However, these democratic achievements do not guarantee that Taiwan's democracy receives positive evaluations of its quality from citizens. Negative evaluations of democratic quality tend to erode their satisfaction with democracy, which may influence their political support for democracy. Thus, citizens' perception and evaluation on the quality of their democracy may hold great significance in determining their political support for democracy. Utilizing the 2018–2019 Taiwanese data from the fifth Asian Barometer Survey (ABS),[2] this chapter examines how Taiwanese citizens perceive and evaluate the quality of Taiwan's democracy in terms of three different aspects of democratic quality—procedures, effectiveness, and performance—and then it explores how the perception and evaluation of citizens on the quality of democracy affect their political support for the political system.

Public Perception and Evaluation on the Quality of Democracy in Taiwan

How do the people of Taiwan, which is regarded as one of successful cases of democratic transition and consolidation in Asia, perceive and evaluate the quality of their democracy? This section examines the public perception and evaluation on the quality of Taiwan's democracy, focusing on three different dimensions of democratic quality: procedure, effectiveness, and performance.[3] First, the public perceptions of democratic procedure are examined, focusing on the three essential institutional and procedural elements of democracy: ensuring political freedom, free and fair competitive elections, and the rule of law. The political procedures of a good democracy need to ensure citizens' political freedom, including freedom of expression, assembly and association; free and fair competitive elections at regular intervals; and the realization of the rule of law (Chang et al. 2011; Kim 2014, 50). More specifically, for a good democracy, the rule of law not only requires the independence of jurisdiction but also needs all members of society, including political elites, to comply with the law and receive equal treatment under the law. Furthermore, all government activities in the political process must be carried out in accordance with democratic procedures within the boundaries of the law while the corruption and abuse of power by government officials must be eradicated.

Second, public perceptions on the effectiveness of democracy, closely related to the quality of democratic functioning, are examined in three aspects: representation, responsiveness, and accountability. Representation relates to whether all citizens have equal opportunities for political participation and whether their interests are fairly represented in the political process. Responsiveness relates to whether political leaders respond sufficiently to the demands and preferences of citizens in the process of policy-making and implementation. Political accountability includes vertical and horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability relates to how citizens hold their political leaders accountable, while horizontal accountability relates to the checks and balances among different government branches. A good democracy requires a high level of democratic representation, responsiveness, and accountability. Thus, a democratic government needs to fairly represent the interests of citizens, to be responsive to their demands and opinions, and to be accountable for political outcomes in the process of policy-making and implementation (Bühlmann and Kriesi 2013; Kim 2016).

Third, the public perceptions on the performance of democracy are examined, focusing on the level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country as well as the evaluations on the overall performance and specific policy outcomes of incumbent democratic government formed through a democratic process. A good performance of democracy requires the democratic government's ability to satisfy citizens with its policy outcomes, including public goods and service provision (Eulau and Karps 1977). Ensuring policy outcomes that satisfy the demands of citizens is also crucial for a democracy to be sustainable, allowing it to achieve political legitimacy. Therefore, maintaining a good performance of democracy is indispensable not only for a good democracy, but also for its sustainability. In

this study, Taiwanese citizens' evaluations of policy outcomes and public services produced by the incumbent democratic government are examined, focusing on their perceptions of policy results regarding the three most concerning issues of economic growth, income distribution, and social welfare in Taiwan.

In order to examine Taiwanese people's perceptions and evaluations on the quality of Taiwan's democracy in these three dimensions of procedure, effectiveness, and performance, this study uses the survey questions and results of the fifth ABS presented in Table 7.1. The survey results show the public evaluations of each element of democratic quality, dividing them into positive and negative evaluations—that is, evaluations in favor of, and against, respectively, whatever is evaluated.[4] According to the survey results, positive and negative evaluations on the quality of Taiwan's democracy were mixed in terms of democratic procedure, effectiveness, and performance.

First, in the procedural aspects of democratic quality, positive evaluations were dominant in terms of ensuring political freedom such as freedom of expression and association as well as in terms of free and fair competitive elections. However, with regard to the rule of law, the public held negative perceptions toward political leaders' lack of law observance and rampant political corruption.

Second, in terms of democratic effectiveness, the negative evaluations on the perceived lack of democratic responsiveness were found to be dominant among the Taiwanese respondents. Regarding democratic representation, the negative perceptions of political inequality between the poor and the rich as well as the negative evaluations of the low efficacy of political participation in the country were prevalent among the respondents, while the public perception on the government's equal treatment of different ethnic communities appeared to be relatively positive. On the other hand, positive and negative evaluations are mixed in terms of democratic accountability. Regarding horizontal accountability that requires checks and balances between branches of government, the negative opinion that the supervisory function of the legislature is not properly performed was prevalent while judicial checks on the executive branch were evaluated positively by the majority of respondents. In evaluating vertical accountability, positive evaluations that vertical accountability can be achieved by guaranteeing a peaceful transition of power between political parties through democratic elections contrasted with negative evaluations about the lack of mechanisms to ensure vertical accountability between elections.

Third, in terms of the performance of democracy, a large majority of respondents expressed their satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country. However, negative perceptions about the incumbent democratic government's performance appeared to be more prevalent than positive perceptions. In particular, its policy outcomes related to economic growth and income distribution were largely perceived negatively. According to the survey results, the negative evaluations of the current economic situation and the unfair distribution of income in the country prevailed among the Taiwanese respondents. On the other hand, social welfare services such as basic livelihood security were generally evaluated positively.

Table 7.1 Taiwanese Evaluations on the Quality of Taiwan's Democracy

Quality of Democracy			Survey Questions	Evaluations (%)	
Categories	*Elements*			*Positive*	*Negative*
Procedure	Political freedom	Freedom of expression	Do you agree with the statement that people are free to speak what they think without fear?	79.6	18.4
		Freedom of association	Do you agree with the statement that people can join any organization they like without fear?	80.9	15.1
	Democratic election	Free and fair election	Overall, how free and fair would you say the last national election?	74.8	16.0
		Competitive election	How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates?	57.5	39.0
	Rule of law	Law observance	How often do government leaders break the law or abuse their power?	38.6	55.1
		Corruption	How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?	36.8	52.1
Effectiveness	Representation	Political equality	Do you agree with the statement that the government treats all citizens from different ethnic communities equally?	53.1	42.4
			Do you agree with the statement that the government treats rich and poor people equally?	36.8	59.9
		Efficacy of political participation	Do you agree with the statement that the people have influence over what the government does?	34.9	61.8
	Responsiveness	Responsiveness to public opinion	How well do you think the government responds to what people want?	35.9	61.0

(*Continued*)

Table 7.1 Continued

Quality of Democracy				Survey Questions	Evaluations (%)	
Categories	*Elements*				*Positive*	*Negative*
	Accountability	Vertical accountability	Accountability through elections	Do you agree with the statement that citizens are able to remove a government they don't like through elections	85.8	10.5
			Accountability between elections	Do you agree with the statement that between elections, the people have ways of holding the government responsible for its actions?	47.7	47.9
		Horizontal accountability	Judicial checks and balances	Do you agree with the statement that when government leaders break the laws, there is what the court can do?	48.4	46.3
			Legislative checks and balances	To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping government leaders in check?	40.1	53.3
Performance	Performance of democracy	Level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy		Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in the country?	67.2	30.3
	Performance of the incumbent government	Level of satisfaction with the incumbent government's performance		How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the current government?	31.1	64.8
	Policy outcomes	Economic growth	Current economic condition	How would you rate the overall economic condition of your country today?	18.8	58.8
		Income distribution	Fair distribution of income	How fair do you think income distribution is in your country?	20.8	73.0
		Social welfare	Basic livelihood security	Do you agree with the statement that people have necessities like food, clothes, and shelter?	70.9	27.0

Source: Taiwanese Data, the ABS W5 (July 2018–January 2019).

Taiwanese Perceptions of Political Support

The concept of political support was established by Easton (1975), who distinguishes between "diffuse support" and "specific support". Diffuse support refers to general support for the political system as a whole, which includes support for the core principles, values, and operating rules of the political system. On the other hand, specific support refers to support for incumbent government, specific political leaders, or their decisions and policies. Previous studies show that in established and emerging democratic countries, although diffuse support for democracy remains high, specific support for the incumbent democratic governments and their political outcomes has declined (Dalton 1999; Norris 1999, 2011; Shyu 2010).

Based on this theoretical framework of Easton, Norris (1999, 2011) further subdivided the concept of political support into five categories. First, the most diffuse political support is the general support for the nation-state and political system as a whole, including patriotism, pride, and the sense of belonging to the nation-state. The second category of political support is support for the core values, principles, and norms of the political system, including democratic values, norms, and ideals. The third category relates to support for the performance of the political system, which includes support for the way democracy works in the given country as well as democratic practices and outcomes. The fourth category is support for political institutions such as the executive, legislative, judiciary, and local governments. The fifth category relates to support for specific political actors, including incumbent government, political leaders, government officials, and politicians, etc.

Therefore, in analyzing political support, it is important to clarify the object of political support, which moves from specific to diffuse according to the purpose of the analysis (Kang 2013). This study aims to examine the public perceptions and evaluations of the quality of Taiwan's democracy in terms of three different aspects—democratic procedure, effectiveness, and performance—and then explore the impact of such perceptions and evaluations on their political support for democracy. In accordance with the purpose of this analysis, this study subdivides political support for democracy into three types: (1) diffuse support for democracy, (2) support for the performance of democracy, and (3) specific support for the incumbent democratic government. Here, diffuse support for democracy refers to general support for the democratic political system as a whole, which this study attempts to measure by using the two survey questions shown in Table 7.2. Support for the performance of democracy is related to support for the way democracy works in the given country, which is generally measured through the survey question of "overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the country?" (Klingemann 1999). Specific support for democracy can be subdivided according to the object of support. This study focuses on specific support for the incumbent democratic government, which is measured through the survey question about the level of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the incumbent government.

In terms of political support for democracy, Taiwan shows a contrast between the high level of diffuse support and the low level of specific support, similar to Western democracies. According to the fifth ABS survey results (see Table 7.2),

Table 7.2 Diffuse Support for Democracy

Survey Questions Answer	Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? (%)	
	"Democracy may have its problems, but it is still the best form of government".	"I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of".
Strongly agree	12.6	4.8
Agree	73.9	55.5
Disagree	9.8	27.3
Strongly disagree	0.7	4.5
Can't choose	1.9	4.5
Decline to answer	1.1	3.3
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Taiwanese Data, the ABS W5 (July 2018–January 2019).

Table 7.3 Support for the Performances of Democracy and the Incumbent Government

Survey Questions Answer	Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in the country? (%)	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the current government? (%)
Very satisfied	6.8	2.3
Fairly satisfied	60.4	28.8
Not very satisfied	25.3	41.0
Not at all satisfied	5.0	23.8
Can't choose	1.3	2.0
Decline to answer	1.3	2.1
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Taiwanese Data, the ABS W5 (July 2018–January 2019).

a large majority of respondents agreed that democracy is still the best political system and they would rather live under the democratic system than any other system, showing a high level of diffuse support for democracy. In contrast, satisfaction with the incumbent democratic government, which shows specific support for democracy, appeared relatively low. Of the respondents, 64.8 percent said they were dissatisfied with the current government (Table 7.3). On the other hand, about 67.2 percent of respondents showed their satisfaction with the way democracy works in Taiwan. It indicates that support for the performance of democracy is relatively high in the society.

Impact of the Perceived Quality of Democracy on Political Support

In order to be sustainable and legitimate in the long term, a good democracy needs not only to maintain a high quality of democracy in terms of its procedures, effectiveness, and performance, but also to continuously garner political support. The perception and evaluation of citizens on the quality of democracy can influence their political support for democracy. Thus, aimed at seeking a "good and sustainable democracy", it is necessary to pay attention to the impact of people's perceived quality of democracy on their political support for democracy.

In this sense, this section examines the influence of Taiwanese people's perceived quality of democracy on their political support for democracy, and discusses what qualitative improvements in Taiwan's democracy can enhance political support for democracy in the country. This study also pays attention to the relationship between diffuse support for democracy and satisfaction with the performance of democracy as well as the relationship between diffuse and specific supports for democracy.

At first, this study investigates the impact of public perceptions of democratic quality on diffuse support for democracy in Taiwan. Using the 2018–2019 Taiwanese data from the fifth ABS, Table 7.4 shows the results of regression analysis with the perceptions of the democratic procedure, effectiveness, and performance, which constitute the quality of democracy, as independent variables and the level of diffuse support for democracy as the dependent variable. According to the analysis, Taiwanese people's perceptions of democratic procedure, including ensuring political freedom, free and fair competitive elections, and the rule of law, appeared to have a significant influence on their diffuse support for democracy. In addition, it is revealed that the evaluations of democratic effectiveness, including political representation and responsiveness, have meaningful effects on general support for the democratic system as a whole, while the perceptions of political accountability did not have a statistically significant impact on such diffuse political support. Regarding the performance of democracy, the analysis shows that the levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in the country as well as with the incumbent democratic government's overall performance have substantial effects on public support for the democratic system. In particular, the evaluations of the incumbent government's performance and policy outcomes related to the issues of economic growth and income distribution were found to have a statistically significant impact on political support for the political system.

The results of analysis indicate that positive evaluations of democratic procedure, effectiveness, and performance are likely to raise diffuse support for democracy. That is, it means that perceived improvements in democratic procedure, effectiveness, and performance can contribute to enhancing political support for the democratic system as a whole. Specifically, regarding the procedural aspects of democratic quality, ensuring political freedom, democratic elections, and the rule of law are all important in garnering political support for the democratic system.

Table 7.4 Effect of the Perception of Democracy Quality on Diffuse Support for Democracy

Dependent Variable	Independent Variable			B	SE	β	t	p	VIF
Diffuse support for democracy	(Constant)			0.167	0.198		0.842	0.000	
	Gender (male = 1)			−0.037	0.052	−0.020	−0.722	0.470	1.044
	Age*			0.005	0.002	0.083	2.412	0.016	1.679
	Level of education			0.005	0.016	0.011	0.317	0.752	1.746
	Economic level			−0.034	0.021	−0.049	−1.648	0.100	1.276
	Partisanship (KMT = 1)			0.087	0.074	0.036	1.167	0.243	1.366
	Partisanship (DPP = 1)			0.075	0.061	0.039	1.230	0.219	1.408
	Perception of democracy quality	Procedure	Political freedom***	0.118	0.034	0.105	3.502	0.000	1.287
			Democratic election*	0.062	0.030	0.061	2.068	0.039	1.253
			Rule of law**	0.136	0.042	0.104	3.274	0.001	1.428
		Effectiveness	Representation*	0.096	0.037	0.080	2.597	0.010	1.366
			Responsiveness*	0.071	0.028	0.084	2.534	0.011	1.585
			Vertical accountability	−0.035	0.038	−0.028	−0.922	0.357	1.317
			Horizontal accountability	0.016	0.033	0.017	0.501	0.617	1.557
		Performance	Performance of democracy***	0.151	0.027	0.175	5.623	0.000	1.383
			Performance of the incumbent government*	0.065	0.028	0.081	2.267	0.024	1.829
		Policy outcomes	Economic growth***	0.121	0.030	0.123	3.998	0.000	1.353
			Income distribution*	0.057	0.028	0.058	2.000	0.046	1.180
			Basic livelihood security	−0.033	0.026	−0.038	−1.266	0.206	1.265
F				21.921 ($p < 0.001$)					
R^2				0.276					
$adjR^2$				0.264					

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.

In particular, considering that negative perceptions on the situation regarding the rule of law are prevalent among Taiwanese, it seems important to improve the rule of law situation in the pursuit of a good and sustainable democracy in Taiwan. In terms of democratic effectiveness, the prevailing negative assessments of the current situation of political representation and responsiveness appeared to undermine diffused political support for democracy in the country. Thus, in order to further strengthen political support for the democratic regime, improvements in political representation and responsiveness are also needed. Furthermore, it is revealed that both support for the performance of democracy and specific support for incumbent democratic government influence diffuse support for democracy in Taiwan. While an overall satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country contributes positively to increasing diffuse support for democracy, negative evaluations of incumbent democratic government and its policy outcomes are likely to erode political support for the political system. Thus, in addition to maintaining and improving the overall satisfaction with the performance of democracy, improvements in the incumbent government's performance and policy outcomes, in particular in the issues of economic growth and income distribution, are needed to sustain and increase diffused support for democracy.

In addition, Table 7.5 displays the results of regression analysis with the perceptions of the quality of Taiwan's democracy as independent variables and the level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy as the dependent variable. The analysis shows that the public evaluations of democratic procedure, such as guaranteeing political freedom, democratic elections, and the rule of law, have significant effects on their satisfaction with the performance of democracy in Taiwan. Furthermore, it is revealed that the evaluation of democratic responsiveness also has a notable impact on the level of satisfaction with the way democracy operates in the country. Regarding the performance of incumbent democratic government, the perception of the current economic situation that reflects the result of the government's policies related to economic growth as well as the level of overall satisfaction with the incumbent government's performance appeared to affect the public satisfaction with the performance of democracy in the country.

The analytical results show that, despite the prevailing dissatisfaction with the current situation regarding the rule of law as well as the incumbent democratic government's performance and responsiveness, the positive evaluations of political freedom and democratic elections in terms of democratic procedure contributed positively to the public's perceived satisfaction with the way democracy works in Taiwan. These results indicate that, if the public evaluations of democratic procedure and responsiveness as well as the incumbent government's performance improve, the level of satisfaction with the performance of Taiwan's democracy is likely to further increase. Thus, perceived improvements in democratic procedure and responsiveness as well as in the incumbent government's overall performance and specific policy outcomes, in particular in terms of economic growth, are needed to enhance support for the performance of democracy which influences diffuse support for democracy in Taiwan.

Table 7.5 Effect of the Perception of Democracy Quality on Satisfaction with the Performance of Democracy

Dependent Variable	Independent Variable			B	SE	β	t	p	VIF
Satisfaction with the performance of democracy	(Constant)			0.944	0.226		4.184	0.000	
	Gender (male = 1)			-0.045	0.059	-0.020	-0.760	0.448	1.043
	Age***			-0.009	0.002	-0.127	-3.733	0.000	1.664
	Level of education*			0.043	0.018	0.083	2.393	0.017	1.753
	Economic level			0.033	0.024	0.041	1.387	0.166	1.281
	Partisanship (KMT = 1)			-0.115	0.085	-0.041	-1.351	0.177	1.358
	Partisanship (DPP = 1)			-0.035	0.070	-0.016	-0.502	0.616	1.406
	Perception of democracy quality	Procedure	Political freedom***	0.179	0.038	0.138	4.661	0.000	1.267
			Democratic election**	0.091	0.034	0.078	2.650	0.008	1.246
			Rule of law***	0.250	0.047	0.165	5.307	0.000	1.393
		Effectiveness	Representation	0.015	0.043	0.011	0.360	0.719	1.363
			Responsiveness***	0.145	0.032	0.150	4.569	0.000	1.555
			Vertical accountability	-0.087	0.043	-0.061	-2.011	0.055	1.314
			Horizontal accountability	0.065	0.037	0.057	1.742	0.082	1.540
		Performance	Performance of the incumbent government***	0.131	0.032	0.143	4.042	0.000	1.797
		Policy outcomes	Economic growth**	0.094	0.035	0.083	2.713	0.007	1.339
			Income distribution	0.009	0.033	0.008	0.282	0.778	1.176
			Basic livelihood security	-0.045	0.030	-0.044	-1.484	0.138	1.265
F				23.640 ($p < 0.001$)					
R^2				0.279					
$adjR^2$				0.267					

Source: Taiwanese Data, the ABS W5 (July 2018–January 2019).
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the public perceptions on the quality of Taiwan's democracy in three categories: democratic procedure, effectiveness, and performance. First, the public perceptions of democratic procedure have been examined based on the three essential institutional and procedural elements of democracy: ensuring political freedom, free and fair competitive elections, and the rule of law. Second, public perceptions on the effectiveness of democracy have been explored in terms of three aspects: democratic representation, responsiveness, and accountability. Third, public evaluations on the performance of democracy have been examined, focusing on the level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country as well as the evaluations on the overall performance and specific policy outcomes of incumbent democratic government formed through a democratic process. By using the 2018–2019 Taiwanese data from the fifth ABS, the results of the analysis on the public perceptions about these three dimensions of democratic quality in Taiwan showed that positive and negative evaluations on the quality of Taiwan's democracy were mixed in terms of democratic procedure, effectiveness, and performance.

This chapter has also investigated the effect of such perceived quality of democracy on political support for democracy in Taiwan. For this analysis, based on the theoretical frameworks proposed by Easton and Norris, political support for democracy has been categorized into three types: (1) diffuse support for democracy which refers to general support for the democratic political system as a whole, (2) support for the performance of democracy which is measured by the level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in the given country, and (3) specific support for the incumbent democratic government.

According to the survey results, the diffuse support for democracy as well as the support for the performance of democracy appeared relatively high in Taiwan, while the specific support for the incumbent government was fairly poor. The results of analysis show that, despite the low level of satisfaction with the incumbent democratic government's performance and democratic effectiveness, the high level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy as well as the positive perceptions of democratic procedure, such as ensuring political freedom and democratic elections, seem to be important explanatory variables to account for the relatively high level of diffuse support for democracy in Taiwan.

The results of analysis also indicate that evaluations of democratic procedure, effectiveness, and performance may significantly contribute to raising or undermining diffused support for democracy. That is, it means that perceived improvements in democratic procedure, effectiveness, and performance can contribute to enhancing political support for the democratic system as a whole. Specifically, regarding the procedural aspects of democratic quality, ensuring political freedom, democratic elections, and the rule of law are all critical in garnering political support for the system. In terms of democratic effectiveness, improvements in political representation and responsiveness are significant in further strengthening

political support for the democratic regime. Furthermore, both support for the performance of democracy and specific support for the incumbent democratic government appeared to influence diffuse support for democracy in Taiwan. Thus, in addition to maintaining and improving the overall satisfaction with the performance of democracy, improvements in the incumbent government's performance and policy outcomes, in particular in terms of economic growth and income distribution, are needed to sustain and increase diffuse support for democracy. Moreover, perceived improvements in democratic procedure and responsiveness as well as in the incumbent government's overall performance and specific policy outcomes related to economic growth also can contribute to enhancing support for the performance of democracy which influences diffuse support for democracy.

Therefore, in order to continuously garner citizens' political support for democracy in Taiwan, multifaceted efforts are needed to improve the effectiveness and performance of democracy in addition to maintaining and strengthening democratic procedures. In particular, it will be important to enhance the incumbent democratic government's representation and responsiveness with its efforts to produce satisfactory policy outcomes in the policy agendas that citizens value, such as economic growth and income distribution.

Notes

1 Polity IV provides a democracy index to judge how democratic the political systems of 170 countries are from 1800 to the present. This calculates an index value that can grasp the characteristics (especially the level of democracy) of each country's political system by scoring detailed items. This calculates an index value that can grasp the characteristics of each country's political system by measuring democratic indicators, including the regulation, competitiveness, and openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, competitiveness and regulation of political participation, etc. Within the range of −10 and 10 calculated index values, −10 is a hereditary monarchy, −10 to −6 are autocracies, −5 to 0 are closed anocracies, 1–5 are open anocracies, 6–9 are democracies, and 10 is a consolidated democracy. For more information on the Polity IV project, please refer to the following link: https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html (accessed on August 8, 2021).

2 Data analyzed in this chapter were collected by the fifth ABS (2018–2021), which was co-directed by Prof. Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received major funding support from Taiwan's Ministry of Education, Academia Sinica, and National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Office is solely responsible for the data distribution. The author appreciates the assistance of the aforementioned institutes and individuals in providing data. The views expressed herein are the author's own. The fifth ABS used in this study was conducted in 16 Asian countries, including China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Malaysia, etc. The Taiwanese data from the fifth ABS were collected by the Center for East Asia Democratic Studies at National Taiwan University in face-to-face interviews with 1,259 respondents aged 20 and older, from July 2018 to January 2019. For the methodological details of the ABS, please refer to the project's website: www.asianbarometer.org.

3   This chapter examines the quality of democracy from the three aspects of procedures, effectiveness, and performance. The three different notions of democratic quality refer to the following studies: Cho 2014; Cho and Lee 2015; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Morlino 2004a, 2004b.

4   This study coded responses on a 5-point Likert scale (2 = very positive, 1 = positive, 0 = the same or cannot choose, −1 = negative, and −2 = very negative).

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8 Indonesia

Democratic Procedure and Muslim Democracy

Kyunghee Choi

Introduction

The transition to Indonesian democracy began with the collapse of the Suharto authoritarian system, which had been in power for 32 years after the IMF financial crisis in 1997, and free and direct parliamentary elections, which began in 1999, proceeded periodically until 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019. The presidential election, which started in 2004, was held periodically until 2009, 2014, and 2019, and was held four times. In this chapter, we will analyze how to evaluate Indonesian democracy, which has experienced more than 20 years, through the concept of "quality of democracy". The concept of democracy quality can be seen as an alternative concept to overcome the recent global democratic crisis. In this context, I would like to apply the concept of democratic quality to Indonesia. Indonesia is attempting a new type of democracy called Muslim democracy for the last 20 years. Therefore, the evaluation of the elements that constitute the quality of democracy in Indonesia at this time is intended to be analyzed in a process sense rather than a result. Therefore, the present evaluation is not conclusive, but rather the analysis is more focused on the possibilities of various aspects.

The discourse on the crisis of global democracy is revealed on several levels. First, there was a Democracy Project that surveyed the state of democracy in the United States. 60 percent of respondents said that "living in a democratic system is absolutely important", and 92 percent of respondents, including these respondents, said "living in a democratic system is important". However, 68 percent of respondents answered the question "The democratic system of the United States is getting weaker and weaker in recent years", and the weakening of the democratic system of the United States was because of "Big money in Politics and racism". Racism and discrimination were ranked first and second. As a result, the research team assessed that, of late, US democracy is facing its most serious challenge. The most visible crisis is the credibility crisis of public institutions, and it is evaluated that they are experiencing various democratic crisis phenomena such as the rule of law and the violation of freedom of the press (Abramowitz et al. 2018).

One of the journals that conducted world democracy research, *the Journal of Democracy* (JoD), started publication in January 1990 and celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2020. JoD examines the state of democracy in the world and addresses

issues as the theme of its 30th anniversary. This topic is related to "Is democracy declining?" dealt with in 2015. Recalling this question that JoD posed in 2015, Marc F. Plattner said, unlike then, that in 2020, many scholars have no choice but to agree that "democracy is in crisis" (Plattner 2020). This trend is reflected in the Democracy Index, which was released by *The Economist* in 2006. In fact, 2006 is referred to as the first year of the transition of the spread of democracy (Diamond 2020; Puddington 2007), and in 2015, it was expressed as a state of democracy in a state of serious concern, and a serious retreat of democracy such as the Hong Kong crisis in 2019 and the Iranian protests and public resistance have only amplified it. The current democratic crisis emerges as populism, populist party emergence, or popular resistance. Larry Diamond describes this phenomenon as an illiberal populist wave (Diamond 2020).

This is the era of the "democratic crisis" pointed out by many democracy researchers. It is mentioned that this is the first time since World War II that liberal democracy has been in such a serious threat (Plattner 2020). What is the cause and reason? The first issue of the 30th anniversary of JoD 2020 explains the causes and reasons in a variety of ways. But what we should pay attention to is that the two aspects coexist. One is the crisis of democracy in the United States and Europe, which can be termed as a representative example of liberal democracy, and the other is Russia, China, and India, expressed as "authoritarian resurgence" (Walker 2015) or "authoritarianism at the global level". This is a phenomenon in which the influence of these countries is expanding in regional or international contexts such as Iran (Diamond 2020, Plattner 2020). Some positions explain how these two flow to each other. For example, Russian intervention in elections in the United States and Europe, or the Chinese model that allows economic development even within an authoritarian system, has an effect on the weakening of democratic legitimacy. Also, conversely, there is no need to justify the current levels of democracy and problems in China and Russia. The spread of the "new authoritarian type" should be studied in various aspects more systematically in itself.

In this context, the study of democracy in the era of democracy crisis should be based on a more post-ideological approach to establish a new direction of democracy research. Indonesian democracy research is the most fundamental research case of democratization implementation and consolidation. It is a research case of progression of democracy or deepening democracy such as change of election system and voter choice. It is the most representative study case of modern political phenomena leading to explosive populist demands, elections, and political stability, as seen in the 2017 Jakarta governor's election and the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections.

The theoretical development of "democratic quality" in this chapter can be a very important tool for measuring democratic development in the era of democracy crisis, and I would like to clarify the reason by analyzing Indonesian democracy through the concept of democracy quality. I see the concept of quality of democracy as an approach that contains the purpose of explaining the types of democracy that are sufficiently different in quality. While analyzing the difference

between Indonesia's democracy and other countries' democracy through the concept of democracy quality, I want to explain the changes required to deepen Indonesian democracy.

Theoretical Discussion

This section analyzes the value of research in the quality of democracy in Indonesia. To this end, one understands the concept of "democratic quality" in the discourse system of "democracy with adjectives" in order to explain Indonesian democracy in a typological level in the existing democratic theory tradition, and the other analyzes the theoretical and methodological meaning of the concept of democracy quality.

The Course of "Democracy with Adjectives"

The start of the various debates on modern democracy comes from a political upheaval called the "third wave of democratization" (Huntington 1991). As is well known, many countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, starting with southern Europe in the mid-1970s, experienced the transition from various authoritarianisms to democratization. And Michael McFaul described the transition experience of 28 countries from the communist regime, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as a transition of a character different from the previous third wave, "The Fourth Democratic Wave (The Fourth Wave of Democracy)" (McFaul 2002). And the Muslim world, long cited as an exception for democratic cargo resolution, experienced the transition of democratization called "Arab Spring" in 2011, and this trend can be termed the "Fifth Democratic Wave", which is distinct from the previous two.

The huge changeover to democracy has created various theoretical areas for discussion and analysis, such as democratic transition and consolidation theory, democratization transition paradigm, comparative democracy research, and democracy measurement. Nevertheless, no matter what research tradition and research paradigm individual researchers have been in for a long time, I think they can reach consensus on two aspects now. First, the level of democracy around the world is not producing the "expected democracy result". It is more concretely revealed in the recent democratic crisis theory. Second, it is believed that democracy around the world has no choice but to have a "diverse" form.

In other words, liberal democracy is not the only form of democracy that citizens all over the world must choose from, but one of the various types of democracy. The types of liberal democracy stem from the fact that not all countries are the same, but that individual countries have different characteristics. From these two conclusions, discussions on democracy around the world from the mid-to-late 2000s debated how to overcome this "crisis" in democracy, how to discuss and create better democracy, and more diverse democracy. This shows that the concept of "the quality of democracy" has implied the expanding of discussions on the quality of democracy.

The question of "democracy with adjectives" was first raised in 1997 by David Collier and Steven Levitsky. It was aimed at capturing "different types of democracy" as a critical discussion of the various research results on the historical experience of democratization and resolving the conceptual stretching among the vast research results. The "democracy with adjectives" discourse argues that third democratization, fourth democratization, and fifth democratization were not the same democratization phenomenon and each democratization started from different authoritarianism. It had no choice but to produce results. From the 2000s, discussions on hybrid regimes such as electoral democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and competitive authoritarianism were raised. Andreas Schedler described the difference between liberal and electoral democracy, and the difference between electoral and electoral authoritarianism in measurable categories (Schedler 2002), while Levitsky and Lucan A. Way created the concept of competitive authoritarianism to explain a new type of mixed political system (Levitsky and Way 2002). And, in 2020, the latter two researchers are explaining the "spread of a new competitive authoritarianism" (Levitsky and Way 2020). This has also been described as an example of the "electoral authoritarianism" stage between electoral democracy and competitive authoritarianism (Morse 2012). In this flow of discussion, there is a research tradition that can explain the change of the system in the line of free democracy, electoral democracy, electoral authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism, and authoritarianism. In other words, electoral democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and competitive authoritarianism can be systematically explained with the concept of "democratic quality".

After all, "democracy with adjectives" contains "sub-democracy with adjectives", that is, sub-democracy with adjectives, according to the degree of democracy such as electoral democracy, electoral authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism, and so on. A typological classification system was created. However, can other groups that assume the maximalist democracy other than liberal democracy assume a democracy with an adjective other than "liberal"? This first problem consciousness can be seen in the emergence of the concept of "Illiberal Democracy" (Zakaria 1997). As Fareed Zakaria proposed, the emergence of non-free democracy, liberal democracy, is based on "constitutional liberalism". In other words, it is a problem consciousness that a democracy type based on constitutional ideology other than the liberal constitutional ideology is possible. However, in the distinction between liberal democracy and non-liberal democracy, this approach is because non-liberal democracy is understood as a residual concept of liberal democracy, or the adjective "illiberal" implies a lack of democracy. The limits of this approach are clear.

In summary, "democracy with adjectives" can be divided into two dimensions. One is maximal democracy and the other is minimal democracy. As explained above, liberal democracy (democracy with adjectives, stage 1) as the maximalist democracy is a minimalist approach that is subclassified according to the degree of democracy such as electoral democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and competitive authoritarianism (democracy with adjectives, stage II). This opens the possibility of the maximal democracy type with the adjective "different" rather

than the adjective "liberal" and positing the qualitative development and evolution of each democracy. In the end, it is a strategy that carefully approaches the democratic conditions, characteristics, limitations, and problems to be solved of individual countries. Since the democratic crisis does not mean that each country is facing the same situation, each country needs a specific and detailed approach, and the concept of democracy quality is the perception that makes this approach possible.

The Meaning and Value of the Concept of Democratic Quality

The study attempting to combine "democracy" and "quality" tried in *Assessing the Quality of Democracy* (2005) is an approach that attempted a new transformation of democracy research. "Assessing democracy requires one clearly defined concept of quality" (Diamond and Morlino 2005, xi). As shown in Table 8.1, the quality of democracy consists of three dimensions: quality in terms of procedure, quality in terms of content, and quality in terms of result.

In the qualitative approach to democracy, the actual content of democracy is based on "freedom" and "equality". The category of freedom that defines the actual quality of democracy as traditionally emphasized by David Beetham includes all three types of political, civic, and social or socioeconomic rights. Political rights include the right to vote, the right to be elected, the right to campaign, and the right to participate in political parties. Civil rights include civil liberty and security, the right to protect personal life, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of information, freedom of religion, freedom of association, freedom of movement and residence, and freedom of legal defense. In addition, socioeconomic rights include not only private ownership and the rights of entrepreneurs, but also the rights of employment, the right to receive fair wages, and the right to act collectively (Beetham 2004). All these political, civil, and socioeconomic rights fall under "freedom", and in most cases, democracy that can be measured in terms limited to political or civil rights has been discussed. And "equality" has been confined mostly to symbolic or political equality in democratic discourse. But a good democracy is about equal rights and legal protections

Table 8.1 Three Levels of Democratic Quality

Procedure level	The rule of law
	Participation
	Competition
	Vertical accountability
	Horizontal accountability
Substance level	Freedom
	Equality
Result level	Responsiveness

Source: Diamond and Morlino 2005, introduction.

for all citizens and groups. It means not being discriminated against under gender, race, ethnicity, religion, political orientation, and any other conditions, and more importantly, what researchers other than Dietrich Rueschemeyer have emphasized, to implement substantial political equivalence, income, wealth, and status. Equality must be realized. In extreme socioeconomic unequal societies, political inequality is reinforced (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Since crises in many democratic countries today can arise from these structural causes, the discussion of "economic equality" is a significant factor in discussing the quality of democracy.

Such "freedom" and "equality" at the practical level of democracy are concepts sufficiently related to the elements of the democratic procedural level, namely "rule of law", "participation", "competition", and "responsibility" categories. The realization of freedom and equality is a society that enhances circulation between the state and citizens. In the end, the three dimensions of democracy quality are distinct in the analytic sense, but the three dimensions work in close mutual influence with each other when positing "democracy as a system". For example, "the rule of law", first set as the procedural dimension of democracy inquiry, essentially affects all other factors, and democracy again converges into the rule of law. In addition, the democracy inquiry procedure emphasizes both aspects of "elected power" and "unelected power". Participation and competition are related to "elected power", and vertical and horizontal accountability means national sovereignty control over "unelected power". In the past, much focus has been placed on how well representatives are elected through free and fair elections, but at the level of democratic inquiry procedural level, "unelected power", that is, democratic control over bureaucratic society, is encompassed.

Lastly, a good democracy means that citizens meet their expectations in terms of the outcome of democracy. A good democracy means that citizens, associations, and various communities actually exercise expanded freedom and political equality. They have the sovereign authority to assess whether they are providing freedom and equality under the rule of law, citizens, civic organizations, and political parties should be able to control the accountability of elected officials and monitor the application and fairness of the law. In other words, the political accountability and responsiveness of elected officials must be controlled (Diamond and Morlino 2005). This "good democracy" research strategy demonstrates the nature of democracy, that is, based on sovereign power and the rule of law in the principle of power, the basics of power, and all modes of operation of power in a democratic political system.

This approach as a strategy can clearly overcome the limitations of existing democracy studies. First, it is the importance of "qualitative research" on democracy. In democracy research, it is possible to overcome the limitations of the research climate that relied more on quantitative data than on qualitative data. When comparing countries around the world, comparable indicators or comparable quantitative data have created a dominant trend. However, it promotes the fundamental discussion of democracy, not quantitative formal or the theoretical premise that other democracy is possible with "qualitative" that cannot be explained with quantitative data. For example, "Muslim Democracy" is a concept

that exists realistically (Nasr 2005), and it is a democracy of problem setting that is qualitatively different from free democracy. Just as various empirical studies and investigations have been conducted under the premise of free democracy, under the qualitative premise of Muslim democracy various empirical studies and investigations can be undertaken. If people around the world are not understood as one and the same, democracy that is qualitatively different can be discussed anew. Second, it seems that at this stage, the theoretical basis for studying the democratic state of countries around the world on the same line has been established. Today, democracy is in crisis, whether created from the third, fourth, and fifth democratization flows or in theocratic countries that have not experienced democratization or regressed, or those who have relatively long democracy experiences. This can be explained on the same basis in terms of the quality of democracy, rather than understanding it as a different phenomenon. For example, it is possible to explain how democratic "American democracy" and "Indonesian democracy" are in terms of the US Constitution and Indonesian Constitution, respectively, and at the same time compare how the results are the same or different from those of other countries.

Procedural Aspects of the Indonesian Democratic Quality: Rule of Law and Accountability

This section aims to specifically explore the procedural dimension in the quality of democracy in Indonesia. Among the elements of a qualitative approach to the democratic process, this chapter focuses on the rule of law and responsibility. This is because, by analyzing the characteristics of the Indonesian Constitution and related laws, it is revealed that Indonesian democracy is a case of qualitatively different character, and that it is a case of democracy with its own "adjective", and the analysis of responsibility for power is seen as a discriminatory point in the concept of quality of democracy.

Pancasila Constitution, Muslim Democracy, and Sharia Economy

Analyzing the quality of Indonesian democracy in the context of the rule of law is an important start and a touchstone for the overall framework that defines the character of Indonesian democracy. The decisive qualitative difference between Indonesian legal systems and other countries is that the Islamic legal system exists at the same level as the general legal system. Islam spread to Indonesia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries before the birth of the modern Indonesian state and the creation of the general judicial system, and through the Islamic kingdom, Islamic law had a much longer influence on the lives of Indonesians. The Dutch colonial process attempted to remove the influence of Islamic law, but it was impossible. After independence, Indonesia had a dual legal system that operated both the general judicial system and the Islamic legal system. As a general judicial system, it has the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court as the

Supreme Court and is a third-trial system called the First Trial District Court (*Kabupaten/Kota area*), Second Trial High Court (*Provinci*), and the Supreme Court. Legal administration is overseen by the 3-Trial System. Since independence, the Religious Justice Law, revised in 2006, has been influential in the history of its enactment and amendment until 1957, 1981, 1989, and 2006. The Religious Court is directed by the Ministry of Religion. The Religious Court is specified to have jurisdiction over marriage, inheritance, testament, Waqf (endowments), Zakat (alms-giving), Sadaqa (charity), and Sharia economy; the Religious Court also has a system of District Court, High Court, and Supreme Court (Kim 2011).

Two aspects must be understood about the "rule of law" as among the enacting principles of modern Indonesian democracy. First, although Islamic law has an influence within the Indonesian legal system, the constitution does not exist under the Sharia law, but the constitutional ideology is Pancasila. Pancasila is the combination of two Sanskrit words, where *panca* means "5" and *sila* means "principle or norm", and thus *Pancasila* means "five principles" (Fatlolon 2016). Second, after the Suharto authoritarian regime in 1998, the phenomenon of Islamization[1] has been accelerating as "Islamic values" become more and more important in the public domain in Indonesian society. The Islamization phenomenon not only affects the political, economic, social, and cultural areas, but also the radical revision of the Religious Justice Law in 2006 is interpreted as the emergence of Islamization of the Judicial Law (Kim 2011, 374).

The preamble to the Pancasila Constitution, which was created at the time of independence, is the most important ideology defining modern Indonesia and is a constitutional ideology peculiar to Indonesia, including religious and traditional and customary elements. Of course, the constitution created at the time of independence has a history of several amendments, but democracy is now operated by the revised constitution between 1999 and 2002 after the implementation of democratization. The most fundamental reason for defining the revised new constitution as "democratic" is the change in Article 2, Paragraph 1 of Chapter 1 of the Constitution. In 2001, in the revised constitution, the principle of people's sovereignty and rule of law, which are the most basic principles of democracy, is stated in the revised constitution as "the sovereignty (*kedaulatan*) belongs to the people and is implemented by the constitution". The democratic implications of the constitutional amendment are clear because the constitution before that stipulated that "sovereignty" was in the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR). The rule that "sovereignty" belonged to the MPR, not to the people, expresses the power base of the Indonesian authoritarian system that had been maintained for 32 years. Through the revision of the new democratic constitution in 1999–2002, a general legal system for electoral democracy was established, such as the separation of people's sovereignty, the separation of powers, the introduction of a straight-line presidential system based on a run-off vote system, and a proportional representation system by party names.

In this revised new constitution, the Pancasila constitutional ideology contained in the preamble to the Constitution is the philosophical basis of the state (*dasar filsafat negara*) that defines the entire Indonesian Constitution (Fatlolon 2016).

Pancasila consists of five elements. First, belief in one god (*Ketuhannan yang Maha Esa*). Second, just and human love (*Kemanusianan yand Adil and Beradab*). Third, Indonesia as one (*Persatuan Indonesia*). Fourth, democracy carried out by wisdom and wisdom within consensus and representative principles (*Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan*). Fifth, it is the pursuit of social justice for the whole people (*Serta dengan mewujudkan suatu Keadilan bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia*) (Choi 2014, 153). When expressed in the local language, the five elements of Pancasila in the preamble to the Indonesian Constitution acquire even greater importance. The five Pancasila elements of constitutional philosophy are also indicative of what they mean for the level of democracy, and it is closer to a social democracy or a deliberative democracy rather than a "liberal ideology" (Choi 2014; Fatlolon 2016).

Above all, just as the economy has a profound effect on politics, one of the economic factors that have a profound effect on Indonesian democracy is the influence of the "Sharia Economy".[2] As mentioned earlier, as Islamization progresses, Islamization continues to increase its impact on the economy and markets. Beginning with the creation of the Islamic Bank in 1992, with the introduction of Islamic finance, Indonesian banks have a dual structure in which traditional commercial banks and Islamic banks coexist, and the relevant legal system is continuously developing to further strengthen Islamic finance. For example, in 2016, the "National Committee of Sharia Finance (*Komite Nasional Keuangan Syariah*)" was established and operated as a committee under the direct control of the president, and the halal certification system was fully implemented from 2019. In addition, a government policy, *Masterplan Ekonomi Syariah Indonesia* 2019–2024, is also being implemented for practice of the Sharia economy.

In conclusion, Indonesian democracy can be termed as Pancasila democracy, and it belongs to a democracy that is qualitatively different from other countries in terms of its type of democracy. However, how long will the Pancasila democracy continue, whether it can develop into a better democracy, or whether democracy will regress remains to be seen. This is because politically, how far the phenomenon of "Islamization" will affect society is a significant factor. In Indonesia, political Islamist forces, politically advocating Islamic radicalism or fundamentalism, are increasing their influence. They are political forces that depreciate or oppose the values of procedural democracy, and as their influence grows, Indonesian Muslim democracy, which seeks to bring a balance between "Islamic values and democracy", is likely to be broken or weakened. In the end, although Indonesian democracy is tangible and unique, it is still difficult to say that it is qualitatively mature at present.

Accountability for Elected and Unelected Power

The modern democratic system is achieved through democratic control over "elected power" and "un-elected power". This is the reason for emphasizing "responsibility" in the procedural level of democracy inquiry. Vertical accountability and horizontal accountability are very core values that enhance the quality

of modern democracy. The modern democratic crisis is created as public account-ability for power becomes weaker, such as high mistrust and dissatisfaction of the government or government policies, injustice in public power, and the distrust of the people increases due to corruption of state power.

Let's describe quantitatively what the level of accountability of the Indonesian government is. The first is the corruption side of power. According to the 2019 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measured by Transparency International, it scored 40 points and ranked 85th in the world ranking. The 2018 CPI is 38 points, and the 2017 CPI is 37 points. In terms of CPI, the transparency of Indonesian power can be seen to be very weak. Above all, the election in 1999 is regarded as an election in which the implementation of democratization began. If one exam-ines the trend of CPI since then, corruption can be seen to be the biggest weak-ness of Indonesian democracy. Second, look at the World Governance Indicator (WGI) measured by the World Bank. The WGI consists of six indicators reflect-ing the quality of public services, the quality of public officials, and the degree to which they can maintain their autonomy from political pressures, policy for-mation and quality, "government effectiveness", and "regulatory quality", which measures the government's ability to develop the private sector and forms sound policies and legislation.

Looking at the level of effectiveness of the Indonesian government in Figure 8.1, the average score on the effectiveness of the government from 2006 to 2018 after 2000 was 52.68 on a 100-point basis. And next, looking at the score of "regulatory quality" by period after 2000, it can be seen as a very low level when viewed out of 100 points, such as 27.55 in 2002, 20.92 in 2003, 24.14 in 2004, and 27.94 in 2005. It has improved a little from 2006, and the average value until 2018 is 48.25. When looking at the level of corruption, government effectiveness, and capabili-ties of the Indonesian public power through the Transparency International's CPI and the World Bank's WGI, Indonesia's democracy, which has been in progress since 1999, is in a state of being very vulnerable to substantial expansion. Of

Figure 8.1 Indonesian Government Effectiveness. *Source:* https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports (Search Date: 2020.03.18).

course, the institutional mechanisms for securing horizontal accountability are "National Accounts", "Constitutional Court", "Judiciary Committee", "Election Management Committee", "Financial Supervisory Service", "Corruption Prevention Committee", "National Human Rights Commission", and so on are established (Choi 2014). However, it is revealed through various surveys mentioned above that these systems are not performing their functions fully while fulfilling their practical purpose.

This discussion on "the undemocratic nature of unelected power" is the most decisive concept that defines the limits of Indonesia's democracy in the process of debating the consequences of democracy and deepening democracy in Indonesia. It is closely related that Indonesia's oligarchy democracy was critical that Indonesian democracy was expected to change a lot after experiencing the first general election in 1999, the second general election in 2004, and the first straight-line president in 2004, but it is not experiencing qualitative changes in content. It is a concept presented as an opinion. In other words, "the changed democratic political institutions were still captured by the authoritarian ruling elites" (Priyono and Subono 2007) and the discussion to overcome them ("Beyond Oligarchy") occupied an important context in Indonesian democracy (Ford and Pepinsky 2013).

The decisive example of a change in the political elite oligarchy was the advent of President Joko Widodo (hereinafter Jokowi) in 2014, which led to the term "Jokowi Phenomenon" (Tapsell 2015). Since President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was elected for the first time in a straight line and took power for ten years, is also from the military, the emergence and election of Jokowi, the first civilian, is the first case of a change in the existing ruling elite system. Jokowi's background as a civilian, not the military, and his widespread support from the poor, sparked a debate about "populism" in Indonesia. One more interesting thing is that during the 2014 presidential election, the political campaign of Prabowo Subianto, opponent candidate of Jokowi, was analyzed as "Oligarchy populism" (Aspinall 2015). Eventually, the emergence and election of Jokowi is recorded as an example of creating a new crack in the Indonesian ruling elite. Such changes in the elected ruling elite, however, have not been reliably unfolded through the innovation and reform of the "non-elected ruling elite" structure. But it can be said that the emergence of Jokowi created the most basic structure of democracy by forming a mechanism of correspondence and responsiveness between the political elite and the voters, which can be evaluated as an important moment in the history of qualitative growth of Indonesian democracy.

Substantial and Responsive Level: Freedom, Equality, and Responsiveness

Although summarized in the previous theoretical discussion, the concept of democracy quality has a very organic relationship. The concept of freedom and equality, which can be said to be the essence of democracy, works concretely in the procedural process of "participation", "competition", "responsibility", and

"rule of law" in which democracy is implemented. As the responsiveness between the voters and the political elite increases, we see a higher quality of democracy. In this section, we will analyze how freedom and equality, which can be seen as the essence of democracy quality, operates in terms of democracy quality in Indonesian society, and analyze responsiveness through economic and social policies.

Freedom of Religion and Islamic Party Politics

The Indonesian Constitution includes basic rights (right to pursue human dignity and happiness), equal rights (equity before the law, equal opportunity), basic rights of liberty (freedom of person, privacy, mental life), and basic economic rights (property rights, freedom of work), basic political rights (right to political freedom and suffrage), basic social rights (right to live a human life, right to receive education, right to work, right to environment, guarantee of marriage and family life, right to health). Compared to other countries, there is no basic right left to claim (Ko 2017). However, when measuring how free Indonesian society is, the Freedom House Index since 1999 has maintained Indonesia's "Partly Free" status. In 2019 too, the status was Partly Free, with a score of 62 out of 100 with 30 for political rights and 32 for civil liberties. Particularly noteworthy is that the score for "Religious Conviction, Freedom of Religious Expression, and Atheistic Conviction is the lowest among civil liberties".

   There are two essential issues of religious freedom in Indonesia. One is the limitation of not allowing "the freedom of not to have religion", and the other is the limitation of freedom over other religions, which comes from Muslim believers taking a quantitative dominant advantage. This is the first principle of the Indonesian Pancasila Constitution, which was mentioned earlier, "belief in one god". Indonesian citizens should have a religion based on the principle of monotheism. That is, all citizens must believe in one of the six religions guaranteed by the law—Islam, Protestant, Catholic, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Hinduism. The social rights of atheists do not exist in Indonesian society. And in Islam, freedom of religion means the freedom to believe and practice one's own religion without interference from other religions and does not include the right to preach one's religion to pagans (Kim 1997). Islam, which occupies a quantitative dominant advantage in the latter aspect, is expanding its influence in interfering with other religions and changing the free and diversified social atmosphere in other directions because more influence is exerted in the public domain after democratization. This phenomenon can also be interpreted as the progress of Islamization. Islamization is contributing to the transformation of Indonesian Islamic culture, which had a free and pluralistic color scheme based on Javanese traditional culture to Islam based on scriptures and doctrine (Kim 2008; 2013). An example of the limitation of religious freedom in this trend is the increase in blasphemy judgments. As the phenomenon of Islamization intensifies, distortion of Islamic doctrine, caricature, and criticism of Islam are taboo. The most recent case of global attention was the blasphemy ruling of Jakarta Governor Ahok in 2018. And

according to the 2020 Human Rights Report, there were three cases of blasphemy in 2019.

Despite such restrictions on religious freedom in Indonesia, the significance of the Indonesian democracy experiment is of great value. Indonesia has the largest number of Muslims in the world. As of 2020, Indonesia's population is about 275 million and nearly 90 percent is Muslim. Indonesia's "democratic" operation as a huge Muslim society, and efforts to further democracy in the future are also important at the international level. The success of Indonesia's democracy can be seen as fundamental to the issue of how to combine, maintain, and transform "Islam" and "democracy" (Choi 2017; Hilmy 2010;Midlarsky 1998). Compared to the cases of many countries in the Middle East that have failed democracy experiences, Indonesia is a relatively successful case—even one experience for the entire Muslim world and development can be a model.

In this respect, the core strength of Indonesia's democracy lies in the "Islamic political parties" in which the majority of Muslim populations freely engage in conducting political activities after democratization. When the general election was first held in 1955 after independence, the support of the secularist party line and the Islamic party line was equally balanced. However, during the 32-year authoritarian regime, which began as a military coup in 1965, Islamic parties were united and controlled as a single party, and from the perspective of party politics, this period saw the one-party governance system of the Golkar party. In the first democratic election in 1999, when the Suharto system collapsed in 1998, and in the newly restored 1999 democratic election, Islamic political parties such as PKB, PKN, PKS, and PPP[3] appeared, and after the 1999 general election, everyone entered parliament. In the first elections in 1999, the support of the Islamic party line was much lower than that of the secularist party line, but the share of the Islamic party line continued to increase in the four consecutive general elections that followed. In the general elections in 2019, PKB 9.69 percent, PKS 8.21 percent, PAN 6.84 percent, and PPP 4.52 percent, respectively, obtained a total approval rating of about 30 percent (Choi 2019). The Islamic party plays a very large role in the institutionalization of the rules of the game in the Muslim-majority Indonesian society, where Islamic parties are actors of the Indonesian democracy game. Above all, the Islamic parties mentioned above represent a wide spectrum in terms of ideology, so they also reflect various Muslim ideologies. The ideological characteristics classify the PKB and PKN as Muslim Nationalist and PPP and PKS as Islamist (Epley and Jung 2016). Of course, political Islamic forces that disagree with the rules of the democratic game—for example, HT, FPI, etc.—are expressing their will through radical political actions in civil society (Choi 2017).

Economic Development, Economic Inequality, and Democracy

Economic conditions and development are important requirements in sustaining democracy and developing politics. And the deepening of economic inequality can be explained as the biggest cause of undermining democracy. In the case of Indonesia as well, the collapse of the military authority-oriented system was

the most decisive cause of the economic impact of the IMF foreign exchange crisis, and the overall economic performance and stability during the terms of Jokowi and Yudoyono. "Equality" is a practical element of democracy quality and seriously threatens democracy as deepening economic inequality can amplify the social crisis. Also, economic issues show the highest responsiveness between voters and political elites, and economic issues are related to "welfare and social policies" from the perspective of voters' interests. In the consequential aspect of democracy quality, how much the government responds to citizens' preferences is very significant. The mechanism of democratic reactivity refers to a cycle of civic preference (step 1) → civic voting behavior (step 2) → policymaker selection (step 3) → public choice and outcome (step 4) (Diamond and Morlino 2005).

The implementation of democratization in Indonesia amid the IMF financial crisis served as an opportunity to increase the responsiveness of government policies. Among Indonesian government policies, social policy is the least developed area, and the emergence of social policy is evaluated as the product of democratization. Reflecting the serious economic situation at the time, social policies began to be made at the national level based on poverty policy. In 1997 and 1998, during the financial crisis, economic growth rates were ×1 percent and ×11 percent, respectively, which was a serious situation for the poor. In 1997, as the IMF financial crisis caused more than 20 percent of the population to slip into poverty, the Social Security Program (*Jaring Pengaman Sosial*, JPS) program was implemented in 1998–1999. During the crisis, unconditional cash transfer and conditional cash transfer programs were implemented to respond to emergency situations (Hong et al. 2011). The Indonesian social safety net and social security system became systematized in 2004. A UU Nomor 40/2004 on the National Social Security System (*Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional*, SJSN) was prepared, and based on this, the Social Insurance Corporation (*Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial*, BPJS) was created in 2011. Opportunities have been created for social security systems to be implemented. Following this trend, the Health Insurance Corporation (BPJS) was also set up and has been operational since January 2014 (Hong et al. 2011).

The social policy initiated by the Yudoyono administration is moving in a more active direction with the advent of the Jokowi administration. With the start of the Jokowi government in 2014, three poverty reduction programs were introduced. The first is a health program (*Program Indonesia Sehat*, PIS) to improve and expand the national health program, which is managed through the Health Insurance Corporation (*Badan Penyelengara Jaminan Sosial Kesehatan*, BPJS Kesehatan). Except for the poor for whom the government pays insurance premiums, all citizens are subject to mandatory health insurance. The target audience for the PSI program includes not only poor households but also vulnerable groups with welfare problems. This program provides not only medical health services but also immunization services. Under the program, a National Health Insurance Card (*Jaminand Kesehatan Nasional-Kartu Indonesia Sehat*, JKN-KIS) is issued and operated. As of November 2018, about 260 million were registered. The second poverty reduction program is the Smart Indonesia Program (*Program Indonesia Pintar*, PIP), an

improved scholarship system for poor students. In addition, PIP includes not only regular schools, but also religious schools and educational centers. The third program is the Family Welfare Savings Program (*Program Simpanan Keluarga Sejahtera*, PSKS). PSKS was implemented in November 2014 to maintain and improve the earlier unconditional cash transfer program. The recipient receives a SIM card containing electronic money and can withdraw money through a bank or an agent designated by the bank. With the implementation of the PSKS, the payment was doubled compared to the previous year (Noh et al. 2015). This social security system was actively introduced by the Jokowi government. It also abolished the fuel subsidy to solve the structural problems arising from the pressure on state finances due to the payment of fuel subsidy.

But, how much economic inequality has been alleviated since the implementation of democratization? The social policies of the Jokowi government analyzed above have contributed to alleviating Indonesia's economic inequality. As a result of a detailed survey, the average Gini coefficient across Indonesia in 2013 was 0.41, but in 2018, the range of inequality narrowed to 0.389. And the islands with the greatest extent of change are Kalimantan and Sumatra (Muhtadi et al. 2019). As such, during the first five years of Jokowi's first term in office, not only did he achieve economic inequality mitigation, but also sustained an average of about 4.5 percent economic growth. The fact that the Jokowi government is implementing an infrastructure strengthening policy is also evaluated as an important stepping stone for long-term economic development. The policy of redistributing wealth through social and welfare policies and strategies for qualitative economic growth are positive foundations for leading Indonesian democracy in a good direction. As such, it can be said that through Jokowi's first election and re-election, a reactive mechanism between voters and political leaders was formed.

Conclusion

The theoretical and methodological implications of the concept of democracy quality are as follows. First, with the quality approach to democracy, the fundamental principle of democracy, "people's sovereignty", is essentially addressed in terms of the breadth and depth of realization. State power must be operated democratically, the reason for the existence of the state does not exist for the political elites who exercise state power, but the actors who exercise state power because state power must be exercised to realize quality of life for the people. It was understood in democracy that people will be elected through the choice of the people. We think the "representative" so elected would engage in political activities that respond to the will of the people. However, since the state does not operate solely with "elected power" but is made up of "innumerable power institutions that are not elected", democracy now must consider even democratic control over "unelected powers". Democratic control over "un-elected power" is related to the concept of democratic quality: rule of law, vertical or horizontal accountability, and responsiveness. Second, the approach to defining democracy as "qualitative" has created a theoretical premise that allows "democracy" to be considered a type of democracy other than a liberal democracy type at the typological level.

In addition, the "qualitative" approach to democracy can contemplate the fundamental meaning and concept of democracy more faithfully. For this reason, an integrated approach has emerged, one including qualitative data and qualitative approaches to democracy as well as quantitative approaches and quantitative measurements of democracy studies.

Based on the theoretical and methodological implications of the quality of democracy, the evaluation of the quality of democracy in Indonesia can be summarized as follows. First, Indonesian democracy occupies a unique position in the typological level. Indonesian democracy assumes a democracy that is qualitatively different from liberal democracy. Along with the constitutional ideology of Pancasila, Indonesian democracy is taking a different course of development. Indonesia, which has the world's largest Muslim population, has the potential and path to establish and qualitatively develop a democratic system. However, we cannot affirm that Indonesian democracy will continue to develop in the future. What kind of democracy can be created in a Muslim-majority Indonesian society is an interesting question. Second, the state of democracy in Indonesia cannot be said to be sufficiently democratic, but it is clear case of "in the process of development" as a new democracy. According to the Economist Intelligence Democracy Index, Indonesia's democracy in 2019 ranked 64th out of 167 countries surveyed, with an overall average score of 6.48 out of 10. Among them, the scores in the areas of political culture and civil liberty were the lowest. This is in line with the recent Freedom House results. This is the social task that must be solved for Indonesia's democracy to develop further. This is why it should be noted how religion can develop democratic values in social, political, and economic areas in Indonesia, where many are Muslims and religion is a very important criterion for their value judgment. To sum up, Indonesian democracy is a qualitatively different type of democracy, but nevertheless, the history and future of democracy in Indonesia seem to be focused on how to more realize the universal values of democracy such as freedom and equality in a Muslim-majority society.

Notes

1 It started with the concepts of Islamic revival, regeneration, and resurrection, which began in the late 1970s, and refers to the emphasis on the importance of Islam and the practice of religious obligations in everyday life (Kim 2013). This overall change is called Islamization. Islamic revival began in the Middle East and affected Muslim societies in Southeast Asia such as Indonesia and Malaysia. In the case of Indonesia, the 1970s was an authoritarian era, and the importance of a new missionary movement and interpretation of the scriptures emerged in the social and cultural fields rather than in the political and economic fields. And after democratization, the Islamic Party emerged, entered parliament, and Islam-related ordinances were made in local councils, and Islamization was revealed in the political and judicial spheres, such as strengthening the role of the religious court. Islamic values are also predominantly appearing in the economic field.

2 The Sharia economy is the Indonesian expression of the Islamic economy. Traditionally, the expression of Islamic economy or Islamic finance is more commonly used, but Indonesia is using the Islamic law applied to Islamic economy and Islamic finance, or Sharia entirely. The academic system for the Islamic economy begins with

the Pakistani scholar Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi. He systematized the Islamic economic principles based on the economic principles found in the Islamic scriptures. The core of the Islamic economic principle is that the premise of human economic activity must be subordinated to "divine understanding and divine teaching". It is to understand the economy as a concept of the welfare and satisfaction of all human beings, as well as a human, just and efficient approach to the economy. He systematized the human economic principle based on divinity, that is, the Islamic economic principle (Ahmad 2011).

3 PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Nasional) is translated as National Awakening Party, PKN (Partai Amanant Nasional) is translated as National Mandate Party, PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) is translated as Prosperous Justice Party, and PPP (Partai Persatua Pembangunan) can be translated as the Development Unity Party.

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9 Assessing the Quality of Democracy in India

With Special References to Rule of Law, Participation, Competition

Rajiv Kumar

Introduction

India is celebrating 75 years of independence. After World War II, when there was the emergence of military dictatorships in Asia, India adopted a democratic system after independence (Moore 1966). Since then, the country has maintained its democratic system despite facing enormous challenges, including but not limited to social diversity, widespread poverty, and political instability (Lijphat 1996). Yet it should also be noted that the pessimism about the prospect of Indian democracy was highlighted by some early studies when India was about to enter the twenty-first century. Raising pessimism about India's democratic future, Kohli (1990) argued India's political order is eroding, and the world's largest democracy is becoming challenging to govern. For Tummala (1992), "India's federalism was under stress". Jaffrelot (2002) noted that the rule of law, an essential prerequisite for a quality democracy, is on trial in Indian democracy. Thus, as Indian democracy enters its eighth decade, some questions arise: What is the quality of Indian democracy? How far has India gone in achieving the task of improving its democracy? What are the key strengths and weaknesses of the Indian democracy?

This study seeks to answer these questions by employing a theoretical framework developed by Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino. What are the dimensions on which democracy varies in quality? Diamond and Morlino identify some key dimensions to assess the quality of democracy worldwide (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 22; Morlino 2004, 9; Morlino 2011; Morlino et al. 2011, 495). Among them, three key dimensions are highlighted. They are (1) the rule of law, (2) participation, and (3) competition. The above three dimensions are part of the procedural dimensions of democracy, concerned with rules and practices. Drawing from above scholarly insights, this chapter will also focus on three key procedural dimensions of Indian democracy—India's rule of law, participation, and competition—to examine the quality of democracy in this country.

This chapter collects data from independent agencies to make its claims. For example, we collected data on corruption from Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. Data on electoral competitiveness were collected from the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index. The reports of Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) provided data on political parties'

funding. Data on election results were collected from the Election Commission of India's website. The Data Intelligence Unit (DIU) and the Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) provided data on the age of lawmakers.

The contribution of this study is twofold: Since the introduction of an analytical framework to assess the quality of democracy, a large number of scholarly studies have recently made efforts to evaluate the quality of democracy around the world. With the above in mind, this study first seeks to make an academic contribution to this ongoing scholarly trend by assessing the quality of democracy in India. Second, as India is celebrating 75 years of independence, this study attempts to contribute to the literature, which seeks to examine how far India has gone in achieving the task of improving its democracy.

This chapter is organized as follows. After this introductory session, the next section will present the theoretical framework of this study. After that, the study will measure the first procedural dimension of democracy, *the rule of law*, where the status of India's rule of law will be examined. The following section will explore the second procedural dimension of democracy, *participation*, where the status of political participation in India will be evaluated. Then, the third procedural dimension of democracy, *political competition*, will be examined. The final section of this study will present concluding remakes.

Theoretical Framework

Assessing the quality of democracy has recently become a new research topic for scholarly and policy communities. For instance, some studies have recently tried to develop a new analytical framework to evaluate the quality of democracy by asking the following questions: How to research the quality of democracy, how can we assess the quality of new and old democratic regimes as democratic governments, what makes a good or high-quality democracy? and so on (see, for example, Altman and Perez-Linan 2002; Diamond and Morlino 2004, 2005; Levine and Molina 2011; Morlino 2004, 2011; Morlino et al. 2011). This development can be regarded as a new phase in the study of democratization (Case 2007, 1). The last phase was when scholars on democratization were more interested in exploring the question, such as the prerequisites for democracy (for classical works on this issue, see O'Donnell et al. 1986; Lipset 1959; Moore 1966).

Indeed, after the "global democratic revolution"—a concept which Samuel P. Huntington coined to describe a political trend in the late twentieth century during which several countries made transitions to democracy (Huntington 1991, 579; Huntington 1993), scholars have recently gone from asking why democratic transitions happen to ask what the quality of democracy is in new and old democracies (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 20; Morlino et al. 2011, 492). Some studies, for example, focus on assessing the quality of democracy in Latin American countries (see, for example, Levine and Molina 2011; Altman and Perez-Linan 2002). Similarly, the quality of democracy in Europe, particularly in post-communist Eastern Europe, has been examined (see Hutcheson and Korosteleva 2006; Roberts 2010). In addition to this, an increasing number of scholars also made

serious academic efforts to evaluate the quality of democracies in East Asian countries (see Baeg-im 2011; Case 2007; Shin and Chu 2004).

With the above scholarly trend in mind, this study seeks to assess the quality of Indian democracy, a research agenda that has not been studied in-depth as a single case study so far. Now the question is: How to evaluate the quality of one country's democracy? Scholarly studies provide many ways to examine this issue. For this study, we mainly utilize an analytical framework provided by Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino to review the quality of democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2004). Diamond and Morlino's analytical framework differs from other important scholarly works on the quality of democracy. For example, whereas leading political scientist Arend Lijphart's seminal work promoted a quantitative comparative method to examine the quality of democracy (see Lijphart 1999), Diamond and Morlino highlighted the incorporation of a qualitative strategy to study this issue.

The relevant question now is: What are the dimensions on which democracy varies in quality? Diamond and Morlino identify a number of critical dimensions to assess the quality of democracy around the world (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 22; Morlino 2004, 9; Morlino 2011; Morlino et al. 2011, 495). Among them, three key dimensions, namely, the rule of law, participation, and competition, were highlighted. The above three dimensions are part of the procedural dimensions of democracy, concerned with rules and practices. Drawing from the above insight, this study will also focus on three vital procedural dimensions of Indian democracy—India's rule of law, participation, and competition—to evaluate the quality of democracy in this country.

The Rule of Law in Indian Democracy

The rule of law is regarded as one of the essential prerequisites for a quality democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 23; Morlino 2004, 2009). According to Guillermo O'Donnell's seminal work, one of the dimensions of a democratic rule of law is, as he mentioned: "there should be generalized recognition of the supremacy of the constitution and a supreme or constitutional court that effectively interprets and protects it" (O'Donnell 2004, 44). In sum, the supremacy of the constitution is a key indicator of a good democracy.

Regarding the rule of law, India has successfully developed a constitutional mechanism that indicates a high quality of democracy system exists in the country. There is, for example, a general recognition of the supremacy of the Constitution of India, which is officially regarded as the supreme law of the country. In addition, India has also developed an independent judicial system, which has been the final arbiter of the Indian Constitution (Irani 1965, 1; Mehta 2002, 187). In the process, the Supreme Court of India, which is the highest judicial court under the Constitution of India with the power of judicial review, has played a significant role in preventing any government act (whether legislative or executive) from overstepping constitutional limits. That is why, as one study suggests, the Supreme Court of India is regarded as a "People's Court" (Chandra et al. 2017, 1).

Equally significant, India has largely maintained the supremacy of its constitution and an independent judicial system, despite facing many challenges. For example, India's influential leaders and their majoritarian government's assertive actions sometimes undermined the rule of law in the country. Yet Indian democracy has successfully overcome these adverse scenarios. Significantly, the rule of law was undermined when a state of emergency was declared across the country from 1975 to 1977 by the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who was regarded as the first female dictator in the twentieth century (Guha 2007, 491). During this emergency period, the rule of law was undermined given the fact that, as Aaron S. Klieman described, "In a series of moves, Mrs. Gandhi managed to break the judiciary's spirit of resistance as well as its independence and supremacy" (Klieman 1981, 248). This development led to a widespread protest against the suspension of the rule of law. Against that backdrop, the 1977 general election was held. As a result, the ruling Congress Party was severely defeated and lost control of national politics for the first time in independent India (Masani 1977, 1). This development was also described as restoring the rule of law in India (Klieman 1981, 243).

Since then, the Supreme Court of India has been utilizing its power of judicial review to curb the central government's tendency to misuse power, which in turn has always helped ensure the democratic foundation of Indian democracy (Mehta 2007, 71). As some observers noted, the rule of law has also been under stress under the current BJP-led one-party dominant system as the center has sought to wield president's rule for party political gain on some occasions. However, the Supreme Court played its role as a safeguard of the rule of law by striking down the unlawful acts of the central government (see on this issue, Sharma and Swenden 2018, 59).The point here is that India has strengthened the rule of law by maintaining the supremacy of its constitution and independent judicial system.

Yet the aforementioned good quality of Indian democracy exists alongside some existing realities, which suggests that the quality of Indian democracy is still poor in many other ways. Scholarly studies illustrate that there is a significant correlation between corruption and the rule of law. More specifically, if the level of corruption is high, then the rule of law and the quality of democracy is low (Baeg-im 2011; Diamond and Morlino 2004; Elbasani and Sabic 2018, 1). In this regard, the quality of Indian democracy is undoubtedly poor. It is significant to emphasize there is widespread corruption among Indian politicians and government officials at both national and state levels, despite the civil society-led anticorruption movements in the country (Jenkins 2007; Sharma 2006; Xu 2014). According to one study, a large number of people living in the cities have to pay a bribe for getting even basic services such as a driving license and an electricity connection. India's rural areas are also suffering from widespread corruption. As former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi famously admitted the corruption level in rural India by saying that "out of one rupee spent by the government for the welfare of the downtrodden, only 15 paise thereof actually reaches those persons for whom it is meant" (The Indian Express 2017).

Even in today's India, corruption is rampant. According to Transparency International's 2019 Corruption Perception Index, both India and China ranked

80 on the list of 180 countries globally (Transparency International 2019). This situation suggests that a democratic country like India is not different from an authoritarian country like China, where the rule of law is weak due to rampant corruption (Li 2012, 1). So what is responsible for this widespread corruption in India? One of India's significant causes of rampant corruption is a political situation in which criminal and powerful politicians and well-connected leaders are unduly favored. According to political scientist Milan Vaishnav, there is a symbiotic relationship between crime and politics in India. It is evident that India's free and fair democratic elections exist alongside rampant criminality and the country's top political parties actively recruit candidates with reputations for wrongdoing (Vaishnav 2017). This situation certainly demonstrates the low quality of Indian democracy; as Diamond and Morlino (2004, 23) suggest, a weak rule of law will likely mean that the resourceful and well-connected are unduly favored.

The Status of Political Participation in India

Besides the rule of law, studies also point out that the quality of democracy is high when a democratic country grants all of its adult citizens formal rights of political participation (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 23; Morlino 2009, 14). Since adopting a democratic system, India has granted all adult citizens to participate in political activities, including voting in elections formally. Moreover, Indian democracy specially cared for the weaker sections of society so that they can politically participate. To illustrate, the Constitution of India—adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 1949 and came into force in 1950—allowed women to enter India's male-dominated political sphere by making women equal legally (Khanna 2009, 1). Moreover, since adopting a democratic system, India, which is a caste-dominated society, also secured rights of political participation of other weaker sections such as Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST), by making several laws. Taken altogether, we can argue that the quality of democracy is high if we consider the formal rights of political participation.

In addition, as scholarly studies suggest, the successful inclusion within the system of all political spectrums, including left, right, and center, broaden the ideological spectrum of a democratic county, making it more flexible, open, and liberal. And this development makes a country a "miraculous democracy" (Chaibong 2008). Indian democracy has also incorporated all different ideologies in the system. During the first four decades after independence, Indian politics was largely dominated by the Congress-dominant one-party system (see on this issue, Kothari 1964; Kumar and Kim 2019; Morris-Jones 1964; Weiner 1982), which political position was central-left. After that, India's socialist and left parties dominated national and state politics since the 1990s. Finally, India's right-wing party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, also came to form the government in the center and states (Kumar 2019b). And since the 2014 general election, it has variously dominated Indian politics (Kumar 2019c, 2020b). Hence, the participation of all political spectrums has made Indian democracy more flexible, open, and liberal, a development that also contributes to improving the quality of Indian democracy.

Despite the above development, there are still issues that need to be addressed to improve Indian democracy. Studies suggest that the common people's participation in decision-making is also an important indicator of a good democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 23). Although the Indian parliament has made several policies since independence to ensure the participation of the weaker sections of society in the decision-making process, it still has a long way to go. Remarkably, it reserved a number of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Indian parliament. Thanks to this policy, the groups mentioned above have been active participants in India's top decision-making process in parliament.

However, women's participation in top decision-making—regarded as an important dimension of a good democracy (Lijphart 1999; Morlino 2004, 7; Tremblay 2007, 1)—remains significantly lower in India. It is significant that there has been a growing demand for the parliamentary representation of Indian women, which is built around several arguments, including an equal opportunity for participation in the top decision-making body (Sharma 2016; Spary 2014). Although women's participation in the Lok Sabha (which is the lower house of India's bicameral parliament) increased in the past few general elections, this progress is too slow.

As Table 9.1 shows, women's participation in the Indian Lok Sabha has been significantly low. In the last three general elections of 2009, 2014, and 2019,

Table 9.1 Women in Lok Sabha (Indian Parliament's Lower House) since 1952

Year of Election	Total Women Members	Percentage
1952	22	4.4
1957	27	5.4
1962	34	6.7
1967	31	5.9
1971	22	4.2
1977	19	3.4
1980	28	5.1
1984	44	8.1
1989	28	5.3
1991	36	7.0
1996	40	7.4
1998	44	8.0
1999	48	8.8
2004	45	8.1
2009	59	10.9
2014	61	11.2
2019	72	13.3

Source: Election Commission of India.

women could not win more than 10 percent of Lok Sabha seats. Yet given the size of the women population in India, which is around 48 percent, their participation in India's top decision-making is too low. One of the major reasons behind this is India's male-dominated political system has blocked the Women's Reservation Bill, which proposes to amend the Constitution of India to reserve one-third of all seats in the Lok Sabha and in all state legislative assemblies for women.

The low level of youth participation in India's top decision-making body is another manifestation of the poor quality of the Indian democracy. India is a relatively young country with more than 50 percent of its population below the age of 25 and more than 65 percent below the age of 35. Despite this fact, the Indian political system has primarily blocked its youth from participating in decision-making. It is ironic that, on the one hand, India has become a young country. But, on the other hand, the number of young MPs in the Lok Sabha has decreased over time. For example, the average age of MPs in the first Lok Sabha was 46.5, whereas the average age of MPs in 2014 (16th Lok Sabha) reached 59 (Table 9.2).

In addition to this, 164 young MPs (those aged between 25 and 40 years) were elected (Kumar 2013, 25) for the first two Lok Sabhas (1952 and 1957), which was almost 33 percent of the total seats. However, according to the DIU and CSDS research, the number of young MPs has steadily declined in the recent general elections. In 2019, only 12 percent of young MPs (between 25 and 40 years) were elected (Rampal 2019). Even more disappointing is that a majority of the young

Table 9.2 Average Age of Members of Parliament (MPs) in Lok Sabha

Lok Sabha Year	Average Age of MPs
1st Lok Sabha (1952–1957)	46.5
2nd Lok Sabha (1957–1962)	46.7
3rd Lok Sabha (1962–1967)	49.4
4th Lok Sabha (1967–1971)	48.7
5th Lok Sabha (1971–1977)	49.2
6th Lok Sabha (1977–1980)	52.1
7th Lok Sabha (1980–1984)	49.9
8th Lok Sabha (1984–1989)	51.4
9th Lok Sabha (1989–1991)	51.3
10th Lok Sabha (1991–1996)	51.4
11th Lok Sabha (1996–1998)	52.8
12th Lok Sabha (1998–1999)	46.4
13th Lok Sabha (1999–2004)	55.5
14th Lok Sabha (2004–2009)	52.6
15th Lok Sabha (2009–2014)	53
16th Lok Sabha (2014–2019)	59

Source: Oberai, 2014; Rampal 2019.

MPs are in the Lok Sabha due to nepotism and dynasty politics. One study found that in the 15th Lok Sabha nearly 66 percent of MPs (aged below 40) are from a privileged background (French 2011).

Political Competition in India

In addition to the rule of law and political participation, as we saw in the previous sections, political competition is also one of the most important prerequisites for a high-quality democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 23; Morlino 2011; Morlino et al. 2011, 496). Indeed, regular democratic elections and the peaceful transformation of powers is vital for a high-quality democracy. As Diamond and Morlino (2004, 24) argue, the quality of democracy is high in a political system that has "regular, free, and fair electoral competition between different political parties". Leading political scientist Samuel Huntington in his "two turnover test" theory argues that democracy becomes consolidated when it survives two turnovers of power (Huntington 1993, 267), that is, political power is peacefully transferred twice after a county adopts a democratic system.

According to the aforementioned scholarly notion, it can be argued that India has become a quality democracy given the fact that there have been regular democratic elections and the peaceful transformation of powers in this country. Indeed, as Table 9.3 shows, in India, a peaceful transformation of power from one party (or coalition) to another party (or coalition) took place since the first election held in 1952. India's grand old party, Indian National Congress, ruled the country for the majority of time in the first four decades since India became a democratic nation (Kumar 2020c). However, it peacefully transferred the power to another party and coalitions once it lost the elections. Other ruling parties and coalitions followed similar practices: After losing the election, they happily accepted the people's mandate and allowed a winning opposition party and its leaders to take charge. The consistency of the above democratic practices in India has undoubtedly strengthened the quality of Indian democracy (Kumar 2020a).

Electoral competitiveness is another indicator, suggested by scholars of electoral theories, to examine the quality of democracy in one country (Mareno-Jaimes 2007). It is argued that "the single most important institutional guarantee of freedom and fairness (and hence competitiveness) in elections is an independent election commission"' (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 25; Pastor 1999). In this regard, India's Election Commission has greatly contributed to improving the quality of democracy in India. As one study suggests, the Election Commission of India has emerged as one of the most important institutional arrangements in the country. More importantly, the people voted the commission in a countrywide poll as the "most trusted institution" in India (Katju 2006). Equally significant, the Election Commission of India is regarded as one of the best in the world by the reputed international agency. For example, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2018, India and South Korea's electoral processes are one of the best in the world and the best in Asia as both countries

Table 9.3 Elections and Peaceful Transformation of Powers in India since 1952

Year of Election	Prime Minister	Party (Alliance)
1952	Jawaharlal Nehru	Indian National Congress
1957	Jawaharlal Nehru	Indian National Congress
1962	Jawaharlal Nehru	Indian National Congress
1967	Indira Gandhi	Indian National Congress
1971	Indira Gandhi	Indian National Congress (R)
1977	Morarji Desai	Janata Party
1980	Indira Gandhi	Indian National Congress (I)
1984	Rajiv Gandhi	Indian National Congress (I)
1989	V. P. Singh/Chandra Shekhar	Janata Dal (National Front)/ Samajwadi Janata Party with Indian National Congress
1991	P. V. Narasimha Rao	Indian National Congress (I)
1996	Atal Bihari Vajpayee/H. D. Deva Gowda/I. K. Gujral	Bharatiya Janata Party/Janata Dal (United Front)
1998	Atal Bihari Vajpayee	Bharatiya Janata Party (NDA)
1999	Atal Bihari Vajpayee	Bharatiya Janata Party (NDA)
2004	Manmohan Singh	Indian National Congress (UPA)
2009	Manmohan Singh	Indian National Congress (UPA)
2014	Narendra Modi	Bharatiya Janata Party (NDA)
2019	Narendra Modi	Bharatiya Janata Party (NDA)

Source: Election Commission of India.

got 9.17 out of 10 points, followed by Japan which got 8.75 points (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2019, 36–37).

Yet, concerning political competition in India, there are still some issues that need to be addressed to improve the quality of Indian democracy. Scholarly studies argue that the full and rapid reporting of all funding for political parties and campaigns promotes greater electoral fairness and competitiveness (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 24–25; Pinto-Duschinshy 2002). However, in India, more than half the contributions to parties are from unknown sources, which makes the quality of Indian democracy poor. Indeed, according to a report by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), over 50 percent of funding for the national political parties, including BJP, INC, BSP, NCP, AITC, and CPI, are from unknown sources as the existing law does not require political parties in India to reveal the names of the individuals or organizations donating less than INR20,000 in cash or through electoral bonds (Kumar 2019a). Concerning the Indian democracy, it is also suggested that the quality of Indian democracy will be strengthened only if political parties in India provide all information regarding their funding under the Right to Information Act (Association for Democratic Reforms, 2019). Hence, the poor regulation of political parties for more than half of the funding seems to hamper greater electoral competitiveness.

Conclusion

India's democracy has come a long way. This chapter examined the quality of Indian democracy by focusing on three procedural dimensions of democracy— the rule of law, political participation, and completion. As this chapter illustrates, despite many challenges, the quality of Indian democracy has significantly improved over the last 75 years. The country has strengthened the rule of law by developing a free and independent constitution and consolidating its constitution's supremacy. In addition, the fact that India has granted all of its adult citizens the right to participate in Indian democracy and allowed all different political spectrums (including left, right, and center) to run the government has enhanced the quality of democracy in India. What is more, regular democratic elections, peaceful transformation of powers, and an independent electoral system have made the Indian democracy a high-quality democracy. Yet there are still some weaknesses. They include, but are not limited to, the rampant corruption, a persistently low level of participation by women and youth in decision-making, and the poor regulation of political parties' funding. These issues need to be addressed for the improvement of the quality of Indian democracy.

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10 A Refined Model of Contingent Consent

Explaining Popular Support for Singapore's People's Action Party

Terence C. Lee[1] and Kay Key Teo[2]

Introduction

Singapore frequently appears on the list of competitive authoritarian regimes (Ortmann 2011). In these regimes, "formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority", but "incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent" that these governments fail to meet "conventional minimum standards for democracy" (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52, 59). In competitive or electoral authoritarian regimes, these anti-democratic machinations are not minor or incidental, but instead "profound and systematic" (Schedler 2006, 3) or "frequent enough and serious enough" (Levitsky and Way 2002, 53). The People's Action Party (PAP) exemplifies these practices—its grip on Singapore politics has been built on the manipulation of electoral laws (Tan 2013) and the employment of draconian laws to repress the opposition (Gomez 2006; Rodan 2008; Tremewan 1994; Worthington 2001).

These explanations of the PAP's political preeminence, however, belie that even with the global upsurge in populism in contemporary times and, more generally, challenges to autocratic rule, Singaporeans have not resisted the country's system of governance. This is evidenced by the fact that in more than five decades of parliamentary general elections, Singaporeans have consistently returned the PAP to power, with an average of 68.9 percent of the popular vote—an exceptional feat when compared to other majoritarian electoral systems (Norris 1997). Also, while there is a lack of viable electoral competition, as Freedom House observed, elections in Singapore are open to challengers, free from voting irregularities, ballot stuffing, or fraud (Freedom House 2020). Electoral contests are likewise free from coercion and violence, more commonly seen in dictatorial regimes across East and Southeast Asia. These suggest, at the very least, that the PAP's ascendancy is a function of the decisions of voters, pointing to popular support for the ruling party.

An overwhelming majority of Singaporeans support the current political system and the government. Singaporean respondents from the second, third, fourth, and fifth waves of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) hold high levels of confidence in government institutions (Figure 10.1), and overwhelmingly indicate that they have access to public goods like help from police, running water, and the Internet, among others. Satisfaction with the political status quo is further evidenced by

Figure 10.1 Trust in national government.

very low incidence of widespread protests or other forms of civil disobedience in Singapore; few individuals or groups are charged for subversion and other forms of anti-government activity.

While there is declining vote share for the PAP in the last two decades, there is clear acquiescence to PAP rule. Why is this so? How does the case of Singapore demonstrate why citizens support an incumbent electoral autocracy?

This chapter seeks to understand the conditions under which quasi-voluntary compliance occurs in competitive authoritarian regimes, that is, when citizens give, refuse, or withdraw their consent to these governments. We contend consent or popular support is based upon three pillars of legitimacy: (1) government effectiveness, (2) societal perceptions of procedural justice, and (3) ethical reciprocity. At first glance, this claim appears to be an oxymoron; it makes no sense to use legitimacy to describe non-democratic rule. However, we argue it is apt and accurate to discuss autocratic legitimacy and the mechanisms such regimes pursue to achieve it.

This study picks up on a growing strand of research explaining how autocratic regimes, besides using repression, stabilize their rule by seeking the support of their citizens (Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017; Gerschewski 2013; Gilley 2009; Grauvogel and von Soest 2014; Holbig 2013; Kailitz and Stockemer 2015). While competitive authoritarian regimes superficially utilize procedural aspects of democracy to remain in power, the chapter illustrates autocrats' need to appeal to notions of citizens' satisfaction (Cho) to sustain their legitimacy.

Refining the model of contingent consent by Levi et al. (2009), we demonstrate that when an authoritarian regime is effective in providing public goods and the more it is viewed as trustworthy, the more legitimacy that government is likely to attain, and the more it will possess the potential to elicit consent or support from its citizens without excessive monitoring or coercion. In addition, this chapter moves beyond performance-based mechanisms and incorporates normative

dimensions of legitimation. It contends that when governments exercise their authority through procedures that its citizens perceive as fair, they are more likely to be viewed as legitimate and deserving of deference and support. Political support for a regime will also be improved by the presence of ethical reciprocity, that is, when citizens trust each other to equally uphold and comply with government demands or regulations. Conversely, when citizens feel there is little sense of fair play, or believe others are free riding and not cooperating with the government, support is correspondingly reduced. We test these theoretical claims empirically on Singapore, drawing data from three waves of the ABS.

   This chapter is organized as follows. The following section reviews the scholarly work explaining popular support for PAP rule. It notes the existing literature predominantly emphasizes instruments that control, coerce, and co-opt the citizenry, paying little attention to the fact that the ruling party's grip on power is a function of voters expressing their preferences at the ballot box. The next section develops the theoretical argument of contingent consent and values-based legitimacy. The subsequent section explains how we test the theory using the ABS data. We explain the findings of our statistical analysis and conclude with thoughts on the implications of our results.

Popular Support for the PAP

Since Singapore attained independence in 1965, there have been 13 parliamentary elections and the PAP has overwhelmingly won all of them. The ruling party has an iron-clasp grip in parliament, holding 100 percent of the seats until 1984 (Figure 10.2).

   Singaporeans are also exceedingly quiescent—the city-state has a reputation for being one of the cleanest, safest, and most orderly countries in the world (Rovnick 2012); Singapore also ranks 12th in the global World Justice Project

Parliamentary General Election Results (Post 1965)

	Year	Vote Share (%)	Seat Share (%)
Parliamentary Elections	1968	86.7	100.0
	1972	70.4	100.0
	1976	74.1	100.0
	1980	77.7	100.0
	1984	64.8	97.5
	1988	63.2	98.8
	1991	61.0	95.1
	1997	65.0	97.6
	2001	75.3	97.6
	2006	66.6	97.6
	2011	60.1	93.1
	2015	69.9	93.3
	2020	61.2	89.2

Figure 10.2 Parliamentary general election results (post-1965).

Rule of Law Index 2020, which measures adherence to the rule of law and quality of legal institutions (Vijayan 2020).

Several scholars have extended several explanations as to why there is broad compliance of government laws, rules, and regulations in Singapore. Jones (1993) and Khan (2001) contend that a pervasive Confucianist ethic that emphasizes the importance of community responsibility and "right behavior" explain the conformity and conservatism of the population. The five "Singapore Shared Values" introduced in 1991—nation before community and society above self; family as the basic unit of society; community support and respect for the individual; consensus, not conflict; and racial and religious harmony—is one prime example (White Paper 1991). Chua (2017) expands on this idea, suggesting that Singapore has redefined the terms of democracy with its overarching communitarian ideas of "nation before community, society above self".

Another body of work points to Singapore's strict social controls, with legal measures to suppress dissent and enforce compliance (Gomez 2006; Rajah 2012; Rodan 2008; Tremewan, 1994; Worthington, 2001). Laws such as the Internal Security Act, the Public Order Act, and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, are among of the list of the state's repressive options. The PAP also wields a tight rein over trade unions, the media, and civil society groups (Gomez 2006; Lydgate 2003). The ruling party has similarly employed "soft repressive" approaches, mounting lawsuits against opposition leaders and critics such as Internet bloggers. The cumulative effect of these repressive measures has been to limit social activism and channel political engagement in ways that are more favorable to the PAP (George 2007).

However, the existence of Confucian norms and the prevalence of harsh laws do not, prima facie, lead to an acquiescent population. As James Scott (1985) has previously argued, even in the most oppressive regimes, subtle forms of everyday resistance could still emerge.

Continued popular support for the PAP is therefore minimally a function of voter preferences and motivations. However, to what extent is voter support for the PAP transactional, one that is merely a consequence of fulfilling material needs? Does support for the party reflect a belief in the appropriateness or legitimacy of PAP rule? Various normative attributes have at some point been used to describe the beliefs people hold about the appropriateness of government structures, officials, and processes, but can we measure this degree of legitimacy, a concept that has long been imprecise for social scientists? This chapter constructs a model of how a government could develop legitimacy through the quality of governance, the perception its leaders are acting fairly, and when others are also contributing their fair share.

Explaining Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes

Compliance, Consent, Support, and Legitimacy

Compliance and consent depict the modal relationship between citizens and their governments. Governments, even dictatorial ones, cannot survive without

some degree of compliance from the people. For instance, the sustenance of taxation and other political obligations depend on the compliance of a fair number of individuals in the populace who obey laws. This minimum level of citizenry compliance is necessary; otherwise, the political and economic costs of governance will become too high. In other words, for any government to subsist, the citizenry's acquiescence and conformity must translate into some form of behavioral consent.

Consent, on the other hand, implies a choice; sometimes this choice leads to inaction, but consent and the refusal to consent always demands a decision.[3] Margaret Levi citing Burawoy (1979, 27) notes that "consent is expressed through, and is the result of, the organization of activities", even if these activities present narrow choices, "it is participation in choosing that generates consent".

However, not all compliance is consent; nor is all non-compliance the withdrawal of consent. For example, a citizen's decision to pay taxes may connote approval of the government, but it could also suggest fear of being caught and punished for non-payment; being in a crowd could constitute milling, but it may also be participating in a rebellion or a riot. Consider the shirking which James Scott (1985) regards as "weapons of the weak" in a political struggle; non-compliance may be opportunism, but it could also be resistance. Correspondingly, compliance may connote a response to incentives, but it could likewise be an endorsement of a government's actions. Compliance could be the result of coercion, sanctions, and incentives, but consent—a form of compliance—expresses a belief in the rightness of the policies and of the trustworthiness of the government actors implementing them, connoting the notion of legitimacy.

Legitimacy describes how citizens regard a state, government, or regime. It is derived from the beliefs citizens hold about the normative appropriateness of a government's structures, representatives, processes, and the belief that rules and regulations are entitled to be obeyed (Tyler 2006). When citizens believe that a government is legitimate, they are more likely to comply with rules and regulations, and voluntarily support their political leaders. With legitimacy, the populace consents to the exercise of governmental power.

Regardless of regime type, a government's claim to legitimacy is important for explaining its means of rule and, in turn, its durability (Brady 2009; Easton 1965). Governments, even autocratic ones, seek to legitimatize their rule, to build popular support, to "engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society" (Lipset 1959, 86).

We distinguish "legitimation" from "legitimacy" itself; the former refers to the process of gaining popular support, by which legitimacy is procured, while the latter is a contingent property of sociopolitical order, the degree of righteousness, or popularity (Dimitrov 2009; Gilley 2009, 10).[4] Not every sociopolitical order qualifies as legitimate, but every order conceived as a lasting institutional arrangement engages in legitimation of some form (von Haldenwang 2017).

Contemporary authoritarian regimes can accrue legitimacy through *diffuse* or *specific* support. Diffuse support is long-term oriented and represents the "reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed" (Easton 1975, 444); specific support is short-term, and

derives from "the satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived output and performance of the political authorities" (Easton 1975, 437).

Legitimation through diffuse support is limited for autocratic regimes. Charisma, for example, is contingent on a leader's personality, but is less effective in contemporary autocracies. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and many other dictatorships based an infallible ideology demonstrate that legitimacy cannot be justified only by utopian visions of society. While leaders in the Middle East and North Africa still govern in the name of a "God-given, natural, or at least established historical right to rule because of [their] descent" (Kailitz and Stockemer 2015, 7), or the "sanctity of immemorial traditions" (Weber 1978, 215), these normative appeals are relatively weak sources of support from below since they imply a hierarchical structure of society and the existence of an aristocracy.

Contemporary authoritarian regimes hold semi- or pseudo-competitive elections, "to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty" (Schedler 2002, 37). The population's participation in these semicompetitive elections implicitly validates the system, especially when there is high voter turnout (Morgenbesser 2016). Participation in these electoral contests and compliance with the rules of the game, such as the regularization of elections and the rotation between candidates of the ruling party, provide the incumbent elite with some procedural legitimacy.

Although holding elections that opposition cannot win could provide nondemocratic rulers with procedural legitimacy, the returns of this legitimation strategy are uncertain. In a democracy, governments are legitimate because elections are regular, inclusive, free, and fair, which allow citizens to select and control their rulers. On the other hand, in authoritarian regimes, fraud and other electoral chicanery prevent opposition victories, rendering such electoral contests dubious touchstones of popular support. In addition, elections are risky because windows of opportunity could open for political change as the reiteration of electoral practices can progressively improve opposition's performance at the polls (Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Lindberg 2009; Schedler 2013).

Present-day autocrats seeking non-coercive forms of political support therefore cannot count on "identity-based" (von Soest and Grauvogel 2017) sources or a "reservoir of favorable attitudes or goodwill" (Easton 1975, 444) from semicompetitive elections. In the words of Beetham (1991, 94), "whatever the precise form of political system, […], political legitimation has to be mass legitimation". Autocrats need to justify their rule by the claim of acting in the interest of the community, which could be done by incorporating more pragmatic and programmatic claims such as the fulfillment of people's will and material needs, representing some form of a *quid pro quo* or a social contract between the ruler and the ruled.

However, political support for autocracies also depends on perceptions of government fairness and the existence of trust among fellow citizens. These normative or ethical dimensions contribute to legitimacy and make horizontal (between citizens) and vertical (between citizens and the state) cooperation possible (Letki 2018). The next section explicates these claims of autocratic legitimation theoretically.

Theory: A Refined Model of Contingent Consent

We adapt Margaret Levi's model of contingent consent to explain how and why citizens support authoritarian governments. Contingent consent describes quasi-voluntary compliance (behavioral legitimacy), arising from the sense of obligation or willingness to obey authorities (values-based legitimacy) (Levi et al. 2009, 356). In other words, when members of a polity view their leaders and the institutions of that polity as legitimate, they consent to their governments out of a normative obligation to do so. Legitimacy (values-based) here denotes popular approval of governments and their leaders, an assessment that the government has performed reasonably well, and that it meets prevailing standards of procedural fairness in delivering services, regulating behavior, and making extractive demands. The consequent effect of this values-based legitimacy is the increased likelihood of compliance with governmental rules and regulations (behavioral legitimacy), which in turn reduces the transaction costs of governing by reducing reliance on coercion and monitoring (Levi and Sacks 2009). This model of contingent consent also accounts for why individuals support governments, even when their material costs exceed benefits, and in the absence of strong ideological convictions.

Values-based legitimacy for governments are cognitive and include ethical components: they are grounded in evidence that a government is discharging its responsibilities justly and fairly, and when there is a sense that other citizens are cooperating and doing their part (see Figure 10.3). However, an effective government is a necessary but insufficient condition for contingent consent. While the perception of a dependable government may explain why some individuals choose to support their leaders, popular support will be significantly enhanced when fellow citizens engage with each other reciprocally. In other words, if most citizens are ethically non-reciprocal but the government is trustworthy, the likelihood of contingent consent is low.

Government Performance

The willingness to contingently consent to a government is likely to increase among citizens who perceive that the government is upholding its social contract

Figure 10.3 A refined model of contingent consent. Adapted from Levi et al., 2009.

with constituents. Governments that seek to improve the welfare of societies are more likely to elicit the willing deference of citizens than ineffectual governments. Positive perceptions of a government rise when it meets its obligations to provide public goods the population requires to attain a minimal level of social welfare. This includes essential services like drinkable water, roads, post offices, electricity, piped water, and sanitation; others include education or publicly provided health care (Levi and Sacks 2009, 315). Evidence from developing countries have demonstrated that deteriorating or inadequate government performance is linked with low compliance with laws or regulations, the rise of resistance movements, and civil wars (Bernstein and Lü 2003; O'Brien 2002).

There is scholarly consensus that the principal substantive determinant of legitimacy, regardless of regime type, is the effectiveness of a government's provision of public goods. Among the most important of these public goods are state expenditures in realms such as education, public health, security, and other facets that improve the citizens' quality of life (Hechter 2009). In one comparative study based on data from 72 countries, a government's effectiveness in providing welfare was of critical importance in evaluations of legitimacy (Gilley 2009, 57).

Procedural Justice

A government's provision of public goods and welfare are necessary but not sufficient conditions to elicit political support. Quasi-voluntary compliance (behavioral legitimacy) also has ethical elements. Citizens who feel it is right to cooperate with government will only do so if they feel the government is doing its part, meeting its social contract obligations to its constituents but also adhering to meeting prevailing standards of *procedural justice* in its provision of goods and implementation of policies. Individuals are less likely to comply if they feel government is exercising favoritism.

The idea here is that legitimacy also encompasses how governments exercise power. A government that departs from the ideal of impartiality in the implementation of policy will be regarded as illegitimate (Rothstein 2009). Indeed, when citizens doubt the state's commitments to enforce the laws and if its information and guarantees are not credible, then the state's capacity to generate interpersonal trust will diminish (Levi 1998).

Procedural justice describes actions of government leaders and their bureaucratic agents, when citizens perceive that their leaders monitor and enforce regulations in a consistent and equitable manner. If citizens believe tax regulations, court decisions, and other laws are enforced impartially and that non-compliers will be caught and punished, the more likely they will have confidence in the government (Levi et al. 2009, 359). Popular support should rise when citizens judge government as administratively competent to control corruption, and even-handedly enforce laws by punishing those who break them (Cook et al. 2005; Levi 1988, 1997; Rothstein 2005). A competent and relatively law-abiding bureaucracy not only reduces the incentives for corruption and rent-seeking but also increases the

probability of cooperation and compliance. High levels of corruption undermine citizen perceptions of government honesty and, consequently, government competence. Patronage and practices that undermine the meritocratic selection of bureaucratic agents and government leaders may erode citizen confidence, more so if these officeholders are ineffectual (Levi et al. 2009, 358-359). We can assess the extent of leadership honesty through the existence of bureaucratic arrangements that reward competence and honesty by bureaucratic agents (Levi and Sherman 1997).

The destruction of perceptions about procedural fairness in the implementation of public policies, on the other hand, may lead to widespread antagonism toward government policy and even active resistance (Levi 1998). The relationship between people's appraisal of procedural justice and their perceptions of legitimacy are found to be widespread and consistent in legal, political, and managerial settings (Levi 1997; Tyler 1990). Failures of government representatives to uphold policy compacts or to treat potentially trustworthy citizens as trustworthy can also have disastrous effects on the extent to which citizens trust the government and each other (which we describe further below).

Ethical Reciprocity

Legitimate or "virtuous" governments may depend on leaders keeping faith with the citizens who have given them authority to act on the public's behalf (Dunn 1988; Pagden 1988). However, failures of government representatives to uphold policy compacts or treat citizens as trustworthy can have deleterious effects on the extent citizens trust their governments and one another. Individuals are more likely to believe in the legitimacy of a government if they perceive a high incidence of *ethical reciprocity,* or low instances of intra-community evasion. *Ethical reciprocity* describes the norm that citizens cooperate with government demands if others are also doing so.

When citizens perceive an ethical sense of obligation to a group or wider community, they are likely to support a government, even if it is not in their self-interest to do so. Individuals are citizens of a state, but also belong to various communities—families, ethnic groups, regions, and nations. This sense of belonging arises not out of a specific goal or pursuit of interest, but because without them, individuals would find it difficult to make sense of themselves as persons (Hur 2020). Communitarian political theorists have recognized that such memberships instill a sense of obligation to the group's welfare, even in the absence of coercion or incentives. As Michael Sandel argues: "to some I owe more than justice requires or even permits ... in virtue of those more or less enduring attachments and commitments that, taken together, partly define the person that I am" (Sandel 1984, 90).

Communitarian ties could translate into support for a government when the act of compliance or cooperation with the government contributes to one's community. Conversely, when cooperation or compliance with the government is

seen as benefiting the "other", an individual's obligation plays little to no role in motivating a citizen's duty to comply. In fact, when the government is seen as threatening to the welfare of one's community, the particularistic communitarian obligation motivates instead a political duty to resist (Hur 2020).

Contingent consent, therefore, points to an ethical position of fair play combined with a perception of the extent to which others who share that position are cooperating with each other instead of freeriding. Quasi-voluntary compliance is not possible without confidence that other citizens will keep their side of the agreement; once such an assurance in others breaks down, so will contingent consent (Levi 1997, 24–25). Perceived congruence is thus a necessary condition because citizens can then be sure their sacrifices contribute to the welfare of the community they belong to.

Data and Method

We use the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) to illustrate that the existence of an effective, fair government, and the belief that others are also cooperating, lead to contingent consent in Singapore. The ABS dataset contains detailed survey questions on Singaporean attitudes toward politics and economic policies, and perceptions of government performance. We employ ABS data from the second (conducted in 2006), third (conducted in 2010), fourth (conducted in 2014), and fifth (conducted in 2020) waves, each encompassing over 1,000 respondents across Singapore. As there were significant changes to the questionnaire after Wave 2, we conducted a cross-wave comparison using linear regression analysis on the data for Waves 3–5 and present only descriptive statistics for Wave 2.

We predict that citizens' perceptions of government effectiveness will have a positive effect on values-based legitimacy. For procedural justice and ethical reciprocity, however, we expect a more complex relationship since both aspects involve normative judgments of the current political arrangement. As procedural justice examines the degree of fairness in government policies, we expect it to be a necessary but insufficient condition in predicting levels of values-based legitimacy. In turn, ethical reciprocity, or trust in others, is likely to affect how importantly people view procedural justice when evaluating values-based legitimacy. Furthermore, the relationship between social trust and political trust have been found to be different across countries, particularly when effectiveness of political and social institutions is added to the mix (Newton 2001).

We hypothesize two possible directions in which procedural justice and ethical reciprocity interact. The first is a mutually enhancing effect: Citizens who are more trusting of their community also have more positive perceptions of procedural justice, thus resulting in a magnified impact on values-based legitimacy. The second possibility is a dampening effect: Citizens who are more trusting of their community are less likely to care about whether rules are fair because of their inherent belief in the goodness of others, thus rendering procedural justice a less important predictor of values-based legitimacy. We test these hypotheses out using linear regression analyses of the data for Waves 3–5.

Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is *values-based legitimacy* and we computed it by taking the average of scores from questions in the ABS, which probed the extent of citizens' support for the current system of governance and the level of trust in government institutions such as parliament, the civil service, and the police. The possible values for the dependent variable range from 0 to 4, with higher scores indicating greater support for the government and increasing level of trust in state institutions. The full list of questions used in our measurement of values-based legitimacy is presented in Appendix 10.1.

Independent Variables

Government Effectiveness

We measured *government effectiveness* by examining responses to the questions on the current and future economic situation in Singapore. Everyday discussions of *government effectiveness* by both citizens and ruling party alike tend to concentrate on the economy (Our Singapore Conversation 2020). While there were questions on whether people have access to necessities, as well as an evaluation of the government's provision of basic services, there was very little variation in these responses. Over 83 percent of respondents in Waves 2–5 noted they had access to necessities like food, clothes, and shelter, and more than 80 percent said they easily obtained basic services such as roads, medical treatment, and police assistance.[5] The full list of survey questions and the calculation of *government effectiveness* is provided in Appendix 10.2.

Procedural Justice and Ethical Reciprocity

We included three components to compile the aggregate score for *procedural justice*—whether the government followed fair procedures and discharged its responsibilities in a predictable fashion; perception of the extent of corruption in government; and if the government was effectual in combating corruption. To calculate the aggregate score for *procedural justice*, we gave the same weights to the above three components and took the average of the three. Possible values for this indicator ranged between 0 and 4, with higher scores indicating more positive evaluations of procedural justice in the country. We measured *ethical reciprocity* by examining the degree of trust within the community. This indicator had possible values ranging between 0 and 5. The full list of questions and our calculations of *procedural justice* and *ethical reciprocity* are found in Appendices 10.3 and 10.4, respectively.

Results

Table 10.1 presents the mean scores and standard deviations of the main variables. The mean scores for the dependent variable, *values-based legitimacy*, were

Table 10.1 Mean Score and Standard Deviation of Main Variables

ABS Wave (Fieldwork Period)	Values-Based Legitimacy	Government Effectiveness	Procedural Justice	Ethical Reciprocity
	Range = 0–4	Range = 0–5	Range = 0–4	Range = 0–5
3 (Apr–Aug 2010)	2.977 (SD = .425)	3.368~# (SD = .610)	2.926~ (SD = .645)	3.040# (SD = .741)
4 (Oct–Dec 2014)	2.949# (SD = .601)	3.579^# (SD = .666)	2.849^# (SD = .806)	3.049# (SD = .878)
5 (Jul–Sep 2020)	3.007~ (SD = .528)	3.166^~ (SD = .656)	2.931~ (SD = .628)	2.831^~ (SD = .643)

^Statistically different from Wave 3 mean.
~Statistically different from Wave 4 mean.
#Statistically different from Wave 5 mean.

near 3 in all three waves, with a statistically significant increase (at the $p = 0.05$ level) recorded from Wave 4 to Wave 5.

Across the four variables of interest, the largest variation in mean scores occurred for *government effectiveness*—although respondents in Wave 4 rated *government effectiveness* higher than in Wave 3, respondents were less sanguine in Wave 5 (Table 10.1). These differences were all statistically significant.

The mean scores for the independent variable, *procedural justice*, were not statistically different in Waves 3 and 5, but a slight drop was observed in Wave 4 (Table 10.1). The sanguine perception of *procedural justice* was also reflected in the free-response questions. When asked what they felt were the most important problems in the country that the government should address, less than 10 percent of the respondents in each of the four ABS waves were concerned about issues of governance and fairness (see Appendix 10.5). When it came to perceptions of *ethical reciprocity*, or social capital, the mean scores were consistent in the first two waves, but there was a statistically significant drop in Wave 5.

The ABS' questions on political action revealed high levels of citizen acquiescence, signaling support for the government (Table 10.2). The survey showed that just under 20 percent of Singaporean respondents had engaged in peaceful actions like contacting officials or influential people, while 31.6 percent said they had previously signed online petitions (Wave 5). Less than 1 percent said they had participated in actions that involved mass organization or turning up physically for a cause, like attending demonstrations or risking one's safety for a cause.

Responses in the ABS point to positive evaluations of *government effectiveness*. Table 10.3 presents the respondents' perceptions of the accessibility of public services from four waves of the ABS. Based on the high agreement rates across the four waves, Singaporeans viewed the government as competent in fulfilling their basic needs.

Table 10.2 Political Activities Singaporeans Engaged In

I Have Done This At Least Once	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5
Attended a demonstration or protest march	0.9%	1.4%	5.5%	0.7%
Contacted elected officials or legislative representatives at any level	14.3%	8.7%	18.3%	Not asked
Contacted officials at a higher level	Not asked	5.3%	12.4%	Not asked
Contacted traditional leaders/ community leaders	11.5%	5.5%	13.6%	Not asked
Contacted other influential people outside the government	6.0%	3.5%	10.4%	Not asked
Got together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition	1.9%	6.2%	11.3%	Not asked
Contacted news media	Not asked	4.1%	7.5%	Not asked
Got together with others face-to-face to try to resolve local problems	Not asked	7.1%	16.0%	11.8%
Signed a paper petition	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	9.1%
Signed an online petition	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	31.6%
Used the Internet, including social media networks, to express opinions about politics and government	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	14.9%
Joined a group to actively support a cause (including online)	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	17.3%
Taken an action or done something for a political cause that put you in a risk of getting injured	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	0.5%

As there were differences in the questions and responses across the four ABS waves, it was not possible to directly conduct a cross-wave analysis. Therefore, an approximated multi-wave analysis was conducted by comparing the regression results across the latest three waves. The full regression results are presented in Table 10.4.

While Singapore's PAP consistently enjoys high *values-based legitimacy* over time, our regression analyses suggest that the components making up the ruling party's legitimacy, as well as how important those components are, have changed across the different waves of the ABS. In all three waves, *government effectiveness* was a significant predictor of *values-based legitimacy*. The more the respondents felt that the government was effective in delivering their basic needs and performing well economically, the higher they rated the government for its *values-based legitimacy*. This suggests that the quality of governance remains an important component of

Table 10.3 Evaluation of Government Effectiveness

It Is Easy/Very Easy to Obtain This Public Service	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5
Help from police	88.7%	80.4%	87.8%	92.7%
Obtaining an identity document (such as a birth certificate or passport)	84.5%	89.8%	90.8%	Not asked
A place in a public primary school for a child	77.2%	73.4%	79.3%	Not asked
Medical treatment at a nearby clinic	89.8%	84.9%	89.0%	Not asked
Roads in good condition	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	96.1%
Running water	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	98.6%
Public transportation	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	96.9%
Health care	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	93.9%
Access to Internet	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked	97.4%

determining whether people want to continue retaining a particular system and the extent of trust they hold in various state institutions (Table 10.4), providing support for our hypothesis regarding the effect of government effectiveness.

As discrete independent variables, *procedural justice* and *ethical reciprocity* were also significant predictors of values-based legitimacy. The more the respondents felt that there was fair treatment of citizens, low corruption, enforcement of rules and regulations, the more they held positive perceptions of the current system of governance and state institutions. In addition, respondents who were more trusting of others held more positive perceptions of government and state institutions.[6]

Of note in our analyses was the moderating effect of *ethical reciprocity* on the relationship between *procedural justice* and *values-based legitimacy*. We observed these in Waves 3 and 5, while the main effects were observed only in Wave 4.

The graphs illustrate how the effect of *procedural justice* on *values-based legitimacy* changed at different values of *ethical reciprocity* (Figures 10.4 and 10.5). In Waves 3 and 5, *procedural justice* was found to have a stronger effect on *values-based legitimacy* when *ethical reciprocity* was low. This trend was not observed in Wave 4—instead, *procedural justice* and *ethical reciprocity* separately influenced the level of *values-based legitimacy*. In Waves 3 and 5, higher scores of *ethical reciprocity* diminished the effect that *procedural justice* had on evaluations of *values-based legitimacy*. These results provide support for the dampening effect hypothesized above while indicating that there is no mutually enhancing effect.

From 2010 to 2020 (the period the three waves of the ABS were conducted), Singaporeans who held sanguine perceptions of *procedural justice* were positively disposed to the government. The findings in Waves 3 and 5 suggest that citizens

Table 10.4 Linear Regression Models for Wave 3 (*N*= 1000), Wave 4 (*N*= 1039), and Wave 5 (*N* = 1,002)

Dependent Variable: Values-Based Legitimacy

Variables	Model 1		
	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5
Predictor variables			
Government effectiveness	.103***	.145***	.242***
	(.021)	(.026)	(.021)
Procedural justice	.214***	.271***	.387***
	(.019)	(.022)	(.021)
Ethical reciprocity	.122***	.093**	.098**
	(.016)	(.019)	(.021)
Procedural justice × ethical reciprocity	−.086***	.035	−.067*
	(.023)	(.021)	(.029)
Demographic variables			
Gender (females vs. males)	.015	−.016	.055*
	(.024)	(.032)	(.026)
Age	.003*	.003	.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Education			
Technical or secondary education	.045	−.034	.005
	(.036)	(.043)	(.035)
High school or some university education	.081*	−.039	−.052
	(.033)	(.038)	(.032)
Reference group: Bachelor's and above			
R^2	.235	.246	.427

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

who trusted members of the community less discerned that the fairness of laws and institutions and the levels of corruption were more important considerations in their assessment of the government's legitimacy. For those who trusted their community more, while procedural justice remained part of their evaluation criteria, it was not as central in their estimation of the government's legitimacy.

The above pattern we observed in Wave 3 (2010) disappeared in Wave 4 (2014) but reappeared in Wave 5 (2020). This indicates that in Wave 4, there was no statistically significant difference in the importance ascribed to *procedural justice* at all levels of *ethical reciprocity*. We also found that Singaporeans' evaluations of *procedural justice* declined in Wave 4 and then rebounded in Wave 5, while perceptions of *ethical reciprocity* remained similar in Waves 3 and 4 but dropped in Wave 5.

Figure 10.4 Wave 3.

Figure 10.5 Wave 5.

Discussion

Our statistical analysis illustrates that values-based legitimacy is strongly influenced by a government's performance, the perception that the government adheres to fair procedures and discharges its responsibilities impartially, and the extent of social trust in the community. In the case of Singapore, our regression findings indicate that, in each wave, the government's effectiveness to provide materially is a significant predictor of the PAP's legitimacy compared to the state of procedural justice and ethical reciprocity, even without the dampening effect. These findings validate the PAP's singular focus on improving the material well-being and ensuring opportunities for intergenerational upward social mobility for

Singaporeans. This is indicative of a "performance social contract" (Chua 2017, 51–53; Ho 2019, 240–242), on which the PAP's political legitimacy rests. The ruling party's success in delivering material benefits is presented as evidence of having discharged the "trust" of the electorate to govern (Khong 1995).

The variation in mean scores of values-based legitimacy across waves does not directly correspond to fluctuations in Singapore's electoral results. Even though the PAP did much better in the 2015 General Elections (conducted after Wave 4) compared to the 2020 General Elections (conducted just before Wave 5), the mean score of values-based legitimacy in Wave 5 was higher than in Wave 4, indicating that absolute electoral results are not analogous to legitimacy, which is the right to rule.

In Singapore's electoral system, although individual battles occur in constituencies across the island, governments are formed based on the overall numbers each political party sends to parliament. Constituencies in Singapore are also uneven in size—some are single-member districts while others are Group Representative Constituencies (GRC), which can send up to five politicians from the same party into parliament.[7] In 2020, the PAP won 61.2 percent of the overall vote share but occupied 89.2 percent of the parliamentary seats. Even though the PAP's overall vote share declined in 2020 compared to 2015, based on its parliamentary presence, the party obtained an unequivocal mandate to form the government.

The moderating effect of *ethical reciprocity* on the relationship between *procedural justice* and *values-based legitimacy* suggests that higher levels of social trust render perceptions that the government is treating its citizens fairly, less important. People who are more trusting of members in their community are less critical about the laws and institutions and the extent to which these are fairly applied. Societies with higher social trust have been found to have greater social capital and political confidence, the latter term referring to confidence in parliament (Newton 2001). Furthermore, people who are doing well in the society they live in are more likely to have higher social trust compared to those who are not doing as well (Delhey and Newton 2003; Putnam 2000). This finding also corresponds with some of the respondents of Teo (2019), who recognize areas for improvement, especially for minority groups, but do not feel any urgency for change because they are in a better situation personally. Hence, a more positive perception of the world can extend to trust in society, the government, and its institutions. The greater political confidence also suggests that less attention is probably paid to whether laws are fair or fairly implemented across different social groups.

Jackman and Miller (1998, 54) suggest that social capital, or trust, might be endogenous to the situation rather than "evidence of durable social norms absorbed by individuals". They explain an individual's decision of participating in trustworthy organizations as the result of cost-benefit analyses. Using Coleman's (1990) example of parent–teacher associations (PTAs) in schools as a public good to produce high disciplinary standards, they explain that social capital can be a "public-good by-product of organizations" (Jackman and Miller 1998, 55). If this PTA continues to produce good results, it gains a reputation of being trustworthy, thus providing "a feedback mechanism that enhances trust"

(Jackman and Miller 1998, 55). When parents expect that joining this PTA will provide them with certain benefits, they do so. In this respect, the focus is placed on trusting that the organization will continue to produce results, instead of whether the rules are fair.

Jackman and Miller argue that individuals join organizations that benefit themselves, and "social capital is generated by their ensuing membership" (Jackman and Miler 1998, 55). Given the PAP's brand is built upon its delivery of efficient governance, and citizens do believe in this brand, it is likely that a similar mechanism is at work. It does not mean that procedural fairness is not a priority, but rather that the social capital resulting from a trustworthy system likely reduces the need for people to scrutinize existing rules and assess its degree of impartiality.

The statistical findings that indicate a dampening effect of ethical reciprocity in Waves 3 and 5 (which reported lower mean scores for *government effectiveness*) also fit into the rational choice perspective of endogenous social capital. North (1990) suggests that both formal and informal institutions contain socially transmitted information. When there are high transaction costs, actors will rely on more informal institutions in their exchanges to enforce agreements and prevent reneging (North 1990, 68). As such, when there is reduced *government effectiveness*, there might be a greater reliance on social capital to ensure one obtains the required results from government officials rather than depending on procedural fairness.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to explain why Singapore citizens acquiesce to PAP rule, reflecting satisfaction with the political status quo. We argue that consent to PAP rule arises from high levels of behavioral legitimacy. Behavioral legitimacy, a form of contingent consent, develops from values-based legitimacy, in which the citizens cultivate a sense of obligation to obey its leaders. Values-based legitimacy arises from *government effectiveness* as well as perceptions of *procedural justice* and *ethical reciprocity*. The more a government is effective, the more legitimacy that government is likely to attain, the more likely it can elicit compliance from its citizens without excessive monitoring or coercion. In addition, when governments exercise their authority through procedures that its citizens perceive as fair, and when citizens equally uphold and comply with laws or regulations, consent to ruling authorities is more likely. We tested these claims empirically, using data from three waves of the Asian Barometer Survey.

Our findings also demonstrate that government effectiveness is not the magic key to citizen compliance, given that the other two independent variables were also significant predictors of values-based legitimacy. While performance legitimacy touted by the PAP and scholars of Singapore politics does indeed help to improve Singaporean perceptions of the regime, it is not the only factor in retaining regime support (Chua 1995; Huff, 1994; Khong 1995; Wong and Huang 2010). As indicated in our analyses, procedural justice and ethical reciprocity are as also important, albeit in less straightforward ways in Waves 3 and 5.

Appendix 10.1

Components of Dependent Variable—Values-Based Legitimacy

ABS Questions		Included in Wave 3?	Included in Wave 4?	Included in Wave 5?
Preference for current system	Over the long run, our system of government is capable of solving the problems our country faces	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4
	Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of government	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4
	A system like ours, even if it runs into problems, deserves the people's support	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4
	I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4
Trust for different government institutions	Prime Minister	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 6
	Courts	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 6
	National government	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 6
	Parliament	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 6
	Civil service	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 6
	Military	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 6
	Police	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 6
Overall points		4	4	4

(Continued)

ABS Questions	Included in Wave 3?	Included in Wave 4?	Included in Wave 5?
Cronbach's Alpha (measure of internal consistency, i.e., inter-item correlation)*	.829	.892	.898

Calculation of dependent variable scores

Waves 3 and 4: Values-based legitimacy = Mean (Preference for current system/4 + Trust for govt institutions/7) = 4

Wave 5: Values-based legitimacy = Mean (Preference for current system/4 + Trust for govt institutions/10.5) = 4

*While the Cronbach's Alpha for some of the composite variables are lower than 0.6 in some waves, the same components were still used so that there is consistency in the measurement across waves.

Appendix 10.2

Components of Independent Variable (1)—Government Effectiveness

Aspect Measured	ABS Questions	Included in Wave 3?	Included in Wave 4?	Included in Wave 5?
Evaluation of economic condition until the present	How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the last few years? Is it …	Yes. Maximum points: 5	Yes. Maximum points: 5	Yes. Maximum points: 5
Future economic performance	What do you think will be the state of our country's economic condition a few years from now? Will it be …	Yes. Maximum points: 5	Yes. Maximum points: 5	Yes. Maximum points: 5
Comparison of personal situation with the past	How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was a few years ago? Is it …	Yes. Maximum points: 5	Yes. Maximum points: 5	Yes. Maximum points: 5
Evaluation of current economic condition	How would you describe the overall economic conditions of our country today? Is it …	Yes. Maximum points: 5	Yes. Maximum points: 5	Yes. Maximum points: 5
Evaluation of current personal economic condition	As for your own family, how do your rate the economic situation of your family today? Is it …	Yes. Maximum points: 5	Yes. Maximum points: 5	Yes. Maximum points: 5
Prediction of future personal economic situation	What do you think the economic situation of your family will be a few years from now? Will it be …	Yes. Maximum points: 5	Yes. Maximum points: 5	Yes. Maximum points: 5
Overall points		5	5	5

(*Continued*)

(Continued)

Aspect Measured	ABS Questions	Included in Wave 3?	Included in Wave 4?	Included in Wave 5?
Overall Cronbach's Alpha (measure of internal consistency, i.e., inter-item correlation)*		.653	.800	.696
Calculation of government effectiveness scores				
Waves 3–5: Government effectiveness = Mean (Economic performance) = 5				

*While the Cronbach's Alpha for some of the composite variables are lower than 0.6 in some waves, the same components were still used so that there is consistency in the measurement across waves.

Appendix 10.3

Components of Independent Variable (2) Procedural Justice

Aspect Measured	ABS Questions	Included in Wave 3?	Included in Wave 4?	Included in Wave 5?
Fair treatment of citizens	All citizens from different ethnic communities in Singapore are treated equally by the government	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4
	Rich and poor people are treated equally by the government	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4
Combating corruption	How effective is the government in cracking down on corruption?			Yes. Maximum points: 4
	In your opinion, is the government working to crack down on corruption and root out bribery?	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	
Enforcement of laws and regulations	How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government in Singapore? Would you say…?	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4
	To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping the government in check?	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4
Overall points		4	4	4
Cronbach's Alpha (measure of internal consistency, i.e., inter-item correlation)*		.583	.741	.722

Calculation of procedural justice scores

Waves 3–5: Procedural justice = Mean (Fair treatment of citizens/2 + Combating corruption + Enforcement of laws and regulations/2) = 4

*While the Cronbach's Alpha for some of the composite variables are lower than 0.6 in some waves, the same components were still used so that there is consistency in the measurement across waves.

Appendix 10.4

Components of Independent Variable (3)—Ethical Reciprocity

Aspect Measured	*ABS Questions*	*Included in Wave 3?*	*Included in Wave 4?*	*Included in Wave 5?*
Generalized trust	Generally speaking, would you say that "Most people can be trusted" or "that you must be very careful in dealing with people"?	Yes. Maximum points: 1	Yes. Maximum points: 1	Yes. Maximum points: 1
	Generally speaking, would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement that "most people are trustworthy"?	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4
Specific trust	Trust your relatives	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 6
	Trust your neighbors	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 6
	Trust other people you interact with	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 4	Yes. Maximum points: 6
Overall points		5	5	5
Overall Cronbach's Alpha (measure of internal consistency, i.e., inter-item correlation)*		.711	.759	.685

Calculation of procedural justice and ethical reciprocity scores
Waves 3 and 4: Mean [Generalized trust + (Specific trust/12)*5] = 5
Wave 5: Mean [Generalized trust + (Specific trust/18)*5] = 5

*While the Cronbach's Alpha for some of the composite variables are lower than 0.6 in some waves, the same components were still used so that there is consistency in the measurement across waves.

Appendix 10.5

ABS Free Range Questions

In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?

Free-response question, but answers are coded according to the table below. Highlighted in grey are the categories that were included in the calculation of the percentage.

Economics
Management of the economy
Wages, incomes, and salaries
Unemployment
Poverty/destitution
Rates and Taxes
Loans/credit
Food/Agriculture
Farming/agriculture
Food shortage/famine
Drought
Land
Infrastructure
Transportation
Communications
Infrastructure/roads
Government services
Education
Housing
Electricity
Water supply
Orphans/street children/homeless children
Services (other)
Health
Health
AIDS
Sickness/disease
Governance
Crime and security
Corruption
Political violence
Political instability/political divisions/ethnic tensions
Discrimination/inequality
Gender issues/women's rights
Democracy/political rights
War (international)
Civil war
Nothing/no problems
Can't choose
Other, Specify_____

Notes

1 Terence Lee is Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore.
2 Kay Key Teo is Research Fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore.
3 The discussion here draws amply from Levi (1997, 17—21).
4 In the words of Beetham: "Legitimacy requires the demonstration of a common interest which unites, as well as a principle of differentiation which divides, dominant and subordinate" (Beetham 1991, 59).
5 The agreement rates for each wave are as follows: 83.2 percent (Wave 2), 89.5 percent (Wave 3), 85.8 percent (Wave 4), and 85.7 percent (Wave 5).
6 In Wave 5, female respondents had a slightly more positive view about the current system of government compared to males.
7 The sizes of the GRCs were slightly modified for the 2020 general elections. In 2015 and earlier, the largest GRCs consisted of six-member teams.

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11 Taiwan's Democracy at Multiple Crossings

Clashes of Partisanship, Generations, Classes, and Social Values

Min-Hua Huang

Introduction

Taiwan's democracy since the mid-1990s has long been praised as a living example of how liberal democracy could emerge and consolidate in a Chinese society (Fell 2010).[1] However, a startling resemblance between the storming of the US Congress by supporters of Donald Trump and the protesters' occupation of Taiwan's legislative and executive agencies during the Sunflower Movement brings back the memory of how bumpy the voyage Taiwan's democracy has just gone through, with the aftereffects still being felt (Ho 2015). As a matter of fact, the many syndromes troubling American democracy nowadays also have been haunting Taiwan's democracy for the past two decades. It started with excessive partisan competition (Huang 2011), extended to intense political polarization (Chu et al. 2016), then coalesced with intractable problems such as social injustice, generational inequality, class opposition, and value conflict (Chu and Chang 2020), which finally developed into widespread distrust of political institutions and the democratic system (Weatherall et al. 2018). While periodic democratic elections might partially relieve these troubling syndromes as the mandate of the governing authority was renewed, those intractable problems remain salient and could heat up rapidly if the circumstance fits well. Despite the complexity, most people encapsulate these problems by viewing them as a sign of underachievement that the incumbent government is supposedly responsible for. Therefore, the topic of the quality of governance becomes a focal point in academic discussion (Chang et al. 2011), and attention is usually directed to who should be held accountable and how convincingly a party or a candidate can resolve these governance problems.

Similarly, citizens have been concerned about the quality of governance for a long period of time; one of the salient topics is stagnant economic growth and salary levels (Lu 2018).[2] But there are a myriad of issues frustrating or dividing the public as well, e.g., income inequality, youth unemployment/underemployment, educational reform, pension bankruptcy crisis, anti-infiltration and countering Chinese influence, and same-sex marriage legalization (Fell 2020). Each of them, depending on the circumstance, could serve as a powerful tool for political mobilization, aiming to win political support from the targeted group along the

main social cleavages. Hence, as electoral competition is becoming more intense, there is less and less room for impartial discussion because parties and candidates are likely to engage in the blame game through a partisan lens (Huang and Whang 2012). That explains why popular evaluation of governance quality is usually more susceptible to subjective perception instead of objective performance, and this phenomenon would become even more severe when political polarization runs high (Park 2017). Previous studies have shown that polarized politics has been a distinguishing feature of Taiwan's democracy since 2001 when political struggle went viral between the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green camp (Huang and Whang 2012).[3]

The long-term impact of partisan mobilization is to entrench political bias when people perceive, process, and evaluate the quality of governance. In addition, some groups aligned along the partisan line might gradually turn into the stronghold of certain political party, and that seemingly diversifies the supporter base and obscures partisan prejudice. But even so, if citizens feel extremely dissatisfied with the issue they are concerned most about for a long period of time, political distrust is likely to develop toward the political establishment, regardless of their original partisan orientation (Barr 2009; Bartlett et al. 2011). In such situation, the anti-establishment sentiment could quickly rise and engender a great opportunity for populism to rise. That usually reflects on the extremely low approval rate of the governing political elites, and signals the coming of a political storm where a dramatic change of political leadership happens and the establishment faces a great setback (Kyle and Gultchin 2018). In Taiwan, such a defining moment lasted five years from 2014 to 2019: It started when nonpartisan opinion leader Ko Wen-je's joined the Taipei mayoral race after the Sunflower Movement and ended at grassroots retired politician Han Kuo-yu's announcement of running the 2020 presidential election representing KMT.[4] The emergence of populist leaders like Ko and Han shows the importance of charismatic outsiders in triggering an anti-establishment movement, despite the fact that the underlying conditions might have already sufficed long before 2014 (Templeman 2019).

In this chapter, the author aims to explain how the rise of anti-establishment and populism in recent Taiwan politics was associated with the clash of multiple social forces, which in turn associated with quality of governance in general, but mainly encompassing the key social cleavages of partisanship, generations, economic classes, and social values. Through analysis of five waves of public opinion data across nearly two decades, we can tease out the relative impact of each factor over time and find out the evolving pattern underneath the complex social development. The result shows that partisanship is the most powerful factor that consistently sways and drives the assessment of governance quality and affect the trustful level toward the establishment leadership, especially among the youth generation. The political turmoil of the Sunflower Movement and the following dominance of the Pan-Green electoral victory reflect the composite result of two chronic trends that converged in the second term of Ma Ying-jeou presidency: The substantiation of the Pan-Blue internal political split[5] and the capitalization

of the Pan-Green successful youth recruitment. Both trends are still ongoing and leading the foreseeable political trajectory through incremental generational replacement and persistent youth indoctrination that favors Pan-Green political domination.

Quality of Governance and the Anti-establishment Sentiment

While various issues in the quality of governance are often identified as the main challenges of Taiwan's democracy, we can hardly make the case from objective measures from international organizations. For instance, by plotting the long-term trend of the quality of governance with the World Bank "Worldwide Governance Indicators" (WGI) (Kaufmann et al 2007), Taiwan has clearly exhibited its strong performance consistently over the last 25 years (as shown in Figure 11.1), with all six WGI scores ranking around or above 70th percentile in the world. Fluctuation did exist in certain periods, particularly in the category of political stability, which usually ranks the least among all. But that reflects the nature of the problem is more related to excessive political competition instead of other more substantive problems such as government effectiveness, regulative quality, control of corruption, and rule of law (Chu et al. 2016). In fact, those four WGI scores all pass the 80th-percentile mark, and government effectiveness and regulative quality even rank above the 90th. With that high quality of performance, it is nitpicking to blame the many problems troubling Taiwan's democracy on the actual quality of governance.

Does that mean those who concern about the quality of governance and its impact to democracy are hypochondriac? Other indicators show a different story. If we examine the indicator that taps into the trust of political establishment in

Figure 11.1 World governance indicators for Taiwan (rank percentile, 1996–2019). *Source:* The World Bank, https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/worldwide -governance-indicators.

general in the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) (Chu et al. 2016) with the question "you can generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right", as Figure 11.2 makes evident, the distrust percentage steadily hovers around 75 percent after 2000, clearly revealing the great disappointment over the long-term political leadership across partisan lines and signaling a strong orientation of anti-establishment sentiment with rising populist political stars and discourses in recent elections.

The Sunflower Movement was another defining moment that manifested the issue of youth poverty and generational justice (Rowen 2015).[6] During the 23-day occupation period, protesters claimed full legitimacy in stopping the legislation for the cross-strait service trade agreement (CSSTA) (Fan 2014), which they claimed was procedural injustice because of the "thirty-second" expedite legislation. However, those leaders who later became lawmakers, e.g., Kuo-Chang Huang, did not reject the same expedite injustice procedure ("one-minute legislation") in passing the Labor Standards Act under DPP's legislative control in October 2016 (Liu 2017). This shows the issue that genuinely mattered was not anything procedural but policy content for the youth generation. What CSSTA represented, though beneficial to the overall economy, might lead to enlarging economic inequality within Taiwan and irreversible political integration with China, both contradictory to the majority youth opinion (Wu 2019). Through the lens of such issues, the overall quality of governance in objective sense is not really the focal point, but rather it is the selective issue that flares up political agency and social momentum behind influential events that change Taiwan's political dynamics. Problems associating with the youth generation thus becomes the political spotlight. For instance, the youth population is the most vulnerable to the enlarging income inequality because they are underprivileged from the moment they walk out of the campus and start their career (Sohn 2019). Based on the World Inequality Dataset as illustrated in Figure 11.3, the trend of enlarging income inequality continues non-stop in Taiwan since 1980, and the youth population are among the worst affected groups.

Figure 11.2 Distrust those who run our government (percentage, 2001–2018). *Source:* Asian Barometer Survey, http://www.asianbarometer.org/.

Figure 11.3 Enlarging income inequality (percentage, 1977–2019). *Source:* World Inequality Dataset, https://wid.world/.

Figure 11.4 Youth unemployment rate in Taiwan (1978–2019). *Source:* National Statistics, R.O.C. (Taiwan), https://eng.stat.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=5.

Youth unemployment rate is an informative measure that shows the youth vulnerability in comparison with other age cohorts. As shown in Figure 11.4, applying the official statistics provided by the Taiwanese government, from National Statistics, R.O.C. (Taiwan), we can easily find the youth unemployment rate (defining youth within the age range 15–39 years and adults 40–64 years), while seemingly not really that bad with all below 10 percent, but it is mostly triple and sometimes even close to fourfold compared to the adult population. Such vulnerable status could easily arouse a sense of relative deprivation and provoke anger and frustration toward those who have long been active in politics and viewed as the political establishment in a collective sense.

If we apply the age of below 40 in 2014 to distinguish the youth population, we can compare the level of trust toward the establishment with the original 4-point Likert score (from the least 1 to the highest 4). As shown in Figure 11.5, while

Figure 11.5 Trust of political establishment by Sunflower generation vs. others. *Source:* Asian Barometer Survey, http://www.asianbarometer.org/.

overall the trust level is low for both the youth and adult generations, the youth did have lower trust in particular, especially during the second-term presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, matching with the timing of the Sunflower Movement. This explicates the close relationship between major political movement and surging youth engagement in Taiwan over the past decade.

All discussions in previous two sections have illuminated the intertwined nature of the factors associated with perceived quality of governance, including partisan mobilization, generational justice, economic inequality, and value conflict. While these factors are mainly domestic focused, they were usually closely linked to the cross-strait or foreign policy, such as the public concern over the democratic movement in Hong Kong since the early 2010s (Chung 2020) or the fear of Taiwan's economy overdependence on China (Huang and Chu 2015), and largely aligned with the Pan-Blue/Pan-Green partisanship well. Due to the scope of the analysis mainly confined to unravel the impact of each intertwined factor, the author does not specifically consider issues of the cross-strait or foreign policy, and assumes that the partisanship factor can duly encapsulate their impact over the time span under analysis.

Measuring Perceived Quality of Governance

The earlier discussion has shown that the relevance of quality of governance is more subjectively defined and what public perception reflects is the overall feeling toward the government instead of precise evaluation on actual performance. In view of this character and data availability, the author applies Schmidt's (2013) three-dimensional framework, comprising "input", "throughput", and "output" dimensions to measure quality of democratic governance.

The author applies the five waves of the Asian Barometer Taiwan Survey (specifically in 2001, 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2018), in which some key questions were administered consistently since wave 2 tapping into these three dimensions, respectively, as below:

Input Dimension:

- How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates? (unavailable at wave 1)
- How much do you feel that having elections makes the government caring more about people's thoughts? (unavailable at wave 2)

Throughput Dimension:

- How often do government officials withhold important information from the public? (available since wave 2)
- How often do you think government leaders break the law or abuse their power? (available since wave 2)

Output Dimension:

- How well do you think the government responds to what people want? (available since wave 2)
- As compared to my parent's generation, my generation has more or fewer opportunities to improve one's standard of living or social status? (available since wave 4)

The input dimension captures the regime legitimacy from efficacy of democratic participation that reflects governance quality. The throughput dimension, on the other hand, shows how people think of the government in terms of transparency and rule of law. The output dimension signifies how responsive people think of the government broadly, and the author specifically includes an additional item to tap into the feeling of changing economic opportunity by generational comparison. Except the throughput dimension, all the questions are phrased in the positive direction. For the analysis, all the items are recoded in a standardized fashion to show the least positive to most positive rating from 1 to 4. Notice that the item availability varies by wave of the ABS survey, and therefore, all of the analyses in this chapter are cross-sectional in nature but the results are conceptually comparable under the same framework.

Comparing to the "New Democracy" indicators proposed in the Introduction chapter, the measurement items in the "input" dimension capture voters' internal and external efficacy about their democratic system, which tap into the "effectiveness" component. For the "throughput" dimension, apparently the two indicators are about the component of "procedural quality" of democracy, because they measure popular assessment of government transparency and law-abidingness. Measures of perceived responsiveness and generational inequality in the "output" dimension reflect the popular assessment on the result of their democratic system, and that directly corresponds to the "performance" component of the "New Democracy" framework.

Research Design

The dependent variable is level of trust toward political establishment with a 4-point Likert scale, as shown in Figure 11.5. Given the importance of perceived quality of governance, the author assumes a structural equation model where perceived quality of governance plays a major role to encapsulate the impact of key factors and intermediate to influence the level of anti-establishment sentiment. As mentioned, political polarization driven by excessive partisan competition is long identified as the source of problem since Chen Shui-ban's first-term presidency. But the issue of economic inequality, as well as generational justice, and the related value cleavages associated with the youth generation versus others are included and specified as the main explanatory factors simultaneously influence the anti-establishment sentiment directly by themselves per se or intermediately by the causal path via perceived quality of governance, as Figure 11.6 illustrates.

As shown in Figure 11.6, the author specifies both direct and intermediary causal paths for four major explanatory variables in a structural equation model (SEM)—partisanship (winning camp the reference group), generation (Sunflower generation the reference group), economic class (measured by income level), and liberal values (composite scores, operationalized and formed with a battery of anti-authoritarian measures).[7] For perceived quality of governance (QOG), the author applies a three-dimensional measurement model as discussed above, except for the wave-1 model where only one indicator in the "Input" dimension (or the effectiveness component of the "New Democracy" framework) is available. For the two dependent variables in Figure 11.6 (QOG and Trust of Political Establishment), five demographic variables are added to control, including male, education, urban residence, economic satisfaction, and political interest. The SEM model is estimated with Mplus8, and for sake of concise presentation, the author only reports the results for the path effects specified in Figure 11.6 and omits those associated with the controls. Information of variable formation is summarized in Table 11.1.

Regarding the hypotheses of the causal paths, the focus is on those factors associated with quality of governance and anti-establishment sentiment, and therefore

Figure 11.6 Testing the intermediary effect with a structural equation model.

Table 11.1 Summary of Variable Formation and Related Information

Variable	Questionnaire	Range
Input dimension (measuring perceived quality of governance)	Mean score of the following two questions: • How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates? (4-point Likert scale) • How much do you feel that having elections makes the government caring more about people's thoughts? (4-point Likert scale)	(1–4)
Throughput dimension (measuring perceived quality of governance)	Mean score of the following two questions: • How often do government officials withhold important information from the public? (4-point Likert scale, reversed coding) • How often do you think government leaders break the law or abuse their power? (4-point Likert scale, reversed coding)	(1–4)
Output dimension (measuring perceived quality of governance)	Mean score of the following two questions: • How well do you think the government responds to what people want? (4-point Likert scale) • As compared to my parent's generation, my generation has more or fewer opportunities to improve one's standard of living or social status? (4-point Likert scale)	(1–4)
Sunflower generation	• Wave 1 (age 20–26) in 2001 • Wave 2 (age 20–31) in 2006 • Wave 3 (age 20–35) in 2010 • Wave 4 (age 20–39) in 2014 • Wave 5 (age 20–43) in 2018	(0–1)
Income	Quintile rank of income	(1–5)
Liberal (anti-authoritarian)	Mean scores of the following seven questions: (level of agreement) • Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions. (4-point Likert scale, reversed coding) • Government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society. (4-point Likert scale, reversed coding) • Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups. (4-point Likert scale, reversed coding) • When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch. (4-point Likert scale, reversed coding) • The government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things. (4-point Likert scale, reversed coding) • If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything. (4-point Likert scale, reversed coding) • If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic. (4-point Likert scale, reversed coding)	(1–4)

(*Continued*)

Table 11.1 Continued

Variable	Questionnaire	Range
Winning camp	• Vote for the winning candidate in the last presidential election (1); vote for the losing one (×1), and neutral, including non-response (0)	(−1–1)
Male	• Male (1), female (0)	(0–1)
Education	• Elementary and less (1), Junior high school (2), Senior high school (3), Vocational (4), College and above (5)	(1–5)
Urban residence	• Urban (1), rural (0)	(0–1)
Economic satisfaction	• Does the total income of your household allow you to cover your needs? (3-point Likert scale)	(1–3)
Political interest	• How interested would you say you are in politics? (4-point Likert scale)	(1–4)

the author specifies each hypothesis as follows, starting with the perceived quality of governance.

Hypothesis 1a: People of the Sunflower generation rate the quality of governance more negatively.

Hypothesis 1b: Those who have higher income rate the quality of governance more positively.

Hypothesis 1c: Those who are more liberal rate the quality of governance more negatively.

Hypothesis 1d: Those who support the ruling party rate the quality of governance more positively.

As to the trust level of political establishment, the hypotheses are specified below:

Hypothesis 2a: People of the Sunflower generation trust less toward political establishment.

Hypothesis 2b: Those who have higher income trust more toward political establishment.

Hypothesis 2c: Those who are more liberal trust less toward political establishment.

Hypothesis 2d: Those who support the ruling party trust more toward political establishment.

Hypothesis 2e: Those who rate the quality of governance more positively trust more toward political establishment.

If we summarize the above causal paths, Sunflower generation and liberal values are negatively related to the trust of political establishment directly or intermediary, and income and partisanship (voting for the winning camp) are positively related to the trust of political establishment. In the following statistical analysis, all the data has been taken from the Asian Barometer Taiwan Survey. Detailed

information about questionnaire design, sample method, field operation, and project history is available on the official ABS website.[8] Notice all the surveys are national probabilistic in cross-sectional fashion, and there is some replacement and change in the inclusion of survey batteries and specific instruments.

Statistical Findings

The result of the SEM analysis is presented in Table 11.2. As can been seen, the overall fit of the SEM models for five waves is all good, with CFI and TLI around 0.9 and RMSEA below 0.05.[9] Specifically, the output dimension carries more weights in shaping the perceived quality of governance, followed by the process dimension and the input dimension in order. Notice that the importance of the process dimension is declining over time, while the input dimension becomes

Table 11.2 Comparison of Explanatory Power for the Four Perspectives

Survey Time (Ruling Party)	2001 (Pan-Green)	2006 (Pan-Green)	2010 (Pan-Blue)	2014 (Pan-Blue)	2018 (Pan-Green)
Loading of QOG					
Input	Default	.38(.03)**	.32(.03)**	.40(.03)**	.45(.03)**
Process	–	.68(.02)**	.59(.03)**	.54(.03)**	.50(.03)**
Output	–	.68(.02)**	.71(.02)**	.68(.03)**	.74(.03)**
Effects on QOG					
Sunflower generation	.00(.03)	−.07(.04)*	−.11(.04)**	−.23(.04)**	−.23(.04)**
Income	.01(.04)	−.05(.04)	−.10(.04)*	.02(.04)	−.04(.05)
Liberal (anti-authoritarian)	−.08(.03)**	−.16(.03)**	−.20(.03)**	−.20(.03)**	−.13(.04)**
Winning camp	.05(.03)	.29(.03)**	.37(.03)**	.29(.03)**	.23(.04)**
Effects on trust of establishment					
QOG	.16(.03)**	.49(.03)**	.49(.03)**	.47(.04)**	.43(.04)**
Sunflower generation	.03(.03)	−.02(.03)	−.02(.03)	.06(.04)	.11(.04)**
Income	.00(.04)	−.05(.03)	−.05(.03)	−.06(.04)	−.04(.04)
Liberal (anti-authoritarian)	−.25(.03)**	−.31(.03)**	−.31(.03)**	−.32(.03)**	−.33(.03)**
Winning camp	.06(.03)*	.01(.03)	−.01(.03)	−.07(.03)*	.13(.03)**
R-squared					
QOG	.021	.185	.254	.273	.212
Trust of establishment	.171	.424	.353	.373	.379
Fit statistics					
CFI	–	.96	.92	.93	.95
TLI	–	.92	.82	.86	.88
RMSEA	–	.04	.05	.04	.04
Sample size (*N*)	1237	1396	1426	1453	1043

Note: Entries are standardized coefficients and standardized errors. Five demographic variables, including male, education, urban residence, economic satisfaction, and political interest, are added as control variables, but the result of those regression coefficients is neglected for the sake of presentation. Level of significance: *$p \leqq 0.05$, **$p \leqq 0.01$, estimated by Mplus 8.
Source: Asian Barometer Survey (2001–2020).

more important in the recent two waves. This contrasts the major claim made during the Sunflower Movement that Taiwan's democracy suffers the most urgent crisis in procedural injustice. In fact, from public opinion point of view, procedural issues are more like an easy excuse for legitimizing violent protest and can be selectively ignored once political interest fits.

With regard to the perceived quality of governance, the Sunflower generation does show significantly more negative rating compared to other generations, and the magnitude becomes larger in the last two waves for greater standardized coefficients. The exception appears in the result of the wave 1, and this might reflect the fact that the only available indicator of QOG is the input dimension or only a fraction of the Sunflower generation was eligible in the wave-1 survey (21–27 years old). Both reasons could obscure the relationship that is supposed to be found, but it is also likely that this generation hadn't developed critical orientation toward the ruling government by then according to backward inference. This finding lends strong support to Hypothesis 1a. For economic class, only the result in wave 3 shows higher income respondents show more negative rating of perceived quality of governance, but that doesn't support Hypothesis 1b. Overall, Hypothesis 1b is not supported.

Liberal attitudes show consistent and negative association with perceived quality of governance with a more stable variation. But considering the magnitude of standardized coefficients,[10] the impact of liberal attitudes is relatively smaller compared to that of partisanship (voting for the winning camp), despite its unanimous corroboration on Hypothesis 1c for all waves. The result of the partisan effect signifies very strong supportive evidence for the explanation of political polarization, by which all perceptions based on subjective rating are very likely colored by partisanship and therefore bias upward toward who they support and downward to those who they don't support politically. This effect is fairly strong and the magnitude of the regression coefficients is at par with the that of the Sunflower generation, despite the difference of the evolving trends: The generational effect keeps ascending over time, while the partisan effect peaks on 2010 and declines afterward. Therefore, Hypothesis 1d is generally supported, with the same exceptional result in wave 1, but that could be subject to other data or methodological problems as discussed earlier.

When it comes down to explanation of the trust level toward political establishment, only perceived quality of governance and liberal values exhibit strong and consistent impact, in an intermediary and direct fashion, respectively. Regarding the perceived quality of governance, the positive relationship stays significantly in all five waves with the strongest effect since wave 2. This indicates that perceived quality of governance did serve as a powerful encompassing concept with which people encapsulated all kinds of favorable or unfavorable factors and attributed to shaping an overall feeling on whether the political establishment can be trusted. Hence, Hypothesis 2e is strongly supported. Another factor that shows strong and consistent results is liberal values, by which its direct impact manifests in the decrease of trust toward political establishment in all five waves. The magnitude of the impact is also stable, and in fact the direct effect much stronger than the intermediary effect through the perceived quality of governance. This finding lends support to Hypothesis 2c, suggesting that liberal values alone can explain

its influence on the distrust of political establishment without intermediary effect through other attribution paths.

For the other three predictors, their direct effects are either non-significant or sporadic at best. Income shows no significant results in all waves, and that is consistent with what we found about its non-finding in the intermediary effect through perceived quality of governance. Hypothesis 2b is clearly not supported. The Sunflower generation, though showing no direct effect in the former four waves, is found positively associated with more trust toward political establishment in the latest survey. This signals that partisanship-laden preference has already penetrated the youth cohort and its impact does not have to be intermediated through other causes but can simply manifest in its Pan-Green political predilection. Such a finding not only shows non-supportive evidence for Hypothesis 2a, but even reveals the possibility that the generation factor could be overshadowed and reified into another form of partisan struggle. The last is about the direct effect of partisanship. Although we found three significant findings associated with the effect of partisanship alone on the trust of political establishment, only the two findings in the first and fifth waves corroborated with Hypothesis 2d. Except for the non-significant results in 2006 and 2010, we even found an unexpected finding that show Pan-Blue supporters (winning camp) were more negative toward the political establishment in 2014 in Pan-Blue Present Ma's second term. What this indicates is that the Pan-Blue incumbent government did not even have their support's endorsement during the Sunflower Movement, and more sympathy not only went to those youth activists but also to the KMT local faction, which has long been split from the pro-China KMT mainstream led by President Ma.

Discussion

We need to assess the relative magnitude of the intermediary effect versus other direct effects to reach an understanding of the substantive importance of different causal paths. As Table 11.3 makes evident, we can evaluate each path effect, direct or intermediary through QOG, to summarize the feature of how each factor impacts on the trust of political establishment. As can be seen, the direct effect of liberal values is way much more than its intermediary effect through perceived quality of governance. However, the effects of the generation and partisanship are indeed intermediated through perceived quality of governance, especially since wave 2 in 2006. As discussed earlier, the positive direct effect that shows the Sunflower generation trusting the political establishment much more than other age cohorts is very strong ($r = 0.11$). This signals a general trend that the youth generation has developed strong partisan attachment leaning toward the Pan-Green partisanship and that effect is even strong enough to offset the critical orientation to assess quality of governance unfavorably ($r = -0.10$). On the other hand, the partisanship support of the Pan-Blue camp during the Sunflower Movement in 2014 collapsed and that manifests in the negative direct effect between Pan-Blue partisanship and trust of political establishment ($r = -0.07$). Both of the above findings signal a political crisis inside the Pan-Blue camp because their supporters

Table 11.3 Direct and Intermediary Path Effects

		Sunflower Generation	Income	Liberal (Anti-authoritarian)	Winning Camp
Wave 1 (Pan-Green)	Direct	–	–	−0.25	0.06
	intermediary	–	–	−0.01	0.01
Wave 2 (Pan-Green)	Direct	–	–	−0.31	–
	intermediary	−0.03	–	−0.08	0.14
Wave 3 (Pan-Blue)	Direct	–	–	−0.31	–
	intermediary	−0.05	–	−0.10	0.18
Wave 4 (Pan-Blue)	Direct	–	–	−0.32	−0.07
	intermediary	−0.11	–	−0.09	0.14
Wave 5 (Pan-Green)	Direct	0.11	–	−0.33	0.13
	intermediary	−0.10	–	−0.06	0.10

Note: Entries (r) are path effects calculated from standardized beta coefficients presented in Table 11.2.

were not solid enough to lend unconditional support to the Pan-Blue leadership when being challenged. However, Pan-Green supporters, especially the youth generation, will be steadfast in their support whatsoever to the Pan-Green leadership. Such a trend together with the force of generational replacement could easily guarantee the Pan-Green camp an overwhelming political advantage in future electoral competition.

The long-term decline of the Pan-Blue public support reflects in the solidification of Pan-Green partisan influence in the youth generation for the past two decades. During the first Pan-Green President Chen Shui-bian's term, the educational reform based on de-Sinicization and transition justice has deeply embedded in the textbooks (Chen 2017). While suffering great setback from 2008 to 2016, the Pan-Green camp successfully developed dense networks in college campuses and social movement organizations (Chen 2019), which attracted myriad of youth followers and filled the void left from the Pan-Blue retreat after the first power rotation in 2000. It is not just these institutions that are supposed to be impartial from political influence gradually turning closer to the Pan-Green camp, but later many of those who once spoke for the interest and concern of civil society and regarded as social conscience became Pan-Green legislators-at-large or ministers, notable examples appearing in all fields of social movements such as environment protection, feminist rights, social work, farmers' group, judicial reforms, and many others (Yang 2019).

The bright side of the above phenomenon is that the Pan-Green camp successfully absorbs these social forces and the consolidation of political support from the youth generation, public intellectuals, and social activists. The downside is the loss of independence and encroachment of civil society because less and less space is left for social activists to genuinely fight for public interest, and instead, many of them are willing to serve Pan-Green allies to outflank its political opponents.

When partisan interest conflicts with public interest, more and more social groups abandon their long-term pursuit of ideal goals but choose to capitalize political gains and side with the incumbent Pan-Green government.

We can find another disadvantageous trend for the Pan-Blue camp as well. Figure 11.8 shows the measure of liberal attitudes (1–4-point Likert scale) by generations in all waves of the ABS. As can be seen, the difference of party orientation (positive suggests leaning toward Pan-Blue and negative the Pan-Green) between the Sunflower and other generations was not significant until 2010, and later the gap deepens in favoring the Pan-Green camp among the youth generation. In fact, many student leaders in the Sunflower Movement right now serve in important Pan-Green posts or have become legislators or elected officials in varying administrative levels (Yeh and Wen 2019). The Pan-Green camp successfully cashed in such momentum once again by provoking anti-China sentiment during the Hong Kong protest and the recent COVID-19 pandemic. We can expect the political advantage lasting for a substantial period for the Pan-Green camp, until to a critical point in the future when political backlash challenges the Pan-Green domination of the social movement and defies its political control as corruption scandals accumulate (Chou 2020).

Pan-Green President Tsai's formula to win widespread support from the youth generation is not simply political in nature, but also rooted in promotion of liberal and progressive values that attract loyal followers. The issues that the Pan-Green pushed eagerly include very controversial policies such as same-sex marriage, including rights of inheritance and guardianship; pension cuts exclusively targeting civil servants, education workers, police, and military; lifting the ban on import of American pork with Ractopamine to show how strongly Taiwan is bonded with the United States; and many others. In fact, a huge budget is spent by the government to engage in cyber public relation campaigns, not just

Figure 11.7 Youth generation becomes much greener. *Source:* Asian Barometer Survey, http://www.asianbarometer.org/.

Figure 11.8 Youth generation becomes much more liberal. *Source:* Asian Barometer Survey, http://www.asianbarometer.org/.

promoting government policies but attacking those who criticize or oppose the government on the net (Chou 2021). Such strategy is very successful and as the youth generation in fact becomes much more liberal, so does the overall Taiwan society. As Figure 11.8 makes evident, all five waves of the ABS results show that the youth generation is always more liberal than other generations by a significant margin, and more importantly, Taiwanese society as a whole continuously exhibits such upward trend for the past two decades. This is no doubt an important factor explaining why the Pan-Green won the 2020 presidential election easily, but we should not ignore the long-term effort of the Pan-Green leadership to cultivate a progressive and liberal image in a credible way. That will give even more advantage to the Pan-Green camp in the future as the demographic replacement continues.

Potential Uncertainty in the Future

While everything seems favorable in a predictable way for the Pan-Green's domination in Taiwan's political landscape, potential uncertainty does exist in the future, particularly from those issues that the Pan-Green capitalized on during the past presidential election. The first challenge lying ahead is the excessive dependence on Trump's anti-China policy and the overdoing that provoked cross-strait tension during the pandemic. Right after losing the mid-term local elections in 2018, Tsai successfully turned the campaign spotlight from domestic issues to a dichotomous choice of pro-China and anti-China, by which the Pan-Green portrayed the Pan-Blue presidential candidate as standing with China and disregarding what China has done to Hong Kong; meanwhile, the Pan-Green firmly supported Hong Kong in its fight against China and is the most credible ally backing Trump's anti-China policy in the world (Tsuyoshi 2020). Such political discourse effectively mobilized a sense of crisis and won overwhelming support

because the bankruptcy of "one country, two systems" had been vividly demonstrated through live streaming from protest scenes showing violent conflicts in Hong Kong (Tsai 2020). Nonetheless, the Tsai administration refused to fulfill her promise to give the Hong Kong protestants unconditional support and deny their application for refugee status after the Hong Kong National Security Law was enforced on June 30, 2020 (Liang 2020). Together with the double-standard policy that targeted China, such as the insistence on naming COVID-19 as Wuhan pneumonia and declining flight requests from Wuhan while admitting flights from elsewhere with infected passengers (Lien 2021), the cross-strait relationship has reached a new low and the tension continues to mount. Especially with the more moderate policy adopted by the Biden administration, it remains uncertain how President Tsai can properly manage the rising tension and stabilize the cross-strait relationship peacefully (Aspinwall 2021).

The second challenge the Pan-Green camp faced is the rising popular discontent on those controversial policies showing arbitrary defection when holding the power. Examples like this abound, and each takes its toll. For instance, the Pan-Green camp in the past fiercely opposed the import of American pork and insisted on zero-tolerance to the use of Ractopamine; however, Tsai lifted the import restriction by signing the administrative order without going through the legislative process (Chung 2021). Another salient example is the trade-off between environment protection and delivery of Tsai's energy policy, by which she has vowed to permanently work for preservation of the algal reef in 2013 while she was the opposition party leader, but now she supports the construction of LNG receiving terminal nearby the algal reef and could easily jeopardize its survival (Trieste 2021). Still another example is the aftereffect of the pension cut, which targets public sector employees, including civil servants, teachers, the police, and the military while leaving other occupation categories intact despite facing the same financial issue (Chu and Chang 2020, 145). Opposition momentum has been accumulated through each issue, and it is likely that the mainstream discourse might turn around someday when the Pan-Green government can no longer contain the backlash and policy defections consume its political legitimacy and alienate its political supporters. The political pendulum could then swing back in favor of the Pan-Blue camp provided no major mistakes are made.

Conclusion

The unexpected breakout of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 changed many things in the world, including the cross-strait relationship between China and Taiwan. Though nothing positive was expected, the lockdown also prevented any possibility of a crisis. The reason Tsai managed to push ahead many controversial policies domestically lies in the strong rally effect following the pandemic emergency. But this shielding effect is going to vanish as the vaccination rate increases globally in the near future. Although the long-term prospect in generational replacement and value orientation seems to be favoring the Pan-Green camp politically, Tsai has to face many protracted issues that should have already

made their impact but for the COVID-19 pandemic. The issues require political sophistication and flexibility that Tsai is not famous for by her credentials. She has to find way to balance what the Biden administration expects and the desirable course she would have foresaw had Trump won the re-election with regarding to the cross-strait policy. The ice becomes even thinner as the time approaches for Xi's third term of presidency because most China experts believe that Xi needs to show at least some progress in resolving the Taiwan issue for consolidation of his political power.

Tsai also faces a succession problem inside the Pan-Green camp, particularly after the 2022 mid-term local election. While the Pan-Blue opposition poses nearly no credible threat in political competition, the lack of an independent and conscience voice inside the administration or from domestic NGO allies could accelerate corruption and misgovernment. A perfect storm could emerge when fierce internal party competition leads to a Pan-Green political split while the Tsai administration fails to maintain a decent level of public support. Then the optimistic prospect might turn the other way round swiftly, and not even the advantageous factor of youth support and ideological proximity can save the Pan-Green from the political fallout. Such a drama has been played twice before during the second terms for both President Chen and President Ma, and it might likely be repeating again in the second term of Tsai's presidency.

Notes

1 Both Freedom House and Polity V datasets rate Taiwan as a democracy since the first popular presidential election was held in 1996. Both scores have kept improving and reached the highest mark in 2017 for Freedom House (1) and in 2004 for Polity V (10) without falling back. While Taiwan's democracy is not perfect and apparently there are many dissident voices domestically, Taiwan is no doubt a consolidated democracy by expert rating. The Freedom House dataset is available online at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world. The Polity V dataset is available online at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.

2 While Taiwan's economic performance is mostly steady ranging from 0 percent to 5 percent for the past decade, the real issue is the worsening polarization of income distribution, which leads to "hollowing out" of the middle class (Weatherall et al. 2018). This manifests mostly in the stagnation of salary and the rising costs of capital, and also attributes to the emergence of an anti-establishment movement.

3 Since Taiwan successfully democratized after 1996, the political landscape in the party system can be generally subdivided into two major camps: Pan-Blue and Pan-Green. Pan-Blue refers to those parties of which the key leaders and party platform and ideology are close to the former authoritarian regime, including Koumintang (KMT) New Party, People First Party. Pan-Green, on the other hand, refers to those parties of which their leaders and party platform and ideology are close to the opposition in the authoritarian era, including Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan Solidarity Union, and New Power Party.

4 Ko Wen-je and Han Kuo-yu are the most well-known grassroots politicians that rose up lately along with the rising populism in Taiwan politics. While both originate from different political camps (Ko from Pan-Green and Han from Pan-Blue), they are widely perceived "atypical" but able to attract a huge number of supporters with their upright character and candid behavior.

5   Inside the KMT party, there has long been an internal split between the Mainlander faction versus the Taiwanese faction, despite this cleavage not completely aligning with ethnic identity. This split started heating up between Ying-jeou Ma and Jin-pyng Wang in 2005 when both competed for the KMT chairmanship and extended between the executive and legislative power after Ma was elected as president in 2008. In fact, Wang served the vice president (1993–1999) and president (2001–2016) of the Legislative Yuan for more than two decades across three presidents and had enormous political influence in both Pan-Blue and Pan-Green camps. Therefore, while the Pan-Blue indeed controlled the presidency and legislative institution, it is well-known that the Pan-Blue was facing a severe internal split between Ma and Wang, and that directly contributed to the happenings of the Sunflower Movement in March 2014, which led to the downfall of the KMT government in 2016.

6   The Sunflower Movement happened on March 18, 2014, starting by students crashing the Legislative Yuan and lasting for 23 days with occupation of the chamber and paralyzing the function of parliament. This movement reached a climax on March 23, 2014, when students and protesters stormed into the Executive Yuan, which is the top executive institution and where the Premier works. Despite portraited a non-partisan and autonomous student movement, many key members of the Sunflower Movement later became Pan-Green politicians and the movement could not have been that successful without Pan-Green partisan support as well as Pan-Blue internal split.

7   There is a long history behind the design of the battery to measure liberal attitudes. While worded in seven questions in accord with anti-authoritarian orientation, their design traced back to Hu and Chu (1996), which aims to tap into liberal orientation that requires a stronger threshold by opposing authoritarian statements that might have legitimate cultural causes (Chu and Huang 2010). For this reason, we notify the readers of the actual operational term for the liberal measure as "Anti-authoritarian" but keep the variable label as "Liberal".

8   All the information and dataset are publicly available at the official ABS website, http://www.asianbarometer.org/.

9   According to Hooper et al. (2008), an excellent model fit is defined by CFI > 0.95, TLI > 0.95, and
    RMSEA < 0.06, and the acceptable cutoff criteria should be at least CFI > 0.9, TLI > 0.9, and RMSEA < 0.1.

10 The proper interpretation of the standardized regression coefficient is how many unit-variance change of the DV caused by per unit-variance change of an IV. In this way, we can compare the magnitude of effects by using the standardized unit as "variance change".

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12 The "Chinese-style" Political System in the Xi Jinping Era

From Neo-authoritarianism to Quasi-totalism*[1]

Jung-Nam Lee

Introduction

The rising China is competing fiercely with the United States for hegemony not only in the realms of defense and security, economy, science, and technology but also in values and institutions. The Xi Jinping administration has made clear China's identity as a global power, shifting the direction of China's foreign policy to that of a great power, and presented the reorganization of the international order through reform of the global governance system as the goal of its grand strategy. And while insisting on the United States to find a path for peaceful coexistence of different institutions and civilizations together (Wang 2020), China made it clear that it would go on the path of forming a new civilization based on the "Chinese-style" political system and values. In short, the path that China wants to choose is a path of historical development based on Chinese-style systems and values that are different from Western values and systems such as freedom, human rights, market economy, and democracy, which have been regarded as universal values since World War II. Thus, the Xi Jinping administration is spurring the construction of the so-called Chinese-style values, institutions, culture, and discourse (X. Yan 2021).

The drive of Xi Jinping's regime to seize the right to discourse in the realm of institutions and values can be confirmed in the declaration that it will build a political development model based on the so-called "Chinese-style" political system and values different from the West while emphasizing the "Four confidence (四个自信: the confidence in path, system, theory, culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics)". The main message is that China will follow the road to socialism with Chinese characteristics based on a Chinese-style system, theory, and culture, with the leadership of the Communist Party as a key condition. In particular, with regard to the political system, the CCP has been emphasizing on its plan "to modernize Chinas governance (zhili: 治理) system and capacity for governance based on socialism with Chinese Characteristics" since the 18th Party Congress, and the third Plenary Session of 18th CPC Central Committee stated this as the overall goal of accelerating reform in every field. The fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee came to present the goal

of modernizing the state governance system and governance capacity in three stages: By 2021, the 100th anniversary of the construction of the CCP, make clear progress in making all aspects of China's institutions more mature and formal; by 2035, realize the fundamental modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity; and, by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, further consolidate and reveal the superiority of socialism with Chinese Characteristics by fully realizing the modernization of the state governance system and governance capacity (Xinhuanet 2019).

It is also noteworthy that a major shift is taking place in the discourses related to China's political reform and political change in the Chinese political academia with the emergence of China as a global power since 2010. As for the direction of China's political reform, Chinese academics have recognized that if China achieves economic development and civil society grows through authoritarian rule, it will eventually lead to a path of democratic transformation. But now, the Chinese academic community is starting to deviate from this perception and shifting to the view that it should go down the road to the formation of a "Chinese-style" political system model that is distinct from the Western liberal and democratic political system (Chen 2021; Jing et al. 2016). Therefore, the current Chinese academia believes that China's political reform should be shifted in the direction of "complementing" the current political system rather than the "democratic transformation" of the current political system. Hence, it is argued that China's current political system should be used as an object of analysis, not as an object of (democratic) transformation, so that a more complete Chinese-style political system can be formed (Jing 2021). In this context, the following argument is gaining strength: Because distinct factors such as the foundation of civilization, the miracle of development, and the socialist-style development path account for the rise of China, it should be explained as a Chinese-style knowledge system rather than a Western-oriented knowledge system. Thus, it is necessary to create a Chinese-style political discourse system that is different from that of the West (Y. Yan 2021).

Then, what are the specific characteristics of the "Chinese-style" political system and values that will support the new international order envisioned by the CCP? What are the characteristics and contents of the "Chinese-style" political system and political system model that the Xi Jinping administration has proposed so far? This article analyzes the Chinese-style political system that will be the basis of the new international order that Xi Jinping's regime is trying to reconstruct, and tries to predict whether it can develop into an attractive political system model that will help the rise of China as a great power.

Theoretical Discussion on the Political System in the Xi Jinping Era

The CCP adopted a policy of economic growth first by breaking away from the dogmatic application of socialist ideology through reform and open-door policy. Politically, it has emphasized the establishment of a democratic system

with Chinese characteristics that excludes free elections, a multiparty system, and separation of three powers. However, in the process of executing this reform and opening-up policies, the CCP has been on the path of economic development based on a neo-authoritarian system, which was premised on the following: After achieving economic development based on a market economy system and authoritarian rule, it will also be transformed into a democracy. In other words, it presupposes that China will become a democratic society through a gradual and long-term process. A consensus among the party elite and intellectuals had formed about this perception of the direction of the development of the Chinese political system at least until the advent of Xi's regime. In fact, the analysis of the development of a series of discourses of "Chinese-style" democracy from the reign of Deng Xiaoping to the period of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao provides sufficient confirmation of this expectation (Lee 2019, 83–111).

However, after the rise of Xi's regime, the focus of discourse on China's political reform has shifted to building a Chinese-style political system that is different from the West. The CCP expressed this as building a modern governance system and strengthening its governance capacity. Specifically, it emphasized the mechanism of negotiation instead of elections as a mechanism of democratic political participation and emphasized the rule by law based on the leadership of the Communist Party (China Economic Net 2013). In addition, the centralized rule of the party-state system was strengthened through the following measures: First, the CCP promoted reforms that strengthen the integration of the party-government organizations in order to utilize the Communist Party organization as an means to strengthen state governance; second, through further emphasizing the traditional ideological resources and revolutionary sign (symbol) resources, the Communist Party's ability to mobilize the masses was strengthened, and the centralized government and high concentration of power in the Party center were strengthened; third, through a ban on a series of critical ideologies such as universal values, separation of three powers, nationalization of the military, powerful capitalism (权贵资本主义), and historical nihilism, it not only wanted to suppress the expansion of left-right political participation, but also to stabilize its rule by strengthening the Communist Party's control over ideology (Xiao 2019).

Stein Ringen defines this system as a party-state, explaining that it is a sophisticated dictatorship, which is close to totalitarianism but not complete totalitarianism. In particular, he argues that since the advent of Xi Jinping, the CCP has been leaning toward relying more on control than on performance in order to gain additional legitimacy of its rule. He asserts that this political control is a complete dictatorship characterized by dependence on the people's silence and self-censorship, rather than on the control of most people's daily lives. He further argues that Xi Jinping is shifting away from a flexible rule to a more powerful, unmasked rule, and the Chinese dream has become an important ideology (Ringen 2016, 164–178).

The theoretical analysis of the political system in the Xi Jinping era is being conducted more comprehensively among Chinese scholars. Jing Yue-jin, a professor at Tsinghua University, argues that the development of China's political

system will be achieved through the "promotion" or "improvement" of the party-state system, not through the transition to a democratic system. His argument is as follows: China's party-state system promotes reforms based on two red lines. One is that a multiparty system is not promoted in the construction of democracy, and political leaders are "(nurtured) managed" by the CCP rather than elected by the people. The other is maintaining a monopoly of power and centralized rule by the Communist Party rather than separating the three powers in the construction of the rule of law (Mao and Cao 2017, 92–96). He argues that this suggests that China has chosen an authoritarian system by adopting "great unification (Dayitong: 大一統)" as its first value instead of the values of democracy and freedom. This phenomenon occurred because China, unlike the West, has not yet completed the task of building a unified nation-state. Therefore, Western comparative political theory cannot explain these political developments and changes in China. To explain this, the Chinese academic community must develop a new "Chinese characteristic" political discourse system.[2]

Professor Xiao Kongchin also contends that China is moving toward globalization through the development of a market economy in the economic realm since the advent of Xi Jinping, but in the political realm, statism devoid of a democratic assumption is emerging. He defines neo-authoritarianism as an authoritarian system that pursues strong political stability based on a market economy system and a long-term goal toward democratization, but defines statism as a political system in which the future direction of democracy has been removed. After the reform and opening-up, the regimes of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao all formed a neo-authoritarianism system with the premise of democratization, but Xi Jinping's regime formed a statism system in which the party-state uses its monopolistic position to promote economic development through mercantilism policies under the conditions of a market economy system. He also pointed out that although the Xi Jinping administration still uses the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, China will follow the statism path "free of democratic orientation" rather than the Marxist-Leninist path, and this is the Chinese-style political development path that the Xi Jinping administration intends to follow.[3]

While the above explanation is based on a modernist approach, active attempts are also made to explain China's political system through an orthodox or historically traditional approach based on the official ideology of the party-state system.[4] Ke Huaqing, professor of Political Science and Law at the Chinese University of Political Science and Law, described China's political system as "a constitutional party-led democracy (立宪党导民主制)". Pointing to Xi Jinping's remarks that "the CCP is leading everything in China, including Party, government, military, civilian, academic, east, west, south, north, and center", he asserts that this indicates that the leadership of the Communist Party is the most essential characteristic of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Based on this very point, he defines China's political system as a constitutional party-led democracy—different from the constitutional monarchy and constitutional democracy. The constitutional democracy is a democratic system formed through competitive elections among

multiparty parties, and it is a Western capitalist democracy. In contrast, the party-led democracy system is a democratic system in a socialist country in which only the Communist Party can become the ruling party and other factions can only participate. Since it can conduct politics of public interest and politics of virtue, its legitimacy is stronger than that of a constitutional democracy which employs self-interest and economic politics (Ke 2017, 2019).

On the other hand, Lu Xiaobo, professor at Nanjing University, defined it as a "Communist party-Traditional people-oriented thought" system, comparing it with the premodern "Emperor-Traditional people-oriented thought (皇权-民本主义)" system. The difference between these two systems is that the former is not based on a private family (imperial family), but rather on a Communist Party with a strong organizational network, iron discipline, and strong dominance and action power, aiming to rule based on people-oriented thought (Minbenzhuyi: 民本主义) (Lu 2018, 5–20). This seems to be an analysis akin to that of Zheng Yongnian's description of communist rule as an "organizational emperor" (Zheng 2010). Professor Ke Huaqing also points out that although the CCP government model is similar to that of the ancient emperors, it differs in two respects: First, the CCP is an organization rather than an individual (family); the other is that it emphasizes public service and cultivation of virtue, not a return to the rites (礼) of Confucianism. He also argues that after reform and opening-up, the CCP has gradually moved toward a state ruled by law, but this is comparable to that of the ancient emperors in that "the CCP leads legislation, ensures law enforcement, supports justice, and takes the lead in enforcing the law" (Ke 2017).

As described above, the analysis of the nature of the political system in the Xi Jinping era has been conducted through various approaches, but two common features are notable. One is the argument that the development direction of China's political system, whether in a form similar to statism or emperor rule, is moving toward the formation of a "Chinese-style political system" rather than the Western-style path of democratization; the other is that the party-state system has strengthened all-round control over all economic and social spheres. However, these discussions do not fully explain the characteristics of quasi-totalism in the political system of the Xi Jinping era.

Tsou Tang defined China's political system in the Mao era as totalism. The totalism system is a political system in which political power (the Communist Party) can invade and control all social classes and all areas "at any time" and "without limits". Under this totalism system, there are areas other than the areas directly or indirectly controlled and managed by the state (the party-state system). In other words, due to the necessity of social development, independence and freedom is granted to national units and social groups, and there is a realm of private life such as playing mahjong, in which the government does not intervene, or it is also an area that political institutions do not temporarily control from strategic considerations. However, unlike the liberal democracy, none of these areas are guaranteed by the constitution, laws, public opinion, and morals, so they can be controlled by the state at any time (Zhang 2018, 79; Tsou 1994, 7–8). Although

these characteristics appear in totalitarian regimes, they differ from totalitarian-ism in the following ways: First, the totalism system was a political system that emerged to solve the overall crisis faced by the Chinese society in the twentieth century, and not only did it play a role of political control, but also a positive role in national construction (Tsou 1994, 81). In addition, by forming organic rela-tions with farmers and forming a series of concentric unions, cooperative relations with various social groups were pursued, thereby expanding the scope of politi-cal mobilization and participation. Therefore, this totalism system differs from totalitarianism, which is characterized by suppressing social revolution, protecting the ruling class, and sustaining the old society through the expansion of the domi-nance of political power (Wang 2021, 24).

Such theory can be used suitably as a theoretical framework to explain the characteristics of the political system in the Xi Jinping era. After the rise of Xi Jinping's regime, the most important national goal was set to realize the "Chinese dream" of the rise of the Chinese nation, and universal values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights were marginalized. In order to achieve this, national unity and stability (the so-called 大一統) is emphasized as the first value, and the ruling status of the CCP is strengthened as the institutional basis to make this possible. In other words, the status wherein "the CCP is leading everything in China, including party, government, military, civilian, academic, east, west, south, north, and center" is given. Now, the CCP can control all areas of society "anytime" and "anywhere", so the control of state power has become common-place. However, while simultaneously emphasizing the "people-centered ideol-ogy of development", the CCP seeks to expand its legitimacy of government by mobilizing public support through a campaign to eradicate poverty and a sweep-ing purge of corruption management. To this end, the so-called "state capital-ist system", which combines the leading role of state-owned enterprises with the economic intervention of an authoritarian system, is formed to continue economic growth, thereby improving the quality of life in China, and realizing the Chinese dream.

The characteristics and background of the emergence of the "Chinese-style" political system in the Xi Jinping era can be found to be quite similar to the total-ism system proposed by Zou Dang. However, as the Chinese economy becomes a market economy and participates deeply in the process of globalization, it is difficult for a totalism system in the full meaning to exist any longer. The control of state power is different from the totalism system in the past in terms of "scope" and "degree" in that individuals with private ownership (guaranteed by the con-stitution) can maintain their lives without being directly dependent on the state through the market economy system. Nevertheless, it is similar to the totalism system in the following respects: It sets the goal of realizing the Chinese dream and strengthens the ruling position of the CCP as a key organization to lead it; it strengthens the full and omnidirectional control of the party-state system in all areas of politics, economy, and society; it seeks to strengthen the legitimacy of government by mobilizing public support while emphasizing the people-centered ideology of development.[5]

End of the Neo-authoritarian System and Emergence of the Quasi-totalism System

Although China's reform and opening policy has been mainly focused on the economic system whereas reform and opening in the political system has been relatively delayed, there has been a common perception that China's political system will transform into a democratic system in the long term. However, since 2010, as China emerged as the world's second largest economy in terms of economic scale, the aspiration to reconstruct the international order based on values and institutions different from those of the West began to exert force in China. As a result, the so-called Chinese-style political system and theories have been emphasized, and a paradigm shift has taken place in terms of the direction of political reform.

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, China's political system was regarded as totalitarian comparable to the Soviet Union because it benchmarked the Soviet political model. Economically, it is a system of planned economy based on public ownership and planning mechanisms, in which a highly centralized power is built through ideology, and the party-government-military organization controls the whole country; the omnipotent state power penetrates everywhere in society. Brzezinski described this totalitarian system as having six characteristics—a single formal ideology; a single popular party, typical of which is a single-person doctrinal leadership; control over the media through technology monopoly; realization of central control and guidance over the national economy through bureaucracies; control through the secret police system; and monopoly of armed capabilities. The totalitarian system defined in this way occupied a mainstream position in the explanation of China's political system before the reform and opening period (Friedrich 1954, 274; Friedrich and Brzeziniski 1956).

However, some scholars pointed out that it is inappropriate to explain China's political situation in the Mao era with the totalitarian theory, a concept that explains the Soviet Union or the fascist system. The reason for this is that first of all, the state power's control over society in the Mao Zedong era was based not only on coercion and oppressive control methods, but also on the mobilization and persuasion of mass movements. Second, the conflict between the supreme ruling elite within the party revealed in the late 1960s was due to the existence of pluralistic competition within the Chinese party-state system (Yan 2020). In particular, Tsou Tang tried to explain the political system of China in the Mao era through the concept of a totalism system. In other words, although the totalism system invaded and controlled all classes and areas of society "at any time" and "unlimitedly", it also contributed to resolving the overall crisis faced by Chinese society in the early twentieth century and building a unified nation state (Tsou 1994, 81). In addition, by establishing organic relationships with farmers and forming a series of concentric unions to pursue cooperative relationships with various social groups, the scope of mobilization and participation in politics was expanded. Therefore, he argues that, unlike totalitarianism, which is characterized by suppressing social revolution, protecting the ruling class, and sustaining the old society through the expansion of the dominance of political power, the

totalism system also plays a positive role to a certain extent (Wang 2021, 24). Thus, after the implementation of the reform and opening policy in 1978, until the emergence of the neo-authoritarian theory, totalism, along with totalitarianism, was positioned as a concept that well explained the characteristics of China's political system in the Mao Zedong era.

Through reform and opening-up policies, the CCP broke away from the dogmatic application of socialist ideology and adopted first and foremost economic growth as its strategic policy line. Economically, it opened the door to Western capitalist countries and became a member of the global economy through a market economy system and recognition of private ownership. As the transition to a market economy system takes place and the economy grows at a rapid pace, the growth of civil society begins to appear. And although the changes in terms of political democratization were minimal, a series of reforms related to the governance system were carried out. It was to respond to the emergence of pluralistic interests and conflicts of interest in the social domain following the transition to a market economy system and rapid economic growth. Under this circumstance, a consensus was formed in China that the Chinese political system would follow the path of democratization after achieving certain economic growth based on the authoritarian rule of the Communist Party and the market economy system.

There was no disagreement in the academic community in explaining this political situation as authoritarianism. The main points of authoritarianism are as follows: China, which is shifting toward modernization, is in a situation where its civil society is not fully developed, and its traditional authority is declining. In order to maintain the stability of this transition process, the authority of the state was necessary, so an authoritarian system emerged. However, authoritarianism is a descriptive concept with a comprehensive scope. It mainly starts from the viewpoint of classification of political systems and includes all political systems that exist in the long spectrum between the two extremes of "ideal" democracy and totalitarianism. As China's political system has undergone many internal changes as a result of the reform and opening-up policy, the perception that it is difficult to explain all these changes in the name of an authoritarian system has begun to spread. Therefore, many scholars tried to explain China's political system by attaching various modifiers to authoritarianism. As a result, according to a survey by Professor Yan Yilong of Tsinghua University, the concept of authoritarianism with more than 30 "modifiers" appeared to explain the Chinese political system (Yan 2017).

This article also defines China's political system in the period of reform and opening- up before Xi Jinping's emergence as a neo-authoritarian system. A distinctive feature of this system is that it is a form of authoritarian rule designed by the Communist Party to induce economic growth based on a market economy system. Around 1992, a neo-authoritarian system was formed in China, and Deng Xiaoping played a decisive role in the process. During the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, Deng Xiaoping used powerful means not only to marginalize the radical liberals, in 1992, he also marginalized conservatives within the Communist Party against reforms in the direction of the market economy through

Nanxunjianghua (南循讲话; a speech he gave while visiting the South). After that, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao also assumed that they would transition toward a higher stage of democracy after achieving economic development based on a flexible neo-authoritarian system. It assumed the following process: When a market economy develops, diversification of social interests appears, and contractual rules and a culture of rule of law are formed. Furthermore, with sufficient development of civil society and social organization, a democratic political system will be formed through the process of democratization with Chinese characteristics.

In particular, by proposing the so-called "three representatives (三个代表)", Jiang Zemin shifted the basis of ruling legitimacy from the promise of utopian egalitarianism to an advanced culture, advanced productivity, and guaranteeing the fundamental interests of the vast majority of the people (including private entrepreneurs and intellectuals). As the system transition and economic growth took place, serious social problems such as social corruption and the gap between the rich and the poor appeared in Chinese society at that time, which put the Communist Party in a crisis of governance. Accordingly, the CCP tried to expand the Communist Party's governing base by attracting private entrepreneurs and intellectuals, who had grown rapidly to the upper social strata in the process of reform and opening up, into the Communist Party. This policy resulted in the transformation of the character of the CCP from a revolutionary party to a party for all the people. The expansion of grassroots democratic elections, the expansion of orderly participation of citizens in politics, the emphasis on the realization of democratization within the CCP and the realization of a harmonious society,[6] as suggested by Hu Jintao, also meant efforts toward a higher level of democratic development in the neo-authoritarian system (Xiao 2019).

As such, before the advent of the Xi Jinping regime, there was a consensus within China that the political system would be transformed into a democratic system after achieving economic development based on the market economy system and the authoritarian rule of the Communist Party.[7] Although the transition of the political system was relatively "delayed" relative to the transition of the economic system, nevertheless, consensus was maintained on the basic direction to democratization.[8] In this situation, Andrew Nathan, professor at Columbia University, tried to explain the dynamic change of the Chinese authoritarian system, considering the Chinese political system as resilient authoritarianism (Nathan 2008, 25–43). Chinese political and constitutional scholars also actively discussed the direction of search for the realization of constitutional democracy.[9] In fact, if we analyze the series of developments in the discourse of Chinese-style democracy from the Deng Xiaoping era to the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras, we can confirm that it is premised on the assumption that China will transform into a democratic society through a gradual and long-term process (Lee 2019, 83–111).

However, entering the Xi Jinping era, China begins to deviate from the basic assumptions held by China since the reform and opening-up policy: After the neo-authoritarian rule by the Communist Party as a transitional political system in the underdeveloped stage, ultimately, the result will be a Western-style constitutional system or democracy. Under the direction of modernization of the

so-called Chinese-style governance system (reporting from the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CCP and the 4th Plenum of the 19th CCP), Xi Jinping's regime is actively promoting the institutionalization of a communist-led strong-authoritarian system. That is, the following was promoted: Ideologically, through the combination of Marxism-Leninism and Confucianism, the ideology of government is created, and through this, the leadership position of the Communist Party in the ideological field is strengthened; pursuing economic growth through the formation of a state capitalist system and mercantilism economic policy; the omnidirectional control of the Communist Party over politics, economy, society, and the Internet space is being strengthened; various experimental attempts to elect political leaders through the expansion of democratic political participation and institutionalization of procedures have been halted (implementation of a nomination system for the election of the party's supreme leader based on secret ballot, institutionalization of grassroots elections, and exploration of institutionalization of direct elections of party and administrative heads at the township level, etc.); by emphasizing the "negotiation" method under the Communist Party's leadership rather than "election" as the main mechanism for democratic political participation, the people's political participation is limited to mobilizing the support of the government.

The role of the Communist Party was further emphasized as a leading power to lead "everything" in China and to bring about the realization of the so-called "Chinese Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation". Also, as more power is concentrated on the "center" of the party and the party's "core", Xi Jinping, a strong authoritarian rule is being achieved by the party center and Xi Jinping. In addition, emphasizing the so-called "Chinese-style" political system and development path, CCP made it clear that such a rigid authoritarian system would be developed into a so-called Chinese-style political system model distinct from Western democracy. In this way, the institutionalization of a series of governance methods under the name of the so-called "Chinese-style" governance model, which is distinct from the West, means the establishment of a "quasi-totalism system". And this is arousing criticism from Western society as a "combination of red imperialism and fascism" (Xiao 2020).

Components and Characteristics of the Quasi-totalism System

Under the quasi-totalism system, the party-state system must carry out the historical task of realizing the rise of the Chinese nation by inducing sustained economic growth. To this end, state power penetrates and controls all social classes and domains "at any time" and "without restriction". But in addition to these control methods, it also governs on the basis of popular support mobilized through anti-corruption and poverty alleviation movements. The main components and characteristics that define this quasi-totalism system in the Xi Jinping era are as follows.

Institutional Arrangement for Realization of the "Chinese Dream (中国梦)"

President Xi Jinping became China's supreme leader at a time when the competition for hegemony between China and the United States and the reorganization of international power began in earnest. Thus, he was given the task of leading China into a superpower in name and reality in the process of increasingly fierce reorganization of international power. Therefore, the Xi Jinping administration set the direction of its comprehensive policy to realize the "Chinese dream", which refers to the rise of the Chinese nation, rather than political democratization, and sought to secure China's leading position in the great change of world order. This can also be confirmed by Xi Jinping's speech at the 5th Plenary Session of the 19th CCP held at the end of 2020:

> The entire party should formulate a unified plan for the overall strategic phase of "the great revival of the Chinese nation(中华民族伟大复兴)" and the "Great Changes Unseen in a Century (百年未有之大变局)" " and take this as a basic starting point for China's economic and social development in a new stage of development.
>
> (Xinhuashe 2020)"

As such, a quasi-totalism system emerged as a result of the institutional arrangement to achieve the Chinese dream, the goal of Xi Jinping's regime. This situation is very similar to the fact that the totalism system of the Mao era emerged based on the national necessity to overcome the national crisis faced by China at the beginning of the twentieth century and establish a unified state. However, in the era of Xi Jinping when China has emerged as a global power, the goal of "establishing a unified country" merely changed to "the rise of the Chinese nation".

Higher Concentration of Power at the Party Center and Xi Jinping's "Core" and Strengthening of Centralized Rule

The totalism rule establishes a strong political organization or party system and provides full control over all areas of society based on its political capacity and method of organization. The reorganization of the power mechanism for quasi-totalism rule in the era of Xi Jinping is achieved through power consolidation by means of high concentration of power in the central part of the Communist Party and Xi Jinping, the "core" of the party. To this end, Xi Jinping has strengthened the position of the Party Center and its "core", Xi Jinping himself, after the 18th Party Congress, while preparing the power base to pursue the government goals and vision centered on the realization of the Chinese dream. The specific process is as follows: In 2016, at the 6th Plenary Session of the 18th Session, Xi Jinping was given a "core" status. At the first Politburo meeting held since the 19th Party Congress in 2017, "Several Rules for the Unified and Concentrated Leadership of the Party Central Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central

Committee" was passed. This regulation stipulated that "we must firmly uphold General Secretary Xi Jinping's 'core' position on the CPC Central Committee and in the Party as a whole, and uphold the Central Committee's authority and its centralized, unified leadership."

Since then, the CCP has named this "Two Upholds(两个维护)", which symbolizes the concentration of power in the "center" of the party and the "core" of the party, Xi Jinping. As such, not only the concentration of power under Xi Jinping, but also the concentration of power in the center of the CCP and reemphasis on the leadership of the CCP were emphasized at the same time.

In particular, the concentration of power and empowerment of Xi Jinping was achieved through methods such as effectively destroying various systems and practices that supported the collective power succession after the 18th Party Congress, and Xi Jinping rewriting the rules of the game of power succession. By inserting "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Xi Jinping Era" into the Party's constitution (党章) as well as the constitutional law, Xi Jinping's authority as a strong man was strengthened through ideological discourse, and Xi Jinping's influence was bolstered through the regression of democratization within the party. In addition, the concentration of power to Xi Jinping was achieved by establishing the role of the CCP's leadership group (领导小组). Currently, the Politburo Standing Members are required to report to Xi Jinping once a year. As Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, the Party General Secretary has the sole authority to set agendas for the four highest-level meetings—Politburo meeting of the CPC Central Committee, the Central Politburo Standing Committee Meeting, the Secretariat of CPC Central Committee Office, and the Party Central decision-making and coordination body. As a result, the collective leadership system, which had been gradually institutionalized since the 1990s, has only a formality and no value or meaning, and a leadership system centered on President Xi Jinping was established.

Realization of Political and Social Stability through Total Control over Society and Ideology

The quasi-totalism system seeks to realize political and social stability through total control over the economy, society, and ideology, rather than drawing out governance stability by strengthening democratic legitimacy through leading democratization of the political system to resolve various accumulated contradictions within society. This control is mainly achieved through control over all areas of society using the Communist Party's organizational resources, and control over ideology and the Internet. The detailed characteristics of these controls are as follows.

The Strengthening of Control Using the Resources of the Communist Party's Organization. Based on the recognition that the leadership and control over all areas of Chinese society needs to be reestablished, the CCP promotes party-state reform centered on power concentration, creating conditions for realizing the Communist Party's centralized and unified leadership

(Chen and Li 2020, 1–17). As the Communist Party power rapidly entered the social and economic domains, the scope of work under the State Council was reduced, and a power structure emerged in which the party sector was in charge of increased policy-making and the government sector was only responsible for implementing policy decisions.[10] In particular, a governance mechanism was built in which the CCP could control all spheres of politics, economy, and society, based on the following measures.

The first measure for this is to reorganize the "institutional system in which the party leads everything" through party-government organizational reform. After the 19th Party Congress, various work organizations, which had been divided into the State Council and the Party Central Organization, were unified, and each division of the Party was unified to guide and manage the existing work divisions under the State Council. This enabled the Party to carry out the full leadership of the Party and directly manage and integrate important sectors for the Party to realize social safety and control (Xinhua News Agency 2018). The second measure was to strengthen the Communist Party's social penetration by expanding the party's network to all areas of society. After the founding of the PRC, the CCP mobilized and transformed society through a dense communist organization network. However, in rural areas after reform and opening up, the Communist Party's organizational power and social mobilization power in the grassroots society rapidly weakened due to the implementation of the village-level autonomy system (村民自治制) after the People's Commune(人民公社) and the Unit (单位) system of urban areas were dismantled (H. Lin 2021). Under such circumstances, with the advent of the Xi Jinping administration, the CCP is promoting the enlargement of the Communist Party's ability to govern the grassroots society through the construction of a grassroots party organization (Tian 2020, 118-140). It is this grassroots party organization that becomes the core basis of power that enables the Communist Party to penetrate the grassroots society (Jo and Lee 2017, 77-78).

Controlled Society Is Built by Establishing an Internet Information Control System and Social Information System. The CCP governs according to the party's lines and policies, and through strict party policy, it does not allow party members to publicly announce to the press any content that violates the party's policy until the party's policy is finalized. In addition, the party's ideology expands and penetrates all aspects of society, constraining and standardizing social actions and ideas, so that it becomes a mainstream ideology. To make this possible, the CCP not only takes initiative in proposing core values, but also strengthens the supervision and management of newspapers, broadcasts, publications, and the Internet, and increases control over ideas and ideologies. In this way, political and social stability is achieved by suppressing actions that go against the CCP's line (Chen and Li 2020, 1–17). In particular, with the development of Internet technology in China, there was an expectation that the Internet would become a major space for social communication, leading to the growth of civil society and enabling the transition to a democratic society. Contrary to expectations, however, China's Internet technology is functioning as an effective

control of civil society rather than a mechanism to propel China's democratization. This is because the Chinese government is creating various social control systems by establishing the Internet information control system and social information system.

The Chinese government has established various mechanisms to strengthen Internet control. One, in 2013, Xi Jinping established the "Information and Communication Leadership Group" (renamed as Information and Communication Commission after the 19th Party Congressto strengthen its status) and seized centralized control over the Internet. As a result, China's web is now dominated by more than 60 institutions with vast legal and technical capabilities to monitor and regulate online behavior. Two, the Cyber Security Act, which has been fully enforced since June 2017, broadly stipulates the security and privacy regulations that companies must observe in China. This allows the Chinese government to force foreign companies to have data servers in China and to censor content in real time. Three, the Internet policy is in place to ban Chinese access to foreign technology sites and to monitor social media platforms intensively. This is a policy to tame Internet censorship by creating an information network where the Chinese people can obtain the information they want from within China (Kim 2017, 473–474).

Further, the Communist Party is strengthening its control through the establishment of a social credit program. The social credit program is part of a broader political control known as social management, which links advances in artificial intelligence (AI) technology with surveillance regimes that netizens naturally embrace. The purpose of the social credit program is to establish algorithmic dominance, which is accepted outside of China as part of a digital dictatorship (Dockrill 2019). In 2014, the Chinese government began to implement a pilot implementation of a social credit system that strictly applied digital surveillance and big data technology in some regions. Once such a social credit system is established, it is expected that all individuals, companies, and local governments will be given a social credit rating to determine not only loan evaluation but also whether or not to board an airplane. For this purpose, street CCTV and facial recognition technology are thoroughly utilized. The new social credit system that regulates society as a whole through such big data is a system in which personal information is updated daily and completely controlled, so it is evaluated as a terrifying intention to turn the whole of China into a panopticon of surveillance and punishment (The ChosunIlbo 2019; The ChosunIlbo 2020).

Ideological Education and Ideological Control for the Elite and the Masses Are Strengthened. Since its inception, the Xi Jinping administration has focused on restoring ideological control, setting the ideological unification of all party members, especially the highest ranks, as an important goal. Through a series of bans on universal values, separation of powers, nationalization of the military, crony capitalism(权贵资本主义), historical nihilism, etc. (the so-called eight-item ban, 八项禁止), the CCP is trying to achieve stability of governance by strengthening its management and leadership over the ideology of the CCP (He 2020). In addition, it has been promoting the deification of President Xi Jinping,

such as strengthening the study of Xi Jinping Thought and teaching Xi Jinping Thought as Marxism in the twenty-first century. The CCP touts that the theories of Marx and Engels is the "19th century Marxism", Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping's theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics are "20th century Marxism", and "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" is Marxism in the twenty-first century(He 2020).

Moreover, by inserting "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" into the Party's Constitution (党章) and the Constitutional law, attempts are being made to increase Xi Jinping's authority as a strong man who overwhelms other leaders through the idolization method of the Mao Zedong era (Li 2018). The pursuit of ideological unification with Xi Jinping's Thought is being practiced concretely through ideological learning of party members at all levels and patriotic education at each level of school.

Mobilizing the People's Support and Strengthening the Legitimacy of Government

During the course of the revolution, the CCP seized power with the support and consent of the people. However, as the conditions of the times changed, this revolutionary legitimacy had its limits in justifying the Communist Party's rule, and thus the Communist Party had to search for a new legitimacy of its rule. In particular, the rapid economic growth accompanied by the transition to a market economy not only resulted in a rapid increase in Chinese income (per capita GDP exceeded $10,000 at the end of 2019), but also raised the level of education and the people's awareness of the rule of law and civil rights. In addition, the growth method based on the "economic development first" policy and the theory of "being rich first" (先富论: the policy which allows partial population to get well-off first) caused serious gaps between the rich and the poor between regions, urban and rural areas, and classes, also causing environmental problems. Moreover, under the neo-authoritarian system without democratization, serious corruption was prevalent due to the collusion of power and capital.

Recognizing that such a problem could turn into a crisis of communist rule if neglected, Hu Jintao put forward the so-called "scientific view of development (科学发展观)" and emphasized the harmonious development between nature and humans, regions and classes. He started to come up with various initiatives to solve environmental problems and the gap between the rich and the poor. In addition, discussions on the construction of a check-in mechanism against the party-government power have been activated in academia. The Xi Jinping regime also realized that such a serious social crisis could seriously undermine the Communist Party's ability to govern. Thus, while emphasizing the "the people-centered development thought", he carried out large-scale poverty eradication campaign and anti-corruption campaign. The development of the poverty eradication campaign and the large-scale purge of corrupt party-government cadres are measures aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of government based on the mobilization of public support. The CCP regards this practical action as

the practice of the "people-centered development thought". In fact, the Chinese people have positively evaluated the results of the anti-corruption and poverty eradication campaigns since the rise of the Xi Jinping regime, which has increased public support for the Xi Jinping regime.

Guarantee of Improving People's Living Standards and Realizing the Chinese Dream Based on Sustainable Growth

Leading to the realization of the Chinese dream and improvement of the people's living standards is the basis for strengthening the CCP's legitimacy of governance, and the key condition for making this possible is continuous economic growth. The CCP has been walking the path of successful growth by entering the global market economy system. However, rather than reforming China's economic system by accepting the norms and rules of the free market economic system, the CCP promoted economic growth based on a state capitalist system[11] that was different from the free market economic system. In addition, it has been pursuing a strategy to catch up with advanced countries (Made in China 2025 (中国制造2025), by using capital and technology introduced from advanced Western countries. Through this state-led economic policy, China has achieved rapid growth so far, and contrary to the general concern that the state's economic intervention undermines the creative ability of the economy, Chinese companies have emerged as global companies leading to the fourth industrial revolution. According to the results of the Nikkei analysis of patents in ten high-tech industries from 2000 to 2019, among ten fields, China swept first place in patent applications in nine fields, including artificial intelligence, regenerative medicine, autonomous driving, block chain, cybersecurity, virtual reality, conductive polymers, and lithium-ion batteries. Only quantum computers came in second after the United States (Dong-A Ilbo 2021). According to the Hurun Global Unicorn Index, out of 484 unicorn companies in the world that exceeded $1 billion in 2019, 206 were from China and 203 from the United States; out of 586 companies in 2020, 233 were from the United States and 227 were from China, thus, approximately equal (Y. Lin 2021).

Even after the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese economy showed a rapid recovery compared to the United States and Europe, and it was the only country in the world to show positive growth with a growth rate of 2.3 percent in 2020. And, contrary to the forecast for decoupling due to US economic sanctions, the export growth rate was 7.8 percent. This is because each country's demand is concentrated in China, which is relatively less affected by the COVID-19 and has the conditions to provide stable production (Ji 2020). However, the US demand for structural reform of the Chinese economy and all-round checks on scientific and technological development are a great challenge to the Chinese economy, which far outweighs the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. To respond to this situation, the CCP presented "the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) for National Economic and Social Development and the Long-Range Objectives through the Year 2035" at the 6th Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP in 2020, with the so-called "double-cycle strategy (双循环)" and

self-sufficient scientific and technological innovation. In other words, the idea is to create an economic structure that focuses on domestic circulation and promote the domestic and international double circulation. It is a plan that seeks to find the driving force for scientific and technological innovation and industrial advancement in China while pursuing growth using the wide domestic market.

This is a plan to find a new breakthrough while retaining the state-led growth method rather than moving to an open free market economy through reform of the state capitalist system. If these initiatives do not lead to sustainable economic growth and scientific and technological innovation, the Chinese economy will not be able to take off any longer and fall into the middle-income trap. Therefore, the success of the 14th Five-Year Plan, which can be characterized by the so-called "double cycle and innovation", will be a major measure of whether China's Quasi-totalism system can be maintained and strengthened continuously.

Conclusion: Can an "Attractive" Political System Model with "Chinese Characteristics" Emerge?

With the advent of Xi Jinping, a series of political changes promoted under the banner of the so-called Chinese-style political development path and system led to the emergence of a quasi-totalism system. This is a political system that strengthened centralized rule by concentrating power on the CPC Central Committee and the "core of the Party", Xi Jinping. This system is a political system that prioritizes the realization of the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which is "the great cause of the Chinese nation(千秋伟业)". This is similar to totalitarianism in that the party-state system, in which power is highly concentrated in the party center and the supreme leader (the core of the party), penetrates and controls all areas of Chinese society. However, it differs from the totalitarianism of the Mao Zedong era in the following points: The party-state system does not rely solely on coercive control, but seeks to strengthen the legitimacy of the government based on achievements through state-led economic growth, and at the same time seeks to govern by mobilizing the support of the public through the eradication of corruption and poverty; it also pursues not only the socialist ideology as the basis of the governing ideology, but also the ideology that combines the traditional people-centered thought (民本主义) of Chinese history, socialist ideology, and nationalism. In addition, since individuals with private ownership can live their daily lives without being directly dependent on the state through the market economy system, the "range" and "degree" of control over an individual's life by state power is much weaker than in a "completed" totalism system. Therefore, it can be defined as a quasi-totalism system.

Above all, the continuation and development of this quasi-totalism system will be influenced by three factors: One, the degree of unity of the party-government ruling elite and whether the government system can put civil society within a controllable range; two, whether it is possible to continuously mobilize people's support for the authoritarian regime through the poverty eradication movement and anti-corruption movement; and, three, whether continuous economic growth

will ensure the realization of the Chinese dream and improvement of the people's quality of life. Based on these three factors, the quasi-totalism system does not appear to be decisively shaken in the short term. The capacity of civil society is still weak, and although they are fighting for power, there is a consensus within the elite that they must unite to realize the Chinese dream. In addition, Chinese people positively evaluate and support the achievements of the CCP's anti-corruption and poverty eradication campaign, and the CCP will continue to pursue these policies in the future. In particular, the CCP has recently emphasized "the people-centered development thought" while further emphasizing that it will pursue a "shared wealth" policy. Above all, it is because there is a positive evaluation that the Communist Party has successfully led economic growth and made China the world's second largest economy. Therefore, in terms of the political system, the quasi-totalism system will be under pressure from various changes, but the positive evaluation of the various achievements brought about by it will offset the pressure for the transition to a democratic political system.

However, the "Chinese-style" political system model proposed by the Xi Jinping administration, that is, the quasi-totalism system, is a political system model that emerged at a specific historical stage to solve the historical task of the Chinese nation—the realization of the Chinese dream. This quasi-totalism system will remain essentially unchanged until the conspicuous achievements of the realization of the Chinese dream appear. And if the CCP develops this quasi-totalism system into a so-called Chinese political system model, it will be difficult for China to create a political system model that fully embodies universal human values such as democracy, human rights, freedom, and equality that can be accepted by the international community. Therefore, although China is emphasizing the so-called "Chinese-style development path, institutions, theories, and culture" and that it will go on the path of forming a Chinese-style civilization, the possibility that such an attempt will be successful is still unknown. Based on the current situation, it is highly likely to become a "strong" but "unattractive" global power based on economic and military power based on a soft authoritarian system at best.

In his speech on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP on July 1, 2021, President Xi Jinping declared that "the Chinese nation has ushered in a great leap from standing up, getting rich to becoming strong, and realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has entered an irreversible historical process." He also emphasized that China will not tolerate any humiliating treatment while proudly competing with any foreign forces, including the United States. Indeed, China's rise is dazzling. By the end of 2021, China's GDP is expected to be about 71 percent of that of the United States, which is remarkable compared to the fact that the Soviet Union's GDP was less than 50 percent of that of the United States in the early 1980s during the Cold War. However, as the pride and self-confidence of the Chinese are at an all-time high, emphasizing the peculiarities of the Chinese style, values, and systems, the international community is showing a rapid decrease in a favorable sentiment toward China while perceived threat is increasing. According to the results of a survey in 17 countries by the Pew Research Center in the United States on June 30, 2021, the negative view was

the highest ever. According to a survey on China's reputation between February and May 2021, among approximately 19,000 adults in 17 countries in North America, Europe, and Asia, more than 50 percent of the 15 countries responded that they viewed China negatively. According to Pew Research, this number has risen sharply since 2018, hitting an all-time high this year.[12]

China, a global power that has not been agreed or accepted by the international community through the construction of attractive institutions, values, and culture, is likely to be regarded as a challenge or threat to the international community, which will make it difficult to emerge as the center of a new civilized order. In the end, China's dream of becoming a leader at the global or regional level will be possible when it creates acceptable systems and values from the more open and representative international community, rather than being trapped in the logic of Chinese "specificity".

Notes

1　This chapter was written with some modifications from the following paper and research report: "China's Political System in Xi Jinping 'New Era': The 'Evolution' of the Party-State System and the Emergence of a New Paradigm Authoritarian System", *Sino-Soviet Affairs* Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn, 2020; "Sustainability of the Strong Authoritarian Regime in China and Korea's Countermeasures", *North East Asia Research Foundation Research Report* (March 2021).
2　Based on an in-depth interview on July 30, 2019.
3　Based on an in-depth interview conducted in Shanghai on August 2, 2019.
4　This classification is based on three approaches to the study of political change in China by Xuedong Yang, a research fellow at the Central Translation Bureau of the CCP. The three approaches are as follows: First, as a traditional analysis method, it is an approach that attempts to explain the political changes in China at the time through a mirror of Chinese history. The second is a modernist approach, which is characterized by estimating the political changes in China at the time through a modern mirror and predicting the future direction and result. The third is an orthodox approach, which attempts to explain political changes in China through the mirror of the official ideology of the party-state system (Yang 2018, 115–126).
5　At the CCP Politburo Study Meeting, Xi Jinping emphasized that the mission that the CCP must follow through the twenty-first century is to consistently practice for the happiness of the people and to pursue the revival of the Chinese nation (Xi 2021).
6　It was argued that a harmonious society would be realized by bridging the development gap between social classes and between urban and rural areas, and by resolving environmental problems destroyed in the process of economic development.
7　Based on data from an in-depth interview with Professor Yue-jin Jing on July 30, 2019.
8　Based on an in-depth interview with Professor Kongchin Xiao on August 3, 2019; based on data from an in-depth interview with Professor Yue-jin Jing on July 30, 2019..
9　Yu and Lieberthal co-edited (2013) contains a large number of related papers.
10　Vice-President Wang Qishan attended the meeting of the Beijing delegation of the National People's Congress on March 5, 2017, and noted that "there is no party-government separation, only the division of work of the party government". At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, the Party constitution was revised, and the Party leadership was stipulated. It is the same as the rule that "the party leads the whole of the party, government, military, people's studies, east, west, south, north, and middle" appeared

in the editorial of the *People's Daily* on July 1, 1974, during the period of Cultural Revolution. In addition, Article 1 of the Constitution amended in 2018 stipulates the leadership of the party. The party leadership was stipulated in the 1975 revised constitution, deleted from the 1982 constitution, the current constitution, and was included again with the partial constitutional amendment in 2018.

11   Branko Milanovic, in *Capitalism Alone* (2019), regards the systemic confrontation between the United States and China as a confrontation between America's liberal meritocratic capitalism and China's political capitalism. This article refers to political capitalism as state capitalism. State capitalism uses the market economy as a "means" for modernization, adopting a market-friendly approach, but not leaving it to the market alone. The state comprehensively deploys financial policy, industrial policy, manpower policy, etc. in order to optimally allocate scarce resources by properly combining planning and the market. Meanwhile, Ying Zhu, professor of economics at Shanghai Normal University, argues that China's economic system is clearly different from the free market economic system, and China has never declared that it is going to the path of a market economy system based on a Western model. China takes advantage of the Western model for economic development but cannot accept a market economy. The reason is that in principle, a market economy has no choice but to reject the leadership of the Communist Party and insist on the liberalization of the economy. The market economy is only a means of economic development in China (Zhu 2020).

12   The country with the most unfavorable view was Japan at 88 percent, followed by Sweden (80 percent), Australia (78 percent), Korea (77 percent), and the United States (76 percent). Following the United States, more than 50 percent of people viewed China negatively in Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, Taiwan, Belgium, New Zealand, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain. The countries with a negative response rate of less than 50 percent were Greece (42 percent) and Singapore (34 percent). In particular, Singapore is the only country with a high level of positive responses in a survey on the trustworthiness of President Xi Jinping. However, they showed a negative view on human rights issues in China (ChosunIlbo 2021).

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13 Myanmar's Broken Democracy "Disciplined" by the Military

Analysis on the Quality of Procedure in Fledging Democracy

Young-Hwan Shin

Introduction

On Monday morning, the first day of February 2021, an aerobics teacher filming a video accidentally captured the seamless march of a convoy of military vehicles to the parliament in Naypyidaw, the capital of Myanmar. The military detained the government's leading figures, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, most of whom were affiliated with the National League for Democracy (NLD), and deposed the members of the ruling party who were democratically elected in the general election of November 2020. A year-long state of emergency was proclaimed, and all political power was declared to have been transferred to the Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services Min Aung Hlaing. The third military *coup d'état* in the history of the country left the people of Myanmar in a state of grim frustration.

Having experienced more than a decade of liberalization and democratic transition, the people of Myanmar have not been willing to tolerate this military coup, which justified itself by asserting that the 2020 election had been corrupt and illegal. People poured out onto the streets in the big cities of Yangon and Mandalay as well as in rural areas, shouting "We want democracy" and demanding that the military release the detained democratic leaders and restore the democratically elected government by people's will. However, the non-violent and peaceful protests were oppressed by violent armed forces, and many innocent citizens, young and old, male and female, educated and uneducated, urban and rural, were victimized. The citizens of Myanmar banged on tin pots every night, turned the lights off and on together in the darkness, spelled out "We want democracy" on empty backgrounds, and held sporadic flash mobs on the streets to demonstrate in protest of the coup. All of these are clever ways to express disobedience and reject the military coup while avoiding violent oppression. However, the level of violence and the number of civilian victims has increased, and citizens have begun to arm themselves. The danger of civil war within Myanmar is increasing as violence between the armed security forces and anti-military coalition escalates.

The 2021 military coup in Myanmar astonished the world. The international media described Myanmar's democratization as having been frustrated under

military boots that trampled the hope of freedom. Five years ago, the world watched the landslide victory of the National League for Democracy in the election, which was recognized as a historical turning point and a step toward democratization after more than 50 years of military authoritarian rule. The people of Myanmar took the opportunity presented by the first free and fair election in the nation's history and succeeded in achieving regime change by voting against the military dictatorship. However, the dream of five years ago was short and fruitless. While prospects for democratic transition were very hopeful then, today's despair feels far greater.

Why was the civilian government so helpless that the military was able to annul the results of the democratic election and restore its authoritarian rule regardless of the will of the people? Is it so easy for the military to pull off a *coup d'état* in Myanmar? Isn't there a safety net for pursuing democratization and civilian rule in the country? If they had a plan to take power through another coup, why did the military allow the 2015 general election to take place? Couldn't the 2015 election be recognized as a milestone of achieving procedural democracy in Myanmar, which can be expected to lead to further transitional steps for democratization?

The political reform and liberal policies adopted by the Thein Sein regime and the subsequent general election in 2015 seemed to put Myanmar smoothly on the path to democratic transition. But democratic transition is not a mechanical process that follows a linear sequence. Democratic processes or institutions do not guarantee political development. The content which fills the democratic framework should be considered, and this demands that we consider the quality of democracy as an essential component of political transition (Diamond and Morlino 2004). The quality of democracy can help us understand, evaluate, and compare existing democratic states. However, the application of such quality requirements to a nascent democratic country like Myanmar will likely result in such low scores that it is difficult to place the regime in the democratic category. Therefore, when we assess the quality and prospects of a nascent democracy which has just emerged from the dark tunnel of authoritarian rule, we need to focus on the basic requirements for a fledgling democracy to consolidate the initial phase of transition and take the next step. In other words, it is appropriate to lower the standard when evaluating the quality of democracy in new democracies that are still in the early stages of transition.

The theory of "New Democracy", which targets the quality of democracies, adopts the two main pillars of quality of procedure and quality of results as indicators. This chapter tries to analyze the nascent democracy of Myanmar in an attempt to understand why the civilian government was so helpless when facing the third military coup in 2021. Because it is very difficult to expect a nascent democracy to be able to adopt measures that may be required to meet quality of result metrics, we must look at quality of procedure metrics instead, as the prior condition which makes it possible that the quality of results could be addressed. Therefore, this chapter uses the concept of quality of procedure to understand the 2015 general election and the NLD government, and to evaluate the possibilities

and limitations of the civilian government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar.

Three Dimensions of the Quality of Democratic Procedure

As stated above, the "New Democracy" theory understands the quality of democracy through quality of procedure and quality of results. Quality of democratic procedure, which nurtures democratic effectiveness and performance, looks at two metrics: Whether a political system has democratic procedures such as regular and fair elections and democratic legal and constitutional frameworks; and whether the democratic procedures operate according to the basic principles of democratic values such as civil representation, rule of law, human rights, and so on. In other words, the quality of procedure as measured by the "New Democracy" theory requires both institutions and practices which address democratic values. Procedural quality includes participation, competition, and power distribution, as expounded in Chapter 1. The three components need to be separated and examined individually in order to be applied to the case of nascent democracy in Myanmar.

Participation

The aspect of participation in quality of procedure focuses on whether bottom-up channels which convey the needs and desires of various interests in society to the state are preserved both practically and legally. At a minimum, all citizens of legal age, regardless of their gender, birthplace, educational level, wealth, and other biological and social differences, shall have the right to vote to express their political interest and will through the election. This means universal suffrage and free and fair elections which are held regularly and enshrined into law. Additionally, in a mature democracy, elections should not be the only chance that civil society has to influence the processes of legislation and policy-making. Citizens are to be endowed the right to express various political opinions through media, publications, demonstrations, and civil association during ordinary non-election periods, and these activities should be capable of influencing the considerations of political leaders. This may be described as extended procedural quality.

Fair elections are a key feature of democracy and closely related to its quality. Fair elections are intended to give governments political legitimacy because all citizens, regardless of who they voted for, are willing to acknowledge the justice and authority of a government elected by their own majority (O'Donnell 2007, 6). As in Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*, a "commonwealth" which is established through a "social contract" by authorizing and giving up one's right of governing to a third entity (Hobbes 1904) has unequal and exclusive power, but this power is justified by equal voting to determine who wields the power and how it is wielded (Buchanan 2002, 710). Therefore, free, fair, and regular elections are not only a necessary condition for establishing a legitimate government which is supported

by its citizens, but also an important indicator, fairness being critical, to evaluate the quality of democracy (O'Donnell 2007, 8–9).

In a mature democracy, civil society has well-organized mechanisms to deliver political will and interests to the legislative and policy-making processes during inter-election periods. Civil society may include media, interest groups, civil society organizations, think tanks, and various associations whose support is sought by political parties. But in a nascent democracy, where such mechanisms are often absent, the eruption of various interests can be recognized as political disorder and instability. As a result, the government may be tempted to censor and oppress any political opposition, which ushers in a downturn of democratization. Freshman democracies struggle to find an optimum balance which guarantees both political stability and freedom.

Competition

Competition focuses on the ability of political elites to be elected through a free and fair election process. The term "elite" may betoken the image of "the power elite" which is suggested by C. Wright Mills, an exclusive conglomerate of the triumvirate which monopolizes military, economic, and political power, and which may avert democracy toward the path of oligarchy (Michels 2001 (originally 1915); Mills 2000 (originally 1956)). Nevertheless, political elites and their groups play an important role in democratic transition, as long as "competitiveness" among them is conditioned so that the principle of representativeness is addressed. Competitiveness of political elites can be understood through two dimensions—multiplicity and capability.

Democracy, which is premised on social diversity and the accommodation of pluralist values, is often described as a process of competition and compromise among various interests. In this process, competing actors with different interests endure a tortuous transition from intolerance to tolerance, from tolerance to dissent, and with dissent to the recognition of inescapable diversity among themselves (Sartori 1976, 12). A diverse society will express various interests and cultivate a number of associations and groups as well as multiple political parties that represent the full sociopolitical landscape of interests and ideologies. Politicians and political elites organize political parties and compete against one another to be elected through the campaign process. Therefore, constituents will be given a ballot of multiple alternatives when voting. The presence of a number of political elites affiliated with different parties competing for votes and multiple alternatives for voters to choose from in elections are both important conditions for pluralism and representativeness.

Simply the presence of multiple political elites and parties is not sufficient for competition. If one political leader or one party is dominant while other competitive elites and parties are so weak that they have no hope of being elected in the foreseeable future, we cannot say that it is truly "competitive". Therefore, we also need to consider the capacity of the competitors. Not all political elites can be equally politically talented, but they should at least have a hope of becoming an

elected political leader in the future. If they are qualified, they can act as a check against incumbent and elected elites even if they fail to be elected themselves. Capable competitors keep elections and political power from being monopolized by the elected few. Neither winners nor losers should be permanent. A winner may lose, and a loser can win next time. This makes elections competitive, and allows people to express their will by voting.

Power Distribution

A participatory and competitive election procedure can contribute to the establishment of a democratic political system. However, formally satisfying the condition of fair and competitive elections does not necessarily guarantee democratic government building. Power distribution matters, and we need to examine election outcomes. Power distribution is often understood by counting the number of seats each political party has in the legislature and assessing the ratio among them (Vanhanen 2000, 253). However, we will focus on whether political power is monopolized by one political leader or a specific ruling group. We can see this kind of power monopolizing example in economically developing and politically authoritarian countries. Then, how can political power be monopolized when there is a participatory and competitive election process?

First, the incumbent power takes advantage of the election procedure to strengthen its ruling position, through which it can also secure the legitimacy of its ongoing rule. In this case, participation and competition may not function well enough as institutionalized in the formal scheme, or the election process may be manipulated through fraudulent tricks and bad practices. Second, political coalitions need to be considered. If the incumbent party was unable to win a majority and its biggest competitor won a meaningful number of seats, and if the two recognize their shared interests, they may agree to build a coalition which benefits both. This oligarchic coalition between the previous competitors can monopolize power and acquire autonomy apart from society. Monopolized power does not need to be responsive to social demands.

It may be difficult to see how a nascent democracy can successfully address all three dimensions of the procedural requirement. However, we can evaluate the progress of the political transition and identify the next obstacle to be overcome in the journey toward democratization in a developing country.

The Distorted Procedure of Democracy in Myanmar

The general election held on November 8, 2015 in Myanmar was widely expected to contribute to democratic transition in the country. It was regarded as a generally free and fair process where citizens of legal age had the right to vote freely for whichever candidate on the list they favored. There were no major incidents of violent oppression or voter intimidation reported, and the outcome of the election was based on an open and reliable official vote tally. However, when we call the 2015 election meaningful, it is not because the election effectively met democratic

requirements, but rather because it was a historical opportunity to replace the long-lived military dictatorship by establishing a civilian government with public support. Myanmar's electoral law and practices suffer from a number of deficits that harm the procedural conditions for democratic quality, and this may well hinder future efforts for political reform beyond initial expectations.

Citizenship and Freedom of Expression

Participation in elections is primarily based on universal suffrage. All citizens of legal age should be guaranteed the equal right to vote at their own free will. There should not be any discrimination based on gender, wealth, education level, or other demographic factors. The electoral law of Myanmar provides universal suffrage for its "citizens", which does not initially appear to be problematic. However, the right of citizenship has not been naturally given to all of the residents who live in the territory of Myanmar. With a historic inheritance of ethnic diversity and inflows of people from other areas during the colonial era of British India, the current citizenship law of Myanmar was established on the principle of discrimination and exclusion. The law stipulated the qualifications for full Myanmar citizenship based on *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* practically defined by ethnic background and religion, and excluded many residents who couldn't meet the criteria. According to the 1982 citizenship law, only those who belong to one of the eight legally recognized ethnic groups (Bamar, Chin, Karen, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan) are considered to be genuine citizens. All "others" were categorized as "naturalized" or "associate" citizens, and their sociopolitical lives were legally restricted. For example, only full citizens were able to ascend to higher positions of public service, some categories of professions, and certain areas of higher education (Arraiza and Vonk 2017).

Exclusiveness and discrimination are also found in the electoral law and its practices, which can be seen in the 2015 election. Discrimination against the Rohingya is a clear example corroborating the accusation that Myanmar's "free and fair" elections are in fact hypocritical. The 2010 Political Parties Registration Law, which was amended in 2014, stipulates that only full citizens are allowed to form and join a political party. This law excludes Rohingya and other Muslim ethnic groups from normal political participation. In 2015, the military government did not hesitate to revoke the voter eligibility of members of minority ethnic groups by declaring that the "white cards", or temporary registration certificates provided to minorities, would expire. As a result of this move, about 700,000 Rohingya and tens of thousands of ethnic Chinese and Indians who have resided in the territory for generations were not able to vote or run for office. The situation in 2020 was not so different. Following the landslide victory of the NLD in 2015, minority ethnic groups hoped that the civilian government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would welcome them as full citizens of Myanmar in accordance with the spirit of the Panglong Agreement in 1947. Instead, the NLD government tolerated and even supported the military when it committed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya. By 2020, the NLD had not tried

to amend the legal frameworks regarding citizenship and elections. Practically speaking, there was no practical change under their rule for many Muslim people and ethnic minorities, who were still not allowed to vote or to run for office (Human Rights Watch 2020; Freedom House 2021).

Liberalization policies during the Thein Sein regime contributed to the promotion of freedom of expression in civil society. Political prisoners were released from custody, and many democratic activists who had been living in exile came back home. They enthusiastically set up civil society organizations and mobilized democratic movements targeting the 2015 general election. They thought that the 2015 election would be an opportunity to end the military rule and place the people's hands on the wheel to drive the country toward democratic transition. With a relatively high literacy among adults in Myanmar (Department of Population 2017), they saw the possibility of making real change through voting. The Union Election Commission released information about electoral procedures and instructions, creating a threshold for ordinary citizens, who didn't have much experience with elections, to overcome. Many civil society groups carried out voter education for those who had limited access to information about voting, most of whom were in rural areas. In addition to this, many candidates and parties devoted a substantial amount of their campaign activities to voter education (The Carter Center 2016). During the 2015 election, those activities of civil society organizations and competing parties were guaranteed in general without notable suppression by authorities reported.

We might expect that Myanmar's 2020 election would be freer and fairer as the NLD government was supposed to promote democratic transition. However, this did not turn out to be the case. Rather, social movements and freedom of expression were interrupted by authorities during the civilian government. For example, the Ministry of Education released directives requiring all student events at universities to get permission from both the Ministry and the military in advance. Political activities and movements on university campuses as well as student associations were viewed with suspicion by authorities and generally discouraged. Freedom House reports that student activists were detained and charged for distributing handouts that criticized government policies (Freedom House 2021).

COVID-19 was an unexpected but useful tool for the government to control the election. The government utilized the pandemic to suppress political opposition during the campaign period. The government implemented measures to control the spread of the virus, including restrictions on social gatherings, travel, and freedom of movement. As cases increased, the government issued stay-at-home orders in the bigger cities like Yangon and Mandalay, Rakhine State, Mon State, Bago, Ayeyarwaddy, and other affected areas. Only "essential" workers were exempted from the restrictions. On September 20, 2020, the government declared journalism a non-essential business, leaving many journalists subject to stay-at-home orders. As a result, journalists faced significant difficulty in traveling to campaign and election events, let alone producing and distributing newspapers and magazines. Only two government-affiliated media outlets were allowed to

cover the election and print newspapers, becoming the de facto main channels to deliver election information from the authorities (Human Rights Watch 2020).

Ethnic Representation

In Myanmar's politics, ethnic diversity, which has been behind major insurgencies and instability in the country, is one of the major problems that should be considered in political transition. General Aung San eagerly endeavored to convene leaders from different ethnic groups in 1947 because he thought that ethnic problems should be prioritized in order to build a new independent nation after the long, humiliating colonization. Otherwise, Myanmar would disintegrate into unending hatred and conflict, and the dream of one nation of Myanmar would have been dashed. Under the military regime, the country's ethnic interests have long been coerced into silence, often violently, which resulted in ongoing political instability in the country. As part of the peace process during the new military regime led by General Thein Sein, major ethnic groups agreed to suspend their century-long armed struggle against the Bamar military and seek a peaceful approach within the political process. This meant that ethnic groups would participate in the upcoming election by forming political parties and nominating candidates to run for office (David and Holliday 2018, 25–27).

In the 2015 general election, 91 parties took part in the competition for seats in the Assemblies of the Union and State (*Pyidaungsu Hluttaw*) and the Regional *Hluttaws*. The Union Election Committee allowed various parties representing minority interests to run for election, but it had a useful tool to control the election landscape. The constitution contains a requirement that political parties should be loyal to "the State". This clause is rife with potential for abuse by the authorities. As mentioned above regarding citizenship limitations, the election law disenfranchised religious Muslims, including Rohingya, and prevented them from running for office. The laws and practices that were in place in 2015 did not support full competition in the general election. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that a number of political parties, many of which centered on minority ethnic interests, entered the public arena to compete for public support in 2015, and citizens who voted received a very long ballot full of candidates. It was not perfect, but it was a meaningful step forward toward democratic transition in Myanmar.

While the number of competitors is important, it is not sufficient to ensure true competition. Only when the number has real meaning, the competition can be achieved. Therefore, we need to think about the performance of minority ethnic parties in the election. The performance of a political party depends on whether it is able to get support from voters and win seats in the election. A journalist argued (Belford 2015) prior to the election, "Assuming the election is a fair fight, the ethnic parties will prevail in the ethnic areas", but the results told another story. In fact, minority ethnic parties won just about 11 percent of the elected seats in the lower legislative house. Even in the seven states where ethnic minorities are the majority of the population, their results were not impressive, winning only one-third of seats in the legislative body. Of course, the Arakan National Party in

Rakhine State, which won 12 of the state's 17 seats, was successful. But generally, ethnic representativeness was not achieved during the electoral competition in 2015 (Jap and Ziegfeld 2020).

Myanmar's single-member plurality electoral system may be a good reason for the disappointing performance of these ethnic political parties, given that the political landscape is characterized by many ethnic groups who live scattered all over the country (Tan and Preece 2020). However, this is not the only reason, as one would expect these parties to have won in the districts where they shared the same identity as the majority of the constituents. The reasons behind the results of the election may not be what we expect. Here, we can consider two plausible assumptions. The first is election strategy. The 2015 election was a historical opportunity for Myanmar's public to bring about true regime change from military to civilian, from dictatorship to democracy, and from oppression to freedom. Therefore, they thought that NLD, the most capable party among oppositions, should play a leading role, and they were afraid that split voting might have an unintended benefit for the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and lengthen the military's rule. Second, the ethnic parties were not particularly capable. They were small and very ineffective financially and organizationally. It was not uncommon for two or more parties in a district with the same ethnic identity to compete against each other, resulting in party fragmentation and split voting. Many ethnic minority groups lacked leadership capable of mobilizing people to participate in the election process (Stokke 2019). Third, we must consider the obstacles that kept ethnic parties from being competitive. As reported by Freedom House, given that unequal access to information and government-affiliated media, restrictions on in-person campaigning, Internet shutdown, and cancellation of balloting in some districts were cunningly utilized by the government, which made the 2020 election less competitive (Freedom House 2021).

A lot of political parties with different backgrounds were competing in 2015. As a consequence, they failed to achieve ethnic representation. The situation surrounding the 2020 election had not improved—in fact, it had arguably worsened.

Minimum Seats for Maximum Power

Having won a landslide victory in the 2015 election, the NLD took a majority of the seats in both the House of Nationalities (*Amyotha Hluttaw*) and the House of Representatives (*Pyithu Hluttaw*) of the Assembly of the Union, where it obtained more than 57 percent seats in total (Dinmore 2015). This was enough to win the presidential election, and to control both Houses at the Union level. Although the constitution barred Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from being the president on the basis of her husband being foreign, the NLD was powerful enough to appoint her as the State Counselor, a position which was designed to be similar to, but more powerful than, Prime Minister. In practice, State Counselor was the top position above the presidency (Cochrane 2016). No matter whether the initial measures in the transition phase were lawful or democratic, it is fair to assess the power

transition as having been peaceful and recognize the hope that many people felt at the prospect of initiating a true democratic transition by ending military rule.

The military leaders were embarrassed by the 2015 election results. They knew that the people supported Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, but the results were much more than they expected. There were concerns that the military would nullify the results as it did in 1990, leading to public protests and another coup justified by the "need" to intervene to restore stability and order in the country. This was what the military had always done before. Fortunately, the worst case scenario did not occur. There are several possible answers as to why the military "tolerated" the disadvantageous outcome of the election, which seemed poised to take away all of the privileges it had enjoyed for decades. Even as it announced the seven-step "Roadmap to Discipline-flourishing Democracy" in 2013, the military would not want to escape the orbit it had created. Or, more plausibly, the junta feared that with international society watching the historical election in Myanmar, hasty actions might incur harsh international criticism. More realistically, it is possible that the military was confident in its ability to secure its essential position and share of power even with the NLD at the helm.

The 2008 Constitution secures privileges which the military has enjoyed for decades. In the preamble, it states the "eternal principles" of justice, liberty, equality, peace, and prosperity, as often found in other countries. Besides these written principles, the constitution seems to be mainly a tool for the junta to strengthen its privileged position and continue to operate beyond civilian control. First, 75 percent of the seats of both the Houses in the Assembly of the Union are elected, but the remaining 25 percent are allocated to the military without election. Therefore, the commander-in-chief appoints 56 seats in the House of Nationalities and 110 seats in the House of Representatives who are subject to military discipline (Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Constitution Articles 7 and 11). Given that the USDP is the second biggest party supported by the military, the military is automatically guaranteed to have more than 25 percent seats at minimum in the parliament, by which they are able to veto any attempt to modify the constitution and undermine their interests. The constitution can only be amended with more than 75 percent of all parliament members (Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Constitution Article 436). In other words, no matter how many seats the NLD and anti-military coalition may win in parliament, it is fundamentally impossible to reform the 2008 Constitution without the military's endorsement. Even the constitution contains articles which can be used for "lawful" *coup d'etat* (Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Constitution Articles 417 and 418), as we saw in February 2021.

In constituting the executive branch, while two candidates for presidency are nominated by each elected House, a third candidate is named by the military. Among the three candidates, one is elected as the president for a fixed five-year term by the Assembly of the Union, and the other two serve as vice-presidents. In addition, the military has the exclusive right to compose essential departments in the executive branch. The commander-in-chief can appoint the leaders of key executive bodies such as the Ministries of Defense, Home Affairs, and

Border Affairs. This effectively allows the military to construct line management of the police and border guard forces (Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Constitution Article 232). By ruling over the Ministry of Home Affairs, the military exerts influence on the General Administration Department (GAD), which provides civil service by directing staff at all levels of provincial and local governments (Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and Arnold 2014). The National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), which has important powers, is chaired by the president, but the military appoints five or six members, which is the majority (Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Constitution Articles 201, 204, 206, and 410–432).

Though the 2015 election was recognized as important momentum for democratic transition in Myanmar, the civilian government faced formidable obstacles which prohibited any attempts to harm the privileges of the military. The country's constitutional and legal frameworks still serve as a form of "political insurance" for the ruling elite to prepare for a possible loss of power in the future and to secure essential powers (David and Holliday 2018, 53). Under the 2008 Constitution, civilian control seems to be impossible practically, and the formidable power of commander-in-chief at the top of the military "conglomerate" keeps sturdy position.

Discipline-Flourishing Democracy

In 1988, the public's increased unrest over the prolonged economic fiasco and political oppression ushered in a nationwide pro-democracy movement, known as the 8888 Uprising. The military suppressed the demonstrations ruthlessly and violently, killing thousands of unarmed civilians, and the military, led by General Saw Maung, staged a *coup d'état* stating that the military had to come forward to restore the country's fallen law and order and establish integration and unity of the state. The junta organized the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The SLORC declared martial law and erased "socialism" from the country's official name, changing the "Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma" to the "Union of Myanmar". It needed to adopt a new ideology to replace socialism, and chose "democracy" as the aim of the roadmap for political development. The concept of democracy suggested by the SLORC was far different from the Western concept that is widely accepted as the norm. During the regime's first press conference with *Asia Week* on January 17, 1989, General Saw Maung said, "Discipline is essential for flourishing democracy. All democracy wants is discipline, and discipline is law" (Jang 2017, 224). Like many authoritarian dictators who describe their regime as "democratic" by adding adjectives in front of it (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 431), the SLORC emphasized the concept of "discipline" in ordaining the character and attributes of Myanmar democracy. On August 30, 2003, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), which was the new name of the previous SLORC, endorsed the Roadmap to Discipline-flourishing Democracy in an announcement made by General Khin Nyunt on state media (Bünte 2011, 17–18).

As indicated by the name, "discipline-flourishing democracy" emphasized law and order as the top priority. Individual freedom, freedom for political parties to engage in activities, and a fair legislative process in a representative parliament could all be guaranteed, as long as they complied with the laws. Discipline, which is realized through law, was put forth as the core value under which democracy can function well. Democracy was to be coordinated in accordance with discipline, which would contribute to providing fair interest to all people under the flag of national solidarity. Discipline-flourishing democracy seems to have been created as a hybrid system which mixes Sukarno's guided democracy with the leading role of political elites, the Suharto regime of military supremacy in the economic and political realms, and the Asian Values ideology advocated by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore (Jang 2017, 226–227). At this point, we should ask: "Who defines discipline?" Considering its privileged position in the power distribution and its exclusive possession of physical force, the answer is most certainly the military.

The 2008 Constitution is based on this principle of discipline-flourishing democracy, and it forms the basis from which the junta has ruled over the entire nation. Even if the NLD gained a majority of seats in parliament, discipline-flourishing democracy put the junta above the parliament and the executive. Even as the constitution and legal frameworks secure its privileges, the military has continued to try to create more favorable conditions for its dominating power.

First, the military's rule has fed on social disorder and political instability. When it staged the first coup in 1962, the junta justified itself by arguing that the nation's devastated unity and fallen order made its intervention inevitable. In 1988, facing the nationwide pro-democracy demonstrations, the military declared martial law again. Given that Myanmar lacks any precedent for a successful civilian government, the military's rule is recognized to be effective in managing the social conflicts that stem from ethnic diversity, ideology, religion, and other social and economic issues. After the 2015 election, Myanmar's society had democratic momentum, which meant that various interests started to openly emerge in the public arena. A lot of social interests and civil movements were organized, and their different opinions and claims struggled and clashed with one another. Ethnic and religious issues had long been silenced, but now they surfaced as extremely sensitive topics of public controversy. While some saw this as natural, others worried that it might increase social unrest and ultimately lead to chaotic disorder. This concern resulted from the unexpected effects of Myanmar's democratic momentum. Considering the landslide victory of pro-democracy parties in 2015, it would be easy to assume that public support for military rule would decrease. However, reality was somewhat different. According to the 2019 Asian Barometer Survey, people's trust in the military and positive response to the military's political role increased after 2015, although support for democracy and people's rule as favorable future regime type in Myanmar remained high.[1] This can be interpreted to mean that a number of people agree that the military has a role as a necessary guardian during the transition period (David and Holliday 2018, 54–59).

Even though the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi dominated the seats in the parliament and the executive branch after the victory in 2015, they faced obstacles which could not be overcome by majority numbers. The NLD was not able to amend the 2008 Constitution, which secured the military's power over both the parliament and the executive. Another factor was the established bureaucracy of the state, which had long been under the military's influence and had built a close relationship with it. The established bureaucracy could and would weaken the control and performance of the civilian government if the NLD pushed too far. With these limitations, the NLD government had to make a strategic decision. It could not control the military. It could not look upon the armed forces as a political enemy. It did not have the capacity to replace the country's ruler of half a century. The capacity of the civilian administration to act without the military's cooperation was very limited, if it existed at all. It is not surprising that the new political leaders would think of strategically coexisting with their previous enemy. As a consequence, the NLD, whose only source of power was and is the people's support, was not responsive to public criticism. The NLD even suppressed its political opponents and freedom of expression as they endeavored to construct their own pool of political elites in the state and favored top-down decision-making, considering it more effective. Given that it was partly captive to and partly in concert with the entrenched military, the government of Myanmar's fledgling democracy became autocratic as it strategically aligned itself with the previous dictator (Thawnghmung and Robinson 2017). This regime was described as a "democratic dictatorship" (Cartalucci 2016), a very strange combination of contradictory words.

The Rohingya problem, which is an ongoing conflict between the Rohingya Muslims and the Rakhine Buddhist communities and Myanmar security forces, clearly shows this aspect of the regime's character. The long-lasting conflict resumed on October 9, 2016, when unidentified insurgents attacked Myanmar border posts and killed border officers, followed by military's crackdown on Rohingya residences. In August 2017, Myanmar's armed forces carried out "clearance operations" in northern Rakhine State, and a massacre against Rohingya civilians was committed. According to the report released by the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), "the destruction of Rohingya villages in northern Rakhine State, and other serious human rights violations committed in the aftermath of the 25 August attacks, were executed in a well-organized, coordinated, and systematic manner" (OHCHR 2017). International society paid special attention to the culminating human rights abuses in the border area and looked to the civilian government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a symbol of democracy in Myanmar, for peaceful resolution and even for punishment of the brutal military (Smith 2019). However, surprisingly and disappointingly, Suu Kyi chose to maintain the line with the military by defending her country against the Rohingya genocide accusations at the highest United Nations court (Simons and Beech 2019). By escalating conflicts in the northwestern border adjacent to Bangladesh, the military was able to aggravate social conflict and instability, mobilize Bamar-Buddhist support, and estrange Aung San Suu Kyi from

international society, proving its firm autonomy over the civilian government. By siding with the military on this issue, the NLD government revealed how entangled it was with the military, willingly or unwillingly, forming a power coalition of political elites between the junta and "democrats" and, disappointingly, abandoning democratic values.

With the framework of discipline-flourishing democracy ingeniously designed by the military, the junta built itself a formidable fortress presiding over the country, and secured the seemingly immutable privileges it has enjoyed for more than half a century. With its autonomy, the military forces dare to further social unrest and to commit human rights abuses against the Rohingya, escalating ethnic conflicts and hatred. Such an environment may well be considered favorable for its unique role as the guardian of the state. Under this framework, the NLD government, though it had the support of the public, faced a long, far, and bumpy road to democratic transition at the time it was established. It was not competent enough to control the bureaucracy and drive democratic reform. Rather, the anxiety of historical opportunity made the civilian winners eager to construct another political elite group, who chose to coexist with the military. The dream of democratic momentum transformed into oligarchic degradation.

Conclusion

We need to evaluate the meaning of the 2015 general election in Myanmar from a different perspective. If we simply describe it as a historical moment for democratic transition in Myanmar, as we often saw in the media at the time, all we can do now is blame the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who had no choice but to coalesce with the military by abandoning democratic values, for their incompetence and failure.

This case study of nascent democracy in Myanmar with the framework of "New Democracy" and a focus on "democratic procedure" among the two pillars of quality of democracy shows that the 2015 election and its result, a landslide victory for the NLD, had innate limitations in terms of the practical democratic momentum that could be generated for the country. The quality of procedure in Myanmar at the time that the new civilian government appeared was too deficient to prepare the ground for a political transition toward democracy. Participation was selective, and freedom of expression was often restricted. Formal competition could be evaluated positively, but actual competition did not represent social interests, especially the interests of ethnic minorities, which mainly desired to address Myanmar's historical and political conditions. Further, the country's power distribution that was established following the NLD's victory in 2015 could not change the privileged power that the military has enjoyed since at least 1968. The liberalization policy promulgated in Thein Sein's regime and following the "free and fair" general election in 2015 are to be recognized as a political survival strategy for securing the military's dominance (Croissant and Kamerling 2013). And it was successful, as we can see now. The military used "discipline-flourishing democracy" to institutionalize its insurmountable superiority in the power-sharing

arrangement, even with a civilian regime, as the guardian of both discipline and the state. It did not hesitate to commit a coup again in 2021, arguing that the 2020 general election, which resulted in another landslide victory for the NLD, was illegal. The junta's claims have been demonstrated to be groundless (Bae and Lee 2021).

The quality of procedure forms the basis for the further development of democratization, on which quality of effectiveness and performance can accumulate. This case study focusing on the quality of democratic procedure of Myanmar during the 2015 general election, and later under the NLD government, shows us how difficult it is for a nascent civilian government to drive democratic transition forward. The case of Myanmar's broken democracy seems to be hopeless, as we cannot expect further democratic development at the military's initiative within the despotic structure of so-called "discipline-flourishing democracy". Nevertheless, it should be noted that democratic transition is not a linear process, but one with frustrations as well as triumphs. The success stories in 2015 and in 2020, and the painful setback after the 8888 Uprising and the Saffron Revolution followed by the resurgence of military rule, may all be ingredients for future democracy in Myanmar.

Note

1   In 2015, 43 percent said they "strongly agree" or "somewhat agree" that the military is trustworthy, and this number increased to 57 percent in 2019. Regarding whether the military's role in politics was positive, 39 percent said they "strongly agree" or "somewhat agree" in 2015, while 49 percent said the same in 2019. Regarding democracy, 66 percent of respondents chose "democracy always preferable" in 2019, which was a moderate decrease from 72 percent in 2015 (Welsh et al. 2020).

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Index