On Educational Leadership as Emancipatory Practice

Problems and Promises

Duncan Waite

ON EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP AS EMANCIPATORY PRACTICE

As a critical reflection on education and educational leadership today, this book makes use of the ideas of some of the major thinkers of our time—Adorno, Arendt, Biesta, Brown, Apple, Hall, Marx, Nietzsche, Rancière, Said, Williams, and others—in an examination of the emancipatory potential of education. Author Duncan Waite explores the political, social, systemic, epistemological, and cultural barriers and roadblocks that inhibit liberatory education, discussing the concepts of corruption and abuse of power; systems and structures that hobble us; ideologies such as neoliberalism, capitalism, and corporatism; identity and consciousness; and conceptions of learning, growth, and development. Ultimately the author unpacks how these issues relate to liberation, emancipation, and social justice for students, teachers, and educational leaders, as well as the role leadership can play in realizing the emancipatory promise of education.

Duncan Waite is Professor of Education and Community Leadership at Texas State University, USA, and Editor of the *International Journal of Leadership in Education*.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

ON EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP AS EMANCIPATORY PRACTICE

Problems and Promises

Duncan Waite

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
NEW YORK AND LONDON

Cover image: © Getty Images

First published 2022
by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

and by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this title has been requested

ISBN: 978-0-367-75891-2 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-367-75890-5 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-16444-9 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003164449

Typeset in Bembo
by Taylor & Francis Books

CONTENTS

Preface *vi*
Acknowledgments *ix*

1 By Way of an Introduction 1
2 Contextual Considerations Considered Differently 13
3 On the Shortcomings of Our Organizational Forms 50
4 The Imperium: Class, Caste, and Control 71
5 Imperial Hubris: The Dark Heart of Leadership 91
6 Notes towards a Conclusion 114

Index *137*

PREFACE

We humans are incredible creatures. We have such potential—as individuals and groups. We are resilient, we overcome adversity and loss, and we are able to inhabit the most inhospitable of environments. At our best, we are creative and compassionate. We produce transcendental works of art—the Sistine Chapel; Bach concertos; the *oeuvres* of Shakespeare, Cervantes, García Márquez, and Tolkien. Creativity and compassion are two of humankind's most laudable characteristics. A sense of fairness and justice is another; as is the freedom impulse.

And yet there is that other side, a darker side of human individuals and groups. Often beyond our comprehension, humans are capable of the most heinous atrocities—the Holocaust; Rwanda, Serbia-Kosovo, Syria, and Myanmar; racism, torture, starvation, and child abuse; slavery; and the decimation of the natural world, to name but a few of the horrors we precipitated.

What differentiates the two? Why the one and not the other? Can we cast off the dark and move towards the light? If so, how?

I'm not the first to wonder about such things. As early as 1665, Spinoza asked:

> Why are the people so deeply irrational? Why are they proud of their own enslavement? Why do they fight 'for' their bondage as if it were their freedom? Why is it so difficult not only to win but to bear freedom? Why does a religion that invokes love and joy inspire war, intolerance, hatred, malevolence, and remorse?
>
> *(as cited in Deleuze, 1988, pp. 9–10)*

Some two hundred years later, Friedrich Nietzsche (1874/2014) considered similar questions when he wrote:

> every human being understands very well that he is entirely unique on this earth… he knows, yet he hides it like a guilty conscience—but why? Because he fears his neighbor, who demands conventional behavior… But what forces an individual to fear his neighbor, to think with the herd, and to take no joy in himself?
>
> *(p. 1)*

This Nietzsche wrote in *Friedrich Nietzsche's Third Untimely Meditation* in praise of his teacher, Schopenhauer, a teacher whom he never met. Nietzsche knew full well the power of a teacher and the influence a teacher can have. A teacher can help the student towards liberation, educating themselves '*against our times*' (p. 27, emphasis in original). But the teacher can only show the student the path, which the student must walk themselves. 'No one can build you the bridge on which you, and only you, must cross the river of life' (p. 4). In his later years, in a reflective piece, Nietzsche admitted that crediting his own becoming to Schopenhauer, no matter how great an educator he was, was misguided, that 'even the greatest educator… [cannot] relieve one of the burdens of *self-education*' (Pellerin, 2014, p. xiv, emphasis in original).

Education alone won't ensure our emancipation, though it is an essential component of that project. We need education to see, but we need courage to act. Courage allows us to overcome our fears and inhibitions.

Stuart Hall (2017) summarized the issues:

> The material and technological means for complete human freedom—a freedom within which man could develop a true individuality and a true consciousness of himself and his possibilities—are almost to hand. But the structure of human, social and moral relationships are in complete contradiction and have to be set over and against our material advances… Until we can throw over the system within which these relationships take place, and the kind of consciousness which feeds the system and upon which it feeds, the working class will be men as things for other people, but they can never be men for themselves.
>
> *(p. 42)*

This book explores these issues, and more—issues such as freedom and emancipation and the role education plays. More specifically, this book examines the possibilities, and the problems, of educational leadership as emancipatory practice. Education and emancipation are twinned, complementary. Together they can aid our individual and collective journey into the light.

References

Deleuze, G. (1988). *Spinoza: Practical philosophy* (R. Hurley, Trans.). City Light Books.

Hall, S. (2017). *Selected political writings: The great moving right show and other essays* (S. Davidson, D. Featherstone, M. Rustin, & B. Schwarz, Eds.). Duke University Press.

Nietzsche, F. (2014). *Schopenhauer as educator: Friedrich Nietzsche's third untimely meditation* (D. Pellerin, Trans.). Daniel Pellerin. (Original published in 1874)

Pellerin, D. (2014). A note on the text. In *F. Nietzsche Schopenhauer as educator: Friedrich Nietzsche's third untimely meditation* (pp. xiii–xiv). Daniel Pellerin.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Susan Field Waite, Stephanie Chitpin, and Michael Apple for their encouragement and support of this project. I would further like to thank Monica Ruiz-Mills, Heriberto Arámbula, and Elizabeth 'Libby' Belasco (at dogearedghostwriter@gmail.com) for assistance with the preparation of the manuscript.

Portions of Chapter 3 were adapted from Waite, D. (2010). On the shortcomings of our organizational forms: With implications for educational change and school improvement. *School Leadership and Management, 30*(*3*), 225–248.

Portions of Chapter 5 were adapted from Waite, D. (2014). Imperial hubris: The dark heart of leadership. *Journal of School Leadership, 24*(*6*), 1202–1232.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

1

BY WAY OF AN INTRODUCTION

This is a critical book, at a critical time. It's a book about educational leadership and emancipation. How is that even possible? Educational leadership, mimicking educational administration, is often perceived and practiced as anathema to freedom. As a function of the State (Hazony, 2012), administration aligns with control, predictability, and stability, not freedom and emancipation. The common ground—overlays and intersections—between administration and leadership leave but little space for freedom and emancipation. But it's that 'little space' of freedom and emancipation which we ponder in this work. I believe in the emancipatory potential of education, and so I'll look for ways that educational leadership can facilitate and contribute to it.

Sadly, our world is awash in migration and human movement on an unprecedented scale. Millions and millions of people emigrate from their home countries, displaced by war, famine, persecution, and the effects of climate change. Many of their destination countries are experiencing political and economic tectonic shifts themselves, often trapping immigrants and refugees in a political and cultural maelstrom. Untold numbers are imprisoned, accosted, robbed, raped, or refused sanctuary and forcibly returned to the sordid conditions they had hoped to escape. Fully half of these refugees are children who experience indescribable trauma from the loss of a relatively stable home life, relatives and friends, and experience a 'disrupted education' (Waite, 2016).

Western countries and their populations are experiencing disruptions and crises. The COVID-19 pandemic and our response to it have exposed inequalities, not just in infection and mortality rates, but throughout society—inconsistencies, inadequacies, and inequities in schooling and school systems that theretofore had been hidden. But we don't need a hurricane or a pandemic to see what is wrong with schooling today. Public schooling has been in decline in the United States

DOI: 10.4324/9781003164449-1

and likely elsewhere for some time. Federal and state funding have decreased. Public schools have lost students to privatized, private, public-private partnerships, charter schools, and homeschooling.

Yet, all is not doom and gloom—some amazing things are happening in schools. Ravich (2020) noted pockets of resistance and pushback. Teachers, parents, and community leaders who value education of a more emancipatory kind point us to the promise and potential that remain in education for freedom and the common good. We need to carefully stoke the embers of education for freedom that lie smoldering in the ashes of public education and gently but resolutely fan them into a flame.

This book calls out and names the political, social, systemic, epistemological, and cultural barriers and roadblocks that prevent people from experiencing a liberatory education. These include corruption and abuse of power; systems and structures that hobble us, such as status and dominance hierarchies; mental models and ideologies (neoliberalism, capitalism, corporatism, and others) that have deleterious effects; consciousness and its (mal)formation; and inhibitory conceptions of learning, growth and development (i.e., 'progress'). These are the topics of this book.

Like Social Justice, but Different

Words matter. Definitions matter. Far from being 'just semantics,' what we say and how we say it matter greatly. There's a nice quote from Mark Twain that's apropos here. He said: 'The difference between the almost right word and the right word is really a large matter. 'Tis the difference between the lightning bug and the lightning.' Words matter. Sometimes words are our only weapon, our only resource. The battle over words and their meanings is critical. Language and discourse are shot through with power—the power of the oppressor to name the oppressed in the oppressor's terms, to categorize him/her/them, to pigeonhole them, to label and be done with them.[1] This is the prison house of language. As a professor of mine once said, 'words speak us even as we speak them' (Bowers, 1986, class notes). These battles take place on vast and complex terrains, from the personal psychological, to immediate interpersonal relationships, to the political and social relations of 'masses,' collectivities, cultures, societies, and civilizations. These are the territories on which and within which Michael Foucault worked: power, knowledge, and discourse.

Further, we must take into account that each word cannot hope to contain its meaning, there is always a surplus, a surfeit of meaning that the word cannot contain (Derrida, 1976). There is an infinite universe of meaning between the 'almost right word' and the 'right word'—the difference that makes a difference (Bateson, 1972). Words have histories, etymologies, and work in relation with other words. They bump up against one another, and overlap or not. Every word carries more than we mean when we invoke it; that's its surplus.

When we use the terms emancipation, liberation, freedom, and social justice, we can never be precise. Social justice and emancipation are similar concepts, though distinct. They are complementary, just as freedom and emancipation are different and complementary. Social justice is just that: mainly concerned with the social. It focuses on inequalities of a more social nature—societal, even global and historical injustices. That said, 'social justice' as a term suffers from the same inconsistencies, contradictions, and simply amorphous and ill-defined (even poorly understood or misunderstood) conceptions of 'the social,' as we'll discuss elsewhere in this book. (See Waite & Arar, 2020.)

However important, 'social justice' cannot cover all contingencies. What does its particular focus—the social—cover? While we often think of social justice on a national level, and the egalitarian ideal to deliver social justice on a global scale, for humanity as a whole, we must recognize the struggle itself happens in localities, on smaller scales (Wright, 2010). Wright himself preferred to speak of 'human flourishing' (p. 13), favoring it over happiness, well-being, or welfare because the ability to flourish indicates ideal conditions for growth and development—a healthy environment absent of material, social, or psychological deprivations. Wright united the concepts of social justice and emancipation, seeing in them 'a central moral purpose in the production of knowledge—the elimination of oppression and the creation of the conditions for human flourishing' (p. 10). With that in mind, emancipatory social science has three tasks:

- First, to define the present existence
- Second, to envision feasible alternatives
- Third, to understand the difficulties associated with making the change.

Williams (1961/2013) identified four systems of relationships between individuals and society—systems of decision or governance (political), systems of maintenance (economic), systems of learning and communication, and systems that create and sustain life. At any given point in time, one force tends to dominate. Nonetheless, these primary forces act on one another, influence one another, and change one another. In our time, economics seems the most influential, if not wholly determinant force, underscored by the fact that most social analysis and theorizing has focused primarily on political and economic systems, relegating those of learning and communication, and creating and nurturing life, to secondary, almost incidental roles. Most of our inherited social theories view life and the sweep of history from the top down, focusing more on the power elites and the superstructures than on the lived experiences of the common woman or man (Geertz, 2000).

Privileging the economic and political has severely diminished our available cultural resources of analysis (Hall, 2016), our mental models if you will, and with it our potential for imagining and then realizing alternative ways of being. It is part of the hegemony of late capitalism that we think primarily in economic terms. This has led

us to accept what I call corporativism as one of the main ways we think about and organize our lives.

Changes in the Concept of 'the Social' and the Individual

In his thorough analysis of the evolution of 'the social' and 'the individual,' Williams (1961/2013) reminded us that these human constructions constitute 'the structure of feeling' of an age. Once, 'the individual' was inseparable from society, yet over time, it spun off and developed a meaning separate and distinct from society. 'Society' has also developed a distinctive character. Yet both are abstractions. 'The individual', despite being separate and distinct, is related to the state.

'State' has come to mean the structure or framework that defines certain boundaries, relationships, communities, or societies—again, abstractions (Williams, 1961/2013). In the liberal tradition, the 'State' is seen as the protector, dare we say provider, of individual rights, achieved through a 'minimum of government' (p. 100). This has produced much human good 'in the actual *liberation of men from arbitrary and oppressive systems*' (p. 100, emphasis added). Nonetheless, tensions and conflicts between 'the individual,' 'society,' and the 'State' have ensued, as we know.

The new 'neoliberal "entreprenerialization" and "human capitalization"' (Brown, 2019, p. 38) movements have attempted to privatize numerous 'State' services, by transferring provisional responsibility to individuals, families, or private ventures. Brown argues this has produced three important changes. First, the process of privatizing social responsibilities results in a plethora of forms intended to enhance human capital value. Second, as more quasi-'State' organizations are dismantled, newly deunionized workers are forced into the new 'sharing' or 'contract' economy (Brown, 2019, p. 38) where they must figure out how to monetize themselves. And third, again a by-product of minimizing 'State' responsibilities, families must assume the financial burden of securing for themselves what were formerly seen as 'public goods,' such as education, health, or social security, for children, as well as for elderly family members, or relatives who are unemployed, disabled, etc. Brown went so far as to say, 'the neoliberal attack on social justice, social reform, and social provision challenged equality, reframed the culture wars, and produced massive disorientation on the Left' (p. 40). But the social, in Brown's calculation, is too important to surrender. 'It is where we, as individuals or a nation, practice or fail to practice justice, decency, civility, and… It is where political equality, essential to democracy, is made or unmade' (p. 41).

Why Education?

Above all, education means change—change in the individual and change at the societal, even global level. Nonetheless, Williams (1976) noted the persistent class connotations associated with the idea of *being educated*. Despite universal

education, the vast majority—even those who have achieved much higher levels of education than their parents or grandparents—continue to be viewed as members of a separate, and markedly lower, class by the educated elite. To be well and truly educated, then, has become a moving goal or adjustable standard changing with the times. Even with more universal education worldwide, the demand for more education—and more education of a particular type, according to reformers—has typically been occasioned by the level of technical skill required for work in a globalizing world. But increases in education, especially for reformers then and now, usually means an increase in its provision, its dispersal or spread—more people being educated and for longer; either more years of universal schooling, more days in the school calendar or more hours. Seldom are other, more fundamental aspects of education—such as the purpose of education, what is taught (curriculum), or how it is taught (pedagogy)—the focus of serious and radical change.

The pressures of inertia are intense. Teachers teach as they were taught. Parents expect children to learn what they learned. Administrators are risk-averse. And schools are seriously underfunded. Inertia works against radical and meaningful school change.

And then there's fear. Fear is pervasive in schools. Nations fear being left behind in global economic (capitalist) competition. Administrators and teachers fear losing their jobs if scores on high-stakes tests aren't what district and state administrators and technocrats demand. High-stakes testing regimes, what Biesta (2019) called the global measurement industry, and the ideologies behind them, so drive schools and curricula that too much teaching has become rote 'drill and kill' memorization for regurgitation on tests. The tests, and the curricula thought necessary to remediate deficiencies or gaps between socially constructed groups, are developed and sold by a few large global corporations. Teachers and administrators are so hard-pressed, by time pressure, the numbers of children they are responsible for, and the insistent demand to get the test numbers up, that they seldom have the luxury to even think, let alone think creatively and imagine or dream, or to read good books and discuss them.

Williams (1989) posited four major ways communication is organized, whether in a society, country, or organization—the authoritarian, the paternal, the commercial, and the democratic. These can be seen to parallel educational systems which also tend to the authoritarian, paternal, commercial, or democratic. The link between learning and communication was central to Williams' theses.

The contemporary norms and structures attendant to late capitalism or neoliberalism position teachers and leaders as workers—not even knowledge workers or intellectuals, of an 'organic' or any other kind, but as simple workers—alienated from both the means and the products of their labor. Within capitalist structures and superstructures, teachers and leaders are valued for what they produce. This is a tortured and contradictory calculus, one might say a warped one, when the 'products' of teaching are rightfully of the

mind and of sensibilities—hardly material products. And there we have the crux of our current dilemma: learning and growth, as the 'products' of teaching, are transmogrified, reified into a measurable thing, and teachers are assessed accordingly, under the assumption that their actions or interventions contribute to or 'produce' this thing, or not. But learning and growth require, among other things, experience and reflection. Reflection is ideational. Learning both spawns and draws upon theories, ideas, schemas, models, and ideologies. Thinking can't be forced or rushed. It can't be managed or controlled. It can't be 'produced' like other products can. It can't be produced on demand.

Thinking takes time. Speed and haste are its enemies (Kahneman, 2011), though speed is handmaiden to capitalism (Maurer, 1995). Teaching takes time, thought, and reflection. Worldly matters and concerns are a distraction. Thinking, deep thinking, is nurtured, as Rancière (2019, p. 46) might suggest, by *far niente* (loosely translated as doing nothing), by letting thoughts roam unbridled—the antithesis of this is, of course, mind control.[2] But this *far niente* is a luxury for workers. Who would pay someone for doing nothing?

We're heirs to ways of thinking influenced by thinkers such as John Locke and Adam Smith, who characterized labor as either manual or intellectual, as 'productive' or 'unproductive.' In the capitalist scheme, thinking is intellectual, but seldom 'productive,' as it is immaterial, lacks substance, and hence cannot be made into a product or commodity. Nonetheless, some have tried, especially in an era known for its 'knowledge economy,' where 'intellectual property' is established, fought over, and defended—thinking and thoughts leave traces in the material world of market capitalism. Arendt (1958) went so far as to label thinking as 'even less "productive" than labor; if labor leaves no permanent trace, thinking leaves nothing tangible at all. By itself, thinking never materializes into any objects' (p. 90). Even 'intellectuals,' whose main job is to think, feel as though thinking itself is not productive work. They feel guilty 'just thinking,' as though they have to steal this time from more productive endeavors. Their guilt echoes Adorno's (1978) 'bad conscience,' which viewed thinking in a disreputable light, requiring 'justification,' and which could only be indulged after 'obligations' and 'appointments' had been met (p. 138). In other words, freedom of thought, or a mind that treasures the freedom to think, has become suspect—a subversive in the capitalist culture system (Adorno, 1978). And in losing its legitimacy, thinking has also lost its autonomy and trustworthiness—it can 'no longer [be trusted] to comprehend reality, in freedom, for its own sake' (p. 196). Or, as Enzensberger put it, 'No illusion is more stubbornly upheld than the sovereignty of the mind' (1982, p. 3). Even in his time, what Enzensberger called the mind industry was so comprehensive, its reach so wide and deep, that he saw little escape from its effects. Like it or not, he recognized thinking had been co-opted by the 'huge industrial complex'—an 'accomplice' (p. 14) to the very organization on which it was dependent for survival. And, he ominously warned intellectual thinkers, whether they 'play[ed] it crooked or straight,' whether they 'win or lose the game,' (p. 14) they should understand the gravity of the stakes.

Everyone needs distance—it's our only 'protection against the infringements of the universal' (Adorno, 1978, p. 94). Distance allows us to recoup, to think and process, to nurture independence. And yet, distance is not free from opposition—it's 'not a safety-zone but a field of tension' (Adorno, 1978, p. 127). The distance may be physical, temporal, or 'critical,' or simply a retreat into the solitude of one's mind, one's thoughts. But as we've seen, even one's thoughts, one's consciousness has been invaded and colonized. Jameson (1991) feared the complete and utter abolishment of such distance in 'the new space of postmodernism,' in which 'multinational capital ends up penetrating and colonizing those very precapitalist enclaves (Nature and the Unconscious)' which were 'footholds for critical effectivity' (pp. 48–49).

Zuboff (2019) exposed surveillance capitalism's erosion of democracy through its control of the lives it touches—nearly everyone's. Our behavior is predicted by Big Data. Our data sold for profit, our behavior manipulated, as is our knowledge. Gone are the traditional relationships between seller and buyer and the responsibilities of one to the other. Gone, too, are the distinguishing and distinctive features, identities, or positions of the individual citizen. There is only data. People are interchangeable, indistinguishable, and known as the data they generate.

Big Other is so intrusive that there is no refuge, no distance. Through our actions, through the generation of the data that the surveillance capitalists harvest, we participate in what Zuboff (2019) termed 'the life of the hive' and the hive mind. We have entered a neo-feudal era, where the common man and woman are serfs and where the elite have become a plutocracy in an epoch 'marked by the consolidation of elite wealth and power far beyond the control of ordinary people and the mechanisms of democratic consent' (p. 44).

The development of the whole self-authoring person is threatened by the forces of surveillance capitalism. Privacy, solitude, and distance from the collective are essential to psychological well-being and growth. As Zuboff (2019) stated, 'the crucial developmental challenges of the self-other balance cannot be negotiated adequately without the sanctity of "disconnected" time and space' (p. 479). Privacy is an essential component for reflection, growth, and development, for one's mental health. Time spent in solitude or with close friends and family restores us, refreshes our creativity, rejuvenates us, and allows time for cathartic contemplation (Pederson, 1997; Zuboff, 2019). Together, these aspects and benefits of privacy granted persons sanctuary, or as Enzensberger (1982) termed it, the sovereignty of one's own mind. Privacy and its benefits are threatened as surveillance capitalism and other equally intrusive and oppressive (hegemonic) forces burrow deeper into our individual and collective lives.[3]

Work

What counts as work? It all depends on your worldview, your perspective. Capitalists, in the pure ideal sense, do little work. Their capital works for them. There are those, capitalists and others, who labor not, who perform no work, and

make no things. In fact, Piketty (2014) has shown that capital outperforms labor over time. No matter how hard a laborer works, she cannot in her lifetime hope to produce/earn that which can be earned through capital investment. *Far niente*, then, is the privilege of the 'leisure class.' Yet, Rancière (2019) saw a type of subversion in the *far niente*. While some might see it as laziness, it's quite different. It's the privilege of enjoying 'the time when one [expects] nothing… the kind of time that is forbidden to the [working man]' (p. 46). The privilege of *far niente*, then, distinguishes one class from another—members of the wealthy class view it as an occupational right, while workers must busy themselves with 'doing,' not 'thinking.' This concept of 'doing' aligns perfectly with Arendt's (1958) characterizations of labor, work, and action, and Rancière's (2019) thoughts on the new order which 'still divides [people] into active and passive citizens' (p. 41).

Judgment, in all its manifestations, is an important aspect, some might say the defining and essential characteristic, of the professional. As Biesta (2014) pointed out, teacher competence is important, but it is never enough—teachers need judgment. At the simplest level, teachers need to be able to judge 'which competence needs to be deployed when… with reference to the purpose of education' (Biesta, 2014, p. 130). And owing to the multidimensionality of the purpose of education, the judgments teachers make must be multidimensional as well, balancing the gains and losses of pedagogical decisions/judgments, their trade-offs.

Both in the classroom and at the school level another trade-off we must consider is that between individual mastery and collaboration or cooperation. Collaboration has become part of many school reform initiatives. 'Working with others' is one of the new '21st-century skills' children should learn and practice to better prepare them for the workplace of the future.

Here we have an excellent example of the dynamism in what Arendt (1958) referred to as one of the fundamental aspects of the human condition: plurality—'living as a distinct and unique being among equals' (p. 178). The human condition of plurality holds special significance for teachers and teaching, and for educational leaders. Though teaching requires thought, and thought requires quiet and solitude, the act of teaching itself takes place in public, or in a semi-autonomous public sphere, the classroom (nowadays this includes direct and limited online interactions; never a substitute for in-person teaching). Of the three types of human effort or initiative—labor, work, and action—action alone necessitates interaction with others. And for Arendt, excellence, whether in teaching or in other arenas, is realized in 'the public realm where one could excel… excellence, by definition, [requires] the presence of others' (pp. 48–49).

How do we define the teacher's audience, their public? If we accept Rancière's (1991) equality of intelligence(s), then students are not inferiors, and the classroom assemblage is not 'a causal, familiar presence of one's equals or inferiors' (Arendt, 1958, p. 49), but a public one. Teaching can be thought of as an activity, or better an ensemble of activities, made from, out of, and through all three

types of activity—labor, work, and action. The labor aspect of teaching is found in that we teach to earn a living, and that the 'product' of our labor is consumable and perishable. The work aspect, again in Arendt's (1961) typology, is that certain aspects of teaching are 'works' that stand against time, that are more permanent, if not durable. Our teaching, our best teaching, becomes then an inheritance, something we can gift our students which will be a part of them through the rest of their lives, if they so choose.[4] A close reading of Arendt would have us question peer- or co-teaching. Arendt held that 'there can be hardly anything more alien or even more destructive to workmanship than teamwork' (p. 162).

Arendt's (1958) conception of excellence as realized in its performance for peers doesn't tell the whole story. Absent is the preparation involved, the hours and years a virtuoso spends in study and practice, in successive approximations of a masterful performance, and failures both before and after. Absent, too, is any mention of luck or chance, or initiative and spontaneity, which are always part of any success (Kahneman, 2011; Lingis, 2018).

Liberatory education is what Biesta (2014) referred to as a weak emancipatory process. In fact, for Biesta, education is rightly a weak process itself. It's dialogical. It's providence 'lies in the *transformation of what is desired into what is desirable*' (p. 3, emphasis in original). And, to Biesta's way of thinking, education is a transformation that requires engagement between the self and the other. 'This makes education the slow way, the difficult way, the frustrating way, and… the weak way, as the outcome of this process can neither be guaranteed nor secured' (p. 3).

The weakness of education is important for Biesta (2014) because the very weaknesses present in communicating and interpreting engage one in the act of thinking, and in that act, one becomes 'the author and originator of one's actions [and becomes] responsible for what one's actions bring about' (p. 4).

Further, emancipation through education is 'weak' because to fulfill its promise, to realize its potential, it cannot be brought about through coercion, deceit, or trickery. It cannot be forced. Unlike liberation, emancipation cannot be given, only grasped at, strived for, never achieved and never guaranteed. It is a process of struggle, though the effort needn't be melancholic or disheartening. It can be sanguine, even joyful. Emancipation is a journey, not a destination. So rather than treating it as a noun, it is better thought of as a verb. After all, we can make our own grammar and syntax as we go, authoring our future histories. The forces arrayed against emancipation, those with which it must contend and wrestle, have not only ideological and ideational components, but structural aspects and material forces or manifestations as well, such as the police of the police order (Rancière, 1991, 2010).

Emancipation first emerges and takes root as an idea, a concept, a feeling, or a desire. It may manifest materially through our relationships, relationships with other people or with the contexts in which we find ourselves. Still, emancipation is hardly material, though it may be incarnate, corporeal, in its effects. It is not purely abstract. It requires a human actor or agent. And though emancipation

cannot be bestowed upon another, and has to be fought for and 'won,' it can be ceded to another, or better said, recognized and acknowledged, though we do not require another's permission to realize our own emancipation. Nonetheless, emancipation is best when others do not move to obviate, erase, or thwart another's journey toward emancipation.

Though educational leaders or administrators cannot emancipate a teacher or the students in a school, they can and should conspire to arrange, organize, and otherwise administer the school and wider contexts so that they are more conducive to the emancipation of those who live and work within them.

Wise and experienced school leaders know that policies and directives are always open to interpretation. This was one of the insights Harold Garfinkel (2002), the originator of ethnomethodology, provided for us. Rules, laws, policies, even such seemingly mundane practices as following the directions to assemble a DIY project from IKEA, are not so clear and explicit that they can implement themselves. There is always a certain something that the person needs to bring to the endeavor to put it all together, to put it into practice, to make it work. This is what Garfinkel called the 'etcetera principle.' It's the taken-for-granted and implicit knowledge needed. It's built from experience and leavened by reflection.

Experienced and wise principals know when and how to be subversive. When necessary, such principals and teachers can muster the resources to turn aside harmful initiatives or directives. They can be the 'give' in such systems, lessening the burden and deleterious effects of injurious directives for those for whom they are responsible. No matter how well-intentioned policies and directives may be, no one can predict their outcomes or effects.

Teaching is more than just work, more than simply labor. Teaching and leading are more like what Arendt (1958) described as action. Action builds and is built on relationships—it is boundless, unpredictable. 'Action… no matter what its specific content, always establishes relationships and therefore has an inherent tendency to force open limitations and cut across all boundaries' (Arendt, 1958, p. 190). We drop a pebble into a pond. Our efforts as teachers and as leaders ripple out, touching not only our students through the course of their lives, but their others, parents and caregivers, siblings and familial relations, the communities they are part of.

The second characteristic of action for Arendt (1958) is 'its inherent unpredictability' (p. 191). Like the pebble in the pond, the effects of good teaching are both boundless and unpredictable, and can never be fully known until the end—the end of the student's life. Teaching and learning are such that the effects are never known in the moment of interaction between a teacher and a student. Owing to the generational divide between teacher and student, a teacher may never know what effect they have had on their students. Arendt would hold that even the student may never truly know.

Actions, such as teaching, are relational. The relationships students have with a teacher and in a teacher's classroom matter, and at a visceral, fundamental level. Treating students with respect, recognizing them as unique and capable—of an equality of intelligence (Rancière, 1991)—treating them as already emancipated persons is what the emancipated teacher does and can do. Equality of intelligence needs to be the starting point, our assumption from the outset.

Learning and education hold emancipatory promise, for individuals and collectivities. This book is a down payment on that promise. Here, we'll tease out the emancipatory promises inherent in education, while recognizing those conditions and processes that might tend to limit or inhibit them, stop them from coming to fruition. Furthermore, we'll look at the role leadership plays or can play in realizing the emancipatory potential of education.

Notes

1 Despite its sometimes awkward constructions (and I apologize in advance), I will use gender-neutral language throughout. However, in quoted material, I'll leave the author's pronouns as they are.
2 Enzensberger (1982), Adorno (1978), and others have suggested our minds have been invaded, colonized, by modern communication technologies and media, suggesting our minds are no longer our own. Enzensberger referred to the mind-making industry, and Jameson (1991) to the culture industry.
3 In Orwellian double-speak logic, even car companies, those representatives of Big Capitalism ('what's good for General Motors is good for the country'), offer us 'the power of sanctuary' in a Lincoln Navigator™ from only $85,000! (www.youtube.com/watch?v=l8fQcKaoAFY).
4 Academic lineage (Waite & Betts, 2020) implies that teaching and learning are an inheritance. For example, Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, and Damon (2001) wrote 'beliefs and practices associated with exemplary good workers… are often passed on not only to students and protégés but even further down the lineage to "grandstudents" and even "great-grandstudents"' (p. 247). Such deep relationships (as opposed to transactional exchanges) enable learning to become part of one's DNA.

References

Adorno, T. (1978). *Minima moralia: Reflections from damaged life* (E. F. N. Jephcott, Trans.). Verso.

Arendt, H. (1958). *The human condition* (2nd ed.). The University of Chicago Press.

Arendt, H. (1961). The crisis of education. In *Between past and future: Eight exercises in political thought* (pp. 173–196). Viking Press.

Bateson, G. (1972). *Steps to an ecology of mind*. The University of Chicago Press.

Biesta, G. J. J. (2014). *The beautiful risk of education*. Paradigm Publishers.

Biesta, G. J. J. (2019). What kind of society does the school need? Redefining the democratic work of education in impatient times. *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 38, 657–668.

Brown, W. (2019). *In the ruins of neoliberalism: The rise of antidemocratic politics in the west*. Columbia University Press.

Derrida, J. (1976). *Of grammatology* (G. C. Spivak, Trans.). Johns Hopkins University Press.

Enzensberger, H. M. (1982). The industrialization of the mind. In R. Grimm & B. Armstrong (Eds.), *Critical essays* (pp. 3–14). Continuum.

Garfinkel, H. (2002). Central claims of ethnomethodology. In A. W. Rawls (Ed.), *Ethnomethodology's program: Working out Durkheim's aphorism* (pp. 91–120). Rowman & Littlefield.

Geertz, C. (2000). *Available light: Anthropological reflections on philosophical topics*. Princeton University Press.

Hall, S. (2016). Rethinking the base and superstructure. In J. D. Slack & L. Grossberg (Eds.), *Cultural studies 1983: A theoretical history* (pp. 74–96). Duke University Press.

Hazony, Y. (2012). *The philosophy of Hebrew scripture*. Cambridge University Press.

Jameson, F. (1991). *Postmodernism, or the cultural logic of late capitalism*. Duke University Press.

Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking, fast and slow*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Lingis, A. (2018). *Irrevocable: A philosophy of mortality*. The University of Chicago Press.

Maurer, W. M. (1995). Complex subjects: Offshore finance, complexity theory, and the dispersion of the modern. *Socialist Review*, 25(3–4), 113–145. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5339-9893.

Pedersen, D. M. (1997). Psychological functions of privacy. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 17, 147–156.

Piketty, T. (2014). *Capital in the twenty-first century* (A. Goldhammer, Trans.). The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Rancière, J. (1991). *The ignorant schoolmaster: Five lessons in intellectual emancipation* (K. Ross, Trans.). Stanford University Press.

Rancière, J. (2010). *Dissensus: On politics and aesthetics* (S. Corcoran, Trans.). Continuum.

Rancière, J. (2019). *Aisthesis: Scenes from the aesthetic regime of art* (Z. Paul, Trans.). Verso.

Ravich, D. (2020). *Slaying Goliath: The passionate resistance to privatization and the fight to save America's public schools*. Vintage Books.

Waite, D. (2016). The where and what of education today: A leadership perspective. *International Journal of Leadership in Education*, 19(1), 101–109. https://doi.org/10.1080/13603124.2015.1096080.

Waite, D., & Arar, K. (2020). Problematizing the social in social justice education. In R. Pappa (Ed.), *Handbook on promoting social justice in education* (pp. 169–192). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74078-2_153-1.

Williams, R. (1976). *Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society*. Fontana Press.

Williams, R. (1989). *Resources of hope: Culture, democracy, socialism* (R. Gable, Ed.). Verso.

Williams, R. (2013). *The long revolution*. Parthian. (Original published in 1961)

Wright, E. O. (2010). *Envisioning real utopias*. Verso.

Zuboff, S. (2019). *The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the frontier of power*. PublicAffairs.

2

CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS CONSIDERED DIFFERENTLY

Times change. They change us, we change them; through individual and collective agency, we alter our social landscape. Each of us interacts with the material world just as we interact in relationships. We act upon them just as they act upon us.

Education is a social and personal endeavor. Since at least the Enlightenment, education has been viewed as a means of emancipation, for individuals and whole peoples, whether through social mobility or increased knowledge and understanding. It appears to be a relatively straightforward formula—education = emancipation—but it is much more nuanced. To begin with, what do these concepts entail? What comprises them? How do they interact?

One modern assumption is that schools, as a purveyor of education, not only reflect 'society,' they influence and change it. These two constructs, schools and 'society,' must also be unpacked in terms of our assumptions, conceptions, and their interconnectedness.[1]

Though we've only just begun, let's pause a moment to take stock. We've introduced several key terms (we'll deconstruct them shortly): education, emancipation, 'society,' and school(s). Each has its constitutive elements—implicit components such as knowledge, understanding, learning, student, teacher, educational leader. We'll take up each in turn. Let's begin with 'society.'

Society as Context

'Society' can mean many things. Would it be a tautology to simply say that 'society' is a social construction? 'Society' is a difficult concept to get hold of. But it's also ready to hand, so it's bandied about by scholars, especially sociologists, and others. The danger lies in the fact that 'society' is ill-defined, ambiguous, and without due care and consideration its use leaves us no further along in our

DOI: 10.4324/9781003164449-2

understanding. Its careless use may even muddy the waters of our understanding, divert our attention, and waste our energies when we attempt 'social' change. Or educational change, for if schools are 'social' institutions, how we understand 'society' and schools' place or function colors our understanding both of 'society' and of schools/education. And, to drive the point home, our ontological perspective of 'society' affects how we view schools as organizations, as ecosystems in their own right. We apply our worldview, our ontology, of the 'social' to the interactions, relationships, and 'social' processes within the school. In short, how we view 'society' and its component processes affects how we view schools, and, in turn, education. What role does schooling have in 'society'? What role or roles should it have? For instance, can schools and education remedy the perceived ills of 'society'? Is an emancipatory education possible within a corrupt 'society'? Within a failed state or a totalitarian one?

How we view 'society,' how we view the world, human and non-human, matters. Another consideration in our examination of 'society' and its schools, with an eye toward emancipatory education and leadership that facilitates it, is what we might think of as the individual, the human person. It seems only natural to speak of the individual (some prefer to speak of the particular) and the collective (the general or universal). We might even think of 'society' as everything extra-individual that is of human construction. Thinking about the individual and the collective cannot be avoided when discussing 'society' and education.

Raymond Williams (1958/1983), critiquing the emblematic writing of the Industrial Revolution era, disparaged the unreflective use of 'class' as a concept. Such facile classifications, he believed, saved the trouble of thinking or thinking too deeply. Williams put an inflection on this line of critique when he discussed the use of 'mass' and 'masses' in discussions of 'society:'

> There are in fact no masses; there are only ways of seeing people as masses… In practice, we mass them, and interpret them, according to some convenient formula. Within its terms, the formula will hold. Yet it is the formula, not the mass, which is our real business to examine.
>
> *(p. 300)*

Discussion of 'society' invites consideration of the individual, especially in Western thinking, which, in turn, introduces notions of personality, identity, consciousness, and the 'social.' When we think of individuals we sometimes think in terms of role or function, as within an organization such as a school. Identity is a fraught term, too (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). Thanks to the considerable work done in such areas of scholarship as critical race theory and its offshoots—in gender, ableness, and sexuality—the notion of position has become refined and nuanced such that we can talk of positionality, one's sociopolitical and agential position, whether self-defined or ascribed. Members may inhabit and enact or perform multiple social positions. In this case, we use the term intersectionality, which has a rich literature of its own.

Here again, how one thinks of these issues—identity, position, role—depends upon one's ontology and epistemology, or ontoepistemology. Critical race theory has roots in Marxist thinking, particularly the Frankfurt School, and critical theory more generally. In its US iteration, critical theory is concerned primarily with class, race, and gender. And the Marxist inflection encourages scholars, 'social' or 'cultural' critics, and public intellectuals to ask 'whose interests are served' by the phenomenon of interest.

Identity and consciousness and their development are connoted by the term individuation—an individual coming into his/her/their own; what Williams (1961/2013) terms 'the social process of making "selves"' where 'the conscious differences between individuals arise in the social process' (p. 107). Gert Biesta (2014, 2017) refers to this process as subjectification, the making of a unique subject. Williams details how 'even if there is a common "social character" or "culture pattern," each individual's social history, his actual network of relationships, is in fact unique' (p. 107). He continues:

> These are the basic individualising factors, but again, as the unique potentialities and the unique history interact the very fact of the growth of self-consciousness produces a distinct organisation, capable of both self-scrutiny and self-direction. This 'autonomous' self grows within a social process which radically influences it, but the degree of gained autonomy makes possible the observed next stage, in which the individual can help to change or modify the social process that has influenced and is influencing him.
>
> *(p. 107)*

We have discussed the individual and 'society' (keeping in mind that individuals are, in fact, members of multiple communities simultaneously), but how shall we then think of the relationship between the individual and 'society'?

Williams (1961/2013) considers the relationship of the individual and 'society' in terms of membership. A *member* enjoys a positive identification with 'society.' 'The member of a society feels himself belong to it… its values are his values, its purposes his purposes' (p. 109). But a member differs from the *subject* and the *servant*, though all exhibit conformity. The difference is in the feeling of belongingness. While a member feels part of the 'society,' a subject or servant, whose personal values and purposes likely differ, merely acquiesces to authority and carries out 'functions that have no personal meaning to him' (p. 111). The subject conforms because they can see no other way they can survive. For the servant 'the pressure is less severe, though still, to him irresistible' (p. 112): 'the subject has no choice; the servant is given the illusion of choice, and is invited to identify himself with the way of life in which his place is defined' (p. 112).

> It is an illusion of choice, because again, like the subject, he has no obvious way of maintaining his life if he refuses. Yet the illusion is important, for it

> allows him to pretend to an identification with the society, as if the choice had been real.
>
> *(p. 112)*

Williams (1961/2013) then describes 'modes of nonconformity,' particularly the rebel, the exile, and the vagrant. 'The rebel,' Williams avers, 'resembles the member in that he has made a strong personal commitment to certain social purposes… The ways of his society are not his ways, but in rebelling against one social form he is seeking to establish another' (p. 113). 'The rebel fights the way of life of his society because to him personally it is wrong… the new reality he proposes is more than personal; he is offering it as a new way of life' (p. 114)

The exile and the vagrant are more individual forms: 'The exile is as absolute as the rebel in rejecting the way of life of his society, but instead of fighting it he goes away' (p. 114). An exile may be driven from society or his removal may be self-imposed, a self-exile. Williams (1961/2013) notes the Bolshevik membership category of the internal émigré: 'this kind of self-exile lives and moves about in the society into which he was born, but rejects its purposes and despises its values, because of alternative principles to which his whole personal reality is committed' (p. 115). Both the exile and the self-exile want the society to change so that they can belong to it, but unlike the rebel or revolutionary, the exile waits: 'when the society changes, then he can come home, but the actual process of change is one in which he is not involved' (p. 114).

Finally we have the vagrant: 'The vagrant also stays in his own society, though he finds its purposes meaningless and its values irrelevant' (Williams, 1961/2013, p. 115), yet they lack the exile's pride and purpose. 'There is nothing in particular that the vagrant wants to happen; his maximum demand is that he should be left alone' (p. 116).

In summary:

> To the member, society is his own community; the members of other communities may be beyond his recognition or sympathy. To the servant, society is an establishment, in which he finds his place. To the subject society is an imposed system, in which his place is determined. To the rebel, a particular society is a tyranny; the alternative for which he fights is a new and better society. To the exile, society is beyond him, but may change. To the vagrant, society is a name for other people, who are in his way or who can be used.
>
> *(p. 117)*

Williams (1961/2013), in *Culture & Society*, portrayed George Orwell as an exile, as he did D. H. Lawrence. Orwell as exile was observer and reporter, we might say critic. Orwell was

> one of a significant number of men, who, deprived of a settled way of living or of a faith or having rejected those which were inherited, find virtue in a kind of improvised living, and in an assertion of independence.
>
> *(p. 289)*

The virtues of the exiles are 'empiricism, a certain integrity, frankness' (p. 289). The exile exhibits 'certain qualities of perception: in particular, the ability to distinguish inadequacies in the groups which have been rejected' (p. 289). They have the 'appearance of hardness (the austere criticism of hypocrisy, complacency, self-deceit)' (p. 289). The qualities of the exile give one the appearance of strength, but, says Williams, 'this is largely illusory' and 'the qualities, though salutary, are largely negative' (p. 289). 'The substance of community is lacking, and the tension, in men of high quality is very great' (p. 289). 'Alongside the tough rejection of compromise, which gives the tradition [of exile] its virtue, is the felt social impotence, the inability to form extending relationships' (p. 289). These constitute what Williams terms the paradox of the exile.

The exile seeks his/her/their liberation in dissociating. But they have to go somewhere if they are not to become a hermit. Still, the exile, says Williams (1961/2013), fears association

> because he does not want to be compromised (this is often his virtue, because he is so quick to see the perfidy which certain compromises involve). Yet he fears it also because he can see no way of confirming, socially, his own individuality.
>
> *(p. 291)*

'This, after all,' he continued, 'is the psychological condition of the self-exile' (p. 291). The paradox or ambiguity lies in that 'when the exile speaks of liberty, he is in a curiously ambiguous position, for while the rights in question may be called individual, the condition of their guarantee is inevitably social' (p. 291).

In *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*, Said (2000) differentiates among exiles, refugees, expatriates, and émigrés. Exile, he wrote, was historically associated with banishment: 'Once banished, the exile lives an anomalous and miserable life, with the stigma of being an outsider' (p. 181).

> Refugees, on the other hand, are the creation of the twentieth-century state. The word… has become a political one, suggesting large herds of innocent and bewildered people requiring urgent international assistance, whereas 'exile' carries with it… a touch of solitude and spirituality.
>
> *(p. 181)*

'Expatriates voluntarily live in an alien country, usually for personal or social reasons' (Said, 2000, p. 181). They 'may share in the solitude and estrangement of

exile, but… do not suffer under its rigid proscriptions' (p. 181). Contrarily, émigré is a more ambiguous status: 'Technically, an émigré is anyone who emigrates to a new country. Choice in the matter is certainly a possibility' (p. 181).

Exiles can and do contribute to their newfound home, according to Said (2000): 'Like medieval itinerant scholars or learned Greek slaves in the Roman empire, exiles—the exceptional ones among them—do leaven their environments' (p. 183). While recognizing the positive attributes of exile and the contributions of exiles, Said reminds us that 'when looked at from the bleak political perspective of modern mass dislocations, individual exiles force us to recognize the tragic fate of homelessness in a necessarily heartless world' (p. 183). 'To be rooted,' having an association with a place is, in Simone Weil's opinion, 'perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul' (Weil, as cited in Said, 2000, p. 183).

Said (2000) also recognizes how 'the exile knows that in a secular and contingent world, homes are always provisional. Borders and barriers, which enclose us within the safety of familiar territory, can also become prisons and are often defended beyond reason or necessity' (p. 185). Crossing borders, exiles 'break borders of thought and experience' (p. 185).

This underscores Ziman's (1981) belief that ideas travel inside of people. The profound and tremendous scale of human movement today adds to the wellspring of ideas, the 'culture' as a whole way of life (Williams, 1961/2013) of individual nations and the world as a whole. This commerce, this human intercourse, gestures toward the hybridity Burke (2000) discussed, and his reminder that how we orient to difference, to the potentiality of change newcomers bring with them, has serious ramifications, for good or ill.

Conventionally, 'social' theory divided the world into two categories—members and non-members. Non-members were thought of as outsiders, others. Today, owing to globalization and the unprecedented movement of human bodies and intercultural contact, we think in terms of migrants, immigrants, expatriates, and exiles. But the classical, original work on 'society's' other was that done by Georg Simmel (1950) and his notion of the stranger. Rather than speaking of the stranger as someone who is here today and gone tomorrow, Simmel examines the person not originally of the group, one who comes from outside, who stays but still possesses the potential of moving on—'the *potential* wanderer' (p. 402, emphasis in original): 'although he has not moved on, he has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going' (p. 402). In Simmel and elsewhere we are introduced to at least three important concepts relevant for our deliberation on freedom and emancipation—the group and its membership, freedom of movement, and the inside/outside (or insider/outsider) distinction and its ramifications. Freedom of movement is an essential human right, allowing an individual to escape a tyrannical situation or an abusive relationship. And freedom of movement also implies the free movement of ideas and what Edward Said (2000) called 'traveling theory.'

Simmel (1950) discusses the stranger as part of the group, with a special role and function. 'The stranger, like the poor and like sundry "inner enemies," is an element of the group itself. His position as a full-fledged member involves both being outside it and confronting it' (pp. 402–403). The stranger often is a trader, supplying the group with what its members, being geospatially fixed, cannot obtain for themselves. This is a social position the stranger can take up: the stranger

> intrudes as a supernumerary, so to speak, into a group in which the economic positons are actually occupied… The stranger is by nature no 'owner of soil'—soil not only in the physical but also in the figurative sense of a life-substance which is fixed, if not in a point in space, at least in an ideal point of the social environment.
>
> *(p. 403)*

The stranger, as trader or other role available to 'the owner of no soil,' may engage in 'pure finance… [which] gives him the specific character of *mobility*' (p. 403, emphasis in original).

In fact, today global finance is hyper-mobile, and like water, which always seeks the lowest point, global finance is forever seeking the cheapest, most lax locale, so-called 'tax havens' (Harrington, 2016).[2] Such hide-the-money schemes are so popular among despots and their families, sports luminaires, robber barons, and corporations (including some of the more prestigious universities such as the University of Southern California and the University of Texas, and many others[3]) that various concerns and limited partnerships were established to facilitate this type of tax dodge, Mossak Fonseca being the most (in)famous. While strictly legal, the hyper-wealthy use shell corporations and offshore finance in these 'tax havens' to limit their financial liability in taxation, divorce, and inheritance (Harrington, 2016). The hyper-wealthy exert an out-sized influence on the laws and policies of their adopted and home countries, seeking more favorable treatment, especially 'wealth defense' (Winters, 2011).

Lingis (1994) wrote not of the stranger, but of the intruder. Like Simmel (1950), Lingis discussed the inside/outside of the established community to which the intruder presents him/herself. Lingis' contribution was in setting out and examining what he termed the community of those who have nothing in common. The inside/outside is framed, sometimes, in terms of acceptance, and membership, or exclusion. Politics, according to Rancière (1991, 2010), is the destabilization of the established order. This disruption is often undertaken in an effort by those who have been excluded or marginalized (othered) to be allowed admittance to the (rational) community. Lingis wrote that 'This *other community* is not simply absorbed into the rational community; it recurs, it troubles the rational community as its double or its shadow' (p. 10, emphasis in original). In other words, the *other* and the *rational* communities cannot live apart—one cannot avoid exposure to 'the demands and contestation[s]' (1994, p. 10) of the other. The

nomad, the guerrilla, the enemy, the psychotic, the savage, the mystic are excluded from 'the community that produces something in common, that establishes truth and that now establishes a technological universe of simulacra' (p. 13). Yet, in the very process of being excluded these outsiders form 'the community of those who have nothing in common, of those who have nothingness, death, their mortality, in common' (p. 13). The community in common of which Lingis speaks is a truth community, established through discourse and policed by its institutions and their inhabitants. 'Every discourse among interlocutors is a struggle against outsiders… it designates outsiders as not making sense, as mystified, mad, or brutish, and it delivers them over to violence' (p. 135). He contended that:

> What can be true is a statement that can be integrated into the common discourse. Statements can be true, and meaningful, only in the discourse of an established community that determines… what could count as an argument.
>
> *(1994, pp. 135–136)*

Every 'society' establishes and maintains its institutions, those which sustain it and which serve the functions of maintenance and control. Althusser (1984) considered eight types of institutions, which he called ideological state apparatuses. They included: the religious (Churches); the educational; the family; the legal; the political; the trade union; the communications;[4] and the cultural. These are private apparatuses (i.e., they mainly operate in private) as opposed to the very public State apparatuses. Althusser further claims that the State is above the bourgeois distinction between public and private because the 'State [is] *of* the ruling class, [it] is neither public nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition for any distinction between public and private' (p. 111, emphasis in original). Any State apparatus functions by one of two primary means: repressive regimes predominantly employ violence as a control mechanism, and only secondarily utilize ideological means. Conversely, ideological State apparatuses primarily use ideological tools for control, but are not above using repressive means as necessary (as examples, schools and churches use disciplinary measures). There is no such thing as a purely repressive or ideological State.

Historically, 'society' originally connoted companionship or fellowship (Williams, 1976). Though it retains that connotation today, it has also come to mean 'the body of institutions and relationships within which a relatively large group of people live' (p. 291). Our views of both 'society' and the 'state' are relevant for how we see the roles or functions of schools (a 'societal' institution) and of education. Our notions of both have evolved. Whereas 'society' once indicated an association of free men and 'the state' was associated with the monarchy, rank, and hierarchy, today we see '**society** [as] that to which we all belong, even if it is also very general and impersonal; [while] the *state* is the apparatus of power' (p. 293, emphasis in original).

In *The Long Revolution*, Williams (1961/2013) wrote of our conceptions of 'man and society' as the impetus, the guiding light for social change. He wrote:

> Looking back… our ideas of the nature of social change were limited by actual societies and their corresponding conceptions of relationships, so that the emphasis naturally fell on changes in power and property, in their common forms of conquest, revolution, or the rise and fall of classes. The counter-emphasis, on individuals and on learning and communication, was itself a social response, not only to the narrowness of society construed as power and property, but to real changes, which were actually liberating more and more individuals, and which were building ever widening and more powerful means of learning and communication.
>
> *(p. 148)*

'The long revolution,' Williams wrote, 'which is now at the centre of our history, is not for democracy as a political system alone, nor for the equitable distribution of more products nor for the general access to the means of learning and communication' (p. 149). Social change and the long revolution 'derive meaning and direction, finally, from new conceptions of man and society,' and 'these conceptions can only be given in experience. The metaphors of creativity and growth seek to enact them, but the pressure, now, must be towards particulars, for here or nowhere they are confirmed' (p. 149).

Functions of Institutions

Althusser (1984) was certainly not the first to discuss the institutions in (a) 'society' and the functions they serve. Early city-states and later States invested all power and authority in a monarch or ruler. Many met the challenges of governing through the establishment of a bureaucracy, the early Chinese emperors being one early, if not the earliest, example of imperial rule through bureaucracy.

States and city-states were political entities built out of territory won through conquest or hammered together through alliances. State and city-state were and are somewhat artificial codifications, in many cases subsuming the more 'organic' differentiations of familial, tribal, or ethnic territory. The artificial nature of boundaries or borders established in the political division of the land, the earth, is revealed and problematized by the existence of nomads (McDonell, 2016). Nomads, outsiders (Lingis, 1994), people of perpetual movement, are a problem for the State, which finds it difficult to find, count, or tax them. They fit no established role in the State or in 'society.' Borders themselves hinder free movement. Borders and borderlands comprise a unique space (Anzaldúa, 1987), neither here nor there, and people in borderlands can develop a hybridized identity.

A political differentiation of territories into states, a political frame, invites a differentiation of collectivities by types of political systems: a monarchy, an

oligarchy, a democracy, or, inflected by economic considerations and differentiations, capitalist, socialist, or communist systems. Granted, pure types are rare, most being some blend of two or more types (e.g., social democratic). Political framing of collectivities, of 'society,' changes the equation. The individual now becomes the citizen, and as Rancière (1991) points out, the citizen is different from the man or woman, for the citizen is a political construct, with rights or privileges granted by the State, and is framed as a political subject. The role they play, or are expected to play, varies with the type of political system and the conditions in which they live.

Institutions perform 'societal' functions. Organizations are subtypes of institutions and vary, again, depending on the 'social' or political milieu within which they operate. Schools are an organizational form and perform the 'societal' function of education, which Althusser (1984) claims is ideological.

Institutions perform 'societal' functions; the individual parallel is role. What role do individuals perform? A danger presents when we begin to think of the function individuals perform, which is a danger of instrumentalist thinking. A further danger emerges when functionalist thinking is coupled with valuation: what roles or functions are of more value?

Within the function of education and the institution of schooling people fill roles as student, teacher, administrator, and staff. These are usually conceived of in a hierarchical manner. Others may be associated with schooling in the role of parent, community member, 'stakeholder,' and, less immediately, as policy maker or legislator.

Other Conceptions of 'Society' and its Members

Others have framed the relationship between 'society' and its members a bit differently, with implications for how we view each. How people, scholars and 'laypeople' alike, view 'society' or the collective and its constituents depends to a great degree on the person's worldview or ontology, and their mental models, which are informed by the discipline in which the person works and/or into which they have been socialized, and the theoretical assumptions operant within those disciplines. Each discipline has its unique intellectual history or genealogy and, likely, camps and cliques within them—camps and cliques with which academics and other intellectuals, including public intellectuals, affiliate and form an allegiance (Becher & Trowler, 2001). Each discipline has its own unique way of framing the world, dividing it up for study. When studying the constituent components of 'society,' the 'social' or the collective, philosophy has its subject; psychology has the self; sociology has the member; and political science has the citizen, as examples.

These are both ontological and epistemological, or ontoepistemological issues. As an epistemological concern, the more familiar canons of the sciences, social and natural sciences alike, have predominantly developed out of the

Enlightenment, rooted in Greek and Roman thinking; that is to say, they are 'Western' epistemologies. Our thinking about the world and our knowledge of it were given impetus by Cartesian dualism, which, as Quijano (2007) shows, coincided with the rise of the nation-state and urbanism. The advent and codification of capitalism and its development into a world system, some would say a hegemonic global system, occurred contemporaneously with, perhaps as an outgrowth of, such Cartesian thinking, particularly the mind/body and self/other or subject/object dualisms. In its historical context, the birth of the subject 'as an isolated individual' allowed for 'the process of liberation of the individual with respect to the adescriptive [sic] social structures that imprisoned it in Europe' (p. 173). These 'social' structures 'condemned the individual to one single place and social role during its entire life, as happens in all societies with rigidly fixed hierarchies sustained by violence and by ideologies and corresponding imagery' (p. 173). The emergence of the individual subject in Europe of the time provided for a 'liberation [that] was a social and cultural struggle associated with the emergence of social relations of capital and of urban life' (p. 173). Instead, Quijano sees the damage, the epistemological violence, done through the sundering of the individual from the totality and suggests that

> the differentiated individual subjectivity is… ['real'], but it is not an entity, so it doesn't exist only *vis-à-vis* itself or by itself. It exists as a differentiated part, but not separated, of an intersubjectivity or intersubjective dimension of social relationship.
>
> *(p. 173)*

The consequences of the subject/other duality are clear for Quijano (2007). The category of other allowed for property and knowledge as property, but property 'as a relation between one individual and something else' (p. 173). 'Probably it is not accidental that knowledge was considered then in the same way as property—as a relation between one individual and something else' (p. 173). He continued: 'Nevertheless, property, like knowledge, is a relation between people for the purpose of something, not a relation between an individual and something' (p. 173). The individuation of the subject allowed for the emergence of a distinct Europe and a distinctly European identity. It allowed for racialization and racism. The other as property and the other's property, above all, seeing them as such, led to European colonialization of the other and eventually to the dominance of the Western epistemology over all other ways of knowing, an event and a process from which we are still trying to recover.

Zygmunt Bauman (1996) proposed another way of looking at members, at their identities, through a postmodern lens. He offered this: 'if the *modern* "problem of identity" was how to construct an identity and keep it solid and stable, the *postmodern* "problem of identity" is primarily how to avoid fixation and keep the options open' (p. 18, emphasis in original). Here the modern, conventional, one might say 'traditional' views of 'society' and its members are put into stark

relief with the postmodern views. The more 'traditional' societies and their members value stability, security, and predictability. Indeed, we could argue that in the 'traditional' view, this is 'society's' purpose: to provide security for its members.[5] As Bauman put it, 'one thinks of identity whenever one is not sure of where one belongs; that is, one is not sure how to place oneself among the evident variety of behavioural styles and patterns' (p. 19). In fact, '"Identity" is a name given to the escape sought from… uncertainity… "Identity," though ostensibly a noun, behaves like a verb, albeit a strange one to be sure: it appears only in the future tense' (p. 19).

And, for Bauman (1996), identity is a project and always an individual one: 'It was up to the individual to find escape from uncertainty. Not for the first and not for the last time, socially created problems were to be resolved by individual efforts' (p. 19). But such a focus on the individual was accompanied by socially collective ('cultural') efforts to aid and assist the individual in their identity formation. All sorts of counselors, life coaches, trainers, psychologists, teachers, and more (demagogues) were there to assist; so much so, that 'the "disembedded" identity simultaneously ushered in the individual's freedom of choice and the individual's dependency on expert guidance' (p. 19).

From early Christianity on, the individual is as a pilgrim and modern life is seen as a pilgrimage. For the pilgrim, writes Bauman (1996), 'the truth is elsewhere; the true place is always some distance, some time away. Wherever the pilgrim may be now, it is not where he ought to be, and not where he dreams of being' (p. 20). But the modern world is inhospitable to the pilgrim and is one of what Bauman calls 'a continuous present' and within it a determination to live one day at a time. The modern individual is 'beware [of] long-term commitments' (p. 24) and 'refuse[s] to be "fixed" one way or the other. Not to get tied to the place. Not to wed one's life to one vocation only. Not to swear consistency and loyalty to anything and anybody' (p. 24).

Bauman (1996) proposes four postmodern 'successors' to modernity's pilgrim in 'the daunting task of identity-building' (p. 26); these are the stroller, the vagabond, the tourist, and the player. The stroller is '*in* the crowd but *not* of the crowd' (p. 26, emphasis in original). They take in strangers as surfaces, 'so that "what one sees" exhausts "what they are"' (p. 26). The stroller knows others episodically: 'strolling means rehearsing human reality as a series of episodes… events without past and with no consequences… encounters without impact' (p. 26). The stroller was the 'playful consumer' and strolling 'once the activity practised by marginal people on the margins of "real life" came to be life itself, and the question of "reality" need not be dealt with any more' (p. 27).

Another of Bauman's successor identities is the vagabond. The vagabond, 'the bane of early modernity' (Bauman, 1996, p. 28), 'was *masterless* (out of control, out of frame, on the loose), was one condition modernity could not bear' (p. 28, emphasis in original). They represented anarchy, and 'they had to go if order (that is, space managed and monitored) was to prevail' (p. 28). The presence of the vagabond 'made the search for new, state-managed, societal-level order imperative and urgent' (p. 28).

'What made the vagabond so terrifying,' according to Bauman (1996, p. 28), 'was their apparent freedom to move and to escape the net of heretofore locally based control.' 'Worse than that still, the movements of the vagabond are unpredictable; unlike the pilgrim the vagabond has no set destination' (p. 28). But 'wherever the vagabond goes, he is a stranger; he can never be "the native," the "settled one," one with "roots in the soil"' (p. 28). (Compare Bauman's vagabond with Simmel's (1950) stranger.) The vagabond makes no attachments, either to people or place, as he or she is likely to move on 'as other places beckon' (p. 28). 'Cherishing one's out-of-placeness is a sensible strategy. It gives all decisions the 'until-further-notice' flavor. It allows one to keep the options open' (p. 29). And where once the vagabond was the anomaly, 'post-modernity reversed the ratio. Now there are few "settled" places left… Now the odds are that the people he meets in his travels are other vagabonds' (p. 29).

The third of Bauman's (1996) successor types is the tourist: 'though the vagabond was marginal *man*… tourism was marginal *activity*' (p. 29, emphasis in original). The tourist's movements are purposeful; they feel pulled, to new places, new experiences. An essential difference between the vagabond and the tourist is that the tourist has a home. The home provides security upon return and a sense of a somewhat stable identity in her travels. The fact of a home assures the tourist that 'whatever has happened to my face here, in the tourist land, or whichever mask I put on it, my "real face" is in safe keeping, immune, stain-resistant, unsullied' (p. 30). The problem becomes 'that life itself turns into an extended tourist escapade… it is less and less clear which one of the visiting places is the home' (p. 30). But homesickness is a yearning for an imaginary place called 'home.' And

> homesickness… is not the sole tourist's sentiment: the other is the fear of *home-boundedness*, of being tied to a place and barred from exit. 'Home' lingers at the horizon of the tourist life as an uncanny mix of shelter and prison. *(p. 31)*

Here, as with Said (2000) above, we see the image of home as both shelter and/or prison. In a Weberian sense, organizations, too, can be prisons. This has relevance, especially, for schools, where in this view, not only the student, but the warden, the administrator can be a prisoner of the organization.

Bauman's (1996) fourth type of postmodern identity is the player. For the player, the world is a game or a succession of games. 'In play,' Bauman writes, 'there is neither inevitability nor accident (there is no accident in a world that knows no necessity or determination); nothing is fully predictable and controllable, but nothing is totally immutable and irrevocable either' (p. 31). 'In play, the world itself is a player, and luck and misfortune are but the moves of the world-as-player' (p. 31). This distinguishes the postmodern worldview from others, notably the positivist epistemology. Luck and chance are common features in the postmodern, and risk is central to the player's identity: 'The player's world

is the world of *risks*, of intuition, of precaution-taking' (p. 31, emphasis in original). Other authors, notably Kahneman (2011) and Lingis (2018), call attention to the role of luck, chance, or fortune in our worldly affairs, our successes and our failures; though it is not above the leader to take credit for success, even if it was due to luck (Lakomski, 2005). For the rest of us 'common' folk in the world, indeed in universe(s) in which we find ourselves, as they find themselves, and as we find them, chance is the greatest cause of all, if we can call chance a cause (Lingis, 2018).

There are those who feel more secure believing in predetermination, a telos of existence, such that all that is, all that occurs or will occur, is somehow determined beforehand, that this is the way things were meant to be. Some (mistaken) interpretations of Darwin lead many to believe that the way things are is the way they were meant to be (Gould, 1980). But even natural selection is the result of chance. Many things are distributed by chance—where you were born, for example, or that you were born at all. Whether you were born into a wealthy or a 'poor' family or country is a result of chance. In fact, Lingis (2018) avers, 'all the major events in our lives are due to chance' (p. 30), including 'our birth; a teacher who captivated us… the person we happened to meet and fell in love with' (p. 30) and more. 'Chance is unpredictable, the incalculable, the incomprehensible' (p. 30). 'There is physical bad luck, there is also moral bad luck' (p. 31), all distributed by chance. 'Passions,' too, 'are distributed to humans by chance. The passion for truth, which drives great scientists—they say they found it in themselves; it was not really put in them by education. Likewise the passion for justice… Passion for adventure, for love' (p. 31). Lingis adds that 'it happens that a chance event changes not only our circumstances but also our identity' (p. 33). This is materiality acting upon consciousness again. And this aspect of chance, its unpredictability, corresponds to Arendt's (1958) views of action.

But if we were to take the notion of chance seriously, incorporate it into our ontology, the implications would be phenomenal. It would alter our views on responsibility and on obligation. It would affect how we see accountability. If we allow that chance plays a large role, whether or not we see it as determinant, our views of our guilt would change. How we view our students, even how we view our colleagues, other teachers and even administrators, would be forced to change. Students could no longer be held responsible for their 'social' position or condition. They couldn't be held directly responsible for their aptitudes, their passions.

True, Lingis (2018) says, 'there are… necessity, choice, and chance' (p. 30). Even if we were to accept the role chance plays in our lives and in those of others, we might still hold ourselves and others accountable for the choices we make, granting and viewing those made out of necessity with grace and compassion. Chance means that those less fortunate are so due to no fault of their own. And those who are more fortunate, wealthier or healthier, also are in the main not responsible for their good fortune.

'All four intertwining and interpenetrating postmodern life strategies'—the pilgrim, the vagabond, the tourist and the player—'have in common that they tend to render human relations fragmentary… and discontinuous… and militate against the construction of lasting networks of mutual duties and obligations' (Bauman, 1996, p. 33). And this stance toward mutual obligation has severe consequences for 'social' relations, for the relationship between the individual and the group, even for one's relationship with the Other, any other. And this has moral implications. In fact, this is one of Bauman's splendid contributions to 'social' theory, his notion of 'floating responsibility': modernity tends to 'shift moral responsibilities away from the moral self either towards socially constructed and managed supra-individual agencies, or through floating responsibility inside a bureaucratic "rule of nobody"' (p. 32). The implications of such floating responsibility are considerable, especially within and for organizations such as schools. Who is responsible, either for success or 'failure'?

Elsewhere (Waite, 2013), I've written of some common linguistic features of ours, features which, when combined, make responsibility and accountability elusive. These include reification and objectivization, collectivization, and anthropomorphization, among others. In combination these linguistic moves allow administrators, say, to avoid blame or taking responsibility. These linguistic features include use of, for example, the passive voice ('schools are not adequately funded'); anthromorphization ('the school failed minoritized children'); the third person plural ('they have no clue what the children in our community need'); and objectification and reification ('administration made that decision'). In combination, these phenomena speak to Bauman's (1996) notion of floating responsibility. And on a larger, 'societal' or global scale, this language both reflects and contributes to our failing to take responsibility for the Other, for each other—because each of us is an Other to someone else.[6]

This 'rule of nobody,' a 'society' made up of 'nobodies,' is more than just the mass or masses mid-century sociologists conceived of. And there are many different ways of arriving at this conception of 'society' and of the individual. Even those scholars working on the assumptions undergirding complexity and chaos theory and their implications came to, if not the same, similar conclusions, though starting from different points and employing radically different language (e.g., Maurer, 1995). Complexity theory makes use of a model of 'society' built out of systems referred to as adaptive non-linear networks. These are 'adaptive and complex systems already interpenetrated *by* and composed *of* other complex systems, for which problem solving is more than instantaneous. It has no identity as such; it is unlocatable, and simultaneously a part of everything' (Maurer, 1995, p. 125, emphasis in original). This theory or set of theories 'excavates' the subject—there is really no subject as such as there is in neoclassical economics: 'It [the subject] has no identity as such; it is unlocatable, and simultaneously a part of everything' (p. 125). For Maurer (1995), 'anything that could be recognized as a 'subject' would disperse into new networks of power with no originary point' (p. 125). As you might imagine, this makes accountability impossible.

Maurer's (1995) focus is offshore financing, specifically the composition and the practices of corporations employing offshore financing to generate wealth and avoid regulation and taxation. And, as he writes, 'the new economy, a complex, more-than-hierarchical, more-than-instantaneous, adaptive and anticipatory network of networks, attempts to render questions of accountability moot' (p. 139). But the non-locatable subject, embedded or entangled in such non-linear adaptive networks, raises fundamental and critical questions—for society, for governance, and for social action; questions such as:

> What kinds of politics are possible in a world where there is no easily identifiable subject on whom to place blame, no one whom we can take to task for a now nonlocatable structure of domination that is itself a part of us?
>
> *(p. 141)*

The sheer complexity of the 'society' or 'societies' into which we are born and in which we live make them difficult to grasp, understand, or comprehend, both the whole and our part in them, which itself is a constitutive element of our identity. The complexities inherent in most of our 'societies,' the numerous and various webs of relationships in which we are entangled, makes it all the more difficult to see the sources of our oppression and harder still to disentangle ourselves from them. It can be frustrating and alienating not to see the inflection points, systems, and process that bind and inhibit us from realizing our fullest freedom and fulfillment. It is all too easy to lose hope, to veil ourselves in ignorance, to become frozen, or to give up.

Education, and its development of consciousness, help. The more complex the milieu, the more complex and nuanced need to be our mental models, and the more flexible and adaptive our consciousness. Understanding and meaning making are our common and our individual projects.

Laclau (1996/2007) reminds us that 'emancipation presupposes elimination of power, the abolition of the subject/object distinction, and the management—without any opaqueness or mediation—of communtarian affairs by social agents identified with the viewpoint of social totality' (p. 1). 'There is no emancipation without oppression, and there is no oppression without the presence of something which is impeded in its free development by oppressive forces' (p. 1). 'The identity of the oppressive forces has to be something inscribed in the identity searching for emancipation. This contradictory situation is expressed in the indecidability between internality and externality of the oppressor in relation to the oppressed'—What is my relationship with the oppressor? Is the oppressor part of me?—'to be oppressed is part of my identity as a subject struggling for emancipation; without the presence of the oppressor my identity would be different' (p. 17). 'Freedom,' Laclau wrote, 'is both liberating and enslaving, exhilarating and traumatic, enabling and destructive' (p. 19, fn. 2).

The models we use, those we either develop for ourselves or those we have foisted upon us by means of ideological imperialism and intellectual colonization, models of systems of understanding that in their ugliest forms translate into racism, classism, nationalism and racial supremacy, and other exclusionary and oppressive ideological and material systems, these models have ramifications. Whether we, and those with more power than us, conceive of people as masses or as publics, as in Mills' (1956/1959) seminal discussion, matters in terms of 'social' policy, and matters as to the potential for progress, liberty, emancipation, and freedom. As Mills saw it, one difference between conceiving of people as a public or as a mass was 'the members of a mass exist in milieux and cannot get out of them, either by mind or by activity' (p. 321). Whereas

> publics live in milieu but they can transcend them—individually by intellectual effort, socially by public action. By reflection and debate and by organized action, a community of publics comes to feel itself and comes in fact to be active as points of structural relevance.
>
> *(p. 321)*

Seeing the big picture and one's place in it is important for Mills (1956/1959), and a liberal education can, but too often doesn't in its contemporary manifestation, contribute to this. In a public as opposed to a mass, 'the knowledgeable man in the genuine public is able to turn his personal troubles into social issues, to see their relevance for his community and his community's relevance for them' (p. 318). Education, a true education—not one of what Mills calls '"life adjustment" that encourages happy acceptance of mass ways of life' (p. 319)—fosters 'the struggle for individual and public transcendence' (p. 319); 'the end product of such liberal education is simply the self-educating, self-cultivating man or woman' (p. 318). For Mills:

> In a community of publics the task of liberal education would be: to keep the public from being overwhelmed [by the pressures of modern life]; to help produce the disciplined and informed mind that cannot be overwhelmed; to help develop the bold and sensible individual that cannot be sunk by the burdens of mass life.
>
> *(p. 319)*

Williams (1958/1983) draws a similar conclusion, that positioning people as 'masses' is a way of othering people, often for economic or political manipulation and exploitation: 'the masses are always the others, whom we don't know, and can't know' (p. 299). 'We mass them, and interpret them, according to some convenient formula' (p. 300), Williams notes, but it is the formula that is or should be suspect. 'It may help us' to scrutinize and critique the formula and its application for political, 'cultural,' or economic ends, 'if we remember that we

ourselves are all the time being massed by others' (p. 300). Serving political ends, the formula converts 'the majority of one's fellow human beings into masses, and thence into something to be hated or feared' (p. 300). But remember 'there are in fact no masses; there are only ways of seeing people as masses' (p. 300). The critic, the 'organic' intellectual, the critical theorist might ask, whose ends does massing people serve?

Wendy Brown (2019) has shown how a neoliberal conception of 'society' benefits free market capitalists, undermines democracy, and has in effect become hegemonic throughout most of the 'Western' world. In her analysis she takes Arendt (1958) and her 'rule of nobody' to task for its complicity in neoliberalism's hegemony. Neoliberalism benefited from the theoretical groundwork laid by two of its originators, Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman (Brown, 2019). Brown lays out her argument of how neoliberal theorists sought to erase society, especially social or governmental support of more egalitarian provision or distribution of resources.

Classical liberal economic theory positioned the State as the guarantor of individual rights, and the protector of capitalist wealth accumulation (Winters, 2011). Friedrich Hayek, an early neoliberal theorist, harbored a deep animus toward 'society' and 'the social.' At best, according to Brown (2019), Hayek saw 'society' as a term and concept 'that carries nostalgia for ancient worlds of small and intimate associations and falsely presupposes "a common pursuit of shared purposes"' (as cited in Brown, 2019, p. 30), and at worst as 'a cover for the coercive power of government' (p. 30). Hayek cautioned against the ambiguity of the term 'society': 'more than mere sloppiness in society's semantic slide from small chosen groups to nation-states,' Brown says that Hayek 'detects a dangerous romance with a lost past… where "society" is inappropriately used to denote impersonal, unintentional, and undersigned human cooperation on a mass scale' (p. 31). Brown claims that, for Hayek, this is both wrong and dangerous.

The idea and idealization of 'society,' in Brown's (2019) reading of Hayek, is dangerous in that it is a mistaken personification of a collection of individuals and a false animism, which together invite attempts at manipulation, which then lead to totalitarianism. According to Hayek, '"what has been brought about by the impersonal and spontaneous processes of the extended order" [i.e., 'the market'] is imagined to be "the result of deliberate human creation"' (as cited in Brown, 2019, p. 31). 'Personification and animism also lead to the belief that society is more than the effects of spontaneous processes and can therefore be manipulated or mobilized as a whole' (p. 32). Rather than the abstraction of 'society,' Hayek sees the independent evolution of the market and morals (norms) as forming the basis of, in Brown's words, 'order, innovation, and progress' (p. 32). 'Society' thus conceived is a dangerous concept which must be dismantled.

This dismantling is modern neoliberalism's project. 'This dismantling takes place on many fronts. Epistemologically, dismantling society involves denying its existence… or dismissing concerns with inequality' (Brown, 2019, p. 36). On the

political front, 'it involves dismantling or privatizing the social state—welfare, education, parks, health, and services of all kinds' (p. 37).

> Legally, it involves wielding liberty claims to challenge equality and secularism along with environmental, health, safety, labor, and consumer protections. Ethically, it involves challenging social justice with the natural authority of traditional values. Culturally, it entails a version of what the ordoliberals termed 'demassification,' shoring up individuals and families against the forces of capitalism that threaten them.
>
> *(p. 37)*

The issue for neoliberals has always been 'the social question'; that is, should the State buoy up, protect, and support individuals, 'the masses'? To a degree, this is what is often referred to as the social safety net. In today's fraught political climate, with nationalism, even ultra-nationalism, on the rise, this social safety net is confused with and demonized as socialism, which is likened in the minds of many to communism and is to be both hated and feared. What of the poor, the downtrodden, the disadvantaged and disenfranchised? Though perhaps a bit of an exaggeration, neoliberal politics (and finance, for the two are wedded in policy and State action and tempered with moral reasoning) hold the individual solely responsible for their state of affairs. The individual alone is responsible if poor or suffering, and it is the individual's responsibility, almost an obligation, to better themselves. We see this in welfare-to-work programs, where individuals can't simply accept welfare, but must work or seek work in order to qualify. Likewise, in a post facto justification or rationale, if an individual is well off or wealthy, it is thought to be owing to their efforts alone, and hence justified. Absence of a social safety net, some state effort at economic distribution or redistribution, say through progressive tax systems, has resulted today in vast wealth disparities, a chasm between those 'at the top' and those 'at the bottom.' And, as Wilkinson (2005) and others have shown, wealth inequality has severe negative effects, not just on the 'poor,' but on all of 'society' and in nearly all aspects—in morbidity, mortality, crime, mental health, societal trust, education, and more.

In citing Milton Friedman, Brown (2019) highlights his assertion that 'there is an intimate connection between economics and politics… only certain combinations of political and economic arrangements are possible, and… a society which is socialist cannot also be democratic, in the sense of guaranteeing individual freedom' (Friedman, 1962, as cited in Brown, 2019, p. 65). And there we have it: individual freedom trumps political or social intervention, which is, in the neoliberals' minds, antidemocratic, and tends towards totalitarianism. This is not entirely accurate because neoliberals do invite state intervention, but as a guarantor of a 'free' market and individual 'liberties.' Liberty has eclipsed freedom, which has social dimensions. Freedom as individual liberty has come to mean that individuals can do as they please regardless of the social consequences (Brown, 2019).

'For Hayek,' Brown (2019) notes, 'freedom requires the absence of coercion by other humans, whether that coercion is direct or comes through political institutions' (p. 96). Freedom, for Hayek, 'is not emancipation, it is not power to enact one's will, and it is not license. Indeed, it is not even choice' (p. 96).

Theorists of radically different persuasions can draw from or base their assumptions on the same general theory or set of theories, consciously or unconsciously.[7] For example, Edward Said (1993), too, viewed freedom as the absence of coercion. Brown cites Hayek's belief that 'restraint is a condition, not the opposite of freedom' (Horwitz, as cited in Brown, 2019, p. 97). For Hayek, 'freedom… has nothing to do with emancipation from accepted social norms or powers. Rather, it is the uncoerced capacity for endeavor and experimentation within codes of conduct generated by tradition and enshrined in just law, markets, and morality' (p. 97). 'Liberty, more than limited by moral tradition, is partly constituted by it' (p. 97), and 'moral freedom, more than challenged by politically imposed justice schemes, is destroyed by them' (p. 97). Hayek thus develops a framework that 'sets the stage for dismantling robust democracy in the name of freedom and moral values. Tradition parallels the ontology of markets' (p. 97). Both arise 'spontaneously' and 'yield order and development without relying on comprehensive knowledge or reason and without a master will to develop, maintain, or steer them. Both are antirationalist (neither designed by reason nor fully apprehended by it) without being irrational' (p. 97).

Brown (2019) saw Arendt's (1958) view of society as cynical and negative. Arendt was likely thinking of 'mass man' and 'the masses.' Having escaped Nazism's rise in Germany and immigrating to the US, Arendt was all too familiar with what mobs and the mob mentality were capable of. Her work *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Arendt, 1961) remains a classic, still much cited, debated, and discussed. Arendt was concerned that the mass would rob individuals of their freedom and creativity: 'For Arendt… [the social as a] bloated modern development has destroyed the quintessential human capacities for freedom and action in the public sphere' (Brown, 2019, p. 46). As Brown portrays it:

> In *The Human Condition*, there is almost nothing wrong with modernity that Arendt does not lay at the feet of the overtaking of everything by the social: inauthenticity as well as conformism; action replaced by behavior and epic narrative replaced by statistics; the disappearance of a realm whose coordinates were risk and distinction in favor of one of equality and mediocrity; political rule as a unique form of human achievement trammeled by the rise of 'rule by nobody' in markets and bureaucracies; public life as a domain of *arête* and *virtu* replaced by society centered on work, 'the one activity necessary to sustain life' that was formerly hidden away in the household as shameful; and citizenship allocated to the free and oriented entirely to self-rule disappearing into slavish crowds carrying 'an irresistible instinct toward despotism.'
>
> *(p. 47, emphasis in original)*

Brown (2019) takes up Arendt's discussion of 'the social question' in the latter's *On Revolution* (Arendt, 1963). Brown's reading of Arendt has her deeply critical of the turn from political freedom and emancipation promised by modern revolutions in favor of ameliorating poverty and other concerns of the poor. Arendt uses the French revolution as her example. Brown cites Arendt to the effect that: 'When [the multitude] appeared on the scene of politics, necessity appeared with them… freedom had to be surrendered to necessity… the revolution changed its direction; it aimed no longer at freedom… [but] the happiness of the people' (as cited in Brown, 2019, p. 48). This assertion of Arendt's leaves Brown wondering 'why is the struggle against want antipathetic to the revolutionary desire for emancipation?' (p. 48).

Though there are significant differences between Hayek and Arendt, according to Brown (2019), they share a distrust, even disdain, for 'the social.' They both 'share a conviction that the social question has overtaken modern political life and society has overtaken the individual' (p. 50). 'Above all, both reject the Left's critical understanding of the social as the essential modern site of emancipation, justice, and democracy' (p. 50).

It boils down to how we view 'society,' the model we and others use. Is 'society' a fiction, as Rancière (1991) and Latour (2005) contend? Is 'society' meant to protect and develop people and the commonweal, or is 'society' and limited government as a part of it meant to only guarantee individual freedom as Hayek and Friedman would have it? In this regard, Williams (1958/1983) differentiated between two models of 'society': that which he associated with the 'bourgeois' and that more associated with the 'working class.' 'The crucial distinction,' he wrote, 'is between alternative ideas of the nature of social relationship' (p. 325).

The 'bourgeois' conception is rooted in individualism, of which the neoliberal made good use. This is the philosophy of Hayek and Friedman and their disciples. Individualism is a dominant ideology in the West, whereby 'society' is 'a neutral area within which each individual is free to pursue his own development and his own advantage as a natural right' (Williams, 1958/1983, p. 325). 'The exertion of social power is thought necessary only in so far as it will protect individuals in this basic right to set their own course' (p. 325).

Set against this 'bourgeois' conception of 'society' is that which Williams (1958/1983) claims is more properly associated with the working class; one which, 'whether it is called communism, socialism or cooperation, regards society neither as neutral nor as protective but as the positive means for all kinds of development, including individual development' (p. 326). It is cooperative and communal, in the sense of being both common and held in common:

> Development and advantage are not individually but commonly interpreted. The provision of the means of life will, alike in production and distribution, be collective and mutual. Improvement is sought, not in the opportunity to escape from one's class, or to make a career, but in the general and

> controlled advance of all. The human fund is regarded as in all respects common, and freedom of access to it as a right constituted by one's humanity; yet such access, in whatever kind, is common or it is nothing. Not the individual, but the whole society, will move.
>
> *(p. 326)*

This is based on Williams' deeply held belief that 'the only equality that is important, or indeed conceivable, is equality of being' (p. 317). Though some inequality

> is inevitable and even welcome… The inequality that is evil is inequality which denies the essential equality of being. Such inequality, in any of its forms, in practice rejects, depersonalizes, degrades in grading, other human beings. On such practice a structure of cruelty, exploitation and crippling of human energy is easily raised.
>
> *(p. 317)*

Williams' (1958/1983) belief in the essential equality of being is not dissimilar to Rancière's (1991) equality of intelligence. Millennia of pedagogical relationships have instilled in us the belief that there is a hierarchy of intelligence—that some are smarter than others, and these often become teachers. And as these relationships are formed in and constitutive of broader 'social' relationships and 'society,' they manifest what Rancière terms 'stultification,' meaning the Old Master always holds something back, and therefore never ruptures the presumed inequality of intelligence. The Old Master and his/her knowledge is always greater than the student's. The student is always in an inferior position. This, for Rancière, infests all 'social' relations in 'a society pedagogicized.' But a belief in the equality of intelligence is emancipatory, and such a belief must be foundational, not some far-off goal or dream:

> There is inequality in the *manifestations* of intelligence, according to the greater or lesser energy communicated to the intelligence by the will for discovering and combining new relations: *but there is no hierarchy of* ***intellectual capacity***. Emancipation is becoming conscious of this equality of *nature*.
>
> *(p. 27, emphasis in original and added)*

'The problem is to reveal an intelligence to itself' (p. 28). Also, in parallel with Williams (1958/1983), Rancière, touches on the communal aspect when he writes that 'this power of equality is at once one of duality and one of community' (p. 32) as he reminds us that 'to emancipate someone else, one must be emancipated oneself' (p. 33). And

> what an emancipated person can do is be an emancipator: to give, not the key to knowledge but the consciousness of what an intelligence can do when it considers itself equal to any other and considers any other equal to itself.
>
> *(p. 39)*

And like Nietzsche (1874/2014), Rancière considers laziness, a lack of will, to be a hindrance to intellectual emancipation: 'No one makes an error except by waywardness, that is to say, by laziness' (Rancière, 1991, p. 57). In Rancière's image of 'a society pedagogicized,' one built of stultification through explication and a hierarchy of intelligences—that is to say, unequal intelligences—'explication is the work of laziness' (p. 117). 'Explication is… the very bond of the social order. Whoever says order says distribution into ranks. Putting into ranks presupposes explication, the distributory, justificatory fiction of an inequality that has no other reason for being' (p. 117). 'Every institution,' in such a 'society,' 'is an *explication* in social act, a dramatization of inequality' (p. 105, emphasis in original).

And echoes of Nietzsche can be heard in Rancière's (1991) assertion that '*stultification* is not an inveterate superstition; it is fear in the face of liberty. Routine is not ignorance; it is cowardice and pride of people who renounce their own power for the unique pleasure of affirming their neighbor's incapacity' (p. 108, emphasis in original). Nietzsche (1874/2014) wrote:

> At bottom every human being understands very well that he is entirely unique on this earth and that not even the strangest coincidence will ever throw together such curiously multifarious ingredients into that single thing that he is; he knows, yet he hides it like a guilty conscience—but why? Because he fears his neighbor, who demands conventional behavior and disguises himself with it. But what forces an individual to fear his neighbor, to think with the herd, and to take no joy in himself? Modesty, perhaps in a couple of rare cases. In most cases by far, it is a matter of comfort, inertia, in short, the very tendency towards laziness… human beings are even more lazy than they are timid, and what they fear most of all are the troubles with which an unconditional honesty and bareness would burden them.
>
> *(p. 1)*

For Nietzsche (1874/2014), temerity and laziness stopped people from realizing their liberation: 'There is no way to help any soul attain… happiness, however, so long as it remains shackled with the chains of opinion and fear' (p. 2). Fear drives us apart and fear brings us together. It brings us together, and has done so throughout history, in mutual self-protection against the Other. But just as the enemy, the Other, has changed and evolved alongside 'society,' so too has fear. The perceived or imagined dangers have changed. Though 'we have long lived in fear of the impoverished and oppressed. Afraid to walk alone among them, we have feared the force of their humiliation and desperation' (Lingis, 2020, p. 471),

since the COVID-19 pandemic, 'now we fear their bodies.' 'Each of us urgently needs the others whom we fear' (p. 472). But we take strength, just as we take sustenance and assistance from those courageous and empathetic enough to face their fears to assist others: 'We fear for them and we understand them. This understanding shows that there is something of their motivation and their strength in us' (p. 472).

Nietzsche (1874/2014) encourages us: 'One must take a somewhat mischievous and dangerous attitude towards existence, especially since one will always lose it in the end, however poorly or well things may turn out' (p. 3). Education, or better, certain educators, may be of some help in realizing one's liberation:

> Your true educators and cultivators will reveal to you the original sense and basic stuff of your being, something that is not ultimately amenable to education or cultivation by anyone else, but that is always difficult to access, something bound and immobilized; your educators cannot go beyond being your liberators. And that is the secret of all true culture.
>
> *(pp. 4–5)*

Nietzsche concludes this line of thinking thus:

> There may be other methods of finding oneself, for waking up to oneself out of the anesthesia in which we are commonly enshrouded as if in a gloomy cloud—but I know of none better than that of reflecting upon one's educators and cultivators.
>
> *(p. 5)*

But while he praises the odd educator and cultivator, Nietzsche severely criticizes schooling, even the best universities of his day. And he minces no words in his criticism, referring to 'the presumptuous complacency of our contemporaries' and

> the sometimes stingy, sometimes thoughtless, but always puny demands they make of educators and teachers. How little suffices, even among our nobler and better-taught types… What a collection of cranks and outdated methods goes by the name of Gymnasium and meets with our approval.
>
> *(p. 7)*

'What leaders, what institutions, when we set them beside the demanding task of educating a human being to be a human being!' (p. 7). He asks: 'Who still remembers that the education of a scholar, if his humanity is not to be abandoned and left to die of thirst, is a most delicate problem?' (p. 8).

But elsewhere, Rancière (2019) reminds us that idleness is not necessarily laziness. Not doing is important for thinking, and can have a subversive aspect. Rancière discusses this using the term *far niente* (p. 46). As a type of '(in)occupation,' *far niente*

evokes 'thinking of nothing except the present moment, enjoying nothing other than the pure feeling of existence' (p. 45):

> *Far niente* is not laziness. It is the enjoyment of *otium*. *Otium* is specifically the time when one is expecting nothing, precisely the kind of time that is forbidden to the plebian… This is not the lack of occupation but the abolition of the hierarchy of occupations. The ancient opposition of patricians and plebeians is in effect firstly a matter of different 'occupations.' An occupation is a way of being for bodies and minds. The patrician occupation is to *act*, to pursue grand designs in which their own success is identified with the destiny of vast communities. Plebeians are bound to *do*—to make useful objects and provide material services to meet the needs of their individual survival.
>
> *(p. 46)*

This distinction between doing and acting is reminiscent of Arendt's (1958) typology of labor, work, and action.

Early in the (Western) historical record, the Romans and Greeks held contemplation to be the highest goal to which man could aspire (*vita contemplativa*), and action or doing, labor (*vita activa*), was considered lowly, the domain of the enslaved and of politics, to be engaged in only out of the necessity for survival (Arendt, 1958)[8]:

> A Latin word for 'business,' *negotium*, reveals how seriously some societies used to take non-laboring time. *Negotium* literally means the absence (indicated by the prefix *neg-*) of leisure (*otium*). Romans, in other words, described business in negative terms, as the mundane stuff one does when not attending to the enjoyable aspects of living.
>
> *(Tokumitsu, 2018, para. 5)*

This hierarchical relationship between contemplation and action was reflected in Christianity, epitomized by the words of Thomas Aquinas: '"*vita contemplativa simpliciter melior est quam vita activa*" ("the life of contemplation is simply better than the life of action")' (as cited in Arendt, 1958, p. 318). Not every Christian scholar agreed and there were those, like Augustine, who, according to Arendt, saw an advantage to labor or action 'against the temptations of an idle body' (p. 317, fn. 83).[9] One such advantage, common to both Christianity and Roman morality, was 'as a means with which to ward off the dangers of otiosity' (p. 317) or idleness.[10] The contemplation/labor hierarchy was reversed forever in favor of action as a consequence of the invention of the telescope and Galileo's decentering of the earth, and hence mankind, from being the center of the universe. This contributed to Cartesian doubt as to the veracity of sensory experience and to mankind's 'world alienation' (Arendt, 1958). Man/womankind could no longer trust contemplation or introspection as a means for establishing truth. One could only trust what one could make with one's own hands. Contemplation, the *vita contemplativa*, was

dethroned by *homo faber*, man(/woman) as maker, tool maker and the maker of tools to make tools. The Industrial Revolution wedded to capitalism established production and productivity as the rule. Materialism, pragmatism, instrumentality, utilitarianism conspired to relegate theory to a handmaiden's role. These modes of thinking, these world views and ideologies, found their ways into schools in the language of school effectiveness, global competitiveness, and achievement. A robust and broad liberal education lost out to careerism, and education became simply a path to a job or a better job rather than individual intellectual and moral growth and development.

But thinking itself still has a role to play in one's emancipation and in that of the collective. In *The Human Condition*, Arendt (1958) concluded that thinking would surpass all other activities in the *vita activa* and looked to Cato for support of her assertion in his words to the effect that "'*numquam se plus agere quam nihil cum ageret, numquam minus solum esse quam cum solus esset*"—"Never is he more active than when he does nothing, never is he less alone than when he is by himself"' (Cato as cited in Arendt, 1958, p. 325).

Thinking is hard. It is fragile and vulnerable. Yet thinking is foundational to our liberation, our emancipation, and therefore essential for the emancipation of the individual and the collective. As Arendt (1958) concluded:

> Thought, finally—which we, following the premodern as well as the modern tradition, omitted from our reconsideration of the *vita activa*—is still possible, and no doubt actual, wherever men live under the conditions of political freedom. Unfortunately, and contrary to what is currently assumed about the proverbial ivory-tower independence of thinkers, no other human capacity is so vulnerable, and it is in fact far easier to act under conditions of tyranny than it is to think.
>
> *(p. 324)*

And though thinking is essential for emancipation, we cannot be so naïve as to underestimate the hold material conditions and human 'social' constructions have over us, particularly the structures and superstructures we erect, establish and re-establish daily through our individual and collective actions. And though thought is foundational in our liberation and in our freedom, it is action that works on the material and structural conditions that can hinder us and keep us in place or that, through change(s), contribute to ours and others' emancipation.

Is 'the social'/'society' the site of emancipation, justice, and democracy, or, with Arendt and Hayek, is it a repressive, coercive force? I suggest that it's not an either/or—either 'society' is liberating and emancipating or repressive—but rather a both/and. Jacques Rancière (1991) mounted a not-too-dissimilar argument in his discussion of intellectual emancipation when he wrote that:

> one must choose to attribute reason to real individuals or to their fictive unity. One must choose between making an unequal society out of equal men and making an equal society out of unequal men. Whoever has some taste for equality shouldn't hesitate: individuals are real beings, and society is a fiction.
> *(p. 133)*

Whether a fiction or not, how we think, the models, terms and concepts we use, both individually and collectively, can affect us and have material consequences for our lives. Take the example of race. Race is widely accepted to be a 'social' construct. Though that may be the case, racism has severe deleterious consequences for millions of people. How we think matters. How we think about the collective, whether we call it 'society' or use some other term, matters. How we think about the individual matters as well. And how we conceive of the interaction, the relationship of the individual and the collective matters too.

There are varying and contested notions of what constitutes 'society,' of how we define it. Immanuel Wallerstein (2004) wrote of the emergence of the social sciences—sociology itself having emerged as a term and a discipline with its use by Comte in 1830 as a response or reflection on the effects of the Industrial Revolution, and 'what liberal ideology had designated as the three separate arenas of modern, civilized social life: the market, the state, and the civil society' (p. 75). Others, myself included (Waite et al., 2007), write of the major social institutions as being the State (/government), business (/the market), and the Church (including all formal religious institutions), sometimes with the addition of civil society. Civil society includes 'institutions' such as the family and informal clubs and associations. The point being that throughout human history these institutions have vied for supremacy, with the State usurping the preeminence of the Church and with business dominating ever since. We have witnessed the interpenetration of business in the other spheres.[11]

Williams (1976) offers us this:

> **Society** is now clear in two main senses: as our most general term for the body of institutions and relationships within which a relatively large group of people live; and as our most abstract term for the condition in which such institutions and relationships are formed. The interest of the word is partly in the often difficult relationship between the generalization and the abstraction.
> *(p. 291, emphasis in original)*

Noting how the term came into use in English in the 14th century and connoted companion(ship), association, and fellowship, Williams traced the change in meaning 'from the notion of general laws of fellowship or association to a notion of specific laws forming a specific society' (p. 292). As such, 'it prepared the way for the modern notion, in which the laws of society are not so much laws for getting on with other people but more abstract and more impersonal laws which

determine social institutions' (p. 292). To make the distinction clear, he distinguished 'society' from the State. State had and continues to have the meaning of a general condition, but as it shares its etymology with estate, it also referred to rank, a place in a hierarchy: 'the word was particularly associated with monarchy and nobility, that is to say with a hierarchical ordering of society' (p. 292). As such, it was 'an institutional definition of power' (p. 292). 'Through many subsequent political changes,' Williams wrote, 'this kind of distinction has persisted: **society** is that to which we all belong, even if it is also very general and impersonal; the *state* is the apparatus of power' (p. 293, emphasis in original).

As I've noted, 'society' as a term and concept emerged with the Industrial Revolution and many of the public intellectuals of that time were concerned with the effects industrialization had on people, individually and collectively. 'Social' critics were concerned that men, and it was primarily men who constituted the workforce, the paid workforce, of the time, were themselves becoming mechanized, being turned into and treated as machines in the production process. Alongside industrialization, commercialism/capitalism was the other main object of criticism. Industrialization prompted a great migration to the towns where the mills and factories were located, which then exploded into cities, with all the attendant problems of a large and sudden influx of people and an infrastructure ill-prepared to accommodate them humanely. In England especially, industrialization demanded energy in the form of coal, and the number of mines and miners multiplied. Mining was a hard, dirty, and dangerous life. Some few people got very wealthy and class distinctions and differences, exacerbated by the anonymity of cities and factories, profoundly altered the 'social' contract. Where in feudal times, no matter how poor peasants were in terms of economic wealth (money), they were in relationship with the lord or laird, in 'modern' cities and factories, these relationships were absent. People were simply workers, faceless and anonymous. Their problems became abstractions to the wealthy and the rulers. Even otherwise enlightened 'social' critics and academics of the time began to refer to them as masses, or worse, mobs.

Identity and Consciousness: Stasis, Growth, and Development

If we think of 'society' and its constituents, and whether we view those constituents as distinct and yet inseparable (Quijano, 2007) or as monadic (Adorno, 1978), autonomous and atomistic automatons—isolated little universes unto themselves—and whether we think in terms of self(/selves), individuals, citizens, consumers or subjects, we must pause to consider: What are they, these building blocks of 'society' or 'culture'? Or we can start from the bottom up in constructing a model of 'society': What or who is the material out of which 'societies' or collectivities are built? The simple answer is people. But who are these people?

We can, using the models we've discussed already, place people, singularly and collectively, into categories or roles. Williams (1958/1983) had his subject, servant, vagrant, rebel, and revolutionary. Bauman (1996) provided us with the pilgrim, the stroller, the vagabond, and tourist. And then of course, there are racialized and ethnic categories or identities, and there are national identities. Many of these are assigned according to place of birth or parentage—all historical markers. Many are affiliative: there are tribal designations and even sports team affiliations, which seem to be quite strong and determinative, especially in the United Kingdom, where, in a very real sense, sports team affiliation and identification captures the individual, not the other way around.

As Quijano (2007) asserted, in rigid hierarchical systems one's role and identity are ascribed to one, and social mobility or role flexibility is difficult if not impossible. One is born into and dies in the same 'social' position. More, these 'social' positions are inherited and passed from generation to generation, 'socially' immutable, unchangeable and rigid. These are often caste systems (Wilkerson, 2020). The mores and conventions in such 'societies' are so strong as to work to keep everyone 'in their place.' But even in less hierarchical, ostensibly merit-based systems, 'social' class, what Bourdieu (1987) called social capital, is inter-generational, passed on and inherited. This occurs through what Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) and many scholars after them referred to as social reproduction, and schools and universities play an important role in it.

So the question then becomes to what degree can someone, anyone, determine for themselves who they are or how they are perceived? This is the question of identity, and today the question often is framed as identity politics. As regards gender and sexuality (sex being the biological determinant and gender being the 'socially' realized equivalent) we often hear reference to how one self-identifies; that is, how one likes to think of oneself and would like others to think and/or refer to them. Here again, as with other 'social' categories, we come up against a conundrum or logical problematic: If, say, race is 'socially' constructed, as most have come to accept, is it real? Is racism real? Those who suffer oppression of any kind (homophobia, racism, ageism, or ableism) know it to be so. Again we find 'real world' consequences for what is essentially an idea, an ideology. This is worse when that ideology becomes hegemonic.

The concept of hegemony calls on us to ask other questions of 'the social.' Just how does an idea or ideology become hegemonic? And if such a rationality is hurtful and oppressive how do we free ourselves individually and collectively from its grip? Again we're talking about human freedom, emancipation, and liberation.

Said (1993) and others speak of oppression, unfreedom, as being the result of coercion. But coercion is too narrow and not nuanced enough to even begin to cover the range of oppressions and injustices perpetrated upon people by other people and systems. Quijano (2007) points to coloniality as 'still the most general form of domination in the world today… [But] it doesn't exhaust, obviously, the conditions nor the modes of exploitation and domination

between peoples' (p. 170). Coloniality operates in and through a rationality, a modernist rationality. And hegemony enters in the 'colonization of the imagination of the dominated; that is, it acts in the interior of that imagination, in a sense, it is a part of it' (p. 169). Knowledge and knowledge production are its instruments, as power. Beyond violence (and coercion), which are blunt, bald instruments, the dominators use knowledge and knowledge production of 'beliefs and images… to impede the cultural production of the dominated… as a very efficient means of social and cultural control' (p. 169). Some of the dominated were co-opted into the colonizers' world view/rationality and images, 'into their… power institutions. The European culture was made seductive: it gave access to power. After all, beyond repression, the main instrument of all power is its seduction' (p. 169).

The way forward for Quijano (2007) involves extricating 'oneself from the linkages between rationality/modernity and coloniality, first of all, and definitely from all power which is not constituted by free decisions made by free people' (p. 177). This means 'epistemological decolonization, as decoloniality' (p. 177), a freeing of the mind:

> The liberation of intercultural relations from the prison of coloniality also implies the freedom of all peoples to choose, individually or collectively, such relations: a freedom to choose between various cultural orientations, and above all, the freedom to produce, criticize, change, and exchange culture and society. This liberation is part of the process of social liberation from all power organized as inequality, discrimination, exploitation, and as domination.
>
> *(p. 178)*

Consciousness is a fundamental part of identity, and its coming into being is, first, a critical stage in a person's growth and maturity. A child, through the normal course of development, comes to realize itself as separate or distinct from its mother, father, or other caregiver. Since George Herbert Mead's (1934) seminal elucidation of the self and society, scholars and the public have come to accept that we are born into already existing 'social' relations, those that existed before us and which will persist after we are gone. Even as a child develops a self distinct from its mother, father, and caregivers, it moves into and develops webs of other relations—the extended family, the neighborhood, the tribe or clan, and the school with its numerous and varied 'social' webs of relations. In some 'societies' the child's role or place is determined for them; in others, less so. But even in those 'societies' that are less restrictive and even into and through adulthood, the child and then the adult is constantly bombarded with messages about who she is and what is expected of her; that is, what her place is. These messages can be about behavior or about roles. These messages affect identity and how others see her.

Thanks especially to post-structural feminist theorists (e.g., Judith Butler) and others (e.g., Stuart Hall), we have come to accept identity as not fixed but fluid, sometimes contingent, but always performative. At a basic level, we aren't an identity, we *have* an identity; and at the next level of complexity, we enact or perform an identity through interactions with others and with our environment.

Along with identity, and often in conjunction with or parallel to its development, we develop a consciousness. Simply put, consciousness is an awareness of one's self in relation to one's context, environment, or milieu (Zuboff, 2019). Kegan (1994; also Waite, 2002) set out five stages of human development, which he referred to as levels of consciousness; the ego-centric, the concrete operational, the traditionalist, the modernist, and the postmodernist. The first two are characteristic of early and late childhood. Self-concept and role concept awareness emerge in the second level. By late adolescence or early adulthood, people have generally moved to the traditionalism stage, one characterized by role consciousness, and their ontology is one that is cross categorical or trans-categorical (of two independent systems or categories). Further growth in consciousness beyond this level is not assured, but can and does frequently take place. The next level, modernism, is distinguished by self-authorship and consciousness of the self. Its ontology is that of complex systems. The fifth level of consciousness is characterized as trans-system and trans-complex and the interpenetration of self with others and other systems—systems within systems within systems. It's the case here, too, that at the modernism level and the levels prior, one is of the system as a subject of the system; while at the postmodern level, one can metaphorically step outside of the system and it becomes an object. This is important for further growth and development for if one can objectify the system, one can reflect on it and maybe change it; whereas if someone is one with the system, this is difficult to do.

Consciousness is the awareness of one's self in one's context(s). Of itself, this awareness is just that: recognition and acceptance; but beyond that, if one reads their context and their place in it but is dissatisfied with either, this requires an analysis and analysis is always theory laden, no matter how grand or lowly or common the theory. It can, and often is, cobbled together from the resources already to hand, such as received wisdom, tradition, religious orthodoxy, or 'cultural' learnings. It could come from school learning or independent reading and study. Theories can be of the 'off the shelf' type, already developed by others in established disciplines and simply adopted and applied to how one reads the situation one is part of or wishes to analyze. Or it can be one's own amalgam of bits of other theories, a bricolage, or entirely of one's own making. Analysis and interpretation rely on theory or theories.

But if one finds the situation and one's place in it dissatisfying or unfair, and perhaps unfair not just to oneself but to others as well, this is the seed for the development of a critical consciousness, what Freire (1970) called conscientization. Pak and Ravitch (2021) define criticality as involving 'the theoretical, conceptual, and contextual analysis of people's lives, institutional structures, and

cultures, while paying particular attention to the norms, policies, and practices that serve the interests of the dominant class' (p. 2). It involves 'analyzing power and structural inequalities… disrupting dominant norms and assumptions… exhibiting agency and critical hope when critiquing power, structures, and norms… and advocating for social change' (pp. 2–3).

Pak and Ravitch (2021) discuss the development of a critical consciousness in educational leaders, or anyone for that matter. They see social identity as related to 'the leader's gender, social class, race, sexual identity and orientation, culture, ethnicity, and religion [if any], as well as the intersections of these and other identity markers such as national origin, language communities' of which one is part, 'and so on' (p. 27). 'Inextricably linked to social identities,' they assert, 'are leaders' relationships with power and privilege, and hierarchy broadly, which inform the development of our mental models for how we think the world operates' (p. 27)—our ontologies. Privilege and entitlement factor into one's 'social' position and ought to be considered in one's reflection upon one's 'social' identity and role. Pak and Ravitch see that

> becoming a critically self-reflexive, inquiry-based leader requires much more than occasional self-reflection or exposure to formal research; it necessitates that practitioners actively work to systematically explore and understand their own social identities and how they relate to their socialized belief systems, ideologies, and biases in their leadership practices.
>
> *(p. 30)*

Development of consciousness, critical or otherwise, is based in an awareness of one's self and one's environment, the web of 'social' and other entanglements of which one is part. We use our developing mental models or ontologies to make sense of these. These ontologies may be innate, tacit, and rather informal in the beginning. We later add to and refine our mental models as we learn and grow. Learning is relational and itself develops out of our own dispositions—dispositions such as curiosity and openness, among many others—and input from our environment, input such as teaching, which is intended especially to aid our learning, and the other input we process through experience and reflection. But none of these factors are simple and unproblematic. Generations of philosophers, from Descartes to Kant and Lèvinas, Dilthey and Merleau Ponty, have argued about perception and experience and their role in informing our epistemology. How do we know what we (think) we know? Can we believe what we see and hear? Are they first order (direct) inputs; that is, is the world exactly and only as we perceive it? Our sense input is always mediated, by the sense receptors themselves, by our brain and by our cognitive schema or frames. Perception is always theory-laden. Making sense of what we perceive is more so. And, again, what is the relation between our material and 'social' condition and development of our consciousness? What have these to do with our emancipation?

Our senses are easily fooled. Cognitive psychologists have shown this time and again (see for example Kahneman, 2010).

And this superficial and pedestrian description of perception doesn't take into account the 'social' into which we are born and in which we grow and develop. As we develop we are constantly bombarded with input, with stimuli, and with messages in and about the 'social.' These are never neutral. Some are benign (e.g., Santa Claus), some less so (e.g., some theology and religious orthodoxy), and some are outright oppressive (e.g., racism and White supremacy), intended to groom us for our place in the 'social,' a particular type of 'social.' Some of these messages are unintentional, while others are designed to control us and to keep us malleable, docile, and domesticated.

This is the realm of ideology (Althusser, 1984), where 'truth' is manufactured to suit the purposes of the ruling elite. Noam Chomsky (2021) tweeted recently that 'the general population doesn't know what's happening, and it doesn't even know that it doesn't know'. In our current post-truth era, the media are full of half-truths, fake news, and 'alternative facts.' A whole new area of scholarship has arisen whose focus is untruth and ignorance. Called *agnotology* by some, this area of research deals with lies, secrets, occlusion, and other systematic deceptions (Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008). Transparency is its enemy and antidote. Wasn't it the former US Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes who said that sunlight is the best antiseptic?

If, as Said (1993) asserted, unfreedom results from coercion, surely he didn't mean that coercion is the only cause. What of duplicity, lying, and manipulation? Althusser (1984) enumerated the various state ideological apparatuses, and though they operate through consciousness and consciousness formation, violence, coercion and the threat of them lie just below the surface and states, totalitarian and otherwise, are quick to revert to violent suppression when the other forms of control don't work.

Though it is not written about as much now as it was, we would be remiss if we didn't at least mention the notion of 'false' consciousness, a Marxian concept meant to explain how workers and others could come to believe in, accept and support systems that weren't in their best interests or were actually downright repressive. Marxists discussed this in terms of the worker's relationship with the means of production. In class terms, the capitalists owned the means of production and the workers supplied the labor, which they didn't own. Workers in this formulation were *rentiers*, selling their labor. As many, if not most, workers couldn't afford the products they produced, what then was their relationship to the means of production, to their work?

Brown (2019) summarized the neoliberal fear of what they thought to be a totalitarian possibility of a democratic 'social' State where the majority supported the State's intervention in the market on their behalf as a resolution to 'the social question' (also see Rancière, 2014). Their argument, according to Brown, was: 'Unless they are tricked, trained, or effectively disenfranchised, the workers and poor will always fight markets as unfair in their distribution of opportunities and

rewards' (p. 63). Neoliberal tactics, strategies, and rationales worked to trick 'this class… with appeals to other lines of privilege and power, such as whiteness or masculinity, especially since liberty, rather than equality reproduces and secures these powers' (p. 64). They were 'trained to accept… [that] "there is no other alternative"… as a reality principle' so that neoliberal rationalities guiding policy 'become unchallengeable' (p. 64). And they were 'disenfranchised through voter suppression, gerrymandering, bought elections and legislation, and other ways of insulating legislative power from democratic will or accountability' (p. 64).

Brown (2019) concluded that the fact 'that each of these [tactics] has been an important part of the American political landscape during the neoliberal decades helps explain why and how neoliberal reason gained its grip so easily without an overt assault on representative democracy' (p. 64). The grip of neoliberal rationality, its ontology, is in fact so strong and so pervasive, so taken for granted, unquestioned, and unchallenged, that even ostensibly progressive US presidential administrations instituted heavily neoliberal education reforms. President Obama's 'Race to the Top' educational reform, for example, was steeped in neoliberalism with its emphasis on accountability, charter schools, and anti-union policies.

Notes

1 The 'scare quotes' call attention to the term and gesture at its problematic nature (I have similar concerns with 'culture' and 'tradition'). Seymour Sarason (2004) also discussed several ambiguous terms: learning, culture, and democracy.
2 Unlike for most of today's refugees and migrants, borders are thrown open to the wealthy, with countries falling all over themselves to offer them citizenship through so-called 'cash-for-passport' schemes (Harrington, 2016), where, for a nominal fee (nominal to the wealthy) of some $500,000–$1,000,000, these individuals and their families are granted citizenship.
3 A list of many of the universities which partake in this scheme is available courtesy of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists at: www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/universities-colleges-offshore-leaks-database/
4 Althusser lists the 'press, radio, and television, etc.' (p. 111), but we could add the 'new media' occasioned by the internet—email, instant messaging, Facebook, TikTok, Instagram, other sites and streaming services.
5 For decades, Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues have conducted and published the World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp). They find that the world's 'societies' can be differentiated on two dimensions—1) traditional values versus secular-rational values, and 2) survival values versus self-expression values. Traditional societies (and their members) 'emphasize the importance of religion, parent-child ties, deference to authority and traditional family values' (para. 3), while secular-rational 'societies' emphasize these values less. 'Societies' scoring high on the survival values place 'emphasis on economic and physical security. It is linked with a relatively ethnocentric outlook and low levels of trust and tolerance' (para. 5). They tend to be more ethnocentric and distrustful and less accepting of 'strangers' or 'foreigners.'
6 Of course, these alone are not responsible for our 'social' relations, other phenomena such as greed and competition, capitalism, a lack of empathy, and more also play a part in our individual and collective responsibility or its lack.

7 See Waite (2002) for further discussion of how the same philosophies or theories, even less progressive ones, may be held by those with differing political views.
8 I wrote 'man' because the Romans and Greeks considered only free men, landowners, to be citizens.
9 In monasteries labor 'sometimes played the same role as other painful exercises and forms of self-torture' (Arendt, 1958, p. 317).
10 Augustine saw three advantages to labor: 'it helps to fight the temptations of otiosity; it helps monasteries to fulfill their duty of charity to the poor; and it is favorable to contemplation because it does not engage the mind unduly like other occupations, for instance, the buying and selling of goods' (Arendt, 1958, p. 318, fn. 83).
11 Another aspect of the historical record which we'll not develop here is that of civilization, as in Wallerstein's quote above of 'civilized social life,' as this term, even more than 'society,' tends towards the normative.

References

Adorno, T. (1978). *Minima moralia: Reflections from damaged life* (E. F. N. Jephcott, Trans.) Verso.

Althusser, L. (1984). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation). In *Essays on Ideology* (pp. 100–140). Verso.

Anzaldúa, G. (1987). *Borderlands/La frontera: The new mestiza*. Aunt Lute Books.

Arendt, H. (1958). *The human condition* (2nd ed.). The University of Chicago Press.

Arendt, H. (1961). The crisis of education. In *Between past and future: Eight exercises in political thought* (pp. 173–196). Viking Press.

Arendt, H. (1963). *On revolution*. Viking Press.

Bauman, Z. (1996). From pilgrim to tourist—Or a short history of identity. In S. Hall & P. duGay (Eds.), *Questions of cultural identity* (pp. 18–36). Sage.

Becher, T., & Trowler, P. R. (2001). *Academic tribes and territories: Intellectual enquiry and the culture of disciplines* (2nd ed.). The Society for Research into Higher Education & Open University Press.

Biesta, G. J. J. (2014). *The beautiful risk of education*. Paradigm Publishers.

Bourdieu, P. (1987). What makes a social class? On the theoretical and practical existence of groups. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 32, 1–17. www.jstor.org/stable/41035356.

Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J. C. (1990). *Reproduction in education, society and culture* (2nd ed.). Sage.

Brown, W. (2019). *In the ruins of neoliberalism: The rise of antidemocratic politics in the west*. Columbia University Press.

Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond 'identity.' *Theory and Society*, 29(1), 1–47. www.jstor.org/stable/3108478.

Burke, P. (2000). *A social history of knowledge: From Gutenberg to Diderot*. Polity Press.

Chomsky, N. (2021, March 8). The general population doesn't know what's happening, and it doesn't even know that it doesn't know @noamchomsky [Tweet]. Twitter.

Freire, P. (1970). *Pedagogy of the oppressed* (M. B. Ramos, Trans.). Bloomsbury.

Gould, S. J. (1980). *The panda's thumb: More reflections in natural history*. Norton.

Harrington, B. (2016). *Capital without borders: Wealth managers and the one percent*. Harvard University Press.

Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking, fast and slow*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Kegan, R. (1994). *In over our heads: The mental demands of modern life*. Harvard University Press.

Laclau, E. (2007). *Emancipation(s)*. Verso. (Original published in 1996)
Lakomski, G. (2005). *Managing without leadership: Towards a theory of organizational functioning*. Elsevier.
Latour, B. (2005). *Reassembling the social: An introduction to Actor-Network Theory*. Oxford University Press.
Lingis, A. (1994). *The community of those who have nothing in common (studies in continental thought)*. Indiana University Press.
Lingis, A. (2018). *Irrevocable: A philosophy of mortality*. The University of Chicago Press.
Lingis, A. (2020). The new fear of one another. *Journal of Bioethical Inquiry*, 17, 471–472. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-020-10035-6.
Maurer, W. M. (1995). Complex subjects: Offshore finance, complexity theory, and the dispersion of the modern. *Socialist Review*, 25(3–4), 113–145. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5339-9893.
McDonell, N. (2016). *The civilization of perpetual movement: Nomads in the modern world*. Hurst & Company.
Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self and society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist* (C. W. Morris, Ed.). The University of Chicago Press.
Mills, C. W. (1959). *The power elite*. Oxford University Press. (Original published in 1956)
Nietzsche, F. (2014). *Schopenhauer as educator: Friedrich Nietzsche's third untimely meditation* (A. Collins, Trans.). Theophania Publishing. (Original published in 1874)
Pak, K., & Ravitch, S. M. (Eds.) (2021). *Critical leadership praxis for educational and social change*. Teachers College Press.
Proctor, R. N., & Schiebinger, L. (Eds.). (2008). *Agnotology: The making and unmaking of ignorance*. Stanford University Press.
Quijano, A. (2007). Coloniality and modernity/rationality. *Cultural Studies*, 21(2–3), 168–178. https://doi.org/10.1080/09502380601164353.
Rancière, J. (1991). *The ignorant schoolmaster: Five lessons in intellectual emancipation* (K. Ross, Trans.). Stanford University Press.
Rancière, J. (2010). *Dissensus: On politics and aesthetics* (S. Corcoran, Trans.). Continuum.
Rancière, J. (2014). *Hatred of democracy* (S. Cochran, Trans.). Verso.
Rancière, J. (2019). *Aisthesis: Scenes from the aesthetic regime of art* (Z. Paul, Trans.). Verso.
Said, E. W. (1993). *Culture and imperialism*. Vintage Books.
Said, E. W. (2000). *Reflections on exile and other essays*. Harvard University Press.
Simmel, G. (1950). *The sociology of Georg Simmel* (K. H. Wolff, Ed.). The Free Press.
Tokumitsu, M. (2018, March 4). Time after capitalism. *Portside*. https://portside.org/2018-03-04/time-after-capitalism.
Waite, D. (2002). 'The paradigm wars' in educational administration: An attempt at transcendence. *International Studies in Educational Administration*, 30(1), 66–81.
Waite, D. (2013). Thinking about school improvement. *Education and Society*, 31(1), 7–16. https://doi.org/10.7459/es/31.1.02.
Waite, D., Moos, L., Sugrue, D., & Liu, C. (2007). Framing education: A conceptual synthesis of the major social institutional forces affecting education. *Education and Society*, 25(3), 5–33.
Wallerstein, I. M. (2004). *The uncertainties of knowledge*. Temple University Press.
Wilkerson, I. (2020). *Caste: The origins of our discontents*. Random House.
Wilkinson, R. G. (2005). *The impact of inequality: How to make sick societies healthier*. The New Press.
Williams, R. (1976). *Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society*. Fontana Press.

Williams, R. (1983). *Culture & society: 1780–1950*. Columbia University Press. (Original published 1958)
Williams, R. (2013). *The long revolution*. Parthian. (Original published 1961)
Winters, J. A. (2011). *Oligarchy*. Cambridge University Press.
Ziman, J. (1981). What are the options? Social determinants of personal research plants. *Minerva*, 19, 1–42. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02192547.
Zuboff, S. (2019). *The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the frontier of power*. PublicAffairs.

3

ON THE SHORTCOMINGS OF OUR ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS[1]

School improvement is a complicated, complex endeavor characterized by distinct perspectives that inform and underpin it, and disparate conceptions of just how to accomplish it. Many believe school reforms are as likely to cause harm as they are to improve the lived worlds of students, teachers, and administrators (Ingersoll, 2003; Sarason, 1996, 2004; Varenne & McDermott, 1998).

Improvement of schools, organizations, and of individuals themselves, can be brought about by recognizing and accentuating systems and processes found to be effectual (e.g., Harris, 2002; Sergiovanni, 1994), by attenuating those found wanting (e.g., Ingersoll, 2003; Schmuck & Runkel, 1994), or by a combination of the two (e.g., Hargreaves & Fullan, 1998; Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009).

I take a novel approach in this chapter, but one solidly situated in and aligned with efforts to identify and attenuate negative or deleterious aspects of schools and schooling to ameliorate organizational shortcomings. I draw not only from organizational theory, but from ethology, primatology, and neural psychology, as well as my anthropological and sociological training and work. Such a wide-ranging and comprehensive approach is warranted, given both the subject matter and Bourdieu's declamation that 'the division among disciplines—ethnology, sociology, history and economy—translates itself back into separated segments that are totally inadequate to the objects of study' (1999, p. 181, fn. 1). Likewise, the French philosopher Françoise Dastur (2009, citing Heidegger), noted how a philosophical anthropology touches upon at least three dimensions of the objects of study: biological, psychological, and cultural.

The springboard for this chapter was my preliminary analysis from an ongoing empirical study of the changes administrators undergo due to their job. The questions guiding that study were asked to get at a phenomenological understanding of educational administration and the effects it, whatever *it* is, has upon

DOI: 10.4324/9781003164449-3

the incumbent. This led me into research having to do with not just the processes and dispositions of leaders and leadership, but the ways in which we organize ourselves and our work and the dynamics at play among form, process, and person. The interplay between organizational forms and interactive social processes—what John Dewey termed 'the implications of human association' (1916, p. 81)—is my focus.

Space limitations prohibit an exhaustive treatment of all the ways we organize ourselves (e.g., school age, alphabetical by surname, etc.). These are, as are all types of organization or categorization, to a certain degree, arbitrary (Burke, 2000). My focus is on those types which are most prevalent in and have the greatest impact on the way schools work. And though my experiences and the examples I employ are drawn mainly from US contexts, the universality, indeed the ubiquity, of the forms discussed apply to educational institutions around the globe.

Schools as a Greedy Institution

The first phase of my empirical work was undertaken in my local setting, a public university. The questions driving my research and thinking stemmed from an extrapolation of Willard Waller's (1932) seminal work on the sociology of teaching, in particular the chapter 'What teaching does to teachers.' This caused me to wonder what effect administration has on school administrators; put another way: What is the nature of educational administration and what effects, if any, does the job have on incumbents? Waller noted:

> What does any occupation do to the human being who follows it? Now that differences of caste and rank have become inconspicuous, and differences that go with locale are fading, it is the occupation that most marks the man. The understanding of the effects upon the inner man of the impact of the occupation is thus an important task of social science. It is a problem almost untouched.
>
> *(p. 375)*

As with most research, my wonderings led me to look around, first at my local scene. I noticed an odd situation with the administration of my own college of education. First, most of the administrators at the rank of department chair and above were women, and, upon further investigation, I realized most were 'empty nesters' or otherwise childless, by chance or by choice.[2] Concerned that perhaps this was an anomaly, I surveyed a convenience sample of graduate students in our educational administration program. I found the patterns I had observed in our college were generally repeated throughout numerous public schools in the area. The overwhelming majority of administrators in these public schools—tertiary, secondary, and elementary—whether male or female, had no children currently in the home.

Unprompted by me, some of the respondents volunteered poignant stories of their own, or of administrators or administrative aspirants they knew personally. One told me he was counseled by a senior male administrator not to enter the profession yet because he had young children at home. Another told me he had won legal custody of his special needs daughter after a lengthy divorce and bitter custody battle. Yet, soon after taking an entry-level administrative position at a secondary school, he reconsidered, imploring his ex-wife for her help in raising their daughter; in essence, surrendering the legal rights for which he had fought so hard.

These data and their preliminary analysis piqued my interest. I couldn't help but wonder whether these phenomena resulted from the nature of the job, organizational features of schools, attributes of people seeking jobs as administrators, a combination of these factors, or some other factor as yet unidentified.

This thinking led me to consider Coser's (1974) notion of the greedy institution. Though dealing more with what Goffman (1962) termed 'total institutions'—Coser presented the priesthood and the military as exemplars—Coser's depiction accurately characterizes some schools, colleges, and universities today, especially from the perspective of the administrator, but increasingly affecting other actors as well. He stated:

> Total commitments might reduce anxieties that spring from competing role-demands and the pull of differing loyalties and allegiances. But when the desire for wholeness leads to an enlistment in greedy organizations, it may end in an obliteration of the characteristics that mark the private person as an autonomous actor… Commitment to greedy institutions requires that the autonomy gained by men [or women] who stand at the intersection of many circles is relinquished, and is replaced by heteronomous submission to the all-encompassing demands of organizations that greedily devour the whole man [or woman] in order to fully fashion him [or her] into an image that serves their needs.
>
> *(1974, p. 18)*

Max Weber (1958) referred to (then) modern bureaucracies as iron cages. In a like vein, I once suggested educational administrators were prisoners of the organization (cited in Ajofrín, 2008). Gronn (2003) commented on the impact of world-wide labor and market trends and their effect on, especially, work in service- and knowledge-based economies, including schools. He, too, characterized school organizations as greedy institutions which, 'rather than diminishing servility, [have, through] marketised regulation of public sector agencies and the creation of an enterprise culture [bred] their own new and unique forms of exploitation and serfdom, which I term greedy work practices' (p. 147). Thomson (2009) likewise intimated one reason educational administrators are overworked is that they work for greedy organizations. Further noting how such

organizations prize work addiction, Thomson (2009, citing Gini) made the point that administrators are implicated in their own overwork.

Perhaps there is a tendency to romanticize home and private life and demonize work and the workplace. Such tendencies lend commonsense support to Coser's notions of the greedy institution (1974). We might conclude that such 'greedy work' (Gronn, 2003, p. 148) sucks the person away from home and enslaves her at work.

However, as Hochschild (1997) found, work can be a haven for some, a retreat from home life. Although she mainly studied male CEOs who found fulfillment through work, she noted similar tendencies in the occasional female manager or CEO. Gronn (2003) also commented on the tendency of social science research to view the workplace as a respite:

> This notion means that the workplace is beginning to be seen as a respite or an escape route, where people are freed from their domestic emotional entanglements and where their identities as persons are affirmed, in some cases, in increasingly supportive workplace communities.
>
> *(pp. 152–153)*

Gronn focused on the impact work and work intensification have upon the personal:

> as one rises to meet the challenges created by work intensification, one may jettison or reduce a range of competing social attachments to make space for a greater commitment to work, which is perhaps made possible for the first time at that point in the career cycle when one's offspring leave the domestic nest.
>
> *(p. 153)*

There is much to recommend a more structural reading of the modern, industrial, and post-industrial human condition. From Weber's iron cage to Whyte's organization man (1956/2002), there has been

> a good deal of… work on organizational behavior… [that] has been a footnote to the bureaucratic 'backlash' which aroused Weber's passion: saving mankind's soul 'from the supreme mastery of the bureaucratic way of life.'
>
> *(Bennis, 1993, p. 7)*

Interestingly, the COVID-19 pandemic has altered many people's attitudes toward the workplace, if not to work itself.

So, then, how are we to view schools as organizations and the effect they have upon the individual? A more balanced approach might look at the dynamism between the person and his/her work, between the private and public, between the agent and structure. This dynamic—between the individual's wants and needs, and the structure, processes, and demands of the workplace—plays out

differently for each. That is to say, individuals form distinctly different relations with their jobs—a point captured by Billett's (2004) notion of co-participation at work, stressing the 'interdependent process of engagement in and learning through work' (p. 197). Coming at the problem from a different perspective, he examined how the individual's 'simultaneous participation in other social practices… influences how they are able or elect to participate at work' (p. 197). Work, work environments, and processes offer, in Billett's terms, certain affordances, though usually differentially distributed. Affordances can be perquisites such as salary, status, personal assistants, bonuses, and more. For teachers, these might include being tapped to teach top-level (advanced placement) classes, being assigned less onerous duty periods and locales, or being granted stipends for professional development (Ingersoll, 2003). Billett noted how 'workplace affordances are constituted and distributed by workplace hierarchies, group affiliations, personal relations, workplace cliques and cultural practices, and kinds of activities in which individuals are able to or are requested to engage' (p. 200).

Billett (2004) considered the worker's contribution in his co-participation calculus: 'individuals' learning is not a process of socialization or enculturation arising from participation at work. Instead, their agency also shapes how they participate and engage in activities and respond to guidance they are being afforded in their workplace' (p. 200). Workplace affordances, in interaction with the individual's 'relatedness,' comprise Billett's co-participatory dynamic—the process is ever iterative: 'Inter-psychological processes are interdependently relational, albeit situated in particular social action' (p. 202).

One global work trend Billett (2004) commented upon, one with the potential to impact the local, especially the work of schools, is shifting the responsibility, burden, and blame onto individuals for their own learning, growth, and professional development. Billett reasoned:

> this account is never more salient than when workers are constantly being expected to take responsibility for the currency of their work-related competence (OECD, 1998), and at a time when employers are avoiding their traditional responsibilities to assist this development.
>
> *(p. 202)*

He continued,

> while individuals are active agents throughout their working life, how workplaces afford opportunities to participate in different kinds of goal-directed activities and engage in interactions plays a central role in what they learn and how they extend that learning.
>
> *(pp. 202–203)*

This insight—how workplaces afford opportunities to participate—compliments Burrell and Morgan's (2006) injunction to consider how human nature interrelates with the environment, including workplace environments such as schools. Burrell and Morgan discussed assumptions fundamental to various approaches to studying social science and the ontological and epistemological assumptions inherent in these different research approaches or stances. Through this they remind us that:

> Associated with the ontological and epistemological issues, but conceptually separate from them, is a third set of assumptions concerning *human nature* and, in particular, the relationship between human beings and their environment. All social science, clearly, must be predicated upon this type of assumption.
>
> *(p. 2, emphasis in original)*[3]

Consideration of these ideas leads to questions I address in the next section; how does human nature affect how we organize ourselves? We cannot sidestep the related question: What effects do the way we organize ourselves and our schools have on the person? And what are the ramifications for educational change and school improvement?

Common Organizational Forms

In the following, I discuss four general forms of organization: the cell, silo or stovepipe, pyramid, network, and their variants. Of course, fundamental human nature dynamics influence human associations or organizational forms in varying strengths and guises, characteristic of no particular form yet common to all. Two principal dynamics have to do with 1) collectivism and individualism, and 2) competition and collaboration. Hofstede (1991) claimed the collective/individualist orientation was a defining characteristic of countries, cultures, and organizations. Vandello and Cohen (1991) argued for the salience of the collectivist/individualist dynamic and charted its geographical distribution across the United States.

Competition contributes to and is a product of hierarchical organizational forms. While it may strengthen within-group bonds in the face of external forces, goals, or threats (Kaufman, 2009), interpersonal or localized competition tends to rend or strain social bonds (Wilkinson, 2001). Wilkinson reminds us that cooperation (as among egalitarian hunter gathering groups) has been a more prevalent, continuous characteristic of human association than competition and status hierarchies. Clearly, competition and collaboration share a complex dynamic relationship.

Just how competition, collaboration, individualism, and collectivism play out through organizational forms is discussed next. Though I discuss these forms as if they were ideal types, in reality, they hybridize, overlap, intermingle, and otherwise morph.

Cellular Types of Organization

Principles of cellular organization abound in nature—honeycomb cells in beehives for instance. Yet both animal and human societies provide examples of two basic types of cellular organization: isolated and collective. Such organizations insulate individual members from one another. Isolated cells are exemplified by terrorist—especially sleeper—cells. Their primary advantage to, in this case, terrorists, is that members can escape detection due to the enforced intentional lack of communication between individuals or units. Because of the insulation of cells, threats and damage can be minimized, controlled, or localized, which can aid the organization's survival. Although this is an extreme example, cellular structures can be applied to more mundane groups, as well.

In schools, the classic 'egg-crate' design, or as Weick (1976) described it, loosely coupled systems (see also Pajak & Green, 2003), is evidence of cellular-type organization in which the design of schools and the isolating processes that occur within them isolate classrooms and individuals (Little, 1990).

This organizational form is likely to produce balkanization—a phenomenon common to modern high schools (Hargreaves, 1994). Balkanization in schools results in the separation of academic departments, which become nearly autonomous entities. Often, in such cases, the teacher's first loyalty lies with their academic discipline, and not with the school as an organization. This is problematic for communal identity formation and it may hinder reform efforts, as academic units can become sites of resistance (Hargreaves, 1994).

Nor does this type of organization foster collaboration. Borrowing from game theory, Lakomski (2005) found that although innovation and change can occur in organizations of this type, they do so slowly and incrementally, communicated from cell to cell to cell—either discrete group cells or individuals—to contiguous neighbors across the field.

Hierarchies

Hierarchical structures are common to—indeed implied by—both the silo (or stovepipe) and the pyramidal forms. Fukuyama (1999) suggested that the tendency to organize in hierarchies is human nature. This is perhaps accurate in a limited sense. I would add at least two qualifications to Fukuyama's assertion: 1) not only humans so organize; non-human primates and other mammals do so as well; and 2) hierarchies are not innate, but constructed, and socially constructed at that.

The second of these qualifications finds support from Gardner et al.'s (2001) discussion of good work. They asserted that 'it is in our power to create the kind of society that we want, in the way that we want' (p. 245). This recognizes the agential potential of human association. Whether or not the tendency to organize hierarchically is human nature, we would be mistaken (and unnecessarily handicapped) were we to assume human nature is destiny. That is, individually and

collectively we make choices and perform actions that shape our environments—both natural and social. Lortie (2009) noted, 'the constraints and obstacles that retard [school] improvement—the inhibiting aspects of present structures—are the result of decisions we have, as a society, made in the past. We can make different decisions in the future' (p. 6). This is precisely my point—we would be wise to recognize our tendency toward hierarchical arrangements, with their advantages and disadvantages, in order to opt for more felicitous alternative arrangements.

As alluded to above, several types of hierarchies—most commonly dominance and social status—exist in human and non-human worlds. Dominance hierarchies appear more commonly in the wild. Chimpanzees and baboons are organized so (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). As the name implies, dominance hierarchies typically evolve from the use, or threat, of force. Social status hierarchies develop from and instantiate forms of status, power, and recognition (e.g., wealth, celebrity, ability, intelligence, strength, seniority, skin tone, etc.). Zink et al. (2008) reported that 'social hierarchies spontaneously and stably emerge in children as young as 2 years' (p. 273). Likewise, they observe that:

> status within a social hierarchy is often made explicit (e.g., via uniforms, honorifics, verbal assignment, or even in some languages via a status-specific grammar)… but it can also be inferred from cues such as facial features, height, gender, age, and dress… In humans, dominance has been linked to heritable personality traits.
>
> *(p. 273)*

Hierarchies differ based on fixed rigidity or flexible dynamic characteristics. In their report of a brain imaging experiment which registered the effect of relative social status and one's perceptions of it, Zink et al. (2008) noted:

> hierarchical status can be either fixed or changeable, and this aspect of social stratification has pronounced implications for individuals. In nonhuman and human primates, the more subordinate position in stable social hierarchies is associated with greater stress, whereas in dynamic hierarchies, the dominant position experiences the more stressors due to increased competition and instability… during times of reorganization, and may be at greater health risks.
>
> *(p. 277)*

Even potential advancements (i.e., upward movement) in social hierarchical position activated the same reward center in the brain as winning money, 'confirming the high value accorded social status' (NIH, 2008, para. 8). Loss or potential loss of status worked the opposite way, depressing people and causing them stress. Zink et al. suggested that we humans orient to hierarchy and social hierarchy outcomes (or potential outcomes), and that our assessments (how an

outcome might affect our position in a social hierarchy) are ideational and emotional, especially in unstable hierarchies.

> An important feature of the unstable hierarchy setting was that particular outcomes now acquired positive or negative *hierarchical value* based on their potential impact on the participant's status relative to the other… The fact that only outcome contrasts associated with hierarchical value elicited significant brain responses implicates social relevance as a primary determinant of how the outcome was processed; furthermore, virtually all the resulting activations were social specific.
>
> *(2008, p. 279, emphasis in original)*

In baboons, the dynamics and tone of the group (whether it's contentious, problematic, or pacific) depend on the personality of the leader—usually the alpha male (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). And though the alpha male hierarchies are the most commonly known, similar female status hierarchies also exist. Generally, females are born into their mother's hierarchical status (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007); as such, the daughter of an alpha female has status relative to an adult beta female. Female hierarchies tend to be conservative, with little change, disruption, or upheaval. In cases where lower status females resist or rebel, they generally form alliances with higher ranking females, which works to preserve the status quo (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). Dissimilarly, male hierarchies are known for disruption and upheaval, often through the introduction of an interloper—generally a strong adolescent male—who vies for supremacy. As such, it is common for adolescent male baboons to leave or be forced out of their natal group and, being social animals, attach themselves to other groups.

Self-concept (an important component of identity) is affected by one's relative status—how the individual sees him/herself relative to others and his/her perception of others' impressions (Takahashi et al., 2009). A boost in relative status (i.e., a promotion, or a prestigious honor) activates the same neural substrates as do rewards such as money and food. A loss (or perceived loss) of relative status registers in the same neural substrates as those activated for pain.

Neural psychological research (e.g., Takahashi et al., 2009) has suggested that individuals derive pleasure from the misfortunes, diminishment, or loss of status of another—a concept known by the German schadenfreude: 'schadenfreude occurs when envied persons fall from grace' (p. 937). Conversely, a person is likely to feel some level of pain (in the anterior cingulate cortex) when the referent gains status, prestige, or similar reward. Takahashi et al. pointed out the characteristics of the other must be self-relevant to the observer—being self-relevant implies that not all the fortunes, rewards, or status of another are cause for envy and pain. Not all losses or diminishments of another activate our reward center—only those occurring to someone sharing certain relevant, or self-relevant, characteristics, 'similar attributes, characteristics, group memberships, and interests (for example, gender, age, and social class)' (p. 938).

In addition to internal effects, tremendous social and social-psychological consequences stem from the socially-constructed hierarchical orientation of organizations such as schools and universities, relative to each other (Stack, 2021). That is, organizations arrange themselves, or are perceived to be arranged, in social hierarchical form, with perceived and attributed prestige allocated by rank. Some schools or universities are perceived to be 'better.' Under the market conditions occasioned by a shift in governmental policies toward, most recently, new public management and neoliberalism, a disproportionate share of public or private resources flow to 'better' schools. Competition for places is more acute at such schools whose rankings reflect various metrics such as high-stakes accountability tests and college entrance exam scores. In public schools, such exam scores and the political and public use of them in public schools contribute to (some might say produce) so-called 'failing' schools (Varenne & McDermott, 1998). Recently, due to widespread institutional and public economic difficulties, competition for admission to American first-choice colleges (those at or near the top tier of the prestigious college social hierarchy) has increased. Zernike (2009) noted how those who are able to pay full tuition costs (as opposed to those needing financial aid) are given preferential admissions treatment by prestigious universities. According to some college admissions officers and other observers:

> the inevitable result is that needier students will be shifted down to less expensive, less prestigious institutions. 'There's going to be a cascading of talented lower-income kids down the social hierarchy of American higher education, and some cascading up of affluent kids,' said Morton Owen Schapiro, president of Williams College and an economist who studies higher education.
>
> *(p. A16)*

Insight into status hierarchies, especially of US colleges and universities, can be had by examining an issue facing policy makers in Texas (and perhaps in other places) as they wrestle with the pressures and forces inherent in cultivating/creating more so-called tier-one schools (Haurwitz, 2009). That such rankings of colleges and schools is both subjective and socially constructed is evidenced by this observation:

> There is no precise and universally accepted definition of a tier-one school. One frequently cited benchmark is membership in the Association of American Universities, an organization of 60 major research universities in the United States and two in Canada. Another measure is annual research spending of $100 million or more… Faculty honors, such as membership in the National Academy of Sciences, and student performance in high school and on admission tests are important as well. A good showing in various national rankings, such as those compiled by US News & World Report, helps, too.
>
> *(p. A4)*

At issue for policy-making bodies throughout the world is how to allocate resources, given the fact that federal and state funding for higher education has decreased over the past decades (Waite et al., 2005). In such status hierarchies, especially when resources are perceived to be (relatively) fixed, competition for those resources escalates. The end goal is status; the vehicle to attain status is allocation of resources (both a means and a marker). Generally, higher status individuals or organizations garner more resources (status, wealth, power, influence, etc.). This can create a snowball effect wherein the rich get richer.

Those positioned higher in social status hierarchies not only do less work or, to be more precise, less of the core organizational work—whether automobile assembly, policing via patrol car or walking a beat, teaching, or heavy lifting in construction (Shirky, 2008)—they receive higher levels of compensation and are generally held less accountable (Ingersoll, 2003). This is true at both the individual and collective levels. To illustrate, consider an immigrant's integration (or lack thereof) into the host or receiving society and the organizations within it. In an article about race and societal integration after the election of Barack Obama in the US, Nadia Azieze, an Algerian-born nurse living in France, said that, in all the jobs she's ever had, 'I've always been asked to do more, because I'm an immigrant. We always have to prove ourselves' (Erlanger, 2008, p. A12). Or consider the riots in Western China between ethnic Uighurs and Han. Reporting on a Uighur's experience, Scott Tong (2009), a correspondent for American Public Media's Marketplace, reported:

> And when I was in Xinjiang, I went to a construction site, and I talked to some of these Uigher men, and one of them said he makes $7 a day kinda lifting the heaviest stuff. The ethnic Han Chinese who also work at that construction site, they don't have to lift the heavy stuff, and they make three times the money. So that's the argument they make, that they're frozen out of this economic boom we all think about in China.
>
> *(Tong, 2009, para. 5)*

Complementary and Competing Status Criteria

Social status hierarchies are formed according to a certain criteria—such as height, physical strength, beauty, skin tone, parentage or genetic stock, financial resources, intelligence, and so on; or, social status can be granted for combinations of attributes. Often, status (as an end) and the processes leading to its bestowal run contrary to the official organizing principles of the bureaucratic organization. Deep cultural, psychological, or other leanings and impulses can motivate individuals and groups to grant priority status according to criteria that, in many cases, are unarticulated, tacit, and deeply ingrained. Many times, these attributions operate alongside official bureaucratic organizational criteria (say, for example, in

job hirings, promotions, or other compensation). Most certainly they influence formation of school and workplace cliques and subcultures. Sometimes explicit and implicit criteria work at cross purposes.

A status hierarchy lens illuminates the experiences of women school administrators in more traditional and patriarchal societies—for instance, China (Ribbins, 2008) or Pakistan (Shah, 2010). Ribbins noted 'there is much evidence that in the competition for place and promotion with men for a first principalship women are commonly tested unequally, but it is also clear that some women are treated more unequally than are others' (p. 71). He quoted Osler to the effect that, 'the narratives of all the senior managers (indicate) that Black and ethnic minorities need to make twice the effort of their White counterparts' (Osler, as cited in Ribbins, 2008, p. 71). Shah's analysis of several Pakistani women educational leaders' narratives disclosed:

> a female educational leader… in immediate authority over the male principal was denied a professional right and a simple human courtesy because of her gender. The fact is that women bring their femaleness, with its connotations and status in society, with them when they enter the profession. There is no doubt that patterns of power and subordination are not just gendered, they are also cut across and transformed by class and other social formations.
>
> *(pp. 37–38)*

Organizational Energy Dispersion

Discussing newly emerging organizational forms (such as those of social networking sites), Shirky (2008) reminded us that organizational resources and energies dissipate and are consumed in ways that do not advance the organization's public, stated, or agreed-upon mission:

> no institution can put all its energies into pursuing its mission: it must expend considerable effort on maintaining discipline and structure. Self-preservation of the institution becomes job number one, while its stated goal is relegated to number two or lower, no matter what the mission statement says. The problems inherent in managing these transaction costs are one of the basic constraints shaping institutions of all kinds.
>
> *(pp. 29–30)*

Often, energy and resources dissipate due to goal displacement—organizational leaders and others become seduced by ends or goals that are *seemingly* similar to the original goals—the organization becomes lost or confused. In the military, this is known as mission creep.

One task of an organization has to do with identity formation and maintenance (Berquist, 1993). Establishing and maintaining an organizational identity is

fundamental to garnering workers' commitment and motivation. But individuals have different wants, varying needs, and disparate agendas, which pull the organization in different directions.

Consider institutions of higher education: conventionally, US colleges and universities have a tripartite mission: teaching, research, and service. However, a critical examination of the current functioning of tertiary educational organizations compels us to ask: Just how much of the organization's energies are directed to fulfilling this primary and tripartite mission? Conversely, how much of the members' energies go toward simply maintaining the organization? When examined through the lens of social status, the question becomes: How much of our work goes toward simply maintaining or elevating the status of the organization of which we are part? How much of our work contributes to the diversion from the core function or mission?

Corruption, the use of public office for private gain, is yet another way an organization's resources get squandered (see Waite & Allen, 2003; Waite & Waite, 2009). In corrupt systems, groups and private individuals—more likely those situated near the top of the hierarchy—siphon off resources allocated to the organization; once in the coffers of corrupt individuals, these ill-gotten gains never go toward their intended use. As the corruption becomes more entrenched, ordinary members are likely to be subverted or coerced—not only making them complicit but likely producing negative psychic effects in them, and delegitimizing the organization, system, or government.

Silo or Stovepipe Types of Organization

Silo organizational forms have been common to the military ever since the Roman Empire organized its military into legions. This is reflected in most modern countries by separating each branch of the armed services from the others. Not only is narrow, vertical organization typical, multiple internal silos frequently manifest. Such strict, vertical segregation necessitates duplication of fundamental functions. In the US military, while each service branch ostensibly has a different mission (despite some overlap), branches duplicate (and seldom share) intelligence gathering, policing, or education and training: West Point (Army), Annapolis (Navy), etc.

One drawback to the silo type of organization is the within-unit insularity. Units are walled off from one another often with impermeable boundaries which hamper communication across units. Redundancy and turf issues are common (Mazzetti, 2009). These characteristics make organization-wide innovation difficult. Improvements or advances in a single unit seldom transfer to another.

The combined insular effects constitute another disadvantage. To the degree the organization and its culture encourage and support role identification and differentiation, the purview or remit of organizational members becomes self-limiting. Jobs, tasks, or markets may fall between the cracks because they are

perceived as outside either the job description or responsibility of certain members. Such conditions can result in what Bauman (1993, 1995) termed floating responsibility—though each individual attends to his/her job responsibility, and though many are aware of organizational failures, snafus, harm, danger, risks, or shortcomings—no-one accepts responsibility.

In education, curricula are organized in a stovepipe manner with an internal hierarchical structure. Consider the mathematics curricula in most schools: basic numeracy occupies the lowest level; theoretical mathematics is generally found at the highest levels, in post-graduate work. Each level is meant to serve as a foundation for successive levels. The characteristics of silos make interdisciplinary curricular offerings difficult—extremely so in high schools, but difficult still even in primary school.

Pyramidal Types of Organization

Pyramids are another quintessential hierarchical form. But, unlike the silo, a pyramid is broad at the base, and narrow at the top—organizational charts represent a pyramidal form and accurately reflect Max Weber's (1958) notion of modern bureaucracy. Often, in such a form, the top position has one sole incumbent, a president, CEO, principal, district superintendent, or director. This is only the formal explicitly acknowledged or engineered form although informal processes and structures exist in all organizations, often not depicted, sometimes not acknowledged, other times not even perceived by officials and administrators.

Pyramidal organizations concentrate power and resource control at the top. Such organizations are ripe for corruption, as power and all that goes with it is held by a small, tightly controlled group (see Waite & Allen, 2003; Waite & Waite, 2009), typically well-insulated from any accountability (Ingersoll, 2003). Free flow communication is impeded in such organizations; not only is the flow typically 'top-down,' it is filtered at each bureaucratic level; 'bottom-up' flow is impeded, or non-existent, insulating those at the top. Further, CEOs often surround themselves with people like them or who think like them, making the executive team vulnerable to myopia. In extreme cases, this insularity contributes to rationalizing behaviors and group reinforcement of norms and worldviews that are outrageous or egregious to outsiders or the general public (for example, executive compensation or reimbursement schemes).

The unique contribution here is the application of newly revealed effects of status on individual physiology and psychology and the implications these effects have for both the individual and the collective. These influences and effects could not have been anticipated by Weber, or even more recent organization theorists.

Alternate Forms

Contrary to Fukuyama's (1999) belief that humans are somehow 'hardwired' for hierarchy, humans have historically organized in other-than-hierarchical fashion;

however, the dominant mental model of the 21st century does appear to be hierarchical. One must look to marginal groups and historical records for alternatives. For example, Wilkinson (2001) reminded us of 'the two distinct types of social organization found among both human and non-human primates: those based on power and dominance ("agonic") and those based on more egalitarian cooperation ("hedonic")' (p. 22). He recognized, as do we, that:

> since class societies have been predominant throughout human history, we tend to take the agonic forms of social organization as the human norm. But this overlooks the evidence that during our hunter-gatherer prehistory—the vast majority of human existence—we lived in hedonic groups. Anthropologists have described modern hunter-gatherer societies as 'assertively' egalitarian.
>
> *(p. 22)*

These, then, are the main contrasting types of human and non-human primate organization—hierarchical and egalitarian. As discussed, the hierarchical is exemplified by pyramidal and silo types of organizational schemes (also known by their line authority, chain of command structure). Egalitarian forms of organization are more likely to manifest in network structures (obviously as an ideal type). It is not unheard of for these two general forms to morph or hybridize, with a hierarchical form superimposed onto networks. But generally characterizing the two predominant forms of organization, hierarchies tend toward the vertical, networks tend toward the horizontal.

Network Types of Organization

Networks do not necessarily connect proximate individuals (as colonies do); they sometimes skip over proximates to connect individuals on the basis of some common characteristic or purpose. Hence, networks may be the most complex and complicated organizational form discussed here.

Schematically, networks resemble rhizomatic root systems, spreading out in several directions, much like the neurons of the human brain. Though characterized as horizontal, networks are by no means two dimensional; in fact, they vary considerably by complexity, related both to linkages (connectors) and nodes (units being connected). Members who comprise a network may be local—town, village, school, neighborhood, or other community—or global. Members may share many characteristics (perhaps a community of indigenous tribal members) or organize according to singular, though pertinent, individual characteristics (an online chat group). The linkages or connections between individuals or nodes may be hearty and dense (as in so-called first-order relations (Milroy, 1980)), or ephemeral, in second-, third-, or nth-order relations. Dense, hearty linkages are characterized by frequent, reciprocal, and meaningful interactions or exchanges

between members. Conversely, weak networks exhibit infrequent or superficial exchanges. Any one individual is likely to have relationships (linkages) of various strengths (i.e., some first-order, some second-order, and so on), and individuals can belong to multiple networks simultaneously, as can schools (Evans & Stone-Johnson, 2010) or other organizations.

As mentioned, networks are potentially more egalitarian than hierarchies. Citing anthropological research, Wilkinson (2001) noted a countervailing tendency to the supposed human tendency toward hierarchical forms of organization. One set of social strategies evidenced throughout the historical record—in both human and primate societies—is that termed 'counter dominance strategies' (p. 23). Anecdotally, perhaps this both accounts for and is a result of the impulse in especially socially cohesive or communal cultures to keep with the herd, to not set oneself apart or stand out in any way. The well-known Japanese saw that 'the nail that stands up gets hammered down' is a case in point. Likewise, the phenomenon of schadenfreude (Takahashi et al., 2009) is 'a rewarding feeling derived from another's misfortune' (p. 937), that operates as a social leveling device; as does what some researchers refer to as the justice instinct and its complement, self-protective retaliation (Carey, 2008). Wilkinson also identified friendship and gift giving as egalitarian and reciprocal exchanges.

We might think of networks as a hybrid organizational form, especially as membership in multiple networks is common, and as networks themselves achieve differential (hierarchical) social status. Another hybrid, equally complex, is that of community; and though community is not a bureaucratic organizational form, it is an organizational form that has been adopted and adapted by different organizations; thus it deserves brief mention here.

Hybrids

Pure ideal types are seldom realized in the lived social world. For example, many of us may be simultaneous members of a hierarchical work environment while we maintain professional networks with similarly situated colleagues nationally or globally. We are, then, both a part of a professional network and a hierarchy. Bureaucratic organizations (one of the most rigidly hierarchical of our organizational forms) may be networked, one to another, and may have various networks operant within them. Networks themselves may be hierarchical, with one network granted higher status than another (Evans & Stone-Johnson, 2010). The nodes or members of various networks may enjoy higher or lower relative status than others in the same network. The more highly valued or high frequency network member or node correspondingly exerts more influence on the network and its members (Hite, 2005).

Community

Communities may be thought of as another hybrid organizational form; we may initially be reluctant to think of community as an organizational form because

community has the image of being more *organic* than other structures. Like community, the organic metaphor, in and of itself, lacks specificity and this may impede a thorough deconstruction of its meaning, constitution, processes, and effects. We have come to equate the organic with good, but we must keep in mind arsenic and carbon monoxide are organic, too. Communities have their problems. Some are so dysfunctional as to be toxic for (certain) members. But healthy communities functioning optimally offer their members support and a sense of belonging. Communities are synergistic, multiplying members' energies and accomplishing goals beyond the capabilities of single members.

Communities, especially traditional communities, have one advantage over individualistically-oriented organizations: they recognize (and honor) the individual qua individual as uniquely situated or positioned. Within the community, each person has a place. True, there may be problems with the assignment of place or position (rank, status, and privilege based on birth rights, etc.); identity may be a thorny issue. Nonetheless, individualistic (even meritocratic) forms of association, especially within current global contexts and trends, skew toward recognizing the individual in market terms, as producer, or consumer, rather than as an individual qua individual with a valued, separate identity, and rights.

Perhaps due to our collective tendency to romanticize community this has become a popular term in the organization and change literature (e.g., Sergiovanni, 1994). Communities are shot through with other organizational forms. This fact alone qualifies them as hybrids. But, more than that, communities may be geographical or categorical. Communities and their boundaries include some while simultaneously excluding others (Lyotard, 1993).

As there are few, if any, pure types, one form of organization may be influenced by, riddled with, or driven by another type. In some cases, these different types work at cross purposes. Take for example the school reform initiative of professional learning communities: ideally these associative forms strive for egalitarianism and the free give and take of information (learning, teacher growth, professional development, curricular or pedagogical innovation, etc.). However, even these laudable ends are not immune from the corrupting influence of status and dominance hierarchies, power, and control.

'Culture'

Yet another organizational principle, if not a form per se, is 'culture.' Though not one form, like community, 'culture' deserves brief mention because it is frequently used as a central concept in school improvement and reform schemes (e.g., Hargreaves & Fullan, 1998; Harris, 2002); often in less technically precise ways. Varenne and McDermott (1998) went to great lengths to show how facile, superficial, or erroneous conceptions of 'culture' have precipitated severe negative effects that often extend beyond the scope of the original work. More than perhaps any of the other terms and concepts discussed thus far, how various authors, administrators, policy

makers, and would-be reformers use the concept of 'culture' belies their ontology, their worldview, sometimes even their intentions. For instance, rather than viewing 'culture'—the 'culture' within a school or other organization, say—as a chaotic, dynamic, self-organizing system, some might view 'culture' as being manipulable or controllable. Such a view, in my opinion, is evidence of what I term manage-mentality (a play on the Foucaultian concept of governmentality), whose ontological earmark is a propensity to frame the lived, social world into problems or issues that can then be managed. It is doubtful that 'culture' or even 'a culture' can be changed, manipulated, or engineered in any meaningful, conscious way, for, as a dynamic system, any such effort is likely to produce numerous effects—some intended, no doubt, but many unintended. As with all such dynamic systems, 'culture' is always in flux, and changes to such systems, aside from being unpredictable, also require constant attention, reassessment, and frequent corrective action.

Summary

This chapter is intended to contribute to the discourse of educational leadership and administration, especially that concerned with school, schooling, and school improvement. While the treatment given the various types of organizational forms here is, of necessity, partial and incomplete, I have attempted to provide a more comprehensive and nuanced view of the processes at play within schools and other types of organizations. Knowledge of the processes presented here is, of itself, insufficient to reform or improve schools, but I am certain that ignorance of these processes dooms school improvement and change efforts from their inception. But I want to be clear that, along with Rancière (1991), I do not believe there is any perfect system. As he wrote, 'Philosophers are undoubtedly right to denounce the functionaries who try to rationalize the existing order. That order has no reason. But they deceive themselves by pursuing the idea of a social order that would finally be rational' (p. 89). That said, we must not abandon our efforts at educational change and school improvement; but rather than pursuing a utopian ideal, the point I've tried to make here is that we would be well served if we simply improved upon our organizational forms. In this, our efforts resemble those of philosophers, who proceed, according to Burbules, 'not towards truth, but away from error' (1995, p. 7).

Notes

1 Portions of Chapter 3 were adapted from Waite, D. (2010). On the shortcomings of our organizational forms: With implications for educational change and school improvement. *School Leadership and Management, 30*(*3*), 225–248. Used with permission.
2 These data were originally collected ca. 2005–2010, and though the players have changed since, the pattern remains.
3 It is helpful to keep in mind that human nature itself is a social construction (Cox, 1959).

References

Ajofrín, L. G. (2008, April 30). El liderazgo eficaz no reside en una sola persona, según la OCDE. *Magisnet*. www.magisnet.com/articulos_imprimir.asp?idarticulo=33511.

Bauman, Z. (1993). *Postmodern ethics*. Blackwell Press.

Bauman, Z. (1995). *Life in fragments: Essays in postmodern morality*. Blackwell Press.

Bennis, W. (1993). *Beyond bureaucracy: Essays on the development and evolution of human organization*. Jossey-Bass.

Berquist, W. (1993). *The postmodern organization: Mastering the art of irreversible change*. Jossey-Bass.

Billett, S. (2004). Co-participation at work: Learning through work and throughout working lives. *Studies in the Education of Adults*, 36(2), 190–205. https://doi.org/10.1080/02660830.2004.11661496.

Bourdieu, P. (1999). The abdication of the state (P. P. Ferguson, S. Emanuel, J. Johnson, & S. T. Waryn, Trans.). In P. Bourdieu, A. Accardo, G. Balazs, *et al.* (Eds.), *The weight of the world* (pp. 181–188). Stanford University Press.

Burbules, N. C. (1995). Reasonable doubt: Toward a postmodern defense of reason as an educational aim. In W. Kohli (Ed.), *Critical conversations in philosophy of education* (pp. 82–101). Routledge.

Burke, P. (2000). *A social history of knowledge: From Gutenberg to Diderot*. Polity Press.

Carey, B. (2008, October 27). Wired for justice: The urge to punish is more than Wall Street loathing: It's instinctive. *The New York Times*, D1,D6.

Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2007). *Baboon metaphysics: The evolution of a social mind*. University of Chicago Press.

Coser, L. A. (1974). *Greedy institutions: Patterns of undivided commitment*. The Free Press.

Cox, O. C. (1959). *Caste, class, & race: A study in social dynamics*. Monthly Review Press.

Dastur, F. (2009). Phenomenology and anthropology [Keynote]. Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy National Conference, Arlington, VA, October 29.

Dewey, J. (1916). *Democracy and education: An introduction to the philosophy of education*. The Free Press.

Erlanger, S. (2008, November 11). After US breakthrough, Europe looks in mirror. *New York Times*. www.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/world/europe/12europe.html.

Evans, M. P., & Stone-Johnson, C. (2010). Internal leadership challenges of network participation. *International Journal of Leadership in Education*, 13(2), 203–220. https://doi.org/10.1080/13603120903288405.

Fukuyama, F. (1999). *The great disruption: Human nature and the reconstitution of social order*. Free Press.

Gardner, H, Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Damon, W. (2001). *Good work: When excellence and ethics meet*. Basic Books.

Goffman, E. (1962). *Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates*. Anchor Books.

Gronn, P. (2003). *The new work of educational leaders*. Paul Chapman Publishing.

Hargreaves, A. (1994). *Changing teachers, changing times: Teachers' work and culture in the postmodern age*. Teachers College Press.

Hargreaves, A., & Fullan, M. (1998). *What's worth fighting for out there?* Teachers College Press.

Hargreaves, A., & Shirley, D. (2009). *The fourth way: The inspiring future for educational change*. Sage.

Harris, A. (2002). *School improvement: What's in it for schools?* Routledge/Falmer.

Haurwitz, R. K. M. (2009, May 2). Hurdles remain in push for more top tier schools. *Austin American–Statesman*, A1–A4.

Hite, J. (2005). Multiple networks of public school administrators: An analysis of network content and structure. *International Journal of Leadership in Education*, 8(2), 91–122. https://doi.org/10.1080/1360312042000329086.

Hochschild, A. R. (1997). *The time bind*. Metropolitan Books.

Hofstede, G. (1991). *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind*. McGraw-Hill.

Ingersoll, R. M. (2003). *Who controls teachers' work? Power and accountability in America's schools*. Harvard University Press.

Kaufman, L. (2009, January 31). Utilities turn their customers green, with envy. *The New York Times*. www.nytimes.com/2009/01/31/science/earth/31compete.html

Lakomski, G. (2005). *Managing without leadership: Towards a theory of organizational functioning*. Elsevier.

Little, J. W. (1990). The persistence of privacy: Autonomy and initiative in teachers' professional relations. *Teachers College Record*, 91(4), 509–536. www.tcrecord.org/Content.asp?ContentId=406.

Lortie, D. C. (2009). *School principal: Managing in public*. The University of Chicago Press.

Lyotard, J. (1993, March). The other's rights: An approach to the question of human rights [Lecture]. University of Georgia Humanities Center, Athens, GA.

Mazzetti, M. (2009, April 2). Report faults spy chief for inaction on turf wars. *The New York Times*, A15–A20.

Milroy, L. (1980). *Language and social networks*. University Park Press.

Morgan, G. (2006). *Images of organization* (Updated ed.). Sage.

NIH/National Institute of Mental Health. (2008, April 24). Human brain appears 'hard-wired' for hierarchy. *ScienceDaily*. www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/04/080423121430.htm.

Pajak, E., & Green, A. (2003). Loosely coupled organizations, misrecognition, and social reproduction. *International Journal of Leadership in Education*, 6(4), 393–413. https://doi.org/10.1080/1360312032000150760.

Rancière, J. (1991). *The ignorant schoolmaster: Five lessons in intellectual emancipation* (K. Ross, Trans.). Stanford University Press.

Ribbins, P. (2008). A life and career based framework for the study of leaders in education: Problems, possibilities and prescriptions. In J. Lumby, G. Crow, & P. Pashiardis (Eds.), *International handbook on the preparation and development of school leaders* (pp. 61–80). Routledge.

Sarason, S. B. (1996). *Revisiting 'the culture of the school and the problem of change.'* Teachers College Press.

Sarason, S. B. (2004). *And what do YOU mean by learning?* Heinemann.

Schmuck, R. A., & Runkel, P. J. (1994). *The handbook of organization development in schools and colleges* (4th ed.). Waveland Press.

Sergiovanni, T. J. (1994). *Building community in schools*. Jossey-Bass.

Shah, S. J. A. (2010). Re-thinking educational leadership: Exploring the impact of cultural and belief systems. *International Journal of Leadership in Education*, 13(1), 27–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/13603120903244879.

Shirky, C. (2008). *Here comes everybody: The power of organizing without organizations*. Penguin Press.

Stack, M. (Ed.) (2021). *Global university rankings and the politics of knowledge*. University of Toronto Press.

Takahashi, H., Kato, M., Matsuura, M., Mobbs, D., Suhara, T., & Okubo, Y. (2009). When your gain is my pain and your pain is my gain: Neural correlates of envy and schadenfreude. *Science*, 323(5916), 937–939. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1165604.

Thomson, P. (2009). *School leadership: Heads on the block?* Routledge.

Tong, S. (2009, July 7). The economics behind Xinjiang unrest. *Marketplace*. www.marketplace.org/2009/07/07/economics-behind-xinjiang-unrest/.

Vandello, J. A., & Cohen, D. (1991). Patterns of individualism and collectivism across the United States. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77(2), 279–292.

Varenne, H., & McDermott, R. (1998). *Successful failure: The school America builds*. Westview Press.

Waite, D., & Allen, D. (2003). Corruption and abuse of power in educational administration. *The Urban Review*, 35, 281–296.

Waite, D., & Waite, S. F. (2009). On the corruption of democracy and education. In P. Jenlink (Ed.), *Dewey's democracy and education revisited: Contemporary discourses for democratic education and leadership* (pp. 297–323). Scarecrow.

Waite, D., Moos, L., & Lew, C. (2005). Globalization and its effects on educational leadership, higher education and educational policy. In J. Zajda (Ed.), *International handbook on globalization, education and policy research: Global pedagogies and policies* (pp. 279–292). Springer.

Waller, W. W. (1932). *The sociology of teaching*. J. Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Weber, M. (1958). *The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism* (T. Parsons, Trans.). Scribner.

Weick, K. E. (1976). Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 21(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.2307/2391875.

Whyte, W. W. (2002). *The organization man*. The University of Pennsylvania Press. (Original published in 1956)

Wilkinson, R. G. (2001). *Mind the gap: Hierarchies, health and human evolution*. Yale University Press.

Zernike, K. (2009, March 31). Paying in full as a ticket into colleges. *New York Times*, A1–A16.

Zink, C. F., Tong, Y., Chen, Q., Bassett, D. S., Stein, J. L., & Meyer-Lindenberg, A. (2008). Know your place: Neural processing of social hierarchy in humans. *Neuron*, 58 (2), 273–283. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2008.01.025.

4

THE IMPERIUM

Class, Caste, and Control

The Latin *imperium* has given us such derivatives as imperial, imperialism, and imperialist. *Imperium* itself connotes 'command, supreme authority, power' (Online Etymology Dictionary, n.d.). It can refer to either 'the domain ruled by an emperor or empress' or 'the region over which imperial dominion is exercised.' It signifies absolute dominion. Imperialism, in the etymological sense, refers to the 'advocacy of empire, devotion to imperial interests' (Online Etymology Dictionary, n.d.). Hobson (1938), in his tome, *Imperialism: A Study*, suggested that 'imperialism is a depraved choice of national life, imposed by self-seeking interests which appeal to the lusts of quantitative acquisitiveness and of forceful domination' (Hobson, 1938, p. 390; also see Williams, 1976). Imperialism is the force, effort, or process by which The Imperium is installed and justified. Williams noted both its political (i.e., whereby 'colonies are governed from an imperial centre' (Williams, 1976, p. 159)) and economic connotations ('external investment and the penetration and control of markets and sources of raw materials' (pp. 159–160)). He observed that even if the political imperialist relations were to end, imperialist economic relations may persist. Indeed, imperialism may be primarily economic and less political or governmental, as in the case of 'American imperialism' (p. 160), which was absent colonial administration for the most part. Immerwahr (2019) made the same point: that the United States functioned as an empire through economic imperialism and, in the main, not through settler colonialism. He pointed out that after WWII, the United States took no territory, historically an extremely rare occurrence for a victor. However, the United States has always supported its economic interests with military force. The economic and political are hard to untangle. Williams pointed to cases 'where the primarily economic reference, with implications of consequent indirect or manipulated political and military control, remain extact' (p. 160). That economic relation is capitalism in its many forms.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003164449-4

True, empire, as a phenomenon, has deeper historical roots than capitalism (think the Ottoman, Mongol, and Holy Roman Empires among others; Burbank & Cooper, 2010). The speed, global reach, and rapaciousness of imperialism were driven by capitalist greed. The enslavement of Africans on a global scale was driven by capitalists seeking cheap exploitable labor (Cox, 1959). The violence done to Indigenous peoples and the environment by the advance agents of competing imperialist powers was undertaken in the service of capitalist competition for resources and exploitable labor. Postcolonial scholars have shown how the epistemological and 'cultural' violence done by and in the name of imperialism and colonialism reverberate for the heirs of the colonized and colonizer alike still today. Cox (1959) showed how the seeds of modern-day capitalism and its attendant imperialism, and with it The Imperium, were sown in the 15th century, driven primarily by greed. As the merchant classes in Spain, Italy, and Portugal relentlessly pursued trade with the near East, they fueled the epochal ascendance of businessmen, as full-blown capitalism awaited the advent of the Industrial Revolution. Businessmen control nothing less than the fate of the world (Cox, 1959, and others).

Other Characteristics of The Imperium

The Imperium is not a thing per se. It's immaterial, but its manifestations are surely felt. The Imperium is made of its relationships, and being nearly entirely process, they are difficult to see. One way to think about The Imperium is to consider who's in and who's (or what's) out. Also, members of The Imperium function best from the shadows, hiding in plain sight, manipulating the levers of government, the economy, the media, education, and 'the culture' either directly or through intermediaries.[1] We know The Imperium by its effects.

The Growth of Private Property, Wealth, and Power

Originally, humans relied upon themselves and their immediate family. In order to survive, perhaps prosper, each had his/her strength and skills. Brute strength was a prime asset, even in incipient clan or tribal groups. Early collectivities developed relationships based on locale and the affinity groups of family, tribe, and clan.[2] Some developed matriarchically, some patriarchically. Some took more communal and non-hierarchical forms.

Nomadic groups generally had little need for private property and land ownership. Agriculture, with its more sedentary existence, changed people's relationship to the land and to each other. Property and land ownership became more common. Their development and protection became primary concerns. Property meant wealth and power.

During the feudal period, from roughly the 9th century through the 11th (Cox, 1959), land and its wealth were apportioned as estates. Organizationally,

estates were comprised of different ranks or classes: the laird (later out of relation to the sovereign or monarch as a noble), burghers or townsfolk, peasants or serfs, and slaves (Cox, 1959). The peasant class included several strata, including feudal tenants (those who paid the lord to work his land), serfs (some bound for finite terms, others indefinitely), household domestics (those enslaved), and free peasantry (Cox, 1959).

The Church grew and developed in parallel during these times, separate and apart, with the clergy having a rank on par with the nobles. It amassed large land holdings, wealth, and status, and developed its unique organizational structure, one which was not only 'characteristically institutional' (Cox, 1959, p. 127), but which has served as the blueprint for modern organizations.

The Church initiated The Crusades ostensibly to liberate its holy land; but powerful players with economic interests used these religious wars in an effort to hew overland trade routes to China and the Indian subcontinent through Constantinople and the Middle East. Owing to its dominance, the Church was able to enlist and conscript knights and nobles, and with them their charges—peasants and serfs primarily—to prosecute its religious (and economic) war. These resources came as rents owed the monarch, the nobles, and the Church, and paid out of obligation, fealty, and sometimes in penance with the promise of spiritual salvation. Such was the power of the Church through the 11th century and beyond.

Thus began the age of conquest, of empire, and of imperialism. Towns, then cities, then city-states, then sovereign states arose and coalesced to eventually rival the power of the Church. Prior to the advent of towns, virtually all people were tied to an estate or manor as members of an agriculturally-based 'social' system. Towns, cities, and city-states changed society so dramatically that Thompson (1931) called their development 'the most important phenomenon of… the feudal age… a political, economic, and social revolution of the first magnitude' (as cited in Cox, 1959, p. 132). Before towns, the lords of the estate had the power and the right to forcibly apprehend peasants who tried to leave (Cox, 1959). 'In fact, they were his men in every sense of the word' (Thompson, as cited in Cox, 1959, p. 132).

Ultimately, in the hands of the king or monarch, lands were divisible, apportioned to nobles of various titles and statuses, and in turn, leased to other nobles. A cunning noble could hold in trust lands from several different nobles, becoming even more powerful than any of them individually. 'Thus came about the strange paradox, that the peasant owed closer loyalty to his squire than to his king' (Cox, 1959, p. 129).

Education in the Middle Ages

Education during the feudal era, the medieval, and Middle Ages, as Williams (1961/2013) reminds us, was of two types: the clerisy and the chivalric systems. The clergy was highly structured and very powerful, rich and learned, extremely close-knit, and heterogenous. But, 'it had to be continually repopulated from other estates' because it did not and could not 'reproduce itself' (Cox, 1959, p. 128). 'Thus, in a peculiar way, the estate of the priesthood belonged to every stratum of

society, for all men [and being patriarchal it was almost entirely men] might aspire to its ranks' (p. 128). In other words, anyone, from any stratum of 'society' could enter the priesthood and avail themselves of the opportunities this career offered for social advancement, power, and wealth. 'On the decline of feudalism education became one rough road to success—at least, through the priesthood' (p. 130).

The Relative Freedom of the Towns

The emergence and growth of towns offered avenues for individuals to escape from the estate, though towns themselves had to buy or otherwise negotiate their freedom from the estate on whose lands they were situated. They needed this freedom to organize and govern themselves to facilitate trade and commerce. Towns were markets made permanent (Cox, 1959). 'Before about the twelfth century… there was no effective and recognized class of town dwellers' (p. 133).

Towns drew their population (considered dross by many) from the farms, manors, and estates. By and large these were younger sons of tenant farmers, 'marginal persons in an agricultural society' (Pirenne, 1925, as cited in Cox, 1959, p. 133). Early on, these 'vagabonds' would find casual work as tradesmen, but they were vulnerable to being apprehended and hauled back to the manor. But, as time passed, towns slowly began to extend fugitive protection to these valuable workers, and eventually, once a runaway had lived in a town for one year plus one day, they were free men (Cox, 1959). The rise of towns with their mercantile class gave birth to the bourgeoisie class.

The nobles were not as organized as the clergy. Certainly they were economically orientated, and they influenced and were influenced by society, but they could never overcome competition amongst themselves as 'a unified corporate body working harmoniously toward some common end' (Cox, 1959, pp. 128–129). Although they failed to cooperate with each other, nonetheless they uniformly exploited the peasant class.

Extrapolating from Williams' (1989) observation that there are no masses, as such, only ways of seeing people as masses, we might say that there are no 'social' classes as such, only ways of seeing people as members of a class. Rather than based on some quantitative distinction, such as income or accumulated wealth, 'social' status is more subjective, an estimation of a person's relative 'social' position.

Helpful here is Williams' (1961/2013) concept of 'a structure of feeling,' of the orientations, perspectives, and dispositions of an age or milieu and the persons involved. People of our age orient toward The Imperium and its members in a unique way. Those of The Imperium share a certain structure of feeling—dispositions or habitus (Bourdieu, 1987)—of themselves and others. Much in the same vein, C. Wright Mills (1956/1959) observed that the top stratum of society—the elite, upper class, or inner circle—viewed themselves as distinct, set apart, 'self-conscious members of a… compact social and psychological entity' (p. 11). As such, they behaved differently within their strata, 'They accept one

another, understand one another, marry one another, tend to work and to think if not together at least alike' (p. 11).

The Imperium is not monolithic. Much like the schisms of the Middle Ages among nobles and between clergy and nobles, there are differences among those of The Imperium, some quite fundamental. Some may be more politically progressive, such as those chronicled in a *New York Times* article titled 'Silver-Spoon Socialists' (Beery, 2020).[3] Most in this small subclass inherited vast wealth but practice anti-capitalism, being deeply aware of the exploitative and competitive nature of that system: 'Because the stock market is both an engine of capitalism and responsible for heirs' massive wealth, few want anything to do with it' (Beery, 2020, p. 9). One person interviewed for the article said 'I would rather put my money into a community that has been denied economic resources and disrupt the system' (Elizabeth Baldwin, quoted in Beery, 2020, p. 9). She and others of her peers invest in what they call 'the "solidarity economy"' (p. 9),

> using their money to support more equitable infrastructures… investing in or donating to credit unions, worker-owned businesses, community land trusts, and non-profits aiming to maximize quality of life through democratic decision making, instead of maximizing profits through competition.
>
> *(p. 9)*

One described it as 'investing in… "an economy that is about exchange and taking care of needs, that is cooperative and sustainable, and that doesn't demand unfettered growth"' (Emma Thomas, quoted in Beery, 2020, p. 9).

These are likely a small minority of those in The Imperium, most of whom are stridently capitalist and conservative, if not ultra-conservative and reactionary. A common interest among oligarchs (The Imperium) is 'wealth defense' (Winters, 2011), growing and protecting their wealth and using state resources to do so. Winters suggested that despite any political differences among oligarchs, wealth defense is one thing that binds them. However, the 'silver-spoon socialists' appear to be an exception, seeking instead to (re)distribute their wealth. But how far are they willing to go and what impact can they have?

With wealth comes privilege—a benefit, and entitlement—a disposition shared by those in The Imperium, whether conscious or unconscious. Money is no object and cost is not prohibitive. Borders present no barrier for the wealthy. The least wealthy, such as refugees, find borders increasingly impassable, and are themselves used as pawns in larger political games. But borders are no barrier for the flow of capital. Jobs, too, cross borders, seemingly unimpeded, in search of the most exploitable labor. The super-wealthy are 'hyper-mobile' (Harrington, 2016), and many countries court them with offers of citizenship and passports (in effect, passports for sale),[4] tax havens, and other amenities. The wealthy have an outsized influence on the politics, policies, and laws of not just the 'poorer' countries that court them, but on those better off as well, as they do at the global, international, or transnational levels.

Networks: Their Insularity and Effectiveness for The Imperium

Security is a concern for those in The Imperium. They live insular lives, often in gated communities and with security details, some the size of small armies, to protect them. The insularity extends to their 'social' circles and networks. Their children attend elite private schools and grow up insulated.

Networks are important for everyone, but the networks of those of The Imperium differ in quality of ties and, of course, in the qualities of the nodes of the network; those being similarly situated members of the elite. Like to like. Network ties can be formal or informal, but the advantages realized are material—a job for a wealthy family scion, a stock tip, or an introduction to someone with influence in another network. Immediate network connections are first-order ties. Then come second-order ties (a friend of a friend, say), and so on. Businessmen and women and politicians know how to capitalize on their network ties. Sometimes the uses to which network ties are put are only marginally legal, sometimes clearly illegal and/or unethical. Nepotism and cronyism are based on network ties. Corruption, as well. We don't have to look far to find examples of The Imperium using unethical and illegal network ties to their own or their associates' advantage. Consider a sample of fairly recent *New York Times* headlines: 'Jailed Saudis tap Trump's inner circle for influence over harried Crown Prince' (Vogel & Hubbard, 2020),[5] 'Trump ally said to violate ban on Libyan arms' (Walsh, 2021),[6] and 'Expensive gifts and favors eased Deutsche [Bank] into China: Secret documents detail a bank's brazen wooing of the nation's elite' (Forsythe et al., 2019).[7]

Those of The Imperium are adept at capitalizing on their networks of affiliation and influence to increase their wealth, power, and control. Power circulates through these networks. There are, though, limits on power generally and that of The Imperium in particular.

Limits on the Power and Hegemony of The Imperium

Those of The Imperium aren't necessarily maleficent or consciously evil. Their primary aim isn't necessarily the outright oppression of others as a consequence of profit seeking. They may not be aware of how their actions harm others, or they simply may not care. Like imperialists of the empire age (Arendt, 1958), imperialists today likely don't concern themselves with others' troubles. They are aloof (Arendt, 1958), in a world apart, and simply don't come in contact with common people, those affected by their attitudes and actions. This doesn't excuse The Imperium for the harm done, harm to others and harm to the environment, as they go about the business of enriching themselves. It does mean that those who are harmed must be agential in protecting themselves and our shared resources.

Even within a democratic polis, The Imperium has several mechanisms of control at its disposal. Certainly, coercion and force (military and/or police) are at their disposal; but The Imperium can exercise even greater influence in the

legislative arena, enacting and enforcing laws and legislation. They assert outsized influence in the areas of training and education, and indoctrinate the 'masses' through various media. These channels combine to give them tremendous influence on 'social' norms and sumptuary codes (Fields & Fields, 2014). Of the 'democratic' control mechanisms, sumptuary codes and 'social' norms are at once more 'organic'—that is, least easily manufactured, engineered, and manipulated—and equally efficacious across all levels of 'society.' Thinkers from Nietzsche, to Machiavelli, to Adorno and Williams have shown how all are connected through 'culture,' both 'high' Culture—capital C—and common 'culture' in the anthropological sense (Eagleton, 2000).

One 'social' norm, common to all, operates as what Wilkinson (2001) called a social leveling device. Colloquially, social leveling devices keep people from getting a big head, or getting uppity, in the vernacular. In archaic parlance, people *acted above their station* (though seldom below). Schadenfreude is an expression of social leveling, indicating the satisfaction people take when those in the upper stratum fall from grace, usually through their own devices.

Social leveling devices are especially salient in collectivist 'societies.'[8] They norm and discipline people. There are two sides to its effects: Directed at the elite they serve egalitarian ends; applied to those in lower strata, they inhibit 'social' change, individual ambition, and betterment. In this way, they work to maintain the status quo and its hierarchies. Narcissists (and sociopaths) tend to ignore 'social' norms. Especially in more individualistic 'cultures,' the privileged can ignore 'social' norms with some impunity, whereas the not-so-privileged cannot. In class-based 'societies,' norms and rules of comportment are class dependent (Cox, 1959).

Affinity and identity—and identity politics—complicate matters. Generally, a group defends its members should they come under attack by an outsider.[9] Any differences within the group are usually temporarily set aside in the spirit of solidarity when an individual or the group itself is threatened from the outside. This makes criticism, and change, more difficult. The Imperium looks after itself and its members, as do other organizations (Weber, 1958; also see Chapter 3). In schools and universities, administrators support one another, especially against threats from the outside. These factors make democratic change all the more difficult because self-preservation and advancing the commonly held aims of The Imperium are facilitated by its outsized influence, if not control, of the State, the business sector, and major media. In these, The Imperium is hegemonic.

Establishing the Hegemony of The Imperium as a Class

The eminent sociologist C. Wright Mills published *The Power Elite* in 1956/1959, which identified groups of individuals who had tremendous power and influence. Writing as he did shortly after the end of WWII, near the beginning of the Cold War, and in the midst of US economic and industrial expansion, he paid

particular attention to 'the big three': the corporate, the military, and the political/state groups (p. 6). And though, for the most part, his schema were hierarchical and siloed, he did admit to some degree of interdependence among these elite. He described an inverse relationship between traditional and modern influences: as the importance of class (family and marriage) decreased, corporate (career) influence increased. As the power of 'social' connections lessened, those of the State grew stronger.

The educational system plays a fundamental role in inculcating nationalist loyalties, and in our discussion, legitimating The Imperium. 'If the centralized state could not rely upon the inculcation of nationalist loyalties in public and private schools, its leaders would promptly seek to modify the decentralized educational system' (Mills, 1956/1959, p. 6). To Mills' point, we see members (state legislators) of The Imperium manipulating education toward blatant ideological ends through reactionary attacks on schooling and its curricula; condemning teachers and educational leaders by demonizing their antiracism efforts, mislabeling them as critical race theory, which they lambast in the most heated ideological terms; or by passing laws making it illegal to discuss such matters, severely limiting teachers' speech and academic freedom—what they can teach, if not what students can learn. Those same legislators fail to see or to admit that this move is itself eminently ideological, and though it does not, necessarily, inculcate nationalist loyalties, were these efforts successful, they would underwrite and perpetuate a certain kind of nation and its schools, one in which discussions of race are taboo, where teachers can be hauled before a school board or court for teaching as they see fit. This is colonialization of the popular mind by political ideological values, beliefs, telos, organizational forms (e.g., corporativism), and more.

In the case of, especially, state legislators, we see that membership in The Imperium doesn't require wealth, for many of these legislators are of more humble means.[10] It is sufficient that they wield the power of the state regardless of income or wealth.

The sociological and ideological influences in the development of the individual Mills (1956/1959) mentioned are remarkably similar to those Althusser (1984) discussed as ideological state apparatuses, which include the religious (Churches), educational, family, legal, political, trade union, communications industries, and the cultural. Not surprisingly, Mills pointed out that as these domains centralize power and control, as their activities and influence increasingly interconnect, consequences increase exponentially.

Mills (1956/1959) wrote in the mid-20th century, using the best tools, extant 'social' theories, at his disposal. Of the elite, he wrote:

> By the powerful we mean, of course, those who are able to realize their will, even if others resist it. No one, accordingly, can be truly powerful unless he has access to the command of major institutions, for it is over these institutional means of power that the truly powerful are, in the first instance, powerful.
>
> *(p. 9)*

This suggests that corruption by state capture and imperial hubris (Chapter 5) encourage those of The Imperium to become arrogant, hubristic, and inured to the conditions and concerns of others not similarly situated.

Aloofness and indifference are the epiphenomena underpinning Arendt's (1950) 'more dangerous form of governing' (p. 309). Aloofness, manifested as a total absence of any relationship with the subject, 'was a more dangerous form of governing than despotism and arbitrariness because it did not even tolerate that last link between the despot and his subjects which is formed by bribery and gifts' (p. 309). During the Raj in India:

> Integrity and aloofness were symbols of an absolute division of interests to the point where they are not even any longer permitted to conflict. In comparison, exploitation, oppression, or corruption look like safeguards of human dignity, because exploiter and exploited, oppressor and oppressed, corrupter and corrupted still live in the same world, still share the same goals, fight each other for the possession of the same things; and it is this *tertium comparationis* which aloofness destroyed.
>
> *(p. 309)*

According to Zetland (as cited in Arendt, 1958), British aloofness went so far as to convince administrators they belonged to 'a nation which had reached a comparatively high plane of civilization' and therefore held their position by right of birth, regardless of personal achievements (p. 310).

Both Mills (1956/1959) and Williams (1961) expressed concerns with the scale, centralization, and interconnection of institutions. Mills viewed compulsory education and mass media as tools of 'physic management and manipulation' (pp. 310–311) in the hands of the elite. As for manipulation, Mills saw it as the inevitable outcome when a relatively small, closed group chose to exercise power either clandestinely, or without legitimation. Concentrated power, even in the absence of authority, easily evolves into manipulative or coercive power. Further, indifferent or recalcitrant people are easily manipulated. It is through manipulation and 'mind-making' (Enzensberger, 1982) that The Imperium asserts its hegemony and manufactures its legitimation.

A key concern for Lukács (1971/1983) was the degree to which a hegemonic class was 'conscious of the actions they need to perform in order to obtain and organize power' (p. 53). Further, is this conscious awareness '"true" or "false,"' because the ability of any class to control fate depends on how successfully they 'elucidate and solve the problems with which history confronts [them]' (p. 53). The hegemonic classes, the bourgeoisie and capitalists for Lukács, control and are controlled by capital and its demands,[11] as are the other classes. Comparing capitalist 'society' with earlier epochs—notably the feudal and estate 'societies'—Lukács observed a much greater degree of cohesiveness in capitalistic societies, in the sense of greater dependencies both among the dominant class and upon the State.

On the emergence and behavior of an elite authoritarian class, The Imperium for our purposes, Henry Grioux (2014) commented on the state of democracy and counter-democracy in the United States. Central to his 'social' analysis is the notion of 'the 1 percent'—the belief that wealth disparities have become so extreme that the top one percent control more wealth than the other 99 percent combined. Citing other economists such as Robert Reich and Charles Ferguson, Giroux noted that both predatory and sociopathic behaviors often result from extreme concentrations of power that engender 'an authoritarian class of corporate and hedge-fund swindlers' who 'actively… [buy]… election[s]—and with [them], American democracy' (Reich, 2012, as cited in Giroux, 2014, p. 4).

Zuboff (2019), for her part, is concerned with surveillance capitalism, an omnipresent phenomenon, and one which affects nearly every aspect of modern life. She demonstrated how Big Data manipulates and controls the public through addiction, by intent, and robs them of 'the will to will' (p. 20). Operating in and through networks, Big Tech effects a colonialization of the mind through a rhizomatic process, leaping over nodes of resistance or recalcitrance, to find fertile ground in widely dispersed locales. This is how information and misinformation spread today, and with them, the potential for ideological manipulation.

Adorno (1978), too, was concerned with class subjugation and manipulation. He wrote of the subjective differences between classes, which he referred to as psychological, as opposed to objective, differences (also see Cox, 1959). In an interesting exploration of the factors that facilitate domination and subjugation, he noted:

> The self-education of the ruling clique, with all its concomitant discipline, stifling of spontaneous impulses, cynical scepticism and blind lust to command, would not be possible if the oppressors did not themselves submit, through hirelings among the oppressed, to a part of the oppression they inflict on the others. This is doubtless why the psychological differences between the classes are so much less than the objective economic gap.
>
> *(Adorno, 1978, pp. 182–183)*

Adorno argued quite forcefully that the oppressor shares certain dispositions, attitudes, and drives with the oppressed (echoing Cox's assertion that status is a subjective measure, whereas class as measured in income or wealth is a more objective one). Those of The Imperium have the wherewithal and resources to escape the most onerous effects of the policies they impose on 'society' at large and even those outside of their control, such as the extreme weather events caused by climate change.[12]

By contrast, the paltry level of resources meted out for the education of the working class public, especially in marginalized communities, limits their potential intellectual emancipation. Yet similarly, the wealthy, though they do not want for material resources, are limited in their intellectual emancipation due to

insularity, myopia, and a lack of imagination and empathy—'they are unable to think against themselves' (Adorno, 1978, p. 187).

Lukács, Giroux, Adorno, and Mills captured the hegemony of the power elites, the hegemony they instituted and oversaw, at least to the limits of these 'social' theorists' analytical schema. Lukács (1971/1983), in true Marxist fashion, employed class as his heuristic, as did Althusser (1984). Both used structure and superstructure as society's organizing principles. Althusser, Mills, Giroux, along with most mainstream social critics, employed the concept of the institution as a social subset, and organizations as a subset of institutions. This type of analysis or social criticism usually portrays institutions, even the broader society of which they are part, hierarchically, often pyramidal and siloed and/or insulated. (See Chapter 3.) While such analytical schema or paradigms have their uses, and they are easy to grasp and simple to use, therein lies their principal shortcoming: such schema fail to capture the complexity and nuances of current 'social' relations, which are more often than not interpenetrating and non-hierarchical—in Maurer's (1995) terms, operating as non-linear adaptive networks.

Power, in varying degrees and forms, circulates, as Foucault taught us. Power is contingent and performative: it commonly manifests at its moment of application. But it can be constant and hidden too, an unseen presence. And as Burbules and Rice (1991) showed us, each of us can be another's oppressor, and anyone can be oppressed, including leaders.

Nietzsche (1968) was perhaps not the first to point out that 'leaders', if not slaves to the led, are certainly beholden to them. He wrote in *The Will to Power* of 'the predominance of the herd over all shepherds and bellweathers' (p. 41) and of the 'herdsman, i.e., the herd's chief requirement' (p. 196). 'It is not a matter of going ahead,' he wrote, '(—for then one is at best a herdsman, i.e., the herd's chief requirement), but of being able *to go it alone*, of being able *to be different*' (p. 196, emphasis in original). But 'the great human being,' Nietzsche wrote, 'is colder, harder, less hesitating, and without fear of "opinion"; he lacks the virtues that accompany respect and "respectability," and altogether everything that is part of the "virtue of the herd." If he cannot lead, he goes alone' (p. 505). Yet, in *The Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche (1954) wrote of questions of conscience: 'You run ahead? Are you doing it as a shepherd? Or as an exception? A third case would be the fugitive. *First* question of conscience' (p. 472, emphasis in original).

Intermediaries, Advisers, Consiglieres, and the Inner Rings of The Imperium

Old World monarchs had their advisors; mafia *capo dei capi* had their consigliere. Schmitt (2015) noted how 'even the most absolute prince is reliant on reports and information and dependent on his counselors' (p. 34). Schmitt referred to this power to inform the powerful as the antechamber:

> in front of every chamber of direct power an antechamber of indirect influence and powers constructs itself, a path of access to the ear, a corridor to the soul of the holder of power. There is no human power without this antechamber and without this corridor.
>
> *(p. 35)*

'In the course of world history,' Schmitt claimed, 'a motley and mixed society has found itself assembled together in this antechamber of power. Here the indirect assemble themselves' (p. 36). He held that as great power coalesced in a single position or individual, the competition for the power of influence in the antechamber would correspondingly become more destructive and dangerous, leaving the 'holder of the power himself evermore isolated' (p. 37).

Imperialist projects needed complicit agents on the ground to function (Burbank & Cooper, 2010). In addition to those agents, mostly men, who undertook the conquest and exploitation of others and their lands—the financiers, the military, the clergy, the administrators, and the scholars—empires relied on intermediaries on the scene. These could be local elites such as tribal chiefs or princes, transplants from the home country recruited or remanded into such service, or conscripts or enslaved persons from the empire's other territories (Burbank & Cooper, 2010). The latter were ideal, as they had no local loyalties, affiliations, or obligations. These intermediaries performed control functions through the police, military, and colonial administration. They practiced what Burbank and Cooper termed contingent accommodation. Often, they could and did subvert the edicts and directives of the empire, insulating themselves and their fellows from the worst abuses of empire and enriching themselves in the process.

Empire and imperialism were advanced by technological superiority—whether that was the advanced horseman warrior of the Mongols,[13] or guns and steel (Diamond, 2005), or the sailing ships of maritime-based empires, or the communication technologies of today. Just as steam power fueled the Industrial Revolution, capitalism underwrote imperialism and was its beneficiary. Empires were rapacious in seeking out and extracting the resources needed to fuel their growth and to maintain their dominance. The 'technologies' of capitalism and 'free trade' bought first Britain and then the United States a certain type of technical superiority. Burbank and Cooper (2010) called this '"the imperialism of free trade"—the exercise of economic power punctuated by intermittent military interventions' (p. 448). The authors noted the unique success the United States enjoyed as the result of using economic and military might to discourage (coerce) foreign countries from opposing American interests. Through such actions, the world's 'greatest democracy' effectively advanced imperialist 'free trade.'

The heart of empire was an imperialist imaginary of domination and control, of unlimited wealth and power, anesthetized by arrogance and a lack of concern for 'the Other.' In fact, many imperialists felt it their right to subdue and exploit others, those 'less-than.' Burbank and Cooper (2010) reported how 'at

conferences of imperial rulers, European powers expressed their collective entitlement to rule others, reinforced by theories of social evolution and racial distinction' (p. 448).

Bald and brazen land grabs are less common today, but imperialist tendencies and projects still fester, albeit in dramatically different forms—those being mainly economic and ideological (molding and controlling consciousness). Rather than gunships and airplanes, the new imperialism is waged over conference tables and the internet. Of course, capital still rules, and economic motives still propel the desire to conquer and control. But today imperialism is both less bald and more insidious. Using the global reach of modern communication technologies, capitalism, particularly surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2019), has infiltrated and exploited most every space on the globe, every country and nearly every citizen, and at depths unattainable under older, more conventional modes of empire and imperialism.

The incredible amount of wealth generated, wealth that is more and more in the hands of fewer and fewer people, has spawned a new class of professional, that of the wealth manager (Harrington, 2016). This is a new class of consigliere, an important player in Schmitt's (2015) antechamber of the powerful. The wealthy have always been concerned with wealth defense—accumulating and protecting their wealth (Winters, 2011). The very wealthy, such as oligarchs, use the State for this purpose. Winters noted 'five main individual power resources—power based on *political rights*, the power of *official positions* in government or at the helm of organizations, *coercive* power, *mobilizational* power, and finally *material* power' (p. 12, emphasis in original). It's not unusual for The Imperium to draw from all of these power resources. In discussing the difference between an elite and an oligarch, Winters claims that 'one of the most fundamental divergences is that nearly all elite forms of minority influence have been significantly challenged through democratic struggle and change, whereas oligarchic power, because of its different nature, has not' (p. 8). But even oligarchs, according to Winters, 'can have elite forms of power stacked on top of or blended with their defining material foundation' (p. 9). Because 'some of the most subtle kinds of power operate structurally, culturally, or unconsciously' (p. 12), and to muster a sense of legitimacy for their wealth and power, 'ideological hegemony… plays an important role for oligarchs in defending their material dominance' (p. 21), their right to power. But, cautions Winters, 'there should be no illusions. All such theories, ideologies, and norms serving to secure property claims… are erected ultimately on coercive capacities. Property and violence are inseparable' (p. 21). And though oligarchs might clash occasionally and on certain issues, their interests cohere around 'a set of wealth-defense issues and politics' (p. 8).

> Whatever else the rich may care about that divides them, they are united in being materially focused and materially empowered… A shared commitment to wealth and property defense is the source of their cohesion as a set of political actors.
>
> *(p. 20)*

Herein lies perhaps an important distinction between those of The Imperium and, say, an oligarch in Winters' model: whereas oligarchs tend to be more localized and property-dependent, though of course not all of their wealth and power is vested in or emanates from property, those of The Imperium tend to be, in Harrington's (2016) terms, 'hyper-mobile' and 'transnational' (p. 12). The networks of relationships through which those of The Imperium generate their wealth and exert their influence are more of a postmodern neoliberal globalized sort—more of the type Maurer (2015) referred to as non-linear, non-hierarchical adaptive networks, echoing Arendt's (1958) rule by nobody, where the subject 'has no identity as such… is unlocatable, and simultaneously part of everything' (p. 125) and where 'anything that could be recognized as a "subject" would disperse into new networks of power with no originary point' (p. 125).

Harrington's (2016) analysis points to how wealth managers and their clients, the 'one percent,' use and abuse the State, using the State when it suits them, bending, breaking, or remaking the State and international laws when they can. As with Winters' (2011) oligarchs, wealth managers work toward wealth defense, helping their clients protect their wealth from taxation, divorce, and inheritance. Citing Robinson, Harrington notes how 'a key feature of the current epoch is the supersession of the nation-state as the organizing principle of capitalism,' allowing for a new type of imperialism, one in which 'transnational or global space is coming to supplant national spaces' (Robinson, 2001, as cited in Harrington, 2016, p. 235).

The hypermobility of the wealthy and their money was made possible by 'undermining a system of state authority based primarily on a fixed subject: that is, individuals who consistently inhabit a specific space within a well-defined jurisdiction' (Harrington, 2016, p. 236). These changes have disrupted the conventional relationship between the State and the subject. The changes and conflicts include 'challenges to the relevance of states' authority and geographical boundaries, the influence of wealthy families as competitors with state power, and the impact of international finance on developing countries, particularly in former colonial states' (p. 236).

Tax avoidance and the ignoring, bending, and reshaping of national and international law undermines the legitimacy of the State. The wealthy, The Imperium, 'search for "freedom from democratic restraint"' (Harrington, 2016, p. 244). One of Harrington's research participants, a wealth manager, related how her clients 'view themselves as "above nationality and laws"' (p. 245). Corporations and individuals relocate their headquarters or legal place of residence to avoid paying taxes. They hide their money in offshore financial institutions, within layers and layers of shell corporations, accountable to no nation's government. Worse, when the wealthy avoid paying taxes, their share of the tax burden is shifted to those who do pay; in effect, the average, less wealthy and less mobile citizen shoulders the wealthy's share—another way the wealthy exploit others. And they feel as though it is their privilege.

The global spread of surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2019) and its colonialization of the mind, coupled with the postmodern epoch's reconstitution of the spatial and temporal and of relationships, taken together mean that, unlike during the feudal era when someone could escape the estate and find acceptance, if not sanctuary, and a new life and identity in the newly emerging towns, there is no such refuge today. In the globalized neoliberal world of surveillance capitalism there is nowhere to hide. Work can be done from nearly anywhere, anytime. Some managers expect the worker to be available at all times. Instantaneous communication, from email to DM (direct messaging) and texts, to Zoom, FaceTime, Snapchat, and Signal have introduced new norms. Speed is the handmaiden of capitalism (Maurer, 1995). Time is money.

Home is no longer the sanctuary it once was (Zuboff, 2019), and more's the pity. The public-private boundary has been sundered. Work-life balance has become illusory. Home is no longer an escape from the maddening world, but simply another place from which to do business and engage the world. Every person needs the refuge of a sanctuary, away from the public eye, to be at home with themselves (or, better, to be by themselves). Everyone needs privacy. Everyone needs somewhere (and the time) to escape to, if only temporarily, much like the feudal peasant who escaped the estate for the relative freedom of the city. Privacy and sanctuary offer inestimable benefits, especially in terms of human freedom and development. People need time to think, *otium* (Ranciére, 2019, p. 41).

Zuboff (2019) cited Pedersen's (1997) research on the psychological benefits of privacy. Pedersen identified 'six categories of privacy behaviors'—'solitude, isolation, anonymity, reserve, intimacy with friends, and intimacy with family' (p. 479). Pedersen's 'privacy functions' allow for 'contemplation, autonomy, rejuvenation, confiding, freedom, creativity, recovery, catharsis, and concealment' (p. 479), which are all essential to individual and collective human flourishing. Human flourishing is the term noted anti-capitalist scholar Erik Olin Wright (2010, 2019) came to prefer over emancipation, liberation, and freedom, for its inclusiveness. Human flourishing, for Wright, subsumes social and political justice, and speaks to both material and social conditions:

> To develop and exercise these [human] potentials requires material resources and appropriate social conditions. The importance of material resources for human flourishing is obvious… But the development of intellectual, physical, and social capacities requires much more than simple material necessities. It requires access to educational settings within which learning takes place and talents are cultivated, not just in childhood, but throughout life. It requires access to work settings where skills can be developed and exercised and activity is to a substantial extent self-directed. It requires communities [collectivities] which provide opportunities for active participation in civic affairs and cultural activities.
>
> *(pp. 14–15)*

But the barriers, the hindrances, to human fulfillment and flourishing, to emancipation and liberation, are manifold, as we have seen. The world is too much with us. The current, extant 'social' conditions of which we are part and in which we engage and the material resources we enjoy and how they are differentially and disproportionally distributed hinder the human flourishing we seek. For instance, Zuboff (2019) has shown how dependent we are on our connected devices; and more than simply dependent, addicted. This is by intention and design. Rather than spend what free time there is in contemplation or *far niente* and *otium* (Ranciére, 2019, p. 41), many reflexively turn to their smart phone. Time spent online means profits for the corporations of The Imperium. Data are collected by all means of tracking software and sold to sundry capitalist enterprises. Data mining is big business. We are the serfs working the digital landscape (Carr, 2011; see Waite, 2016). de Rosa (2011) noted how:

> We live in a world of Digital Feudalism. The land many live on is owned by someone else, be it Facebook or Twitter or Tumblr, or some other service that offers up free land and the content provided by the renter of that land essentially becomes owned by the platform that owns the land.
>
> *(para. 2)*

Our lives are being mined, our most intimate data plucked out of the ether, sold and reworked through algorithms that then are used to predict our behavior and to control us.[14] The mining and manipulation of our data by what Zuboff (2019) terms 'Big Other' has created a deep division in learning and knowledge. While most of us may have access to or consciousness of knowledge of the first order, the mining and massaging of seas of data and their algorithmic application produces knowledge of a new, higher order, and it is these data which are used to control us. The Imperium is thus hegemonic.

As Zuboff (2019) puts it, taken together, globalized neoliberalism coupled with surveillance capitalism have produced a neofeudalism 'marked by the consolidation of elite wealth and power far beyond the control of ordinary people and the mechanisms of democratic consent' (p. 44). The frustration for us is that more than any point in history, more and more of the world's population has become educated, emancipated in that sense, and in the main aware and knowledgeable, but only of knowledge of the first order. Resistance on the personal and collective levels is rising, driven by frustration at the lack of power we have over the forces that affect us. Thus we see the Occupy movement, Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, and more. In Zuboff's terms '*what is unbearable is that economic and social inequalities have reverted to the preindustrial "feudal" pattern but that we, the people, have not*' (p. 44, emphasis in original). 'This,' she says, 'is the existential condition of… [our lives], our conditions of existence: we want to exercise control over our own lives, but everywhere that control is thwarted' (p. 45).

As a dire warning, Zuboff (2019) predicts that the unmitigated rise of surveillance capitalism and its global control, top to bottom and throughout, will result in what she terms 'the seventh extinction,' the extinction of human sociality and solidarity, perhaps an end to humans and human 'society' as we have known them. She lays this at the feet of surveillance capitalism, which is:

> A boundary-less form that ignores older distinctions between market and society, market and world, or market and person. It is a profit-seeking form in which production is subordinated to extraction as surveillance capitalists unilaterally claim control over human, societal, and political territories extending far beyond the conventional institutional terrain of the private firm or the market.
>
> *(p. 514)*

It thus remains beyond the oversight and control mechanisms of our conventional collectivities and forms of association, such as nation, institution, organization, community, and family. Zuboff warns that:

> This 'seventh extinction' will not be of nature but of what has been held most precious in human nature: the will to will, the sanctity of the individual, the ties of intimacy, the sociality that binds us together in promises, and the trust they breed.
>
> *(p. 516)*

Today, the landscape has changed, but the basic motives and processes of imperialists have not. They remain essentially the same, if somewhat more nuanced, even invisible and un-centered, manipulated by and profiting the unlocatable subject, through the rule by nobody. The terrain on which the battles for control of our lives are waged are less material and corporeal, and more epistemological, ideological, and increasingly digital. Their reach is global and their depth and density nearly limitless.

Resistance is there and it's possible. It's becoming increasingly evident at the individual and collective levels. Education, as always, is key to emancipation and human flourishing. What this might look like and how it can unfold will be taken up in more detail in later chapters.

Notes

1 Harrington's (2016) study of wealth managers and the work they do for those in 'the one percent' is a case in point.
2 Hannah Arendt (1958) suggested that all subsequent organizational structures, principally those of government, were based on the model of the family, with the father at the head.
3 Some members of The Imperium, such as George Soros and Bernie Sanders, espouse and support more democratic ideas and projects.

4 The US EB-5 program grants green cards (a permanent resident visa) to persons from other countries, and their family members, who invest a minimum of one million dollars and create at least ten jobs in the US. Green card holders can later apply for citizenship. Canada and other countries have similar 'passport for sale' schemes as well.

5 Vogel and Hubbard (2020) reported 'a handful of prominent jailed Saudis and their allies, concluding that they are unlikely to win release by pleading directly with their own government, are planning to press their cases in Washington, including by hiring lobbyists with connections in President Trump's orbit' (p. A18). 'A former senior associate of the jailed Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud… signed a $2 million agreement to retain… a Washington-based lobbyist who is well connected in Trump administration foreign policy circles' (p. A18). The Saudi government for its part has increased its own lobbying efforts since the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi to head off criticism and dampen any repercussions from that assassination working through Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law' (p. A18).

6 Erik Prince, Trump's 'ally,' 'former head of the security contractor Blackwater Worldwide' (p. A1), the brother of Trump's Secretary of Education, Betsy DeVos, and a former Navy SEAL, 'became a symbol of the excesses of privatized American military force when his Blackwater contractors killed 17 Iraqi civilians in 2007' (p. A1). 'During the Trump administration, Mr. Prince was a generous donor and staunch ally of the president, often in league with figures like Steve Bannon and Roger Stone as they sought to undermine Mr. Trump's critics' (p. A1).

7 The *Times* article reported Deutsche Bank spent millions to buy influence, court Chinese consultants, and secure a private meeting with the Chinese president. Part of their strategy to 'become a major player in China' included hiring relatives of the Communist Party's elite, despite the fact many were unqualified' (Forsythe et al., 2019, p. A1).

8 The Japanese saw that the nail that sticks up gets hammered down articulates this social leveling device. In communal collectives, independence and ambition, especially if it comes at a cost to the group, are frowned upon.

9 A case in point is the reaction of the Indian government, the Indian media, and Indian citizens to the arrest and eventual expulsion of Devyani Khobragade, an Indian diplomatic attaché, for visa fraud and making false statements in connection with her exploitation of Sangeeta Richard, a domestic servant (Barry & Weiser, 2014). The uproar was so intense that the Indian government imposed sanctions on the US diplomatic mission in New Delhi and the fracas was only resolved when the United States agreed to expel one of its diplomats from India.

Citizens interviewed for *The New York Times* report were incensed that someone of Khobragade's status should be arrested and strip searched for such a minor thing as how they treat domestic servants. 'Maneesha Puri, 53, said… She is a diplomatic person and you strip her and check her because the maid says she was ill-treated? It's ridiculous. It's not that she had employed an American servant. This was an Indian servant' (para. 22).

10 The US Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate, however, are different. Members of this political institution generally have great wealth, which is why it's referred to as the Millionaires Club. https://ballotpedia.org/Net_worth_of_United_States_Senators_and_Representatives

11 'A social force whose movements are determined by the individual interests of the owners of capital—who cannot see and who are necessarily indifferent to all the social implications of their activities. Hence the social principle and the social function implicit in capital can only prevail unbeknown to them and, as it were, against their will and behind their backs' (Lukács, 1971, p. 63).

12 At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, wealthy New Yorkers left the city for their homes in the Hamptons. When an extreme winter freeze gripped most of Texas in

February 2021, resulting in more than 200 weather-related deaths, the US Senator from Texas, Ted Cruz, flew his family to Cancun (BBC News, 2021).

13 Such was the speed of the Mongol horseman warriors that it is reported they drank from the blood of the horse they were riding so as not to slow down or have to stop to eat as frequently (Chua, 2009). Of course the Mongols had other advantages, notably a pragmatic and inclusive view on diversity and religion that aided them in conquering and controlling the largest contiguous empire the world has ever known.

14 The case of Cambridge Analytica is an example of the nefarious uses to which our data are put. In this case the Facebook data of approximately 87 million users and their 'friends' and contacts were used by Cambridge Analytica to aid the Trump election campaign, mainly without the expressed consent of the users.

References

Adorno, T. (1978). *Minima moralia: Reflections from damaged life* (E. F. N. Jephcott, Trans.) Verso.

Althusser, L. (1984). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation). In *Essays on Ideology* (pp. 100–140). Verso.

Arendt, H. (1958). *The human condition* (2nd ed.). The University of Chicago Press.

Barry, E., & Weiser, B. (2014, January 10). As Indian diplomat exits after arrest, a culture clash lingers. *The New York Times*. www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/world/asia/indian-diplomat-flies-home-after-indictment-in-us.html.

BBC News. (2021, February 19). Texas Senator Ted Cruz flew to Cancun, Mexico, amid weather crisis. www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56117800.

Beery, Z. (2020, November 29). Silver-spoon socialists: Some Millennials are using the riches they inherited to fight capitalism. *The New York Times*, Sunday Styles, 1, 8–9.

Bourdieu, P. (1987). What makes a social class? On the theoretical and practical existence of groups. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 32, 1–17. www.jstor.org/stable/41035356.

Burbank, J., & Cooper, F. (2010). *Empires in world history: Power and the politics of difference*. Princeton University Press.

Burbules, N. C., & Rice, S. (1991). Dialogue across differences: Continuing the conversation. *Harvard Educational Review*, 61(4), 393–417. https://doi.org/10.17763/haer.61.4.yr0404360n31j418.

Carr, D. (2011, February 12). At media companies, a nation of serfs. *The New York Times*. www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/business/media/14carr.html?_r=1&src=busln.

Chua, A. (2009). *Day of empire: How hyperpowers rise to global dominance—and why they fall*. Anchor Books.

Cox, O. C. (1959). *Caste, class, & race: A study in social dynamics*. Monthly Review Press.

de Rosa, A. (2011, January 17). The death of platforms. *Soup*. http://soupsoup.tumblr.com/post/2800255638/the-death-of-platforms.

Diamond, J. (2005). *Guns, germs, and steel: The fates of human societies*. W. W. Norton & Company.

Eagleton, T. (2000). *The idea of culture*. Blackwell.

Enzensberger, H. M. (1982). The industrialization of the mind. In R. Grimm & B. Armstrong (Eds.), *Critical essays* (pp. 3–14). Continuum.

Fields, K. E., & Fields, B. J. (2014). *Racecraft: The soul of inequality in American life*. Verso.

Forsythe, M., Enrich, D., & Stevenson, A. (2019, October 15). Expensive gifts and favors eased Deutsche into China. *The New York Times*, A1, A10–11.

Giroux, H. (2014). *Neoliberalism's war on higher education*. Haymarket Books.

Harrington, B. (2016). *Capital without borders: Wealth managers and the one percent*. Harvard University Press.
Hobson, J. A. (1938). *Imperialism: A study*. Routledge.
Immerwahr, D. (2019). *How to hide an empire: A history of the greater United States*. Picador.
Lukács, G. (1983). *History and class consciousness: Studies in Marxist dialectics* (R. Livingstone, Trans.). The MIT Press. (Original published in 1971)
Maurer, W. M. (1995). Complex subjects: Offshore finance, complexity theory, and the dispersion of the modern. *Socialist Review*, 25(3–4), 113–145. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5339-9893.
Mills, C. W. (1959). *The power elite*. Oxford University Press. (Original published in 1956)
Nietzsch, F. (1954). *The portable Nietzsch* (W. Kaufmann, Ed. & Trans.). Penguin Books.
Nietzsche, F. (1968). *The will to power* (W. Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Vintage Books.
Online Etymology Dictionary. (n.d.). Imperium. Retrieved December 9, 2021, from www.etymonline.com/search?q=imperium.
Pedersen, D. M. (1997). Psychological functions of privacy. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 17(2), 147–156. https://doi.org/10.1006/jevp.1997.0049.
Pirenne, H. (1925). *Medieval cities, their origins and the revival of trade* (F. D. Halsey, Trans.). Princeton University Press.
Rancière, J. (2019). *Aisthesis: Scenes from the aesthetic regime of art* (Z. Paul, Trans.). Verso.
Schmitt, C. (2015). *Dialogues on power and space* (A. Kalyvas & F. Finchelstein, Eds., S. G. Zeitlin, Trans.). Polity.
Thompson, J. W. (1931). *The Middle Ages, 300–1500* (Vol. 1). Alfred A. Knopf.
Vogel, K. P., & Hubbard, B. (2020, May 19). Jailed Saudis tap Trump's inner circle for influence over harried crown prince. *The New York Times*, A18.
Waite, D. (2016). Of charlatans, sorcerers, alchemists, demagogues, profit-mongers, tyrants and kings: Educational reform and the death by a thousand cuts. *Urban Review*, 48, 123–148. doi:10.1007/s11256-015-0348-3.
Walsh, D. (2021, February 20). Trump ally said to violate ban on Libyan arms. *The New York Times*, A1–8.
Weber, M. (1958). *The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism* (T. Parsons, Trans.). Scribner.
Wilkinson, R. G. (2001). *Mind the gap: Hierarchies, health and human evolution*. Yale University Press.
Williams, R. (1976). *Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society*. Fontana Press.
Williams, R. (1989). *Resources of hope: Culture, democracy, socialism* (R. Gable, Ed.). Verso.
Williams, R. (2013). *The long revolution*. Parthian. (Original published 1961)
Winters, J. A. (2011). *Oligarchy*. Cambridge University Press.
Wright, E. O. (2010). *Envisioning real utopias*. Verso.
Zuboff, S. (2019). *The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the frontier of power*. PublicAffairs.

5

IMPERIAL HUBRIS

The Dark Heart of Leadership[1]

A dysfunctional dynamic lies at the heart of many of our schools and institutions. It is a sense of entitlement and arrogance that often infects leadership traits, tendencies, and dispositions. I call it *imperial hubris*. This chapter covers its characteristics, processes, effects, and contributing factors such as managerialism, corporatism (Waite & Waite, 2010), and corporativism (Waite et al., 2014).

Leadership is, above all else, relational. Relationships in schools influence everything that teachers and school leaders seek to accomplish. Until and unless we recognize and address the nature of in-school relationships, school improvement will forever be hobbled, and academic achievement will be a mere fraction of what it could be. This problematic nature of in-school relationships has been noted by others. Seymour Sarason (1996) observed that:

> *Any effort at systemic reform that does not give top priority to altering that relationship* will not improve educational outcomes… unless those changes directly or indirectly change the student-teacher relationship, classroom learning will be unproductive.
>
> *(p. 367, emphasis in original)*

This applies to every hierarchical school relationship, as well as between incumbents at various levels. Unless in-school relationships improve, nothing else will.

Imperial hubris is the tendency of (some) leaders, nations, institutions, organizations, or their agents to act out of a presumed privilege with no regard for the rights, feelings, or concerns of those in less powerful positions and/or those over whom the leader exercises authority. To be clear: not all leaders or organizations practice, condone, permit, or encourage imperial hubris, but all too many do. This, then, is an account of the people, structures, and processes that inhibit

DOI: 10.4324/9781003164449-5

democratic development, equality, and social justice—both within schools and throughout society at large.

The Precursors of Corporativism

The modern era has witnessed at least three generations of business organizational models—bureaucratization, managerialism, and corporatism. Bureaucratization was first taken up by the Catholic Church (Fukuyama, 2011), and later adopted by business and the state. Managerialism, or the rise of the manager (McMurtry, as cited in Down, 2009; Waite & Nelson, 2005; Waite et al., 2014), was spawned from early capitalism and the bureaucratic form.

Others have commented on this sea-change concerning work, organizational hierarchies, compensation (a proxy for societal valuing, status, and perception of worth), and the colonization of the lived world by business and business-oriented thinking and values. Down (2009) cited McMurtry and his contention that 'managerialism is a "deep value system" which is "concealed in the sleep of habit and presupposition"' (p. 58). Likewise, Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001) noted:

> a new type of imperialism whose effects are all the more powerful and pernicious in that it is promoted not only by the partisans of the neoliberal revolution who, under the cover of 'modernization,' intend to remake the world by sweeping away the social and economic conquests of a century of social struggles… but also by cultural producers (researchers, writers and artists) and left-wing activists who… think of themselves as progressives.
>
> *(p. 2)*

These authors observed how this 'cultural imperialism' worked on the collective psyche through what they termed 'commonplaces'—ideologies and ontological stances projected as universal. They observed how:

> cultural imperialism is a form of *symbolic violence* that relies on a relationship of *constrained communication* to extort submission… These *commonplaces*—in the Aristotelian sense of notions or theses with which one argues but over which there is no argument—these undiscussed presuppositions of the discussion owe most of their power to convince to the prestige of place from which they emanate.
>
> *(p. 2, emphasis in original)*

The historical record shows how capitalism both contributed to and benefited from the development of bureaucratization, which, in turn, contributed to widespread managerialism in business and corporate life (see Whyte, 1956/2002). These organizing principles and the rationales behind them both welcomed the introduction of and contributed to the development of neoliberalism and

corporatism (Giroux, 2002), first, in the workplace, and later, in the homes and personal lives of workers, and their families and friends. Corporatism and its ontological shadow forms metastasized as corporativism (Waite, 2011a, 2011b; Waite & Waite, 2010), which even now is in the process of spreading throughout the world (Waite et al., 2014).

Corporativism

Recognizing the defining characteristics, though tentative, of corporativism (Waite, 2011a, 2011b) may help us think about the forces that influence and often dominate our lives and our lived worlds, including schools. Corporativism attaches individual personal identity to the corporate, assuming a business hierarchical model to enforce and reinforce a corporatist 'culture.' It not only promotes the use of business/corporate language, but corporativism permits, and even elicits, imperial hubris. Although imperial hubris is only one aspect of corporativism, it is emblematic of the modern worldview especially prevalent in so-called developed countries. This mindset drives how we think and, as a consequence, how we structure our lives, especially our work lives; but not exclusively, as our work and non-work selves become more and more inseparable—implicating issues of identity and sovereignty.

Evidence that corporativism has infiltrated (colonized) our lived world at the ontological level comes from popular culture. One example is a recent letter to the editor in the local paper, titled 'USA, Co., Inc.' The letter writer proclaimed that:

> After looking at this year's election and the past few, I believe Americans need to start thinking of our country as a company, and ourselves as its shareholders… It becomes clear that our current CEO has not fulfilled his duties. Our plants are idle. The company has massive debt and 1 percent growth to show for it. There is no unity in the departments… As shareholders, we need to remember what a great CEO once said: 'Ask not what your company can do for you but what you can do for your company.'
>
> *(Austin American-Statesman, 2010, p. D6)*

The thorough and complete taken-for-grantedness or commonsensical (i.e., unproblematic) nature of the letter writer's position and positioning (*commonplaces*) is both apparent and remarkable. Further, he bastardizes one of the more poetic and forceful pieces of US presidential oratory, JFK's 'ask not what your country can do for you' rhetoric, warping it into corporate newspeak. The writer implies an ancillary argument of this essay (below)—that we are all serfs now—and suggests that our labors and aspirations should be put to the service of the corporation.

Still more evidence that the corporate and the corporation have infiltrated our lived world can be had in the *Citizen's United* US Supreme Court decision (2010) granting corporations the same free speech rights as people and also in the comment

by former Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney that 'corporations are people, my friend' (Parker, 2011, p. A2).

Individual and Collective Imperial Hubris

Leaders at the school, district, and classroom level exhibit imperial hubris when their policies, processes, and practices determine who's in and who's out—who gets what in the 'distribution of the sensible'[2] (Rancière, 2004, p. 12)—doing so unreflexively, presumptuously, habitually, and as a matter of course. Granted, hubris and even imperial hubris existed long before the social invention of corporations, long before capitalism. That is to say that imperial hubris can exist apart from a corporation, corporate structure, and the capitalist system of exchange. Although hubris is thought of as an individual trait, collectivities and their members demonstrate imperial hubris when they act unilaterally, without regard for those who are or will be affected by the policies, programs, and decisions those collectivities endorse and enact—for whomever supports the existing order is complicit in its policing. Politics is always involved. According to Rancière (2004, 2010), politics is the process by which those who are excluded from established power regimes act to disrupt them.

Whether one credits or blames the individual for the actions—and the results of those actions—of the collectivity depends upon the view of leadership one holds. Individual trait theorists, at one extreme of the continuum, will likely attribute the success or failure of the collective to the individual leader, while those at the other extreme are more likely to posit that the collective is the determining factor. These collectively-oriented theorists (such as Lakomski, 2005; or Wheatley, 2006) go so far as to suggest that leadership is an un-verifiable concept; that the collective self-organizes and that, in a sense, the 'leader' is simply along for the ride. Hofstede's (1991) now classic study is worth mentioning in this regard: one of the factors by which he differentiated organizational cultures (and the cultures within which they operate) was by their position on the individual-collective continuum.

Whether individualistically or collectively oriented, a relationship exists between the imperium—the lord, lady, or liege—and those s/he leads. Historically, sovereignty was coterminous with geography. Now, owing to the evolution of the corporate/business form, the effects of globalization, and the internet, sovereignty is extraterritorial; that is, power, reach, and influence extend beyond borders in this postmodern world—yet they are more fractured. And though people can be members of multiple communities simultaneously, the locus of sovereignty remains the individual. This is why identity, loyalty, and allegiance are considerable factors in imperial hubris.

That collectivities can exhibit personalities (Kets de Vries, 2011) and dispositions such as imperial hubris is reflected in a piece by *The New York Times* columnist Maureen Dowd (2011). Writing of the scandal that racked Penn State University, and citing David Israel, she wrote:

> Like the Roman Catholic Church, Penn State is an arrogant institution hiding behind its mystique… And sports is 'an insular world that protects its own, and operates outside of societal norms as long as victories and cash continue to flow bountifully.'
>
> *(p. A27)*

Imperial hubris may characterize particular subdivisions (e.g., a department or branch) within an institution even when the larger organization doesn't openly manifest these characteristics. It must still somehow permit, countenance, or condone such attitudes, consciously or unconsciously, and is thus still complicit. Individuals in these units may evidence these selfsame characteristics, attitudes, and dispositions. Imperial hubris is a collective social construction. An individual CEO or 'leadership' team can get away with egregious or blatantly self-serving (avaricious) behavior only through the enabling behaviors of an inner circle or collusion among those charged with oversight.

Norms have history. As a social construct, the *new normal* has not materialized out of nowhere. This particular end-state can be accidental, or consciously sought after and maintained through strategy and manipulation, driven by vested interests and agendas. Many and varied discourses rationalize and support imperial hubris as the status quo, through a type of myth-making exercise.

Often, whole mythologies are spun as rationales for these individual excesses. One suspect rationale is that used to justify differential treatment for some in the distribution of the sensible, such as gender pay inequities, exorbitant CEO pay, or unequal pay for persons otherwise similarly situated but who may work in different areas, fields, or departments.

By way of illustration, *CEO World Magazine* (Dhiraj, 2017) reported that the pay packages for presidents of 50 private US colleges exceeded $1 million; those in the top 10 earned over $2 million; those in rank positions two, three, and four earned over $3 million; and the highest paid president of a private university (Wake Forest) earned over $4 million. Orientation toward and acceptance of the collective myth justifying such high salaries was demonstrated by the president of the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, when he said that:

> the job of college president has changed dramatically in the last 30 years, as have the demands… There is just a small pool of candidates who possess the skill set that is required and are willing to take on the stressful 24/7 nature of the position.
>
> *(p. A17)*

To be clear, imperial hubris may be evidenced by a unit or individual within a larger collective even when the superordinate body does not wholly manifest or condone it. Imperial hubris may emerge when the smaller unit is cut off, isolated,

insulated, or protected from the governing forces, the policing, of the larger unit or society at large. The leaders of the larger unit may condone, tolerate, and/or enable the imperial hubris of the smaller unit for any number of reasons. They may take a laissez faire approach or otherwise not challenge the policies, procedures, and practices of the sub-unit simply because they perceive it to be successful. They may think they lack the power, position, or responsibility to affect the functioning of another (semi)-autonomous, albeit related, unit. They may not perceive the imperial hubris of the sub-unit to be wrong or misguided in any way (that is, they may accept the commonplaces of corporativism and imperial hubris).

All too frequently, imperial hubris is revealed in the excesses of an individual leader, a unit, organization, or even a nation—something recognized as early as the 18th century by Giambattista Vico, who spoke of 'the arrogance of nations' (as cited in Burke, 2000, p. 210). The excess may be manifested in flaunting the law, in the accumulation and callous application of power (financial or political) and influence, in ostentatiously doling out gifts and favors, and many other ways. For these and other reasons, corruption and imperial hubris often go hand in hand (see Waite & Allen, 2003).

Just as collectivities may enable the rise of imperial hubris within their ranks, so, too, they can guard against its emergence. Counter dominance and social leveling devices are social norms that work to keep arrogant, presumptuous individuals in check (Waite, 2010; Wilkinson, 2001).

Individual Hubris and Diminished Accountability

Not every organization or leader is possessed of or practices imperial hubris, and those who do may manifest it only part of the time. That is to say that there is a continuum of imperial hubris, from more to less, in individual leaders, whole organizations, and society at large. Collectivities can call forth and/or reward imperial hubris in their leaders or certain organizations may attract those with this trait.

In organizations and groups, including human and primate societies based on dominance hierarchies, status activates the reward center of the brain (Waite, 2010), much as do sex and money (NIH/National Institute of Mental Health, 2008). Status is habit-forming and its effects may be addictive. The loss of status or even the threat of the loss of status act in the reverse, causing depression and increased levels of stress (Zink et al., 2008). But status is a relative phenomenon, not an absolute one. That is to say, one has status relative to another. Rank is a marker of relative status, with trappings (e.g., the size of one's office, its location, one's pay package, or domicile) serving as proxies for such rank and status. The valuation of such proxies often contributes to competition, sometimes fierce competition. Competitive, individualistic behaviors may be, if not condoned, at least tolerated in certain professions and organizations, and whether by coincidence or intent, such organizations tend to be hierarchical and bureaucratic. A combination of historical, psychological, and sociological factors has produced

what may be the quintessential organizational form: the bureaucratic hierarchy or pyramid (Waite, 2010; also Chapter 3). And where Fukuyama (1999) saw hierarchical social organization as human nature, Rancière (2004) sought 'an egalitarian or anarchist theoretical position that does not presuppose this vertical relationship of top to bottom' (p. 50), and Cox (1959) saw human nature as socially constructed.

In bureaucracies, those at the top usually enjoy little or no supervision and are the least accountable of any in the organization (Ingersoll, 2003). As Ingersoll noted, what little accountability (in policy or practice) there is at these levels can easily be either skirted or ignored by any leader so inclined. The pyramidal form permits the leader to insulate him/her/themselves in a cocoon formed by security details or bodyguards, or administrative personal assistants, and by ring upon ring of subordinates. The norms in place enforce stratification and insularity and those in power mutually reinforce each other's dispositions and rationalizations.

Whether individual imperial hubris is brought to the job or brought out by the job is an open question. That it exists is nearly indisputable. What we are here concerned with are its characteristics, its breadth, and its effects.

In his discussion of managerial incompetence, Wagner (2004) identified certain characteristics of the failed manager. Among these traits and manifestations are arrogance, the illusion of control, and a preference for action over analysis. Wagner recounted a sitting university president, described by two visiting deans conducting a program evaluation as 'an arrogant, abusive bully' (p. 43).

Another type of failed manager described by Wagner (2004) was the narcissist who exhibits:

> a combination of attitudes including feelings of entitlement, exhibitionism, expectations of special privileges, exemptions from social demands, feelings of omnipotence in controlling others, intolerance of criticism, and a tendency to focus on one's own mental products, including viewing contributions of others as extensions of oneself.
>
> *(pp. 59–60)*

Additionally, 'narcissists share many of the positive characteristics that are attributed to aggressive managers… Narcissistic individuals tend to be described as appearing self-confident, highly energetic, competitive, achievement-oriented, aggressive, outgoing, and leader-like' (p. 60). These traits are constitutive or demonstrative of imperial hubris.

Sovereignty and Imperial Hubris

The leader's power over a people, a company, or a unit is related to sovereignty—both in terms of freedom for and freedom from (Biesta, 2010; Simmel, 1950). At the individual level, sovereignty has to do with partition of the public/

private self (and with individual–communal associations). As to the private life, the condition of slavery represents a complete lack of autonomy or sovereignty: those who are enslaved are owned by the slave holder *in toto* (Zerubavel, 1985). They have no private life and are expected to perform each and every task set by the master or mistress.

The website for Anti-Slavery International states that:

> Modern slavery is the severe exploitation of other people for personal or commercial gain. Modern slavery is all around us, but often just out of sight. People can become entrapped making our clothes, serving our food, picking our crops, working in factories, or working in houses as cooks, cleaners or nannies.
>
> *(Anti-Slavery International, n.d., para. 2)*

Though often obfuscated by language and duplicitous terminology used to protect the slave trader or slave owner, slavery can be known by its characteristics. According to Anti-Slavery International:

> Modern slavery takes many forms [including] the use of violence, threats or coercion to transport, recruit or harbour people in order to exploit them for purposes such as forced prostitution, labour, criminality, marriage or organ removal… People [who are] trapped in poverty borrow money and are forced to work to pay off the debt, losing control over both their employment conditions and the debt… people are treated as property… People end up trapped in modern slavery because they are vulnerable to being tricked, trapped and exploited, often as a result of poverty and exclusion.
>
> *(para. 5)*

The point is not necessarily about the horrors of modern-day slavery, though that is certainly worth mentioning, but that, owing to the reciprocal nature of all relationships, and in a refractive sense, looking on the subjugated gives us insight into the subjugator. Slavery and other types of domination help illuminate the characteristics, dispositions, structures, and processes of those who practice imperial hubris (and other atrocities).

A fitting example comes to us from Chile (Vergara, 2012). According to news reports, the arrest of a Chilean maid (a 'servant'), Felicita Pinto, spurred outrage at her treatment and the imperial hubris practiced by those living in a wealthy, gated community in Chicureo, Chile, outside Santiago. According to the report, Sra. Pinto:

> Arrived early at the gates of the luxurious community where she labors as a maid, but the minibus to her employer's home was late. So she decided to walk six blocks to work, on streets lined with broad lawns and imposing homes. Security guards quickly chased her down and forced the 57-year-old widow back to the gate.
>
> *(p. A15)*

This particular gated community has 'bylaws that forbid servants to move at will' (p. A15). One of the residents told a local television station: 'Can you imagine what it would be like here if all the maids were walking outside, all the workers walking in the street and their children on bicycles?' (p. A15). As the news story pointed out:

> discrimination against domestic workers is among the most entrenched social ills in Latin America and beyond. In luxury complexes just south of Peru's capital, maids can't swim in the ocean until after their employers have left the water. In Mexico City, some luxury restaurants prohibit maids from sitting down to eat, and some high-rises force workers to take the service elevators.
>
> *(p. A15)*

It is not so much the words used to describe people (servant, domestic, maid, and so on), but the attitudes and dispositions these words instantiate that these status distinctions are somehow natural, proper, right, deserved, and deserving.

The enslaved are at the whim of the slave owner. Usually in education today, job descriptions of mid-managers have the catch-all, inclusive phrase 'and other duties as required,' or something similar (Oliva, 1989). Also, at least in higher education, the subordinate or lesser administrator serves, in that well-worn phrase, 'at the whim of' the next highest administrator. This notion of serving at the whim of an administrator evokes notions of social status hierarchies and the capriciousness, even whimsy, of administration and administrators. Today, with so-called advances in technology, administrators and managers practice limited forms of imperial hubris when they colonize or invade the personal life or private time of employees. Often this is accomplished by issuing a cell phone or mobile device with the expectation that the employee will make themselves available to the boss 24/7—often even during weekends or vacations. No matter that the worker, indentured servant, serf, or enslaved may be well paid or highly placed, it is the sovereignty, freedom, or autonomy (or lack thereof) that concerns us here.

Take, for example, Joel Klein, former chancellor of the New York City public schools under the autocratic mayor, Michael Bloomberg. Klein later worked for media mogul Rupert Murdoch as his consigliere (Peters et al., 2011), or what Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001, p. 5) referred to as the '*communication consultant to the prince*' (emphasis in original). According to the report:

> Mr. Klein's dizzying journey, in under a year, from one of the nation's foremost education reformers to the corporate consigliere for a media titan whose politics are far to the right of his own, has surprised and unsettled many friends and colleagues, who fear that he will be unable to extricate himself from a scandal that shows no sign of abating or, they say, ending well.
>
> *(Peters et al., 2011, pp. A1 & A10)*

That these roles, these units and these contexts are saturated through and through with imperial hubris can be seen by the report's descriptions of Klein, his relationship with his boss, Rupert Murdoch, and his office. Klein was described as possessed of 'a driving, sometimes overwhelming competitive fire' (p. A10). One acquaintance commented that 'he has a take-no-prisoners attitude.' She continued, 'he is a litigator. He is about winning.'

Just weeks after going to work for Murdoch and News Corporation (or NewsCorp), ostensibly to head a new education technology division (Peters et al., 2011), Klein was convinced by Rupert Murdoch himself to head up an internal investigation at News Corporation in response to the continuing disclosure of illegal and nefarious practices by it and its subsidiaries. Klein moved into an office just down the hall from Murdoch and was a constant companion and supporter of the magnate, sitting behind him during testimony before the British Parliament and elsewhere, and even dining together as couples—Mr. Klein, Mr. Murdoch, and their spouses. Klein was initially hired for $4.5 million a year, though the total compensation package may have crept higher, especially as he was eligible for stock awards and received a $1,200 monthly car allowance.

Though many friends and close associates expressed shock that Mr. Klein would go to work for Mr. Murdoch (Peters et al., 2011), especially given Murdoch's conservative politics and Klein's reputation as a 'dyed-in-the-wool Democrat' (p. A10), the two were seen to share many traits:

> In each other, they saw themselves: Mr. Klein and Mr. Murdoch were both unapologetic about their beliefs, frustrated with status-quo politics and tenacious. They shared a distaste for small talk with strangers and had a habit of quickly disappearing from social events.
>
> Their friendship morphed into a political alliance. Mr. Murdoch's *New York Post* emerged as an unflinching and potent champion of Mr. Klein's proposals to remake the [New York City] school system, like his successful fight to lift a state cap on the number of charter schools in New York City.
>
> Mr. Murdoch began to put his own money behind Mr. Klein's efforts. At one point, he quietly donated $1 million to an advocacy group, Education Reform Now, run by Mr. Klein, bankrolling a continuing campaign to overturn a state law protecting older teachers.
>
> *(p. A10)*

Despite his reputation as a staunch Democrat, Mr. Klein had 'taken on a more conservative tack on education' (Peters et al., 2011, p. A10), a neoliberal agenda in line with the US Department of Education's Race to the Top. Later, Mr. Klein, as Murdoch's consigliere, 'often traveled on Mr. Murdoch's private jet, and seemed to relish access to the company's stable of media properties… He closely aligned himself almost immediately with the chairman, isolating himself from other senior executives' (p. A10).

As the communication consultant to the prince, Mr. Klein sheds some light on various aspects of imperial hubris, while straddling or borrowing from the second category of Bourdieu's and Wacquant's cultural producer of neoliberal reason, *the expert*. Of these two cultural producers, the expert, 'in the shadowy corridors of ministries or company headquarters, or in the isolation of think tanks, prepares highly technical documents, preferably couched in economic or mathematical language, used to justify policy choices made on decidedly non-technical grounds' (p. 5). The other, the communication consultant to the prince, is 'a defector from the academic world entered into the service of the dominant whose mission is to give an academic veneer to the political projects of the new State and business nobility' (p. 5).

Keeping the central topic of this chapter, imperial hubris, in mind, Mr. Klein was first hired to run Rupert Murdoch's new educational division (Peters et al., 2011). Soon after, and at Mr. Murdoch's insistence, Klein was tasked with heading up NewsCorps' internal investigation into the misdeeds and alleged illegalities committed by NewsCorps' employees, including phone hacking, bribing police, and more. Such reassignment is suggestive of the 'other duties as required' stipulation noted above. Mr. Klein worked tirelessly to contain the damage from what appears to have been an epoch of wanton disregard for the law of the land and unethical behavior on the parts of managers, journalists, and other employees of NewsCorps, and likely its chairman. The 'scandal' (i.e., criminal acts) seems to have originated from, and/or to have affected the deepest recesses of NewsCorps' corporate structure/organization, resulting in the pre-emptive shuttering of *The News of the World* and the 'resignation' (/sacrificial firing) of its former editor, long-time Murdoch confidant and News International chief executive under Murdoch, Rebekah Brooks, who was arrested on charges of conspiring to intercept communications and suspicion of corruption (Wikipedia, 2021).

In testimony that emerged from various investigations by the British government—including testimony before Parliament and in the Royal Court of Justice—an image of Rupert Murdoch's empire slowly took shape. Investigation into 'the "culture, ethics and practices" of British newspapers' (Burns, 2011, p. A3) revealed organizations and individuals who encouraged and engaged in 'blackmail' of and 'menacing tactics' toward celebrities and other newsworthy people, including Sienna Miller, Hugh Grant, Max Mosley—the former head of Formula One racing—J. K. Rowling of Harry Potter fame, and Bob and Sally Dowler, 'the parents of a murdered 13-year-old girl whose cell phone was hacked by a private investigator working for the now defunct tabloid *The News of the World*' (p. A3). The tactics Murdoch's tabloid staff used were characterized in sworn testimony as bullying, intimidation, and blackmail, and the organizations themselves as a mafia.

The unbridled arrogance associated with this type of imperial hubris does not always result in criminal malfeasance, though it often does. The ever-widening investigation into the 'culture of corruption' (Waite & Allen, 2003) exhibited throughout the Murdoch media empire, enveloping the other of Rupert

Murdoch's major British newspapers/tabloids, *The Sun* (estimated daily circulation 2.7 million; Somaiya, 2011), resulted in the arrest of 21 people, including Andy Coulson—former editor of *The News of the World*, other journalists and at least one police officer. According to sources quoted for the report, government investigators also focused on 'public officials who are not police officers' (para. 12). Rupert Murdoch's son James, the apparent heir to the media empire, is entangled in the affair, suspected of lying to Parliament as concerns what he knew about the phone and computer hacking, bribery, blackmail, and other illegal acts.

Murdoch and his assistants closely followed the conventional playbook in dealing with the exposure of illegalities and alleged crimes committed by those in the companies he owns: First, blame a rogue individual. Second, form a committee to look into the matter (Joel Klein's charge). Third, throw someone to the wolves (e.g., Rebekah Brooks, *The News of the World*). And fourth, build a firewall around prized personnel and divisions.

Issues such as identity, loyalty, and affiliation are central to understanding imperial hubris, how it is constructed and maintained. And loyalty is often the coin of the realm: as loyalty, obedience, complicity, and silence are often the rent sought by corrupt and despotic rulers (Osipian, 2012).

Illustrative Examples from Diverse Domains

China

Imperial hubris is evident in the manner in which civic authorities in China conduct evictions and their reasons for doing so. China is known as a country where civil authorities—the president of a village or governor of a region—initiate widespread evictions in land grabs (Jacobs, 2011), simply in order to profit by selling the real estate. China operates through a system of state capitalism. In this environment, a municipal, county, or regional state authority, either alongside or in collusion with their Communist Party counterpart, will often be behind the developer or construction company that plans to build on land forcibly (and often illegally) acquired (Jacobs, 2011). As Jacobs described it:

> It is a familiar tale of modern China with a sadly predictable denouement. A group of people wake up to find demolition notices affixed to their homes. After they reject the government's compensation as too meager, a dark campaign of harassment ensues. The bulldozers arrive in the dead of night. Score another win for the boundless authority of the state.
>
> *(p. A4)*

That such projects have steamrolled over not just groups of poor laborers, immigrants, farmers, and ethnic minorities, but also now middle class and professional class housing developments (those of 'doctors, financiers, retired

government bureaucrats—who thought they were immune to such capriciousness' (p. A4)) has grabbed the attention of the international press (e.g., Jacobs, 2011). Such land grabs and illegal evictions are sanctioned under the legal-governmental system of China, which Fukuyama (2011) described as authoritarian. The speed and scope of economic growth in China perhaps gives cover to government authorities and party bureaucrats in their corrupt efforts to join the emergent wealthy class in China. Such change has encouraged what a reporter for *The New York Times* referred to as 'the naked rapaciousness of public officials' (Jacobs, 2011, p. A4).

That such illegal expulsions and jailings are widespread is evident in the government's own research center report. According to *The New York Times* story:

> The clash would seem to suggest a new wrinkle in the seemingly ubiquitous fights over land that have become one of the most nettlesome challenges to the stability so prized by the ruling Communist Party. Last year, the government-run Research Center for Social Contradictions found that forced evictions, more than all other issues combined, were the driving cause behind the 180,000 so-called mass incidents—protests, riots and group petitioning—counted by one prominent sociologist in 2010.
>
> *(Jacobs, 2011, p. A4)*

Only rampant imperial hubris could account for bizarre and eye-catching events such as that of the son of a local party functionary. Driving drunk one night, the son hit two female Chinese university students, killing one. Leaving the scene of the accident, he drunkenly taunted bystanders to take action by calling out 'I am the son of Li Gang'—a phrase that went viral and became 'a widely used expression for corruption and abuse of power among the country's elite' (Dailymotion, 2011, para. 1).[3]

Zimbabwe and the Anglican Church

A telling example of the arrogance (and more) that is part of imperial hubris comes from an ecclesiastical battle in Zimbabwe (Dugger, 2011) where Nolbert Kunonga, a bishop, was excommunicated by The Anglican Church, Zimbabwe's leading denomination. Nonetheless, he held onto power and his diocese of Harare 'through courts widely seen as partisan to… [President] Mugabe' (p. A6)—as the excommunicated bishop was a political supporter of Mugabe, he had his backing. As such, the former Anglican bishop battled the Anglican Church and harassed its officially appointed bishop in Zimbabwe, often with brutal force, competing for control of 'thousands of Anglican churches, schools and properties across Zimbabwe and southern Africa' (p. A6). According to the report, 'he also has been backed by a police force answerable to the president' (p. A6). Other Anglican priests, bishops, and church leaders 'who have refused to submit to Mr.

Kunonga's authority say they have been subjected to death threats, spied on by state agents and blocked from worshipping in their churches or burying the dead in Anglican cemeteries' (p. A6).

That the church was instrumental in creating bureaucracies (Fukuyama, 2011) and hierarchy goes a long way in explaining how church matters and imperial hubris are interrelated. Often, sovereigns and other rulers claimed that their power was derived from the gods. That many of the narcissistic characteristics (Wagner, 2004), identified above, are present in Mr. Kunonga, Joel Klein, Rupert Murdoch, and so many others—traits such as arrogance, intolerance of criticism, ambition, aggression, self-confidence, and more—is illustrated by Kunonga's comments: 'I'm superior intellectually and from a legal point of view… I'm very superior to them' (Dugger, 2011, p. A6). Further, in describing his position and power base, Mr. Kunonga was quoted as saying that 'the throne is here' (p. A6).

Global Open Source Internet Companies. It would be easy for us to dismiss individual imperial hubris as an artifact of a simple mind or the benighted—those more prone to use brute force, for instance, to gain the upper hand or to rule—but we would be mistaken. Even those whom we anoint as intellectually or morally superior or more enlightened are likewise prone to the seduction of imperial hubris. In 'The overlords of open source: Why people-powered projects are ruled by tyrants,' those at *Wired* magazine exposed some of the least enviable dispositions of those who lead what are portrayed as the more democratic or egalitarian internet companies, using descriptors such as megalomania and 'arrogant prick' (Schwartz, 2011, p. 26). The examples plumbed for the article included WikiLeaks, Wikipedia, and Craigslist. The point of the article was that:

> As indispensable as these people-powered projects can be… the paradox is that they're often more authoritarian, even autocratic, than the most tightly controlled for-profit firms.
>
> The volunteer model makes them almost *feudal in structure*: an enormous *mass of unpaid serfs*, kept in line by a small group of paid manager-nobles, in turn serving at the pleasure of the kingly founder, whose authority is more or less absolute… Conventional checks on your power no longer apply… So the overlords of open source are left to their regal eccentricities.
>
> *(p. 26, emphasis added)*

In feudal systems, the vassal or serf gave of himself (or herself) to the lord or liege, but as the serf was not a slave, he or she had some semblance of a private life (and certain rights). Whether we call them serfs, indentured servants, or some other term, they offered their labor or the fruits of their labor (rent, in the broadest sense of the term) to the lord of the estate. The lord offered the king or queen, first, his sword and his armies for war efforts, then, later, only needed to offer either his armies or his rents in lieu of himself and his sword (Simmel, 1978). As

with slavery and serfdom, in modern times, imperial hubris, as part and parcel of corporativism, permits the executive to colonize the private world, private life of the employee, unreflexively, without thought, and as a commonplace occurrence.

It is an irony of history (Santayana not withstanding), that we have witnessed a return of sorts to widespread serfdom (NPR, 2011), thanks to the new media. This was brought to light by the sale of the *Huffington Post* in early 2011. The *Huffington Post* was an online web portal—nothing more than a web site, really, begun by Arianna Huffington—which posted liberal or left-of-center summaries of topics or longer articles with links to the original. Relatively few of those who wrote for the *Huffington Post* were paid anything for their contribution. Most did so out of a political motivation or to self-promote. Early in 2011, AOL bought the *Huffington Post* for $315 million. Both the sales figure and the business model caused social and financial commentators to ask whether writing online for no pay was worth it (NPR, 2011), and prompted commentators to assert that we are all serfs now (Carr, 2011), living 'in a world of Digital Feudalism' (de Rosa, 2011, para. 2).

Online For-Profit Charter Schools

Lest you think that education and/or schools would be immune to this feudal model, consider this from the world of online charter schools (Saul, 2011): the online charter school business model is highly lucrative because of the technologies employed and the scale of operation that these technologies permit.

> Kids mean money… The business [for-profit online charter schools] taps into a formidable coalition of private groups and officials promoting non-traditional forms of public education. The growth of for-profit online schools, one of the more overtly commercial segments of the school choice movement, is rooted in the theory that corporate efficiencies combined with the Internet can revolutionize public education, offering high quality at reduced cost.
>
> *(p. A1)*

In 2011, eight of the largest for-profit online charter schools enrolled more than 200,000 full-time virtual students.[4] Numbers mean profit. The largest for-profit online charter school provider, K12, earned $720 million in 2010 (Saul, 2011). The second-largest company, Connections Education, had revenue of $190 million. Connections Education was recently bought by Pearson for $400 million. Pearson itself was embroiled in a conflict-of-interest controversy surrounding all-expenses-paid junkets for some state superintendents of education of states with which the company does business—with contracts in the hundreds of millions of dollars—for 'workshops' or 'business meetings' in such exotic destinations as Rio de Janeiro, London, and Singapore (Winerip, 2011).

By all accounts, the performance of these online charter schools and their students is sub-par (Saul, 2011). The student turnover (or 'churn rate') is remarkably high. Teacher salaries are extremely low and teacher workload is incredibly high, bordering on unmanageable (i.e., serf-like). The prime concern of the owners and executives of such companies appears to be enrollment, simply getting students on the books—this means profit, even if the students later withdraw (a policy of these companies is to keep these students on the books for as long as possible). As one observer noted: 'a portrait emerges of a company [e.g., K12] that tries to squeeze profits from public school dollars by raising enrollment, increasing workload and lowering standards' (pp. A1 & A18). The report cited a university professor as saying that 'what we're talking about here is the financialization of public education' (p. A18), and further, that 'these folks are fundamentally trying to do to public education what the banks did to home mortgages.'

Saul (2011) noted how 'companies like K12 are almost fully in charge—devising curriculum, hiring teachers and principals and evaluating student performance' (p. A18). These for-profit online charter schools are essentially 'government-financed business, much as military contractors have capitalized on Pentagon spending.' 'But online schools,' though they earn the same per pupil income from state coffers as do brick-and-mortar public schools, 'have negligible building costs and cheaper labor costs, partly because they pay teachers low wages… Parents, called "learning coaches," do much of the teaching, prompting critics to argue that states are essentially subsidizing home schooling' (p. A18).

What is more, in the for-profit online charter school model, 'a sizeable portion of the public money collected by K12 is rolled back into generating more business,' a practice that 'raises questions when the money is intended to educate school-children' (Saul, 2011, p. A18). With retention a problem, the affiliates are pressured to increase enrollment. Some 'enrollment pals' are paid bonuses for enrolling large numbers of students. According to one observer, 'the kids enroll. You get the money, the kids disappear.'

One effect of this business model is that, again serf-like, teachers are pressured to take greater and greater numbers of students: 'I know on the elementary level we have anywhere from 70 to 100,' one teacher is quoted as saying (Saul, 2011, p. A19). Teachers reported that:

> the job had become less desirable as the company increased enrollment, particularly because the pay at many K12 schools starts in the low 30s—low even for online schools. Some class sizes have become unwieldy, they said, requiring 60-hour weeks and compromising instruction.
>
> *(p. A19)*

Former teachers of the Ohio Virtual Academy and the Colorado Virtual Academy were interviewed for this report and complained of larger class loads, 'with elementary teachers who once handled 40 or 50 pupils now supervising 75.' At

this rate, 'a teacher with an elementary class that size and a 40-hour workweek could devote little more than 30 minutes a week to each student' (p. A19).

Such enrollment increases are apparent at the high school level too, and affect teachers, their instruction, the curriculum afforded students, and, ultimately, the students' education. One former teacher, whose children are still enrolled in an online for-profit program, commented 'what has happened now in honors literature courses, the teachers are not able to keep up with 300 students, so they'll just cut curriculum. The kids are losing out' (Saul, 2011, p. A19). She shared how 'the past week my son was exempted from *The Great Gatsby* because of the workload of the teacher.'

Sports

Examples of imperial hubris can be found quite readily in the sports world, where the patriarchy, the money, competition, and high levels of risk and reward make 'gaming the system' an attractive option. Here in the United States, even the former US Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, felt the need to recognize, and from his bully pulpit comment on, the state of affairs in college football. He said:

> The narrative for 2012 in college sports is all about the deal; it's all about the brand. It's about big-time college football programs saying 'Show me the money.'… Too often, large, successful programs seem to exist in *an insular world, a world of their own*. Their football and basketball players, sometimes even their coaches, are given license to behave in ways that would be unacceptable elsewhere in higher education or in society at large.
>
> *(Bohls, 2012, p. C4, emphasis added)*

Some of these excesses came to light in revelations concerning the practices of the individuals and organization in charge of the college football Fiesta Bowl (Dahlberg, 2011a, 2011b; Frommer, 2011). According to one commentator: 'the long-time president of the Fiesta Bowl operated it like a personal ATM machine, rewarding friends, family, and any politician who asked' (Dahlberg, 2011b, p. C2). The Fiesta Bowl president, John Junker, engaged in major and minor excess, including political manipulation (illegally coercing the Fiesta Bowl employees into contributing to the political campaigns of local and national politicians Junker wanted to support and influence, and reimbursing those 'donations' from Fiesta Bowl accounts in 'an apparent violation of federal and state laws' (Frommer, 2011, p. C6)). Further,

> As *The Arizona Republic* [newspaper] exposed in its investigation, Junker handed out gold coins to workers, sent a former board member and his wife on a first-class all-expenses-paid trip to Ireland and paid for both the wedding and honeymoon of his assistant.
>
> *(Dahlberg, 2011b, p. C2)*

In addition, 'one year Junker was reimbursed for an astonishing $770,865.85 in charges on his personal American Express card, and investigators said they couldn't figure out whether nearly half the $4.8 million he charged over 10 years was legitimate' (p. C2). Ultimately, 'until it all came crashing down, the *personal fiefdom* served both Junker and the Fiesta Bowl well… It's a shocking tale of greed, excess and entitlement in college sports' (p. C2, emphasis added).

It appears that such practices and the public dispositions toward college football, its incredible ability to generate untold wealth, the power structures that maintain these systems, and the myths, discourses, and rationales enlisted to support them are widespread throughout at least the United States. This has led one passionate commentator to remark that, in at least one conference:

> if you ain't cheating, you ain't trying… [But] let's not be naïve. College football was corrupt long before the BCS [Bowl Champion Series] came along… One scandal after another, spiraling coaches salaries, infrastructure arms races, propped up by employees (athletes) who can't be paid above the table thanks to the holy guise of education. And it's all been outsourced to pseudo nonprofits and run by pimps at TV networks.
>
> *(Goodman, 2011, p. C2)*

In a discussion concerning college football coaches who make the move to a professional team, one professional team president noted how:

> The coaches at the bigger schools… I think when you get to that level at those schools, to say you're a control person is an understatement. There's a college president, but in most cases *the head coaches of those big-time programs are like the king*. They have their kingdom. They have to answer to the president but, really, what they say goes.
>
> *(Gosselin, 2010, p. C6, emphasis added)*

The parallels between the world of sports, with the imperial hubris of some coaches, and that of education, with the imperial hubristic tendencies or practices of some school superintendents, school principals, and even some teachers (those who close their classroom door and operate their classroom like a fiefdom) suggest that perhaps structural issues are at play.

Educational Leadership

Consider the imperium of the former superintendent of schools for Atlanta, Georgia, Beverly L. Hall, who, in the opinion of many, 'ruled by fear' (Winerip, 2012, p. A12):

> Principals were told that if state test scores didn't go up enough, they would be fired.
>
> Underlings were humiliated during rallies at the Georgia Dome. Dr. Hall permitted principals with the highest test scores to sit up front near her, while sticking those with the lowest scores off to the side, in the bleachers.
>
> She was chauffeured around the city, often with an entourage of aides and security guards. When she spoke publicly, questions had to be submitted beforehand for screening. 'She was known as the queen in her ivory tower,' said Verdaillia Turner, president of the Atlanta teachers' union.
>
> But Dr. Hall got results. Test scores soared. Two national groups [The American Educational Research Association and the American Association of School Administrators] named her superintendent of the year. The secretary of education, Arne Duncan, hosted her at the White House.
>
> Fear seemed to work.
>
> Then, last summer, the Atlanta miracle collapsed… [Now] felony indictments are expected, for altering state documents, lying to investigators and theft of government funds.
>
> *(p. A12)*

Concluding Thoughts

Whether certain people are attracted to jobs and/or positions that permit them to practice imperial hubris, or particular positions and their work environments bring out or elicit such dispositions and practices in people, is difficult to tell. The eminent sociologist, Willard Waller (1932) wondered:

> What does any occupation do to the human being who follows it? … The understanding of the effects upon the inner man [or woman] of the impact of the occupation is thus an important task of social science. It is a problem almost untouched.
>
> *(p. 375)*

As an initial examination of imperial hubris and its related concepts and issues, it is understandable that more questions remain to be answered, more avenues to be explored. One issue that was only briefly touched upon here is the relation of imperial hubris to status hierarchies, their symbioses and other dynamics. Another issue touched upon, though left unresolved, is the degree to which hubris, arrogance, and entitlement are embedded in our human psyche, DNA, and deep culture. Are these tendencies and dispositions 'human nature' and, if so, what are the implications of this for schools and other organizations? For to the degree that

these are situated in our deep culture, in our DNA, they will be difficult to acknowledge, root out, and change.

But lest we be overly cynical and simply not attempt this change because the task seems too daunting, we ought to keep in mind that the picture painted here is but one side of the story, a look at the dark heart of leadership. Countervailing tendencies, such as the counter dominance and social leveling devices mentioned earlier, are also in play. These processes serve to keep communities and other collectivities more level, more egalitarian, and more equal. Rather than their being simply a realization of schadenfreude, these social leveling and counter dominance devices serve as societal checks on individuals assuming too much power and status over others. They keep over-sized egos in check—sometimes successfully, sometimes not. The issues surrounding imperial hubris have to do with equality, democracy, social justice, and emancipation. They have to do with how we govern ourselves. It's ultimately about who we are as people and how we treat one another.

That our schools and other organizations may be organized into hierarchical, bureaucratic patterns may be deemed acceptable by some, but it is not acceptable that those occupying successive hierarchical rungs assume some special privilege because of their position. The presumption or assumption of special privilege and entitlement runs contrary to democratic principles—conviviality based on joint, fair, and equal treatment.

By naming and recognizing imperial hubris in ourselves, our leaders, and our organizations, we may work toward more humane, more equal treatment of all, ourselves included. That we happen to work and live in hierarchically arranged social groups doesn't mean we are any less human, any less deserving of respect, any less equal. For those who by chance or fortune occupy higher-level positions in our social structures to assume some type of superiority, for them to either treat others disdainfully or with no consideration at all, should not be tolerated by anyone.

To the extent that we support these types of arrangements, attitudes, and dispositions or are otherwise complicit, we ourselves surrender our humanity, and allow ourselves to be used as chattel, to be exploited as but a means for someone else to realize their ambitions.

This discussion of imperial hubris is meant to raise our awareness of this ubiquitous phenomenon, its reach, and the deep-seated effects is has on all of us—not just as teachers, school administrators or students, but as citizens living in complex and complicated societies, struggling for more just and equal social relations. Imperial hubris, as I hope to have made clear, is one of the more insidious, if not predominant, impediments to more democratic relationships, more equitable and just social structures, and emancipation. But rather than simply blaming the leader for taking advantage of us and their position, with its privileges, perks, and power, we must all accept responsibility for the systems we create and the leaders we produce and choose to follow.

Notes

1 Portions of Chapter 5 were adapted from Waite, D. (2014). Imperial hubris: The dark heart of leadership. *Journal of School Leadership, 24*(*6*), 1202–1232. Used with permission.
2 Rancière (2004) defined the distribution of the sensible as 'the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts within it… it reveals who can have a share in what is common to the community' (p. 12).
3 The *Toronto Star* reported that, once the offense and the perpetrator's arrogance went viral in China, stirring public resentment and underscoring 'the tensions that exist between the authorities and the common people' (Schiller, 2011, para. 11), Li Qiming was sentenced to six years in prison for vehicular manslaughter and drunken driving (when he could have been charged under harsher laws) and ordered to pay $69,000 in compensation to the family of the deceased student and $13,800 to the woman he injured.
4 The numbers have likely increased astronomically as a result of school closures during the COVID-19 pandemic.

References

Anti-Slavery International. (n.d.). *What is modern slavery?* www.antislavery.org/slavery-today/modern-slavery/.

Austin American Statesman. (2010, January 8). USA, Co., Inc. Letters to the editor, D6.

Biesta, G. J. J. (2010). *Good education in an age of measurement: Ethics, politics, democracy*. Paradigm Publishers.

Bohls, K. (2012, February 24). Mack's talking more accountability as he toughens up Horns. *Austin American-Statesman*, C1–C4.

Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (2001). New Liberal speak: Notes on the new planetary vulgate. *Radical Philosophy*, 105, 2–5.

Burke, P. (2000). *A social history of knowledge: From Gutenberg to Diderot*. Polity Press.

Burns, J. F. (2011, November 26). Inquiry into press tactics turns the tables on tabloids. *The New York Times*, A3.

Carr, D. (2011, February 12). At media companies, a nation of serfs. *The New York Times*. www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/business/media/14carr.html?_r=1&src=busln.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310 (2010). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/558/310/.

Cox, O. C. (1959). *Caste, class, & race: A study in social dynamics*. Monthly Review Press.

Dahlberg, T. (2011a, May 12). Considering the excesses, Fiesta's penalty is a joke. *Austin American-Statesman*, C1–C6.

Dahlberg, T. (2011b, April 1). Fiesta Bowl chief's excesses are picture of greed run amok. *Austin American-Statesman*, C2.

Dailymotion. (2011, January 2). Son of Chinese officer Li Gang gets 6 years for hit-and-run. www.dailymotion.com/video/xgu6dl_son-of-chinese-officer-li-gang-gets-6-years-for-hit-and-run_news.

de Rosa, A. (2011, January 17). The death of platforms. *Soup*. http://soupsoup.tumblr.com/post/2800255638/the-death-of-platforms.

Dhiraj, A. B. (2017, December 11). America's top 50 highest paid private university presidents. *CEO World Magazine*. https://ceoworld.biz/2017/12/11/americas-top-50-highest-paid-private-university-presidents/.

Dowd, M. (2011, November 9). Personal foul at Penn. *The New York Times*, A27.

Down, B. (2009). Schooling, productivity and the enterprising self: Beyond market values. *Critical Studies in Education*, 50(1), 51–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/17508480802526652.

Dugger, C. (2011, May 30). Mugabe ally escalates push to control church. *The New York Times*, A6.

Frommer, F. J. (2011, April 26). NCAA panel members enjoyed Fiesta favors. *Austin American-Statesman*, C1–C6.

Fukuyama, F. (1999). *The great disruption: Human nature and the reconstitution of social order*. Free Press.

Fukuyama, F. (2011). *The origins of political order: From prehuman times to the French revolution*. Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux.

Giroux, H. A. (2002). Neoliberalism, corporate culture, and the promise of higher education: The university as a democratic public sphere. *Harvard Educational Review*, 72(4), 425–464. https://doi.org/10.17763/haer.72.4.0515nr62324n71p1.

Goodman, J. (2011, November 26). In BCS, it makes cents—not sense. *Austin American-Statesman*, C2.

Gosselin, R. (2010, December 1). Coaching success in college not indicator of smooth ride in NFL. *Austin American-Statesman*, C6.

Hofstede, G. (1991). *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind*. McGraw-Hill.

Ingersoll, R. M. (2003). *Who controls teachers' work? Power and accountability in America's schools*. Harvard University Press.

Jacobs, A. (2011, October 28). Harassment and evictions bedevil even China's well-off. *The New York Times*, A4.

Kets de Vries, M. F. R. (2011). *Reflections on groups and organizations*. John Wiley & Sons.

Lakomski, G. (2005). *Managing without leadership: Towards a theory of organizational functioning*. Elsevier.

NIH/National Institute of Mental Health. (2008, April 24). Human brain appears 'hard-wired' for hierarchy. *ScienceDaily*. www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/04/080423121430.htm.

NPR. (2011, February 15). Is writing online without pay worth it? *National Public Radio*. www.npr.org/2011/02/15/133759724/is-writing-online-without-pay-worth-it.

Oliva, P. F. (1989). *Supervision for today's schools* (3rd ed.). Longman.

Osipian, A. L. (2012). Loyalty as rent: Corruption and politicization of Russian universities. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 32(3–4), 153–167. https://doi.org/10.1108/01443331211214730.

Parker, A. (2011, August 11). 'Corporations are people,' Romney tells Iowa hecklers angry over his tax policy. *New York Times*, A2.

Peters, J. W., Barbaro, M., & Hernandez, J. C. (2011, July 24). Murdoch's unlikely ally. *The New York Times*, A1–10.

Rancière, J. (2004). *The politics of aesthetics* (G. Rockhill, Trans.). Continuum.

Rancière, J. (2010). *Dissensus: On politics and aesthetics* (S. Corcoran, Trans.). Continuum.

Sarason, S. B. (1996). *Revisiting 'the culture of the school and the problem of change.'* Teachers College Press.

Saul, S. (2011, December 13). Profits and questions at online charter schools. *The New York Times*, A1, A18–19.

Schiller, B. (2011, January 30) 'My father is Li Gang!' accused gets six years. *The Toronto Star*. www.thestar.com/news/world/2011/01/30/my_father_is_li_gang_accused_gets_six_years.html.

Schwartz, M. (2011). The overlords of open source: Why are people-powered projects ruled by tyrants? *Wired*, 19(3), 25–26.

Simmel, G. (1950). *The sociology of Georg Simmel* (K. H. Wolff, Ed.). The Free Press.
Simmel, G. (1978). *The philosophy of money* (T. Bottomore & D. Frisby, Trans.). Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Vergara, E. (2012, January 22). Chilean maid's actions spur civil rights debate. *Austin American-Statesman*, A15.
Wagner, R. K. (2004). Smart people doing dumb things: The case of managerial incompetence. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Why smart people can be so stupid* (pp. 42–63). Yale University Press.
Waite, D. (2010). On the shortcomings of our organizational forms: With implications for educational change and school improvement. *School Leadership and Management*, 30(3), 225–248. https://doi.org/10.1080/13632434.2010.485183.
Waite, D. (2011a). Reflections on changes in the world, on life, human dignity and social justice: With implications for schooling and work [Keynote]. Workshop on social justice held by the MÜSIAD—The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, Istanbul, Turkey, February 18–19.
Waite, D. (2011b). Universities and their faculties as 'merchants of light': Contemplation on today's university. *Education and Society*, 29(2), 5–19.
Waite, D., & Allen, D. (2003). Corruption and abuse of power in educational administration. *The Urban Review*, 35, 281–296.
Waite, D. & Nelson, S. W. (2005). Una revisión del liderazgo educativo (Educational leadership reconsidered). *La Revista Española de Pedagogía*, 63(232), 389–406. www.jstor.org/stable/23766326.
Waite, D., & Waite, S. F. (2010). Corporatism and its corruption of democracy and education. *Journal of Education and Humanities*, 1(2), 86–106.
Waite, D., Turan, S., & Niño, J. M. (2014). Schools for capitalism, corporativism, and corruption: Examples from Turkey and the USA. In I. Bogotch & C. Shields (Eds.), *International handbook of social (in)justice and educational leadership* (pp. 619–642). Springer.
Waller, W. W. (1932). *The sociology of teaching*. J. Wiley & Sons.
Wheatley, M. J. (2006). *Leadership and the new science: Discovering order in a chaotic world* (3rd ed.). Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
Whyte, W. W. (2002). *The organization man*. The University of Pennsylvania Press. (Original published in 1956)
Wikipedia. (2021). Rebekah Brooks. Retrieved October 29, 2021, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebekah_Brooks.
Wilkinson, R. G. (2001). *Mind the gap: Hierarchies, health and human evolution*. Yale University Press.
Winerip, M. (2011, October 10). Free trips raise issues for officials in education. *The New York Times*, A12–15.
Winerip, M. (2012, February 20). A new leader helps heal Atlanta schools, scarred by scandal. *The New York Times*, A12.
Zerubavel, E. (1985). *Hidden rhythms: Schedules and calendars in social life*. University of California Press.
Zink, C. F., Tong, Y., Chen, Q., Bassett, D. S., Stein, J. L., & Meyer-Lindenberg, A. (2008). Know your place: Neural processing of social hierarchy in humans. *Neuron*, 58 (2), 273–283. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2008.01.025.

6

NOTES TOWARDS A CONCLUSION

At its heart, this is a book steeped in the belief of the emancipatory promise of education. This belief, like all beliefs and assumptions, benefits from clear-eyed consideration and analysis. That is what I've tried to do here.

Emancipation and education, and their relationships, have changed over time with the milieu of which they are part. The emancipatory potential of education has been extolled from the ancient Greeks, and earlier, through the Enlightenment and high modernism, only to be pilloried in the postmodern. We can't ignore this.

Education serves as a necessary if not sufficient condition for freedom, liberation, and emancipation at the individual and collective levels. But as we have seen, there are many impediments to realizing emancipation through education. In these pages, we have examined learning and education, how they are related and how they differ; how they can contribute to emancipation, and how they do not. We've looked at how the collective or universal—'society,' the state, and 'culture'—affect education: how they impede emancipation and how they can promote it. We've seen how our collective conceptions of school and of education shape and influence what goes on in schools, what is expected of those who populate schools, and how these expectations are enforced. We've discussed how corruption within and without severely limits students' and teachers' freedom, not simply in severely diminishing the amount of resources available to them, but by colonizing their minds and trapping them in insidious webs of corruption where those 'at the bottom' enrich those 'at the top,' who may or may not be educators themselves and who may or may not avail themselves of a public education—they may simply be rapacious capitalists serving themselves but no public good. I think I've shown how other resources, material and symbolic, function similarly; where in hierarchical pyramidal structures, the alphas engorge themselves and their cronies, and, sated, leave less for those 'lower down' as we go about the work of educating our

DOI: 10.4324/9781003164449-6

children. We cannot escape the fact that in corrupt systems, we are all complicit, though some may benefit less and wield less power to change or right such systems. We've discussed how organizations, such as schools, can be prisons or cages. 'Culture' too. And 'society.' As Arendt (1958) noted, action in a totalitarian 'society' (organization or institution or even family or clan) is difficult, thought is even more difficult, but neither is impossible. We must tend to our organizations, or more importantly our relationships, for organizations are but relationships systematized for some purpose.

The COVID-19 pandemic and demands for racial justice in the aftermath of the police killing of George Floyd and our collective response have shown how much we demand of teachers and how little we trust, value, and respect them. The national push to re-open schools, despite the risks to teachers and students, despite the risk to 'society,' speaks to how we depend on schools to take care of children so that adults can work, as though the economy depended on it. The blowback to the open discussion of race in classrooms shows that racism is still a very powerful force today, and reveals some of the many guises it can take. But the emotionally laden and vocal, even violent opposition to the open discussion of race in schools also speaks to the power of ideas and the power of education.

Individual and Collective Spaces

As we've discussed, the material is tied to consciousness, whether it be determinant or less so. Consciousness is related to education, learning. Is freedom then economically contingent? Is economic independence a prerequisite for emancipation? Is emancipation an individual act? Is emancipation even possible without the totality, the collective, being emancipated, or at minimum allowing for the individual's emancipation? On its face, this question may seem absurd: if the collective, 'society,' is emancipated, what need is there then for the individual to seek their emancipation? If so, from what?

There are different points of view regarding the emancipation of the individual vis-à-vis the collective. Arendt (1958) suggested that one can't be independent of others and that all rights originate from 'society.' Adorno (1978) believed that there can be 'no emancipation without that of society' (p. 173). He felt that individualism, 'the cult of the individual,' weakened the individual and contributed to the rise of totalitarianism, including fascism. He wrote that:

> Within repressive society the individual's emancipation not only benefits but damages him. Freedom from society robs him of the strength for freedom. For however real he may be in his relations to others, he is, considered absolutely, a mere abstraction. He has no content that is not socially constituted, no impulse transcending society that is not directed at assisting the social situation to transcend itself.
>
> *(pp. 149–150)*

And he further noted that:

> That the setting free of the individual by the undermining of the *polis* did not strengthen his resistance, but eliminated him and individuality itself, in the consummation of dictatorial states, provides a model of one of the central contradictions which drove society from the nineteenth century to Fascism.
>
> *(Adorno, 1978, p. 149)*

Jacques Rancière (1991) was of a different mind: he felt that the emancipation of the individual was paramount, and that 'society' was a fiction:

> One must choose to attribute reason to real individuals or to their fictive unity. One must choose between making an unequal society out of equal men and making an equal society out of unequal men. Whoever has some taste for equality shouldn't hesitate: individuals are real beings, and society a fiction. It's for real beings that equality has value, not for a fiction.
>
> One need only learn how to be equal men in an unequal society. This is what *being emancipated* means.
>
> *(p. 133, emphasis in original)*

Any collectivity is consummated according to some organizing principle—be it family, tribe, community, nation, 'society,' business, or school. That organizing principle is a fiction, in Rancière's (1991) eyes. It's artificial, not natural; a (human) construct and not a given. It's constructed and too often imposed. Only individual human beings are real. And once we leave the abstract and ideal, questions present themselves: On what basis are collectivities to be organized? How are they going to be governed? And our leaders? What qualifies some to be leaders and others led?

The central contradictions of which Adorno (1978) wrote (above) are suggestive of the 'double thrust' of democracy which so interested Rancière (2014), a double thrust revealing a hatred of democracy. Rancière dealt with questions which concern us here, among them 'the social,' government, equality, freedom and emancipation, and education. 'The liberalism displayed by the French intelligentsia,' wrote Rancière,

> is a doctrine with a double thrust. Behind its reverence for the Enlightenment, and for the Anglo-American tradition of liberal democracy and human rights, one can discern a very French denunciation of the individualist revolution tearing apart the social body.
>
> *(p. 15)*

It is this 'double thrust of the critique of revolution [which] enables us to understand the formation of contemporary antidemocratism' (p. 16).

Conventional liberal thinking evidences a dichotomy of a 'good' and a 'bad' democracy: 'the good democracy of human rights and individual liberties, and the bad collectivist and egalitarian democracy' (p. 16). Rancière observed how:

> The critique known as liberal—which arraigns the totalitarian rigours of equality before the wise republic of individual liberties and parliamentary representation—was from the beginning subordinated to a totally different critique, one for which the sin of the revolution was not its collectivism, but, on the contrary, its individualism. On this view, the French Revolution was terroristic not for having refused to recognize the rights of individuals; it was terroristic for having consecrated them… The Revolution was the consequence of Enlightenment thinking and of its first principle—the 'Protestant' doctrine that elevates the judgment of isolated individuals to the level of structures and collective beliefs. Shattering the old solidarities that the monarchy, the nobility and the Church had slowly woven, the Protestant revolution dissolved the social link and atomized individuals.
>
> *(p. 14)*

This, then, was the liberal critique of the French revolution and its aftermath, the radical valorization of the individual. 'The critique of human rights immediately reasserted itself,' Rancière noted (p. 16), this time 'in the manner of Hannah Arendt: human rights are an illusion because they are the rights of that bare humanity that is without rights' (p. 16). In short, the critique of individual rights asserts that all rights emanate from the state in the end, from 'society' and the collective. But what this critique fails to acknowledge is that rights are never freely granted, rights are won, wrested from the state and other collectives, through struggle, often violent struggle.

As to the question of who is to govern in a democracy, a 'society' of equals, Rancière (2014) turned to Plato and his seven types of titles to govern. Four of these titles are related to birth—those who are firstborn or highborn are superior, parents over children. Then there are two positions found in nature such as the strong over the weak and the power of those who know. (Rancière cleverly termed this an epistemocracy.) Plato introduced what effectively for Rancière is the insertion of politics into the equation, because for Plato it was not simply the firstborn or the strongest or the wisest but the best who ought to govern. But designating or electing the best as leader or governor upsets the traditional hierarchies of birth, strength, wealth, and knowledge. Even more unsettling is Plato's last and seventh title, a title that is not a title:

> the title of that authority that has the 'favor of heaven and fortune': the choice of the god of chance, the drawing of lots, i.e., the democratic procedure by which a people of equals decides the distribution of places.
>
> *(p. 40)*

This, to Rancière (2014), is the 'most profound trouble signified by the word democracy' (p. 41)—'a title that refutes itself: the seventh title is the absence of title' (p. 41). Democracy 'is simply the dissolving of any standard by which nature could give its law to communitarian artifice via the relations of authority that structure the social body' (p. 41). 'Democracy first of all means this: anarchic "government," one based on nothing other than the absence of every title to govern' (p. 41).

The drawing of lots, election of the governor or leader by chance, counters the most insidious evil of any collectivity, what earlier I referred to as imperial hubris. As Rancière (2014) put it:

> The drawing of lots was the remedy to an evil at once much more serious and much more probable than a government full of incompetents: government comprised of a certain competence, that of individuals skilled at taking power through cunning.
>
> *(p. 42)*

The philosopher-cum-'philosopher-king' was Plato's remedy, his seventh type, the title that is not a title, the ruler who doesn't seek to rule. In a democracy, a truly egalitarian 'society,' anyone is capable of leading.

'Democracy is,' according to Rancière (2014):

> neither a form of government that enables oligarchies to rule in the name of the people, nor is it a form of society that governs the power of commodities. It is the action that constantly wrests the monopoly of public life from oligarchic governments, and the omnipotence over lives of the power of wealth.
>
> *(p. 96)*

The School, 'Society,' Educational Leadership, and Emancipation

Emancipation is something someone does for themselves. It is not given freely. Like education, it must be won (Rancière, 1991). It must be wrested from what Rancière called the police order and its 'distribution of the sensible': all that which *is sensed*—seen, said, heard, felt, tasted, and so on—and all that which *makes sense* (the dominant or hegemonic logics). Democracy and politics are synonymous for Rancière, and both are realized in disruptions of the police order. His belief that society is a fiction, an artifice, is suggestive of Williams' (1958/1983) issues with the lay and academic sociological category of 'the masses': 'There are in fact no masses;' Williams claimed, 'there are only ways of seeing people as masses' (p. 300).

Rancière (1991) cautioned against progressives, his republicans, and their (educational) reform projects. (See also Waite, 2016.) Such progressives would seek to emancipate by means of more education, education of the worst type. Simply doing more of what we have done will not emancipate anyone, only

make people more unfree. Rancière decried what he saw as 'the pedagogization of society' (p. 133) and the 'general infantilization of the individuals that make it up' (p. 133). It is Rancière's belief that equality, an equality of intelligence, is not and should not be an end-goal; because then it will never be realized but will always appear on the horizon, just out of reach. The equality of intelligence must always be a starting point, a basic assumption, verified through action.

The educational regime, and by extension 'the pedagogization of society,' rest on the assumption of the *inequality* of intelligences. The teacher, 'the Old Master' for Rancière (1991), always holds something back. There is always more to learn. The whole regime is based on and results in stultification, an awkward translation by the translator's own admission of the French word '*abrutir* (to render stupid, to treat like a brute)… Stultify carries the connotation of numbing and deadening better than the word "stupefy," which implies a sense of wonderment or amazement absent in the French.—TRANS' (fn. p. 7).

Just as Rancière (1991) asked how one might live as an emancipated individual in an unequal 'society,' we might ask how a school administrator or other 'leader' might both live as an emancipated individual and lead so that others—students, teachers, parents and caregivers, and members of the community at large—might find their own paths toward emancipation. Rancière held that one can't emancipate another without being emancipated oneself and that collectivities and formal programs never emancipated a single individual. He claimed that the state doesn't owe anyone an education; that education, like liberty, isn't given, it's taken. So the problematic is this: How can an educational leader, an administrator, deeply entangled in and likely benefitting materially and symbolically from the system of stultification that is the educational regime, emancipate themselves and help others to emancipate themselves?

Like Nietzsche (1874), Rancière (1991) saw two principal barriers to emancipation: fear and laziness, or lack of will. Rancière wrote of stultification:

> *Stultification* is not an inveterate superstition; it is fear in face of liberty. Routine is not ignorance; it is the cowardice and pride of people who renounce their own power for the unique pleasure of affirming their neighbor's incapacity.
>
> *(p. 108, emphasis in original)*

He wrote: 'it is the lack of will that causes intelligence to make mistakes. The mind's original sin is not haste, but distraction, absence' (p. 55). 'The first vice is laziness' (p. 55). 'It is easier to absent oneself, to half-see, to say what one hasn't seen, to say what one believes one sees. "Absent" sentences are formed in this way… "I can't" is one of these absent sentences' (p. 55). 'Meaning is the work of the will' (p. 56); by which he meant 'that self-reflection by the reasonable being who knows himself in the act' (p. 57). And further,

> No one makes an error except by waywardness, that is to say, by laziness, by the desire to no longer listen to what a reasonable being owes himself. The principle of evil lies not in a mistaken knowledge of the good that is the purpose of action. It lies in unfaithfulness to oneself.
>
> *(p. 57)*

What does this mean for the (self-)work of the educational leader?

The Leader as Subject and Agent

We might begin with the self of the leader or administrator. Much of the critically oriented literature of late (e.g., Kendi, 2019; Lopez, 2020; Pak & Ravitch, 2021) suggests this tact, at least as a starting point. That is, leaders must take stock of themselves, their attitudes and beliefs, dispositions, and actions. It begins with reflection.

Lopez (2020) asserted that 'it is important for educational and school leaders to decolonize their minds as a precursor to engaging in decolonizing educational leadership practices' (p. 35). Educators and educational leaders must develop a critical consciousness, according to Lopez, and 'adopt an agentic mindset' (p. 39). 'Developing a critical consciousness,' Lopez claimed, 'involves change in knowledge and perspectives which involves reflection, political efficacy, and critical action' (p. 40). Borrowing from Absolon (2010), Lopez wrote that in the process of decolonizing one's mind, one should detoxify from the internalization of colonialism; question, wonder, rethink and retheorize our practices; cleanse one's spirit, mind and body 'from the toxins of colonial knowledge' (p. 40); question 'the norms and status quo' (p. 41); '*become uncomfortable* in the detoxing' (p. 41); '*engage* in a journey of learning' (p. 41) from indigenous perspectives as to how colonialization 'is seeded into every fabric of life' (p. 41); '*return* to the land' (p. 41); '*restore* respect to Mother Earth' (p. 41); and '*reject* being a host of colonialization' (p. 41, emphases in original).

Pak and Ravitch (2021) also begin with transforming the self and move from there to transforming (other) educators, transforming organizations and transforming systems. These authors believe educators must develop a sense of what they term 'criticality'; that is, 'the theoretical, conceptual, and contextual analysis of people's lives, institutional structures, and cultures, while paying particular attention to the norms, policies, and practices that serve the interests of the dominant class while dehumanizing others' (p. 2). This involves 'analyzing power and structural inequalities… disrupting dominant norms and assumptions… exhibiting agency and critical hope when critiquing power, structures, and norms… and advocating for social change' (pp. 2–3). A critically informed analysis is essential to praxis, and theory is essential for analysis (points we made in Chapter 1).

Pak and Ravitch (2021) held that 'critical self-reflective leaders must first explore their social identities, power, and privileges and how these influence their worldviews and practice as leaders' (p. 27). '*Social identity*,' they claimed, 'relates to the leader's gender, social class, race, sexual identity and orientation, culture, ethnicity, and religion, as well as to the intersections of these and other identity markers such as national origin, language communities, and so on' (p. 27, emphasis in original). They concluded that 'inextricably linked to social identities are leaders' relationships with power and privilege, and hierarchy broadly, which inform the development of our mental models for how we think the world operates' (p. 27).

An emancipated educational leader, or anyone concerned with their own emancipation for that matter, might evidence what Giddens (1990, 1991) referred to as ontological security—a sense of stability or continuity concerning '"answers" to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses' (1991, p. 47) 'on the level of the unconscious and practical consciousness' (p. 47). They are able to bring meaning to their lives. Ontological security ameliorates existential anxiety. Building on Rancière (1991), an emancipated educational leader (again, emancipated persons generally) would exhibit what we might call 'epistemological security.' This is a profound belief in the equality of intelligences—that theirs is equal to any other, and that any other intelligence is the equal of their own. This is an especially important disposition for educators to have.

Emancipating Emancipated Leaders (or Emancipated Emancipating Leaders)

Most critically-oriented social justice scholars focus on sitting principals and educational leaders rather than on aspiring leaders. Lopez (2020), Khalifa et al. (2016), Pak and Ravitch (2021), and others, don't give as much consideration to leadership preparation programs and leadership students as they do to educating and winning over existing principals.

The scholars mentioned, and most others, in using social justice as an umbrella term for anti-racist, culturally relevant, anti-colonial and critical educational leadership praxis, skirt what seem to be fundamental questions: How can we re-make schools into less oppressive organizations? Or should we? Would it be more efficacious to completely dismantle and/or replace schools as they exist presently? This last question interpellates the revolutionary or rebel and the exile of William's (1961/2013) membership categories. 'The ways of society' (p. 113) are not the rebel's ways. 'The revolutionary's relationship with… society is one of declared opposition and struggle' (p. 114), but the rebel 'opposes the society in terms of the struggle for a different society' (p. 114). 'There are obviously important distinctions to be drawn here, between the revolutionary… and the reformer or critic… For the reformer and the critic are… members' (p. 113) who 'suppose that their own ends can… be achieved within the society's existing forms' (p. 114).

This is the ground upon which education, critical analysis, and praxis meet. A critically oriented analysis assesses the environments, situations, structures, and processes of which one is part, from the micro to the macro. What are the oppressive forces at play in a school and in one's professional relationships?[1] What are the 'societal' forces affecting the school, teachers, and students?

In addition to the reflection Lopez (2020), Pak and Ravitch (2021), and others encourage educational leaders to engage in, we must add other components, tasks, and focuses. These ought to include axiological and normative considerations, questions of value(s) and worth. Revelations from this reflection should prompt leaders and others to think about what they value, what they can countenance and what they cannot.

Leaders' critical analysis of the environments, situations, structures, and processes is then complemented by change theory. They might ask themselves whether the institutions and organizations in which they find themselves can change, can be either less oppressive (a better police order) or better contribute to human flourishing (Wright, 2010) or the fullness of being (Lawrence in Williams, 1958). If, in applying their change theory, the leader answers in the affirmative, they need to ask themselves whether the desired change is worth the effort. Do they stay and do the work, or acquiesce, or should they simply leave—leave for another school, or country, or leave the profession altogether? Should they decide to stay and do the work, further application of change theory would suggest how to go about it.

Can schools be made less oppressive, less racist, less colonial, less exploitative by whatever measure? This speaks to freedom. Freedom and emancipation, while not equivalent, are commensurable. If we believe in emancipation and that schools play or ought to play a part in this, how do we go about it?

Jürgen Habermas (1975) wrote of three different bases of social analysis—the scientific-technical, the humanistic and interpretive, and the critical and emancipatory. These are distinct epistemologies and ontologies. The complexities of modern collective life and the position of school leaders within it necessitates that they take up and address all three logics and the projects informed by them. The demands of modern schooling means that school principals can't survive in their position long without addressing the technical demands of state accountability (the technical rationality). But they cannot ignore students' and teachers' (or their own) mental health and wellbeing (the humanistic logic). And yet, school leaders likely perceive, at a conscious or subconscious level, that all such efforts are for naught if 'society' remains racist or sexist or classist, in short, if the wider 'society' remains unchanged and unchallenged.

Teachers and other educational leaders are public or 'organic' intellectuals. As such, they are political agents. If they want schools to be freer, less exploitative, and more democratic, they must simultaneously work to make 'society' so as well. As John Dewey taught us, schools are not simply laboratories of democratic 'social' action, where students study democracy for later implementation: they must and can be free and democratic in the first instance. Rancière (1991) is relevant here.

Freedom of movement and choice are key components of liberation, if not emancipation. The opposite is also true: restricted freedom of movement and choice invite exploitation, abuse, and oppression. Exodus is one freedom strategy, not that it necessarily leads to emancipation. Emancipation involves conscientization. Students can pursue their freedom by moving somewhere freer—a less oppressive classroom or school. Or, they can advance their 'social' position through academics, sports, or the arts. But again this advancement doesn't automatically equal emancipation. Here we encounter the problematics of the ladder metaphor of social advancement (Hall, 2017; Williams, 1958/1983, 1989), extolled as being merit-based. In capitalistic 'societies,' merit is not egalitarian. Those who have 'made it' have done so by playing the game and playing it well (or by gaming the game), or because they are somehow otherwise privileged. However they have 'made it,' they have done so in contra-distinction to others, in competition with other individuals in a zero-sum game.[2] Competition is anathema to egalitarianism, but fuels capitalism.

Resistance as a Change Tactic

Resistance is a tactic which can be used to effect change, whether at a global level, such as a nation, or at a local level, such as in a school. Fields and Fields (2014) described the life of their 'Gram' and others who suffered the racism of Jim Crow and their resistance to it. Seldom did people fight such racism in blatant and overt ways, but engaged in what these authors referred to as a type of guerrilla war. Education played a large part in that war. They wrote:

> Not accidentally, it is in the domain of education that we find continuous evidence of such ferment and continuous guerrilla war, for education is about what we agree that the young should carry in their minds: what schoolbook lessons and what non-schoolbook lessons they should receive, about where they stand in the world and what the world is made of. In the 1950s, when the issue was desegregation, the guerrilla battles to fill the mind differently made the transition to conventional warfare.
>
> *(p. 189)*

They continued:

> But in the 1920s and 1930s, Gram's heyday, this fight proceeded in the South on a personal or local scale, underground, and hit and run. But I would maintain that the larger fight that later entered national awareness is inconceivable without it.
>
> *(p. 189)*

What Fields and Fields call guerrilla and conventional war evoke Gramsci's (1971/1999) differences between a war of maneuver and a war of position. For

Gramsci, a war of position is the only possible avenue for radical 'social' change in that it uses the 'cultural' means at its disposal—trade unions, political agitation, and conscientization through advancement of a proletarian 'culture,' targeting the civil society. It is, in essence, politics. A war of maneuver for Gramsci is more in line with what Fields and Fields term conventional warfare, but a war of maneuver involves force, particularly military might and the power of the State.

We can take a lesson from enslaved peoples and how they practiced subversion from within (Hall, 2016). Hall observed:

> There is something which all slaves learned (although… it is certainly not confined to slave or ex-slave culture): the importance of cultural resistance by negotiation. It is not possible to be in the position of the slave in a society and not learn how important it is to maintain the difference between yourself and the other in the moments between the points where you can resist openly.
>
> *(p. 198)*

Hall asked:

> How is this subversion from within possible? Slaves develop a set of skills by which they can conform perfectly… but adapt the forms in such a way that something is secured, some advance is made, maintained, and continued. Forms remain contradictory in spite of their manifest meanings.
>
> *(pp. 198–199)*

This, for Hall, is 'the importance of cultural resistance by negotiation' (p. 198).

These wars of position—everyday, seemingly mundane acts of resistance and subversion—are as important as, perhaps more important than, larger more sweeping wars of maneuver. They are not imposed from above. Being mundane and everyday occurrences, they are more ubiquitous and woven into the fabric of everyday life. As Fields and Fields (2014) noted, they can and do lay the groundwork for more monumental change. Hall (2019) commented:

> If they are waiting for a politics of maneuver, when all the locals, in every part of the world, will all stand up at the same moment and go in the same direction, and roll back the tide of the global in one great historical activity, it is not going to happen.
>
> *(p. 80)*

Rather,

> If they engage in another project, it is because it has interpellated them, hailed them, and established some point of identification with them. It has brought them into the historical project. And that notion of a politics which,

> as it were, increasingly is able to address people through the multiple identities which they have—understanding that those identities do not remain the same, that they are frequently contradictory, that they crosscut one another, that they tend to locate us differently at different moments, conducting politics in light of the contingent, in the face of the contingent—is the only political game that the locals have left at their disposal.
>
> *(p. 80)*

Hall (2016) recommended a Gramscian analysis as part of the political change project. This includes consideration of the existing structural components of a 'society' or the objective relations. Such an analysis includes distinguishing between, in Gramscian terms, 'the "organic" historical movements and more occasional immediate, almost accidental movements' (p. 160); the 'periodization of crisis'; and an analysis of 'relations of force' which constitute the actual terrain of political and social struggle, looking for 'unstable balances' and different moments to assert ourselves. This analysis ought to guide us in determining when and where (and how) our efforts at change would be most effective.

Hall (2017) reminded us that

> we are dealing not with a set of abstract economic relations but with a whole social and cultural system. And the only political strategy which has the least hope of transforming such a system is that which makes a totalizing confrontation with its every feature and part.
>
> *(p. 102)*

And though 'anti-'treatises seem to have captured the collective progressive imagination lately—anti-racism (Kendi, 2019), anti-capitalism (Wright, 2019), decolonialism (Lopez, 2020), and others—these efforts, were they to be only *against* the named injustices, would fall short of achieving a positive progressive collective future. As Hall pointed out, and setting aside for the moment the problematics of identity and identity politics, people manifest multiple subject positions simultaneously. Likewise, people experience oppression and subjugation from multiple directions and from within multiple logics simultaneously, on multiple levels. Sometimes the source of oppression or exploitation is 'nobody' (Arendt, 1958) or a non-locatable subject (Maurer, 1995).

Imagining Emancipation

Imagine if we could come up with a progressive, emancipatory project that would address each and every oppression, rather than doing so in a piecemeal and contingent fashion. We have to dream. We have to imagine a global collective egalitarian future, one with the potential to realize 'a fullness of being' (D. H. Lawrence in Williams, 1958/1983) or 'human flourishing' (Wright, 2010).

Wright's (2010) *Envisioning Real Utopias* gestures at this. For Wright (2010, 2019), socialism is the solution, and for him socialism is synonymous with democracy; but socialism is primarily an economic relationship. True, if we were to target the most egregious and ubiquitous repressive system, the one with the deepest and broadest penetration into people's lives, it would be capitalism in its current form—global neoliberal capitalism. But we ought to be careful here, and our analysis and interventions more nuanced. In this vein, Apple (2018) is instructive. While being mindful of the multiplicity of power dynamics (i.e., oppression) and intersectionality, Apple commented as to how 'we need to focus on the complex and specific power relations that exist *inside* as well as surrounding… contexts' (p. 136) and 'the *multiple* dynamics at work in a specific context' (p. 136, emphasis in original). 'While recognizing multiplicity is essential,' he wrote, 'it can carry its own dangers. It can lead us to underplay the significance of the dominant power of particular dynamics in any one situation' (p. 136). He cautioned us that:

> Economic forces and class relations may be primary… But recognizing this can be too reductive in other contexts. Thus, many critics of capitalism and its accompanying destructive class dynamics are apt to assume that all of the serious issues we face—crucial dynamics that occur around such relations as racism, sexism, fundamentalism, homophobia, and many other oppressive conditions—are the direct results of dominant economic relations. This is more than a little reductive and should be resisted.
>
> *(p. 136)*

Later in the same essay, he stated that:

> Even with a necessary focus on intersectionality, class is an essential dynamic to a substantive critical understanding of the politics of education and the role of the local, regional, and national state… A two class model—'dominant/ruling class versus working class'—is insufficient to fully comprehend the ways in which education functions in class and race stratification.
>
> *(p. 147)*

It is essential, though, that we recognize the dynamics involved in the making of 'class' politics, as a rhetorical device and as form of categorization and analysis. Apple is right to point out how so-called minorities are construed: 'No one is a "minority." Someone must *make* another a minority; someone or some group must *minoritize* another person and group' (p. 137, emphasis in original). Words such as minority and slave, Apple noted, are verbs masquerading as nouns, in that the label, an essentialism, elides the power dynamics behind its manufacture. But can't the same be said for 'class [as]… an essential dynamic'? First, class in this usage is a gloss. And despite class being quite possibly a more objective marker,

owing to its basis in wealth and income (i.e., money)—a relatively objective indicator[3]; and despite it being a tautology (though nonetheless true), the signification of class is a social construct. Class, too, then is a verb masquerading as a noun.

Reforming or replacing capitalism no doubt would go a long way towards eradicating or at least easing worldwide oppression; but it isn't a given, especially if many of the relational dynamics that are at the heart of capitalism—dynamics such as competition and private property ownership—remain unchanged and unchallenged. But herein lies the question: Can and should capitalism be reformed or must it be eradicated and replaced in whole? Wright (2010) is one who believes it must be replaced. But just as Rancière (cited in Bingham & Biesta, 2010) holds that there are better and worse police orders, there are likely better, less repressive capitalist systems (and worse).

Wright (2019) provides us with 'four strategic logics' for eroding capitalism: 'resisting capitalism, escaping capitalism, taming capitalism and dismantling capitalism' (p. 120). Only the last two—taming and dismantling capitalism—involve use of the State and its apparatuses to achieve their goals. These four logics provide 'a legitimate place for very different kinds of activism that in different ways oppose the dominance of capitalism' (p. 121), and rather than seeing them as antithetical, they 'can become complementary… [though] this is not always easy… Nevertheless, they need not be viewed as intrinsically antagonistic' (p. 121). The question for Wright hinges on 'how to think about the process of creating these kinds of interconnected collective actors capable of acting politically' (p. 122). The answer rests on the development of collective agency. The progressive, anti-capitalist agenda must include the articulation of common progressive values, such as 'equality/fairness, democracy/freedom and community/solidarity' (p. 142), and education, both individual and collective, in schools and beyond, plays a vital role in this (Rincón-Gallardo, 2019). These values, Wright believes, 'can provide a vital connection between class interests at the heart of eroding capitalism and other identity-interests with emancipatory aspirations' (p. 142). As an inclusive project, he noted that 'what has been termed the "identity politics" of oppressed social categories should be treated as an integral element within a broad emancipatory politics rather than a matter of secondary concern' (p. 142). Deepening democracy is a fundamental aspect of Wright's vision: 'efforts to restore and deepen democracy… constitute a unifying objective for people who may be less sympathetic to the overall anticapitalist agenda' (p. 143). Alternatives to capitalism must be established and fostered:

> eroding capitalism depends as much on resisting and escaping capitalism as on the concentrated politics of taming and dismantling it. In particular, the efforts at building and expanding the social and solidarity economy [see Chapter 5], the cooperative market economy and… [an] array of new economic practices… are essential for this long-term erosion.
>
> *(p. 143)*

Education can serve as a catalyst for progressive or liberatory projects. In addition to schools and colleges, other pedagogical spaces can serve liberatory ends—wherever we can introduce and reinforce the progressive values of equality/fairness, democracy/freedom, and community/solidarity (Wright, 2019, p. 142).

Along these lines, Apple (2018) enumerated nine tasks incumbent upon the critical and transformative educator, working 'tactics of interruption' (p. 152). These tactics make use of and build towards what Apple referred to as a '*decentered* unity—a substantive and much more inclusive expansion of the "we"' (p. 151, emphasis in original). Such a decentered unity has the potential to bring together vastly different groups (the identities in identity politics) and recognize their interests, while forging common bonds around progressive democratic education. The expanded 'we' would bring together students, parents, teachers, educational leaders, other educationists, community leaders, and activists—anyone concerned with a progressive, inclusive democratic education. The tasks Apple sets for us include: 1) critical analysis: 'bear[ing] witness to negativity' (p. 152), to the ways education and educational policy are related to dominance and exploitation in 'society'; 2) revealing possible spaces for action; 3) broadening what counts as research, chronicling and documenting progressive community change efforts; 4) redefining, reworking, reframing and (re)employing knowledge (i.e., what counts), especially so-called 'elite knowledge'; 5) 'keeping traditions (plural) of radical and progressive work alive' and 'extending and (supportively) criticizing them' (p. 154); 6) 'relearning or development and use of varied new skills of working at many levels with multiple groups' (p. 154) in accessible language; 7) participating in the work as a 'public' or 'organic' intellectual and learning from/with the movements one is part of; 8) acting as 'a deeply committed mentor' (p. 154), demonstrating 'what it means to be *both* an excellent researcher and a committed member of a society that is scarred by persistent inequalities' (p. 154, emphasis in original), and being willing to be taught by others; and 9) 'using the privilege one has as a scholar/activist' (p. 155). Apple recognized the risks involved, both personal and academic, as 'the "we" gets larger and more inclusive and as the struggles for alternative forms of solidarity and the building of the institutional conditions that support them continue and the spaces of interruption widen' (p. 155). The risks have increased dramatically since he wrote that, given the vitriolic atmosphere today, but the need is perhaps even greater and more urgent.

Putting Our Own House in Order

Education, schooling, isn't necessarily liberatory. As Rancière (1991) has shown, conventional schooling can be stultifying, its pedagogical relations oppressive. Changing these stultifying and oppressive pedagogical relations must be the first order of business for students, teachers, and educational leaders.[4]

Education can serve as a catalyst for change and emancipation, emancipation at the individual and freedom at the collective levels. Lopez (2020) and Pak and Ravitch (2021) begin at the individual level. Lopez believes we must decolonize the mind. Pak and Ravitch and Lopez look to reflection as a key component in individual change and emancipation. In her decolonization project, Lopez calls on educators, especially teachers and educational leaders, to engage in the process of decolonizing their minds 'as a precursor to engaging in decolonizing leadership practices' (p. 35). Beginning with themselves, she stated, educators 'must develop a critical consciousness and adopt an agentic mindset when engaging with Indigenous students and all students who are marginalized by the education system' (p. 39). 'Decolonization is a systemic rejection of colonialism,' she stated, 'through a critical encounter and examination of the dominance and hegemonic knowledge, representation, and theory used in teaching and learning' (p. 40). Lopez suggested that 'empowerment means challenging systems to create space and new voices and knowledge' (p. 43) in a process which includes naming, reflection, and action, or praxis. And though Lopez accepts that outside experts can bring 'new knowledge to school leaders' (p. 38), she recognizes the tension such a move might create if outsider knowledge is valued over insider knowledge: 'This insider and outsider dynamic can impact the process, however valuing outsider knowledge over the contextualized understanding of school leaders can be problematic, sending a signal that their knowledge is somehow secondary' (p. 38). 'The difficult question,' she conceded, 'has always been how to draw on and include the knowledge that school leaders have built up through their experiences, while disrupting racist, stereotypical [sic], and Eurocentric views that they may hold' (p. 38). Are we then to accept others' knowledge and experience *except* that which we deem to be racist, stereo-typifying, and Eurocentric? This is problematic.

And while Lopez (2020) gave a nod to the 'tensions' and 'dynamics' in insider/outsider knowledge, she failed to say whether the outsider is or identifies as what she refers to as BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, and People of Color). And while she pointed to 'the vulnerability and tensions that can arise when practitioners who work in the same space or school have the responsibility of leading capacity and professional development' (p. 38), and gestured at a problematic aspect of the outsider's 'lack of understanding of the culture of the organization' (p. 38), she missed an opportunity to fully unpack and problematize insider/outsider positionality, whether self-identified or ascribed, and insider/outsider knowledges. She failed to take up the bias insiders hold against outsiders, no matter their identity, and failed to problematize the whole concept of identity altogether. (See Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Fields & Fields, 2014; Reed, 2001.) One of the problems with 'identity' is that it sediments one's position and (de)limits one's agency, in that, as Fields and Fields (2014) point out, social position (i.e., 'identity') carries with it sumptuary codes by which we abide, if we allow them to do this work, if we accept our position, whether self-identified or ascribed, unproblematically.[5]

One of the problems with 'cultures' in general and 'cultures' of organizations in particular is that 'cultures' assign people to places or positions and thereby capture them. Reification of a 'culture' artificially and capriciously establishes an us/them boundary, the insider/outsider identity.[6] Such boundaries can inhibit the free passage of information and knowledges inside out and outside in. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) suggested that invoking collective identities 'is the emotionally laden sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded group, involving both a felt solidarity or oneness with fellow group members and a felt difference from or even antipathy to specified outsiders' (p. 19). Most scholars, they noted, 'tended to emphasize boundary-formation rather than boundary crossing, the constitution of groups rather than the development of networks' (p. 21).[7] Such boundaries promote insularity, which is anathema to a universal bond among peoples. As Arendt (1958) reminded us, change comes from outside, though we cannot dismiss lightly the change that can be occasioned inside and by insiders. Both are necessary, if only in the sense that local actors are the agents of any change that transpires, but neither is sufficient on its own.

Pak and Ravitch (2021) also included reflection—or 'critical self-reflexivity' as they phrase it—as a fundamental first step in critical leadership praxis. Transforming the self is the first stage in their model, before transforming (other) educators, transforming organizations, and finally, transforming systems. The definitions they give and the processes they outline for self-reflection remain highly individualistic: 'self-reflection is widely recognized as an important skill for educational leaders… and it involves an introspection into one's own leadership emotions, traits, behaviors, styles and habits of mind and how these are perceived by others' (p. 13). Elsewhere they state that 'critically self-reflexive leaders must first explore their social identities, power, and privileges and how these influence their worldviews and practice as leaders' (p. 27).[8] They take a subjectivist and relativistic view of the leader's epistemology and the leader's stance towards that of others, asserting that:

> in a relational and critical approach to educational leadership, leaders reject and problematize deficit orientations and take the stance that 'everyone is an expert as to their own experience,' meaning that all knowledge and ways of being are considered valuable, important, and worthy of respect and recognition.
>
> *(p. 29)*

Respect, perhaps, but acceptance, no. It's all too easy to misremember. We are better served by operating from a less certain, more open and questioning stance. We, and others, can be mistaken, even when it comes to remembering our own lives and our own experiences. Each of us interprets events differently, even those events of which we were a part. This is not to argue a positivist or objectivist ontoepistemology; quite the opposite. However, as Brubaker and Cooper (2000) suggested, an objectivist view of identity would:

> permit one to distinguish 'true' identity (characterized as deep, abiding, and objective) from 'mere' self-understanding (superficial, fluctuating, and subjective). If identity is something to be discovered, *and something about which one can be mistaken*, then one's momentary self-understanding may not correspond to one's abiding, underlying identity.
>
> *(p. 19, emphasis added)*

Although on its surface accepting someone as the expert on their own experience is a laudable ideal, in practice it would leave us without a stance for sympathetic critique and change. We would be forced to accept at face value others' reasoning and rationales, even when we might believe them to be complicit in oppression, their own and others'. A sanguine, Pollyannaish consensus is dangerous. It breeds stasis, complacency and supports the status quo. Dissensus is more productive, even if it is more fraught.

We need critical friends. Our solitary reflection upon our experiences and situations is often incomplete: it's a limited (and limiting) perspective. Critical distance is helpful. Robert Kegan (1994) discussed the ability to step outside, metaphorically, of the systems of which one is part as a distinguishing characteristic of higher orders of consciousness.

Similarly, judging another from the outside is limiting. Empathy is important, as is understanding. Understanding is aided by open, honest dialogue.

Walzer (2002) held that 'social' critics work best from inside and as insiders. The dispositions he felt important for critics were courage, compassion and a 'good eye.' By a 'good eye,' he meant 'a (relatively) unmediated experience of reality or, better, a readiness to have such an experience, and openness to the "real world"' (p. xvii). 'Some people are more ready than others to look at the world and acknowledge what they see. And this readiness seems to me a moral quality, a kind of down-to-earth honesty' (p. xvii).

The critics' relationship with their 'society' is important for Walzer (2002), who wrote:

> Courage, compassion, and a good eye are the three virtues that good critics need. They must be brave enough to tell their fellow citizens that they are acting wrongly, when they are acting wrongly, but refuse the temptation of a provocative recklessness. They must sympathize with the victims, whoever the victims are, without becoming their uncritical supporters. They must look at the world in a straightforward way and report what they see.
>
> The 'connected critic'… stands in a certain moral relationship with his or her society… The virtues of courage, compassion, and a good eye… constitute and sustain the connection.
>
> *(p. xviii)*

But what of the exile, the refugee, the immigrant and émigré, those on the outside or who are marginalized or who regularly cross the borders and boundaries of a

nation, 'society' or organization such as a school? Can they not serve as 'social' critics? Is their input not valued? Are they of no value? We come back to Williams' (1961/2013) distinctions among the rebel, the critic, the reformer, and the revolutionary. Recall that, for Williams, the reformer and the critic possess 'a sincere desire to change… aspect[s] of [a society's] general values' which 'is perfectly compatible with adherence to its general values, and with that kind of insistence on the essential continuity and unity of the society to which reformers and critics ordinarily adhere' (p. 113). The revolutionary, on the other hand,

> lacks that sense of membership of a particular society which makes it possible for the reformer and critic to suppose that their own ends can in fact be achieved within the society's existing forms. The revolutionary's relationship with his society is one of declared opposition and struggle… in terms of the struggle for a different society.
>
> *(p. 114)*

However, 'the rebel fights the way of life of his society because to him personally it is wrong… but the new reality he proposes is more than personal; he is offering a new way of life' (p. 114). The rebel or revolutionary has given up on the current 'societal,' organizational, or other form and seeks 'a new way of life' or of association.

The New York Times reported on a push by President Putin to exile or imprison Russian dissidents and rights activists, journalists, opposition politicians and their families and staff, and others the regime finds insufferable (Trojanovski, 2021). Some are jailed, some given the choice between 'going east or West,' meaning exile in the West or prison in the east. Those targeted are faced with a monumental decision: Can they be more politically effective if they stay, even if imprisoned, or more effective from abroad? 'The question for the new exiles is how to remain relevant at home,' the *Times* reported, and quoted one such exile, the Russian journalist Roman Badanin, on remaining relevant because, in his words, Russian émigrés 'become interesting only to each other' (p. A9). The internet has changed the equation, with many exiles working through these channels to effect change from their newfound havens abroad. Still, at least one dissident, Yulia Galyamina, chose to stay, saying 'I'm sorry, but how will anything change here if everyone leaves?' (p. A9). Proximity and immediacy seem important to her, as she concluded: 'When everything starts collapsing, power will fall into the hands of those who are close by' (p. A9).

Exiles, émigrés, refugees, and other immigrants contribute or are thought to contribute to their new home country. Said (2000) remarked how:

> Contemporary interest in exile can be traced to the somewhat pallid notion that non-exiles can share in the benefit of exile as a redemptive motif. There is, admittedly, a certain plausibility and truth to this idea… Exiles do leaven

> their environments. And naturally 'we' concentrate on that enlightening aspect of 'their' presence among us, not on their misery or their demands. But looked at from the bleak political perspective of modern mass dislocation, individual exiles force us to recognize that tragic fate of homelessness in a necessarily heartless world.
>
> *(p. 183)*

Exiles do leaven their environments. Exiles and immigrants come together with locals in educational settings where each can learn from and with the other (Swisher, 2021). Education remains one of the few resources immigrants have to surmount hardships and obstacles of their past or current situations. It remains one avenue of 'social' mobility and increased status of individuals and groups (Reed, 2001). The traveler can enjoy and serve as a model for academic freedom. Said (2000) wrote:

> Our model for academic freedom should therefore be the migrant or traveler: for if, in the real world outside the academy, we must needs be ourselves and only ourselves, inside the academy, we should be able to discover and travel among other selves, other identities, other varieties of human adventure. But, most essentially, in the joint discovery of self and Other, it is the role of the academy to transform what might be conflict, or contest, or assertion into reconciliation, mutuality, recognition, and creative interaction.
>
> *(p. 403)*

In school and the university, Said felt that:

> the image of the traveler depends not on power but on motion, on a willingness to go into different worlds, use different idioms, and understand a variety of disguises, masks, and rhetorics. Travelers must suspend the claim of customary routine in order to live in new rhythms and rituals. Most of all, and most unlike the [academic] potentate who must guard only one place and defend its frontiers, the traveler *crosses over*, traverses territory, and fixed positions all the time… [This is] a kind of academic freedom at its highest, since one of its main features is that you can leave authority and dogma to the potentate… To join the academic world is therefore to enter a ceaseless quest for knowledge and freedom.
>
> *(p. 404, emphasis in original)*

Schools and schooling can help immigrants, as well as the native born, toward freedom and liberation through qualification, socialization, and subjectification (Biesta, 2010); qualification, so they might find a career or life's work; socialization, so they fit in; and subjectification, so that they realize their own unique selves, which in itself is an emancipatory project.

Educators, educational leaders, and the community which supports and sustains them can and must change schools so that they better meet these goals. Schools and the 'societies' of which they are part must change simultaneously (Rincón-Gallardo, 2019). We cannot change one and not the other.

Notes

1 See Eacott (2018) for a refreshingly different model of educational leadership as relational.
2 True, there are historical cases where, in the US, whole groups have 'advanced' their social status (Fields & Fields, 2014; Reed, 2001). But this 'advancement' is done over and against other groups.
3 Though money, too, has a symbolic value. See Simmel's (1978) *The Philosophy of Money*.
4 Wilkinson (2017) draws attention to the educational aspects of educational leadership and, as such, the political implications involved.
5 A more poststructuralist stance would posit 'identity' as being more fluid, less fixed, less of a thing one possesses, and more performative.
6 We acknowledge that 'culture' is not only limiting; it can also be supportive and empowering (Varenne & McDermott, 1998).
7 There are exceptions. For example, Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) wrote eloquently of borderland identities, living lives on borders both literal and metaphorical and the hybridity which results. Still, border(s) figure prominently in her account.
8 A divergence from the individualistic reflective process in Pak and Ravitch (2021) is provided by Pak et al. (2021) in a chapter titled 'Asian American women leaders reclaiming leader identities through collaborative autoethnography.' This chapter raises as many issues as it settles, issues having to do with the contradiction inherent in a collaborative autoethnography, issues of autoethnography in general, and unproblematized 'identity work' (see Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, on problems with the unexamined use of 'identity').

References

Abolson, K. (2010). Indigenous wholistic theory: A knowledge set for practice. *First Peoples Child and Family Review*, 5(2), 74–87.

Adorno, T. (1978). *Minima moralia: Reflections from damaged life* (E. F. N. Jephcott, Trans.). Verso.

Anzaldúa, G. (1987). *Borderlands/La frontera: The new mestiza*. Aunt Lute Books.

Apple, M. W. (2018). The struggle continues: Lessons learned and what can be done. In M. W. Apple (Ed.), *The struggle for democracy in education: Lessons from social realities* (pp. 135–160). Routledge.

Arendt, H. (1958). *The human condition* (2nd ed.). The University of Chicago Press.

Biesta, G. J. J. (2010). *Good education in an age of measurement: Ethics, politics, democracy*. Paradigm Publishers.

Bingham, C., & Biesta, G. (2010). *Jacques Rancière: Education, truth, emancipation*. Continuum.

Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond 'identity.' *Theory and Society*, 29(1), 1–47. www.jstor.org/stable/3108478.

Eacott, S. (2018). *Beyond leadership: A relational approach to organizational theory in education*. Springer.

Fields, K. E., & Fields, B. J. (2014). *Racecraft: The soul of inequality in American life*. Verso.
Giddens, A. (1990). *The consequences of modernity*. Polity.
Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age*. Polity.
Gramsci, A. (1999). *Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (Q. Hoare & G. Nowell Smith, Eds. & Trans.). Lawrence & Wishart. (Original published in 1971)
Habermas, J. (1975). *Legitimation crisis* (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Beacon Press.
Hall, S. (2016). Rethinking the base and superstructure. In J. D. Slack & L. Grossberg (Eds.), *Cultural studies 1983: A theoretical history* (pp. 74–96). Duke University Press.
Hall, S. (2017). *Selected political writings: The great moving right show and other essays* (S. Davidson, D. Featherstone, M. Rustin, & B. Schwarz, Eds.). Duke University Press.
Hall, S. (2019). *Essential essays* (Vol. 2): *Identity and diaspora* (D. Morley, Ed.). Duke University Press.
Kegan, R. (1994). *In over our heads: The mental demands of modern life*. Harvard University Press.
Kendi, I. X. (2019). *How to be an anti-racist*. One World.
Khalifa, M. A., Gooden, M. A., & Davis, J. E. (2016). Culturally responsive school leadership: A synthesis of the literature. *Review of Educational Research*, 86(4), 1272–1311. https://doi.org/10.3102/0034654316630383.
Lopez, A. E. (2020). *Decolonizing educational leadership: Exploring alternative approaches to leading schools*. Palgrave Macmillan.
Maurer, W. M. (1995). Complex subjects: Offshore finance, complexity theory, and the dispersion of the modern. *Socialist Review*, 25(3–4), 113–145. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5339-9893.
Nietzsche, F. (1874). *Use & abuse of history for life*. https://archive.org/details/NietzscheUseAbuseOfHistoryForLifejohnston.
Pak, K., & Ravitch, S. M. (Eds.) (2021). *Critical leadership praxis for educational and social change*. Teachers College Press.
Pak, K., Leigh, E. W., & Phuong, J. (2021). Asian American women leaders reclaiming leader identities through collaborative autoethnography. In K. Pak & S. N. Ravitch (Eds.), *Critical leadership praxis for educational and social change* (pp. 49–62). Teachers College Press.
Rancière, J. (1991). *The ignorant schoolmaster: Five lessons in intellectual emancipation* (K. Ross, Trans.). Stanford University Press.
Rancière, J. (2014). *Hatred of democracy* (S. Cochran, Trans.). Verso.
Reed, A. (2001). *Class notes: Posing as politics and other thoughts on the American scene*. The New Press.
Rincón-Gallarado, S. (2019). *Liberating learning: Educational change as social movement*. Routledge.
Said, E. W. (2000). *Reflections on exile and other essays*. Harvard University Press.
Simmel, G. (1978). *The philosophy of money* (T. Bottomore & D. Frisby, Trans.). Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Swisher, J. R. (2021). *Beyond refuge: A theoretical framework for emancipatory education of forcibly-displaced youth*. Doctoral dissertation, Texas State University.
Trojanovski, A. (2021, August 31). Putin opponents are given a grim choice: Go West into exile or East into prison. *The New York Times*, A1–A9.
Varenne, H., & McDermott, R. (1998). *Successful failure: The school America builds*. Westview Press.
Waite, D. (2016). Of charlatans, sorcerers, alchemists, demagogues, profit-mongers, tyrants and kings: Educational reform and the death by a thousand cuts. *Urban Review*, 48, 123–148. doi:10.1007/s11256-015-0348-3.

Walzer, M. (2002). *The company of critics*. Basic Books.
Wilkinson, J. (2017). Reclaiming education in educational leadership. In P. Grootenboer, C. Edwards-Groves, & S. Choy (Eds.), *Practice theory perspectives on pedagogy and education: Praxis, diversity and contestation* (pp. 231–241). Springer.
Williams, R. (1983). *Culture & society: 1780–1950*. Columbia University Press. (Original published 1958)
Williams, R. (1989). *Resources of hope: Culture, democracy, socialism* (R. Gable, Ed.). Verso.
Williams, R. (2013). *The long revolution*. Parthian. (Original published 1961)
Wright, E. O. (2010). *Envisioning real utopias*. Verso.
Wright, E. O. (2019). *How to be an anti-capitalist in the twenty-first century*. Verso.

INDEX

Adorno, T.: bad conscience 6; central contradictions of democracy 116; class subjugation 80; culture 77; distance 7; hegemony of the power elite 81; monadic societies 40; 'societal' rights 115
agnotology 45
Althusser, L.: 'social' ideology 45, 78; societal institutions 20, 21, 22, 81
Anzaldúa, G.: borderlands 21
Apple, M. W.: 'class' politics 126; power relations 126; tactics of interruption 128
Aquinas, T. 37
Arendt, H.: action and acting 10, 26, 37, 115; aloofness and indifference 79; change 130; masses and mob mentality 32, 33; neoliberal hegemony 30; performance excellence 9; plurality 8; productivity 6, 8, 9; 'societal' rights 115, 117; the Imperium 76, 84; thinking 38, 47n10
Azieze, N. 60

Badanin, R. 132
Baldwin, E. 75
balkanization 56
Bateson, G. 2
Bauman, Z.: floating responsibility 27, 63; identity and the *postmodern* problem of identity 23–26, 27; successor identities 24
Becher, T. 23
Beery, Z. 75
Berquist, W. 61
Biesta, G. J. J.: education 9; global measurement industry 5; judgment 8; sovereignty and subjectification 15, 97
Billett, S. 54
Bourdieu, P.: Joel Klein 99–101; social capital 41, 50; imperialism and the Imperium 74, 92
Brooks, R. 101–102
Brown, W.: neoliberal 'entreprenerialization' and society 4, 30, 45–46; social freedom 31, 32, 33
Brubaker, R. 15, 129–130
Burbank, J. empire, imperialism, and the Imperium 72, 82
Burbules, N. C. 67, 81
Burke, P. 18, 51, 96
Burns, J. F. 101

Carey, B. 65
Carr, D. 86, 105
Cato, M. P. 38
Chomsky, N. 45
collectivism 55, 117 (*see also* collectivization)
collectivization 27 (*see* collectivism)
community 16, 19–20; hybrid organizational form 64–66; of publics 29
complexity theory 27
Comte, P. 39
Cooper, F.: 14, 129–130; empire, imperialism, and the Imperium 72, 82

conscientization 123 (*see also* emancipation)
consciousness 15, 42–44 (*see also* individuation)
corporatism 2, 91–93 (*see also* corporativism)
corporativism 92–93
corruption 62, 76, 79
Coser, L. A. 52
Coulson, A. 102
Cox, O. C. 67n3, 97; history of exploitation 72–74
critical race theory 15, 78
criticality 43, 120
Csikszentmihalyi, M. 11n4
cultural imperialism 92

Dahlberg, T. 107
Damon, W. 11n4
Dastur, F. 50
de Rosa, A. 86, 105
Derrida, J. 2
Dewey, J. 51, 122
Dhiraj, A. B. 95
Diamond, J. 82
Dowd, M. 94
Dowler, S. 101
Down, B. 92
dualism 23
Dugger, C. 103–104
Duncan, A. 107, 109

Eagleton, T. 77, 11n2
educational administration 1, 50–51
emancipation 1, 3, 9–10, 13, 33, 38, 87, 114–116, 118–119, 123, 125 (*see also* conscientization)
émigrés 28
entreprenerialization 4
Enrich, D. 88n7
Enzensberger, H. M. 6, 7
Erlanger, S. 60
Evans, M. P. 65
exile 16–18, 121, 131–133
expatriates 17–18

Fields, B. J. 77, 123–124, 129
Fields, K. E. 77, 123–124, 129
Floyd, G. 115
Fonseca, M. 19
Forsythe, M. 88n7
Foucault, M. 2, 67
Frankfurt School 15
freedom 1, 3, 18, 28, 32, 42, 74, 97, 115, 123, 133
Freire, P. 43
Friedman, M. 30, 31, 33
Frommer, F. J. 107
Fukuyama, F. 56, 63, 92, 97, 103, 104
Fullan, M. 50, 66

Galyamina, Y. 132
game theory 56
Gardner, H. 11n4
Garfinkel, H. 10
Geertz, C. 3
Giambattista, V. 96
Giddens, A. 121
Giroux, H. 80, 81, 93
Goffman, E. 52
Gould, S. J. 26
governmentality 67
Gramsci, A. 123, 124, 125
Gronn, P. 52, 53

Habermas, J. 122
Hall, B. 108–109
Hall, S. 3, 43, 123–125
Hargreaves, A. 50, 66
Harrington, B. 19, 46n2, 75, 83, 84, 87n1
Harris, A. 50, 66
Hayek, F. 30, 32, 33
Hazony, Y. 1
Heidegger, M. 50
hierarchies 2, 23, 54, 56–58, 60, 65, 109
Hite, J. 65
Hobson, J. A. 71
Hochschild, A. R. 53
Hofstede, G. 56, 94
Holmes, O. W. 45
Hubbard, B. 76, 88n5
Huffington, A. 105
Huffington Post 105

identity 14, 15, 23–25, 28, 40, 41, 43, 44; fluid 134n5; insider/outsider 130; objective 130–131; organizational 61; personal 93; politics 77, 125, 127, 128; *social* 121
Immerwahr, D. 71
Imperium 71; characteristics 72; hegemony of 77; inner rings of 81, 87n3; limits on 76; networks and 76
individualism 33, 55, 115
individuation 15, 23
Ingersoll, R. M. 50, 54, 60, 63, 97

intruder 19
Israel, D. 94

Jacobs, A. 102, 103
Jim Crow 123

Kahneman, D. 6, 9, 26, 45
Kant, E. 44
Kegan, R. 43, 131
Kendi, I. X. 120, 125
Kets de Vries, M. F. R. 94
Khalifa, M. A. 121
Klein, J. 99–102, 104
Kunonga, N. 103–104

Laclau, E. 28
Lakomski, G. 26, 56, 94
Lawrence, D. H. 16, 122, 125
liberation 3, 9, 17, 23, 35, 36, 38, 42, 86, 114, 133
Lingis, A. 9, 19–20, 21, 26, 35
Locke, J. 6
Lopez, A. E. 120, 121, 122, 125, 129
Lortie, D. C. 57
Lukács, G. 79, 81, 88n11
Lyotard, J. 66

Machiavelli, N. 77
managerialism 91, 92
Marxian 45 (*see* Marxist)
Marxist 15, 45, 81 (*see also* Marxian)
Maurer, W. M. 6, 27–28, 81, 84, 85, 125
Mazzetti, M. 62
McDermott, R. 50, 59, 66, 134n6
Mead, G. H. 42
Miller, S. 101
Mills, C. W. 29, 74, 77, 78, 79, 81
Mosley, M. 101
Mugabe, R. 103

neoliberal 4, 30, 31, 33, 45–46, 84, 85, 92, 100, 101
neoliberalism 2, 5, 30, 46, 59, 86, 92
Nietzsche, F. 35–36, 77, 81, 119

Obama, B. 46, 60
objectivization 27
Oliva, P. F. 99
ontoepistemological 23 (*see* ontoepistemology)
ontoepistemology 131 (*see also* ontoepistemological)
organizational theory 51
Orwell, G. 17 (*see also* Orwellian)
Orwellian 11n3 (*see* Orwell)
Osipian, A. L. 102

Pak, K. 44, 120, 121, 122, 129, 130, 134n8
Peters, J. W. 99, 100, 101
Piketty, T. 8
pilgrim, 24, 25, 27, 41
Pinto, F. 98
Ponty, M. 44
positivist 25, 130
poststructural 134n5
Proctor, R, N. 45

Quijano, A. 23, 40, 41, 42

Rancière, J. 6, 8, 9, 11, 19, 22, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 45, 67, 85, 86, 94, 97, 111n2, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 127, 128
Ravitch, S. M. 44, 120, 121, 122, 129, 130, 134n8, 117
refugees 1, 46n2, 75, 132
Reich, R. 80
reification 27, 130
Ribbins, P. 61
Rice, S. 67, 81
Rincón-Gallardo, S. 127, 134
Romney, M. 94
Runkel, P. J. 50

Said, E. W. 17, 18, 25, 32, 45, 132, 133
Sarason, S. B. 46n1, 50, 91
Saul S. 106, 107
Schiebinger, L. 45
Schmitt, C. 81, 82, 83
Schmuck, R. A. 50
school improvement 50, 55, 67, 91
Schwartz, M. 104
Sergiovanni, T. J. 50, 66
Shah, S. J. A. 61
Shirky, C. 60, 61
Shirley, D. 50
Simmel, G. 18, 19, 25, 97, 104, 134n3
social justice 2, 3, 4, 31, 92, 110, 121
Stevenson, A. 88n7
Stone-Johnson, C. 65
stultification 34, 35, 119
subjectification 15, 133

Takahashi, H. 58, 65
tautology 13, 127
Thomson, P. 52, 53
Tong, Y. 60

tourist 24, 25, 27, 41
Trojanovski, A. 132
Trowler, P. R. 22
Twain, M. 2

vagabond 24, 25, 27, 41, 74
Varenne, H. 50, 59, 66, 134n6
Vergara, E. 98
Vico, G. 96
Vogel, K. P. 76, 88n5

Wacquant, L. 92, 99, 101
Wagner, R. K. 97, 104, 109
Waite, D. 1, 27, 47n7, 60, 86, 91, 92, 118: academic lineage 11n4; consciousness 43; corporatism 93; corruption 62, 63, 96, 101; imperial hubris 111n1; organizational forms 67n1, 97; social institutions 39; social leveling devices 96
Waller, W. W. 51
Walzer, M. 131
Weber, M. 52, 53, 63, 77 (*see also* Weberian)
Weberian 25 (*see* Weber)
Weick, K. E. 56
Weil, S. 18
Wheatley, M. J. 94
Whyte, W. W. 53, 92
Wilkinson, R. G. 31, 55, 64, 65, 77, 96, 134n4
Williams, R. 3, 4, 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 29, 3, 34, 39, 40, 41, 59, 71, 73, 74, 77, 79, 118, 122, 123, 125, 132
Winerip, M. 105, 108
Winters, J. A. 19, 30, 75, 83, 84
Wright, E. O. 3, 74, 77, 85, 122, 125–126, 127–128

Zernike, K. 59
Zerubavel, E. 98
Ziman, J. 18
Zink, C. F. 57, 96
Zuboff, S. 7, 43, 80, 83, 85, 86, 87