Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4

Bart Zwegers

Cultural Heritage in Transition

A Multi-Level Perspective on World Heritage in Germany and the United Kingdom, 1970-2020

Springer

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Volume 4

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ISSN 2524-7425 ISSN 2524-7433 (electronic)
Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market
ISBN 978-3-030-93771-3 ISBN 978-3-030-93772-0 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

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1.1 Whose Heritage?

Every academic discipline has its Holy Grail; one thing it collectively strives to find. For the young field of heritage studies it is the answer to a deceivingly simple question: "Whose heritage is it?" (Hartfield 2001, p. 1). Directly or indirectly, almost every researcher in the field asks this question. Up until some fifty years ago, the question could justifiably be answered with a deceivingly simple answer: 'the nation's'. Heritage is traditionally the responsibility of national governments and state-sponsored private organizations that protected important buildings of the nation, for the nation. However, the heritage field diversified enormously over the past fifty years as a result of, amongst others, globalization, regionalization and, in Europe, cooperation. Besides the old-established national curators, numerous local, continental and global actors, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), and the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) are now involved in heritage preservation (UNESCO 2005).[1] The ambitions, perspectives and practices of these new actors certainly do not always coincide with those of the traditional caretakers of heritage. National discourses and practices must now compete with alternative discourses and practices. The way built heritage is selected, interpreted, preserved,

[1] Throughout this book I use the term 'preservation' to indicate efforts to protect historic buildings. In some contexts this term is used in opposition to the concept of 'conservation'. While 'preservation' in such cases refers to the prevention of change, 'conservation' means accepting change as inevitable and trying to manage it in a sensible way. The German language makes a similar distinction. While 'Denkmalschutz' means the protection of monuments, 'Denkmalpflege' means to care for monuments. The latter concept allows for more intervention. When I cite or describe such polemics I will stay as close as possible to the terminology of my actors, otherwise I will use 'preservation' as a neutral term.

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_1

restored and (re)used is the result of a dynamic negotiation process in which different international, national and local actors interact and compete.

This book aims to analyse the new and complex interplay between a growing variety of heritage actors, organizations and institutions that have challenged and continue to challenge national interpretations of heritage and its preservation. It will do so by focusing on UNESCO World Heritage in Germany and the United Kingdom between 1970 and 2020. This book will put forward the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) as a potentially fruitful way to analyze this interplay (Geels 2007). MLP, which was originally developed to study technological changes, distinguishes between three related levels: the regime, the landscape and the niches. The regime comprises of the historically developed organization that determines how specific societal functions—in our case heritage selection, interpretation and preservation—are fulfilled. It consists of heterogeneous actors, organizations and institutions that are held together by 'rules', such as habits, ingrained common practices, laws, mutual interests, bureaucratic ties or financial interdependencies. Even though the actors, organizations and institutions in the regime might have differing ideas and interests, the 'rules' ensure that the societal function in question is fulfilled more or less consistently and coherently through time. Despite this relative stability, regimes can and do change. MLP conceptualizes such processes of change as a consequence of the interplay between the regime, landscape developments and niche activities. Landscape developments comprise of longue-durée societal, economic, cultural, environmental, political or demographic changes that cannot be controlled or steered by the regime, but do affect it. Landscape developments can put the 'rules' that hold the regime together under pressure. Drastic economic changes in the landscape might, for example, lead to changes in subsidiary provisions and hence weaken the financial links between actors, organizations and institutions. Likewise, political changes in the landscape might affect bureaucratic or legal ties. The key to regime change, however, generally lies with the niches. In niches actors can develop innovative approaches to the way societal functions are fulfilled. These innovations have the potential to change the regime, but usually fail because the regime is stable and rigid. However, if the 'rules' of the regime are weakened as a result of (temporary) landscape pressure, niche actors can leverage this opportunity to bring about change.

Employing MLP, I pose the following research questions: How did the traditionally nationally oriented heritage regimes change over the past fifty years? What landscape developments have put pressure on existing regime arrangements? Which niche activities helped change heritage regimes? This research will focus on heritage regimes in two countries: Germany and the United Kingdom. I selected these countries because each represents a different regime type—e.g. one federalized, the other centralized. One of the aims of this comparative historical research is to find out whether (and how) different types of regimes, responded differently to recent landscape developments and niche activities. Therefore, I will analyse debates about the selection and preservation of six UNESCO World Heritage Sites. The six cases function as (potential) niches for innovations, and are situated through time. Although UNESCO will get ample attention in these case studies, World Heritage

merely serves as a lens to study the interaction between all kinds of local, national and international actors, organizations and institutions.

In recent years, the body of scholarly work related to the emergence of UNESCO and other major changes in the heritage field has grown rapidly and extensively. This introductory chapter will begin with a select overview of that literature. The main schools of thought will be identified and compared. This section also serves as a way to position this research in the wider field of heritage studies. The second section will focus on the conceptual and analytical tools that are offered by MLP and assess the ways in which this theoretical perspective can complement the existing literature on heritage. With some theoretical refinement, MLP can offer an interesting new perspective on the growing body of literature in heritage studies. The third part will outline the structure of the book and clarify the methodological choices that I made. It will, among others, elaborate on the choice of comparing Germany with the United Kingdom.

1.2 The Heritage Field: A Literature Review

Today, heritage is conceptualized as socially and culturally constructed. The selection, preservation and representation of heritage suggests a narrative which tells people who they are, where they come from and where they belong. However, not all elements are equally important to this story. In the decision-making process, the near infinity of the past is boiled down to what currently dominant societal groups perceive as highlights. This begs the kind of questions that Michael Hartfield (2001) formulated: "What do we protect? Who decides what is worth keeping? Who is it meant for?" (Hartfield 2001, p. 1). At first glance these questions might seem easy to answer because official national heritage organizations are in many respects in charge of the interpretation and preservation of heritage. Much like in the nineteenth century, creating a national heritage is seen as a defensible political agenda. Especially in many West-European societies national heritage is treasured as a means to improve societal cohesion, prevent further cultural polarization between different groups and to combat social exclusion (Graham and Howard 2008; Hall 2008; Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996).

Postmodern predictions about the waning of nation-states or the diminishing appeal of national identities have turned out to be rather exaggerated. The national roots of heritage are still highly visible. It is difficult to imagine heritage without national museums and archives; without national monuments and national narratives, heroes and villains; without national ministries, laws, policies and subsidies (Graham et al. 2000). Since the early 2000s a burgeoning number of scholars acknowledges that the national heritage discourse has not lost its potency. These 'critical' heritage scholars claim that local distinctiveness and empowerment is in fact threatened by the undiminished national appropriation of heritage. Influenced by Eric Hobsbawm and his 'invention of tradition' thesis (1983) and David Lowenthal's work *The Past is a Foreign Country* (1985) these scholars set out to show that—not

unlike in the time of nation-building—heritage is still used by a powerful nationalist elite to legitimize and consolidate its position and suppress marginalized groups (see e.g. Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 1998; Munasinghe 2005; Mullally and MacDonald 2007).

In her book *Uses of Heritage* (2006), Laurajane Smith—probably the most forceful voice within this 'critical heritage' school of thought—identifies a so-called 'Authorized Heritage Discourse' (AHD) which she contrasts to "subaltern and dissenting heritage discourses" (Smith 2006, p. 29). She argues that the AHD lays claims on cultural capital via elite notions of 'inheritance' and 'value' (Smith 2006, pp. 36–48; see also Hall 2008; Byrne 2008; Waterton et al. 2006). The meaning that the AHD attributes to heritage objects is specifically national, male-oriented, Western, and middle to high class. The AHD gains its authority through a number of discursive mechanisms, such as a focus on professionalism and expertise. Moreover, the AHD attempts to 'naturalize' the values it ascribes to heritage objects by claiming that these structures are 'inherently valuable'. Much of the constitutive work of the authorized discourse is therefore obscured. The national narrative that the AHD reinforces, according to Smith, is imposed on local communities by various actors, such as official government organizations and professional heritage experts who aim to iron out local differences and keep the national history "safe sterile and shorn of danger, subversion and seduction" (Urry 1990, p. 52; see also Pocock 1997).

In an attempt to counter the perspective that a national discourse is simply imposed on society, Ian Robertson (2008) introduced the notion 'heritage from below'. Unlike Smith, he argued that the power of national identities is constantly being challenged and changed by organizations and actors that promote other spatial and non-spatial manifestations of belonging (144). The 'heritage from below' idea resonates with 'history from below' which was intended to prioritize the story of the defeated and non-privileged. In much the same way Robertson recognizes the possibilities of 'heritages' other than those of the dominant in society. He argues that 'heritage from below' can offer an alternative version of the past to that of the hegemonic and, thereby, both "galvanize and cohere local communities around alternative constructions of identity and narratives of place" (Robertson 2008, p. 147). Robertson explains that "if 'landmarks' or 'lieux de mémoire' can be written into the landscape in support of national landscape ideologies, national identity and the meanings and values of the dominant within society, then counter-hegemonic landmarks can equally be written into the landscape in support and expression of local identity. As heritage from below, such landmarks can celebrate, perpetuate and make material oppositional meanings and practices" (Robertson 2008, p. 147). While 'critical' heritage scholars such as Smith tend to see local communities as tame, marginalized and helpless subjects that passively take in the national narrative that is imposed on them, Robertson acknowledges them as self-assured and indeed driving forces to be reckoned with.

The issue of heritage from below and heritage from above is discussed by Schofield in the context of heritage management. He notes that systems to oversee and control heritage exist at various levels: "at an international level through

conventions and protocol [...]; nationally or state-wide through legislation; and locally through planning guidance, through local and amenity societies and by the enthusiastic commitment and engagement of local communities. One can view this process from the top down, with influence and the principles of good practice cascading from the state to local authorities and communities, backed up by powers of enforcement. One can also view it from the bottom up, with the wishes, values and perception of local communities influencing budget-holders and decision-makers" (Schofield 2008, pp. 20–21). Schofield argues that the different levels depend on each other. Whatever is imposed by national governments or international organizations requires community support if it is to be implemented successfully. Schofield's understanding of the heritage process is valuable, because it shows that there is more than mere top-down indoctrination. The international and the national levels depend on local levels for the implementation of their policies, and in this process, the policies can change.

Several authors in the edited volume *Heritage Regimes and the State* write about the local deployments of international and national heritage using the metaphor of 'translation'. Chiara Bortolotto states for instance that applied global policies are 'domesticated' or 'twisted' by local institutional structures and categories. This domestication results, in her view, in "different safeguarding approaches" (Bortolotto 2012, pp. 275–276; see also Bendix et al. 2012; Craith 2012). In their often cited book *A Geography of Heritage* Brian Graham, John Tunbridge and Gregory Ashworth (2000) explain, much like Schofield, that even when the interpretation and value assessment of heritage is created and maintained largely as a matter of national policy for the pursuit of national objectives, the execution of such policy will necessarily often be local. According to these authors the governmental system of a country determines whether and how much power can be exercised by local actors. Governance may be unitary and centralized, federal—with power and even sovereignty shared between federal and subordinate levels—or even more locally distributed among cities and districts. The bureaucratic structure of the state determines the way in which national governments deal with local heritage initiatives. Sub-national jurisdictions usually participate in initiating or ratifying entries on national inventories and may even supplement the national level by creating additional regional or local lists of buildings and sites. In many federal states heritage is controlled largely by the lower levels, usually combined with other responsibilities such as culture, education and tourism. Even in countries with centralized governments, the responsibility for heritage preservation and management is increasingly delegated to local or regional levels. Graham et al. conclude that regardless of the way a country is governed, the responsibility for heritage preservation is almost always divided between different levels.

Local initiatives and the 'translation' of national policies by local actors—at least at times—complicate traditional national discourses and practices. The same could be said about international initiatives by organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS). UNESCO was created by the United Nations in 1945 to stimulate international cooperation in the fields of education,

science and cultural heritage. In 1972, UNESCO drafted the World Heritage Convention and since 1978 it enlists heritage sites of "outstanding universal value" on the UNESCO World Heritage List (UNESCO 1972, 1978). UNESCO's official advisory body in matters of cultural heritage is ICOMOS, established in 1964. ICOMOS advises the UNESCO World Heritage Committee whether the nominated sites should be included on the list or not. Moreover, it monitors the 'state of conservation' of sites that are threatened. Some scholars argue that UNESCO and ICOMOS form a "part of the new architecture of global governance" and have created "a world without borders" (Pannell 2006, p. 76; see also Schmitt 2011). These authors ascribe a lot of power to these organizations. According to Zacharias, for example, UNESCO can potentially "send a fleet of black helicopters flying over the protected area to compel national authorities to fulfil their obligations under the World Heritage Convention" (Zacharias 2006, p. 273).

Other authors, however, claim that World Heritage is used not to create a world without borders or to establish a new global government, but to affirm existing borders, reinforce national differences and strengthen the position of nation-states. Smith (2006), for instance, claims that the notion of 'universal heritage' as it is propagated by UNESCO reinforces the discursive dominance of the national level, rather than challenging it. Based on a detailed Foucauldian discourse analysis of international charters and policy papers, she concludes that UNESCO and its sister organization ICOMOS are the key global agents that have institutionalized the AHD and perpetuated it through their policies and technical guidelines (Smith 2006, pp. 106–114). Other critical heritage scholars, such as Emma Waterton, note that the charters of international organizations like UNESCO and ICOMOS "may be understood as the international repository of the authorized heritage discourse. [...] This discourse stresses the importance of nationalism and national identity, and champions an ancient, idealized and inevitably relict past for the assumed universal rights of future generations" (Waterton et al. 2006, p. 341). Likewise, Scott explained: "UNESCO's World Heritage List has formalized the status of 'the nation' as the repository of cultural identity" (2002, p. 100). In doing so it has—though perhaps unintentionally—also broadened the official canon of 'world-class heritage' and thus institutionalized the channels for converting national heritage into symbolic capital at the global level (Rehling 2011). Countries like Italy, Spain, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (each with 55, 48, 45, 46 and 32 listings in 2020 respectively) compete to top the list of countries with most listed sites, which indicates that rather than a collection of *world* heritage sites the list is a means to authorize certain national narratives and values. Moreover, nation-states are crucial for the execution of the World Heritage Convention. The states that signed the treaty (called State Parties in official UNESCO documents) are, for example, responsible for the World Heritage Fund that is used to help protect heritage in developing countries.

National governments are also responsible for the nomination of sites for the World Heritage List, and they usually do so, as Bas van der Aa showed in his studies, from a national perspective in pursuit of national aggrandizement and narrow-minded chauvinism (Van der Aa 2005; see also Ashworth and Van der Aa

2002a, b). Nation-states have the ability to politically or economically exploit the world heritage status of 'their' monuments. In the dialectic between the national and the global, the national often still prevails. Although some scholars tend to see UNESCO as an entirely new form of global government (Pannell 2006, p. 76; Turtinen 2000, p. 14), most of them acknowledge that "UNESCO is not a [new] world government" (Ashworth and Van der Aa 2006, p. 156). In this latter view, UNESCO and ICOMOS are not really new actors, but rather "old agents with new agendas" (Askew 2010, p. 33).

In sum, while some scholars see the heritage process as flowing top-down from a powerful elite to a subordinate mass, others approach it as a bottom-up process from local communities to society at large. UNESCO is sometimes conceptualized as part of a new global government and on other occasions as an actor that reinforces the existing national heritage discourse. Yet, there is one thing that all these schools of thought have in common: they conceptualize the heritage process as a power struggle; a fight with clear winners and losers. The past is seen as a valuable socio-political and economic resource claimed by dominant groups in order to consolidate their hegemonic position. Although persuasive in many respects, this perspective has its limitations. The heritage process cannot—at least not anymore—be reduced to a one-way street between a powerful elite and a powerless subordinate mass, nor should it be seen as being impacted only by grassroots actors. Both characterizations would be an underestimation of the changes that have taken place in the heritage field over the past forty years and would disregard the emergence of numerous highly influential local, regional and transnational heritage actors, organizations and institutions.

The strict dichotomy between 'authorized' and 'subaltern' heritage, between heritage from above and heritage from below, creates limitations for the analysis of today's complicated heritage field. Although power certainly matters, too much focus on power relations might cause the analyst to turn a blind eye to the wider context in which preservation is embedded. In order to understand how the heritage process works, it is not enough to only determine who won and lost. Moreover, many scholars—especially 'critical' heritage scholars—analyze heritage by focusing on the formal discourse reflected in charters and policy papers (e.g. Waterton et al. 2006), and therefore turn a blind eye to the deployment of the discourse in practice, as well as to the broader societal developments affecting the discourse. The Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) can offer a valuable approach to overcome some of these limitations. Rather than viewing the heritage process as a struggle between a limited number of actors, it is perceived here as an ongoing negotiation and complex interplay between various actors or stakeholders, all of which—including local organizations—act according to their own interests and socio-political objectives. Responding to the specific political, societal or economic context, actors and stakeholders can, sometimes opportunistically form and break alliances. Due to its dual focus on regime or system changes in relation to the landscape developments and niche activities, MLP potentially provides a valuable contribution to the existing body of literature on heritage. The following section will describe the different analytical tools that MLP can offer and consider its applicability for heritage studies.

1.3 Towards a Multi-Level Perspective on Heritage

1.3.1 Key Concepts of MLP

The starting point of this work's theoretical framework is the Multi-Level Perspective developed by Frank Geels in his work *Technological Transitions and System Innovations* (2005b). As the title suggests, Geels' book aims to explain technological transitions and system innovations related to societal functions such as housing, transportation or energy supply. Societal functions, Geels argues, are fulfilled by socio-technical systems. Although Geels' work focuses on the technological aspect of system innovations, it is important to note that his work is inclusive of other factors such as market and user practices, public policy and regulations, infrastructure, symbolic meaning and scientific understanding. Geels states that: "change is not limited to technological transition. There are all kinds of knock-on effects, which affect the entire socio-technical system [. . .] social and technical aspects are always intertwined and constitute each other" (Geels 2005a, p. viii). In order to analyze socio-technical transitions, Geels proposes the Multi-Level Perspective.

This model has three main elements: a macro-level landscape which consists of mostly slow changing factors in society and the physical environment at large, a meso-level which consists of an established socio-technical regime, and a micro-level which consists of niches where innovation can occur. Infrastructures, formal and informal rules, ways of defining problems, ideas about best practices, skills and procedures keep an established regime in place and ensure that certain practices and institutional arrangements are durable. The linkages between these heterogeneous elements are historically established and hence usually hard to break (Geels 2002; Geels and Schot 2007). The regime is characterized by path dependency, meaning that procedures unfold according to established patterns and only slowly adapt because they are institutionally embedded. However, rigorous regime-changes can occur when changes in the broader societal context of the landscape destabilize the regime. This can create 'windows of opportunity' for niches. For transitions to occur, dynamics at different levels should come together and reinforce each other. Or, as Geels explains: "System changes are emergent outcomes of interactions between social groups with myopic views and differing interests" (Geels 2007, pp. 1414–1415).

1.3.2 Regime

In their much-cited text on 'technological change', René Kemp and Arie Rip (1998) defined a technical regime as "the grammar or rule set comprised in the complex of scientific knowledges, engineering practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, and institutions and infrastructures that make up the totality of technology" (Kemp and Rip 1998, p. 338). This particular

understanding of the regime level stresses the institutional character of the regime as a collective outcome that cannot be changed at will. The technical regime is sustained by a coherent set of rules which materialize in the form of production process technologies and products, as well as engineering practices, search heuristics, user practices, and so on.

In line with Kemp and Rip, Geels (2002) argued in favour of using the term *socio-technical* regime in order to emphasize that not just engineers or scientists, but all kinds of business people, end users, policy makers, societal interest groups and associations share the rules and practices that constitute a regime. In later publications, Geels (2004, 2010) clarified how he understands these rules precisely. He distinguished between cognitive, regulative and normative rules. The cognitive rules consist for example of shared belief systems, goals, innovation agendas, problem definitions and search heuristics. Many cognitive rules are never questioned by the actors involved. This taken-for-granted character makes these types of rules hard to change. Examples of regulative rules are laws, government regulations and legally binding contracts. Regulative rules are difficult to deviate from, because formal sanctions are involved when actors do not obey them. Lastly, normative rules comprise more informal role relationships, values, behavioural norms and mutual expectations between actors. These rules are sustained by mechanisms like socialization, conformity pressure, social authority, rewards and punishment (Geels and Schot 2010, pp. 20, 49–50).

Rules account for the stability and 'lock-in' of socio-technical systems. In other words, socio-technical systems change slowly because they are tied up by rules that are difficult to diverge from. Cognitive routines might result in engineers and designers turning a blind eye to alternative options. Legally binding contracts or regulations for government subsidies might favour existing technologies. Industries may establish lobby groups, branch organizations or professional associations which contribute to the regime's hardness. Important stakeholders may have invested in certain machinery, infrastructures, and competencies, which might lead to preferences for prevalent technologies (Christensen 1997). Certain organizations may be largely resistant to major changes as a result of a "web of interdependent relationships with buyers, suppliers, and financial backer [. . .] and patterns of culture, norms and ideology" (Tushman and Romanelli 1985, p. 177).

The constraints (and possibilities) offered by cognitive, regulative and normative rules make the development trajectories of change usually slow and fairly predictable—at least to a certain extent. All such rules and ties can be perceived as mechanisms that steer the development process and make it path dependent. Such predictable trajectories, however, also occur in other domains such as policy, science or industry. The different trajectories are carried and enacted by social groups that have relative autonomy. Internally such groups share particular views, problem-agendas, norms, values and preferences, and experience "their own structuration dynamics [. . .] that lead to trajectories" (Geels and Schot 2010, p. 21). However, besides their own internal dynamics, different groups also interact and form alignments that make them mutually dependent. In other words, social groups "interpenetrate" (Stankiewicz 1992, p. 19). Different social groups interact and overlap,

without losing their autonomy and identity. This interconnectedness of regime actors leads to relative stability, yet the dynamics of actors' internal pathways or their involvement in other regimes may lead to tensions within the regime. As a result, the regime is dynamically stable. Innovation does take place, but only in an incremental way.

1.3.3 Landscape

The macro-level landscape provides a context for both the regime and the niches. Landscape developments appear to unfold autonomously and usually span various regimes. Broad societal, demographic or (geo)political shifts, as well as broad economic restructuring or cultural developments are all part of the landscape. Also the availability of material resources and spatial arrangements of cities and infrastructures are constitutive of the landscape. Landscape developments occur outside the regime's control, although regime changes may on the long run change the landscape too. The metaphor of the landscape expresses relative hardness. Changes in the 'landscape' are usually slow—much like in an actual landscape where the growth of mountains or the rise of oceans goes gently. The notion of landscape, however, also includes more disruptive changes like avalanches or earthquakes.

The MLP landscape includes both slow and long-term processes like demographic developments and fast and sudden events like wars or sudden and drastic shifts in the availability of material resources, all of which affect the actions of niche and regime actors. It is important to note that although landscape factors *affect* actions, they do not determine them. In 1979, the psychologist Gibson coined the terms 'affordance' and 'action possibilities' to explain how the physical composition of a subject's environment influences behaviour. The empty space in an open doorway affords movement across its threshold (Gibson 1979). Likewise, one can traverse a mountain landscape through difficult paths (climbing) or through easy paths (through valleys). This analogy applies to the MLP landscape too. Landscape factors do not determine behaviour, but provide the deep-structure that makes some actions easier than others (Geels and Schot 2010, p. 28). Landscape developments are thus more than just a backdrop or context to regimes and niches. Rather, they create gradients and affordances that affect trajectories, by enabling or disabling certain potential transition pathways. Sometimes landscape changes become pressure points for change on the regime level.

Most 'normal' landscape developments, however, do not distort or disrupt the regime, yet they usually lead to minor adaptations at the regime level. Most minor and incremental changes in the regime are responses to new situations, triggered by such 'normal' landscape developments. Sometimes, developments on the landscape level might even reinforce the regime trajectory, and help to 'harden' the prevailing procedures, policies, bureaucracies or practices. At other times, however, the landscape can generate opportunities for niches and put pressure on the regime, 'softening' the connection between the various regime actors.

1.3.4 Niches

In the Multi-Level Perspective, transitions largely depend on activities within niches. Compared to the regime level, there are fewer constraints and configurations at the niche level. Niche developments are therefore less restrained and less path dependent than regime developments. The downside of the absence of such alignments is that niche actors—at least initially—also lack the network of regime actors. In order to successfully exercise influence on the regime, niches therefore need a 'protective space' where ideas and organizational structures can grow undisturbed. Such a 'protective space' can be offered by specific regime actors who are looking for ways to solve specific problems. In this case, the regime actors are not opposing niche innovation, but nurturing it in order to solve internal issues. Niche protection can also be offered by actors outside the regime or by actors from other regimes. The actors are able to spark the interest of other actors like policy makers, users or suppliers and to mobilize resources that can help in further development of innovations (Geels 2005a, p. 79).

Innovations usually start as 'hopeful monstrosities'—a term coined by Joel Mokyr (1990). Innovative technologies are 'hopeful' because they can do things that existing technologies cannot do, and because they can potentially help to solve prevailing problems of the regime. However, innovative technologies are also 'monstrous' because they are usually expensive, unreliable and experience teething troubles. Despite their potential, innovations in an early stage could not survive in the mainstream market. Therefore, they need a network of actors who are willing and able to invest time and money in the innovative technology, and who can offer an 'incubation room' for it. Niche protection can, as said, be offered by a variety of actors. Governments can provide protective spaces for innovations via subsidies. Firms or corporations can stimulate and nurture innovation via strategic investments. Market niches can also offer protection for innovation by finding specific clients for new technologies outside the mainstream economy (Geels 2005a, p. 79). Generally, niches are a source for transformative ideas and capabilities, but not blueprints. Their potential is constrained by the regime. This means that there is a lot of uncertainty and flux in niches. Before a niche innovation can successfully 'invade' or change the regime it needs the backup of other niches or regime actors. Whether a niche development makes it, however, depends on landscape developments as well as on the commitment of actors: "Entrepreneurial action transforms extant reality into new markets through a chain of stakeholder commitments over time [. . .] The end-product of this process is inherently unpredictable [. . .] because the process is actor-centric: it depends on which actors come on board with what commitments" (Sarasvathy and Dew 2005, pp. 542–544).

While the direction of innovations in an early stage is unclear, successful innovative technologies stabilize as time progresses. Niche developments stabilize for example when actors successfully mobilize social support for innovative technologies. This results in positive expectations in niche markets and subsequently in a stabilization of the design and functionality of the technology. If such processes

reinforce each other the niche will gradually expand and align with more and more actors, which then leads to further stabilization. In most cases, however, niche developments are not successful. When actors fail to build a substantive social basis for niche innovations, or when niche innovations are not meeting niche market expectations, the niche will fall apart and actors will leave the support network in favour of other innovations or existing technologies (Geels and Schot 2010, pp. 22–23). In MLP niches are considered the seeds of regime change. The landscape, however, is the soil—to expand on the metaphor—which determines if the seeds will sprout (Mokyr 1990, p. 299).

Using MLP as an analytical model thus requires constant shifting between a bird's eye view—taking into account broad societal, cultural, political and economic developments—, and a worm's perspective—focusing on specific niche and regime developments. Successful application of MLP requires a clear and sharp delineation of its three main concepts, as well as of the relationship between them. Poole and Van de Ven (1989) made a useful distinction, arguing that process theories should have two complementing components: global and local models. In this case, the terms 'global' and 'local' do not only refer to a difference in spatial scale, but imply also a difference in temporal focus. They argued that: "The global (macro long-run) model depicts the overall course of development of an innovation and its influences, while the local (micro, short-run) model depicts the immediate action processes that create short-run development patterns [. . .] A global model takes as its unit of analysis the overall trajectories, paths, phases, or stages in the development of an innovation, whereas a local model focuses on the micro ideas, decisions, actions or events of particular developmental episodes" (Poole and Van de Ven 1989, p. 643). MLP explicitly aims to combine local and global, macro and micro, the long- and the short-run, in a coherent analytical framework. In order to operationalize this combination of foci, this research provides an in-depth analysis of individual local cases, as well as of more long-term general changes.

1.3.5 A Multi-Level Perspective on Heritage

Both differences and similarities can be identified between socio-technical regimes and the heritage regime. In Geels' theory the focus is primarily on the technological artefacts, while the heritage regime is mostly about practices. Much in line with Geels' theory, however, heritage preservation is an important societal function around which a regime is formed that determines how this function is practically fulfilled. It involves mutually dependent heterogeneous actors. Until a few decades ago, the boundaries of the heritage regime were rather clearly defined. National governments, national laws and institutions determined what should be preserved and how. Nowadays, these boundaries are less clear. New actors, organizations and institutions are now involved in the preservation and selection of heritage. The number of actors and thus the number of interests involved has grown. National institutions now need to position themselves vis-à-vis new international, regional

and local organizations. In the background, broader social and cultural developments such as globalization, European integration and 'localization' affect the heritage regime.

There is a great variety of linkages and configurations between the different heterogeneous actors involved in today's heritage regime. Some actors, organizations and institutions are financially linked, others have bureaucratic ties. Owners of classified buildings are for instance linked to various governmental bodies through subsidiary streams. Certain NGO's can be linked to national governments due to their official statutory role, or their dependency on government funding. Some owners are linked to NGO's that represent their interests, or partially fund the preservation of their property. Certain national NGO's have connections to international umbrella organizations such as Europa Nostra—an organization that aims to preserve European heritage. National governments are institutionally tied with UNESCO. ICOMOS has national branches that are often linked to educational institutions, such as universities. Although there is no strict hierarchy between most actors, some actors are more important to the regime's stability than others.

Due to their interconnectedness, major changes in the regime will most likely affect various actors. The heritage regime is held together by formal institutionalized 'rules' such as laws, policies, bureaucracies, treaties, charters, legally binding contracts and subsidiary streams. Cohesion between the various actors in the regime, however, not only depends on such formal links, but also on informal and normative 'rules'. These might include implicit consensus or agreement between actors on how to solve specific problems, implicit mutual expectations, timeworn habits and routines, personal connections and friendships. As a result, favourable institutional arrangements are made, formal regulations are enacted and suitable infrastructural measures are taken. These formal and informal ties and linkages ensure that regimes usually remain rather stable and create a certain path dependency. Also the vested interests of organizations involved, contribute to the regimes' stability and 'hardness'. Mutual agreement and shared interests on every aspect of heritage preservation is not necessary for maintaining the firmness and sturdiness of heritage regimes. In fact, actors may well disagree on important issues. What does hold the regime together are rules—formal and informal—which ensure that the actors do not go about doing whatever is in their own interest. The mutual dependence of the actors—for example through laws, regulations, subsidies or bureaucratic ties—guarantees that practices such as identification, restoration and maintenance—i.e. the 'societal function' of heritage preservation—are executed more or less consistently. In times of regime stability, the various actors generally agree upon the 'rules'.

Potentially conflicting interests, however, cause constant tension within the regime. The fact that the actors reached a stage of general consensus and agreement does not mean that changes are impossible. Alliances may shift. When the World Heritage Committee places a site on the World Heritage in Danger list, this might, for instance, undermine the linkage between UNESCO and the respective national or local government. At the same time such a decision can strengthen other alignments within the regime, for example between UNESCO and local interest groups. In a similar fashion, owners can have interests that compete with those of certain NGO's

or government bodies. This continuous internal tension—in relation to developments in the landscape—causes 'normal' incremental change, ensures that the regime is never entirely 'closed' to new initiatives and ideas, and allows for relatively limited regime changes to suit local demands.

1.4 Methodology

1.4.1 How to Implement MLP for Heritage Research

This section outlines the trajectory of my work to operationalize MLP for the purpose of researching heritage. Firstly, I identified the main actors, organizations and institutions of the heritage regime. As the regime is 'dynamically stable' it is not immediately self-evident which actors, organizations and institutions belong to the regime, and which do not. The 'edges' of the regime are usually blurry (ten Pierick et al. 2010, pp. 18–33). Some actors and organizations might be only temporarily involved in the regime. Other actors and institutions might be involved in more than one regime. The most important 'carrying' actors, organizations and institutions, however, are usually involved for a longer period of time and ensure relative stability. Official governmental heritage agencies, owners, municipalities or established non-governmental heritage organizations, for instance, are almost always part of the heritage decision-making process—even though their impact may vary depending on the specific situation or time period. In this research, the organizations, actors and institutions involved in the regime have been identified on the basis of secondary literature and interviews with professionals from the heritage field. Chapter 2 provides a general overview of the development of the German and the British heritage regime from the end of World War II up to the 1970s. It describes the most important preservation laws in both countries, as well as the key actors and organization involved in the decision-making process regarding the listing, preservation and restoration of heritage sites and monuments. As the case studies mainly focus on the development of the heritage field since the 1970s, this review serves as a starting point, providing a sketch of the German and British heritage regimes up to the early 1970s.

Secondly, I analyzed how the heritage regimes developed since then. How did the procedures for the identification and preservation of heritage change over time? How did the role of key actors and organizations change? The analysis of the historical development of the regimes over the past fifty years will depend on a cross-case analysis, focusing on changes regarding the composition of the regime, the role of specific actors, organizations and institutions, as well as on changes in the procedures. This part of the analysis is done on the basis of a wide range of sources, including interviews, archival material, media coverage and secondary literature. Interviews were conducted, for example, with scholars, conservators, policy-makers, representatives of non-governmental organisations and diplomats (see list of interviewees). The interviewees worked at local, national as well as international levels.

These interviews provided valuable information about the day-to-day practice of heritage preservation. However, not everyone I approached was willing to talk to me. I reached out, for example, to several employees of the UNESCO World Heritage Center in Paris. During the period of this research project, however, the World Heritage Center faced major budget cuts and drastic reorganization. The people I approached therefore had other priorities than to be interviewed. This lack of interviewees from the World Heritage Center could in part be compensated by extensive research in the ICOMOS and UNESCO archives. These archives included official minutes of meetings as well as personal (email) correspondence between UNESCO employees. Apart from these international archives, several local, regional and national archives in Germany and Great-Britain were consulted (see list of archives).

The specific cases studied serve to identify and analyze possible regime changes that are the result of the interaction between local niche actions, landscape developments and the regime. In order to analyze the interactions between the three conceptual levels of MLP, I reconstruct and analyze debates about six specific heritage sites. In this research the case studies provide the basis for the analysis of niche activities. The analysis focuses on the responses to specifically local preservation and restoration issues. Which actors and organizations were involved in the discussions? What policy responses did the issues at hand provoke? Each case should be seen as a potential niche that posed specific challenges for established regime actors and procedures. In order to find out if (and so how) the regime responded to these challenges, I analyzed policy documents, legislation, and official and unofficial reactions of established regime actors and organizations to the specific cases. Moreover, I conducted interviews with representatives of the regime in order to find out how specific challenges were dealt with. Here the analysis focuses on the way local actions and changes in local practices impacted the way the societal function of heritage preservation was fulfilled.

In order to come to an understanding of regime changes it is crucial to see the regime and the niche activities in the broader context of the landscape. The landscape can potentially form a barrier for certain policy trajectories while indeed enabling or stimulating other trajectories. Whether niche activities lead to regime change largely depends on the landscape. Certain landscape developments can be used by niches to challenge the regime, or the position of the regime can be strengthened by landscape developments. Landscape factors that potentially affect the regimes and niches include—amongst others—economic, demographic, political and environmental developments. The landscape is so all-encompassing that I first identify potentially impactful landscape developments in the given time period on the basis of secondary literature. Through the lens of the regime and the niches, I identify which landscape factors obstructed or enabled certain policy trajectories. The aim of this last mentioned step is thus not to be as complete as possible in describing the landscape at a certain point in time, but to isolate and pin down those landscape factors that affected the regime and the niches. Once the relevant landscape factors are identified, their precise impact on the regime and the niches is

further investigated by analyzing media coverage, secondary literature, interviews and archival material.

1.4.2 Comparative Historical Analysis and the Case-Study Method

An important research aim is to analyze the interplay between the three conceptual levels of MLP. What mechanisms of regime change can be identified? MLP explains the causes of socio-technical regime change as a combination of long-term, usually slow landscape developments and specific niche activities. The research methods used—comparative historical analysis and case studies—are attuned to this dual theoretical focus. This section will briefly explain how these two methods, in combination, can strengthen each other (Gagnon 2010). One of the main advantages of the case study method is that it allows for detailed descriptions and in-depth analysis. According to the author of a popular guidebook on the case study method, it can provide "the most vivid, the most inspirational analysis that an inquiry can offer" (Thomas 2015, p. i). One of the potential pitfalls of the case study method, however, is that cases usually have their own dynamic and raise their own questions. As a result, the analyst risks that the case starts leading a life of its own, obscuring that which it was supposed to exemplify in the first place (Gerring 2007). One way to avoid this problem is to focus on multiple cases and compare and contrast them with a cross-case method. Comparative historical analysis is one way to structure cross-case observations (Skocpol 2003). Specific locales—a selection of case studies—will be explored and analyzed in detail. A comparison between these locales will provide insight into the development and dynamics of heritage regimes over time, the similarities and differences between the German and the British heritage regime, as well as the similarities and differences between different types of heritage.

Apart from its focus on a modest, yet significant number of cases, the method of historical comparative analysis is embedded within a diachronic perspective. Studies that use this method by definition examine long stretches of time. Unlike more synchronic perspectives, comparative historical analysis is thus able to capture the long term 'landscape' causes for societal change (Thelen 2003). This method therefore fits well into the MLP framework. The main argument of MLP is, after all, that transitions should be understood as the outcome of the interplay between specific niche activities and broad, general landscape developments. This research involves an analysis of a long stretch of time (mainly between 1970 and 2020) and a comparison across cases in two different national contexts. The MLP concepts guide the case-based comparative historical analysis. The research design is in line with this methodology.

Debates on six different UNESCO World Heritage sites will be analyzed. These cases are treated in three main clusters—each presenting one German and one British case. The cases were selected by chronologically listing all the German and British

Cultural World Heritage sites that were inscribed between 1978 and 2010. I then ordered these sites according to the category of heritage that each of them represents. Three main categories could be distinguished: traditional monuments, industrial heritage and cities. The first category includes individual historic buildings with a long-established and nearly undisputed heritage status and aesthetic value: e.g. castles, palaces, churches, monasteries or town halls. The second category comprises former industrial sites that were mostly inscribed for technical historic reasons: e.g. former factories, mines, machine halls or mills. The last category consists of large historic urban areas, which typically include a wide range of different monuments, as well as buildings that are not included in inventories of individually listed monuments. A final selection of cases was made on the basis of similarities in terms of heritage type (traditional monuments, industrial heritage and cities) and in terms of the historic period in which the debates about these sites and monuments took place (ranging from the 1970s to the present). These two selection criteria are closely intertwined, because the type of heritage that UNESCO identified as World Heritage changed over the decades. According to Cotte "a process of three main steps [can be observed] in the history of the Convention implementation. It first followed the main trend of the early decades of the Convention, which focused first on 'monuments', then on collections of monuments or 'ensembles', and later on urban values and city planning" (Cotte 2012, p. 168). The lay-out of this book follows this trend from traditional monuments, to ensembles of industrial heritage and, later, cities.

While each case has its own dynamic, the analysis focuses on a number of recurring aspects. Firstly, it will focus on changes in regulative rules such as legislation and subsidies. Secondly, it focuses on changes in cognitive rules such as routines and procedures. And lastly, the analysis focuses on normative rules such as ideas and ideals of regime actors. Moreover, the cases inform each other. If one case reveals particularly relevant and interesting aspects, these will also be explored for the other cases. Each cluster of case studies is introduced by a short chapter that provides the context to the relevant period under study. Each of these introductory chapters will discuss the landscape of the period at hand on the basis of secondary literature. The introductory chapters will focus on those landscape factors that potentially impacted the regime: general economic developments, demographic developments, social and cultural developments and political developments. At the end of each cluster of case studies a short concluding chapter wraps up the main findings. The main aim of these chapters is to compare and contrast the two countries. What similarities and differences can be observed with regards to legislation and policy guidelines on certain heritage related issues? How did the institutional and organizational arrangements change in the two countries in a given time period, and how do they compare? The concluding chapters draw on insights from applying MLP to the cases. While the type of niche activities are often different—each case has its own dynamic—the mechanisms involved in regime-niche interactions are useful resources for comparative analysis. The concluding chapters analyze if—and if so how—the regime has changed in the period that was analyzed and

whether the cases studies really served as successful niches, occasioning a change in the regime.

1.4.3 Case Studies

Three German World Heritage Sites and three British World Heritage Sites will be investigated in detail. Characterizing the heritage regimes of these two countries, however, is not straightforward. Between 1949 and 1990 West-Germany and East-Germany had considerably different approaches to heritage. While heritage policy in the German Democratic Republic was highly centralized, in the Federal Republic of Germany it was organized at the level of the *Länder* (Dölling 1974). After 1990, this federal system was also implemented for the new German states in the East (Burns and van der Will 2003). In the United Kingdom, Westminster is traditionally responsible for heritage preservation. However, England, Wales and Scotland each have their own heritage agencies and lists. Since the late 1990s, responsibility for heritage has partially been delegated to the governments of Scotland and Wales. This research focuses specifically on the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand and England on the other hand. Other levels of authority (e.g. the UK government, the GDR government) will be engaged with as and when they are relevant to the specific case under consideration.

Despite the challenges in comparing two countries with such complicated governmental systems of their own, a comparative analysis between Germany and Great-Britain is worthwhile for a number of reasons. If we were to imagine a distribution of policy-making models along an axis ranging from highly centralized to highly decentralized, the traditional cultural policy-making frameworks of the United Kingdom and Germany would probably be on opposing ends of the resulting spectrum. In the United Kingdom, heritage preservation is traditionally the responsibility of national Ministries and agencies at arm's length from the central government. In the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, cultural policy has, since the end of the Second World War, been almost exclusively a matter of the *Länder*[2] and municipal councils. This decentralized system evolved partly as a prophylactic reaction to the central (totalitarian) cultural policy of the Nazi's (Thamer 1997). The cultural autonomy of the *Länder* is part of the German constitution since 1949 and has been fiercely guarded ever since. A typological exercise like this has become increasingly difficult, as oppositional lines between the United Kingdom and Germany have become less clear-cut. The United Kingdom witnessed—since the election of the New Labour government in 1997—a process

[2] In Anglo-Saxon literature, the *Länder* are often referred to as the 'federal states'. Here, however, the original German term will be used in order to avoid any confusion with the 'federal government' at the national level. The national government in Berlin will thus be referred as the 'federal government' or the 'German government', while the 'federal states' (like Saxony or North Rhine-Westphalia) will be referred to as *'Länder'*.

of decentralization (Hesmondhalgh et al. 2015). Local and regional government bodies, as well as numerous charities, took over tasks that traditionally belonged to the national government. In Germany, however, one can see the opposite trend. Here, the federal government took several initiatives—including the installation of a federal Minister of Culture in 1998—which led to more central control over heritage policy-making. Clearly, the governance structures of both countries have grown closer to each other. The devolution of power from one level to another—either from the level of the *Länder* to the national level or from the national level to municipalities and regions—has major implications for the relationship of these governments with international organizations, in particular UNESCO.

Secondly, a comparison between the national contexts is worthwhile because the United Kingdom and Germany represent different traditions in preservation philosophy. John Soane argues that despite general European trends in heritage preservation there are also important variations between European countries, especially between the United Kingdom and Germany. He admits that the rise of international actors during the 1970s has reduced some of the differences between countries, but certainly not all. Behind the seemingly general circumstances there remain varying degrees of emphasis put on e.g. visual perception of the built objects. Soane argues that a comparison between the tendencies in heritage preservation in the United Kingdom and Germany can help to analyze general opposing trends in preservation philosophy and practices. Interesting about Soane's argument is that he explains the differences in preservation and restoration practices from the difference in national experience of the industrialization and modernization process. He argues that the industrialization and modernization process took different paths in the United Kingdom and Germany respectively. In the United Kingdom, the industrialisation process was long and fundamentally changed people's living conditions and social position. This ensured a "more radical break from the past than the abrupt confrontation with a more developed form of industrialisation [...] experienced in the Germany of a century later" (Soane 2002, p. 269). This ultimately impacted the way historic monuments were valued and interpreted, which partially explains the different preservation approaches that evolved in the twentieth century. John Soane argues that: "Although no two countries can ever be taken as fully representing two strongly opposed cultural traditions, the basic divide in modern conservation practices can be most clearly observed in a comparison between general tendencies in Great-Britain and Germany" (Soane 2002, p. 268).

Lastly, a comparison between Germany and the United Kingdom is worthwhile because of the differences in their historically developed relation to UNESCO and the World Heritage Convention. In their work *A Geography of Heritage* Graham et al. (2000), briefly describe the emergence of UNESCO and explain that it should be seen in the historical context of the Nazi defeat and the subsequent desire to create global institutions that would promote international security and solidarity. The authors argue that the notion of a global heritage had great appeal at the time, because it reinforced concepts of human equality, common destiny, shared stewardship over the earth, optimal use of scarce natural and cultural resources, and the consequent imperative of peaceful coexistence. UNESCO aimed to prevent conflicts

caused by such national aggrandizement and glorification. It was an explicit challenge to the chauvinistic extremism that the Nazi regime had epitomized (Graham et al. 2000, p. 236).

In this sense it is perhaps not surprising that West-Germany was one of the first countries to ratify the World Heritage Convention in 1976. Many other countries ratified the convention much later. The United Kingdom, for example, only endorsed the treaty in 1984. One reason for the belated ratification was that the British government had doubts about the way UNESCO was run. It felt too much money was being spent on UNESCO's bureaucracy in Paris and not enough was done to protect the actual monuments. Moreover, it doubted whether it was really necessary to add yet another layer of protection over—as far as the government was concerned—an already solid and efficient national policy apparatus. The relationship between the United Kingdom and UNESCO would long remain problematic. In fact, Britain left UNESCO in 1987 and only returned in 1997 (LA Times 1986, December 5). In this period the United Kingdom did participate in UNESCO as a so-called 'observer', meaning that a delegation could take part in several projects but was not allowed to vote on any of the resolutions and conventions. During this period the United-Kingdom did not put forward new nominations and UNESCO only enlisted British sites that were already under review (Dutt 1995, pp. 246–247).

1.4.4 Lay-out

In order to compare the heritage regimes of these two countries in more detail Chap. 2 will first describe the historical development of the German and the British heritage regime between 1945 and 1970. Chapter 3 will form the introduction to the first cluster of case studies. It will focus on potentially relevant landscape developments of the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, it will discuss the origins of the World Heritage Convention. Chapter 4 will focus on the World Heritage Site of Aachen Cathedral. This was the first German site to be enlisted into the World Heritage list in 1978. While this building traditionally served as a national monument, after the war its meaning was reconstructed around the theme of European solidarity and integration. Chapter 5 draws attention to the World Heritage site of Durham Cathedral and castle. The site was amongst the first in Britain to be proposed for World Heritage listing in the mid-1980s. However, the castle was in a terrible material state as a result of acid rain. The question soon arose who should pay for the restoration of the World Heritage: the owner or the government. These two case studies allow for analyzing the interaction between the niches and the regimes in the context of the emergence of UNESCO as a global player in the heritage field. How did the emergence of UNESCO affect the way traditional monuments were interpreted, and how did it change the division of responsibilities? Chapter 6 concludes the first cluster by comparing these two cases.

Chapter 7 introduces the case studies on industrial heritage in the 1980s and 1990s, outlining the main economic and political landscape developments of the

time and describing the emergence of industrial heritage as a new category of (World) heritage. Chapter 8 analyzes the transformation of the Zollverein mine in Essen from a working coal mine into a heritage site. This complex closed down in the 1980s. While some actors wished to demolish the buildings, others were in favour of preservation. Eventually the site was preserved and even enlisted into the World Heritage List in 2001. Chapter 9 studies the contested industrial heritage in the English region of Cornwall. In 1999 a local pressure group called the Revived Cornish Stannary Parliament—a local organization established in 1974—requested the national organisation English Heritage to remove signs bearing their name from heritage sites in Cornwall, because these should be regarded "Cornish heritage, not English" (CSP 2012, p. 1). The sensitivity of the question 'whose heritage?', manifests itself clearly in Cornwall. Both Zollverein and Cornwall can be perceived as potential niches where innovative approaches to heritage developed in the context of a de-industrializing landscape. These new approaches required adaptations and revisions on the part of established regime actors. Chapter 10 will compare and contrast the two cases.

Chapter 11 forms an introduction to the last cluster of case studies. The set focuses on an increasingly common type of World Heritage: cities. It will describe some of the most recent challenges to heritage in an urban context. Chapter 12 discusses the World Heritage Site in the city of Dresden. Dresden had become a World Heritage site in 2004 but was removed from the list in 2009 because the local authorities gave permission for the construction of a four-lane motorway bridge. Following the plans to construct the bridge, UNESCO argued that Dresden no longer qualified as World Heritage. Debates about the bridge took place at different levels varying from the municipality of Dresden, to the state and the federal government. Also local activists were engaged in the discussions. This chapter will analyse these debates. Chapter 13 focuses on Liverpool's conflict with UNESCO over new urban developments within its World Heritage Site. UNESCO contended that Liverpool's urban development altered the skyline of the World Heritage site. In 2021 it was decided to remove Liverpool from the World Heritage List. Chapter 14 concludes this set of case studies with a Multi-Level analysis on the way these controversies over urban development changed the heritage regimes in Germany and the United Kingdom.

Chapter 15 consists of an overall conclusion and will provide an answer to the main research question: How did the nationally oriented heritage regimes in the United Kingdom and Germany change under the influence of a global player, UNESCO, over the past fifty years? It will analyse what landscape developments put pressure on existing regime arrangements and which niche activities helped change heritage regimes. Moreover, this concluding chapter evaluates the usefulness of MLP for heritage studies and makes suggestions for further research on this subject.

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Chapter 2
A History of Germany's and Britain's Heritage Regimes (1945–1972)

2.1 Introduction

Heritage preservation is usually seen as a relatively recent phenomenon with origins that can be traced back to the social, political and economic revolutions of the nineteenth century. Eric Hobsbawm, explaining his 'invention of tradition'-thesis, noted about the nineteenth century that it was a turbulent time that called for "new devices to ensure or express social cohesion and identity and to structure social relations" (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, p. 263). 'National heritage' became one of these devices. Historic buildings were presented as tangible evidence of the nation's deep roots and helped underpin the states' territorial claims (Karlsson 2007). As a result, especially buildings that could be associated with the grand and glorious past of the nation were considered worth preserving (Glendinning 2013).

Heritage was in fact a crucial element of nationalist ideology. Graham, Ashworth and Tunbridge argued in this regard that: "Indeed nationalism and national heritage developed synchronously in nineteenth-century Europe. The nation-state required national heritage to consolidate national identification, absorb or neutralize potentially competing heritages of social-cultural groups or regions, combat the claims of other nations upon its territory or people, while furthering claims upon nationals in territories elsewhere" (Graham et al. 2000, p. 183). Through national heritage, a sense of lineage, unity and continuity of the nation was achieved. Preservationists were usually highly selective, focusing on buildings and objects that could be associated with national heroes, triumphs and achievements. This required "nothing less than the abolition of all contradiction in the name of national culture" (Bommes and Wright 1982, p. 264). National heritage objects helped to naturalize and justify the creation of nation-states.

In Germany, for example, the relatively late political unification, the strong persistence of regional ties, and the growth of democracy in a political culture still shaped by monarchical and aristocratic values called for the creation of a national heritage that could cohere the community (Koshar 2004; Huse 2006). Similar

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_2

nationalist notions propelled heritage preservation in Britain during the 'long nineteenth century' (Swenson 2013). Especially the aristocracy helped create a sense of national belonging by restoring and opening up country estates that formed not only a source of pride for the leading class, but also of national pride. Moreover, many restoration campaigns of church buildings owned by the Anglican Church were portrayed as a national duty (Swenson 2013, p. 60).

Despite the fact that the German and the British heritage regime both find their origin in nineteenth century nationalism, each took a different path and after World War II embraced different ways to govern and deal with heritage. This chapter attempts to sketch the heritage regimes first of Germany and then of the United Kingdom. It will outline the historic paths these regimes took between 1945 and the mid-1970s. It will introduce the main regime actors, organizations and institutions that emerged in both countries. Many of these are still active in the field today, or have played a role in one of the periods that this study focuses on. Moreover, the chapter describes the most important legislative changes during this period.

2.2 The German Heritage Regime

2.2.1 A Legacy of a War-Torn Landscape

During the Second World War over 130 German towns and cities were struck by Allied bombers. Besides the inconceivable human suffering, numerous buildings and artefacts of inestimable cultural, historical and architectural value were lost (Lambourne 2001). The discussions about heritage and its preservation—which had been so lively during the early twentieth century—faded in the face of this catastrophe (Hubel 2011, p. 131). Or, as the Westphalian preservationist Joseph Busley noted: "the burden of indescribably difficult conditions of daily existence [make thoughts of] a higher cultural life [impossible]" (Busley 1948—cited in Koshar 1998, p. 233; see also Speitkamp 1996).

While most landscape developments are slow, the war was an avalanche that hit the heritage regime abruptly. German preservationists were not only confronted with the sobering reality of destructed cities, they also faced political, economic and legal obstacles during the immediate post-war years. Several historic building records had suffered war-damage. The buildings that used to house the preservation offices were largely destroyed. There was only a provisional government in place that often had other priorities than the restoration or preservation of historic buildings. Although several German preservationists tried to get in touch with each other after the war, there was no formal framework for this either. In the absence of clear national guidelines, each German city chose its own way of dealing with the war-damage (von Beyme 1990; Diefendorf 1993). As there was no national coordination, individual restoration projects often depended on financial aid from abroad—mainly from former neutral states like Sweden and Switzerland (Hammer 1995; Koshar 1998).

An important step towards the establishment of a more or less coherent heritage regime in West-Germany was the drafting of the new constitution in 1949 which made heritage preservation a responsibility of the *Länder*. The constitution ensured the cultural autonomy of the *Länder*—a principle referred to as the *Kulturhoheit der Länder*. This move was a return to the system that had existed before the Nazis had centralized cultural policy. However, Schleswig-Holstein was initially the only *Land* with an actual heritage preservation law. Most other *Länder* would only follow this example in the 1970s (Fisch 2008, p. 87). After the drafting of the constitution, most *Länder* introduced a governance system that consisted of several levels and reinstalled an authority for the preservation of monuments—in most cases called the Landesamt für Denkmalpflege. These offices were led by chief conservators, who reported to the relevant minister.[1] In most cases this was the Minister of Culture and Education, although in some *Länder* the Minister of Internal Affairs was responsible.

The role of the heritage preservation offices of the *Länder* was primarily the supervision and coordination of heritage work, including the listing of monuments. Except in rare cases of particular importance, these offices did not intervene in the execution of preservation work. This was the role of the lower preservation authorities.[2] The jurisdiction of the lower preservation authorities varied. Some were responsible for large districts, while some cities had their own lower preservation authority under the leadership of a city conservator.[3] Almost all *Länder* followed this division in terms of higher and lower preservation authorities.[4] The only exception was North Rhine-Westphalia, which created an additional layer in the form of regions—with one office for the Rhineland and one for Westphalia-Lippe (Siegel 1985, pp. 266–267).[5] Despite the installation of this layered bureaucratic system, lack of public support made it hard for preservationists to defend their agenda. Due to the 'indescribably difficult conditions of daily existence' it was not easy to gain popular mandate for preservation. This was not only true for government offices, but also for private groups like the *Heimat* associations.

Saving historic landmarks was considered a luxury at a time when so many Germans were living in temporary barracks. The notion that preservation was merely a 'hobby of romantic antiquarians and idealists' already existed before the war, but gained popularity during the post-war reconstruction. With this criticism, the loud voices for renewal appeared to drown out the ones in favour of preservation. Some modernist urban planners saw the wasteland of ruins and rubble as an opportunity to accomplish their utopian plans, and threatened to demolish the last remaining historic buildings. The public demand for housing was so strong that many such plans seemed favourable at the time, and in some cases the modernist renovation

[1] These chief conservators are called in German the "Landeskonservators".

[2] The lower preservation authorities are called in German the "Untere Denkmalbehörden".

[3] Called in German the "Stadtdenkmalpfleger".

[4] The German term for these is "Obere Denkmalbehörden".

[5] These regions are called in German the "Landschaftsverbände".

process was even supported by local heritage officials (Hubel 2011, pp. 132–133). Although some cities choose to rebuild in a traditional style or along their historic street patterns, such plans were often criticized as being expensive forms of "sentimental romanticism" (Gutkind 1949, pp. 53–54).

In order to turn the tide, preservationists tried to explain to the public that monuments were not a luxury, but an elementary aspect of life. In an article entitled *Residential Building instead of Preservation of Monuments?* the Bavarian heritage official Christian Wallenreiter wrote for instance that: "social policy can only be successful if it is shaped by the knowledge that the social question has to do with the totality of existence [. . .] rather than only with economic matter". This totality of existence was in turn dependent on cultural referents such as monuments, which acted as spiritual mirrors that enabled the "*Volk* to recognize itself" (Wallenreiter 1952, p. 3). The message of this public outcry was clear. Preservation should not stand apart from the economic and political recovery of Germany, but should form a vital part of it. The campaign to convince the public of the importance of heritage preservation had only limited success, partly due to preservationists' alleged link to national-socialism. Heritage had been appropriated by the Nazis for nationalist purposes. The notion of *Heimat* had become a blemished by its association with the Nazi ideology of *Blut und Boden*. As a result, the official preservationists and private preservation societies—called *Heimatschutzvereine*—received criticism in the post-war era, for example during Mönchengladbach's 600th anniversary in 1950. This celebration was accompanied by a display of local historical artefacts and the publication of a book about the city's most prominent historic buildings. One observer was struck by the rhetoric of loyalty to the *Heimat* that was expressed at the festivities and cynically remarked: "Did we not hear the same thing in Hitler's time?" (cited in Koshar 1998, p. 423).

Responding to this kind of criticism, the Bavarian conservator George Lill felt the need to straighten the record. He wanted to: "once and for all inform the public about the heavy responsibilities German historic preservation took on during the war in an effort to protect the cultural treasures entrusted to it in the face of disastrous conditions and the often hostile hindrance by culturally ignorant Nazi government agencies" (Lill 1946b, p. 7). The fact that the Nazi regime had been welcomed by many of Lill's colleagues was largely ignored. Instead, preservationists were portrayed as heroic keepers of culture and tradition in the violent world of Nazi barbarism. Despite efforts to clear the name of preservationists, their association with Hitler's regime continued to be a problem throughout the entire reconstruction era. For most of its history, 'nationalism' was an important normative and cognitive 'rule' that kept the German heritage regime together, but the war had made it hard to legitimize preservation on such terms. Preservationists found themselves in an unfamiliar landscape wherein selection of heritage on the basis of nationalist principles had become unacceptable, financial and material shortage put a strain on restoration work and a bureaucratic and legislative framework had to be reinvented.

2.2.2 *Rebuilding the Heritage Regime*

In addition to the lack of public support, preservationists found themselves increasingly on the sideline of the reconstruction. They were often excluded from restoration works, and preservation policy was increasingly executed by institutions over which preservationists had little to no control. Heritage officials were also often excluded from the restoration of religious buildings. Both the Protestant and the Catholic Church had considerable autonomy and often hired architects to draw restoration plans without consulting preservation officials (Koshar 1998, pp. 209–210). Moreover, landscape factors such as a shortage of materials and skilled labour posed constraints on heritage preservation. Facing political, economic and social instability, heritage officials had to rethink their public task and readjust their conceptual framework. Before the war there had been a clear shift away from the nineteenth century notion of monumentality. An increasing number of 'ordinary' buildings such as farmhouses, dwellings and mills had been listed. Also larger areas like villages or historic city centres enjoyed a monumental status. Due to the limited availability of financial, material and human resources it became virtually impossible to preserve large areas. Preservationists therefore abandoned the wide purview of preservation and began to focus again on 'high culture' buildings such as cathedrals, castles and palaces (Koshar 1998, p. 211). City and state authorities often favoured the rebuilding of key public buildings, museums and other monumental structures, while restorers of vernacular and private buildings had to seek funds elsewhere.

'First class' buildings like the Goethe House and Cathedral of St. Paul in Frankfurt am Main or Schloss Charlottenburg in Berlin were restored or re-built while 'lesser' historic structures were largely ignored. As said, this narrower purview of heritage was born out of economic, political and social necessity. However, the renewed focus on the 'monumental' cannot be explained as a response to practical constraints alone. Protecting only a limited number of historic sites and buildings went hand in hand with a more general return to an elitist notion of culture. Prominent historic buildings were treated as symbols of a glorious past—although this past was fundamentally different from the past that was evoked in previous decades. More and more, preservationists became custodians of "highly visible public symbols rather than fields of care" (Koshar 1998, p. 212).

Besides instigating a re-conceptualization of heritage selection criteria, the post-war reconstruction process forced preservationists to reconsider the practice of rebuilding and restoring, and to rethink the associated notion of authenticity. Some preservation purists stood by their pre-war principles and argued that replicas or fakes would have little or no artistic and historic value, while others believed that the specific circumstances demanded a less conservative approach. Although the traditional doctrine of 'conserve, don't restore' was bolstered by many German art historians, popular opinion often favoured the recreation of destroyed monuments (Stubbs and Makaš 2011, p. 210).

In the case of the restoration of structures with a complex building history, such as churches built in various phases and styles, many restoration architects chose to seize

the opportunity to remove 'unfitting' or 'misplaced' architectural additions. During the early 1950s, for example, the restorers of St. Michael's church in Hildesheim—a world heritage site since 1985—decided to restore the building to its 'original' eleventh century Romanesque form by removing all elements of later building styles (Hubel 2011, pp. 139–140). Also many nineteenth century historicist style features were removed during the post-war reconstruction era. These kinds of reconstructions can be seen as a way to reconnect to the 'better' part of the German past. In these cases, all the war damage was reversed and by removing historicist elements, the reminders of nineteenth century nationalism were wiped out as well. By restoring churches to their 'original' form, the threads for the German nation were carefully re-knit around themes like Christian harmony. It was hoped that now people could visit church without being constantly reminded of the nation's traumatic experience. This move to the plane of European Christianity already existed before and during the war—the proponents of *Kunstschutz* also claimed to save the Occident, but this discourse gained more prominence after the war. In this new arrangement the nation is not predominant anymore, but stands alongside the Occident and the region.

The regime that slowly began to take shape in this period had an international outlook and aimed to connect to early post-war transnational initiative. At the same time, it focused on the regions and firmly grounded the cultural autonomy of the *Länder* in the constitution. This de-nationalization of monuments preservation—both through regionalization and through internationalization—can be explained partly as a response to the overly nationalist appropriation of culture under the Nazi regime. Moreover, successfully showing that these buildings were not only of value to Germany, but had European, Occidental or universal values as well, meant that Germany's former enemies would be more likely to contribute to their preservation and restoration. In 1946 the former conservator and personal tour guide of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Paul Clemen plead for international aid by stressing that the restoration of monuments was a shared burden: "Today the whole of Europe and her culture stands trembling and moved by the wounds that this war has left behind – in the whole of Europe. Should we not – we who bear these wounds and who inflicted them in the course of the war– try to heal them. . .together?" (Clemen 1946, pp. 20–21; see also Thamer 1997, pp. 109–137).

This hope was shared by Germany's former enemies. Immediately after the war, the American military offered 'cultural aid', and helped for instance to find materials for emergency repairs for the Dom in Aachen. One officer of the American Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives division—popularly known as 'the monuments men'—wrote about the positive response to their work: "Was there, perhaps, in this mutual confidence and common interest, the germ of something that might be made to work for world peace at least as effectively as the disciplinary measures upon which we now rest so much faith?" (Hancock 1946, p. 311). The underlying idea of this kind of international collaboration was that culture formed a neutral terrain for reconciliation between Germany and its neighbours. Arts and culture supposedly transcended the boundaries of nation-states, or as the German preservationist Georg Lill noted: "Anyone who feels deeply about art feels the same piercing pain when hearing that the cathedral of Reims or the cathedral of Cologne has been

destroyed" (Lill 1946a, p. 20). While collaboration on a political level would have been deemed inappropriate so soon after the war, the difficult process of reconciliation could at least slowly start on the "carefully depoliticized patch of cultural ground" (Lambourne 2001, p. 195).

Lill even claimed that the cultural sphere was the *only* area in which Germany could retain international respect: "No more power politics or world trade for Germany. One thing remains to us: not just the memory that we were a cultural nation of world significance, no, more the fact that we still are" (Lill 1946a, p. 32). The cultural sphere could gain from Marshall help, but unlike economics or politics, culture was not completely determined by it. Despite the hope of both Germany and the United States to use heritage as a means to reconcile Germany and its European neighbours, former Axis countries were initially not granted permission to join the most obvious international platform for cultural exchange: the newly founded UNESCO. When UNESCO was established in 1946, Austria, Italy and Germany were excluded. While the former two were granted membership in 1947, Germany was only admitted in 1951. The membership of Germany was mainly obstructed by Poland. The main rationale behind this exclusion was that—unlike Polish, Dutch, French or English cities – German historic cities had 'deserved' their misfortune (Lambourne 2001, p. 197). The belated admission of Germany to UNESCO meant that Germany was excluded from the European-wide surveys of war damage, which was executed by UNESCO in the late 1940s.

2.2.3 The Consolidation of the German Heritage Regime

According to the legal historian Felix Hammer, heritage preservation in Germany was largely incoherent and ineffective in the first years after the war. He noted that in most *Länder* heritage preservation was: "very rudimentary and insufficiently incorporated in the legal system" (Hammer 1995, p. 285).[6] However, there were several attempts—both on the level of the *Länder* and of the federation—to make the policy more effective and coherent. In 1951, for instance, the Society for the Monument Preservationists of the *Länder* was formed to coordinate the activities of the various state agencies.[7] The organization was divided in different specialized groups, mainly focusing on specific restoration methods or buildings from specific time periods or building material. The association also published its own professional journal and organized conferences for professional conservators. According to historian Stefan Fisch (2008), the Association of State Conservationists acted as "some kind of functional equivalent of the non-existent central administrative authority" (87), yet it only coordinated between the different state conservationists. It acted under the auspices of the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural

[6] "höchts rudimentär und ungenügend kodifiziert".

[7] Called in German the "Vereinigung der Ländesdenkmalpfeger".

Affairs of the Federal States in the Federal Republic of Germany, often abbreviated to KMK.[8] The KMK was founded in 1949 in order to streamline educational and cultural policy in the different *Länder* (Stubbs and Makaš 2011, p. 214). The primary aim of the KMK was to avoid major differences within Germany. However, it also acted as the representative of Germany in international cultural and educational organizations such as UNESCO.

Despite these apparent signs of interest, the early 1960s were devastating for Germany's heritage. Although the urge for urban renewal in the 1960s swept historic towns all over Europe, in Germany—at least in the West—the break with the past was even more radical. The historian Jason James explained: "Most post-war urban reconstruction [in West-Germany] abandoned notions of heritage and tradition due to their association with fascism, favouring instead a modernist approach to architecture and planning that would signal a radical break with the past" (James, 2004, p. 151). However, as the 1960s progressed, more people began to regret the radical changes to the urban environment. "The earlier desire to remake West-German cities in a modern, democratic cast, some contended, had actually made them uniform and dysfunctional, lacking in character, memory and community ties" (ibid.). With regret and nostalgia some officials observed that many West-German cities had mutated into "schematic Legolands" (Hampel-Zöllner 1990, cited in James 2004, p. 151).

According to some critics, even so-called historic cities lacked authenticity because they had lost their original substance. By 1968, only four in every ten residential buildings in small villages predated 1900. In cities, this ratio had dropped to only two in every ten buildings (Koshar 1998, p. 292). In the early 1970s, however, the attitude slowly began to change. Growing dissatisfaction with the modernist buildings of the previous decades fuelled a call for preservation. In 1972 the German Urban League began a campaign under the slogan 'Save Our Cities Now!'—a catchphrase that pointed to the renewed social interest in historic buildings and their preservation (Fuhrich and Goderbauer 2011, pp. 49–50).[9] West-Germany experienced the beginnings of what the Hessian conservator Bentmann typified as a new cult of monuments.[10] After 25 years of rapid change and renewal, a "wave of nostalgia" came over the nation. Germans regressed "into the lap of history and into the warm stone and wooden heart of old cities". Bentmann, like many of his colleagues, was rather sceptical of this general trend and described it as an attempt to "escape the responsibility of being 'grown-up'" (Bentmann 1975, cited in Koshar 1998, p. 289). As the rise of the new cult could not be undone, professional preservationist should, according to Bentmann, deal with the increased popularity of heritage. He recommended that preservationists should, for instance, find ways to

[8] The official German name for this body is the "Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland". In day-to-day language this name is abbreviated to "Kultusministerkonferenze" or "KMK".

[9] The original German campaign slogan was 'Rettet unsere Städte jetzt!'.

[10] With this characterization Bentmann refers to the seminal work *Moderne Denkmalkultus: Sein Wesen und seine Entstehung* of the Austrian art historian Alois Riegl (1903). Around the turn of the twentieth century, Riegl observed a collective obsession with heritage.

deal with new phenomena such as mass tourism and increasing involvement of amateur enthusiasts, as well as with the urban development of the previous decades.

This period saw a change in the role and self-image of heritage professionals. Architecture expert Manfred Sack wrote that "the idea of the conservative conservator, the 'gilder of the nation' who shuns the present and sees his task even today as consisting only in the museal protection of a few art-historically preferred monuments, is passé [. . .] In his place belongs the conservator who enjoys reality, who conceptualizes and practices historic preservation in its connection with the politics of urban development" (Sack 1975, cited in Koshar 1998, p. 299). The profession had to adapt also to the new reality of the increasing popularity of heritage. The period witnessed, for example, an immense growth in the number of voluntary heritage organizations and a significant increase in membership to the existing ones. The new cult of monuments went hand in hand with an unprecedented tourist boom in Germany. The number of overnight stays in Germany grew by 60% between 1964 and 1975. Germany became one of the most popular holiday destination for American tourists in Europe, second only to the Netherlands. Masses of tourists flocked to picturesque villages, old churches and castles. It was "a pilgrimage that worried preservationists but delighted mayors, shopkeepers, and travel agents" (Koshar 1998, p. 316).

One of the perceived ways to cope with the consequences of increasing popularity of monuments was new legislation. Although the national government was constitutionally not allowed to intervene in matters of cultural heritage preservation, it did intervene in affairs that had a direct impact on heritage. An example of this is the Federal Building Law of 1960, which required local authorities to consider cultural assets when proceeding with building projects and permitted some degree of intervention by the federal government in development and building disputes (Stubbs and Makaš 2011, pp. 213–215; see also Stubbs 2009). Moreover, in 1971, the federal government had passed an Urban Renewal Law, which was supposed to regulate unwieldy urban development projects. This law forced planning authorities to take into account 'cultural requirements', including historic building preservation, when deciding on planning issues. The law also made subsidies available for patching-up worn-down historic city centres. The federal government and the governments of the *Länder* together paid two-third of costs of such projects. The remainder was paid for by the municipalities. Local authorities were given relative freedom to spend the funding. Almost 600 projects of this kind were finished between 1971 and 1978.

The federal government also tried to give direction to preservation through international charters. In 1964, Germany signed the *Venice Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites*, commonly known as the Venice Charter (ICOMOS 1964). This influential document provided international guidelines for the conduct of restoration and preservation work, and formed the founding text for the International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS). The impact of international charters like the Venice Charter is visible in most German States. The principles expressed in ICOMOS charters inform heritage legislation in most states especially when it comes to restoration ethics. In practices, however, it is often impossible to exactly follow all the guidelines due to the ever expanding number of

monuments. The National Association of Land Conservationists functions as a platform where the authorities of the *Länder* collaborate. It holds conventions and draws up common positions in nation-wide specialist working groups to allow *Länder* to benefit from each other's expertise (Brüggemann and Schwarzkopf 2001).

By the early 1970s, the German heritage regime had developed into a system in which the *Länder* were responsible for heritage preservation. Most *Länder* were in the process of drafting heritage laws which would be implemented one by one in the course of the 1970s and would further consolidate their dominant position. Meanwhile, the federal government was getting involved in various international initiatives and organizations. Heritage preservation received much public support. The wave of destruction of historic buildings that had occurred in the 1960s was over. Now heritage preservation was widely perceived as an important societal function with economic and socio-cultural potential.

2.3 The British Heritage Regime

2.3.1 Post-War Heritage in the United Kingdom

It is perhaps a cliché, but one learns to appreciate objects more when they are threatened with loss or destruction. In this sense it is not surprising—although maybe ironic—that the bombing of British towns and cities during World War II gave a boost for the field of heritage preservation. The heritage regime of the United Kingdom of today is largely a product of the challenging landscape of this time. While pre-war attempts at heritage preservation were often dispersed, incoherent and informal, the threats of the war and the challenges of the reconstruction required a formalized division of labour. In this new division, the national government became increasingly dominant in setting the heritage selection criteria and in standardizing preservation methods. As the architectural theorist and conservationist John Pendlebury noted: "the role of the state was transformed [. . .] from being a bystander to becoming a provider and implementer of a comprehensive conservation system" (Pendlebury 2009, p. 38).

In this period, various regime actors became formally linked to each other through previously absent legislative and bureaucratic ties. Also many common practices and methods find their origins in the war years. The systematic listing of historic buildings, for example, was first applied during the war to help salvage teams with the difficult task of clearing the rubble resulting from air raids (Ross 1991, p. 19). The threats of destruction also led to the foundation of the National Building Record (NBR), which was assigned the painstaking task of conducting a complete photographic survey of historic buildings in England before it would be too late. This institution continues to exist today under the name National Monument Record (NMR), and recently changed its name again to Historic England Archive. It has still not completed its assignment, not least due to the immense broadening of the

heritage scope since its establishment in 1940 (Pendlebury 2009, p. 43; Delafons 1997).

The 1940s also saw a number of important legislative provisions. The *Town and Country Planning Act 1944*, for example, made it possible to protect privately owned historic buildings. This was a major step, given Britain's longstanding reluctance to meddle with property rights. The Act also enabled—yet not required—the new Minister of Town and Country Planning to prepare heritage lists for the guidance of local planning authorities. However, heritage preservation formed only a minor part of the new Minister's portfolio responsibilities, which included urban planning, housing and infrastructure too. It is not surprising that—in a time when roads, houses and factories laid in ruins—not much was done to undertake a systematic survey of the surviving heritage initially. This changed when the post-war Labour government wrote a new *Town and Country Planning Act*, which passed parliament in 1947. In the first draft, the clause concerning heritage preservation was literally copied from the 1944 Act. Regarding the role of the Minister it stated that he: "may compile lists of such buildings [of special architectural or historic interest]" (Delafons 1997, p. 59). A crucial, last-minute amendment was made by the conservative politician Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords: the word 'may' was changed to 'shall'—thus changing the listing of historic buildings from a noncommittal Ministerial capacity into a statutory duty.

When Lord Salisbury introduced his proposal to the House on July 1, 1947 it became clear that he would rather see the national Ministry taking the lead in this matter, because he deemed the local planning authorities incapable of making complete inventories of historic buildings. He expressed his concern that local planning authorities would exclude buildings which experts would include (Delafons 1997, p. 60). Clearly, Lord Salisbury expected the central government to hire 'experts' who would do a swift and thorough survey of the national heritage. In reality, the process was slow and often inefficient. The main reason for this was that there were not many architectural historians around and still less of them able or willing to undertake lengthy fieldwork for the low salary that was offered. Most of the work was therefore done by amateurs working on a voluntary or near-voluntary basis, who were given the title 'investigators'. Salisbury's hope that the national survey would be more inclusive then preceding local inventories, turned out to be false. The Ministry of Town and Country planning had issued—in confidence—a document entitled *Instructions to Investigators* (see Delafons 1997, pp. 194–200). Even though the listing criteria presented in this document were rather progressive and inclusive—it mentioned for instance industrial structures, buildings of sociological interest, and the possibility of listing groups of buildings–, the investigators on the ground ignored substantial parts of the historic built environment. Many entries for villages, for instance, consisted simply of the church and the 'big house'. Small buildings or structures built after 1800 were often not even considered (Ross 1991, pp. 23–24).

However, the "shades of the amateur sleuth" (Ross 1991, p. 23) of the first years of the investigation process, began to disappear with the introduction of the *Historic Building and Ancient Monument Act* in 1953. This Act established the Historic

Buildings Council for England—the predecessor of English Heritage. It also created similar bodies for Scotland and Wales. Although these three organizations kept their own lists of heritage, they fell under the responsibility of the UK government. It was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that the governments of Scotland and Wales took over this responsibility. Heritage preservation in England—in the absence of a government of its own—remains a responsibility of the British government. The Historic Buildings Councils consisted of the leading scholars of the day, giving the government access to scholarship and expertise. The act also made provisions for government grants for the upkeep of privately owned monuments. The Council assisted the Minister with distributing the grants and formulating criteria (Delafons 1997).

2.3.2 *A New Challenge: Heritage and the British Urban Landscape*

The legislative and financial steps, however, formed no match for the sledgehammers and bulldozers of developers, who began to play a more important role. In fact, more historic buildings were lost during the post-war reconstruction then during the war itself. In response to these threats and the loopholes in the government's investigation, several non-governmental organizations were established in this period, which lobbied for the preservation of specific building types or architectural styles. In 1957, for instance, the Victorian Society was established by John Betjeman and Lady Rosse—wife of the co-founder of the Georgian Group that was established twenty years before. The immediate cause of the foundation of the Victorian Society was the plan to demolish the Euston Arch in London. Eventually the campaign to salvage the arch was in vain; the structure was pulled down in 1961 (Ross 1991, p. 24).

Also the Civic Trust was established in 1957 by the Conservative Member of Parliament Duncan Sandys—Winston Churchill's son-in-law. Like the Victorian Society, it was formed out of feeling of heavy indignation about the redevelopment of London—in this case the plan to renovate Piccadilly Circus. The popularity of organizations like the Victorian Society and the Civic Trust grew rapidly during the 1960s. While the former had barely 600 members in 1961, that number grew to 1700 in 1968. The latter initiative grew to 700 local affiliates by the mid-1960s. Despite the growing public concern for heritage preservation and the minor successes of non-governmental organizations, the demolition continued. In 1962, for example, the London Coal Exchange was pulled down in spite of a public outcry to salvage it. More worrisome than the loss of individual buildings, however, was the large-scale redevelopment of historic town and city centres in Britain. Cases like the demolition of a large number of neo-classicist buildings around Eldon square in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, which were replaced by a colossal concrete shopping centre, proved that the existing legislation was insufficiently strict. The *Town and Country*

Planning Act and the *Historic Building and Ancient Monument Act* only offered possibilities to list individual buildings or small ensembles; it was impossible to protect whole areas (Pendlebury 2001).

Meanwhile in the late 1960s, the first national survey of individual historic buildings—a project that had begun just after the war—was finalized. Almost 120,000 buildings were given statutory protection. Some 5000 were in the top Grade I. The rest was either in Grade II or Grade II*. A further 137,000 buildings were listed under the non-statutory Grade III category. This was no guarantee for protection, but it helped local authorities whenever they came to consider proposals affecting them. The lists were, somewhat confusingly, divided into 'provisional lists'—which contained brief descriptions of the buildings–, and 'statutory lists'—which gave the name and address of the owners (Ross 1991, p. 24). Many local authorities complained about this lack of clarity. Moreover, during the last phase of the inventory, it became clear that the listing of individual buildings alone was an insufficient legal tool to counter the large-scale urban re-development projects of those years. In the years that followed, the government took several measures to change this situation. Especially the introduction of the 'conservation area' and a more integral approach to preservation and planning became the government's policy responses to the situation for much of the 1960s and 1970s (Delafons 1997).

A first step was taken in 1966 when the government commissioned the *Four Towns Reports*. These were four separate case-studies on Bath, Chester, Chichester and York, and were carried out by consultancy agencies. The reports not only identified place-specific issues, but also provided more general lessons that could be applied to other historic towns and cities. The report discussed a great number of widely relevant questions and problems including economic issues, the desolation of old buildings, traffic pressure and the difficulty to find financial means to counter decay. Responding to the *Four Towns Reports* the government set up a new committee—the Preservation Policy Group (PPG). This multi-disciplinary group included the famous German-born architectural historian Sir Nikolaus Pevsner, the widely respected economist Professor Alan Day, the architect, designer and sculpture Theo Crosby, as well as some of the best practitioners from several local authorities. The main tasks of the PPG were to reflect on the *Four Towns Reports*, review and compare experiences elsewhere in the United Kingdom and abroad, and to recommend legal, financial and administrative arrangements for heritage preservation. The committee seemed well aware of the growing public interest in their work which formed the backdrop to their efforts. In their report of 1970 the PPG stated: "We do not think it would be an exaggeration to say there has been a revolution over the past five years in the way old buildings are regarded, and the importance now attached by public opinion to preservation and conservation" (PPG 1970, p. 1).

The report had little to recommend with regards to new legislation. Instead it focused on the execution of the existing laws: "What are needed are not more powers but the will, the skill, and the money to use the powers that already exist" (PPG 1970). Nonetheless, the committee had a few recommendations for legislative change. First, it argued that local authorities should be able to recover from owners

the costs of any emergency repair that it undertook to prevent further deterioration of a listed building. Secondly, local authorities should be able to initiate preservation schemes in the knowledge that central grants would be forthcoming. Thirdly, owners should no longer be eligible for compensation for the 'break-up' value of their property in case local authorities had acquired it to ensure its preservation. The recommendations were implemented two years later.

While the PPG had been drafting its final report between 1966 and 1970, the government had been very active on other fronts too. Most importantly, in 1967 the Ministry of Housing and Local Government—a Ministry that had been established in 1951 as a somewhat odd fusion between several departments of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Town and Country Planning—wrote the report *Preservation and Change*. This work was printed in a—for government standards—exceptional quality, in a large format and with many high-quality pictures. Also content wise the authors of the report have often been praised for their innovative and outstanding work. It painted a frightening picture, pointing out that if redevelopment would continue at the same pace, within 50 years every British town would have been rebuilt completely (Delafons 1997).

The twentieth century, it was argued, brought numerous benefits for town dwellers, but also wrought destruction. The authors stated that preservation should be compatible with change. It meant that preservation should not simply be about saving listed buildings. Instead, it was argued, one should look at the whole physical composition of historic areas—the size and proportion of the buildings, their alignment and roof-lines, their detailing, structure and colour. This holistic and morphological perception of urban development should guide planning policy. *Preservation and Change* thus stressed—for the first time—the importance of an integral vision on planning and preservation. Many of the ideas presented in *Preservation and Change* came from a small group of civil servants in the Ministry of Housing and Local Government led by the architect-planner Roy Worskett. In 1969, he published his own book *The Character of Towns: An Approach to Conservation*, which elaborated some of the ideas that were already discussed in *Preservation and Change*, and made an important contribution to the conceptualization of the 'conservation area' (Worskett 1969).

2.3.3 The Widening of the Regime

Another important step that led to the introduction of the 'conservation area' concept was the implementation of the *Civic Amenities Act* in 1967. This Act was the brainchild of Lord Kennet, the Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Housing and Local Government between 1966 and 1970. Kennet began his Ministerial job by paying educational visits to France. He learned about the French concept 'zone protégé'. These zones consisted of circles of one kilometre around every listed monument within which proposed demolition and new building had to be approved by the central government. This system was invented by André Malraux, the French

Minister of Culture, in 1962. Although Kennet did not believe that the French approach could be readily transferred to the United Kingdom—not least because it had about four times as many listed monuments than France–, he was "attracted by the idea of increasing central government control at the expense of local government" (cited in Delafons 1997, p. 100). Kennet discerned another difference between France and Britain: while in France the main threat was dereliction, in Britain it was development. In Kennet's view, it was therefore important to define which areas were suited for large-scale development, and which were not.

The crystallization of these ideas into concrete policy was—again—propelled by a specific threat to historic buildings in London. The case involved two adjoining terraced houses in St. James' Square, owned by the Earl of Iveagh. Building preservation notices had been served by the Minister of Housing and Local Government on the grounds that their demolition or alteration would have an unfavourable effect on the square. The Earl challenged this decision and in 1964 the case came forth in the Court of Appeal. The Court had to decide whether a building should be listed for its intrinsic special architectural or historic interest, or whether it might possess such interests simply by virtue of being part of a group. The Court ruled in favour of the Minister, but the decision was not unanimous—indicating that the law was not clear on this point. This led to a growing awareness of the importance of conserving larger areas, and ultimately, in 1967, to the *Civic Amenities Act*. This Act legally forced local authorities to "determine which parts of their area [. . .] are areas of special architectural or historic interest the character or appearance of which it is desirable to preserve or enhance and shall designate such areas". It was already predicted that these areas would cover large surfaces: "Conservation areas will [..] be numerous. It is for this reason that the Act requires local planning authorities to designate them". The Act was vigorously defended in Parliament by Duncan Sandys, and had the full support of the Civic Trust. Sandys explained in Parliament that: "The Bill had three purposes: to preserve beauty, to remove ugliness [and] to protect the character not only of individual buildings of interest but also the areas around them" (Delafons 1997, pp. 100–101).

In 1968, one year after the implementation of the *Civic Amenities Act*, the government introduced a new *Town and Country Planning Act*, which replaced the Act of 1947. The new law strengthened the protection of historic buildings by abolishing the 'building preservation order'. Before this Act, such an order had to be given out every time a listed building was threatened with alteration. Under this law, the list itself effectively became a preservation order, so that any building on the list was automatically subject to listed building control. For owners this meant more clarity. They no longer had to wait for the Damoclean sword of the building preservation order, but knew straightaway that their listed building was subject to the consent procedure. Another facet of the 1968 Act was that local authorities were given the power to temporarily serve building preservation orders for non-listed historic buildings, until the Minister had had a chance to determine whether this building should be listed permanently (Delafons 1997, p. 102).

Moreover, the Act gave several organizations the status of 'amenity society'. Old-established societies like the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings as

well as younger organizations like the Georgian Group and the Victorian Society were now official 'statutory consulters'. This meant that local planning authorities were obliged to ask their advice regarding any plan affecting historic buildings. Although the advice was not binding, it did give these societies the opportunity to comment on planning proposals and assist both applicants and planning authorities. The emergence of organizations like the Victorian Society had been the direct consequence of the interplay between the rapidly changing urban landscape and the existing regime's insufficient acknowledgement of the value of Victorian architecture, which was generally excluded from the official lists. Through the creation of the amenities societies, the heritage regime 'pulled in' organizations like the Victorian Society and gave them an official role in heritage preservation. Apart from creating the amenities societies, the Act also, for the first time, made Crown buildings eligible for listing. Until 1968, Crown buildings were not subject to listed building control. Given the large number of historic buildings in the ownership of the Crown—for instance all the real-estate owned by the government—this was an important step (Delafons 1997, p. 103).

In 1969, the government started a resurvey of the national heritage—barely two months after the first survey had finished. The main reason was that the existing lists were already outdated. The lenient system of control that existed before the 1968 reforms meant that many listed buildings had long disappeared, or had been altered in such a way that they were no longer of 'listable' quality. Moreover, many lists had been created 10 or 20 years before, and reflected the architectural taste of those days. This is exemplified by the limited attention for Victorian and neo-Gothic architecture. Investigators were given a new set of criteria which had the approval of the Historic Buildings Council. These new criteria ensured that Victorian architecture was included, and stressed that attention should not only be paid to the age of a building, but also to its economic, social, or technological significance, as well as its importance as an example of its building-type. Moreover, the lay-out of the lists was simplified. The non-statutory Grade III was dropped—although most of the Grade III buildings were now considered worthy of an upgrade to Grade II. The old 'provisional' and 'statutory' lists were abolished in favour of a single volume. The lists no longer mentioned the owners and occupiers, but did include fuller descriptions of the buildings. The poorly duplicated sheet of foolscap on which the old lists were printed, were replaced with neatly covered volumes. In 1971, the Act was replaced with yet another *Town and Country Planning Act*. Several important new provisions were made. Local authorities were now, for example, allowed to do emergency repair to historic buildings, the costs of which could be reclaimed from the owner. In 1972, the law was amended to implement the recommendations of the PPG (Ross 1991, pp. 40–41).

Moreover, the Act was amended to permit the Secretary of State to make funds available by grant or loan for work connected to the promotion, preservation or enhancement of outstanding conservation areas. The definition of 'outstanding conservation area' was set by the Historic Buildings Council. Similar to the grading and listing of buildings, the criterion for receiving a grant was that the conservation area should be "so splendid and so precious that the ultimate responsibility for them

should be a national concern" (Ross 1991, p. 29). Another reform introduced in 1972 was the control of demolition of unlisted buildings within conservation areas. Perhaps characteristic for the traditional English reluctance to meddle with property rights, this control was again rather lenient—using a system akin to the old building preservation order that had just been abolished in the case of listed buildings (Andreae 1996).

In 1974 this ill-considered solution was pushed aside when the government introduced the *Town and Country Amenities Act*. This Act ensured that any building within a conservation area was automatically subjected to control. Other, less important, reforms introduced by the 1974 Act were the protection of trees and the restriction of advertisement within conservation areas. These changes were executed by the newly established Department of the Environment (DoE), which in 1970 had taken over the responsibility for heritage preservation from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. DoE—often jokingly referred to as the 'Department of Everything'—was a typical example of the monstrously large ministries that were created in the early 1970s. Its responsibilities included transport matters, housing, environmental protection and a number of other tasks. Despite—or perhaps because of—these bureaucratic and legislative shifts, the number of conservation areas continued to grow at an incredible rate. The success of the implementation of this concept is difficult not to appreciate (Ross 1991; Delafons 1997).

Already in June 1970, the Civic Trust announced the 1000th conservation area. Also the variety of types of conservation areas grew and now included streets, village greens, town centres and squares. By the mid-1970s the number of conservation areas had reached 3000. In the 1970s more and new forms of grants were made available for preservation purposes. With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to see the 1970s as part of the upsurge of interest in heritage preservation that was reinforced in subsequent decades, but at the time this was far less evident (Pendlebury 2009, pp. 61–62). Meanwhile, the criticism on the resurvey that had started in 1969 became louder. According to critics the process went far too slow. The slow pace of the resurvey led to dissatisfaction amongst activist preservation groups, as well as amongst individuals with a passion for historic buildings. The investigators therefore often received requests to consider particular buildings which were allegedly overlooked in the previous survey. This time-consuming procedure was known as 'spot-listing'. The investigators were legally obliged to consider such requests. As a result, the resurvey process slowed down even more (Earl 2003, p. 98). It would take until 1987 before it was finalized.

2.4 Conclusion: Comparing and Contrasting

Between 1945 and 1970, heritage preservation was contested; its sense and need constantly questioned (Howard 2003). Despite the efforts of both government bodies and private organizations to fight for the preservation of historic buildings, the *Zeitgeist* often favoured the new over the old. The landscape of post-war Europe

posed almost insurmountable challenges for preservationists in Germany and the United Kingdom alike. Both countries suffered major war-damage, faced an unprecedented housing challenge and had to cope with limited material and human resources. Yet the way both countries faced these challenges differed. One of the key differences is the government system that evolved in both countries. Germany (at least West-Germany), reintroduced the federal government system after a relatively short period of centralization under National-Socialist rule. This decentralized structure is deeply embedded in the German political culture as well as in the constitution. The relative independence of the *Länder* has led to different organizational arrangements, authorities and priorities within Germany.

In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the challenges of the post-war period led to a higher degree of centralization. Here, reconstruction efforts were organized from the central level. Although the responsibility for the execution of these laws and regulations regularly shifted from one ministry to another, it was always firmly in the hands of the national government. One possible reason is that the popular mandate for heritage preservation in Britain was arguably greater than it was in Germany in the post-war era. Already in the late 1940s, studying ancient buildings became a popular hobby and visiting heritage sites became a widespread leisure activity in the United Kingdom. In Germany, on the other hand, heritage preservation had become tarnished by its association with national extremism. The general public was sceptical towards investing time, money and effort in preservation. The past was something best forgotten or ignored. The war had knocked-down the existing bureaucratic structure for preservation and had caused major shortage of restoration materials. The war also made people despise the past—or at least caused them to be indifferent to it. The first line of the GDR national anthem—"risen from ruins and facing the future"—could have applied to either side of the German-German border.[11] Given the material and technical difficulties and the general scepticism vis-à-vis the past, it is not surprising that it took a long time before the heritage regime in Germany re-stabilized.

In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the war led to a slow but steady professionalization of preservation and heritage management. Unlike in Germany, where the attitude was generally biding, the British government immediately after the war assumed a leading role in the reconstruction and the preservation of historic buildings. This difference in attitude also had an impact on the regimes' regulative rules, especially in legislative terms. A number of differences can be identified between Germany and Britain on this point. While it took a relatively long time before a legal system was in place in Germany (most *Länder* did not even have a heritage law until the 1970s), in Britain the body of laws related to heritage preservation grew consistently between the late 1940s and the 1970s. Also the position of private initiatives differed. In Germany, only the Bavarian law (and after the reunification of Germany also the Saxon law) explicitly mentioned the cooperation with volunteers in the field as an essential element of heritage protection

[11] "Auferstanden aus Ruinen und der Zukunft zugewandt".

(Fisch 2008, p. 87). In the United Kingdom, on the other hand the law gave special status to (certain) voluntary organizations via the amenities' act. A possible explanation for this is the general scepticism in Germany—also in government circles—towards the traditional *Heimatvereine*, which were associated with nationalist ideologies. The British non-governmental organizations did not face this problem and could, after the war, pick up where they left and soon assumed an official role within the heritage regime. Another explanation could be that most German private heritage organizations focused on certain regions—although there are important exceptions. While such regional and regionalist organizations also existed in Britain, most heritage organizations here focused on specific building types or architectural styles that are not bound to any specific region.

These differences between Germany and Britain, however, would become more and more unclear during the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. In what follows, I will show that the abovementioned typologies were not set in stone, but that the two regime types—at least in some respects—are becoming more alike. Moreover, I will show how the established and historically developed regime arrangements were complicated as a result of the involvement of international organizations like UNESCO. It has become increasingly difficult to reduce the differences between the German and the British heritage regime to clear-cut oppositional characteristics. The emergence of new actors and interests has made the analysis of the heritage field more problematic. In the time period that was studied in this chapter, governments—either at the national or the sub-national level—dominated the regime and set most of the rules. As a result, one could draw a relatively complete picture of the main developments in the field by studying official policy documents and the main views of a handful of private organizations – as I indeed did in this chapter. However, in the years that followed, the field has become ever more complex. The Multi-Level analysis provided in the following parts of the book is an attempt to do justice to some of that complexity.

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Part II
Traditional Monuments (1970s–1980s)

Chapter 3
Tumultuous Times: Landscape Developments 1970–1980

3.1 Introduction

On November 16 1972, the UNESCO General Conference in Paris adopted the *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage* (UNESCO 1972), or, as it is commonly known, the World Heritage Convention. The two case studies in this part of the book regard the nomination and preservation of the first German site and one of the first British sites that were registered under this international treaty. Through these cases I will analyze how the German and the British heritage regimes developed in the early years of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention. The main aim of this introductory chapter to Part II is to identify and describe landscape developments that potentially enabled or disabled regime change. Its purpose is thus not to merely provide a context for the case-studies that follow, but to identify those landscape developments that possibly created constraints and affordances for regime and niche actors. One of the most important of these was the global economy—not least because in this period heritage was often considered a luxury that was to be paid for by the surplus of the economy. The idea that heritage was not simply a costly luxury but also an economic driver emerged in the course of the 1970s, and only became common policy practice in the 1980s. Moreover, socio-economic factors like rising unemployment affected people's trust in political authority.

Apart from the economy, heritage regimes are influenced by changes in the political landscape. Shifts in political culture and ideology might, for example, lead to different selection criteria for heritage or to a reprioritization of government spending. Therefore, this chapter also analyses major changes in the political landscape, including international developments such as the ongoing European integration process and changes in the respective national political cultures. Lastly, the chapter will focus on socio-cultural developments in relation to heritage. In the 1970s existing social structures changed quite drastically. Traditional authorities, both religious and worldly, were increasingly questioned. This broad cultural trend

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_3

affected what was perceived as heritage and who was involved in its preservation. Furthermore, general trends in heritage preservation, including the changing meaning of heritage, the democratization of heritage and the declining trust in traditional heritage actors will be addressed.

3.2 Economic Decline and Its Social Consequences

During the first twenty-five years after World War II, Western Europe enjoyed the most spectacular growth of welfare in its history (Crafts and Toniolo 2014, p. 356). While the population increased by only some 20 percent, the gross domestic product rose by a staggering 268 percent. In only a few decades a prosperous consumer society emerged from the ashes of total war. The French economist Jean Fourastié dubbed these thirty-odd years "les trente glorieuses"—thirty glorious years (Fourastié, cited in Crafts and Toniolo 2014, p. 356). The English called it a "Golden Age" (Howlett 1994) and the Germans even talked of an economic miracle—a *Wirtshaftswunder*. In this period Western Europe more than quadrupled the total value of its export (Armstrong et al. 1991). Some economists speculated that economic crises and depressions now belonged to the past (Berend 2014). During the late 1960s, though, economic growth slowed down. A period of high growth figures was followed by relative stagnation. From now on, Europe would play a less central role in the global economy. This process of stagnation was accelerated by the first oil shock of 1973.

In response to the United States' involvement in the Yom Kippur War, the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) proclaimed an oil embargo on the United States, as well as for Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Crafts and Toniolo 2014, pp. 356–360). By the end of the embargo in March 1974 the price of oil had become four times as high as it had been before the crisis. In 1979, a second crisis followed the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Altogether, the price of oil in 1980 was tenfold of its price before the crisis began in 1973. The economic consequences were severe and enduring. The oil crisis led to a financial crisis. Important sectors of the economy—including construction work—suffered major losses and inflation reached a worrisome level in the whole of Western Europe. Moreover, the price of imported goods, mostly raw materials, increased twenty percent more than the prices of exported goods (Black 2003, pp. 276–277).

While the oil shock was a direct result of political unrest in the Middle-East, the roots of the economic crisis were much deeper. The oil shock made manifest more structural issues. According to the economic historian Ivan Berend, the post-war prosperity in Europe had undermined itself. Virtually full employment, the lack of a flexible labour reserve, a shortage of labour in several sectors and the associated increase in labour migrants made labour oppositions strong. Unions launched strikes for higher wages. The social partnership between employers and employees came under pressure and class confrontation reappeared (Berend 2014). The collective

self-restraint that had characterized the immediate post-war years began to disappear. Paradoxically, the high prosperity dug its own grave in the form of over-investment and over-production. As the economist Andrea Boltho explained: "the success of the 1950s and 1960s had laid the preconditions for at least some of the failures of the 1970s" (Boltho 1982, p. 28). Further signs of a creeping economic crisis occurred when the Nixon government ended the Bretton Woods accord. This international agreement was signed in 1944 and ensured that the value of currency was fixed to the dollar, and that the value of the dollar was fixed to a set amount of gold. This system ensured that currency exchange rates hardly fluctuated, thus ensuring relative economic stability. In 1971, however, the United States' government decided to devalue the dollar and abolish its exchange rate for gold. This decision shocked the international monetary system and caused major unrest on the global stock markets. The European economies were therefore extremely vulnerable when the oil crisis hit. The 1970s, in this sense, formed a watershed in Europe's economic development. It marked the end of unrestrained growth and would have a lasting effect for the decades that followed. Or as Berend remarked: "Nothing worked as normal any longer" (Berend 2014, p. 409). The consumerist euphoria of the previous decades was replaced with feelings that resembled the general sentiment of time of the Great Depression.

Not least for Britain, the oil crisis marked the beginning of a period of economic downfall. While there had been gradual long-term economic decline in Britain since the 1870s, between 1973 and 1981 Britain's annual growth in gross domestic product dropped sharper than ever before. In many ways, the impact of the global economic crisis was felt even more in Britain than in other developed countries. The average standard of living fell beneath that of Germany, France, Italy and Japan (Kirby 2006, pp. 105–137). The country faced major problems with under-investment, diminishing industrial production rates and limited innovation. Even the discovery of major oil reserves in North-Sea in the mid-1970s could not prevent further economic downfall. The oil crisis and the subsequent stock market crash forced the British government to request a £2.3 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, in order not to go bankrupt the government had to cut back drastically on government spending, putting the welfare state system under pressure (George and Wilding 1999, pp. 332–345). The government cut income growth in the public sector and encouraged the private sector to do the same. The combination of high inflation rates and frozen salaries led to major unrest among trade unions. Strikes became increasingly common as wages did not keep pace with price increases. In an attempt to tackle the energy crisis, the government tried to find ways to reduce the use of electricity and to save coal reserves. One of the proposals was a 'three-day-week'—which was introduced in December 1973. Commercial consumption of electricity was limited to three consecutive days a week and television stations were required to stop broadcasting after 10.30 pm. This way, Prime Minister Edward Heath wished to prevent a total electricity shut down, ensure business continuity and avoid further inflation (Campbell 1993, pp. 574–597).

In comparison to Britain and other competitors, the West-German economy withstood the consequences of the oil crisis relatively well. Its export in fact tripled

between 1971 and 1975. Yet, in the same period, the Deutsche Mark had been devalued, making export production less profitable. This profoundly impacted the basis for economic growth. Moreover, between 1970 and 1975, the hourly wages in manufacturing had risen substantially (Berend 2014). As a result, significant sections of manufacturing—especially labour-intensive industries—ceased to be viable. The share of traditional industries—like construction and building materials, iron and steel, wood, paper and textile—in the gross value added of total industry declined by 40 percent in West-Germany between 1970 and 1980 (Brenner 2006, pp. 179–188). In general, however, the German economy recovered quicker and better than most of its global competitors. By 1975 it was one of the leading economies—second only to the United States. Although the impact of the oil crisis was felt less in Germany than in the United Kingdom, here too it signified the end of the period of the post-war economic miracle. As a result of the global crisis Germany's gross domestic product fell by 1.4 percent between 1971 and 1980—the sharpest fall since the founding of the republic in 1949 (Funk 2012, pp. 9–11).

Also the unemployment shot up from 300,000 in 1973 to 600,000 in 1974 and 1.1 million by 1975. The unemployment figures stabilised in the late 1970s but remained at a considerably higher level in comparison to the 1960s (Carr 1987, p. 385). Moreover, the crisis undermined the welfare state system. Until the early 1970s, West-Germany spent more on social welfare than any other country in the Western world. In post-World War II Germany, the welfare state had become an essential element of what was called the social market economy—*soziale Marktwirtschaft*. This way, a balance was found between socialism and capitalism—a balance that Helmut Schmidt described as the "policy of the middle way" (Schmidt 1976, cited in Leibfried and Obinger 2004, p. 199). This policy was the result of a compromise between the country's Christian-Democratic, social-democratic and liberal political forces. The coexistence of an advanced welfare system with an almost unrestricted and booming market economy was, at the time, often quoted as a model for success. However, the post-war consensus was undermined as result of the economic crisis of the 1970s. The German welfare state was no longer seen as a model but as a financial burden. Declining economic growth, growing unemployment rates, increasing public debt and population ageing put the welfare system under pressure (Leibfried and Obinger 2004, pp. 199–209).

3.3 Political Landscape Developments

The unfolding economic crisis of the late 1960s and early 1970s coincided with a political crisis in Western Europe. In Britain, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) launched a series of bombing campaigns targeting both military targets and civilian populations. This organization became particularly active after Northern Ireland was officially incorporated into the United Kingdom in 1972. Other countries faced political turmoil too. In March 1968, riots started at French universities. The result was a general university strike, occupations of buildings and mass demonstrations by

over 1 million people. Street fights rattled the Quartier Latin—Paris' main student neighbourhood. In other parts of the country, workers occupied factories and 2 million of them went on strike, demanding wage increase (Klimke 2014, pp. 254–255). The events that took place in France in the spring of 1968 resonated all across Europe. In West-Germany, for example 1968 represented the climax of a protest movement that had been active in the Federal Republic since the mid-1960s. Student activists opposed the lack of democratic participation at universities, the United States' invasion of Vietnam and the strong American military presence in Germany. Furthermore, the students protested against the 'emergency legislation' bill that vastly expanded the executive power at the expense of parliament (Klimke 2014).

The protesters mainly operated under the flag of the German Socialist Student League (SDS). This movement was inspired by the works of Karl Marx, Herbert Marcuse, Georg Lukács and Che Guevara, and maintained a close relationship with the American civil rights, anti-war and Black Power movements (Thomas 2003). The protests reached their peak in 1968 when the demonstrating student Benno Ohnesorg was killed by a police officer during a visit of the Shah of Iran to West-Berlin (Klimke 2014). This dramatic event is often perceived as pivotal to the emergence of radical left-wing groups like the Baader-Meinhof group—which was later called the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF)—who saw the death of Ohnesorg as symptomatic for the state's authoritarian attitude and violent means of suppression. This terrorist organization caused major political unrest. By means of bombing, kidnapping, and executing kidnapped politicians and businessmen the RAF terrorised West-Germany between its creation in 1968 and the mid-1970s (Hauser 2008, pp. 269–280).

The combined political and economic issues posed a major challenge for the government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who succeeded Willy Brandt in 1974. Both within Germany and on the global stage, Schmidt manifested himself as a powerful and self-conscious politician. This was, according to historian Friso Wielinga, not merely a matter of personality. It reflected that the Federal Republic was gradually stepping out of the shadow of its nationalist past and faced the future with renewed self-confidence. More than ever before, Bonn claimed its role in global politics (Patel 2011, p. 782). For international observers, this new political mentality did not go by unnoticed. According to the Dutch ambassador in Germany, for example, the inauguration of Schmidt signified a third period in post-war German politics. Adenauer's politics of reconciliation with the West and Brandt's politics of normalising relations with the East were, each in their own way, focused on *Wiedergutmachung* for the acts of the Nazi-regime. Now, the ambassador felt, German politics entered a new era in which the feeling that the generation of the war was relieved of its debts would dominate. He considered Schmidt to be the perfect protagonist of this mentality. Although one could well argue that the Dutch ambassador overestimated the rate at which the dark past was left behind, he was surely right in observing that it was the German government's ambition to step out of the long shadow of the Nazi-past and further normalise international relations. The

formation of the Schmidt government, Wielinga argued, marked a period of "normalisation" (Wielinga 1999, p. 59).

Much like West-Germany, the various British governments of the 1960s and 1970s had the ambition to become a part of the European Community. When the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in 1951, the United Kingdom had not joined, nor had it joined the European Economic Community (EEC) that was formed in 1958. In part, this had to do with the country's economic structure. Unlike the economies of the founding members of the ECSC and the EEC, Britain's trade was much less focused on Europe. In this sense, joining would have been much more disruptive for Britain than for other countries as it would entail a major economic dislocation. In the course of the 1960s, however, it seemed more and more likely that European collaboration would become a success. A growing number of British politicians feared that the costs of staying out would exceed those of joining. As a result, successive governments in the 1960s, both Conservative and Labour, applied to join the EEC. The British first applied in 1961 and a second time in 1967. Both applications, however, were vetoed by the French President Charles de Gaulle, who argued that Britain's claim to a European identity was compromised by its close ties to the United States. After the departure of De Gaulle in 1969, the British government—under the Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath—requested the EEC to reconsider its earlier membership application. After a brief period of negotiation, Britain eventually joined in January 1973 (Black 2003, pp. 301–303).

3.4 A New Life for Heritage

The socio-cultural and political landscape of the 1970s provided fertile soil for heritage preservation. By the early 1970s unrestricted economic growth had run its course. One of the most significant results of the political and cultural developments of the period was that people who were formerly indifferent or even opposed to historic preservation gradually became interested again in monuments and the past. The number of new heritage organizations grew significantly. The scope of heritage widened in response to this democratization of heritage. While in the immediate post-war era the efforts of preservationists had focused on traditional monuments like churches and castles, now people increasingly wanted to see other parts of the build environment protected. In many ways this was a response to the intrusive urban development of the 1960s and early 1970s. Traffic-oriented planners tried to make cities prosper and solve housing problems. The result had been overwhelming and was increasingly being regretted.

In Britain, voices of public protest against the large-scale destruction of historic inner-cities got louder as the 1970s progressed. The decade saw a range of protest books like Tony Albous' *Goodbye Britain?* (1975), Colin Amery's and Dan Cruikshank's *The Rape of Britain* (1975) and Patrick Cormack's *Heritage in Danger* (1976). Moreover, the 1970s saw an upsurge of non-governmental organizations,

most notably SAVE and the Thirties Society. Both organizations saw their membership numbers quickly rising. Also the membership numbers of more traditional heritage organizations grew significantly. While the decade was generally one of change and turmoil, for heritage preservation it was, as John Pendlebury (2009) observed, a time of consensus and nearly unanimous public support. Much of the credit for establishing this consensus has been given to the political campaigns to save heritage from destruction. Advocates of preservation—not least the authors of the abovementioned books and members of the abovementioned activist groups—heralded themselves as being at the centre of a heroic struggle against bulldozers and developers. Although their actions are laudable from a preservationist perspective, in reality the heritage preservation consensus was to a great extent not the result of heroism, but of the economic depression. Many potentially threatening urban development projects were cancelled, not because of the actions of preservation lobbyists, but simply because there were no investors (Pendlebury 2009, p. 63).

At the same time, however, the motivations for heritage preservation began to change. Preservation efforts in the 1960s had primarily aimed "to preserve beauty and to remove ugliness", as Duncan Sandys had stated when he introduced the government's new heritage law in 1966 (Delafons 1997, p. 93). In the 1970s these aesthetic aims were complemented by new types of social aims (Appleyard 1979). Governments became increasingly aware of the potential of heritage as a force for social inclusion. Heritage was seen as a way to forge bonds between people, help the underprivileged and a force for regeneration. In his much appraised review of heritage preservation in Europe, the urban designer Donald Appleyard noted that there was a tendency towards "social conservation"—particularly in Britain. The focus of preservationists, he argued, was no longer solely on aesthetics, architectural importance or historical significance, but also on "the maintenance of [the] neighbourhood [for] the existing population" (Appleyard 1979, p. 33).

Heritage preservation thus was no longer done out of blind respect for the ancestry, nor was it done for the sheer purpose of helping the posterity, or national identity building. Instead, heritage became a tool to solve present-day problems. In Britain, the need for this shift was acknowledged in a speech by Duncan Sandy at a meeting of the Civic Trust in 1971. Here he talked about preservation in relation to "the basic values within the nation" (Civic Trust 1972). When Sandys had introduced the Civic Amenities Act in 1957 the focus was on aesthetic principles; now he justified preservation from a social point of view. Somewhat ironically, however, the government was increasingly accused of having an elitist attitude. The urban planner David Eversley, who worked for the planning office of Greater London, observed for instance that: "[w]hat society suffers from [. . .] are the extraordinary tastes of that small group of people who constitute, for instance the Historic Building Council [. . .] It is these people who dictate what is good and beautiful, according to aesthetic standards known only to themselves, but which are supposed to have absolute values. That is to say, no price is too high to pay for the community to conserve these buildings" (Eversley 1973, p. 270). Despite the allegations of elitism and snobbery at the address of state-sanctioned institutions, the heritage concept broadened immensely in the 1970s. As Pendlebury rightly notes, in the 1970s "historical

justifications for protecting and conserving old buildings on the basis of art-historical criteria, which suggested a high degree of selectivity, shifted to much more inclusive arguments more firmly based on the character of whole settlements. Furthermore, there was a perception of a broader social and psychological purpose in sustaining places, implying the need to conserve much more ordinary environments for the benefit of local communities, in contrast to the rather narrow preoccupations traditionally held by the conservation movement" (Pendlebury 2009, p. 70).

Much like in Britain, heritage preservation came to enjoy unprecedented public support in Germany. Here too, the scope of heritage preservation widened. As a result, the number of officially protected buildings rose significantly from only two hundred thousand in the late 1960s to eight hundred thousand in 1976 (Beseler 1976, p. 281). Apart from this "monument-boom" (Koshar 2004, p. 70), a growing number of grassroots organizations became involved in heritage preservation. Similar to Britain, the establishment of these organizations was a response to the urban redevelopment of the 1960s. According to critics, the period of the economic miracle had been almost as disruptive for the historic environment as the war had been (Schleich, cited in Koshar 1998, p. 290). Campaigns of organizations like the 'German Urban League' aimed to stop the scrupulous renewal of historic cities. In the course of the 1970s growing number of people were mobilized to save heritage from destruction. Writing in 1975, one of Germany's leading newspapers even described "preservation of monuments as a people's movement"[1] (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1975, p. 1; see also Petzet 1994). The backgrounds of these organizations were diverse. Socialist and trade union cultural groups, history workshops and a variety of ad hoc clubs were established. Their aims were equally diverse, ranging from the preservation of windmills and pubs threatened by urban development to the inspection of the built environment for traces of the Holocaust (Koshar 2004). The public engagement with heritage preservation was even so strong that some preservationists felt there was too much popular concern. According to the historian Rudy Koshar "this criticism only became stronger as official preservation increasingly felt itself to be overburdened by a public thirsty for instant history" (Koshar 2004, p. 69).

The involvement of a growing variety of people and organizations also meant that the variety of meanings attributed to historic buildings grew and the normative rules for preservation were changing. Attributing a traditional national meaning to heritage was now deemed inappropriate. Koshar explains that: "the nation was said to have abandoned its once lofty position as the object and motivation of cultural policy. In its place stood a multiplicity of groups with a multiplicity of orientations to the past. National identity no longer gave coherence or meaning to this panoply of memories. A pluralistic concept of the monument—and not the focused national symbolism of Dehioan practice—now appeared best suited for the new situation" (Koshar 2004, p. 72). In this sense, historic preservation was not—as it had been traditionally—about forging a bond between past, present and future, but to

[1] "Denkmalschutz als Volksbewegung".

overcome the past or at least show the depth of the break between past and present. The national past was either ignored or subjected to critical scrutiny. “Old monuments”, according to Koshar, “would be redefined, often to point out the nationalist and authoritarian sins of one’s forefathers, while newly historic edifices would be restored to highlight the struggles and fates of political and religious dissidents, workers, women, homosexuals, and Holocaust victims” (Koshar 2004, p. 72).

In a sense, the democratization of heritage had two apparently oppositional effects. On the one hand, the democratization of heritage meant that heritage preservation received wide public support. The mandate for preservationists had arguably never been greater. On the other hand, the democratization of heritage forced preservationists to reconsider their existing formal selection criteria. The 1970s was a period in which authorities were no longer taken for granted. Experts in the field of heritage, mostly working for state institutions or traditional preservation societies, also had to cope with this new socio-cultural reality. This was not always easy. The consensus that John Pendlebury observed only existed at the surface. Although heritage preservation would become generally accepted as an important ‘societal function’, there remained debate about ‘how’ this function should be fulfilled. What qualified as heritage and in what way should it be dealt with? The introduction of the World Heritage Convention in 1972, as the following chapters will show, added an additional layer of complexity to these discussions.

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Chapter 4
Aachen Cathedral and the Beginnings of World Heritage

4.1 Introduction

In the second half of the eighth century, Charlemagne built a palace and a chapel in Aachen, making it the centre of an empire that stretched from the Mediterranean to the North Sea and from the Atlantic Ocean to Bohemia. Charlemagne saw himself not only as a Frankish king, but as the rightful heir to the Emperors of Rome. In the year 800, he was crowned Emperor of the Romans by Pope Leo III. Charlemagne is often portrayed as a defender of Christianity. During his reign he organized several—often violent—campaigns to conquer and Christianise heathens. In the early ninth century, Charlemagne received several valuable relics from the patriarch of Jerusalem. The possession of these and other important relics made Aachen a popular destination for pilgrims. After the disintegration of the Carolingian Empire, Aachen continued to play a prominent role in the history of Western Europe. Throughout the middle ages the rulers of the Holy Roman Empire were crowned in Charlemagne's former palatine chapel. The original structure was enlarged several times to adapt it to its new role as pilgrimage and coronation church (Stender and Nelsen-Minkenberg 2012; Lepie and Wentzler 1991).

Due to its rich history as the centre of the Carolingian Empire and the coronation city of the Emperors of the Holy Roman Empire, Aachen's heritage was appropriated by nineteenth and twentieth century German nationalists. It was used by both the Wilhelminian and the National-Socialist regime as a symbol of German pride (Kerner 2003). As discussed in Chap. 2, nationalist ideology dominated the political landscape at the time, impacting the approaches and methods of heritage conservationists. After the war, the nationalist image of Aachen and the Carolingian heritage became untenable—not least due to its association with contaminated ideologies. In this period the German heritage was carefully stripped of its nationalistic connotations. It would be tempting to interpret the denazification and denationalization of Germany's heritage as an allergic reaction to years of exposure to political extremism. Yet, it also served pragmatic economic and political goals. The transition of

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_4

Aachen Cathedral from a symbol of the German nation to a symbol of international peace and solidarity exemplifies a broader trend of internationalization of Germany's heritage, which reached its summit in 1978 when Aachen's cathedral received the World Heritage label.

This chapter will trace back how Aachen Cathedral was transformed from a national to an international monument and the impact of this shift on restoration and preservation practices. The first section describes the changing perception of the Carolingian past and of Aachen Cathedral as a material manifestation of this past. This heritage has been claimed by different groups for different socio-political reasons. The perception and appreciation of this past has had a direct impact on the city's appearance and the meaning attributed to it by the general public. The second section will focus on the nomination of Aachen as a World Heritage Site. Why was the Dom selected as the first World Heritage Site in Germany? How was this choice legitimized? This section will show that in the early years of the World Heritage Convention a detailed system for the selection of World Heritage still had to evolve, leaving room for individuals to steer the process. The third section focuses on the aftermath of the World Heritage enlisting and its impact on fund-raising efforts, tourism, and restoration practices to investigate whether the elevation of Aachen Cathedral from national monument to World Heritage Site brought about regime changes?

4.2 Changing Perceptions of Aachen Cathedral

4.2.1 A Monument of the Nation

On the 14th and 15th of September 1978, the French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing met the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in Aachen. Giscard d'Estaing had a special bond with Germany. Not only because he was born there as the son of a French officer stationed in Koblenz, but also because during his time in office a friendship had grown between himself and Chancellor Schmidt. The two gentlemen met on a regular basis and liked to play chess against one another. However, on the political chessboard of Europe they played on the same side. Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing ultimately formed a well-functioning political tandem that would steer the continent to further unification and integration (ZDF 2014). In this context, a number of official meetings between the two gentlemen took place in the period between 1974 and 1981. The meeting in Aachen, which focused on the issue of monetary and economic cooperation in Europe, was special. In the first place, this was due to the content of the matters that were discussed. Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing talked for instance about a 'European Monetary System' and a 'European Monetary Institution'. In this sense, the meeting helped pave the way for the treaty that would be signed fourteen years later in Maastricht (Krotz and Schild 2013, pp. 187–189).

However, the location also made the meeting special (Moravcsik 1998, p. 301). After all, Aachen was the city from which Charlemagne, around the year 800, ruled

Fig. 4.1 Aachen Cathedral viewed from across the Katschhof. The oldest—Carolingian—part of the church is in the centre. Although this part is still identifyably, the view on the original structure is somewhat obscured by the side-chapels that were added in later centuries. Picture by the author (2019)

over an Empire that covered almost the whole of Western Europe. Due to his ambition to unite the continent under one throne he earned names such as 'the father of Europe' and 'the first European'. Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing were showed around in Charlemagne's former palace—the current city hall—and his palatine church—where he was probably buried and where his throne stands (Fig. 4.1). The history of Aachen gave the bilateral meeting an aura of dignity. Both statesmen showed that they were aware of the special symbolic meaning of this place. In his dinner speech, Schmidt claimed that: "Aachen is a special case. [. . .] We Germans associate Aachen with the memory of the common historical origins of the French and German nations. For us Germans, Aachen has developed from that memory and has become a symbol of our hopes for a peaceful and united Europe. Aachen is truly a symbolic location for this Franco-German gathering" (Schmidt 1978, cited in CVCE 2013, p. 2). Also Giscard d'Estaing, a self-proclaimed descendent of Charlemagne, was content with the venue. The meaning of Charlemagne, he argued, was not self-evident: "for we French know he was a Frank, whereas for you he is a German Emperor". Nonetheless, he admitted to be "very pleased that Aachen was chosen as the city in which to hold this meeting. Aachen is a city so rich in memories from the histories of our two countries and one which brings those memories alive wherever one sets foot" (Giscard d'Estaign 1978, cited in CVCE 2013, p. 3). The

president even claimed to have felt "the spirit of Charlemagne" during his talks with Schmidt (Giscard d'Estaign 1978, cited in CVCE 2013, p. 3).

This image of Aachen as the cradle of the European ideal and a symbol of international solidarity, however, is not nearly as old as Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing wished to make their audience believe. Before the Second World War, Aachen—and especially its Carolingian heritage—had formed a bone of contention between Germany and France. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth century German nationalists had increasingly laid claim on the legacy of Charlemagne. According to the German art historian Horst Bredekamp, Charlemagne and his residence in Aachen came to be perceived as "the origin of Germany and of German domination in Europe" (Bredekamp, cited in MacGregor 2014, p. 14). In this context, the Dom was portrait as a "majestic structure", an "amazing and arousing monument of national architecture" and a witness of the "great devoutness of our forefathers". Aachen was the city where "the German emperors received their power" and "the glory of the German nation was consecrated" (Karlsverein 1847: cited in Shaffer 1992, pp. 22–23). Aachen cathedral, as the former coronation church of the Holy Roman Empire, was increasingly seen a perfect means to forge a bond between the culturally and politically divided German states. After the German unification of 1871, this trend continued unabated.

In this period, the Carolingian heritage not only became a binding element for the German people, but also a tool to legitimize the new Imperial regime. The Kaiser saw himself as the heir of the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire (Raedts 2011, p. 201). This self-image is expressed, for example, in a state portrait of Wilhelm in his capacity as King of Prussia—six years before the German unification. The painting was commissioned by Wilhelm to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Rhineland being Prussian. It showed Wilhelm in front of the town hall of Aachen with Prussian flags flying in the background. By depicting himself with Charlemagne's former palace, he placed his person and his office in the line of the Carolingian legacy. An even more explicit example of this is a stained-glass window that was created in 1888—the so-called Year of the Three Emperors. The window depicted Wilhelm I with the Holy Roman Imperial regalia. The Kaiser is portrayed wearing the octagonal crown of the emperors of old. The shape of the crown of the Holy Roman Empire is a direct reference to the palatine church of its founder—the cathedral of Aachen (MacGregor 2014).

In the same period several new additions were made to the church. Between 1869 and 1873, the eighteenth century baroque stucco was removed from the interior and replaced with mosaics that were inspired by the medieval originals, but clearly reflected the taste of the nineteenth century. A few years later, in 1879, the façade on the west side of the church was topped with a neo-gothic pike (Stender and Nelsen-Minkenberg 2012). Also the Kaiser's grandson, Wilhelm II, embraced the Carolingian heritage. Like his predecessor, he financially supported the restoration of the Dom. The marble flooring and the mosaics on the ceiling of the ambulatory of the apse are dated from this period. Showing the "remains of the grand past of the united German people" became one of the most important aspects of the new emperor's cultural policy (Wilhelm II, cited in Liman 1913, p. 26). In this context

Fig. 4.2 Interior of the cupola of Aachen Cathedral. The ceiling of the dome is decorated with nineteenth century mosaics. The chandelier dates back to the twelfth century and was commissioned by Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. Picture by the author (2019)

Wilhelm II composed an exposition, in 1913, about the history of Imperial coronations in Aachen. He even made a request to his Austrian allies to borrow the crown with which his grandfather had been captured on stained glass. During the Napoleonic occupation of the Rhineland, the Habsburgers had taken precautionary measures, bringing the crown to Vienna. When Wilhelm's request was turned down, he commissioned a valuable and remarkably accurate replica. Even though the exhibition eventually did not happen due to the outbreak of the First World War, this example shows that German nationalists in the Wilhelminian period showed a great interest in the history of Aachen and used its Carolingian heritage to reach socio-political goals (Fig. 4.2).

That heritage could serve a socio-political function was also recognized in later years by the National-Socialists. They used the past—in a more or less mystified form—systematically in their propaganda. The Carolingian heritage, however, caused disagreement between different party ideologists. Much like Wilhelm II, Adolf Hitler was very interested in the history and heritage of Charlemagne (Werner 1998). Already in 1935 he had described him as "one of the greatest people in the history of the world" and praised his efforts to unify the Germanic tribes (Hitler, cited in Van Kesteren 2004, p. 110). Many of Hitler's followers, however, opposed

the Führer's interpretation. Alfred Rosenberg, for example, was particularly critical about Charlemagne's massacre of the Saxons who, according to Rosenberg, were of a much purer race than the Franks (Bollmus 2006). Also Heinrich Himmler shared this negative perception of the Carolingian rulers. Despite this criticism, Hitler did not change his mind. After the annexation of Austria in 1938 he even brought the Holy Roman crown, sceptre and globus cruciger from Vienna to Nurnberg—the city that formed the centre of massive Nazi parades.

Another example of Hitler's appropriation of the Carolingian heritage occurred in the early 1940s when Hitler was trying to convince French nationalists to partake in his Russian campaign. Hitler had described the war against the Russians as a crusade to defend European values against Bolshevistic barbarism. He succeeded in rousing French volunteers to fight alongside the Germans on the Eastern front. The battalion of French volunteers was named the 'Division Charlemagne'. To thank the troops for their efforts, Hitler commissioned porcelain plates from the renowned French pottery Sèvres. On the front side was a depiction of Charlemagne on horseback and on the backside text in Latin: "The Empire of Charlemagne, divided by his grandsons in 843, is now defended by Adolf Hitler, together with the peoples of Europe, in the year 1943" (MacGregor 2014, p. 38). Interesting about this text is the fact that Hitler placed the legacy of Charlemagne in a wider European context, even though the objective—a German victory over Russia—was clearly national. Although Hitler to a certain extent laid claim on Charlemagne's heritage, the Nazis were not at all charmed by the design of his palatine church. The Nazis despised nineteenth century historicism with all its neo-styles. Gothic monuments were seen as French; Baroque and Renaissance monuments as Italian. The real German *Heimat*, according to the Nazi doctrine could only be found in modest but picturesque peasant villages. The cathedral of Aachen, with its Carolingian renaissance octagonal apse, its Gothic choir, neo-gothic west tower and its Baroque chapels, represented everything the Nazis architecturally detested. Hitler never visited Aachen.

4.2.2 Preserving the Occident and the Denazification of Germany's Heritage

The advancements of the Allied troops towards the end of World War II did not leave the city of Aachen unaffected. It was the first German city to be captured by the Allied forces—a victory that came at a price. Almost 14,000 historic houses in the city centre were bombed in airstrikes, the original Gothic stained glass windows of the cathedral's choir were destroyed by shockwaves of impacting grenades and the roof and interior of the city hall were heavily damaged by bombshells. In 1948, the *Rheinische Heimatverein* began a campaign to raise funds for the restoration of the city hall. In its petition, the society described Aachen as an "eternally living monument to Charlemagne and his imperial ideas [...] for the rebuilding of the Christian Occident after the decline and destruction of the Roman Empire"

(Rheinische Heimatverein, cited in Koshar 1998, p. 223). According to the document, the monument was the embodiment of "historical memories and holy religious feelings [and a bearer of] high symbolism and mysterious world of imagination and otherworldly power" (Rheinische Heimatverein, cited in Koshar 1998, pp. 223–224). Despite the primarily worldly function of the building, the pamphlet attributed mainly religious meaning to the city hall. The notion of the Christian Occident served here as a means to move beyond national symbolism and to place Aachen in a wider European context. As opposed to the nationalist rhetoric of some hundred years earlier, the focus had thus shifted from the national meaning of Aachen's heritage to its transnational meaning (Haude 2000).

This ideological shift had a direct effect on the architecture and heritage of the city. Especially tangible reminders of the Wilhelminian, Prussian past were eradicated. The town hall, for example, had undergone extensive historicist restorations in the Wilhelminian era. Due to its association with this contaminated national past, the Rheinische Heimatverein was not very successful in gathering funds for the restoration of the town hall. While the Cathedral was restored quickly after the war, the town hall would only be restored in the late 1960s. Another example that illustrates the city authorities' attempts to cope with the nationalist past was the demolition of the nineteenth century south-eastern wing of the town hall (Fig. 4.4). Although this structure was not damaged beyond repair, it was decided to pull it down nonetheless because it was seen as too Wilhelminian and too Prussian (Ley 2014). In an attempt to brush away any nationalist connotations, many Germans attempted to reframe their history around themes like international Christian solidarity. This new approach to heritage was a response to change in the broader political landscape. The new Christian-Democratic leadership of the German Federal Republic acknowledged that heritage had this potential. During his speech at an international congress of Christian-Democratic politicians in Luxemburg in 1948, Conrad Adenauer praised Aachen—along with his birth town Cologne—as a catholic bulwark that had always fiercely resisted National-Socialism (Kaiser 2007, p. 215). The new German identity, according to the Christian Democrats, should be engrafted on Germany's better, pre-nationalistic past, and the Carolingian heritage could play a role in this.

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that would be established in 1951 included West-Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy. At least in terms of territory, the ECSC closely resembled the Carolingian Empire. As a result, Aachen was no longer at the periphery of the German Empire, but at the geographical heart of Europe. The local authorities in Aachen were more than willing to play this part. Aachen's potential as a truly European city was also internationally recognized. During the Christian-Democratic congress mentioned above, for example, the Dutch politician of the Catholic People's Party (KVP) Jos Serrarens claimed that reconciliation and appeasement would be much easier with cities like Aachen, because this part of Germany had been under the successive civilizing influence of the Roman Empire, the Carolingian Empire and recent democratic emancipatory ideas. Serrarens stepped through history with seven-league boots and undeniably drew rather anachronistic connections between antiquity, the

Christian Occident, democracy and European integration. Nonetheless, this connection was also drawn by German politicians and heritage professionals to show that German heritage was internationally important (Kaiser 2007).

In this context, Aachen established itself increasingly as an international city and an ideal place to build the new Europe from. One manifestation of this envisioned role is the Karlspreis—a local initiative. This international prize—named after Charlemagne—was created in 1949 by the Aachener merchant and co-founder of the CDU Kurt Pfeiffer (Eversheim 2015). It was meant as an award for politicians who had been of service to European integration. Over the years, many important international figures who contributed to the European integration project received the Karlspreis, including Winston Churchill and Conrad Adenauer (Greiner 2009). The Carolingian monuments in Aachen played—and still play—a crucial role in the Karlspreis award ceremony.

The ritual begins with a mass in the cathedral after which the attendees together cross the Katschhof and gather in the coronation hall of Charlemagne's former palace. Here the award winner is lauded with a speech and receives a medal with the image of Charlemagne. In many ways, the Karlspreis award ceremony resembles the coronation ceremonies of the Holy Roman Emperors. The architectural historian Karsten Ley pointed out this resemblance in a lecture when he noted: "Aachen got its coronation back. It's now just called International Charlemagne price" (Ley 2014). After centuries of absence, Aachen reclaimed its place on Europe's political centre stage. The image of Carolingian heritage as the foundation of Europe would become a recurring theme at a number of international political events. In the summer of 1962, for example, Conrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle together visited the cathedral of Reims. Perhaps even more than the meeting between Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing, the event in Reims was politically sensitive (MacGregor 2014, p. 36).

Much like the cathedral of Aachen, the cathedral of Reims had a fraught history. For centuries this impressive Gothic structure had served as the coronation church of the kings of France. During World War I, it became the target of German bombardments. At the time, the international community followed the event with horror and sharply condemned it, because the destruction of the cathedral served no military purpose. Its only aim was to target the heart and break the spirit of the French people. Reims was also the city where Germany signed the capitulation on May 7, 1945. The visit of a German Chancellor was therefore starling. During their speeches Adenauer and de Gaulle swore the solemn oath that their peoples would never attack each other again. De Gaulle said to Adenauer that they would "continue the work of Charlemagne" (Van Kesteren 2004, p. 117). Adenauer assented to this statement. That Charlemagne was in fact a ruthless warlord who was only able to sustain his Empire through continuous fighting (Collins 1998, pp. 140–170) apparently formed no obstacle to choose him a symbol of peace. In 1967, some years after the controversial meeting between Adenauer and de Gaulle, Reims and Aachen became 'twin cities'. The official linkage between the two coronation cities again reinforced Aachen's ambitions to become a European city and to leave its nationalist past behind (Köhler 2014, p. 5).

In the same year that Aachen and Reims became twin cities a design competition was organized for the towers of the city hall. The towers had been heavily damaged during the war and had to be rebuild. The question of the form of this restoration, however, led to controversy. In the course of history, the towers had been destroyed and rebuild several times. The medieval towers had been ruined in the great city fire of 1656. After the fire they were replaced with towers in a baroque style. In 1883, another fire destroyed the towers after which they reappeared in a neo-gothic style (Fig. 4.4). The issue at stake in the design competition went beyond pure aesthetics. The rebuilding of the towers was politically sensitive and revolved around the question of which past—if any—the Germans should try to reconnect with. Debates about architecture and heritage were closely intertwined with the German *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*—the question of how Germany should cope with the past. The submitted proposals for the reconstruction of the town hall towers reflected an array of possibilities, ranging from reconstructing the medieval towers to building towers in a completely new, modernist style (Ley 2014).

For obvious reasons, none of the participants in the design competition opted for a reconstruction of the neo-gothic towers. As these towers were constructed in the Wilhelminian era, they evoked memories of a nationalist past that the Germans were trying to move beyond. Eventually it was decided to rebuild the towers to the form they had prior to the fire of 1656—a period not contaminated by the political nationalism that Germany had experienced between 1871 and 1945 (Ley 2014; K. Ley, personal communication, June 28, 2016). In these years, the reinterpretation of Aachen's Carolingian heritage was actively supported by European leaders, who saw it as an opportunity to promote a more European sense of belonging among Germans and other European alike. In 1965, for example, the Council of Europe sponsored an exhibition on Charlemagne that took place in the town hall of Aachen. The exhibition focused almost exclusively on Charlemagne's repute as the 'father of Europe' and conveniently left everything out that might place him and his legacy in different light.

4.3 Aachen and the World Heritage Title

4.3.1 Towards a World Heritage

Throughout the 1970s, the German authorities eagerly participated in various international heritage initiatives. An example of this was the European Architectural Heritage Year (EAHY) 1975. During this festive year events were organized in many European countries to make people aware of the importance of heritage preservation. The idea for this special year was put forward at an international conference in Brussels in 1969 by the British politician Duncan Sandys (Delafons 1997, pp. 110–115). In 1973, in view of the EAHY, the German National Committee for Heritage Preservation was established by the German government to remedy the

absence of a national heritage office (Fisch 2008).[1] It formed a part of the Ministry of Internal affairs. Its main tasks were to promote heritage protection at all levels of society and to act as the German representative for heritage matters at the international level. Moreover, the committee in charge of the organization of the European Architectural Heritage Year in Germany was asked by the government to draft a federal law (Deutches Nationalkomitee zur Vorbereitung des Europäischen Denkmalschutzjahres 1975, 1974; Kirschbaum and Schmitt-Vockenhausen 1974).

The federal government thus used this international event to take on a more prominent role in preservation policy. The international initiative required coordination and a degree of standardization at the national level. Even though the proposed heritage law eventually did not pass, the EAHY was generally considered a success.[2] In Germany, according to Rudy Koshar, the European Cultural Heritage Year "symbolized a major turning point in postwar history, indeed an end to the postwar phase of German rebuilding and a valorization of the new popularity the preservation of monuments had in German life" (Koshar 1998, p. 324). For Aachen, the EAHY furthered its reputation as a European, rather than a German city. Interestingly, it was the French government that commissioned a postal stamp in honour of the EAHY, depicting Aachen Cathedral and the word 'Europe' (Haley 1972). One year later, Aachen Cathedral and the town hall also featured on a German postal stamp (Schillinger 1973). One could argue that the 'denationalization' of Aachen's heritage—which was largely achieved in the 1950s 1960s and early 1970s through architecture, urban planning, art exhibitions, postal stamps and politics—, was symbolically concluded in 1978 when Aachen formed not only the scene for an important bilateral meeting between the German chancellor and the French president, but was also enlisted as World Heritage.

In their work *A Geography of Heritage* (2000) Graham et al., explain that the emergence of UNESCO should be seen in the historical context of the Nazi defeat and the subsequent desire to create global institutions that would promote international security and solidarity. The authors argue that the notion of universal heritage had such appeal at the time, because it reinforced concepts of human equality, common destiny, shared stewardship over the earth, optimal use of scarce natural and cultural resources, and the consequent imperative of peaceful coexistence. UNESCO aimed to prevent conflicts caused by national aggrandizement and glorification. It was an explicit challenge to the chauvinistic extremism of which the Nazi regime had formed the pinnacle (Graham et al. 2000, p. 236). Given the Germans' ambition to strip heritage of its nationalist connotations, it is hardly surprising that the Federal Republic of Germany was amongst the first countries to ratify the 1972 World Heritage Convention in 1976.

[1] Called in German the "Deutsch Nationalkomitee für Denkmalschutz" or "DND".

[2] The EAHY also received criticism. Roland Günter, for instance, published a volume with the title *No Future for Our Past?*—an ironic response to the EAHY's official motto: 'A Future for Our Past'. Günter accused the organizing committee of elitism and pointed out that many parts of the built heritage—including industrial heritage—were still neglected (Günter 1975).

In 1978, at the second session of the World Heritage Committee in Washington DC, Aachen Cathedral was amongst the first twelve sites to be inscribed onto the World Heritage list (UNESCO 1978). Almost every tourist brochure about Aachen highlights the astonishing fact that the cathedral was amongst the first World Heritage sites, yet a closer look at the underlying political processes reveals that this is far less astonishing than is generally assumed. For example, only countries that signed the Convention could nominate sites. At that time, only some twenty percent of the UNESCO member states had ratified the treaty. Countries such as Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium endorsed the Convention much later than Germany (respectively in 1982, 1984, 1992, 1996). Moreover, Germany had two representatives in the World Heritage Committee of 1978. The other Committee members were from Australia, Canada, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Poland, Tunisia, the United States and Yugoslavia. The nominations discussed at the session in Washington where almost exclusively of sites in countries that were represented in the Committee (UNESCO 1978).

Today, there is a detailed system in place to determine which sites Germany nominates for the World Heritage status. In the early days of the Convention, however, such a system did not exist. World Heritage was still a relatively unknown phenomenon. A precise policy response had not crystallized yet. Although the choice for Aachen Cathedral was barely contested, it was in many ways an arbitrary and a personal one. At the meeting in Washington, the Federal Republic of Germany was represented by the president of the German League for the Protection of Nature and Conservation of Environment Wolfgang Engelhardt and by the *Landeskonservator* of the Rhineland Georg Mörsch. Especially the latter played a crucial role in nominating Aachen Cathedral (Duval, forthcoming, pp. 11–12). Mörsch was born in Aachen in 1940. After obtaining a degree in art history he worked as a heritage preservationist for the Rhineland. In the mid-1970s he was asked by the federal government in Bonn to represent West-Germany at UNESCO in Paris. In this capacity he earned a seat on the first World Heritage Committee that gathered in Paris in 1976. At this meeting the criteria and procedures for World Heritage listing were discussed. The deadline for submitting the first proposals for the list was set to April 1978 (UNESCO 1976, p. 4). This meant that there was some time pressure.

Many German states at the time were still in the process of drafting new heritage legislation and making new heritage inventories. Heritage laws were passed in all the *Länder* of the Federal Republic in a time span of less than a decade. Hesse was the first state to pass a heritage act in 1971 and North Rhine-Westphalia was the last in 1980 (L. Henning-Meyer, personal communication, June 6, 2014). As a result of this process, many German preservationists were preoccupied. Due to the absence of clear regulations on the pre-selection of potential World Heritage sites, a lot depended on individuals like Mörsch. Given his personal background and his professional ‘two hats’ it is barely surprising that he choose to nominate a site from the Rhineland. This was, after all, the region which he knew best. Despite it being largely a personal choice of Mörsch, the nomination of Aachen cathedral did not lead to controversy. Lutz Henning-Meyer, who was involved in the nomination

process in his capacity as the municipal conservator, affirms that the choice for Aachen cathedral was hardly contested. This had, in the first place, to do with the church's unique design. It was the prime example of Carolingian renaissance architecture.

Henning-Meyer (Interview with the author. Personal interview. Aachen, June 6, 2014) explained that the selection of, for example, any Romanesque church would have led to controversy because there would have been many options to choose from. Aachen Cathedral, on the other hand, was widely considered a one-of-a-kind building and therefore an obvious candidate. The image of Aachen Cathedral as an obvious choice for World Heritage nomination was also confirmed by the former *Landeskonservator* Udo Mainzer, who stressed that the structure's material authenticity was especially uncontested: "In view of the impressive facts and the acknowledgment its authenticity, integrity and genuineness – by the standards of UNESCO – made that there was no discussion between the responsible bodies regarding the nomination of Aachen Cathedral. Thus, it differed fundamentally from other objects that were nominated in later years, such as the cathedral of Speyer and the cathedral of Hildesheim, which, due to their considerably reduced medieval substance, almost failed to get approved for nomination" (Mainzer 2012, p. 9).[3]

Moreover, its association with the internationally well-known and influential figure of Charlemagne gave Aachen Cathedral a clear advantage over other sites in Germany, because its interest "cuts through national borders" (Mainzer 2012, p. 9).[4] For example, Cologne Cathedral was also briefly considered, but this monument had too many nationalist connotations according to the involved authorities (Kier and Krings 1986). Even more so than Aachen Cathedral, the cathedral of Cologne had been embraced in the nineteenth century as a symbol of German unity (Nipperdey 1981). Its restoration was seen as a national task and the project received generous donations from all over Germany. In the 1840s the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV had called Cologne cathedral "the spirit of German unity and power" (Friedrich Wilhelm IV, cited in James 1991, p. 48). The historian Thomas Rohkrämer noted that: "In many ways, the cathedral was an obvious symbol for a romantic nationalism. As unfinished and as fragile as the nationalist project, Cologne Cathedral could stand for a renaissance of German culture. [. . .] The Gothic had acquired the status of *the* quintessentially German style" (Rohkrämer 2007, p. 63) (Fig. 4.3).[5]

[3] "Angesichts dieser beeindruckenden Fakten und Würdigung des weitgehend authentischen Bestandes in Sinne von Unversehrtheit und Echtheit nach den Vorgaben der UNESCO gab es im Rahmen des Eintragungsverfahrens des Aachener Doms bei den zuständigen Gremien keine Diskussion. Damit unterschied es sich grundsätzlich von den bald nachfolgende vorgeschlagenen Objekten, den Dom zu Speyer und dem Hildesheimer Dom, denen mit Blick auf ihre erheblich reduzierte mittelalterliche Substanz die Zustimmung zunächst versagt blieb".

[4] "der die nationalen Grenzen durchdringt".

[5] The Gothic style became '*the* quintessentially German style' in the nineteenth century. According to the Nazi-doctrine, however, the Gothic style was not German but French. The nationalist connotations of Cologne Cathedral thus refer not to twentieth century nationalism, but to the nationalism of the second half of the nineteenth century.

Fig. 4.3 The current city hall was built on the foundations of the Carolingian palace. The statue in the foreground depicts Charlemagne with the imperial regalia and dates back to the seventeenth century. Picture by the author (2019)

Although Aachen cathedral also had nationalist connotations, its Carolingian—and thus internationally significant—history made it a more suitable candidate to become Germany's first World Heritage site than its counterpart in Cologne. This specific asset is also noted in the nomination file for the site. This document was written by Georg Mörsch and submitted to the World Heritage Centre in the spring of 1978. The document focused mainly on the cathedral's architectural qualities. According to the document, Aachen Cathedral is "an exceptional artistic creation. It was the first vaulted structure north of the Alps since Antiquity [and a] prototype of religious architecture". The file draws the attention almost completely to the Carolingian history of the building. It refers to the church as "Charlemagne's own palatine chapel" and barely mentions any later, Gothic, baroque or neo-Gothic architectural additions. The document explicitly places the monument in an international context. It is, for example, argued that: "The construction of the chapel of the emperor at Aix [Aachen] symbolizes the unification of the West and its spiritual and political revival of under the aegis of Charlemagne" (ICOMOS 1978, pp. 1–2).

The symbolic meaning attributed to the cathedral bears close resemblance to the contemporary political discourse of creating political and spiritual unity in Western Europe. The quote clearly suggests a conceptual connection between the legacy of

Charlemagne and the challenges that Europe faced in the post-war era. According to Mörsch, this international emphasis was perceived often as being typically German. Writing in 1980, he recalled that preservationists noted that at international conferences, "West German participants exhibited the least amount of national pride or consciousness" (Mörsch 1980, cited in Koshar 2004, p. 72). In this sense, the nomination of Aachen cathedral illustrates that the practice of historic preservation had come to stand not for national but for a new kind of memory where more credence was given to international values than ethnicity. In addition to its focus on the Carolingian—and therefore international—part of the cathedral's history, the nomination file stands out for its conciseness. Today, nomination document are usually lengthy—sometimes up to hundreds of pages. Aachen Cathedral's nomination file, however, was only two pages long.

In the first place, this had to do with the absence of detailed guidelines regarding how to write such a file. Nowadays, the nomination process is precisely prescribed. It needs to include a management plan, a detailed description of the bufferzone around the site, maps, visual material and detailed art-historical studies. In the beginnings of the World Heritage list, such requirements were not yet worked out, leaving more room for the member states to do it their own way (Meskell 2015). On a more profound level, however, the limited length of the nomination file can be seen as typical of the traditional European notion of monumentality. Today, both scholars and heritage professionals seem aware of the fact that the value and the meaning of monuments are to a large extent ascribed to heritage objects. In the traditional understanding, however, monuments are intrinsically valuable. Their protection and status were considered self-evident. The qualities of the object were not seen as attributed but as ingrained in the material. One could thus say that part of the justification for the selection of Aachen Cathedral was the fact that it hardly needed any justification.

This is, however, not the only discursive means that was used to endorse the nomination. In her book on the concept of 'outstanding universal value', Sophia Labadi (2013) shows that most nomination dossiers—especially those from the early years of the World Heritage Convention—frequently use superlatives. According to Labadi, the concept of 'outstanding universal value' encourages superlatives rather than more subtle comparisons with other sites. This rhetoric justifies claims of superiority and primacy—for example that a certain monument is the oldest of its kind. According to David Lowenthal such claims are popular because "precedence evokes pride and proves title. To be first in a place warrants possession; to antedate others' origins or exploits shows superiority" (Lowenthal 1998, p. 174). In some cases, according to Labadi, the claims of superiority and primacy led to contradicting claims. In the nomination dossier for Aachen Cathedral, the structure is, for example, described as "the first major vaulted building in the early Middle Ages" (ICOMOS 1978, p. 2; Fig. 4.4). Two years later, the German government nominated Speyer Cathedral for inclusion on the World Heritage list because it was "the first [...] vaulted church building in Europe" (ICOMOS 1980, p. 11). Neither the German government, nor ICOMOS or the World Heritage Centre has commented on the repeated claims of precedence.

Fig. 4.4 A bronze model of Aachen Cathedral, situated near the entrance in the western façade marks the plaque that indicates that this is a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Picture by the author (2019)

4.3.2 Another Plaque on the Wall?: The Impact of the World Heritage Title

According to Aachen Cathedral's master builder, Helmut Maintz, the World Heritage designation has not made any significant difference. Aachen Cathedral already was widely recognized as an important structure and stood in a long tradition of care. According to Maintz, the World Heritage title changed nothing with regards to the restoration and preservation of the building. It would have also been cared for without the World Heritage status. Indeed, most *Länder*—including North Rhine-Westphalia—already passed special acts in the 1950s that forced historic church owners to preserve their property, even though churches had considerable autonomy as to how to preserve church buildings (Hammer 1995, p. 303). In this sense the title meant "just another plaque on the wall" (H. Maintz, personal communication, June 24, 2014). Also when looking at how the restoration and upkeep of structures like Aachen Cathedral was financed, one could argue that the World Heritage title did not make any real difference. Prior to Aachen Cathedral's designation as a World Heritage site there already existed a federal fund—since 1971—for the preservation

and restoration of "architectural monuments with particular national and cultural significance" (Koshar 1998, p. 298)—including historic churches and government buildings. The restoration of Aachen Cathedral was partially paid for with money from this federal fund. Moreover, the upkeep and restoration of the cathedral was paid for via so-called Church tax or *Kirchensteuer*—which was introduced with the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949. This tax is paid by members of religious communities—either via the state or the Church (Hammer 2002). Paying this tax is obligatory for everyone who is officially enlisted as a member of the Catholic or Evangelic Church unless the person in question officially notifies the state authorities that he or she refuses to pay this tax. Between 1975 and 1985, the Catholic Church annually received between 3 and 5.5 billion DM of which about 10 percent was used for the upkeep and preservation of Church buildings (Hammer 2002). In this sense, one could claim that the national regime was well equipped to finance church restoration.

However, a closer look at the restoration campaigns that were organized in the period after the cathedral was enlisted reveals that the World Heritage title did make a difference as it was systematically used to attract public funding and to persuade private donors to give generously. In their analysis of the impact of World Heritage listing, Frey and Steiner note that although buildings like Aachen Cathedral would undoubtedly have also been preserved without the World Heritage title, the new status certainly did not harm either: "The World Heritage List is a strong political intervention into the market of heritage (or heritage protection). One possibility to protect heritage is on the *private market* with admission receipt and donations. The amount of demand decides which sites to protect. It can hardly be doubted that most of the well-known sites in the list would still exist if they were not on it. Aachen Cathedral or Versailles would certainly not disappear. But it can be presumed that their state of conservation would not be better if they were not on the list" (Frey and Steiner 2011, p. 265).

The potential utility of the World Heritage title for the acquisition of funds became more and more apparent in the course of the 1980s when the cathedral needed a major restoration. In 1984 and 1985 the cathedral was closely inspected (Maintz 2012). The inspection revealed substantial damage to both the exterior and the interior. The lead roofs were cracking, the sand stone was affected by weathering and the mosaics inside the dome were crumbling down. Earlier restorations had uncovered the original metal anchors around the dome. As a result, these anchors were slowly corroding. Moreover, the marble tiles inside the cathedral were affected by carbon dioxide emission caused by the swelling number of visitors. In 1986 restoration work on the cathedral began. In order to generate funds for the restoration, the church provost Hans Müllejans initiated a fundraising campaign under the slogan "Aachen Cathedral needs help!" (Dombauhütte Aachen 2016).[6] The campaign had a clear international scope. Brochures were printed in multiple languages and the World Heritage title and emblem was used on the campaign's merchandise.

[6] "Der Aachener Dom braucht Hilfe!"

Müllejans also actively sought help of the World Heritage Centre in Paris in order to generate publicity for the campaign. For example, in 1992 the World Heritage Centre organized festivities and an exhibition to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the World Heritage Convention. Aachen Cathedral, as one of the first entries on the World Heritage list, featured prominently in the exhibition in Paris. According to UNESCO Director-General Frederico Mayor the organizers were happy to include Aachen in the exhibition: "The Aachen Dom is a good example of a site well chosen, 1200 years old and packed with tradition of many generations. But, it is also thanks to the enthusiasm of the population of that city, its leaders and its experts who have been active in restoration work, that this unique monument has become a universal property. UNESCO is happy to welcome Aachen in Paris" (Mayor 1992a, p. 1). Parallel to the exhibition in Paris, the Dom chapter organized several activities in Aachen to commemorate the Convention's 20th anniversary. These included a special Mass and the publication of a special issue of the journal *Die Waage* entirely devoted to the World Heritage site and the latest developments of the restoration process.

Müllejans asked Mayor to write a foreword for this special issue. According to the provost the international attention that such a foreword would receive could "help immensely in finding and addressing new sponsors and friends for the Cathedral of Aachen" (Müllejans 1991, p. 1). In his foreword, Mayor commented on the restoration of Aachen Cathedral, stating that: "The restoration work carried out on the Cathedral is exemplary from all points of view, and policy-makers, experts and the citizens of Aachen who have enthusiastically supported this work deserve to be congratulated on their combined efforts" (Mayor 1992b, p. 2). Moreover, he stressed that both the exhibition in Paris and the events in Aachen "should serve to heighten appreciation of this architectural and cultural treasure and to draw attention to the dedicated efforts being made to safeguard it for future generations" (Mayor 1992b, p. 2).

The efforts to use the site's international reputation were further established in the 1990s. In 1995, the European Society for Aachen Cathedral was founded by the Dom chapter.[7] Dom provost Hans Müllejans again played a major role in setting up the society. The objective of the new organization was twofold: "In addition to presenting the European dimension of the Aachen Cathedral as an identification mark of a common European culture, it is the task of the foundation to stimulate regional and long-term assistance in the maintenance work on the building and its treasures and to raise funds for the extensive restoration from all over Europe" (Europäische Stiftung Aachener Dom 2016, p. 1). The organization can be considered successful in its fundraising efforts. The European Society for Aachen Cathedral has several hundreds of members from all over the continent. The owners of the buildings thus successfully made use of Aachen Cathedral's international reputation. By showing that this heritage was not merely local or national, but indeed European and even universal, helped attract individual donors, as well as gifts from charity

[7] In German this organization is called " Europäische Stiftung Aachener Dom".

organizations. In 1996, for example, the American Getty Foundation donated $222,000 for the restoration campaign (Getty Foundation 1996).

In recent years, the World Heritage title has also helped attract funding from multinational corporate businesses. For example, Kärcher—a company that produces cleaning equipment—professionally cleaned the sandstone of the Cathedral's Gothic side-chapels. In 2015 it carried out the project entirely at its own expense. The initiative was part of a program of the German Commission for UNESCO to stimulate private-public partnership in the field of heritage preservation. Only World Heritage sites were eligible for participation in this program (Kärcher 2016). Apart from attracting corporate funds, the World Heritage title has led to more funding from the federal government. Between 2009 and 2014, it made available €420 million exclusively for the restoration of German World Heritage sites. The municipality of Aachen successfully applied for this grant and received €5.5 million in 2011 (BMVMS 2014, p. 21). So even though monuments like Aachen Cathedral would probably also have been restored without the World Heritage title, one could claim that the building's international reputation has played an important role in both past and recent fundraising efforts.

4.4 Conclusion: A New Normative Frame of Reference

The conversion of Aachen Cathedral from a national monument to a symbol of international peace and solidarity reflects a much broader transformation in the German social, cultural and political landscape. Many Germans struggled to leave their nationalist past behind and were—unsurprisingly—eager to show a different—international—side of German history. According to the political leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany, Aachen Cathedral could serve as a vehicle to help bring about socio-political change. Showing that Germany shared a history with its fellow Europeans could contribute to reconciliation between former enemies. In light of the social, cultural and political landscape of the time it is understandable that Aachen Cathedral was selected as the first German World Heritage site. On the other hand, the case clearly shows that this choice was largely the result of individual actions. Even though the Federal Republic of Germany was involved in the World Heritage project from its very beginning, it was not immediately clear on what grounds sites should be nominated. The introduction of World Heritage in Germany was not promptly followed by a worked-out policy response at the level of the regime. In this period of flux, individual civil servants enjoyed relative freedom to select sites. After a transition period, an elaborate system—involving a wide variety of actors, organizations and institutions—gradually evolved for the selection of World Heritage sites in Germany, leaving less and less room for individuals to steer the process.

Niche actors ultimately used the social, cultural and political landscape of growing internationalism in Germany to promote Aachen as an international city and Aachen Cathedral as an international monument. The creation of the International

Charlemagne award—an initiative of the local textile merchant and politician Kurt Pfeiffer—exemplifies how local actors adapted to the changing landscape and strategically used the prevailing public opinion. The owners of Aachen Cathedral, profited from the acquired international status of their property in that it opened up new funding opportunities, especially from the private sector. Although it is fair to claim that an important building like Aachen Cathedral would probably also have been well preserved without the World Heritage title, the new status did help relieve the major financial burden by attracting more private and corporate donors.

With regards to the regulative rules, all the *Länder* of the Federal Republic passed new heritage laws in the 1970s (Morsch 1980), but in terms of content there were clear similarities between the different laws. Every law defined a monument in more or less the same way and explained heritage preservation as a public interest based on scientific, artistic and Heimat-historical motivations. In comparison to the old laws, the new laws were generally more inclusive and introduced new categories of heritage and gave legislators the possibility to protect larger conservation areas. In terms of the government funds made available for preservation, there were differences. In 1975, Bavaria, for example, spend four marks per capita in subvention for the preservation of non-state historic buildings, while North Rhine-Westphalia spend little under one mark and Bremen only eighteen pfennigs (Koshar 1998, p. 298). Overall, however, the laws did not initiate a drastic reorganization of the existing organizational or bureaucratic structures. The subsidiary system for heritage preservation hardly changed and neither did the restoration practice. Although several new actors and organizations got involved in heritage preservation, they did not replace the existing organizational structure. In fact, the new laws further bolstered the existing federal system in which the *Länder*, rather than the federal government, are responsible for heritage preservation—a structure that was firmly embedded the 1949 constitution of the Federal Republic. In this sense the case study does not point to a real regime change, only to minor adaptations.

The main change that the case of Aachen Cathedral points to is a normative one. The new international meaning that was attributed to the building shows that the Federal Republic of Germany was in the process of rewriting its history. The past was used not to show continuity but to prove that nationalism had merely been a phase. Aachen Cathedral illustrated that Germany was an integral part of Europe and that its past was not defined only by its nationalism. At the same time it was used to give the new and fragile European integration project a precedent and a history. The reinterpretation of Aachen's, Germany's and Europe's past was enabled by several landscape developments such as the political will of the German authorities to contribute to the European integration process and the general shift in people's socio-cultural sense of belonging from an exclusively ethnically defined German nation to a European whole.

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Chapter 5
Who Should Pay the Bill for England's World Heritage?

5.1 Introduction

The city of Durham is located in the north-east of England, not far from its border with Scotland. Durham was built in a highly defensible location. Here the river Wear makes a sharp bend, creating a steep peninsula that can only be entered through a narrow bottleneck (Figs. 5.1 and 5.2). The city was founded by the Saxon monks of Saint Cuthbert, who had lived on the island of Lindisfarne some 120 km north of Durham until Viking raids forced them to move south. The monastic community arrived on the peninsula in 995 AD. They buried the body of their Saint near the river gorge and erected a small wooden church to protect the shrine. An earth embankment was raised to protect the more vulnerable north side of the peninsula. In 1069, Durham was conquered by the Normans. In order to consolidate their military position in the region and to protect the monastic community against Vikings and Scots, the Normans commenced the construction of Durham castle in 1072. In 1093, the bishop of Durham initiated the construction of a cathedral, replacing the existing Anglo-Saxon church. The cathedral was built in the Romanesque style and was a true engineering masterpiece. It was the first major building in England to be covered entirely with stone vaults and one of the first buildings in Europe where rib-vaulting was successfully applied. The construction work went remarkably fast; it took only forty years (Roberts 2011, pp. 56–57).

In 1986, the cathedral and the castle were successfully nominated for inclusion onto the World Heritage list. Although the two buildings are situated close to one another, the boundaries of the World Heritage site were neatly drawn around each individual building. The World Heritage title was particularly welcomed by the University of Durham, which owned the castle and used it for student accommodation. However, the castle was in need of costly repairs, which the university could not readily afford. It was hoped that the World Heritage title would help generate the necessary financial resources (Salthouse 1985). Surely the government would not risk the deterioration of a building that just received the prestigious World Heritage

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_5



Fig. 5.1 View on Durham Cathedral from across the river Wear. The construction of the current church began in 1093. The style that is called Romanesque in continental Europe is in the Britain named after the people who brought is to the British Isles: 'Norman'. The steep peninsula and the sharp bend of the river made Durham a highly defensible city. Picture by the author (2015)

title? Unable to cover the expenses, university officials approached various governmental and non-governmental institutions asking for financial aid. In spite of the recently acquired World Heritage status, none of the institutions was initially willing or able to pick up the massive bill. While lumps of stone crumbled from the keep, the university officials were being shuttled from pillar to post.

This precarious situation was largely caused by the so-called 'double-funding rule'. This rule prohibited universities and other semi-public institutions to be subsidized by multiple government bodies at the same time. As Durham University

Fig. 5.2 Skyline of the castle and the cathedral of Durham. View from the train station. The peninsula on which both structures are situated is significantly higher than the rest of the town, thus making this geographic location militarily advantageous. Picture by the author (2015)

already received funding from the Department of Science and Education, it was denied financial aid from English Heritage—which was established only two years earlier. After months of intensive lobbying—a process in which the castle's World Heritage status was a recurring motive—the university managed to persuade the Treasury to abolish the 'double-funding rule'. This had a considerable effect on the British heritage subsidiary system as a whole. Not only universities, but all kinds of publicly funded institutions like museums and ports were now entitled to apply for this funding stream. As a result, English Heritage changed from an organization primarily aimed at helping private owners of historic buildings to an organization aimed at helping the public sector (Binney 1989, p. 1). Its financial means and legal reach were subsequently widened.

This chapter analyzes the impact of the World Heritage title on Durham in particular and the British heritage regime in general. How did the new global accolade affect the funding of restoration projects? What impact did the status have on the British heritage subsidiary system as a whole? The first section briefly describes the history of the castle and the cathedral. The second section deals with the World Heritage title. It will analyze how and why Durham castle and cathedral were nominated and how the site was managed. The third section examines the discussions on the restoration of Durham castle. Although the World Heritage title

did not bring about any direct financial benefits for the owners, the status did give them leverage in attempts to change the subsidiary system. The conclusion will interpret the findings in Multi-Level terms.

5.2 Grey Towers of Durham

The construction of the castle of Durham began in the late eleventh century under the supervision of Waltheof—the earl of Northumbria. It was built according to the typical Norman 'motte and bailey' plan form (Fig. 5.3). A keep was built on top of an artificial mound called a motte. Around the motte was a walled courtyard called inner bailey. A dry moat controlled the access to the inner bailey, which could only be entered via a drawbridge. Further fortifications, called outer bailey, surrounded the peninsula. Despite the many changes that were made over the centuries, this original plan form is still visible today. Several Norman elements survived the ages, including an undercroft chapel and the north range (Brickstock 2007, pp. 1–63). After the earl of Northumbria was executed for plotting against the crown, King William sold the castle and the surrounding lands to Walcher, the bishop of Durham (Pocock

Fig. 5.3 The keep of Durham castle viewed from the central courtyard. The top storeys of the keep were added in the nineteenth century, replacing the existing dilapidated medieval keep. It is currently use for student housing. Picture by the author (2015)

2013, p. 14). It would remain in the possession of successive bishops for almost 750 years, until the university purchased it in the 1830s. In addition to a military stronghold, the castle became the chief residence and the ceremonial palace of the bishops, and later prince-bishops of Durham. The bishops of Durham were the holders of the King's authority in the north. In addition to their spiritual duties as leaders of the clergy, they were responsible for the defence and government of the region. They were granted extensive powers and privileges, such as the right to mint their own coinage, raise their own armies and hold their own courts of law. In the course of the centuries, the castle gradually lost its military function and was increasingly used by the bishops to display their wealth and power. What distinguishes Durham castle from other stately homes is that it was never in the possession of one family, because the position of prince-bishop could not be inherited (Roberts 2011, pp. 31–54).

Each new resident thus tried to leave his mark on the castle, as a result of which the building is rather eclectic. For example, in the second half of the seventeenth century, an impressive pine staircase with baroque carvings was installed. In the eighteenth century the exterior of the Great Hall was topped with four decorative cupolas in an oriental style (Emery 1996, pp. 70–79). Despite these and other changes that took place over time, the castle is appreciated as a rare example of an Anglo-Norman stronghold and due to its former function as the bishopric palace tells an important part of the region's history. It has a large collection of antiques, tapestries, paintings, arms and armour, silverware and ancient busts. Since the 1990s, officially, it has the status of a museum (Brickstock 2007). However, the cathedral, which is often cited as one of the most iconic structures in Britain, has overshadowed the castle both physically and in terms of the value attributed to it. According to one commentator: "Durham Cathedral was hardly surpassed in its day, and has about it air of serene finality which belongs of right to the greatest masterpieces. It represents the summit of achievement" (Conant, cited in Roberts 2011, p. 56).

The cathedral's construction began in the late eleventh century under the rule of the Normans. In a remarkably short period of time the Normans built dozens of new churches, chapels and abbeys in Britain. Massive cathedrals were erected in Lincoln, Winchester, Ely, London and Canterbury. New abbeys arose in Bury Saint Edmund and Saint Alban. Most of these churches were initially planned with flat wooden ceilings over their nave and choir. Stone vaulting was still difficult for Romanesque masons—although there had been experiments in continental Europe—particularly in Germany and Île de France (Roberts 2011). Durham Cathedral was the first structure in Britain where this technique was successfully applied. The craftsmanship of the Norman masons not only speaks from the ribbed vaults, but also from the decorative geometric carvings applied to the pillars and the arches (Fig. 5.4).

In contrast to the castle, Durham Cathedral is built in a rather uniform style, because it took only forty years to build. Nonetheless, the cathedral also underwent several changes over the centuries. The Galilee chapel was added in the second half of the twelfth century. The chapel of the nine altars dates from the thirteenth century—and was changed significantly again in the eighteenth century. The height

Fig. 5.4 The Chapel of the Nine Altars was added in the thirteenth century to the eastern façade of Durham Cathedral. It was created to allow more pilgrims to move around Saint Cuthbert's reliquary. Picture by the author (2015)

of the western towers was increased in the twelfth and thirteenth century. The current central tower was only constructed in the fifteenth century. In the nineteenth century, the west towers were decorated with neo-gothic pinnacles (Roberts 2011; Pocock 2013). In Britain, and well beyond, the structure is widely appreciated for its beautiful architectural features and impressive scale. In 2011, the readership of the *Guardian* chose the cathedral as the best building in Britain (The Guardian 2011). Furthermore, in 1984, a ballot during 150th anniversary of the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) voted Durham Cathedral as the 'best building in the world' (RIBA 1984, pp. 50–57). Not long after, the cathedral, along with the castle, were nominated for the World Heritage title.

5.3 Durham World Heritage

5.3.1 Becoming World Heritage

The first half of the 1980s saw a number of important developments for the British heritage field. In 1983, the government adopted the *National Heritage Act*. The most

important consequence of this act was the creation of the Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for England—commonly referred to as English Heritage. The government first raised the idea of a separate executive agency for heritage in 1981 in a paper entitled *Organization of Ancient Monuments and Historic Buildings in England* (DoE 1981). This was later followed by the publication of the paper *The Way Forward*, in 1982. This paper suggested that a heritage organization at an arm's length from the government could harness "abundant goodwill" in the heritage field (DoE 1982, p. 1). The first attempts to convince the government of the importance of signing the World Heritage Convention were made in the same period. Especially the director of the World Heritage Centre, Bernd von Droste, established contacts "with the highest authorities to encourage the UK's ratification or acceptance [of the World Heritage Convention]" (von Droste 1981). He was, for instance, actively reaching out to important British public and political figures, including Valerian Wellesley the 8th Duke of Wellington and Adrian Philippe, the director of the British Countryside Commission (von Droste 1982a, b). At the same time, several interested British individuals—especially from universities and other research institutions—regularly sought informal contact with the World Heritage Centre in Paris to exchange ideas on which sites could potentially be put forward for recognition once the government endorses the Convention. Durham occasionally came up in such "very informal and tentative enquir[ies]" (Smith and Poore 1981, p. 1).

After several years of such unofficial reciprocal contact between UK officials and the World Heritage Centre, the British government eventually signed the Convention in 1984. Since the United Kingdom signed the World Heritage Convention relatively late, it was not as closely involved in the project as other countries that signed the convention much earlier such as Germany. In 1984, the government placed Durham on the Tentative List of sites that would be put forward in the course of the years to come. In 1986, the site was amongst the first British nominations to be enlisted—along with the cultural sites Ironbridge Gorge, the castles and town walls of King Edward in Gwynedd, the Studly Royal Park including the ruins of Fountains abbey and Stonehenge. Moreover, the first British entries included one natural heritage site—Giant's Causeway—and one so-called mixed cultural and natural site—the Saint Kilda archipelago near Scotland's north-west coast (UNESCO 1986).

The nomination process was organized at the central level—in line with the bureaucratic procedures of many other branches of government in the Thatcher era. Also the local authorities of Durham experienced this top-down style of governing. The nomination was instigated by the national government with barely any involvement of the local authorities or the local community of Durham. As the local historian, Douglas Pocock, recalled: "The survey of the site was hardly thorough, for the person dispatched by the Historic Buildings Commission to assemble the case was unacquainted with Durham, stayed for only two days and considered it unnecessary to consult the city or county planning authorities" (Pocock 2013, p. 106). Likewise, the owners were barely invited to think or work alongside the national government. Pocock noted about this issue that: "the dean [of the cathedral] and the vice-chancellor [of the University College] had been given less than a fortnight to reply to a letter from the Department of Environment, received

without warning, to confirm that they saw no objections to the cathedral and castle on the UK's 'Tentative List'" (Pocock 2013, p. 106).

After the site was placed on the Tentative List, the government prepared a nomination dossier which was officially sent to the World Heritage Centre in Paris in 1985. ICOMOS evaluated the nomination and concluded that Durham castle and cathedral indeed qualified for inscription onto the World Heritage list. The nomination file identified three main reasons for its inscription. First, Durham Cathedral was described as "the largest and most perfect monument of 'Norman' style architecture in England. The small castral chapel for its part marks a turning point in the evolution of 11th century Romanesque sculpture" (ICOMOS 1986, p. 3). Secondly, it noted that "though some wrongly considered Durham Cathedral to be the first 'Gothic' monument (the relationship between it and the churches built in the Ile-de-France region in the 12th century is not obvious), this building, due to the innovative audacity of its vaulting, constitutes—as do Spire and Cluny—a type of experimental model which was far ahead of its time" (ICOMOS 1986, p. 3). The last reason for inscription was related to relics held in the church. It claimed that "around the relics of Cuthbert and Bede, Durham crystallized the memory of the evangelizing of Northumbria and of primitive Benedictine monastic life" (ICOMOS 1986, p. 3).

While the remainder of the document describes the history and architecture of both the castle and the cathedral, the three official criteria for inscription mentioned above almost exclusively apply to the cathedral. The only element that is mentioned of the castle is the sculpturing in the Norman chapel. Moreover, the document is short with just three pages. In this context, the nomination of Durham was not unlike other nominations in the early years of the Convention. In another regard, however, the file stands out, because it reflects critically on the issue of authenticity, which was highly uncommon at the time. With regards to the castle the file notes, for example, that: "[the castle] has been rebuilt, extended and adapted to changing circumstances and uses over a period of 900 years: from being a key fortress in the defence of the border with Scotland, it was gradually transformed in more peaceful times into an imposing and comfortable palace for the Bishops of Durham; and since 1837, soon after the foundation of the University of Durham, it has served as a residential college for many generations of students and dons. As they stand today, the buildings reflect these changing functions and display a wide variety of architectural styles of different periods" (ICOMOS 1986, p. 2). Although the authors' reflection on the sites material and functional authenticity was rather unusual, neither the World Heritage Committee, nor ICOMOS commented on it. The World Heritage Committee officially acted on ICOMOS' advice and enlisted the site during its tenth session in Paris in November 1986. All other proposed sites from the United Kingdom were also enlisted (UNESCO 1986; Lewis 2009).

5.3.2 *Management of the Site*

In the early days of the World Heritage Convention, the inclusion of a management plan was not required. Nowadays, such a management plan details the existing national and local protective measures—legal and otherwise. Obviously, the castle and cathedral of Durham—even though this was not worked out precisely in the nomination file—were also protected by national and local law. Since 1952, both the cathedral and the castle have been adopted in the national heritage inventory as Grade I listed buildings. The eighteenth century Prebends Bridge across the Wear was also a listed Grade I building. In addition to these three Grade I listed buildings, there are numerous buildings in the city centre that have either Grade II or Grade II* status. In 1968, the entire city centre of Durham was enlisted as a conservation area. This area, which was even further extended in the early 1980s, included not only Durham peninsula, but also several surrounding neighbourhoods (Durham County Council 2016, p. 1).

Apart from the national and local authorities, the owners of the cathedral and the castle played an important role in protecting and managing the sites. Especially the Church of England, that owns Durham Cathedral, has a special position in the British heritage regime. In 1986, the Church of England owned 16,700 churches, of which 8500 were pre-reformation and 12,500 were statutorily listed, including 2675 Grade I buildings. This made the Church of England one of the main owners of heritage in Britain. The Church has its own elaborate legal system and procedures for dealing with the construction, demolition or alteration of church buildings. Many of the laws that applied to owners of other historic buildings did not apply to the Church of England. Traditionally, the Church has insisted on remaining exempt from the state's evolving statutory system. From the very beginnings of heritage legislation in Britain, the Church has resisted attempts to include church buildings in state legislations. When the first Ancient Monuments Act was passed in 1882, for example, the Church strongly opposed the inclusion of church buildings and wished to remain in control of its properties instead. In 1913, this wish was formalized with the adoption of the so-called 'ecclesiastical exemption'—a provision that formed part of the Ancient Monuments Consolidation Amendment Act (Delafons 1997, pp. 119–121).

This meant that only the churches that were no longer in use could be subjected to listed building control. Rather than relying on Parliamentary acts, churches were protected through a rather extensive system of ecclesiastical legislation. The Church hired its own conservationists and carried out restoration work. This had the advantage that the Church could largely determine how its heritage was dealt with. However, one of the major disadvantages was that churches were not eligible for any form of national subsidy. Over the years the costs for church maintenance had risen and the Church had less to spend as a result of the secularization of Britain. Therefore, the Church gradually moved from a position where it insisted on remaining exempt of national legislation, to a position where it accepted increased state control in exchange for financial assistance. While the Church maintained some

degree of independence, it now had to ask permission for any major changes to historic church buildings. The government, while allowing the Church to act more or less independently, did require a professional approach to the preservation of churches. In the late 1980s, it even suggested the formation of a new body "something rather like an ecclesiastical cousin of English Heritage" (Delafons 1997, p. 128). Even more than parish churches, cathedrals long remained excluded from state inference. Due to their special position in the hierarchy of the Church of England, cathedrals enjoyed greater freedom from state control. Cathedrals hired their own Master Builders and Resident Archaeologists, and only ecclesiastical preservation laws applied to them.

This system of canon and ecclesiastical provisions, called Faculty Jurisdiction, ensured that the Church could largely determine what could and could not be altered in cathedrals (Grenville n.d., pp. 1–2; CBA 2006, p. 65). The price for this independence, as mentioned earlier, was that cathedrals did not receive government funds. It was only in 1990 with the creation of Care of Cathedrals Measure that English Heritage funding has become available for cathedrals. In the same year, English Heritage set up a Cathedral Repair Grants Scheme and has instituted a survey of the state of repair of all 61 Anglican and Roman Catholic cathedrals in England (Delafons 1997, p. 28). Durham Cathedral is also subjected to the 1990 Care of Cathedrals Measures. As a result, the Diocese must now obtain permission for any major changes to the building. However, when the cathedral was under consideration for World Heritage status in the mid-1980s, the building was still excluded from most governmental heritage laws. Given the long history of relative independence of the Church of England and the government's traditional will to respect this exceptional position, it is surprising that the government informed the Church of England very late about its intention to nominate the site for the World Heritage status (Pocock 2013). One possible explanation for this could be that the title was not perceived as an additional protective measure, but merely as a global acknowledgement of the building's importance and significance. Yet, due to its rather special position within the heritage regime, the cathedral authorities still played an important role in the preservation and maintenance of the World Heritage site.

Similarly, the owner of the castle—Durham University—had a somewhat special role in the preservation of the site. For example, Durham University has a long tradition in the field of archaeology. The subject has been taught at the university since 1931 and the Durham University archaeology department has a longstanding reputation. This department played a prominent role in archaeological research conducted at Durham castle. It had an advisory role in projects affecting the castle. While in most cases the state archaeologists determine the nature of archaeological research, the owner played an active part in the case of Durham castle. Although this role had no official statutory status, there was and still is close collaboration between the archaeologists working for the state and those working for the owner (CBA 2006, p. 123). In this sense, both the owner of the castle and the owner of the cathedral are special because the rules that applied to the preservation of most other historic buildings did not completely apply the cathedral and the castle. However,

the subsidies received by 'normal' owners of historic buildings were also not available to the owners of the castle and the cathedral of Durham. The Diocese—despite high running costs—still managed to finance the upkeep of the cathedral largely thanks to donations by visitors. The costly restoration and maintenance work on the castle, however, became a financial millstone around the neck of the university (Gibson 2015).

5.4 Rotting Joints, Leaking Roofs

5.4.1 Concealed and Unconcealed Damage

University College alumnus and former curator of Durham castle, Richard Brickstock, explained in his book—*Durham Castle: Fortress, Palace, College* (2007)—that unlike the neighbouring cathedral, Durham castle is built on soft soil rather than solid rock. As a result of its location, it has always had to cope with constructional problems. Already fifty years after its construction, the twelfth century north hall began to subside. Although this process was temporarily slowed down by the construction of a tower on the north-west side of the castle in the thirteenth century, it remains a constructional soft spot up to this day. By the mid-eighteenth century, the castle's north range was again in danger of collapsing as the north and south wall were shifting apart. The south wall of the Norman Gallery, which was bulging to one side, had to be cut-back, re-faced and strengthened with wooden beams. Around the same time, the buttresses of the Great Hall were reinforced. The top storeys of the keep, however, were beyond repair and had to be pulled down in the late eighteenth century. The University of Durham, which moved into the building in 1840, became the owner of a building with a troublesome constructional past and, as it would turn out, an equally troublesome constructional future (Brickstock 2007).

In the second half of the nineteenth century the castle was refurbished in order to enable student accommodation. However, the university never possessed sufficient funds for the day-to-day maintenance of the monument. The consistent underspending led to several crises. Drastic action was required several times to avoid the structure from collapsing. By 1900, despite earlier effort to strengthen the construction, the north hall was again on the verge of collapsing. The situation was so worrisome that, in 1904, large metal tie-rods were inserted in the structure to prevent further movement of the outer walls. Yet, all these interventions did not solve the structural problems. In 1927, the university asked the engineer Oscar Faber to take stock of the building's material state. He concluded in his report that the castle was "in a highly precarious condition and any further delay in dealing with it may result in its total or partial collapse" (Faber 1927, cited in Brickstock 2007, p. 124). Following Faber's report the Durham Castle Preservation Fund was set up. The organization launched a national appeal for funding in 1928, after which restoration could begin (Brickstock 2007).

The restoration campaign, led by Faber, began in 1929 and took ten years. The first phase of the campaign focused on undoing some of the earlier restorative measures—not all of which had had the desirable effect. For example, the tie rods that had been inserted in the north range in 1904, were intended to arrest the movement of the south wall by tying it to the relatively stable north wall. However, the result had been the opposite. Not only was the south wall still sliding, it now threatened to drag the north wall along with it. This situation led to major cracks in the stonework. Faber's solution was to underpin the building with bricks and concrete to reduce the pressure on the walls. The west side of the castle was another cause for concern. The soft and unstable bedrock on which this side of the castle was built caused the west wall of the Great Hall to move outwards and downwards towards the river. The castle's location on a steep hill made shoring impossible. The walls were therefore strengthened by drilling holes through them and injecting them with large quantities of cement. After that, a large number of steel tie-rods were placed underneath the building, which were tied to three massive concrete blocks that were sunk into the castle's courtyard. However, for Faber, these measures were incomplete in the larger context of restoring the castle. In a lecture in 1934, he commented on the damaged roofs, the broken window heads "and other matters too numerous too name, which, if unattended, will soon allow this noble structure to become a picturesque ruin" (Faber 1934, cited in Brickstock 2007, p. 127).

After the Second World War, the restoration continued but focused mainly on aesthetics instead of dealing with construction issues. In the 1950s, for example, the castle's chapel was restored and the richly decorated Norman Arch was skilfully cleaned to reveal its former beauty (Roberts 2011, p. 47). The overall constructional condition of the building, however, remained worrisome. In the 1980s, the poor material state of the building became evident again as yet another disaster unfolded. While many of the past challenges were caused by the ground on which the castle was build, the new challenge came from the sky in the form of acid rain.

5.4.2 A New Invisible Enemy

For over 900 years Durham castle withstood hostile invasions of Scots, Vikings and local rebels. Yet, during the 1980s, it almost succumbed to a more elusive enemy: acid rain. Traffic, heavy industry and large-scale farming led to the release of high quantities of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide into the atmosphere. These were spread over vast areas across the globe in the form of acid rain showers. Although this phenomenon had already been discovered in the 1880s, it was only in the 1980s that it became a major problem and a global concern. Not only the natural environment suffered—also buildings and statues were affected. Already in the 1970s, the Austrian geologist Erhard Winkler had studied the effects of acid rain and air pollution on various materials, and made a rather pessimistic prediction that if the emission of chemicals into the atmosphere would continue, the majority of historic buildings would be completely dissolved by the end of the century (Winkler 1973).

Many of Winkler's colleagues initially did not share his pessimistic view, and it was only after some of the world's most renowned monuments were affected that interest in this issue began to grow. Famous buildings like the Capitol in Washington DC, the Acropolis of Athens, the Leshan giant Buddha and the Cathedral of Cologne were all slowly but steadily deteriorating. Particularly, the discoloration of the Taj Mahal in Agra, famous for its whiteness, formed a powerful image, which roused wide public and political attention to the problem. As ApSimon et al. noted: "the threat of irreparable damage to unique national heritage has undoubtedly been the principle force in mobilizing political concern over air pollution damage" (ApSimon et al. 1997, p. 104). In the same period, the international scientific community began to develop major interest in the subject. A recently published bibliography lists dozens of publications and symposia that were written and organized in the 1980s about the impact of acid rain on historic buildings (ICOMOS 2009, pp. 139–152). In addition to aesthetic loss, the economic impact of acid rain in terms of material damage to buildings was considerable. A Europe-wide study conducted a few years later estimated that substantial emission reduction would lead to a cost saving of more than $ 10.6 billion. The additional costs for repair and restoration work to historic buildings meant additional financial pressure on owners (Heinz 1986).

The University of Durham experienced the financial consequences of acid rain as well. A combination of acid rain and atmospheric pollution deteriorated Durham castle's mellow sandstone, leaving "cannonball-sized holes" in its walls (Unwin 1991, p. 1). The university was barely able to cover the cost of maintaining the castle. In the early 1980s the lead roof began to leak and many wooden joints and floors were affected by rising damp. The university could still afford the repairs although its "financial resources [were] stretched to the limit" (Salthouse 1985, p. 2). In 1986 dry rot was found in the castle's wooden support beams. According to the bursar of the College, Albert Cartmell, the wood looked deceivingly solid but in fact it was more "like a pie – a hard, crusty rim but soft inside" (Cartmell 1987, p. 1). Even more troublesome than the condition of the wood, however, was the erosion of the outer walls. Especially the ramparts on the north terrace were riddled with holes (Wainwright 1991, p. 1). The board of Durham University was increasingly concerned about the financial drain caused by the castle's poor state and therefore decided to call for help from the University Grants Committee (UGC). This governmental advisory body was established in 1919 as part of the Department of Science and Education to facilitate the subsidizing of British universities. Although the UGC expressed its sympathy for the complicated situation in which Durham University found itself, it did not see heritage preservation as part of their portfolio of responsibilities. The UGC's only task was to ensure the quality of higher education. Since the castle's restoration would not have "any academic benefit to the region" it was decided not to make additional funds available (UGC 1988).

After this rejection, the board turned to English Heritage, but it took several weeks for them to reply. In his report of the academic year 1987–88, Master of the University College, Edward Salthouse, noted that "there has still been no response from English Heritage to our request for financial assistance towards work necessary on the roofs and the walls – we still live in hope" (Salthouse 1988b, p. 9). But soon

'hope' made room for 'despair'. English Heritage was not able to help either, because the 'double-funding rule' prohibited them from subsidizing the university. Salthouse was stunned that "neither the University Grants Committee or English Heritage [were] willing to admit that this superb building [was] their responsibility" (Salthouse 1988a, p. 5). In an attempt to circumvent the double-funding rule, Salthouse suggested the creation of a body that would not be directly linked to the university and therefore eligible for funding. He proposed something akin to the "friends of Durham Cathedral" (Salthouse 1988e, d, p. 1). However, when the university attempted to find such alternative ways to finance the restoration, it turned out that the 'double-funding rule' was not only an obstacle in acquiring direct public funding; it also discouraged private benefactors and charity organizations to contribute to the university's cause. A request made to, for example, the National Heritage Memorial Fund—a charity organization established in 1980—was turned down because of the fuzzy policy situation (Boobyer 1987).

In a written plea to the Minister of the Department of the Environment, the Vice-Chancellor of Durham University addressed this problem, noting that the 'double-funding rule' is "starting to have an impact on our other appeals [. . .] If we are to be a World Heritage [. . .] then we must be free of the 'double funding' rule to enable us to go to other statutory bodies for help" (Holliday 1988a, p. 1). The Minister, however, stated that the subject was still being discussed and he could not yet give a conclusive answer with regards to the applicability of the 'double-funding' rule. The lack of clarity continued negatively impact the fundraising process. In a scrawl to his colleague Rosemary Cramp, Holliday explained the effect of the 'double-funding rule' in rather apposite wording: "donors were reluctant to give to save a castle that was apparently not considered worth considering for help by the government or its agencies!" (Holliday 1988b, p. 1).

In April 1988 an "emergency developed" (Holliday 1988c, p. 1). The castle's gatehouse partially collapsed and expensive emergency repairs had to be made in order not to jeopardize the safety of the college students. The estimated costs were in range of £250.000. Moreover, an additional £1.3 million was needed to patch-up the severely damaged north side of the castle. Immediately following the gatehouse calamity, Holliday approached the Treasury to explain the situation and to ask if the university could be relieved of the 'double-funding rule'. Unfortunately they were "particularly unhelpful", suggesting that the university should put the castle up for sale if the upkeep was unaffordable (Salthouse 1988c, p. 9). Holliday, Salthouse and other university officials were clearly upset by the Treasury's suggestion. Salthouse, for example, noted that: "I can see no logic in the suggestion that the Castle should be sold to another body, who would in all probability not be able to use it in a way consistent with its history and who would probably be clear to apply to English Heritage for a grant" (Salthouse 1988c, p. 9).

The following day Frederick Holliday wrote to Peter Swinnerton-Dyer—Chair of the UGC—to inform him about the financial hardship that the university faced now that it was confronted with the emergency repair costs and to urge him to reconsider his earlier decision. "As you know", he wrote, "I just do not have such sums of money. God knows where I shall find £250,000 just now – I hope to hear from him! I

spoke informally to Nicholas Ridley [of the Treasury], and his only suggestion was 'sell it'! I have had the Castle valued and, because of its location, status and site, the sum of £350,000 was put on it. But I *cannot* be the Vice-Chancellor who sells the Castle" (Holliday 1988d, p. 1). The UGC Chair responded kindly: "You have my sympathy. I think you ought to assume that God will provide the £250,000 you need, through the intermediary of one branch or the other of the British Government" (Swinnerton-Dyer 1988, p. 1). However, he continued, debates as to which branch of the government this should be, were still going on in Whitehall. Furthermore, Swinnerton-Dyer was not willing to make an exception for Durham, because it could have far-reaching consequences. He explained that "though Durham is probably the only University which owns a habitable Castle, the university system as a whole owns a very considerable number of listed buildings – and if we accept responsibility for one, we shall have to accept responsibility for the lot. That is going to be a considerable financial drain; and the additional burden on our professional staff, if it is not strengthened, is unthinkable" (Swinnerton-Dyer 1988, p. 1).

5.4.3 Defending the Castle, Fighting the Regime

When begging and persuading failed, Holliday decided on another, more drastic strategy. "What I must do", he explained to a journalist, "is shame this Government into bearing its obligations" (Holliday 1988e, p. 6). What followed were several attempts by Holliday and other university officials to lampoon the government via the national and local press and at international gatherings. The World Heritage status of the castle and the government's refusal to properly care for its sites of outstanding universal value were central arguments in this eventually successful strategy. In 1987, the enlisting of the castle and the cathedral onto the World Heritage list was celebrated with a plaque ceremony attended by a government delegation, representatives of the cathedral and of Durham University. Although some officials had hoped for a visit of a member of the royal family, the government was represented by Minister Colin Moynihan. He was the Minister of Sports and Tourism, but due to a reshuffling of ministerial capacities in the mid-1980s, he also had become responsible for heritage preservation and urban planning. Moynihan was a real sports fanatic, who had won a silver medal as a coxswain in the Moscow Olympics of 1980. During the ceremony, Moynihan gave a speech in which he congratulated the university and church delegates and noted that the World Heritage title comes with great responsibility (Moynihan 1987).

Frederick Holliday spoke on behalf of the university. In his speech, he stressed that the government should take its responsibility too. "We in the university", he said "will honour our trust, but we need Government help to allow us to do it properly" (Holliday 1987). The theme that the government should not duck the responsibility for its World Heritage sites, also became the central theme in the university's media campaign to get the 'double-funding rule' abolished. Cartmell, for example, wrote to the editor of the Daily Telegraph that "ownership of a building of international

importance brings with it a clear responsibility for expenditure on conservation and maintenance, far beyond that allowed for by the UGC funding. [The property] cries out to be preserved for the nation and therefore deserves to receive the grant aid from English Heritage which it is currently denied" (Cartmell 1988, p. 1).

With the financial situation of the College becoming increasingly difficult, Holliday sought other ways to fund the restoration. In November 1988, he received a letter from a gentleman who asked him for a favour. His only daughter wanted to work as a lecturer in the psychology department at Durham University College. Despite his daughter's explicit request not to interfere in her business, the gentleman asked Holliday to invite her for an interview. Holliday entrusted his colleague Salthouse that he is considering to invite her, because "this man heads Lloyds Life Assurance and Lloyds Unit Trusts among other things. I [suggest] we approach him over funding for the Castle" (Holliday 1988f, p. 1). Meanwhile, rumours about a possible sale of the castle spread. The solicitors of Smith and Graham from Hartpool made an inquiry about this on behalf of an anonymous client: "We understand that the University is giving consideration to the sale of the castle at Durham. Clients of ours would be most interested in the acquisition of the castle" (Smith and Graham 1988, p. 1). Holliday, however, still did not wish to consider selling the castle: "I hasten to correct any impression that you may have been given that Durham Castle is up for sale. That is most emphatically not the case" (Holliday 1988g, p. 1). Even amongst the staff, there was some fear that the financial situation would force the College to either sell the castle or parts of its inventory. Rosemary Cramp was inclined to inquire about the castle's valuable collections: "We have our library and museum treasures of course, but surely no-one is suggesting we sell them, or are they?" (Cramp 1988, p. 1).

However, instead of selling the castle or the castle inventory, Holliday intended to generate more income in rent. As the student rooms in the castle, according to the board of the College, should remain affordable, it was decided to rent out the Bishop's Suite for honeymoons or otherwise luxurious stays. Bishop David Jenkins, however, initially objected to this idea. One of the preconditions under which the Bishop of Durham sold the castle to the university in the 1830s was that the he and his successors could make use of the Bishop's Suite at any time and free of charge. As Jenkins frequently visited Durham, he reminded the university officials of his right to use the Suite. Holliday answered that the College desperately needed the money, explaining the precarious situation with English Heritage. He, therefore, tried to reach a settlement with Jenkins who was sympathetic to the university's difficult situation. Jenkins noted: "I will not commit to paper my views of the way things seems to be going politically – not least to finances of Higher Education" (Jenkins 1988, p. 1). He agreed to the compromise that he could use the Suite only on appointment.

On November 22 1988, the famous heritage scholar David Lowenthal—who had just published his work *The Past is a Foreign Country*—was invited to give a public lecture in Durham. His talk, entitled *Durham: Perils and Promises of a Heritage*, reflected on the advantages and downsides of the World Heritage status for Durham in terms of, amongst others, tourism (Lowenthal 1988). The lecture drew several

representatives of other British World Heritage sites as well. After the event, these representatives decided to join forces to defend the World Heritage sites' common interests. This rather ad hoc and spontaneous initiative was dubbed 'The Durham Group'. One of the issues that puzzled 'The Durham Group' was the precise legal implications of the World Heritage title. As the University of Durham had already experienced, the title had no impact on funding—at least not on official government funding. In order to clarify the issue, 'The Durham Group' sent a letter to the Minister Moynihan of the Department of Environment. According to the group it would be a shame if the World Heritage title was merely honorific (The Durham Group 1988). In his response Moynihan explained that the World Heritage status had no impact on the existing policies. However, he argued, this "answer should not be taken as implying that the Government regards World Heritage Status as purely honorific, but as stating the fact that the articles of the Convention have not been incorporated into UK law" (Moynihan 1988, p. 1).

The Minister remained indecisive on the matter. As the World Heritage title was still a rather young phenomenon in Britain, there was no "case precedence" (Moynihan 1988, p. 1). In other words, the exact implications of the World Heritage title would only become clear once the issue would come up in a court case and a judge would determine the legal status—if any—of the World Heritage Convention in the British context. Until then, Moynihan argued, the Ministry is "not able to issue anything in the way of guidance on the precise legal ramifications that accrue from listing" (Moynihan 1988, p. 1). This vacillating answer shows that four years after ratifying the World Heritage Convention and two years after nominating the first World Heritage sites, the British heritage regime had still not fully adapted to the involvement of UNESCO. The lack of clarity about the precise implication of World Heritage status shows that the heritage regime was in the process of finding ways to implement the Convention—legally and otherwise.

5.4.4 Impact on National Policy

More clarity—at least about the double-funding rule—eventually came just before Christmas 1988. Master of the College, Ted Salthouse summarized the developments in his Christmas message in the College newsletter: "We have just heard that the double funding problem concerning the Castle, which I referred to last year, is probably resolved and the University is now eligible to receive grants from English Heritage, as long as they have the necessary funds. We can now sit down and consider our long term strategy for the conservation and maintenance of the Castle [. . .] This puts us on all fours with the owners of other historic buildings and gives us great encouragement to proceed with a major fund-raising effort" (Salthouse 1989, p. 4). Fred Holliday also joined in the celebrations. He told a journalist of a local newspaper: "We have now heard that the Treasury has lifted its injunction on double-funding and we are delighted" (Holliday 1989, p. 3).

More good news came the following year when the university was informed that English Heritage "would consider assisting with repairs to the Castle" (Salthouse 1990, p. 5). According to Salthouse, this was a major step forward. He recalled that it had taken several years before a solution to the funding problem was found: "The Department the Environment, who look after English Heritage, did not find this an easy decision to adjust to and it has taken longer than we would have hoped for a decision to be reached" (Salthouse 1990, p. 5). Apart from the possibility to apply for funding, the abolition of the double-funding rule had the advantage of again enabling a normal professional relation with English Heritage: "Over the years we have had good working relationships with the officers of English Heritage and the strain which the impasse placed on such relations has been eased" (Salthouse 1990, p. 5). Moreover, Salthouse hoped that potential donors, who were initially reluctant to donate due to the unclear funding situation, would now be more willing to contribute to the cause. The abolition of the double-funding rule "enables the University to proceed with fund raising plans for the Castle which is not just the home of this College, but a building of local, national and international importance as was recognized when together the Castle and Cathedral were designated a World Heritage site" (Salthouse 1990, p. 5). He also hoped that more clarity would be given by the government about the implications of the World Heritage status. So far, according to Salthouse, many people assumed that World Heritage sites receive enough funding. "Incidentally this designation is just that – contrary to what is often assumed it brings no funding – and so far contrary to what I had hoped it has not made fund raising any easier" (Salthouse 1990, p. 5).

Not everyone shared in Salthouse's and Holliday's joy about the abolition of the double-funding rule. For example, Marcus Binney—a prominent architectural historian and founding member of SAVE and the Thirties Society—was rather critical of this decision. In an open letter to the *Sunday Telegraph*, he expressed his fear that the case of Durham would open the door to a whole new range of applicants from the public sector. Institutions at arm's length of the government like schools, universities, semi-private water authorities or ordnance factories would be able to apply for English Heritage funding. English Heritage grants that were originally aimed at helping the private owner would, Binney feared, be swallowed up by "refugees from the public sector". Binney had noted that already there were "mutterings" about the fact that funds for other major grand recipient—national trust, private owners of stately homes—were cut-back (Binney 1989, p. 4). Binney, therefore, argued that the abolition of the double-funding rule was irresponsible as long as it was not accompanied with a substantial increase of the budget allocated to English Heritage. In the years that followed, the financial means of English Heritage were indeed increased. This increase, however, was not merely a response to the abolition of the double-funding rule and the associated growth of the number of grant applications from public and semi-public bodies, but also to the increasingly heavy workload of English Heritage. Between 1984 and 1990, English Heritage had gradually taken on more responsibilities. In the first two years of its existence 61,500 buildings had been added to the statutory lists. Moreover, English Heritage had to decide on a growing number of requests for the alteration or partial demolition of historic buildings. The

government tried to assist it by increasing the organization's budget substantially (Delafons 1997, pp. 142–146).

The university received its first English Heritage grant in the spring of 1990. Soon after, scaffolding was raised around the gatehouse and the sandstone was replaced where necessary (Brickstock 2007, p. 128). Around the same period, the university had the rest of the castle again inspected for damage. The damage to the roof and the north range had worsened and the financial pressure on the university remained undiminished. In 1992, it was therefore decided to launch an 'Appeal for Durham castle'. This was the embodiment of the idea of Holliday and Salthouse to set up an active fund-raising group. It was run by the University Development Office. This office actively approached the media in order to generate attention for the appeal. The fund-raisers also actively approached corporate businesses and alumni to ask for donations. They were helped in generating attention for the appeal by a visit of the Queen and her husband to the castle in November 1992—an event that received ample media attention (Salthouse 1992, pp. 3–7).

The overall state of conservation of the castle, however, remained troublesome. Although the work on the gatehouse was progressing, the leaks in the roofs were still not fixed. The deprived state of the building was also noted by ICOMOS-UK—the national branch of the International Council on Monuments and Sites. In 1995, the organization conducted a review of all the World Heritage sites in the United Kingdom. The poor condition of the castle was identified as one of the key issues facing the World Heritage site (CBA 2006, p. 13). In 1999, English Heritage placed the structure on their 'Buildings at Risk' register. Since 1991, English Heritage had made its first 'Buildings at Risk' register for the city of London. In 1998, the first national register was created. It used a system of six categories A to F. According to the English Heritage risk analysis, Durham Castle was in category C—"suffering slow decay; no solution agreed" (Brickstock 2007, p. 6; Historic England 2016). Placing the structure on the 'Buildings at Risk' register had several advantages for the university. The registration entitled the university to additional English Heritage grants, for example for emergency repairs. Moreover, it again showed the urgency of immediate restoration and thus strengthened the university's appeal for private donations.

5.5 Conclusion: The Exploitation of Uncertainty

In the first half of 1980s, two major developments took place in the British heritage field: the creation of English Heritage and the ratification of the World Heritage Convention. The case of Durham made clear that several actors in the British heritage regime had to adapt to the new situation. The period following the creation of English Heritage and the ratification of the World Heritage Convention was characterized by a lack of clarity; both about the precise role and mandate of English Heritage and about the possible legal implications of the World Heritage Convention. It was, for example, not clear whether World Heritage objects should be

protected by legal measures other than the existing ones, nor was it clear if the newly established English Heritage should subsidize the restoration of buildings in (semi-) public ownership. Both issues were not solved overnight and had to be figured out in the process. Durham castle formed a niche in the sense that it faced a very specific challenge that probably no other building in the country faced. The owners of the castle not only had to handle the physical consequences of acid rain on their property's material state, they were also confronted with a heritage regime that could not immediately offer a solution for the financial consequences of this environmental crisis, or offer clear information about the implications of the property's new status as World Heritage. Given the suddenness of the acid rain crisis and the novelty of World Heritage in Britain, it is not surprising that the existing regime initially failed to offer ready-made solutions to these problems.

The lack of clarity was strategically deployed by representatives of the University of Durham to push for new subsidiary measures. The unclear situation with regards to the precise implications of being enlisted on the World Heritage list was also used effectively by the owners of Durham castle. Representatives of the university frequently asked major regime actors—English Heritage, the government—what the World Heritage title entailed, but did not receive a clear answer. However, the niche actors used this lack of clarity to express what they believed the World Heritage title *should* mean. In their opinion, the government should take responsibility for the preservation of British World Heritage sites and should be expected to financially invest in them. The absence of clear rules and regulations regarding World Heritage in British thus gave room to the niche actors to engage in discussions that they would otherwise not have been able to enter. After all, in times of regime stability the rules are generally clear, leaving much less room for such negotiations to take place.

The regime was increasingly put under pressure to act upon the acid rain crisis, to change the subsidiary system and to provide clarity about the legal status of the World Heritage title. However, the institutions and organizations in the regime did not readily adapt their rules in ways that would solve the specific challenge that Durham castle faced, because it was feared—particularly by civil servants of the Treasury—that making an exception for this case would have drastic financial consequences. If Durham castle would become eligible for funding, so would numerous other historic buildings in semi-public ownership. This would ultimately put a major strain on the entire subsidiary system. Adapting the regime to the specific challenge posed by the high-running costs for Durham castle's restoration would only be possible if English Heritage would take on a new and larger role and its financial means would be increased accordingly. The government's reluctance to change the rules in a way that would solve the specific issue that Durham castle faced, illustrates the interdependence of the various actors, organizations and institutions and suggests that regime change comes about gradually. As the situation became increasingly precarious for Durham castle, regime actors began to lose their faith in the existing subsidiary system. As a result, the regime began to de-align. The British heritage regime remained in flux for several years before the issue was finally resolved. After the issue was resolved, the regime re-aligned. Although the actors,

organizations and institutions involved the regime remained largely the same, the funding rules that applied to monuments in semi-public ownership did change in the course of de- and re-alignment.

This case illustrates that policy change can be the outcome of interaction between niches, the regime and landscape factors such as environmental and economic issues. In the period that was analyzed in this chapter, the rules that kept the British heritage regime together were weakened by a number of factors. Firstly, the acid rain crisis affected numerous historic buildings in the country which required the system to adaptation for financing restorations. Secondly, the establishment of English Heritage marked the beginning of a period of uncertainty. Its mandate and precise role were not immediately clear. Thirdly, the ratification of the World Heritage Convention and the actual listing of the first British World Heritage sites raised questions about its precise consequences. Niche actors—in this case the University of Durham—made strategic use of the fact that the regime was temporarily weakened. In the process they undoubtedly profited from the growing public concern and media attention for the changing (environmental) landscape. The combination of the niche activities, a temporarily weakened regime and a drastically changing landscape eventually led to new subsidiary rules for buildings in semi-public ownership. This process could be typified as a "reconfiguration pathway" (Geels 2007, pp. 411–412). In this type of transition the existing regime is not entirely replaced. Instead, the regime adapts in order to solve specific local problems. The situation in which the owners of Durham castle found themselves was rather unique indeed. However, finding a solution for this particularly local problem triggered further adjustments in the basic architecture of the regime. In this case, these adjustments included a widening of the mandate and budget of English Heritage. Moreover, the reconfiguration of the regime meant that semi-public owners of monuments were eligible for preservation and restoration funding.

At the same time, the subsidiary arrangements for churches and cathedrals changed. One of the main catalysts for this change was the dropping number of parishioners in Britain. Between 1960 and 1990 the amount of church visitors dropped significantly (Brown 2012, pp. 170–190). As a result of secularization, the Church came to depend increasingly on government funding for the upkeep of their property. The Church used to have a special position in the heritage regime, but apart from some minor forms of legal exemption it has now lost that role. It traditionally had the freedom to make its own preservation policy, appoint its own conservators and lead the restoration and maintenance of its property. Now, churches increasingly became a category of heritage to which the same rules applied as other forms of built heritage. The Church of England now has to go through the same procedures regarding construction and restoration work, but in return is now eligible for public funding from which it was previously excluded. The Church is, however, still important as the owner of a substantial part of the British built heritage (Delafons 1997, pp. 117–130).

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Chapter 6
World Heritage as a Game Changer?

6.1 Introduction

While West-Germany was amongst the first countries to ratify the Word Heritage Convention in 1976, Great-Britain had many reservations and signed up 8 years later (Cameron and Rössler 2013). Britain left UNESCO in 1987 and only rejoined the organization 10 years later (Dutt 1995). Ideological differences, deeply connected with the countries' recent histories, can help explain both the German enthusiasm for and the British scepticism towards UNESCO's World Heritage project. Germany embracing the World Heritage project points to a deeply rooted desire to shake off its contaminated nationalist past. In the United Kingdom, however, such profound motives were lacking. The decision not to join immediately was based more on a simple political and financial cost-benefit analysis than on principle or ideological grounds, and so was the decision to step out (Dutt 1995). The British government doubted, moreover, if it was really necessary to add yet another protective layer over sites that—in their view—were already efficiently and sufficiently protected by existing national laws and institutions.

While Britain and Germany initially had a different attitude towards the World Heritage project, its impact on their respective heritage regimes was to some extent comparable. Both case-studies showed that World Heritage—both as a global accolade and a potential legal entity—did not readily fit in the existing heritage regimes. In both countries, it long remained unclear how World Heritage sites should be selected and how the World Heritage Convention should be implemented into national and local policy. The World Heritage Convention did not come with a set of sharply defined new rules, leaving much room for individuals to steer the process (Cameron and Rössler 2013). It was not clear whether the title was merely honorific or if it should also inform planning policy. The influence of World Heritage on the heritage regimes was thus not one of clear change from one legal situation to another. Instead, it was a gradual transformation during which the precise impact had to be figured out and the procedures were still open to discussion. Even if the small group

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_6

in charge of drafting and signing the Convention had a clear vision, those responsible for its implementation still often had to grope in the dark. It could thus be argued that both heritage regimes were in a temporary state of flux (Geels 2007). In order to analyze the impact of UNESCO World Heritage on the German and British heritage regimes respectively, I will compare and contrast the findings of the two previous chapters in more detail.

6.2 Denationalizing the German Heritage

Germany embraced World Heritage as an opportunity to symbolically denationalize German heritage. The country's troublesome history of nationalistic extremism initially led to a radical break with the past: a 'zero hour'—a '*Stunde Null*'. In this political and societal landscape, the past became something best forgotten. In the 1970s, the fascination for history and heritage revived. However, the attention mainly focused on history and heritage that could be associated with the 'better' pre-nationalist past. West-German politics in the post-war era was about reconciliation. It was primarily about *Wiedergutmachung*; about finding common ground with former enemies as well as with the Germans on the other side of the iron curtain (Wielinga 1999). The German heritage, which had become charged with nationalist sentiments during the Third Reich, was carefully denationalized in the post-war era (Koshar 1998). In this sense, UNESCO and the World Heritage Convention provided the government of West-Germany with an opportunity to show that Germany's past was not exclusively German, but transnational. Germany's close involvement in the World Heritage project was a symbolic step in the process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*—of appeasement with the traumatic national past.

The denationalization of the German heritage was not only symbolic but also had consequences for the administrative regime, because it strengthened the power of the *Länder* at the expense of the central governmental administration. The 1970s witnessed a wave of new heritage laws being passed in all the *Länder*. This furthered the already dominant position of the *Länder* within the German heritage regime. At the same time the federal government tried to maintain a foothold in the heritage regime, using international initiatives to do so. Successful participation in international events such as the European Architectural Heritage Year 1975, according to the federal authorities, required some degree of national coordination. The federal government seized this festive year as an opportunity to take on a more active role in the heritage field and asked the committee that was responsible for the organization of the European Architectural Heritage Year to draft a federal heritage law.

The desirability of such a law had already been a subject of debate in the early twentieth century, and again after the reintroduction of the federalized system in 1949. However, the international reorientation of the German heritage in the 1970s stirred up these discussions more than ever before. The federal government and many preservation experts were in favour of creating one national heritage law, because it would be more efficient both internally as well as vis-à-vis international

organizations. This shows that while the federal government was in favour of a symbolic denationalization of the German heritage, it wished to stay in control of this process as much as possible. The attempt to pass a federal heritage law, however, failed in 1974. The main reason for this was that the *Länder* were not willing to give up their constitutional right to make their own heritage policy. Germany thus maintained a federalized system in which the *Länder* are responsible for heritage preservation. The sturdiness of the federalized system can be explained as a consequence of the experience of nationalist extremism. The National-Socialists had done away with the federalized system and had appropriated heritage for nationalist propaganda purposes. The unwillingness of the *Länder* to give up their dominant position in the heritage field was motivated by historical consciousness regarding the downsides of a more centralized government system.

Apart from affecting the interaction between the federal government and the *Länder*, the denationalization of the German heritage created opportunities for local actors in Aachen, to boast an international reputation based on a far away past. Aachen fitted well into the new narrative of Germany's past—not least due to its association with the internationally renowned figure of Charlemagne (UNESCO 1976a). On the local level, the World Heritage title was primarily considered a way to promote the building internationally and to appeal to local, national and particularly international financial backers. The owners of Aachen Cathedral sought contact with the World Heritage Centre and on several occasions contributed to UNESCO activities. Although many of such initiatives around Aachen Cathedral had an international aim and audience, they generally started locally. The idea to nominate Aachen Cathedral for the World Heritage list, for example, came from Aachen-born architectural historian Georg Mörsch. Also other international initiatives emerged locally. The International Charlemagne price was initiated by the Aachener merchant Kurt Pfeiffer. Furthermore, the founder of the 'Europäische Stiftung Aachener Dom', Monsignor Hans Müllejans, was born in a village approximately 20 km west of Aachen. These examples are not merely anecdotal, but show that the denationalization of Germany's heritage simultaneously led to an international reorientation of the German heritage field and the empowerment of local and regional actors and organizations.

While Germany's involvement in international heritage initiatives affected the dynamics between regime actors, the influence of international organizations on the actual preservation and restoration practice was negligible. The UNESCO World Heritage status, for example, did not lead to stricter rules with regards to restoration and preservation. Although ICOMOS experts occasionally provided advice, in general the practices on the ground did not change significantly. One explanation for such negligible influence is that the ways to restore and preserve traditional monuments was already well-established before the emergence of World Heritage. Indeed, the existing European restoration and preservation philosophy has been cited in UNESCO and ICOMOS documentation as best practices for international experts (ICOMOS 1978). In this sense, the conventional restoration and preservation methods practiced at monument like Aachen Cathedral helped set the standards and guidelines used by UNESCO and ICOMOS today, rather than the other way

around. While the World Heritage title provided local and national actors with the possibility to change the meaning of their heritage, the restoration and preservation practice was barely affected by UNESCO's involvement, and remained organized and executed along the pre-exiting national and local lines.

6.3 The British Heritage Regime After UNESCO

6.3.1 Exploiting the Uncertainty About World Heritage

When the British government hesitantly got involved in the World Heritage project, it had no clearly defined notion regarding the Convention's expected effects on the national heritage regime. The government was unable to provide any answers to the owners' questions about the precise legal impact of the World Heritage status. Nor could it provide any clarity on the consequences of the World Heritage status for the funding of restoration and upkeep. The uncertainty about the meaning and implications of World Heritage had a number of effects on the British heritage regime. On the one hand, relatively long lasting uncertainty about the restoration subsidies gave rise to new private initiatives. Niche actors got themselves, for example, involved in setting up fundraising events. On the other hand, the regime instability negatively impacted the generosity of established private heritage organizations. Several charity organizations were unwilling to donate as long as the funding situation remained unclear.

The owners of Durham castle skilfully exploited the lack of clarity by lobbying and pushing—for instance through the media—for a reform of the national subsidiary system. World Heritage, in this sense, was a jamming station that caused a static on the existing lines of communication between established regime actors. In the late 1980s, the owners of Durham castle used the World Heritage status as an opportunity to renegotiate funding rules with actors and organizations in the national heritage regime. In this context, the World Heritage title was merely used as leverage to persuade the government to change the rules regarding heritage subsidies. This was largely a moral appeal. The government, in the eyes of the owners of Durham castle, was walking away from its responsibility to preserve the British World Heritage sites. Although the local lobbyists were eventually successful in their reform efforts, it did take almost 5 years before new funding rules were established. The 'double-funding rule' that prohibited semi-public organizations like Durham University to receive English Heritage funding was only abolished in 1989. With this change, the mandate and budget of English Heritage were increased.

The precise legal implications of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, however, remained unclear. The incorporation of UNESCO into the heritage regime took many years and is arguably still not completed. The process turned out to be arduous, with mixed results. Even though the owners of Durham castle—as well as many others—raised the question whether the World Heritage title was merely honorific, this issue would not be solved for many years. The precise status of

World Heritage within the British legal system would remain a concern—as Chapters eight and thirteen will show—until well into the twenty-first century. It was only with the endorsement of the 2005 Planning Policy Guide that some clarity was provided on this topic (PPG 2005). This note is the first of its kind in which UNESCO World Heritage status is mentioned as an important aspect to take into consideration when deciding on planning applications.

6.3.2 The National Level Remains Dominant

The introduction of World Heritage empowered, non-intentionally, local niche actors. The case of Durham shows that while the World Heritage status had no immediate and direct impact in terms of legislation or funding, it did give the niche actors additional arguments to help their case—either as a symbolic bargaining chip in negotiations with the national government or as a 'brand' to (nationally and internationally) attract private funds. At the same time, however, the case of Durham shows the continuing and even the further strengthening of the national government's involvement in the heritage field. In the 1980s, the British government took almost full control over heritage selection and management. The establishment of English Heritage in 1984 formed a part of this process. Governments at other levels—e.g. counties, municipalities—were not or hardly involved. The consolidation of the centralized British heritage regime had consequences for the position of niche actors. Although the World Heritage title gave the owners of Durham castle a persuasive argument to rearrange the national subsidiary system, in the end it depended entirely on the national government's cooperation. This is illustrated by the niche actors' strategy. The owners of Durham castle turned directly to national agencies such as English Heritage and the University Grants Committee in order to solve their precarious financial situation and sought no contact with UNESCO or administrations on other sub-national levels.

6.4 Comparing the Regime Changes

6.4.1 The Impact of Acid Rain on the German and British Regime

The establishment of World Heritage was followed by the phenomenon of acid rain. Its effects on building material were often severe and posed an array of problems for owners, preservationists and politicians (H. Maintz, personal communication, June 24 2014; Salthouse 1988; ApSimon et al. 1997). The regimes of both countries needed to adapt to environmental changes and had to develop concrete procedures for dealing with weathering building material. Acid rain required preservation

experts to rethink established preservation and restoration practices and techniques. Should buildings, for example, be wrapped in plastic? Should air cleaning machines be installed inside certain monuments? Should deteriorated stones and statues be replaced, and what would that mean for the building's authenticity? (Review Group on Acid Rain 1982; McGee 1995). In the 1980s, acid rain received growing international (media) attention. Fueled by powerful images—dead fish flushing the shores, leafless trees under a summer sky, the Taj Mahal in a deteriorated state—acid rain became a major global public concern. This raised the pressure on the responsible authorities to find solutions for this problem and gave rise to more international cooperation (ApSimon et al. 1997: Park 1987). New conservation techniques were for instance discussed in international forums like the European network of Master Builders and other international expert networks (H. Maintz, personal communication, June 24 2014).

In both Britain and Germany, the acid rain catastrophe coincided with the worst economic crisis in over 30 years. Here, however, an important difference between the two countries can be observed. While the economic crisis was a global landscape development, its consequences were much more severe in Britain than in Germany (Berend 2014). The fact that the economy of the United Kingdom suffered much more under the economic crisis, helps explain why debates about who should pay for the restoration of (World) heritage were much more sensitive here than they were in Germany. Especially in Britain, acid rain was putting a strain on existing (financial) agreements between owners and the government (Cowell and ApSimon 1996). For the owners of Durham castle, the growing international concern for acid rain had the positive effect that the issues they faced regarding the upkeep of their property received more attention, greasing their lobbying efforts. The British heritage regime was forced to revise—or at least critically review—its subsidiary system. To a certain extent, the transformation of the British heritage subsidiary system and the growing mandate of English Heritage associated with it, can by ascribed to the acid rain crisis of the 1980s. In the early years of its existence, English Heritage had primarily focused on private owners, yet in the course of the 1980s it came to play an important role in the semi-public sector too. Multiple causes contributed to this changing role of English Heritage—one of which was the financial challenges that owners of semi-public buildings faced as a result of acid rain.

6.4.2 The Impact of Secularization on the German and British Regime

Ongoing secularization, in combination with an increasing number of tourist visitors changed the character of the houses of worship as well as the financial position of its owners. While both the cathedral of Durham and the cathedral of Aachen are still functional houses of worship, the way these monuments are used and the way their upkeep is financed has drastically changed as a result of the diminishing role of

religion in both German and the British society (Thönnes et al. 2005). Aachen Cathedral, for example, now attracts more tourists than churchgoers. The cathedral receives about 1.3 million visitors each year, yet only 24% of the total running costs are covered by donations (Maintz 2012). Moreover, as a result of the growing number of visitors, the interior of the church has slowly decayed—an undesirable side-effect of the new function of the cathedral as a global tourist attraction (H. Maintz, personal communication, June 24 2014; K. Ley, personal communication, June 28 2016). This problem has only been solved recently by the installation of air cleaners and a climate control system (Maintz 2008, 2012). In Durham, according to a recent report, the growing visitor numbers of cathedral have not helped much in terms of financing the upkeep of the building either. The running costs of Durham Cathedral are about £1 million per year. Although the Church annually attracts about 600,000 visitors, each visitor only donates 32 pence on average—which remains insufficient (BBC 2012, p. 1). In total, the upkeep of church buildings—including cathedrals—makes up 13 per cent of the costs of the Church of England (Church of England 2013). Dropping income—resulting from secularization combined with the spiralling cost of the upkeep of Church property and disappointing visitor donations—has forced the Church of England into a less autonomous position within the British heritage regime.

The overall trend of diminishing financial means more or less forced the Church to apply for government heritage funding. The Church of England used to have an exceptional position within the heritage regime. It employed its own preservation experts and was extraordinarily rich. The financial position of the Anglican Church, however, became increasingly worrisome which made it more dependent on alternative forms of (government) funding. In Germany, the financial situation of church owners was arguably less precarious due to the system of *Kirchensteuer*. This form of taxation is paid by German citizens to support the churches. The World Heritage status did not bring about direct financial benefits, neither for the owners of Durham Cathedral nor for the owners of Aachen Cathedral. It thus remains difficult to establish whether the owners of these traditional monuments were particularly happy with the World Heritage status. The recurring statement that the World Heritage title is just ‘another plaque on the wall’ could be interpreted either as a factual statement or as a claim with the normative undertone that the title *should* be more than merely honorific. In the cases of Durham Cathedral and Aachen Cathedral, the owners saw themselves as part of a much longer tradition of many hundreds of years to which the World Heritage status was not a significant addition. Nonetheless, they tried to use it to generate funding and increase private donations.

6.4.3 *Different Types of Rules Impacted in Germany and the United Kingdom*

The cases of Aachen and Durham both showed that the direct impact of World Heritage on the day-to-day preservation of monuments was limited. However, the rules of the German and the British heritage regimes did change in the period that was studied in this part. The difference between regime changes can best be captured in terms of changes in 'normative rules' and 'regulative rules'. In Germany, the main change was in the symbolic meaning attributed to monuments such as Aachen Cathedral. The normative framework for heritage preservation shifted its orientation from a national to an international stage. In part, this normative framework was formalized by Germany's eager involvement in international heritage initiatives. The changing normative framework for heritage preservation should not be seen as an isolated phenomenon, but as part of a changing political and societal landscape in which national glorification had become suspect. In the United Kingdom a different type of regime change occurred. While the normative framework for the selection and interpretation of heritage largely remained the same, the regulative rules regarding funding were fundamentally altered. This was a direct response to the specific challenges posed at the local level, but in the long run these changes in regulative rules had an impact on the British heritage regime as a whole.

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Part III
Industrial Heritage (1980s–1990s)

Chapter 7
Heritage in the Post-Industrial Age: Landscape Developments Between 1980–1995

7.1 Introduction

In the course of the 1970s and 1980s, several new types of buildings were listed and visits to heritage sites became an increasingly popular leisure activity (Oevermann and Mieg 2015a). An example of this widening scope is the emergence of the concept of industrial heritage, which became particularly popular in the 1980s. Industrial heritage preservation, however, was placed on the political agenda because it was seen as not only scientifically, aesthetically or historically important, but also because it was perceived as a potential economic driver (Alfrey and Putman 1992). Although this was a general trend that affected all types of heritage, its influence was particularly palpable in regions that suffered from industrial decline (Ashworth and Larkham 1994). Since the economic crisis of the 1970s, the European economy structurally changed from being focused on manufacturing to being focused on providing services. Although industry still remained an important sector in the European economy, a trend of industrial decline had clearly set in. Apart from socio-economic and political challenges, the loss of industry posed a major infrastructural and urban challenge. How to deal with the vast amount of abandoned assembly halls, machine halls, mine shafts, blast furnaces, cokes ovens and other industrial remains? What was their cultural value? How could and should they be preserved? Many politicians were convinced of the idea that industrial heritage could be used to cushion at least some of the negative socio-economic consequences of industrial decline and often tried to stimulate the re-use of industrial structures. In a sense, industrial heritage formed a cradle for innovation. A place for experimentation with reuse that stretched existing notions of authenticity and reshaped existing preservation practices. Industrial heritage opened up the field of heritage preservation to a range of new actors (Oevermann and Mieg 2015b).

The two cases analyzed in this part show how the heritage regimes of Germany and Britain adapted to the growing amount of abandoned industrial sites and the growing popularity of industrial heritage preservation. The case-studies examine the

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_7

wider consequences of industrial heritage preservation against the backdrop of major economic and social transformations. This chapter discusses the economic and political landscape of the 1980s and early 1990s. These developments potentially created chances and challenges for both opponents and advocates of industrial heritage preservation. The first section discusses the socio-economic situation of the 1980s and early 1990s. It will focus specifically on the socio-economic consequences of industrial decline in Europe. The second part deals with political changes in Western Europe in general, and Britain and Germany in particular. The last section addresses the emergence of industrial heritage preservation and describes some of the important developments with regard to this concept.

7.2 Post-Industrial Economy

Writing in 1989, the economist Jürgen Donges looked back on the preceding decade: "For some years now", he noted, "most West-European economies have been operating with a striking lack of dynamic growth" (Donges 1989, p. 1). The consequences were, amongst others, that unemployment had remained high, European firms had become more vulnerable to growing international competition and Europe had become a less attractive location for investment. Another implication of Europe's weakened economic position had been that multinational companies could easily outsource work to developing countries. Ever fiercer global competition led European companies to invest in machinery and smart technology that would make many workers redundant. More and more people in Europe feared losing their jobs to either a machine or to a low-paid worker in some distant land—a fear that was certainly not unjustified. The overall unemployment rates rose steeply in the early 1980s and would remain structurally high for the decade and a half that followed. Some particularly pessimistic commentators even predicted that "the end of work was at hand" and blamed multinational companies for creating "a world in which the bottom line of the corporate balance sheet was the only criterion for economic decision making" (Findley and Rothney 1998, p. 277).

These developments were felt strongest amongst workers in those industries that had been the driving forces of the 'thirty glorious years'. Mining, shipping, steel production and other forms of heavy industry were hit particularly hard by the global economic crisis. Between the 1970s and the 1990s Europe's economy transformed as a result of this industrial decline. In the mid-1990s the economic historians Graham and Spence rightly noted that: "the decline of industrial manufacturing and the concurrent growth in service-sector-oriented activity have been features of change in most advanced urban economies over the last two decades" (Graham and Spence 1995, p. 885). Crewe also observed this process and claimed that it had had major consequences for the workforce. He described the main ramifications of industrial decline as "a smaller labour force, a smaller working class, a contraction of trade unionism, mass unemployment, and a much larger 'peripheral' workforce of part-time and temporary workers" (Crewe, cited in Lilleker 2002, p. 73).

Statistics confirm these claims. In Britain, for example, manual workers made up more than half of the total workforce in 1971. By 1991, this percentage had dropped to little over a third (Lilleker 2002, p. 73). In 1995 only one sixth of total workforce worked within the manufacturing industry. Like in most countries in Western Europe, the focus of the economy became increasingly service-oriented. In the early 1990s, a quarter of the British people was employed in sectors like distribution and leisure related services: hotels, restaurants, bars, retail. Another quarter of the working population worked in public administration. One fifth had a job in the finance sector and well over half worked in other business related activities—including clerical jobs associated with the finance sector (ONS 1997). In Germany, a similar shift from industry to services could be witnessed (Siebert 2005). Although Germany retained a strong industrial base in branches like car manufacturing, the overall trend showed that the number of people employed in the primary and secondary sector dropped while the percentage of employees in the tertiary sector strongly rose. By 1980, more people were employed in service jobs than in the manufacturing industry and by the late 1980s their number formed more than half of Germany's total working population (Larres and Panayi 1996, p. 169). The major changes in the global economic landscape had far-reaching socio-political consequences for both Britain and Germany. From a macro-economic perspective, the growth of the service industry to some extent compensated for industrial decline, but certain regions and groups were unable to benefit from it. This economic trend caused tension and unease amongst employees in the primary and secondary sectors. Their real-wage levels barely grew.

The consequences of industrial decline were not confined to the realm of the economy, but also shook up politics. Growing dissatisfaction with the post-1973 economic situation gave rise to politicians who intended to break down the post-war welfare-state system. The historian Rodney Lowe described the consensus that had existed since the late 1940s: "Dominated by memories of mass unemployment and poverty of the 1930s, the prevailing assumption was that government intervention in economic and social policy was both in the individual's and the national interest. It alone could guarantee 'full' employment, a minimum income for all and the universal provision of other services (such as health care and education) to the highest possible standard" (Lowe 1994, p. 357). The 1980s, however, saw the end of this consensus that the state should redistribute wealth. Social-democratic political movements gradually lost support. As an increasing number of employees came to work in service jobs, labour parties lost their traditional electoral base and membership of trade unions dropped dramatically. Many employees in declining sectors like mining and shipping lost their faith in political leaders. Confrontations between employers and employees became increasingly common, as did rebellious behaviour within political parties (Oerters 2015). The process of industrial decline gave rise to a group of modern, non-aligned voters whose political allegiances were no longer defined by their employment or class. The closure of industry resulted in a fluid political landscape in which the outcome of elections was unpredictable (Cronin 1984).

7.3 New Politics

The combined economic and political crisis of the 1970s formed the hotbed for a major change in the political and ideological landscape of the Western world. The years of rapid economic growth and near full employment were over, and the political establishment seemed unable to counter the course of events. The crisis had raised serious doubts and even harsh critiques about the unintended side effects of post-war policies and institutions. The post-war era had been characterized by a Keynesian approach to the economy. According to this approach, the state should intervene actively to ensure that wealth was distributed. It was widely believed in most countries in Western Europe that the state should invest in social security—and most countries indeed did so in the 1950s and 1960s (Lowe 1994, p. 356–373). In light of the growing global competition and the general economic decline, however, this redistributive welfare system—social harmony through state intervention—was increasingly seen as unaffordable and potentially harmful for economic recovery. Leftist political parties lost their self-confidence as well as their beliefs in the post-war politics that they had helped built. The Left became splintered. In the post-industrial society the growing majority of white-collar employees and the middle class replaced the existing social structures. As a result, the mass parties of the past lost the masses (Berend 2014).

It is in this political climate that neo-liberalism emerged—first in the United States, but soon after in Britain and on the European mainland. Neo-liberals rejected the economic philosophy of Keynes and discarded the interventionist politics of the post-war era. The growing adherence to neo-liberal principles meant a return to the classical liberal school and led to a wave of privatization of former state-owned companies and the dismissal of economic regulations. The market should, once again, be allowed to regulate itself. The intellectual proponents of this school of thought—Hayek, Friedman and other members of the prominent Chicago School of Economics—connected this laissez-fair approach to the economy with social and political principles. They strongly believed that self-regulating markets would guarantee social and individual freedom and prosperity. Individual freedom and market freedom, they argued, were two sides of the same coin. State intervention was—as the title of one of Hayek's books (1974) suggested—*The Road to Serfdom*. The economic crisis of the 1970s, according to neo-liberal intellectuals, had been caused by too much state intervention which had disturbed market automatism and had undermined freedom.

Intellectuals like Hayek and Friedman paved the way for the conservative political revolution of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher (Johnson 1994, pp. 486–487). In the course of the 1980s, neo-liberal politicians began to dismantle the two most important post-war institutions: the welfare state and nationalized companies. In Europe, the Thatcher government elected in 1979, led the way by cutting back significantly on welfare services, which it deemed responsible for having created a "dependency culture" in Britain (Thatcher, cited in Findley and Rothney 1998, p. 298). The Conservatives argued that the Labour government had

been responsible for the rising unemployment figures. "Labour isn't working" had been one of the Conservatives' slogans in the 1979 elections (Hannah 1994, p. 342). Cutting back on social security and welfare would encourage people, it was argued, to start working again. Moreover, the Conservative British government reversed the nationalization of various companies, privatizing several services that had been covered by institutions like the Ministry of Defence and the National Health Service (Johnson 1994, pp. 477–479). In 1985, the government privatized nearly a dozen major state companies, including North Sea Oil, British Petroleum, British Aerospace, Associated British Ports, British Gas, and British Telecom. In total, 400,000 jobs were transferred from the state to the private sector (Santini 1986).

Thatcher's politics led to several confrontations with the unions and other less conventional political groups. Historian Paul Byrne (1994) has noted that between the end of World War II and the 1980s, the British political culture could be characterized as being "consensual" (442). Most British people were, according to Byrne, generally content with limiting "their participation in politics to the 'normal' channels of elections and mainstream political parties, and to leave the details of politics in the hands of established politicians" (Byrne 1994, p. 443). However, in the 1980s, this political culture began to change. Thatcher's policies often unconventional political responses: unorganized strikes, riots and civil disobedience. As a result, economic and political oppositions in Britain grew in scale. Critical observers even talked about "the two Englands" (Findley and Rothney 1998, p. 298); on the one hand, the prosperous south-east—the England of the rich London suburbs and the City–, on the other hand, the impoverished north and far west—England's former industrial centres. Many people, including politicians within the Conservative Party, feared that the growing economic oppositions would lead to political instability. Yet Thatcher, and like-minded people, rejected the idea that the government should redistribute wealth from the centre to the periphery. The principle of taking money from the winners and giving it to the losers, according to Thatcher, embodied not only what was wrong with socialism, but indeed what was wrong with the policies of all her post-war predecessors. Despite her extreme unpopularity in particular groups, Thatcher was re-elected with an increased majority in 1983, and again in 1987 (Johnson 1994, pp. 502–503).

Similarly, in continental Europe, neo-liberalism became a force to be reckoned with. In Germany, the economic crisis gave rise to a revival of conservatism. For almost thirteen years, the social-democrats had dominated the national political arena. Following the 1982 elections, however, the social-democratic chancellor Schmidt was replaced by the more conservative chancellor Helmut Kohl (Elshout 1999). He would remain Chancellor of West-Germany and later of the unified Germany until 1998, making him the longest sitting Chancellor since Bismarck. Like Thatcher and Reagan, Kohl had a liberal approach to the economy and wanted to cut back on welfare state expenses. Referring to the welfare state, he claimed, for example, that: "An important industrious nation, that is a nation with a future, cannot

be organized like an amusement park" (Kohl 1993, cited in Köhler 2005, p. 102).[1] Unlike his British counterpart, however, Kohl had great difficulty in implementing his neo-liberal ideas, because the governments in many of the *Länder* were social-democratic and because he frequently met opposition from within his own political party.

Despite their shared economic ideals, there was also strong disagreement between Kohl and Thatcher on certain issues. Like his predecessors Kohl had continued to reach out to East-Germany, working towards German reunification. Thatcher, on the other hand, feared that a unified Germany would become a force of instability on the continent, hoping to retain the East-West divide. Kohl recalled a meeting with other European leaders which had taken place on December 8 1989—just one month after the fall of the Berlin wall. At this meeting Kohl presented a ten point plan for German reunification to which Thatcher famously replied: "We beat the Germans twice, and now they're back" (Thatcher 1989, cited in Volkery 2009, p. 1). Thatcher was not the only one opposed to German reunification. Douglas Hurd, the British foreign secretary reflected on the imminent conclusion of the Cold War: "[This was] a system [. . .] under which we lived quite happily for forty years" (Hurd 1989, cited in Judt 2005, p. 639). Another difference between the British and the German political leadership was that the British Conservatives were rather sceptical of the European integration process and only reluctantly signed the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, while Kohl was a known advocate of European integration and received the Karlspreis for his efforts in this regard (Davies 1997). Both Kohl and Thatcher became increasingly unpopular in the early 1990s—not least because the economic situation remained worrisome, as unemployment remained high and the social problems associated with industrial decline were not solved.

7.4 The Emergence of Industrial Heritage

7.4.1 National and Local Industrial Heritage Initiatives

The dual political challenge of high unemployment and closing industries formed the seedbed of industrial heritage preservation—which became especially important in the course of the 1980s. Politicians in this period, were not only confronted with the abovementioned macro-economic challenges, they also needed to find ways to deal with the material remains of industries. Anna Storm deployed the term "post-industrial landscape scars" to describe the impact of deindustrialization on the physical landscape. She poetically describes these remains as she noted that: "I am sure you have seen them [. . .] It might be a mountain irrevocably turned into an open-pit mine, surrounded by slag heaps. It could be polluted ground, abandoned,

[1] "Eine erfolgreiche Industrienation, das heißt eine Nation mit Zukunft, läßt sich nicht als kollektiver Freizeitpark organisieren".

overgrown, and perhaps forgotten. It may be a dilapidated factory in a fading mono-industrial town" (Storm 2014, p. 1). In both Britain and Germany, politicians in the 1970s did not know how to deal with these 'scars'. In the 1980s, however, the idea took root that the socio-economic issue and the planning issue could be solved simultaneously (Kierdorf and Hassler 2000, pp. 262–283).

Politicians of all sorts believed that the loss of industry could—at least partially—be compensated by reusing and exploiting industrial remains, particularly for leisure and tourism. According to Anna Storm: "It seems as if heritage and planning professionals to some extent found a common platform in the mid-1980s when, on the one hand, heritage rhetoric began to be used to advertise offices and apartments, and, on the other hand, planning and development ambitions began were used to justify the existence of heritage activities in society, not least in terms of industrial heritage tourism" (Storm 2014, p. 14). It is in this political and economic context that the preservation of industrial heritage moved beyond being a rather isolated effort of small groups of amateurs to a well-established strand of state-led preservation with a clear socio-economic goal (Pendlebury 2009, p. 71). According to Neil Cossons: "Industrial heritage [was] a new, novel and challenging arrival in the heritage arena" (Cossons 2012, p. 4). In both Britain and Germany, however, this trend was built on existing traditions in the field of industrial heritage preservation.

Physical remains of mining had been preserved in several places in both Germany and the United Kingdom. Both countries have a longstanding tradition of industrial heritage preservation, although the motivations for doing so were quite different. In Britain, so-called 'industrial archaeology' was introduced in the post-war years by Michael Rix (1955, pp. 225–229). In an article in *The Amateur Historian*, he called for the preservation of eighteenth and nineteenth century industrial sites and reminded his readership of the past glory of Britain's industry. The term 'industrial archaeology' seemed well chosen because the tangible remains of the industrial epoch were rapidly vanishing. In many cases all that indeed remained possible was to do archaeological digs. The role of the government in preserving and researching industrial heritage was initially very marginal. As the title of the journal in which Michael Rix published his article already indicates, industrial heritage preservation was a movement of volunteers and amateurs. Samuel (1994) even scathingly viewed industrial heritage preservation as an extension of male hobbies concerning mills, canal and so on. Building on the work of Rix, the historian Angus Buchanan defined the discipline of industrial archaeology as: "a field of study concerned with investigating, surveying, recording and, in some cases, with preserving industrial monuments. It aims, moreover, at assessing the significance of these monuments in the context of social and technological history" (Buchanan 1972, p. 21).

In Germany, on the other hand, the focus was more on the art-historical or aesthetic qualities of former industrial buildings. In his *Einführung in die Industriearchäologie*, former director of the mining museum in Bochum, Rainer Slotta (1982) compared industrial archaeology with the history of art, stressing that both disciplines are concerned with the preservation of monuments. Slotta represented the vision of a growing group of enthusiasts who began to appreciate the architectural value of former industrial buildings. The term *Industriearchäologie*

was, however, seldom used in the German context. Instead, the concept used to identify industrial heritage was *Industriekultur*. The concept *Industriekultur* was much broader than 'industrial archaeology' and included not only former industrial buildings and machines, but also working class memorabilia and intangible traditions. Until the 1970s this term was only used occasionally, but in 1979 it appeared in the title of a book by Tilman Buddensieg about AEG's industrial design. Much like Slotta, Buddensieg connected industrial culture with aesthetics. However, the spread of the term *Industriekultur* is usually attributed to Hermann Glaser, the Bavarian Cultural Minister (Günter 2010). Despite the mainly academic interest in industrial remains, the government heritage agencies—both in Germany and in Britain—did not precisely know how to deal with this new type of heritage. Neil Cossons recalled that in the 1970s the British Department of Environment—the ministry that was responsible for heritage preservation—did not really know: "how to cope with industrial heritage when the topic arose" (Cossons, cited in Oevermann and Mieg 2015c, p. 206). This had to do with their professional background and the institutionalized traditions: "They were historians and archaeologist with a long and honourable tradition of taking pre-industrial heritage assets into the care of the state" (Cossons, cited in Oevermann and Mieg 2015c, p. 206).

This initial attitude is hardly surprising. After all, "the desire to preserve the past was in some sense a consequence of industrialization and its cataclysmic effects on pre-industrial communities and landscapes" (Cossons 2012, p. 8). Industrial heritage implied the preservation of the physical remains of a development that preservationists traditionally had tried to resist and, therefore, did not naturally fit into their work practices. Industrial heritage preservation, especially in the 1970s, often depended on local initiatives. According to Cossons, the government did list industrial heritage but it "took a quite conscious decision not to take these places into the nation's care, because at that time there was a popular movement and strong community [that] were prepared to assume responsibility for the care of industrial sites and were encouraged to do so" (Cossons, cited in Oevermann and Mieg 2015c, pp. 206–207). Volunteers within locally based charities played an important role in industrial heritage preservation during the 1970s. "Without these organizations", according to Cossons, "a large part of Britain's industrial heritage would have been lost" (Cossons, cited in Oevermann and Mieg 2015c, pp. 206–207).

Although the interest in industrial heritage preservation grew during the 1970s and 1980s, certainly not all industrial structures in Britain and Germany were preserved. One of the most painful losses was the Firestone tire factory on the Great West Road in London. This factory was designed in 1928 by Wallis and Gilbert and formed a fine example of the stripped classist style of the interwar years. As the first British inventory excluded post-World War I buildings, it had not yet been listed. In the early summer of 1980, the Firestone Company closed down the factory, and began to negotiate its sale to another company: Trafalgar House. In July 1980, the newly established Thirties Society—an interest group for the preservation of interwar architecture—asked the responsible Ministry to spot-list the factory. In August, an investigator visited the site in response to an alert from the local planning authority, and prepared the paperwork needed for spot-listing. The paperwork was

ready to be signed right before the August Bank weekend—an official holiday in the United Kingdom. The document would have been signed in the course of the following week. On Saturday, however, the bulldozers moved in and demolished the façade of the factory (Adlam 2005, p. 1). After this incident, the government hired more investigators in an attempt to speed up the listing process.

Similarly in Germany, several abandoned factories were pulled down in the 1970s and 1980s. Currently important industrial heritage sites like the Zeche Zollern in Dortmund and Zeche Zollverein in Essen were all at one point considered for demolition. In the course of the 1980s the authorities in both Germany and Britain began to take a more active role in the preservation of industrial heritage. This was often done with a genuine belief that preservation of these structures could help solve a range of socio-economic problems. In the late 1980s this approach was increasingly criticised—especially by left-wing intellectuals (Ascherson 1987a, b). In Britain for example, Robert Hewison (1987), published his polemic work *The Heritage Industry, Britain in a Climate of Decline*, where he argued that the cultural worth of cultural objects was devalued because of their commercial exploitation. He regarded the public obsession with the past as a sign of decline. With everything in Britain now decaying the only thing left to sell was a manufactured image of the past. It was clear to Hewison that authenticity was lost in the process of preparing and packaging heritage for mass consumption. Hewison was certainly not a lone wolf. As the 1990s wore on, more and more people felt that the commercial exploitation of industrial heritage was not always the best solution.

7.4.2 International Attention for Industrial Heritage

Somewhat lagging behind these local initiatives, international organizations began to focus their attention on industrial heritage. Despite growing interest in this topic in various national contexts, industrial heritage was not immediately on the radar of international organizations. The most noteworthy early initiative in this regard was The International Committee for the Conservation of the Industrial Heritage (TICCIH). This non-governmental, voluntary organization was the brainchild of Neil Cossons, former director of the Ironbridge Gorge Museum in England. In 1973, he organized a 'congress on the Conservation of Industrial Monuments' in his museum which brought together practitioners—both amateurs and professionals—to discuss the issue of industrial heritage preservation. The first meeting attracted mainly delegates from Europe, particularly from Germany and the United Kingdom, as well as industrial archaeologists from the United States. The follow-up conferences were organized in Bochum in 1975 and in Sweden in 1977. The follow-up conferences attracted a more international company, including delegates from Japan and Eastern Europe. TICCIH was officially launched at the third conference in Sweden. The organization is largely structured along national lines, with National Committees and—in case a solid national organizational infrastructure is lacking—individual National Correspondents. TICCIH had no paid officials or staff and no

headquarter. It was formally established as a charitable trust in England. It still exists today and is an official advisory body to UNESCO (Cossons 2012).

Around the same time that TICCIH organized its first international gatherings, the first industrial sites were enlisted on the World Heritage list. Curiously, the first two industrial sites that were inscribed onto the World Heritage list were both related to the European salt industry: the Wieliczka Salt Mine in Poland (enlisted in 1978) and the Royal Saltworks of Arc-et-Senans in France (enlisted in 1982). Other industrial monuments that were enlisted in the early 1980s were the Roman aqueducts of Pont du Gard in France and Segovia in Spain. The reasons for registering the four abovementioned sites were either aesthetic or age-related. In Wieliczka the workers created unique salt sculptures and the Arc-et-Senans Saltwork was designed by the famous architect Claude Nicolas Ledoux. And the two Roman aqueducts were enlisted primarily because they were old—not necessarily because they exemplified an important phase in industrial history (Stott 2012; Stratton 1996, 2000). It was only in the mid-1990s, however, that industrial heritage became an established and well-represented category of World Heritage.

The enlisting of both Zollverein and Cornwall's mining sites as World Heritage, for example, was instigated by global pressure on UNESCO to diversify and spread World Heritage on a global scale. In the early 1990s, critics observed that an overwhelming majority of the World Heritage was located in Europe. This bias was not only caused by the fact that European countries were financially able to bear the costs of more nominations, but also because UNESCO criteria and categories were themselves founded on Western notions of monumentality. As a result, traditional monuments like castles and cathedrals were overrepresented. In 1994, the World Heritage Committee launched a global strategy for a "balanced, representative and credible" World Heritage list (Steiner and Frey 2011, p. 26). In order to raise the share of non-European sites, the World Heritage Committee introduced new categories of World Heritage—including intangible heritage. The Committee also requested the European member states to put a halt on the nomination of traditional monuments and encouraged them to focus instead on other forms of heritage. One of the suggestions was to focus on industrial heritage. The authorities of Germany and Great-Britain both took note of this suggestion and, around the turn of the century, successfully nominated several industrial sites (Cossons 2012).

The following two chapters will investigate more closely how the German and the British heritage regime adapted to the challenges that the post-industrial landscape posed. What role did the different levels of government play in the preservation of industrial heritage sites? In what political context were decisions about industrial heritage made? What were the main motivations behind industrial heritage preservation? Did the emergence of industrial heritage preservation as a political and public concern lead to any changes in the heritage regime? What new institutions were created to deal with this new type of heritage and what was their precise role? Lastly, these chapters will focus on the international recognition of industrial heritage. What were the consequences of UNESCO's involvement? Were there any fundamental differences between UNESCO's understanding of industrial heritage preservation and the dominant perceptions on national or local levels? The

conclusion following the case-studies on Zollverein and Cornwall will compare the cases from a Multi-Level Perspective and focus on the main similarities and differences in how Germany and the United Kingdom dealt with industrial heritage in the post-industrial age.

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Chapter 8
Zeche Zollverein from Eyesore to Eyecatcher?

8.1 Introduction

The German Ruhr area was shaped by industry. In the early nineteenth century, this area was still a pastoral scenery, but within a few decades the region was transformed into a dense agglomeration of cities and factories. The population grew as immigrants from both within and outside Germany came to work in the coal mines, steel factories, textile mills, and breweries. Due to its natural richness in hard-coal and its strategic position at the intersection of major international (water) transportation routes, the Ruhr area formed one of Europe's biggest industrial conurbations. It seemed that the industry was there to stay. The closely interwoven coal and steel factories of the Ruhr area had proven extremely resilient to change and crises, including World War I, the French occupation, the Great Depression, rearmament, World War II and the British occupation. In the post-war era, the Ruhr area was the powerhouse for Germany's miraculous economic recovery. However, the first signs of decline began to appear with the coal crisis in the late 1950s. Oil, not coal, was the fuel of the future (Raines 2011, p. 185).

The first wave of mine closures in the early 1960s came as a shock to many. Both the state and the federal government were committed to keep the heavy industry alive at all costs. Numerous companies in the Ruhr area received government subsidies or were offered low interest loans. It all turned out to be in vain. While the Ruhr region still had 173 working coal mines in 1957 the number dropped to only 42 in the 1978 (Watson 1994, p. 80). The number of jobs in the region shrank accordingly. What remained was an impoverished environment; Germany's very own 'rusty belt', an area scattered with abandoned industrial remains.

In the geographical heart of the Ruhr area, near the city of Essen, lays the colliery and coking plant of Zollverein. Like no other site, Zollverein mirrors the rise and decline of the Ruhr. The mining complex was founded in 1848 by the German industrialist Franz Haniel. Initially he only had limited success, but after a few years the company began to flourish. For decades, the mine stayed in the possession of the

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_8

Fig. 8.1 The iconic steel hoisting frame over Zollverein's central Shaft XII. This hoisting frame was used to raise and lower conveyances within the mine shaft to transport coal, which was later sent to the coal washing plant where it was separated from rocks and other unwanted material. Although the mine ceased production in the 1986, the hoist is still used to pump water out of the empty mine shafts. Picture by the author (2014)

Haniel family, but in the 1920s it was taken over by the steel consortium Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG. This company removed the existing nineteenth century complex and commissioned the architects Fritz Schupp and Martin Kremmer to draw plans for the world's largest extraction and processing plant of the time (UNESCO 2001, pp. 1–10). The architects' modern *Bauhaus* design embodied the avant-garde of technology and structural engineering. The architects used square frames of steel, filled with brickwork. Their impressive steel hoisting frame at the central Shaft XII (Fig. 8.1) allowed the mine to produce more coal in one day than it had produced annually in the 1850s. At its peak, Zollverein employed 8000 miners who boasted

12.000 tons of coal per day, making it one of the most lucrative mines in the world (Dorstewitz 2014, p. 435).

With its enormous workforce Zollverein was almost a 'city within a city'. The company built houses and apartment blocks to house the miners and their families. It employed nurses and teachers. It ran shops with cheap groceries exclusively for employees. Directly or indirectly, many thousands of people depended on Zollverein for their livelihood (UNESCO 2001, pp. 25–28). Despite its high production rates, however, Zollverein could not compete with cheap fuels from other regions in the world. On December 23, 1986 the last remaining miners made the 1200 meters descent into Shaft XII for the last time. Closure of the adjoining coking plant would follow on June 30, 1993. After decades of constant noise caused by hoists, engines and ovens, Zollverein was silenced. It marked the beginning of the long and difficult process of giving the site a new future.

Today, Zollverein is a World Heritage Site and an international hotspot for design, dance and fine arts. It was also the central hub for all program activities during Essen's year as European Capital of Culture in 2010 (Tenfelde 2010, pp. 167–172). Although its impressive architecture and sheer magnitude gave the mining complex—already during its working lifetime—a reputation as the "most beautiful mine in the world", Zollverein's route from working coal mine to world heritage site was far from a beaten track (Stiftung Zollverein 2016).[1] In the period following the mine's closure, plans for the site ranged from total demolition and (partial) redevelopment of the land to comprehensive preservation and creative reuse. The fact that Zollverein is now a protected heritage site and a centre for arts and design is the outcome of complicated negotiations against the backdrop of a social and political struggle to reform the economic situation of the post-industrial Ruhr area (Tenfelde 2002).

Many authors who have dealt with this subject have described Zollverein's transformation as a remarkable success story. The protagonists in these stories are often individual heroes and heroines who eventually managed to save Zollverein from destruction. This chapter will argue that Zollverein's transformation is not simply the achievement of heroes and heroines, but the outcome of the interplay between various and sometimes serendipitous national, international and local developments that were out of these individuals' reach and control. The efforts to turn Zollverein into a (world) heritage site would have been fruitless if the socio-economic landscape had not enabled and stimulated the commercial exploitation of former industrial sites. This chapter will analyze the discussions about Zollverein's heritage status and potential use. An array of governmental and non-governmental local, national, regional and international actors and organizations partook in these debates. The first section analyzes the history of industrial heritage preservation in the Ruhr area in its political context. The second section focuses on how Zollverein became a monument. The third section will focus on the issue of reuse. After

[1] "die schönste Zeche der Welt".

Zollverein was officially and publicly recognized as a monument worthy of preservation, discussions began to focus on the question of how to do so.

This was not self-evident. In fact, the responsible authorities had hardly any experience with the preservation and reuse of industrial heritage sites of such size and complexity. The actors involved constantly had to 'improvise' and 'invent' solutions to unforeseen problems. For the same reason, there was uncertainty with respect to the division of responsibilities. Many different actors were in charge of the management of the site. From an organizational perspective, it was a "jumble of competences"[2] (Ganser 2002, p. 25). The last section deals with Zollverein's world heritage status, which it acquired in 2001. The involvement of UNESCO seems again to have changed the way this site is dealt with. On the one hand, the world heritage title gave cultural status to the region and made the division of competences more clear. On the other hand—some critics have argued—the involvement of UNESCO has led to an increase in protective measures and has undermined the 'conservation through utilization' philosophy that had been the dominant approach to Zollverein since the late 1970s.

8.2 Industrial Heritage Preservation in the Ruhr Area

Although the case of Zollverein was unique in many respects, the preservation of industrial monuments as such was not unprecedented. In fact, Germany has a tradition in this field that goes back to before the de-industrialization period. In 1903, the engineer Oskar von Miller established the German Museum for Masterpieces of Science and Technology in Munich, which opened—with delay—in 1925. In 1910, the Rhenish Association of Conservation and Cultural Heritage published a volume that dealt with historical and contemporary industrial buildings in a comparative perspective.[3] Since 1909, the Association of German Engineers published a yearbook called *Contributions to the history of technology and industry*.[4] In 1927, the editors of this yearbook made a list of technical monuments that they considered worthwhile preserving (Oerters 2015, p. 242).

The following year, the Association of German Engineers, the German Museum for Masterpieces of Science and Technology and the German League for the Protection of Historic Sites joined forces to form the German Association of the Maintenance of Technical Monuments which aimed to promote the protection of industrial heritage (König 1984, p. xxvi).[5] Even though these organizations managed

[2] "Kompetenz-Wirrwarr".

[3] The Rhenish Association of Conservation and Cultural Heritage was called in German the 'Rheinischer Verein für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz'.

[4] The Association of German Engineers was called in German 'Verein Deutscher Ingenieure'.

[5] The German Association of the Maintenance of Technical Monuments was called in German the 'Deutscher Verein für das Erhalt der Technische Denkmäler'.

to bring attention to the need for the protection of technical and industrial monuments among both the public and the authorities, their efforts had only limited success. Especially after the Second World War, the interest in industrial monuments quickly vanished. The overwhelming destruction of built heritage during the war led to the setting of new priorities, a process in which traditional monuments like churches and castles prevailed over new types of monuments like factories or mines. Moreover, industrial complexes had been one of the prime targets of the Allied bomb raids such that only few industrial monuments survived (Oerters 2015, pp. 242–243). As industrial decline set in, public attention was not automatically drawn to industrial heritage. There were, however, some individuals particularly interested in these old buildings and machines. The German artist couple Bernd and Hilla Becher, for example, appreciated industrial remains for their aesthetic qualities and tried to document them. In the 1960s and 1970s they carried out photographic studies in the Ruhr area as well as in other industrial regions in transition (Becher and Becher 1970). This view, however, was not widespread.

In the early 1960s, demolition of vacant industrial buildings was not only encouraged by the general lack of public support for their preservation but also by the relatively high value of land and scrap metal. In the late 1960s, however, the further deindustrialization of the Ruhr area led to a surplus of land, making the demolition of industrial remains increasingly less profitable. Moreover, contamination made the development and marketing of the land in the area more and more difficult. The effect was that instead of being pulled down, the former industrial sites were left to decay (Oerters 2015, p. 246). The policies regarding industrial heritage in the Ruhr area began to change slowly in the late 1960s. The first industrial building in the Ruhr area to receive monument status was the Zollern machine hall in Dortmund in 1969. This hall is a fine example of early twentieth century *Jugendstil* architecture and was as such not incompatible with the still dominant art historical approach to heritage selection. Nonetheless, the listing of this building opened the door for other industrial monuments too and put the issue of industrial heritage preservation on the political and public agenda.

In 1970, the North Rhine-Westphalian government committed itself to safeguarding and preserving technical historic monuments (Landesregierung 1970, p. 118). In 1973 and 1974, the state government appointed two industrial preservation experts—one for each administrative region of the state: the Rhineland and Westphalia-Lippe. These experts began to make an inventory of industrial heritage in North Rhine-Westphalia, which would later be included in the general heritage inventory that was being prepared for the upcoming heritage act. This act came into effect in 1980 and explicitly mentioned industrial heritage as a focal point. The act also strengthened the institutional linkages between monument preservation and urban planning. This was achieved as a result of a decree of Johannes Rau (SPD). Rau was a known supporter of industrial heritage preservation. In 1980, Rau established the Ministry for Regional and Urban Development and the newly created Department of Historical Monuments and Monument Preservation became an integral part of this ministry (Grätz 1991, pp. 14–18).

One of the reasons for reinforcing the ties between urban planning and monument preservation was that many industrial monuments still did not yet have a new function. Almost a decade after being enlisted as a monument the Zollern complex—as well as many other former industrial sites—still had no prospects for new usage. In 1979, however, the administration of the Westphalia-Lippe proposed the establishment of the Westphalia Industrial Museum which could make use of the abandoned industrial complexes. The Rhineland region followed this example in 1984. Both projects were funded via the Ministry for Regional and Urban Development. The museums were not housed in single locations, but spread out across various former industrial sites. The buildings and their original machinery were the main exhibits of the museums. Zollern became the centre of the Westphalia Industrial Museum (Oerters 2015, pp. 243–244). Around the same time, attempts were made by a group of citizens to preserve the neighbourhood of Eisenheim in the city of Oberhausen (Morsch 1990). The social-democratic politician and art-historian Roland Günter played an important role in generating public support for this cause. The workers' colony Eisenheim had been built in the 1840s by the Krupp firm and was the first non-state working-class housing settlement in Germany. The houses did not meet the comfort standards of 1960s and were therefore considered for demolition. Particularly the lack of an indoor shower and toilet made the houses rather primitive. However, Günter and a considerable group of followers, proselytized that Eisenheim should be preserved because it captured the blue collar identity. Günter claimed that workers had as much, or even more right, to preserve their heritage than others. "The nobility, church, and upper Bürgertum [bourgeoisie] have made use of their right to history", he wrote "it is a scandal that in a democracy the majority of the population has to a great extent been kept from the right to have its own history, that is from the right for preservation of its historic sites" (cited in Koshar 1998, p. 310).

It should be up to the workers and not the owners to determine what should happen to industrial heritage. The outcry for the preservation of neighbourhoods like Eisenheim was not just about maintaining the physical structures, but also an attempt to preserve the social networks within and around them. According to Annekatrin Sonn, sustaining a familiar sight was an important way to deal with the economic and social consequences of industrial decline. She noted that: "a region must know where it comes from. And when one knows one's roots, one can grow and develop further. And when we would have razed everything to the ground and built something completely new, I believe it would be even harder for people to accept and cope with it all" (Sonn 2003, cited in Röllinghoff 2008, p. 302).[6] The mobilization against the demolition of neighbourhoods like Eisenheim and associated technical and industrial monuments was successful. The government increasingly stimulated the preservation of industrial heritage and former workers' houses.

[6] "Eine Region muss ja wissen, woher sie kommt. Und wenn man weiß, wo man die Wurzeln hat, dann kann man auch wachsen und sich weiter entwickeln. Und wenn man jetzt hier alles platt gemacht hätte, glaube ich, wäre es noch schwieriger, also noch schwieriger für die Menschen, das zu akzeptieren und damit umzugehen".

The government's endeavours in matters of industrial heritage preservation have sometimes been explained as an attempt to construct a (social) democratic identity for North Rhine-Westphalia in general and the Ruhr area in particular. One of the perceived problems of North Rhine-Westphalia was that it was a rather artificial post-war creation that lacked historic roots and social cohesion. In fact, since the 'ahistorical' foundation of the state in 1946, various historical policies were launched to strengthen its unity. From the 1970s onwards, industrial heritage and the associated social-democratic political culture were being used for the purpose of identity building (Oerters 2015, p. 249). The social-democratic Minister of Culture from Nuremberg, Hermann Glaser, had already in the early 1980s stated that memorizing the industrial past helped promote democratic identity, especially in times of rapid economic and social change (Glaser 1981). Others pointed to the emancipatory and democratizing potential of industrial preservation, because it dealt with the history of 'ordinary' people (Heer and Ulrich 1985, p. 14). The industrial museums in particular have been described as state-led community-building projects. Prime Minister Rau, amongst others, was committed to strengthening the socio-cultural cohesion of North Rhine-Westphalia. According to Rau, industrial heritage could and should play a role in the process of enhancing the region's identity (Cornelißen 2008, pp. 17–18).

The Ruhr area, as the thrust of Germany's miraculous resurrection, became an important part of this identity. It is in this context that the appreciation for sites like Zollverein slowly began to grow. This appreciation was further fuelled by the perceived economic benefits. In this sense, it was part of a broad strategy of the government to forge socio-cultural cohesion and simultaneously re-boost the regional economy. Over the years, the government of North Rhine-Westphalia attempted to cushion the economic and social effects of deindustrialization. The Ruhr Development Program was initiated in the late 1960s and merged into the North Rhine-Westphalia Program in 1975.[7] The aim of these programs was to provide a planning procedure for the development of the region based on the modernization of the mining industry and the encouragement of inward investment. Another major aim was to stimulate upward mobility by improving the region's educational infrastructure. In the 1960s and 1970s, several institutions for higher education were established in the Ruhr area, including universities in Bochum, Dortmund, Essen, Duisburg and Hagen (Goch 2002, pp. 98–101). Between 1984 and 1988, the government ran the Future Technologies Land Initiative, which focused particularly on the stimulation of technological innovation in the region.[8] In the same period, the Future Initiative Mining Regions—which organized conferences to discuss the economic restructuring of mining regions—and the International Building Exhibition Emscherpark or IBA Emscherpark were also established by the

[7]The Ruhr Development Program was called in German 'Entwicklungsprogramm Ruhr'. This program later merged in the North Rhine-Westphalia Program called in German the 'Nordrhein-Westfalen Programm'.

[8]This initiative was called in German the 'Landesinitiative Zukunfttechnologien'.

Fig. 8.2 View on the Zollverein coking plant from Shaft XII. This is the 'white side' of Zollverein where coal was turned into cokes. The ensemble was almost sold to a Chinese company that intended to deconstruct it and ship it to China to be reassembled. The site served as the exhibition space for the Sonne, Mond und Sterne exhibition. Picture by the author (2015)

government of North Rhine-Westphalia.[9] Especially the latter played a major role in steering structural changes in the Ruhr area and placing industrial heritage preservation high on the political agenda (Fig. 8.2).

Despite these programs the Ruhr area retained a poor image, high unemployment rates and severe social problems. It was recognized by the state government that past initiatives had not solved the structural economic problems, and hence, new ideas were developed. Unlike any previous project, these new ideas focused not so much on changing the economic structure directly, but on promoting, branding and reimaging the Ruhr as an attractive area to live and invest in. In line with this new policy approach, the government envisioned a greater role for entrepreneurs. The new economic situation resulting from industrial decline required the creation of a tertiary sector. While for much of its history the Ruhr area had been exclusively a space of production, it was now acknowledged that it could also be a centre of consumption. Industrial heritage was in this context also increasingly perceived as a consumable commodity for tourists and residents alike (Percy 2003, p. 154). Zollverein was to become an embodiment of this philosophy.

[9]The Future Initiative Mining Regions was called in German 'Zukunftsinitiative Montanregionen'. The International Building Exhibition Emscherpark was called 'Internationale Bauaustellung Emscherpark'.

8.3 Zollverein from Mine to Monument

8.3.1 Protecting Zollverein

In 1978 state conservationist Günter Borchers and then Science Minister Johannes Rau held a joined press conference where they announced that Shaft XII could potentially be listed as a monument. This statement was made while the government of North Rhine-Westphalia was in the process of drafting the new heritage act, which would eventually be implemented in 1980 (L. Henning-Meyer, personal communication, June 6 2014). Unlike the previous act, this one included the possibility to enlist larger ensembles of industrial heritage. Between 1981 and 1983, the two regional heritage offices of North Rhine-Westphalia drew up an overview of potential industrial heritage sites in Essen and its surroundings and created a register for the underground mine shafts in the region, many of which were unmapped. In spite of these developments, it would remain uncertain if Zollverein would indeed become a protected heritage site. Already in September 1982, in anticipation of the completion of the list of potential industrial heritage sites, the owner of Zollverein—Ruhrkohle AG—, asked the municipality for a permit to demolish Shaft 6/9. The following month, the government of North Rhine-Westphalia proposed this Shaft for listing (Buschmann 2002, pp. 31–32). This proposal prevented the municipality to decide on the matter.

Meanwhile, the regional state preservation office continued with the development of a list of potential industrial heritage sites and a policy document for mining heritage. Part of the plan was to enlist thirteen complete mines in the region in their original state, one of which could be Zollverein. For Ruhrkohle AG this decision meant that their demolition plans for Shaft 6/9 could—at least for the moment—not be implemented. When the policy document was publicized in February 1985, Ruhrkohle AG immediately filed their objection at the court in Gelsenkirchen. The company argued that their economic interest was harmed, because it had planned to build houses and offices on the property. The dispute was settled by a compromise. The steam engine that was installed in 1913 to gain coal from Shaft 6/9 was moved to the Bonifacius mine in Essen-Kray (Kania 2002, p. 19). The authorities considered this engine to be the most valuable asset of the Shaft. Ruhrkohle AG covered the expenses for the transport and reinstallation of the antique steam engine and in return was allowed to pull down the remaining structures at Shaft 6/9 (Buschmann 2002, p. 32).

In the course of 1985, a number of events drew attention to Zollverein's possible heritage status. In May 1985, the University of Essen organized a symposium on the theme 'mining architecture' which brought together professionals and academics from across the country to discuss possible ways of dealing with mining heritage. In June, the yearly gathering of the Society for the Monument Preservationists of the *Länder* took place in the city of Wuppertal—just south of the Ruhr region. The meeting included a full day excursion to Zollverein (Ganser 2002, pp. 32–33). In September of that same year, the German National Committee for Heritage

Preservation organized a press conference at Zollverein. The main issue discussed here was the question of the reuse of heritage (Deutsches Nationalkomitee für Denkmalschutz 1985). On this occasion, members of the German National Committee for the Preservation of Monuments for the first time mentioned the site's potential for obtaining the World Heritage title (Raines 2011, p. 191). The journalists present picked up on this issue and wrote extensively about Zollverein's possible heritage status.

Despite the growing attention to Zollverein as a potential (world) heritage site, Ruhrkohle AG requested a municipal permit for the demolition of parts of Shaft XII. The municipality received this request in February 1986, just months before the mine's closure. The owner only wished to preserve the central hosting frame—the most iconic part of the Shaft. Plans were made to pull down the other structures and clear the estate for new development. The municipality swiftly granted permission for these plans because it saw possibilities for economic gain. As Buschmann observed: "In Essen, the plans for a new business park raise the hope for compensation for lost employment and therefore often have a positive ring to it" (2002, p. 32).[10] The municipality offered to buy the land on which Shaft XII and Shaft 1/2/8 were built in order to clear it for redevelopment (Ganser 2002, p. 24; Dorstewitz 2014, p. 436).

The regional branch of the state preservation office, however, did not approve of the plans and called on the responsible Minister Christoph Zöpel to prevent the demolition. Zöpel was a member of the SPD. He had worked as state Minister of federal affairs between 1978 and 1980, and was Minister of Urban Planning, Housing and Transport between 1980 and 1990. He was a known advocate of the economic restructuring of the Ruhr region and saw the economic potential of preserving former industrial sites. The government of North Rhine-Westphalia—and in particular Zöpel—supported the state preservation office and acquired parts of the property via the estate administration and development agency of North Rhine-Westphalia.[11] With this decision the municipality was overruled. This ended the dispute about the question *whether* Zollverein should be preserved. However, it was the start of a new discussion about the precise parameters of the heritage site. Should all the structures and equipment be maintained, or would it be better to preserve only the most iconic elements? On the one hand, the municipality still wanted to use parts of the site for redevelopment and suggested that only the steel hosting frame of Shaft XII and some of the adjoining buildings be maintained (Ganser 2002, p. 32). It proposed a so-called "small solution"; aimed at preserving only those buildings that were considered "architecturally and urban planning wise [...] indispensable" (Buschmann 2002, p. 33).[12]

[10] "In Essen riefen die Pläne für neues Gewerbegebiet die Hoffnung auf Ersatz für die verlorengehenden Arbeitsplätze und damit eine vielfach positive Resonanz hervor".

[11] This body was called in German the 'Grundstücksfonds'.

[12] "Kleine Lösung". "architektonisch und städtebaulich [...] unverzichtbar".

In practice, this meant that every structure situated behind the central courtyard and the hosting frame—including the coal washing hall, the boiler house and several conveyer belt installations—would be pulled down. The state government, on the other hand, did not accept these plans and wished to preserve the entire site. After months of fruitless negotiation between the municipality and the government of North Rhine-Westphalia, the case was forwarded to the higher preservation authority of the *Land*, who recommended preserving the site as a whole. On December 16, 1986 immediately following this advice and only one week before the final closure of the mine, Zöpel decided to enlist the entire site of Shaft XII and Shaft 1/2/8—including all machinery and equipment. The city of Essen was legally bound to accept this decision.

In order to discuss and coordinate the preservation and reuse of *Zollverein*, Minister Zöpel created a working group with representatives of Ruhrkohle AG, the city of Essen, the state heritage office, the *Land* development corporation and the universities. This diverse group included men and women with various professional backgrounds: historians, museum curators, entrepreneurs and urban planners. The working group met for the first time in Dortmund in February 1987. The budget, facilitation and organization of the meetings were in the hands of the 'state development corporation'. Despite Zöpel's decision to list the whole site, several members of the 'state development corporation' used the working group meetings to plea in favour of the 'small solution'. This led to major discussions between actors in favour of preserving the site entirely—including the state preservation office and Zöpel—, and those who only wished to preserve certain parts of the complex—including Ruhrkohle AG and the municipality (Buschmann 2002, p. 23). In the course of 1987, the discussions developed in favour of a 'big solution'—the total preservation of Zollverein.[13]

On the one hand, this was the result of increasing public interest in industrial heritage expressed in public demonstrations against the demolition of Zollverein (Dorstewitz 2014, p. 432). Also the publication of a book about Zollverein in the series *Rheinische Kunststätten*—which normally only dealt with castles, cathedrals and other traditional monuments—contributed to this rising interest (Buschmann 2002, p. 34). On the other hand, the working group members became more and more aware of the possible economic benefits of the reuse of the property. Elsewhere in Europe—especially in the UK—examples could be found of such reuse. By the end of 1987, the working group formulated their conclusive findings, in which it was suggested that Zollverein should be turned into a centre for contemporary culture: a "Forum for 21st century culture" (Ganser 2002, p. 24).[14]

Apart from being 'contemporary' the centre should be rooted in the region: a "Forum Ruhr culture" (Buschmann 2002, p. 33).[15] The idea behind this cultural reutilization of the property was that it could help the Ruhr region—and in particular

[13] Called in German the 'Große Lösung'.

[14] "Forum für die Kultur des 21. Jahrhunderts".

[15] "Forum Ruhrkultur".

Essen—with its transition from an economy based on heavy industries to a service oriented economy. Yet, the site was not instantly ready for its new function; it had to be adapted to new purposes. The idea of cultural reuse was controversial and obstacles had to be overcome before the complex could be used as a cultural centre. Several actors were against reuse and argued that Zollverein should be treated like any other monument. There was no consensus amongst those involved as to how the monumental status should be interpreted *in situ*, and whether changing the buildings should be allowed. The Geschichtswerkstatt Zollverein, an association of ex-miners that was established in 1990, pled for the site's preservation. Also the North Rhine-Westphalian branch of the German Association of Craftsmen, which had already since the 1970s been supporting the preservation of industrial heritage in the Ruhr area, were in favour of preserving sites like Zollverein in the same way that traditional monuments were preserved.[16] Director of the German Association of Craftsmen, the aforementioned Roland Günter, argued, for example, that "what applies to Cologne cathedral, should also apply to the gasometer in Oberhausen [. . .] That which is self-evident for the Middle Ages, applies also to the industrial epoch" (Günter 2010, p. 102, see also Günter 2007).

Despite these views, most actors were convinced that industrial buildings should be treated differently (Lackner 2010, pp. 33–34). The restoration principles and protective measures that applied to traditional monuments, they argued, could not be readily transferred to an industrial heritage site like Zollverein. Preservation in a traditional sense was deemed inappropriate especially because it would run counter to the architectural principles of Schupp and Kremmer. Their modernist design was based on a 'form follows function' rationale. Taken to its extreme this principle implied that form should cease with function loss. It was, therefore, deemed important that the complex remained functional.

8.3.2 The IBA Approach to Industrial Heritage

In order to prepare Zollverein for its new use, the buildings had to be renovated drastically. Schupp and Kremmer had designed the buildings to protect the machinery against weathering, not to be used as spaces for people to work in. Most buildings therefore consisted only of one brick layer. Moreover, Schupp and Kremmer designed the buildings to last approximately sixty years. According to the art-historian and heritage officer of North Rhine-Westphalia, Boris Groys, Zollverein "rebelled against the very idea of something permanent or remaining" (Groys 2002, cited in Dorstewitz 2014, p. 433). The steel, mortar and brickwork were in poor condition and many facades had to be either replaced or restored (Krabel 2010, pp. 55–63). The total costs of the renovation were estimated at 140 million DM. Gerd Peter Wolf, a member of the state parliament, suggested to

[16] Called in German 'Deutschen Werkbund'.

create a temporary team of experts that would manage and execute the renovation of Zollverein. This team was called the *Bauhütte* (the construction shed)—named after the temporary sheds that used to be built by the builders of mediaeval cathedrals. It was founded in 1988 and moved into one of the buildings on the Zollverein terrain. The renovation costs for the complex were mostly covered by the Ministry of Urban Planning of North Rhine-Westphalia, which annually paid 10 million DM to the *Bauhütte* (Ganser 2002, p. 25). The city was also supposed to contribute, yet had not expected the renovation to be so costly. It, therefore, initially refused to pay its share. However, one of the municipal civil servants came up with the idea to stimulate companies to hire unemployed people who enjoyed social benefits and use the savings for the renovation of Zollverein. In 1989, an employment and recruitment agency was installed in one of the buildings of the Zollverein complex. The agency set unemployed people to work. This way the city could annually save up to 1 million DM in social benefits which it could directly reinvest in the *Bauhütte* (Ganser 2002, p. 25).

This initiative exemplifies the increasingly common notion that the 'heritage industry', the creative reuse and exploitation of former industrious sites, could offer an alternative to heavy industry. From the late 1980s onwards, further attempts were made to implement these ideas at Zollverein. Of crucial importance in this regard was the aforementioned organization IBA Emscherpark which was established in 1989. IBA got its name and inspiration from a series of building exhibitions that had taken place across Germany, the first one of which was organized in 1901 in Darmstadt. The purpose of these exhibitions was to revitalize urban areas and display state-of-the-art architecture. IBA Emscherpark was set up by the state of North Rhine-Westphalia as an advisory body. It worked closely with local authorities and developers to coordinate projects. At the same time, the organization had an international outlook and sought to hire internationally renowned architects (Letteboer 2012). IBA also made recommendations to the state with regard to funding. The various projects that IBA Emscherpark initiated were funded mostly by federal government and the state government. Furthermore, the European Union—via the so-called European Regional Development Fund—and the private sector financed several of the organization's initiatives (Percy 2003, pp. 156–157). In the ten years in which IBA operated, €2.5 billion was invested, of which €1.5 billion came from public funding streams (federal government, EU and the *Land*) and the remainder from various companies and other private investors. This *ad hoc* agency soon began to coordinate and take over tasks that were traditionally the responsibility of local authorities (Fig. 8.3).

The vision of IBA Emscherpark on the region's structural change was broad and industrial heritage preservation formed merely one string—although an important one—in what was essentially a multi-disciplinary approach. IBA Emscherpark focused on the area along the river Emscher in the heart of the region. This was the most deprived part of the Ruhr area and the one most affected by industrial decline. IBA Emscherpark covered an area of approximately 800 square kilometres between Dortmund and Duisburg, embracing seventeen cities and towns with a total population of over 2 million. Its plans involved changes in both the cultural and the

Fig. 8.3 Detail of the Zollverein coking plant. The canal in front of the coking plant was especially created for the exhibition *Sonne, Mond und Sterne*. The reflection of the factory in the water makes for one of the most photographed places in the Ruhr area. In the winter the canal is turned into an ice-skating ring. Picture by the author (2015)

natural realm. It cleaned up the river and planted trees on former brown fields and waste tips.

Another part of IBA's plan was to promote culture-led regeneration and stimulate the restoration and creative reuse of abandoned industrial sites (Lötscher 2006, pp. 385–386). One of IBA's first priorities with regards to industrial sites, however, was to win itself time by urging an immediate halt on demolition: "Give things time [. . .] First let everything stay" (Ganser, cited in Raines 2011, p. 195). IBA aimed for "change without growth" (Schwarz-Rodrian 2016, p. 200). Preventing hasty decisions was important because the estates had potential economic value and because they were important to the identity of the community. IBA director Karl Ganser acknowledged that "although certain building types may be difficult to preserve, it is necessary to do so in order to retain the spatial identity, to give points of orientation, and explain the history of the region, as well as to give the next generation the opportunity to interpret their heritage for themselves" (IBA 2000, pp. 175–176).

However, it was not necessary to retain industrial sites exactly as they were in order to retain the spatial identity. As Raines (2011) observed: "Faced with a huge geographical area with a rich legacy of industrial uses, but with limited means at its disposal, IBA's leaders quickly realized that the usual priorities of historic

preservation – the protection of entire sites, conservation as an exact and determinable process – needed a bit of tweaking" (195). According to IBA representatives, former industrial sites should *continue* to produce—if not coal and cokes, then at least art and knowledge. Even though the heavy industry had abandoned the site, the industrious spirit should remain (Fleiß and Strelow 2008, p. 226). It should not be "killed through preservation". These "monuments of modernity" should neither become museums nor leisure parks. Instead they should continue as "locations for projects, research, reflection and experiments" (Dettmar 2006, p. 97).

In many regards, Zollverein was such a site. As Oliver Scheytt noted: "At Zollverein coal and cokes were produced for Europe and the world. In the future Zollverein will become a laboratory for aesthetics, for artistic space and environmental design in the form of architecture, art and design according to international standards. Zollverein will again be a place of production for Europe and the world" (Scheytt 2002, p. 52).[17] In the course of the 1990s, these ideas were gradually implemented on site. In the early years the tolerance towards spontaneous initiatives and projects was high. The first forms of reuse had a provisional and temporal character. Design students from the University of Essen were allowed to use the old coal wash as an exhibition space and performance artists were given carte blanche to set up shows and workshops on the terrain. From halfway the 1990s onwards, the temporal and provisional initiatives were turned into more permanent organizational and physical structures. In 1997, for example, the Red Dot Design Museum was established in the old boiler house. For this purpose, the interior of the structure was redeveloped by the British architect Norman Foster (Roseneck 2002, p. 37).

The various locations that artists had used more or less spontaneously as auditoriums, stages or exhibition rooms were gradually turned into more enduring structures like the PACT dance school, shops, galleries and a branch of the Folkwang University (Heidenreich 2015). While the Zollverein mining estate was already being reused for cultural purposes, the neighbouring coking plant was still being used to produce cokes. The coking plant was built between 1957 and 1961, and was designed by Fritz Schupp. The construction plan of the coking plant was different from that of the mining complex, using a concrete skeleton instead of steel (Fig. 8.4). However, Schupp aimed to make the design in line with the existing complex by covering the concrete walls with non-load bearing walls of steel and bricks (P. Overmann, personal communication, September 15 2015). On June 30 1993, this complex closed down. The owner of the coking plant wanted to disassemble the entire factory in order to ship the pieces to China for reassembly (Heidner and Mehrfeld 2002, p. 8). However, IBA and the state preservation office saw the coking plant as an important part of the Zollverein complex and wanted to prevent its deconstruction. Their attempt to preserve the plant initially met political opposition.

[17] "Auf Zollverein wurden Kohle und Koks für Europa und die Welt produziert. Zukünftig wird Zollverein ein Laboratorium für Ästhetik, für künstliche Räume und Umweltgestaltung in Form von Architektur, Kunst und Design im international Maβstab sein. Zollverein wird damit erneut ein Produktionsstandort für Europa und die Welt".

Fig. 8.4 Ferris wheel on the coking plant Zollverein. Although it was intended to be a temporary installation for the *Sonne, Mond und Sterne* exhibition, it was never removed. During the nomination process, ICOMOS experts feared that the Ferris wheel would harm the site's authenticity. Picture by the author (2017)

The SPD candidate mayor, Detlev Samland, argued for instance that: "industrial monuments should not emerge in every city in the Ruhr area, therefore, the demolition of the cokes factory [. . .] should be executed swiftly" (Samland 1993, p. 1).[18]

In the months that followed, IBA and the state preservation office sent several official requests to the municipality to enlist the plant. The municipality, however, refused and in some instances did not even respond to the letters (Buschmann 2002, p. 35). In the late 1990s IBA decided to use the coking plant for the exhibition *Sonne, Mond und Sterne—sun, moon and stars*. The theme of the exhibition was the history

[18] "Nicht in jeder Ruhrgebietsstadt müssen Industriedenkmäler entstehen, deshalb sollte ein Abriss der erst vor einigen Monaten geschlossenen Kokerei schnell ins Auge gefasst werden".

and future of energy supply. Although *Sonne, Mond und Sterne* was primarily supposed to inform visitors about energy supply, it was as much an exhibition of the cokery itself. The composers of the exhibition experimented with the aesthetic qualities of the former factory and made creative use of the spaces' interaction with light. Parts of the factory that were normally inaccessible, could now be entered. Visitors could, for example, stand in one of the ovens, look up through the chimney and admire how it served as an oculus. Staircases were mounted inside the former cokes silo to make it accessible to the public. The top of the cokes ovens were also made accessible via an especially design pathway. The former access road in front of the cokes ovens was filled with water. The resulting canal spectacularly mirrored the cookery. Moreover, a Ferris wheel—symbolizing the sun—was installed on the site. The exhibition was widely considered a success, attracting over 300,000 visitors. The exhibition also successfully pointed to the aesthetic qualities of the coking plant and showed that it could be reused for different purposes. *Sonne, Mond und Sterne* was the final event organized by IBA. Its ten year mandate ended the same year. IBA has been lauded for its achievements.

There has, however, also been critique on IBA. It has been claimed that the organization focused too much on environment, heritage and design, and not enough on improving the economic circumstances of the inhabitants of the Ruhr area. When IBA's mandate ended, the state of North Rhine-Westphalia adopted a new slogan: "Time to take things seriously!" (Raines 2011, p. 201). Although perhaps unintended, it did imply that IBA had been fooling around and needed to be succeeded by a more staid alternative. Nonetheless, the legacy of IBA—the conservation though utilization principle—would continue to also dominate the management vision of sites like Zollverein after 1999. For example, the *Stiftung Zollverein*, which was founded by the state government and the city of Essen in 1998 to take over some of the tasks of IBA, set as its main goal: "to secure the preservation of the mine and the coking plant, and to develop it for future use" (Stiftung Zollverein 2016, p. 1).[19] A practical example of this approach emerged in 2000 when the government of North Rhine-Westphalia hired the firm Office for Metropolitan Architecture (OMA) of the famous Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas to make a master plan for the reuse of the buildings on the Zollverein terrain. This included plans to redevelop the coal washing hall into a museum on the history of the Ruhr—a plan much in line with the trend that IBA set. OMA's plans for coal washing hall included the construction of a glass block on top and of an exterior escalator. However, around the same time Zollverein was nominated for the World Heritage Title. The involvement of UNESCO and its advisory bodies would soon put these and other plans under a strain. As the British architectural critic Christophe Egret recently noted: "[at Zollverein] the approach of the regeneration has been to keep the soul of the past industry as an anchor for the creation of contemporary new uses. The

[19] "Zeche und Kokerei denkmalgerecht zu erhalten, zu sichern und für eine künftige Nutzung zu entwickeln".

danger, especially with the restrictions of its UNESCO status, is that it might have become a monument rather than a catalyst to regeneration" (Egret 2012, p. 50).

8.4 Zollverein World Heritage

Zollverein officially became a World Heritage Site on December 14, 2001 during the 25th session of the World Heritage Committee in Helsinki. The site was nominated on the basis of four main criteria. Firstly, the site was nominated for its architectural qualities as a fine example of *Bauhaus* design. Secondly, it was nominated for its social history. According to the evaluation by ICOMOS it illustrated the "complex interrelationships of living and working". Thirdly, Shaft XII was appreciated as an individual monument and as a symbol of the "visionary ambitions of industrial rationalization". Lastly, the unique level of output of the "most efficient mine in the world" was mentioned as a justification for enlistment (ICOMOS 2001, p. 1). The Committee voted unanimously for enlisting Zollverein. The unanimity of the decision, however, obscures Zollverein's route to the World Heritage status, which was long and full of obstacles.

The nomination of Zollverein was an initiative of IBA director Karl Ganser. In the summer of 1997 he started preparing a nomination dossier, together with state conservator Udo Mainzer, the art historian and conservationist Eberhard Grunsky and the historian Hans Kania. In 1998, Zollverein was placed on Germany's Tentative List for the period 2000–2010. Meanwhile, the nomination file was finalized. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent copies in both German and English to the World Heritage Center in Paris (Ringbeck 2002, pp. 13–14). Soon after, the site was visited by ICOMOS director Henry Cleere. In his evaluation, he pointed out that a comparative analysis from an international perspective could strengthen the nomination. In 1999 this led to the study *Zeche Zollverein. Eine Steinkohlenzeche als Welterbe!?* by Michael Ganzelewski and Rainer Slotta. This study was sent to Paris to be included as an annex to the nomination document. The site was evaluated again by Henry Cleere, who was this time assisted by Stuart Smith—a representative of the International Committee for the Conservation of the Industrial Heritage (TICCIH) and a member of the Trevithick Trust—an English industrial heritage organization (Ringbeck 2002, p. 14).

After paying a visit to Zollverein between January 30 and February 2, 2000, Smith advised to refer the nomination back. Smith's concern was threefold. Firstly, he was worried about the plans for the construction of an additional glass structure on top of the coal washing hall. The architects in charge of redevelopment of the structure envisioned a five-store glass block on top of the washing plant, which was to house a postgraduate institute of art and design. The second point of concern was the plan to mount an exterior escalator gangway to the same building. This escalator would become the longest of its kind in Europe. According to Smith this would be too intrusive. The last issue was that the Ferris wheel on the cokery side of the complex was not yet removed. During its 24th session in June 2000, the World

Heritage Committee took over Smith's advice and recommended the German government to remove the Ferris wheel, revise the plans for the coal washing hall and review the site's boundaries. The German government was also urged to make a more detailed management plan (Kania 2002; Kania 2005, pp. 117–140; Ringbeck 2002, p. 14).

In the course of the months that followed, German representatives tried to reassure the World Heritage Center and the UNESCO advisory bodies that the issues addressed in the evaluation would soon be resolved. In a letter to the Director of the World Heritage Center Francesco Bandarin, Wolfgang Roters of the government of North Rhine-Westphalia wrote with regards to the Ferris wheel that: "The Ferris wheel will be dismantled after the removal of the exhibition by the end of this year" (Roters 2000, p. 1). Also ICOMOS representative Munier Bouchnaki was assured that: "The Ferris wheel was at all times part of the exhibition 'Sonne, Mond und Sterne' opened in 1999 and is not a permanent installation on the coking plant premises [. . .] The Ferris wheel's service life for technical reasons is limited to five years, i.e. is will be removed at the latest in three years" (Roters 2000, p. 1). The ICOMOS representatives, however, remained sceptical and urged the German UNESCO delegation to ensure the immediate removal of the Ferris wheel: "ICOMOS would find it unacceptable if the installation would remain in site for another three years as indicated in Dr. Roters' letter" (Bandarin 2000, p. 1).

Also the plans for an additional structure on top of the coal washing hall remained a matter of concern for ICOMOS. In a letter to Smith, Cleere wrote: "We are still awaiting confirmation from them about the proposal for an incongruous structure on the top [of the coal washing hall]. We have assurances that the Ferris wheel is to go, but they continue to be evasive [about the planned structure on the coal washing hall]" (Cleere 2000, p. 1). A few months later, these plans were abandoned. The Ferris wheel, however, was never removed and still stand on the cookery site. In the period between the summer of 2000 and the summer of 2001, the management plan for Zollverein was reworked (Ringbeck 2002, pp. 14–15). The buffer zone around the site was changed in accordance with the recommendations of Stuart Smith. By December 2000, however, the management plan was still not up to standard. Henry Cleere noted in a letter to Stuart Smith: "My main reason for contacting you is to send the attached 'management plan' for the Zollverein XII mine, which we have just received via UNESCO. I put the term in inverted commas, since is does not fully confirm with what most people would consider to be a management plan" (Cleere 2000, p. 1).

In June 2001, however, the new management plan was finalized and presented to Henry Cleere. Several changes had been made. Especially the management structure for the site had been drastically altered. Earlier in 2001, the *Bauhütte* had been succeeded by the newly created the Zollverein Development Corporation.[20] The objective of the corporation was to stimulate the reuse of the buildings at Zollverein. Reinhard Roseneck of the Zollverein Development Corporation explained its view

[20] Called in German the 'Entwicklungsgesellschaft Zollverein'.

by stating: "A cultural monument can only be preserved if it is used! This principle also applies to high carat cultural heritage in the league of UNESCO World Heritage" (Roseneck 2002, p. 40).[21]

The new management plan, the revised boundaries of the site and the promise to remove the Ferris wheel on short notice were enough to win over the World Heritage Committee who enlisted it soon after (Ringbeck 2002, pp. 14–15). However, a few months later the controversy would flare again. This time it focused on the redevelopment of the coal washing hall which was scheduled to start in 2002. The historian Silke Röllinghoff recalled: "The redevelopment of the coal washing hall provoked a fundamental confrontation between monument preservationists on the one hand and planners, such as the responsible architects, on the other" (Röllinghoff 2008, p. 269; Kania 2002).[22] The main point of debate was the external gangway that would lead to the second floor of the coal washing hall. One of the main critics was Brigitta Ringbeck who represented the German government at UNESCO. She argued that Zollverein would be transformed "beyond recognition" and the hall would be "packed with one exhibition after another" (Ringbeck 2004, cited in Rosenkranz 2004, p. 4).

The German press also responded critically to the plans. Andreas Rossmann of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* called the gangway "an assault on the historical structure" (Rossmann 2004, p. 37). Some people feared that the redevelopment of the coal washing hall could be the start of a Zollverein theme park. As one critic said in an interview: "I am really not in favour of adding somewhere, I don't know, dance clubs for, for, I don't know. . .children. Or loud, loud bars [. . .] to please the people in the neighbourhood" (Metzger 2003, cited in Röllinghoff 2008, p. 305).[23] Also the aforementioned Hans Kania criticized the plans and accused the Zollverein Development Corporation of creating "Disneyland-like attractions" at the expense of Zollverein's authenticity (Kania 2005, p. 108). Kania noticed that in the second phase of Zollverein's development—meaning the master plan of OMA and the Zollverein Development Corporation—the words "monument" and "preservation" were completely absent.[24] Instead, the management plan consistently referred to Zollverein as a "site of the future".[25] The way the 110 million Euro budget was divided, according to Kania, reinforced this focus on redevelopment instead of preservation: "In any case, the allocation of [financial] means spoke clearly in this

[21] "Ein Kulturdenkmal kann nur erhalten werden, wenn es genutzt wird! Diese Grunderfahrung gilt auch für derart hochkarärtige Kulturgüter im Range einer Weltkulturbestätte der UNESCO".

[22] "Am Umbau der Kohlenwäsche entzündete sich ein grundsätzlicher Streit zwischen Denkmalschützern auf der einen und Planungsstab sowie den für den Umbau verantwortlichen Architekten auf den anderen Seite".

[23] "Also, ich bin wirklich nicht dafür, dass man da jetzt noch irgendwie Discotheken für, für, keine Ahnung. . .für Kinder hineinbringt oder lauter, lauter Kneipen [. . .] um die umliegende Bevölkerung da ruhig zu stellen".

[24] "Denkmal" and "Bewahren".

[25] "Zukunftsstandort".

regard. Not one single cent was reserved for the preservation of monuments" (Kania 2005, p. 111).[26]

Henry Cleere also felt that the objective of preservation had been somewhat overwhelmed by the ambition to transform Zollverein into a 'site of the future'. In speech for the members of the Zollverein Development Corporation he said: "I have the feeling that people forget why Zollverein is on the World Heritage List [...] Zollverein must in any case be preserved. The World Heritage Committee would be furious if you would not preserve it" (Cleere 2002, cited in Entwicklungsgesellschaft Zollverein 2002, p. 56).[27] Michael Petzet, the Director of the German branch of ICOMOS, was even more pessimistic and declared that the plans could "hit the preservation of monuments hard" (Petzet 2004, p. 1).[28] He even went as far as to declare to a German national newspaper that Zollverein, if the plans would be executed, could be enlisted on the list of World Heritage in Danger. Likewise, Horst Dönges of the local historical society was critical not only of the plans to redevelop the coal washing hall, but also of the general approach towards the heritage of Zollverein: "What is made of the World Heritage Site has nothing to do with World Heritage, absolutely nothing. The whole place is used mainly commercially to realize all kinds of things. [...] 'World Heritage' in my view means something else. The mine was enlisted for its excellence. Therefore, one should preserve it, as it was, and at least show the people, the people from abroad what mining entails" (Dönges 2004, cited in Pasternak 2008, p. 112).[29]

The focus on other activities than displaying mining history has also sowed discord amongst the inhabitants of the neighbourhoods around Zollverein—many of whom are former miners, or sons and daughters of former miners. While some tend to think positively about the developments, others perceive Zollverein as an elitist design enclave in the middle of a neighbourhood that is still struggling to cope with the socio-economic consequences of the mine's closure. The transformation of Zollverein has arguably estranged the inhabitants from 'their' heritage. After having depended heavily on the old Zollverein, they now barely pick the fruits of the new Zollverein. As one former employee of Zollverein noted about his old work place:

[26] "Die Widmung der Mittel jedenfalls sprach dazu deutliche Sprache. Nicht einen einzigen Cent gab es für Denkmalpflege".

[27] "Ich habe das Gefühl, die Leute vergessen warum Zollverein auf der Welterbeliste steht [...] Zollverein muss auf jeden Fall bewahrt bleiben. Das Welterbekomitee wird wüttend, wenn sie es nicht bewahren".

[28] "den Denkmalschutz ins Mark treffen".

[29] "Erst einmal, das, was daraus gemacht wird jetzt aus dem Weltkulturerbe, hat mit Weltkulturerbe nichts zu tun, und zwar gar nichts. Die ganze Sache vornehmlich kommerziell genützt, um irgendwelche Sachen zu verwirklichen. [...] 'Weltkulturerbe', da stelle ich mir was anderes drunter vor. Die Zeche ist ja ausgezeichnet worden. Und dann müsste man eigentlich auch die Zeche so erhalten, wie sie war, und mindestens den Leuten oder den auswärtigen Leuten was vom Bergbau zeigen".

"There is actually nothing done there for normal people" (anonymous 2004, cited in Röllinghoff 2008, p. 291).[30]

Despite such criticisms, the redevelopment of Zollverein continued and still continues unabated. In 2006, a new cubes-shaped building by the Japanese architects Kazuyo Sejima and Ryue Nishizawa of the architect firm Sejima and Nishizawa and Associates (SANAA) was completed on the south-east side of the terrain. It houses the Zollverein School of Management and Design (Feirreiss 2006). The Ruhr Museum opened in 2008. And most recently, plans were made to redevelop the land west of the coking plant. The area of approximately 43 hectares would be build up with houses and offices. It remains to be seen whether the latest plans will tip the delicate balance between preservation and reuse. Even though the World Heritage Committee has not officially objected to these plans—and nor in fact to any past plans either—it is to be expected that it will follow the developments with the eyes of Argus.

8.5 Conclusion: The New Ruhr

The Ruhr area has gone through a remarkable transformation by making creative use of its industrial heritage. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the heritage regime was not fully adapted to dealing with industrial heritage sites. There were no clear norms or institutional arrangements in place for deciding how to manage industrial heritage sites of such size and complexity. There were no fixed rules that could help determine if change, or how much change, should be allowed. Nor was it immediately clear if the decisions regarding these sites should be made at the local level (by the different municipalities) or the regional level (by the government and the heritage preservation office of North Rhine-Westphalia). The case of Zollverein illustrates the tensions and discords that existed between the various layers of government about industrial heritage in the Ruhr. Already before the mine's official closure, the city of Essen supported the owners request to demolish the complex, while the government of North Rhine-Westphalia—as well as several non-governmental organizations—opted for its preservation. The discussions between those who wished to demolish (parts of) the site and those who wished to preserve it entirely ran high—not least due to the lack of clarity about whether the municipality or the state government should be responsible for industrial remains. Shortly after the mine's closure in 1986, the government of North Rhine-Westphalia listed Zollverein. Although this ended the discussion about whether the site should be preserved, the question now arose *how* this should be done. What kind of new uses would be possible and acceptable? What is the heritage value of the site? How can the character of the place be retained without threatening its potential for redevelopment? These and other questions were not readily answered and had to

[30] "Für den normalen Menschen ist da eigentlich gar nichts gemacht worden".

be negotiated and debated. Several groups of users could profit from this temporary absence of regime rules and used the site for many different purposes—artist workshops, exhibition space and theatre ground. For a short period of time in the late 1980s, Zollverein was a free-zone for artists (Dorstewitz 2014).

In the course of the early 1990s the regime actors reached a (fragile) consensus: the site should be preserved by using it in a sensitive and sensible way. This philosophy was largely developed by IBA Emscherpark and put into practice at various sites in the Ruhr between 1989 and 1999. However, not all actors and organizations in the regime agreed with this approach completely. Locally active organizations like the Deutschen Werkbund NW and the Geschichtswerkstatt Zollverein were critical of IBA's 'conservation through utilization'-philosophy. Nonetheless, this became the dominant policy for the site. The rules and institutional arrangements that were put in place to execute this policy ended the unwieldy and random development of the site. Efforts to redevelop Zollverein became increasingly orchestrated in the course of the 1990s through organizations like IBA and the Stiftung Zollverein. After Zollverein was nominated for the World Heritage title, the management structure for the site became arguably even tighter, because UNESCO required the drafting of a management plan. Also the founding of the Zollverein Development Corporation meant that the site's management became even more centrally coordinated. Representatives of UNESCO and ICOMOS did not doubt the general approach to Zollverein and agreed that the site should be given a new function. However, the fear existed that the balance between preservation and redevelopment would tip to the side of the latter. Particularly the experts of ICOMOS openly questioned issues like the Ferris wheel at the coking plant, and the escalator and the additional top floor at the coal washing plant. Their attempts to stop these developments had only limited success. Only the plan for the additional structure on top the coal washing plant was eventually abandoned. The escalator was built and the Ferris wheel still stands. Moreover, since Zollverein was enlisted on the World Heritage List, several new structures were build or are currently going through the planning process.

The reuse of Zollverein has, according to critics, harmed the site's material authenticity. According to Ringbeck, for example, the renovation of Zollverein's facade—which was necessary to adapt the building to its new use—cannot be qualified "as 'conservation-compliant maintenance'; it's a reconstruction" (Ringbeck, cited in Mieg and Oevermann 2015, p. 211). Ringbeck regrets that not more was done to preserve sites like Zollverein in a way that respects it as a monument:

> Do I conserve it because it's important as industrial heritage [...] or because I have a relatively good fabric that is suitable for conversion? In the Ruhr, numerous mines have been conserved but none have been conserved authentically. It would have been possible to conserve a single one without much effort. A lot of money has been spent even on the Zeche Zollverein, but it is no longer possible to experience what constitutes a mine. This can be found in many places: mine complexes with cultural event rooms, offices for architects and designers, wine shops etc. But there is no example of a completely preserved mine. [At Zollverein] conservation through utilization was the big slogan, but through this many

> things are also being destroyed, which might have actually been worth conserving for other reasons (Ringbeck, cited in Mieg and Oevermann 2015, p. 216).

Moreover, it could be argued that apart from destroying the historic fabric, the redevelopment of the World Heritage site has alienated its former users and the community living near the mine. Industrial heritage preservation in the Ruhr area was initially a project to preserve the working class identity. The social-democratic leadership of North Rhine-Westphalia tried to protect the material remains of industry not only for aesthetic or scientific reasons, but because it provided the people of the Ruhr with a sense of belonging. While the socio-economic structure of the Ruhr was quickly changing, industrial heritage provided recognizable elements in the area. At the same time, the government—particularly through IBA Emscherpark—tried to find new purposes for industrial sites. This approach has been applauded and has served as an international example. Yet, critics have argued that the industrial sites have now changed beyond recognition. Many inhabitants of the neighbourhoods around Zollverein, many of whom have a direct or familial relation to the mine, feel that the site is not there for them but for arty-farty jetsetter that never made their hands dirty. When coal was still being mined at Zollverein, it was often described as the "forbidden city" (Stiftung Zollverein 2016, p. 1).[31] One could argue that it still is a forbidden city for those who feel they no longer belong there.

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Chapter 9
Exploiting Cornwall's Mining Heritage

9.1 Introduction

Cornwall is located in the most south-western part of the British Isles. The county is roughly separated from the rest of England by the river Tamar, which has its source just four miles from Cornwall's north coast and runs all the way south where it empties into the Atlantic ocean. Cornwall is, however, separated by more than the Tamar alone; the region has a strong sense of 'non-English' identity. The rough land of Cornwall is underlain by extensive deposits of tin, copper, silver, gold, lead, zinc, iron, arsenic, uranium and other minerals, making it a rare geological wonderland. Some historians (Shell 1978; Trounson and Bullen 2012) claim that exploitation of these mineral resources had already began in Roman times, but the history of large-scale mining in Cornwall begins in the eighteenth century with the Industrial Revolution.

The new industry's hunger for metal—particularly copper and tin—stimulated the Cornish miners to delve ever deeper. At its peak there were almost 3000 mines in Cornwall. Mining created a dynamic industrial society in Britain's far west. It was "the Silicon-valley of its day" (BBC 2003[1986]). All kinds of mining related industries emerged here: iron foundries, boiler works, sawmills, rope works, candle factories, boot and shoe works, clothing manufactories, explosive works, fuse works and other industries needed to keep the mines running. This society was the cradle of technological innovations such as high pressure steam engines and pneumatic drills, that served not only mining but other branches of industry too (Sharpe 2005, p. 65).

Cornwall was one of the first regions in Britain to industrialize. However, it was also one of the first regions to experience industrial decline. The prices of lead and tin collapsed in 1866. In the 1880s, the same happened to the price of copper. Ironically, this was in part the result of the success of the Cornish miners. They helped export their skills, knowledge and technologies to regions that now formed Cornwall's biggest competition in the global market (Payton 2005). Especially metal from Australia and the Americas was so cheap that Cornwall's older and deeper

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_9

mines were no longer competitive. Deindustrialization had a heavy toll on the county's economy and demography. The workforce began to emigrate in great numbers. One third of the population left to try their luck elsewhere. It took until 1971 before the population rate was back at the level of the 1850s (Deacon 2010, pp. 7–8; Deacon 2004, pp. 136–174).

Once busy mining settlements were abandoned, harbours silted up, wharves rotted away and fields were left to grow weeds. Land that had been used for mining was often so polluted that it could not be used for any other purpose. The remains of the mining industry—its pump houses and hoists—were often used as dump sites or as quarries for building materials. According to local historian and archaeologist Adam Sharpe this carelessness was explainable: "No longer were they the power house of the economy, but a painful reminder of hard times" (Sharpe 2005, p. 69). Cornwall's deindustrialization process was long and excruciating. One could claim that even by the late twentieth century, the Cornish economy had still not fully recovered from the downfall that had began in the 1860s. By the 1980s, Cornwall's unemployment was amongst the highest in Britain at 18.4%. The gross salaries of those who were employed was 18% below the national average, and Cornwall's gross domestic product was the second lowest of all regions and counties in Scotland, England and Wales (Havinden et al. 1991).

By that time, only a hand full of mines were still struggling on. With the tin prices getting another blow in 1985 and the Conservative government refusing to further subsidize the industry, these mines also closed down one by one. The closure of South Crofty (Fig. 9.1)—the last working mine—in 1998 led to widespread public concern and grief. As the Cornish historian Bernd Deacon observed: "the despair [that the closure of South Crofty] evoked was deeper than that accompanying normal bad economic news. Local communities mourned the loss of over 2,000 years of mining" (Deacon 2010, p. 17; see also Buckley 1997). The loss was not only economic, but also social and cultural. An anonymous graffitist quoted the Cornish songwriter Roger Bryant on South Crofty's wall: "Cornish lads are fishermen and Cornish lads are miners too, but when the fish and tin are gone what are the Cornish boys to do?" (Bryant 1996; see also Laviolette 2003, p. 26). Although this message certainly struck a poignant note of nostalgia, the British government had a clear cut answer to this question: Cornish boys are to work in the new tourist industry. The economic structure implied in the message on the wall had already gone astray many decades ago and attempts to restructure Cornwall's economy had already begun in the 1980s. The government of Margaret Thatcher encouraged post-industrial regions to exploit their (industrial) heritage and this policy was largely continued in the 1990s and 2000s (Larkham and Barrett 1998; Hesmondhalgh et al. 2015).

In Cornwall, however, this attempted transition went far from smoothly. Service jobs in the tourist sector were often seasonal and low-paid. Skilled craftsmen, miners with righteous professional pride were forced into menial and servile jobs like ice-cream seller or car-park attendant (Deacon et al. 1988, p. 108; Urry 1990, pp. 49–50). The county's real-estate market was hijacked by second home owners. Moreover, many of the new heritage attractions—museums, historic theme parks—seemed to misrepresent Cornwall, either by portraying it as just another part of

Fig. 9.1 The Crown engine houses at Botallack mine, Saint Just mining district. These engine houses were constructed in the 1860s to drain mine shafts that reached almost 400 meters under the Atlantic Ocean. In the 1980s the property was acquired by the Botallack Trust and is owned by the National Trust since 2002. Picture by the author (2015)

England, or by making a caricature of its unique and distinctive history (Kennedy and Kingcome 1998, pp. 45–59). According to critics, heritage was no longer preserved as intrinsically valuable. Instead, objects were sanitized, wrapped and prepared for tourist consumption. These sentiments gave rise to numerous conflicts between local and national actors over the use, selection and interpretation of heritage objects in Cornwall. With the enlisting of the Cornish Mining World Heritage Site in 2006, these existing conflicts became even more complex. This chapter will analyze the interaction between local, regional, national and international actors, organizations and institutions in discussions about industrial heritage preservation in Cornwall.

The first section will analyze the rise of the heritage and tourist industry in Cornwall. The analysis places this process explicitly in the neo-liberal political landscape of the 1980s and 1990s. It will discuss the much criticized neo-liberal exploitation of heritage. The second section will focus on some of the (negative) consequences of the (industrial) heritage industry in Cornwall, including the growing gap between rich and poor that resulted from the arrival of newcomers from the

richer Eastern counties and the perceived downplaying of Cornish heritage. It will explain how these landscape developments paved the way for a movement of regionalist actors who strived for more Cornish autonomy in the field of heritage preservation. The third section discusses these actors' position within the new political landscape that took shape in the wake of New Labour's rise to power. The fourth section focuses on a specific conflict on the plans to build a supermarket in the historic port town of Hayle. As this town forms part of the World Heritage Site that was enlisted in 2006, the discussions about these plans involved not only local and national actors, but also international actors. The case illustrates how the existing tensions between different levels of governance impacted the planning process and the interpretation of Cornish heritage.

9.2 Exploiting Industrial Heritage: Neo-liberalism and Conservation

9.2.1 Conservation, Commerce and Its Critique

The rise of neo-liberalism fundamentally changed the heritage discourse in Britain. One could summarize the impact of Thatcherism on heritage by pointing to two main changes that took place under the successive Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s. The first change was that the government increasingly stimulated the commercial exploitation of heritage. This neo-liberal approach had particularly major consequences for the way heritage preservation was publicly legitimized. It was no longer just a humble act of piety in honour of the ancestry. Instead, historic buildings were seen to have real present-day market value. The governments of those days perceived heritage and the associated tourist and leisure activities as an economic cure for economically deprived regions like Cornwall (Robinson 1999). One of the envisioned ways to exploit heritage's economic potential was involving the private sector. Many public buildings that were in the state's care, were sold or rented out to entrepreneurs. In the 1960s and 1970s 'economic regeneration' and 'conservation' were generally considered antonyms, but in the 1980s the two concepts were presented by the government as essentially complementary (Pendlebury 2009, p. 115). This new take on heritage is also evident in the 1983 National Heritage Act, which was the first major legislative change under the new government. This law explicitly mentioned regional economic growth as an important advantage of heritage conservation. John Pendlebury (2009), a scholar and former conservation officer, rightly observed that in the 1980s and early 1990s a discursive shift had taken place from a focus on "intrinsic value" to "instrumental value" (202–203).

A second major trend that set in under the Thatcher government was that the state—in order to ensure that heritage would indeed benefit economic growth—became closely involved in heritage matters. For example, the number of

conservation areas and listed buildings grew exponentially during Thatcher's and Major's time in office (Hobson 2004; Pendlebury 2000). This form of state intervention was somewhat at odds with the neo-liberal ideology. One could say that while the invisible hand of the economy was stimulated to move freely, the government's hand—not least in heritage-related issues—became ever more visible. Many responsibilities that used to sit with local or regional authorities were now taken over by Whitehall or by semi-autonomous bodies that operated at arm's length of the government (Nisbett 2014). The establishment of English Heritage in 1983, for example, formed part of this centralization process. This organization was created for two main reasons: to act as the main national advisory body on heritage and to ensure that historic buildings would benefit the economy. According to critics, the creation of English Heritage was not about heritage protection at all, but about cost effective heritage management and about exploiting the commercial potential of historic properties. As the architectural historian and former English Heritage director, Simon Thurley, noted: "[The act that created English Heritage] was about efficiency and presentation, not preservation" (Thurley 2009, p. 1). The organization itself acknowledged that its dual role was difficult to play. In its annual report of 1987–1988, it noted: "It is not always easy to find the right balance between being on the one hand expert practitioners of conservation and on the other participants in the business of marketing the national heritage. Both roles are important and we try to do both well. Yet to the public we may still appear more as part of the leisure market than as the authorized body in conservation of the historic environment at large" (English Heritage 1988, cited in Delafons 1997, p. 146).

The ideological tension between economic freedom on the one hand and a strong state on the other, not only caused confusion regarding the precise role of English Heritage but also led to disputes within the Conservative Party between those favouring a laissez-faire attitude and those favouring increased government control over planning and preservation matters (see Ridley 1988, cited in Larkham and Barrett 1998, p. 57). The government's approach also attracted criticism from left-wing historians who argued that selling heritage to tourists or otherwise subjecting it to market forces, distorted the image of the past. It shall be argued below that in Cornwall—perhaps more than in other places—this loss of authenticity was strongly felt. Feelings of being misrepresented by the heritage tourist industry gave rise to a rather pugnacious movement of actors who wished to change the heritage regime.

9.2.2 Industrial Heritage Tourism: Cornwall's Economic Panacea?

In the late 1980s, the BBC made a series of short documentaries about Britain's mining past. One of the films opened with two Cornish miners and one of their wives sitting around the kitchen table. "Look at the paper", one of them says in a thick Cornish accent. "Fifteen thousand miners on the dole. Going to have to think about

going away". His wife glances up at him and says: "You know yourself. What are we going to sell these houses for?". "Next to nothing", he answers. "We need the backing of the government. It'll cost 'm more to keep us on the dole than to have us in work. They don't give a bugger about we down here. They're lining their pockets, they don't mind about we. All they want for Cornwall is a holiday center and they're going to get it" (Phillips 1985, cited in BBC 2003[1986]). He was right in many ways. It was 1985 and the Conservative government of Margret Thatcher was caught up in a long and bitter conflict with the coalminers unions. The coal mining sector had been nationalized in the late 1940s and now the government intended to withdraw the subsidies that kept the industry alive. Thousands of miners, especially from northern England, went on strike, threatening to drag the country into another energy crisis. But the Iron Lady did not break: the coalmines closed and thousands of miners lost their jobs (Beckett and Hencke 2009).

Although not everyone expected it yet, the Cornish tin miners awaited the same fate. For years, brokers buying and selling on the London metal exchange had kept the price of tin artificially high, but now Brazil and China flooded the market with cheap produce. The bubble burst on October 25 1985. Almost overnight, the price of tin dropped dramatically—from nearly £8000 per ton to just £3000 (BBC 2003 [1986]). The mine owners looked at the government for help. The owner of Geevor, one of only four mines that had survived into the 1980s, made a request for a twenty million pound government loan. The request was refused. On January 28 1986, some five hundred Cornish tin miners, their families and several thousands of other supporters, marched on Westminster to protest. As it happened, just hours before the Cornish protesters arrived in London by train, the space shuttle Challenger exploded shortly after taking off from the Kennedy Space Centre in Florida. This catastrophe would dominate the news for weeks. Coverage of the tin miners march was pushed from the headlines to the annexes and the political lobby for financial aid petered out (Phillips 2003, cited in BBC 2003[1986]).

Although two other mines, Wheal Jane and South Crofty, did get small loans that allowed them to stay in operation for a few more years, the government's overall plans with Cornwall—as the miner quoted above rightly noted—lay with tourism rather than tin. The strategy to focus on tourism made sense because Cornwall already had a rather longstanding history of tourism on which it could build. Cornwall had been a popular tourist destination since the late nineteenth century, so unlike many other former industrial regions it had an infrastructure in place that—at least in part—could facilitate the rising heritage tourist industry (Busby and Meethan 2008; Fisher 1997). The county was popular with New Age travellers looking for a spiritual connection with Cornwall's mystic Celtic past, with families visiting one of the many beaches, with *noveau riche* yachting and fine-dining in Cornwall's mundane coastal towns and with literature fanatics following the traces of Daphne du Maurier or John Betjeman (Phillips 2013; Watson 2015, pp. 13–54; Thornton 1997). Visits to former industrial sites, however, were not in these charts. If industrial sites were mentioned in tourist guides at all, it was as dark and dirty places to be avoided (Palmer and Neaverson 1998, p. 141).

This negative attitude started to change, however, when visitor numbers began to decline slightly in the late 1970s. With New Age becoming old-fashioned and airliners offering flights to the Mediterranean for a pittance, the Cornish tourist branch needed a unique selling point to turn the tide. It was helped in finding this by a television series called *Poldark*, which the BBC broadcasted between 1975 and 1977. The series was based on the historical novels that Winston Graham wrote in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It tells the story of former British army officer and American Revolutionary War veteran Ross Poldark who reopens the tin mine that he inherited from his late father. The series sketches a rough but romantic image of late eighteenth century Cornwall, depicting engine houses situated in a setting of wild, natural beauty. It was a major hit (Moseley 2013).

Entrepreneurs and local authorities were quick to realize that industrial terrain once considered dodgy and dangerous could be re-sold to tourists as a romantic and picturesque 'Poldark-country'. The former mine Wheal Roots, for example, was turned into a museum and theme-park, offering underground tours in its old shafts. Following the popularity of the television series, the mine was renamed 'Poldark mine'. It was clear to many investors and developers that Cornwall's mining heritage could be commercially exploited. Many local residents, however, feared that the heritage industry and the commercial exploitation of heritage would not benefit and could potentially even harm Cornwall's economy and pose a threat to its unique cultural identity (Ireland 1999). Especially many Cornish politicians were afraid that tourism alone would not be a solid economic basis for the region. Instead, they argued, the government should try to keep the mining industry afloat. In his speech at a rally in Camborne, the Liberal Member of Parliament David Penhaligon, for example, said: "You need more in our economy then just tourism, ice-cream and deckchairs. Our mining industry is not a figment of the last decade or two decades. It has occupied Cornishmen. It has produced wealth for this century, the previous century, probably for the last 2,000 years. And what we're asking the government of today to do is to recognize the great contribution that we've made to the wealth of Great-Britain and in this great time of trial and tribulation to come to our assistance" (Penhaligon 1986, cited in BBC 2003[1986]).

Apart from such macro-economic considerations, there existed a deeply rooted fear that the Cornish identity and the Cornish sense of pride were at stake. Indeed, Cornwall was perceived as one of the 'victims' of misrepresentation by the heritage and tourist industry. Following Baudrillard's famous simulacra thesis, the anthropologists Neil Kennedy and Nigel Kingcome talked, for example, about the 'Disneyfication' of Cornwall. According to these authors, the people of Cornwall were encouraged by the government to "become part of the new, clean, heritage industry" (Kennedy and Kingcome 1998, p. 54). Yet the heritage industry seemed to make a travesty of the past. According to the authors, this misrepresentation was expressed clearest in the mining museums that replaced former working mines. In these museums the real miners were replaced by "redundant miners attired in clean overalls, objectified for the tourist gaze" (Kennedy and Kingcome 1998, p. 54). The heritage industry created an overly romantic image of the Cornish mining industry. According to Kennedy and Kingcome, the 'Disneyfied' Poldark-version of Cornwall

belittled the mines by raising the impression that this was a small-scale cottage industry of miners with pickaxes and candles on their helmet, while in fact it was a highly modern, high-tech industry that continued well into the 1990s (Kennedy and Kingcome 1998, p. 52).

As a result, the community no longer recognized itself in the image that was being sold to tourists. The neo-liberal attitude toward heritage had taken such strong root, that critical voices often fell on deaf ears. When the developer David Bultrode, who had bought much of the historic mining harbour town of Charlestown in order to build a holiday resort, was asked by a local reporter what these plans would mean for the local population he replied: "Anything that brings money into an area is an improvement" (Bulstrode 1988, cited in Deacon et al. 1988, p. 9). The notion that Cornish industrial heritage was mainly a cash cow is also evident in the statements of the industrial historian Mike Hillman. In a radio interview, he comforted those who mourned the disappearance of the mining industry, stating that "your mines may close but you can go on mining your heritage forever" (Hillman 1987).

Some believed that Cornwall would be turned into a vast theme park at the expense of the 'real' and 'authentic' Cornwall (Perry 1993, p. 58). Historian Philip Payton summed these fears up: "a hitherto wild, dramatic, inherently Cornish landscape was being sanitized and anglicized, made safe and familiar for Home Counties [i.e. English] refugees" (Payton 2004, p. 284). As will be explained in the next section, 'English heritage or Cornish heritage?', this perceived lack of authenticity fuelled regionalist critique on the heritage and tourist industry, as well as attempts to take regional control over the heritage interpretation and selection process. The remainder of this section, however, will explain how this heritage industry in Cornwall came about.

9.3 English Heritage or Cornish Heritage?

Although Cornwall is constitutionally an English county, it has a strong sense of regional identity and distinctiveness. This identity is based on its rich industrial past and elements of Celtic mysticism (Knight and Harrison 2013, pp. 186–193; Deacon 2001; Trower 2015). Cornwall has its own flag—the banner of Saint Piran, patron saint of tin miners. Cornwall also has its own language—although very few people still master it—, its own national dish—the Cornish pasty—and its own national bird—the red billed chough. Most Cornish, however, define their distinct character in relation to their 'significant other': the English (Westland 1997, pp. 37–45). Dormant anti-English sentiments flared during the tourist boom of the 1980s when numerous visitors from across the Tamar flocked the Cornish beaches and roomed the county's real estate market in search of affordable second homes (Laviolette 2011, pp. 138–140). Consequently, the house prices in attractive areas skyrocketed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Given that the salaries in Cornwall were far below the national average, many Cornish were outbid and could no longer afford to buy a decent house.

The partisan regional historian Bernard Deacon, who perceived this trend as a form of colonization, noted that: "the Cornish now live in 'reservations' [. . .] tucked away on the edges of our towns and villages, in caravan parks or winter-lets in 'resort' areas. Many Cornish people can no longer compete in the so-called 'free' market" (Deacon et al. 1988, p. 139). Neil Kennedy and Nigel Kingcome described this peculiar situation in a perhaps even more vivid way: "Many [Cornish people] are scathing in their criticism and dismissal of touristic portrayals. This rejection is facilitated by spatial separation, whereby the native Cornish are concentrated residentially in unattractive areas which have not been theme-parked" (Kennedy and Kingcome 1998, p. 58). The population, according to these authors, thus increasingly experienced the downsides and drawbacks of the new tourist industry, while not enjoying any of its benefits. Heritage tourism was more and more perceived as a threat. According to Deacon: "the vultures of the heritage industry are poised to strip the bones of Cornish culture bare, scattering in their wake sloppily written tourist guides [. . .] and smart signs on the way to important places classified as English Heritage, while ignoring the fact that most of these sites had been occupied and vacated by Cornish people long before the English ever came near the place" (Deacon et al. 1988, p. 36). As a result of such feelings of dissatisfaction, the popularity of Cornish nationalist organizations like The Revived Cornish Stannary Parliament (est. 1974), Mebyon Kernow (est. 1951) and the Cornish Nationalist Party (est. 1975) grew considerably (Deacon et al. 2003). Anti-English sentiments also gave rise to more militant nationalist groups like An Gof (est. 1980).

All these groups combined in their programs claims for more political autonomy with strong opposition to the tourist industry and the associated Anglicization of Cornwall. The economic transformation of the region, thus, gave rise to conflicts of a socio-culture nature too. In 1981 and 1982, members of the Cornish Nationalist Party protested against the sale of Land's End—the most western tip of the British Isle—to foreign investors who wanted to build a hotel and theme-park there (Ireland 1999, pp. 215–225). And in the mid-1980s, Mebyon Kernow called for a tourism tax, a moratorium on second homes and actions against realtors who advertised homes in national magazines (Orange 2012, p. 60; see also Orange 2011, 2015). In other cases, tourists themselves became victims of hostilities. In 1984, for instance, An Gof claimed responsibility for placing broken glass under the sand at Portreath Beach—a popular 'bucket and spade' holiday destination for English tourists (Ellis 1985, p. 144). English Heritage, as a perceived agent of English 'cultural dominance' and a promoter of heritage tourism, has often been at the receiving end of Cornish nationalist critique. Protesters have argued that the information provided by English Heritage in their brochures, on plaques and in visitor centres is not 'authentic' because it excludes Cornish history and culture. Instead, the public is presented a centralist and assimilationist narrative of English history. The Cornish critique on English Heritage is as old as the organization itself. In response to the chartering of English Heritage in 1983, a group of activists protested against the name 'English' Heritage and circulated a petition to stop it from operating in Cornwall. The campaign against the allegedly offensive name of the organization continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Several times English Heritage signs and

information plaques were vandalized, mostly by scraping the word 'English' (Hale 2001, pp. 189–191).

In 1996, English Heritage tried to make a concession to the protesters by using bilingual Cornish- and English-language headings on signs and brochures, but the protests actually increased. Several events organized by English Heritage were disturbed by demonstrations. In 1999, for example, English Heritage held an event at Restormel Castle in Lostwithiel (central-east Cornwall) to commemorate and re-enact the Cornish Prayerbook rebellion of 1549. The direct cause for this popular uprising was the introduction of the Anglican *Book of Common Prayer*—a handbook for English reformists which the then still largely Catholic Cornish population was forced to use in church (Laviolette 2003, pp. 216–217). The uprising was violently suppressed at the cost of many lives.

The demonstrators at Restormel Castle strongly disagreed with the way this historic event was presented to the public and therefore spread fliers which read:

> English Heritage under the watchful eye of English state propagandists, carry out their own form of HOLOCAUST DENIAL in order to remove the Cornish dimension from British history. You will not have read about these events before because, like so many aspects of history that show England in a less than flattering light, they are removed from school textbooks by the English National Curriculum's politically controlled culture police. By presenting faked historical accounts Anglo-extremists can reinforce belief in English monarchical perfection and project a virtuous image of the English state religion. Yet it is a dangerous game for such measures fuel the fires of belligerent English nationalism (cited in An Garrack 1999, p. 446).

Such forms of protest did not stand on their own. Since the late 1990s, several internet forums exist that are dedicated the Cornish 'fight' against English Heritage. On these websites, there are pictures of activists removing signs from heritage sites with acetylene torches. Along similar lines, The Revived Cornish Stannary Parliament launched 'Operation Chough' in 1997. The action group removed English Heritage signs from sites, arguing that these are "Cornish heritage, not English". The signs were "confiscated evidence of English cultural aggression in Cornwall" (CSP 2012, p. 1). There have also been systematic efforts to replace all the 'English roses' that mark tourist direction signs with Saint Piran's flag. At first sight, the actions of the abovementioned groups could be mistaken for sheer vandalism, but in fact they point to a profound concern that the Cornish people are denied the right to self-define and materially control their own heritage. The violation of English Heritage signs was driven by a fear of being misrepresented and being culturally assimilated. Even the very presence of national heritage organizations like English Heritage worked as a provocation as it was seen as an expression of English cultural imperialism. John An Garrack, one of the most vocal protesters, noted that English Heritage was deliberately not acknowledging any aspects of Cornish history at their sites in an 'imperial' effort to eradicate the Cornish entirely (An Garrack 1999, p. 276).

The trend described here shows the emergence of a movement of local niche actors aiming to radically change the English heritage regime by advocating devolution of power over the interpretation of heritage from the central to the regional level. Such claims were certainly not confined to radical activist groups. In 2000, for



Fig. 9.2 Cornish engine house at Wheal Coates in the Saint Agnes mining district. This Cornish engine house has become a symbol of Cornwall. Its silhouette features not only on World Heritage Site plaques and brochures, but its picture is also used to mark Cornish food products that have a protected regional status. Picture by the author (2015)

example, the Cornwall County Council published a report that outlined a 'heritage and culture' strategy for Cornwall. The authors of the report complained that there was little community consultation on preservation issues. Their absence resulted in "top-down" or "expert" views of Cornish culture—often given by "heritage managers" who were not even based in Cornwall (Cornwall County Council 2000, p. 18). The attempts to get regional control over heritage largely failed due to an unfavourable political landscape. Under the Conservative governments of Thatcher and Major, Great-Britain gained notoriety as one of the most centralized and unitary countries in Europe. Yet, this centralization process seemed to make the regionalist actors more vocal. Writing in the 1990s, David Lowenthal observed that in countries like the UK, centralized heritage agencies hold a great deal of influence, yet the "heritage movements" themselves are actually decentralizing, with more preservation initiatives coming from the regions (Lowenthal 1998, p. 80). The window of opportunity for those in favour of more Cornish sovereignty seemed to come in the early 2000s when the New Labour government began to unroll its policy of devolution and regionalisation (Fig. 9.2).

9.4 New Labour, New Regime?

9.4.1 A Devolution Deal for Cornwall

The successive Conservative cabinets of Thatcher and Major aimed—somewhat at odds with their ideology of neo-liberalism—for a more centralized form of government and increased state control over town planning and heritage preservation. In Cornwall, centralization was met with a lot of opposition and political parties that strived for more Cornish autonomy became increasingly popular. At first sight, it seemed they could get their hopes up after New Labour's landslide sweep to power in 1997. The new cabinet appeared willing to consider devolving power from London to the regions, much more so than its Conservative predecessors. Prime Minister Tony Blair optimistically announced that: "government's progressive programme of constitutional reform is now moving us from a centralised Britain, where power flowed top-down, to a devolved and plural state. [. . .] A new Britain is emerging with a revitalised conception of citizenship" (Blair 2000, p. 1).

Shortly after Blair's speech, several groups and Members of Parliament from Cornwall formed the Cornish Constitutional Convention. The aim of this cross-party group was to change the constitutional status of the county. Following the examples of Wales and Scotland, it strived for a democratically elected Cornish assembly (Willett 2013, pp. 203–205). In 2001, the group issued a petition for the establishment of such a body, managing to gather 50,000 signatures—some ten percent of the Cornish electorate. Several events around the turn of the millennium seemed to indicate that the lobbyists of the Cornish Constitutional Convention stood a real chance. In 1997, the Member of Parliament for Saint Ives, Andrew George, was allowed to give his House of Commons Maiden speech in Cornish. In 2001, individuals were for the first time able to enter 'Cornish' as a national identity on government census. And in 2002, Cornish was added to the list of indigenous British languages (Orange 2012, p. 64).

Although these successive events showed that the government was more willing to acknowledge the distinctive character of Cornwall and the Cornish, the devolution of real political powers from London to the region failed to occur. One important reason for this was that the devolution policy of New Labour was a rather "centrally orchestrated regionalisation" (Jones and MacLeod 2004, p. 440), which largely ignored popular feelings of regionalism or territorial claims based on heritage, history and identity. Instead, the regions were created on the basis of economic arguments. Typical for this strategy was the creation of eight Regional Development Agencies (Jones and MacLeod 2004, pp. 440–442). These semi-governmental institutions were responsible for urban regeneration and for the stimulation of regional economies. In this new institutional structure Cornwall became part of the South-West region—together with the counties Gloucestershire, Bristol, Wiltshire, Somerset and Devon. The South-West Regional Development Agency held office in Bristol, some 200 kilometres from Cornwall. According to critics the government had placed Cornwall in "an artificial regional construct [. . .] which is very large and

culturally incoherent" (Deacon 1999, p. 3). Apart from the creation of Regional Development Agencies, Blair's government decentralized the bureaucratic structure of English Heritage. In its early years, English Heritage had the image of a "patrician and obstructive London-based body" (Pendlebury 2009, p. 115). In order to bridge the gap between English Heritage and the people, it was decided to create regional English Heritage offices. The Regional Development Agencies were used as a model for this restructuring, their jurisdictions being exactly the same. This was not surprising to rather cynical critics, who observed that English Heritage—with its focus on regeneration and heritage tourism—resembled the Regional Development Agencies more than traditional preservation organizations. The mismatch between the central government's agenda of stimulating regional economic development and the regional actors' agenda of ensuring a 'more authentic' representation of Cornish heritage, thus continued to exist (Dodd 1999; Willet and Giovannini 2014, pp. 201–218).

In 2002, the government published the White Paper *Your region, your choice* in which it defended its decentralization policy by citing international evidence that a strong historical identity is *not* a prerequisite for securing economic and political stability. According to Blair *Your region, your choice* would not only help stimulate regional economic growth, it would also fix a democratic deficit by offering people a chance to get closely involved in the decision-making process and find tailor-made regional solutions for regional problems (DTLR 2002, p. ii). Unsurprisingly, *Your region, your choice* was ill-received by the members of the Cornish Constitutional Convention. Many Cornish activists were in fact furious and perceived New Labour's regionalisation policy as a way to ride roughshod over the Cornish people and their aspirations for more political and cultural autonomy (Deacon et al. 2003, pp. 107–111). Andrew George accused the government of having "'control freak' tendencies" and of being obsessed with boundaries created only to satisfy administrative needs rather cultural ones (George 2002, p. 1). The leader of Mebyon Kernow Dick Cole agreed, noting that the government's talk of democracy and local solutions is merely a mockery as long as it denies the Cornish people a chance to vote on the establishment of a Cornish Assembly (Cole 2002, p. 1).

One could argue that the Cornish attempts to negotiate a devolution deal with the government failed simply because New Labour liked regionalisation more in theory than in practice. However, there was also a more fundamental problem at play, namely New Labour's complete insensitivity to heritage, which was in direct opposition to the campaigners' explicit use of heritage in their arguments for more political autonomy. Immediately after New Labour's win in 1997, the Department of National Heritage was renamed the Department of Culture, Media and Sports. The re-naming of this department indicated a more general shift of direction. 'Heritage' was associated with almost two decades of Tory power. It was the "physical manifestation of an establishment that New Labour wished to dismantle" (Thurley 2009, p. 4). In government papers the word 'heritage' was systematically removed. Rather than talking about 'industrial heritage', for example, the government talked about 'the creative industries' (Nisbett 2014; Hewison 2014; Fairclough 2001). It is not hard to imagine that New Labour's discard of heritage—combined with the

traditional lack of a Labour electoral base in Cornwall—will have done little for the Cornish devolution case. The governmental structure of Cornwall only changed in 2009 when the existing six districts that formed the Cornwall County Council were replaced with the unitary Cornwall Council. This re-organization was much welcomed by the lobbyist of the Cornish Constitutional Convention, not only because the much-hated term 'county' was removed from the name, but also because it was a first step toward devolution of real political powers.

9.4.2 Cornish Mining World Heritage

Cornwall has a long tradition of industrial heritage preservation. Initially the efforts concentrated on the preservation of machines and engines, but soon the focus shifted to the preservation of entire mine sites. In the 1980s, the government made funds available for the acquisition of former industrial sites and stimulated investors to exploit them commercially. Around the same time, the National Trust acquired many hectares of former industrial sites. These include for example the Saint Agnes mine site (Fig. 9.3) and the Saint Just mine site. The industrial heritage sites in Cornwall had and still have many different owners. In 1990 the County authorities presented a report about the mining heritage. One of its conclusions was that it would be desirable to bring together existing heritage centres and several proposed new ones under one umbrella organization, who would promote and manage the dispersed sites in a more coherent manner. It envisioned a 'Museum of Cornish mining' which would exhibit mining heritage on various locations throughout Cornwall. From then on the different mining sites in the region began to work together more closely. This collaboration would eventually form the basis for the World Heritage bid that was submitted in the late 1990s. The transformation of former industrial sites into heritage sites was also propelled by the Derelict Land conference that was hosted in Cornwall and organized by the university of Exeter, which pointed to the "new values" of former mining land in "post-industrial era" (Shipman 1994).

In the early 1990s the World Heritage Committee had explicitly asked UNESCO member states to nominate industrial heritage sites, because it considered this category to be underrepresented on the World Heritage List and because it considered this a good way to encourage post-industrial communities to choose heritage-led regeneration as a way to cope with industrial decline. This request has also been ascribed to the pressure from non-European governments to put a halt on the nomination of European palaces, cathedrals and castles (Hughes 2012). Instead, European governments were urged to nominate heritage that had had a truly global impact, such as monuments of industry. The Conservative UK government jumped on the bandwagon and intended to place several industrial sites on its Tentative List (Albert and Gaillard 2015). Although the UK had not yet officially rejoined UNESCO at this point, the Major government was generally less sceptical of the organization than the Thatcher government had been. Government officials had

Fig. 9.3 Saint Piran's flag flying on top of Robison mine shaft in Pool. This building currently houses a visitor centre and a permanent exhibition on the history of mining in Cornwall. The conversion was in part financed by the National Heritage Lottery Fund. Picture by the author (2015)

repeatedly discussed the possibility of rejoining UNESCO and it was expected that the UK would soon become a full member again (Larkham and Barrett 1998).

In 1993, the Association for Industrial Archaeology (AIA) and the British branch of The International Committee for the Conservation of the Industrial Heritage (TICCIH) compiled a list of important industrial heritage sites in Britain. The list consisted of fifteen sites—five Welsh, five Scottish and five English. It included, for example, the Albert Dock in Liverpool, Blaenafon ironworks in Wales, as well as the Cornish tin mines. In 1994, this list was combined with lists from other countries and sent to TICCIH's international secretariat in Brussels where additional research on the selected sites was done. In the spring of 1994, this dossier was send to ICOMOS in Paris, where the World Heritage Coordinator Henry Cleere selected 33 industrial heritage sites that were forwarded to the World Heritage Committee. Nine of these sites were situated in Britain—more than any other represented country (Hughes 2012, pp. 175–176). The exercise was considered to be a major success. Many of the sites on this list were placed on the United Kingdom's Tentative List and eventually

included on the World Heritage List. The Cornish mining heritage was also put on the Tentative List in 1999.

The preparations for the official nomination began in the early 2000s. The proposed Cornish Mining World Heritage Site was the largest in the UK, covering an area of almost 20,000 hectares. Parts of the site are urbanized; some 85,000 people live within the site's boundaries. The planning authorities annually receive over 200 planning applications and the site is, hence, particularly sensitive to change (A. Cocks, personal communication, October 22 2015). The World Heritage site consists of ten different disconnected areas across Cornwall and West-Devon, some of which are situated along Cornwall's spectacular scenic coast. Given the size and complexity of the proposed site it is not surprising that drafting the nomination file took several years (A. Cocks, personal communication, October 22 2015). It was only in January 2005 that the bid for World Heritage inscription was submitted to the Department of Culture, Media and Sports by a 'bid Partnership Board', which consisted of representatives of individual sites and was led by Cornwall County Council. The bid was formally endorsed by Secretary of State Tessa Jowell and forwarded to the World Heritage Centre as the UK Government's nomination for enlisting on the World Heritage List for 2005. The nomination was evaluated by ICOMOS for a period of thirteen months between March 2005 and April 2006. In the summer of 2006 the World Heritage Committee enlisted the site onto the World Heritage List (UNESCO 2006). Following the site's nomination, the members of the 'bid Partnership Board' formed the 'World Heritage Site Partnership Board', which is responsible for the day-to-day management of the site.

The World Heritage Site nomination was not only cheered by the government, but also by those in favour of more Cornish autonomy. Most Cornish nationalists in fact already had a rather international outlook (Deacon 2007, 2010). Their aim was not to isolate Cornwall, but simply to 'bypass London' and alter the existing perception of centre-peripheral relationships in Britain. Rather than seeing Cornwall as being remote from London, one should see—it was argued—London as being remote from Cornwall. Instead of seeing Cornwall as a peripheral region in England, the Cornish nationalists preferred to see Cornwall as centre, especially in relation to the Cornish diasporas overseas and their Celtic brothers in Ireland, Isle of Man, Scotland, Wales and Brittany. For them, the notion of a Cornish World Heritage was not incompatible with the claims of Cornish nationalists. Many Cornish felt their heritage was exploited by the English. World Heritage was welcomed as a way to reclaim some of the heritage. However, the World Heritage title came with restrictions concerning urban development and planning. The case of the construction of a supermarket in historic port of Hayle, shows that the World Heritage title further complicated the interaction between Cornwall and the British government, and even fuelled the efforts for more regional autonomy in the field of heritage preservation.

9.5 From Ore to Store: A Developers' Paradise

One of the ten designated areas that make up the 'Cornwall and West-Devon Mining World Heritage Site' is the port town of Hayle, which was included because during the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century it formed a vital infrastructural link in the Cornish mining industry. Hayle was the main hub for the import of timber, coal, leather, iron and other goods needed for the mines, as well as for the export of ore and mining equipment. Moreover, it was home to two producers of steam engines: 'Harvey and Company' and the 'Cornish Copper Company'. These foundries developed and produced large vertical steam beam engines that were used the drain mine shafts. Efficient water drainage was essential for keeping the Cornish mines—some of which reached several hundred meters below sea-level—safe, workable and profitable (Cahill 2000, pp. 23–26).

Apart from the import and export of goods, Hayle harbour formed the point of departure for thousands of migrating Cornish miners. Especially in the nineteenth century, they spread their knowledge, skills and culture across the world (Trounson and Bullen 2012, p. 7). The previously rather insignificant settlement of Hayle thrived with the Cornish mining boom of the nineteenth century. In order to link the town efficiently to the mines in the region a state-of-art logistic system of canals and rail routes was created. As the estuary where Hayle is located naturally slits up, an ingenious system of ponds and sluices was created to keep the harbour navigable for large vessels. To allow ships to load and unload, the factory owners built several quays in the Hayle river estuary.

Among these, arguably situated most prominently in the town, is South Quay, which was built by 'Harvey and Company' between 1817 and 1819. To transport products back and forward between the quay and the nearby Harvey foundry, a tram rail track was laid and on the wharf itself several sheds were built for the storage of timber and coal. When 'Harvey and Company' ceased the production of steam engines in 1903, the site was temporarily used for ship breaking. In the 1940s, however, it was abandoned. The decades that followed saw many failed attempts to redevelop the area. In 1969, 'Harvey and Company' sold their properties to the real estate investor 'United Builders Merchants'. This corporation drafted plans to build up the site, but failed to realize them due to the economic recession of the early 1970s (Cahill 2000).

This heralded a period of decline. Substantial parts of the cobbled harbour wall collapsed. In 1976, the harbour stopped sluicing, the sluice doors were left to rot, the area became an illegal dump site and the canal that linked the ponds to the harbour was partially filled in with sand. In 1977, the port was closed off for commercial traffic, because only small recreational vessels could enter the silted up estuary. 'United Builders Merchants' then decided to auction off the site in ten lots. In 1983, all lots were purchased by the local developer 'Tekoa', who immediately began to clear to site by removing the remaining historic sheds. In 1986, the company presented a redevelopment scheme, yet did not manage to get planning permission for it (Cahill 2000). The following year, the harbour was acquired by Aldersgate

Real Estate, owned by the eccentric French-British oligarch Peter De Savery. De Savery had bought several properties in Cornwall. In an interview with a local newspaper, he claimed that "Cornwall has so much potential it is unbelievable. When you think how people are falling over themselves in the South-East for a tiny parcel of development, Cornwall is a goldmine" (De Savary 1988, cited in Godwin 1990, p. 91).

The neo-liberal political climate of the 1980s was helpful to developers like De Savary. In a memo, the government had noted: "The planning system [. . .] must avoid placing unjustified obstacles in the way of development especially if it is for industry, commerce, housing or any other purpose relevant to the regeneration of the country" (DoE 1980, p. 22). In this context, Aldersgate presented redevelopment plans for the quay in Hayle. However, it withdrew these plans in 1994 and the site was sold again. There were several interested parties, including a group of residents led by current Liberal Democratic MP Andrew George who wanted to bring the quay into public ownership. They were, however, outbid by the investment company 'Rosshill and Carruthers'. Like its predecessors, the new owners failed to redevelop the quay. In 2004, South Quay—along with several infringing sites—was eventually bought by the real estate branch of the Dutch ING bank. Not long after acquiring the site, ING began to prepare an extensive planning application for the area (Goodwin 2009, p. 1).

Meanwhile, the preparations for the World Heritage nomination were well on their way. This included writing up an exceptionally lengthy nomination file, which also anticipated the construction work planned at South Quay. It claimed that the site is a "living cultural landscape" in which evolution, growth and decline must be expected and allowed for. Furthermore, it noted that there is a "determined agenda for social and economic change" which will result in "pressure" particularly in "urban centres such as Hayle [. . .] which have been identified for major development" (DCMS 2006, p. 196). The file also included a quote of former ICOMOS director, Henry Cleere, about the level of protection of the nominated site. He wrote: "The State Party [–i.e. the British government], through its central and regional policies, has applied commendable protection and conservation policies in order to preserve this exceptional landscape for and on behalf of present and future generations" (Cleere, cited in DCMS 2006, p. ii). In March 2005, the nomination file—along with an additional note detailing the Hayle harbour development scheme—was sent to the World Heritage Centre, who immediately forwarded it to ICOMOS to be evaluated. The international experts took thirteen months to review the nomination.

The evaluation report that ICOMOS presented in April 2006 painted a far less rose-tinted picture than its former director had done in the nomination file. Not only did the international experts identify a number of threats that could "compromise the integrity of what has been nominated", it also warned that the UK legal framework and planning system were not adequately equipped to handle these threats. The report noted, for instance, that some areas within the site's boundaries were not protected by law in any way. The ICOMOS experts also considered the absence of buffer zones problematic. Overall, they believed the existing national protective

measures did "not adequately reflect the value of all the remains" (ICOMOS 2006, p. 132). The report concluded with the recommendation not to enlist the site, but to refer the nomination back to the British government to allow them to put in place the appropriate legal protection and halt potentially harmful developments. Even though the ICOMOS experts visited Cornwall several times and met with the local and national authorities on several occasions, much the criticism still came more or less out of the blue. In an email to the ICOMOS Paris headquarters and the World Heritage Centre, Mandy Barrie of the Department of Culture, Media and Sports, wrote:

> While we in the UK very much appreciate your support in trying to help us resolve this, we do feel rather let down by the system. Concerns, expressed by ICOMOS, which are fundamental to the bid, such as the need for buffer zones and misunderstandings about the operation of UK planning law and its implementation in Cornwall were raised only in the published evaluation. While this was probably inevitable with regard to Hayle [because the drafting of the development scheme took place during the ICOMOS evaluation period], the points on legal protection and buffer zones could have been raised as matters of clarification during the evaluation process and hopefully resolved then, as we did with other points which ICOMOS did raise with us. The way that things have been handled is not helpful to anyone and we do very much hope that lessons can be learned from this which will help other State Parties in bringing forward nominations (Barrie 2006, p. 1).

Following the advisory body's negative advice, the UK delegation to UNESCO tried to convince the World Heritage Committee that ICOMOS' conclusions were based on a misunderstanding of the way UK planning and heritage law works and that Cornish mining heritage should thus be enlisted onto the World Heritage list. The delegation opposed the suggestion that the national protective measures were insufficient and stressed that all component parts of the nominated site were legally safeguarded. The delegation's attempts to lobby for enlisting worked well. Even though the World Heritage Committee acknowledged that parts of the nominated area were vulnerable, it largely ignored the advice of ICOMOS, and during their 30th annual session in July 2006 decided to enlist the 'Cornwall and West-Devon Mining World Heritage Site' (UNESCO 2006). The British government was, however, urged to keep the World Heritage Centre informed about any large-scale developments within the site's boundaries (Fig. 9.4).

In the following two years, ING completed their application for the redevelopment of Hayle harbour. In March 2009, ING asked official consent for the construction of 1200 domestic units, business units, two hotels, a restaurant, pubs and leisure facilities. The mega-project encompassed not only land at South Quay, but also at North Quay, Riviere Fields and other neighbourhoods around the Hayle harbour basin. ING would also repair the harbour walls and the sluices, and would make the port operational again. During the final phase of the planning process, the responsible planning authorities—Penwith Council—sought advice of ICOMOS UK about the impact of the proposed development on the heritage of the town. After visiting the site, ICOMOS UK wrote a report which concluded that the envisioned buildings would form an "overwhelming intrusion into the harbour landscape" and would "alter fundamentally the strong sense of place of Hayle – away from a port town in

Fig. 9.4 The ASDA store in Hayle. According to the architects, this building was inspired by the mining history of Hayle. Copper cladding was used to cover the facades as a reference to the region's copper producing and manufacturing history. Picture by the author (2015)

its estuarine basin to a predominantly tourist oriented dominant new setting" (ICOMOS UK 2008, p. 7). In order to avoid this the new buildings would have to bear "some resemblance to the low warehouse buildings that once existed [here]" (ICOMOS UK 2008, p. 7). Despite ICOMOS UK's negative advise, planning permission for this project was granted by Penwith Council at its final meeting before the Cornwall unitary authority was created. However, as the global financial crisis gradually unfolded in the course of 2009, ING—by that time heavily depending on state aid from the Dutch government—considered the plans "financially unviable" (ING 2009a).

The original proposals were, therefore, substantially slimmed down to include only a food store, four smaller shops and a parking lot. Consent was also sought for the construction of flood protection measures in the form of a concrete platform on the quayside deck, as well as for the consolidation and repair of the existing harbour walls. The plans for the restoration of the sluices, however, were cancelled. ING claimed that redeveloping the quay would not change and perhaps even enhance the heritage values of the site; in particular its intangible heritage values. "South Quay and Foundry", according to ING, "were historically at the heart of the economic life of the town and the proposals will reinstate these characteristics" and bring "life back into the area" (ING 2009a, p. 29). Moreover, ING argued that developing the quay would open up the area and allow for "[heritage] interpretation opportunities [and] more public access to the heritage of Hayle" (ING 2009b, p. 13). The new proposal was publicized in the *The Cornishman* on New Year's Eve 2009.

In accordance with UK law, comments on the application could be made within 21 days after the announcement; a possibility that many heritage organizations and

dozens of residents eagerly used. These comments revealed that the plans met a lot of opposition. For example, the 'Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment' (CABE)—a statutory consultee—urged the authorities to decline this application. Although it did not object to the construction of a supermarket on this site per se, it disagreed with the design, which resembled an "out-of-town style store" too much. According to the commission, the architects should acknowledge the town's "special qualities [. . .] and history" (Newman 2010, p. 2). Although the proposals were much more modest than the previous scheme, ICOMOS UK still protested; largely on similar grounds as CABE. While it welcomed ING's intent to repair the historic harbour walls, it feared that the construction of a "superstore" on South Quay would distort "historic evidence and spatial relations", interrupt "the harbour views" and harm the "visual coherence of quays". Furthermore, ICOMOS UK noted that the site's Outstanding Universal Value would be at risk if the plan were implemented. It concluded with a clear recommendation: "Hayle deserves better than this and we urge the Council to REFUSE this application" (Denyer 2010, pp. 5–8).

The same advice was given by English Heritage. According to Cornwall's English Heritage officer Simon Ramsden this was "a poor quality and, apparently, opportunistic proposal which [took] no account of its sensitive location, within the World Heritage site and Conservation Area" (Ramsden 2010, p. 1). Both the design and the setting of the supermarket were deemed unfitting with respect to the surroundings. The minimal heritage benefits associated with the scheme—i.e. the restoration of the harbour walls—would, according to Ramsden, not outweigh the major damage it would do to the area. Moreover, he feared that the supermarket plans would interfere with the still ongoing 'heritage-leg regeneration' of the area, which had in part been subsidized by English Heritage. Much in line with the national statutory bodies, the regional planning office recommended the council to decline ING's request. It claimed that the supermarket design did not fit into the existing morphology of the town. With its massive scale and box-like design, the food store would be disharmonious with Hayle's "modestly-scaled [and] rather polite" architecture (Content 2010, p. 1). In addition to the opposition from the regional planning office and established national bodies like CABE, ICOMOS UK and English Heritage, the redevelopment plans for South Quay gave rise to a new local pressure group called 'Friends of Hayle Harbour'. The idea for this group came from John Bennett, who had been the town's Deputy Mayor since 2008. In this capacity, he had been involved in the planning process for Hayle harbour, and indeed voted in favour of the proposals of March 2009.

However, the current proposal, Bennett argued, was completely different. He explained in the local newspaper that: "The harbour plans were finely balanced when we gave permission but ING has thrown out everything it consulted on with plans for a supermarket – now all bets are off". Moreover, he claimed that he "would not have voted in favour if the supermarket had been included" (Bennett, cited in Goodwin 2010, p. 1). Much like Andrew George some 15 year earlier, Bennett now wanted the harbour to become publicly owned: "ING will claim to have gone through the consultation process, but people were consulted on a very different proposal before

outline planning permission was reluctantly granted. Hayle is also in a World Heritage Site, and the World Heritage site advisors (ICOMOS) were scathing about ING's plans. It is time to consider taking over the harbour for the benefit of local people" (Bennett 2009, p. 1). The initiative was backed up by two MPs: the aforementioned Andrew George and his Liberal Democratic colleague Julia Goldsworthy. Goldsworthy especially shared Bennett's concern that the local community was not sufficiently consulted in the planning process. Probably thinking about the upcoming elections, she flexed a muscle: "There have been too many occasions in the past where private owners have attempted to hold the community of Hayle to ransom over the future of the harbour [. . .] This has to stop. The voice of local people must be heard and responded to" (Goldsworthy, cited in Goodwin 2010, p. 1).

The wave of criticism on the supermarket scheme had effect. On March 9 2010, some two weeks before the application would be voted on by the County Council, ING decided to withdraw the plans. In an official press release, ING noted that it "will now review its plans and return with a revised application which will reflect the feedback and in particular concentrate on the issues of heritage, access and linkages and design details" (ING 2010a, p. 1). Although most heritage organizations were glad that the plans were terminated, there were some concerns that ING's withdrawal would further delay the much-needed repair of the harbour wall. The mortar was weak and substantial parts of the wall were in danger of collapsing. Former councillor Geoff Holman requested the council to make use of its right to take action if a listed building is in disrepair and pointed out that it is entitled to reclaim the costs from the owner. The council acknowledged the problem and promised to carefully monitor the site (Holman 2010, p. 1).

On an international level, the Hayle supermarket controversy did not go by unnoticed either. In March 2010, ICOMOS drafted a revised 'Statement of Outstanding Universal Value' for the site. Although this was part of wider project to review and update the statements of Outstanding Universal Value of all the sites nominated between 1978 and 2006, ICOMOS seized this opportunity to pressure the British government into halting the supermarket project and changing its heritage policy. The statement repeated many of the concerns that ICOMOS had already expressed at the time of the site's nomination, including the observation that parts of it were not effectively protected by UK law. The government was given the opportunity to comment on and edit the draft that ICOMOS had prepared. In a letter to the World Heritage Center, Peter Marsden of Department of Culture, Media and Sports, outlined Britain's main objections to the draft revised statement of Outstanding Universal Value. Firstly, it was noted that ICOMOS focused too much on the situation in Hayle: "it is inappropriate to give undue prominence to a particular development proposal in one part of the property at Hayle in a Statement which is meant to stand for many years" (Marsden 2010, p. 1).

Secondly, Marsden argued that ICOMOS' criticism on the UK legal framework was not justified: "The whole property ís protected by the laws, regulations and policy advice of the English planning system as was accepted by the World Heritage Committee when the property was inscribed on the World Heritage List [. . .] As you

know, that level of protection has been further increased in the last 12 months by the publication of new policy advice on the historic environment in general and World Heritage in particular" (Marsden 2010, p. 1). Marsden referred to *Planning Policy Statement 5* and the accompanying English Heritage guidelines, which the government had endorsed in March 2010. In this statement, World Heritage Sites are identified as heritage assets of the highest significance. Substantial harm to them should be wholly exceptional (PPG 2010). The enhanced protective measures, according to Marsden, made ICOMOS concerns ungrounded.

During its yearly session in the summer of 2010, the World Heritage Committee adopted the revised statement of Outstanding Universal Value, which—despite the modifications made by the Department of Culture, Media and Sports—remained critical of the developments in Hayle. In the meantime, ING took the supermarket plans back to the drawing table. In order to find appropriate design solutions, ING's planning and design team had several meetings with the Cornwall Council Planning Service, Cornwall Historic Environment Service, English Heritage and CABE. In December 2010, it presented new plans for a mixed use of the quay. This time, the proposals included a food store on the south end of the wharf and apartment blocks on the north end. The application was exceptionally detailed. The document reflected at length on the development's impact on Hayle's heritage, concluding that the impact would be either insignificant or positive: "The proposed development is considered to have a negligible impact on these areas generally; the design of the buildings on-site have taken into account of the heritage assets and values both on-site and within its surrounding context. In addition, the repair and rebuild of the quay fabric, provision of public access to the quay, reuse of a derelict brownfield site, and dedication of space for a heritage asset is considered to be of a beneficial and positive impact not only to the application site but within Hayle and the wider area" (ING 2010b, p. 14).

ING had commissioned a consultant from Bath named Christopher Pound to write a document on the impact of the proposed development on the heritage of Hayle. Not surprisingly, Pound also downplayed the negative effects and highlighted the benefits of the proposals for the town's heritage. Moreover, the document claimed the heritage value of Hayle was mostly intangible and that the development would only affect a small segment of the World Heritage site. ING gave a lot of weight to the document. In a press release it claimed: "The recent work of Christopher Pound has fundamentally affected ING's approach to the development of this area and his assessment of the significance of the various heritage assets has informed the architectural approach that has been adopted by the applicant's team" (ING 2011, p. 1). Several advisory bodies, however, were very critical of the proposal in general and the assessment of the impact on heritage in particular. The Cornwall Council Historic Advice Manager Nick Cahill wrote a letter to Jeremy Content on January 24 2011, in which he expressed significant doubt about the quality of Pound's report: "The Heritage statement accompanying the application which deals with, amongst other things, the World Heritage site Outstanding Universal Value, is flawed, containing a number of factual errors and contradictions [. . .] We strongly disagree with much of the language used in analyzing the site, which

broadly attempts to break the well-established understanding of the link between the industrial complexes at Foundry [a former copper factory], the mining hinterland, the direct relationship of the harbour infrastructure to these key industrial activities that underpin the World Heritage site". Furthermore, Cahill claimed that the heritage benefits of the proposal were exaggerated by ING. The repair of the harbour walls, for example, was claimed to be a major benefit of the whole plan. However, Cahill argued, this repair was just serving "their own purposes" (Cahill 2011, pp. 3–4).

ICOMOS UK was also critical of the proposed development on South Quay in general, as well as of Pound's document. Most importantly, the organization disapproved of his interpretation of the site's Outstanding Universal Value which supposedly echoed "fundamental misunderstandings of [. . .] what World Heritage inscription actually means" (ICOMOS UK 2011, p. 5). Pound had stated in the application that Hayle was primarily enlisted on the World Heritage list for its "narrative values" (Pound 2010, p. 5). ICOMOS UK, however, stressed that "World Heritage sites are inscribed as *places*, not for narrative associations" (ICOMOS UK 2011, p. 6). The organization also criticized Pound's and ING's attempts to downplay the impact of new buildings on the site's Outstanding Universal Value. According to Pound's report, there is "no direct relationship between Outstanding Universal Value and the design of new buildings" (Pound 2010, p. 5). ICOMOS UK argued, however, this is "misleading as all new buildings must respect Outstanding Universal Value". New buildings should not in any way compromise the harbour "in spatial and visual terms". Moreover, it was argued that "their design [should] not confuse the message that the property conveys or overwhelm the historical record" (ICOMOS UK 2011, pp. 5–6). Like Cahill, ICOMOS UK also believed that the perceived heritage benefits of proposal were not realistic. Although it acknowledged that the restoration of the harbour walls was necessary, it was not convinced that the proposed development was the best way to achieve this goal. The negative impact of the development on the heritage of Hayle would outweigh the potential benefit of the proposed repair. It argued that "preserving a few walls in the middle of a supermarket development is not a sufficient way to respect authenticity" (ICOMOS UK 2011, p. 6).

Despite these, and other, objections, the responsible planning officer Jeremy Content advised not to reject the application but to defer it for a period of five months to allow ING to prepare a new supermarket design that would be less intrusive to the town's heritage—an advice that was followed by the Planning Committee. In early April 2011, ING hired a new team of architects of the firm Feilden Clegg Bradley, as well as the 'historic consultant' Stephen Levrant who was put in charge of the restoration of the wall and the overall heritage impact assessment. As the motto of Levrant was "respecting the past, embracing the present, building the future", ING hoped his involvement would convince critics of its intentions to provide a heritage-sensitive scheme (Levrant 2011). ING did other concessions too. For example, it agreed to the introduction of a so-called World Heritage levy; a premium that the shopkeepers and residents leasing or renting ING real-estate would have to pay (ING 2012, pp. 1–2). The expected £200,000 that this initiative would annually generate would be reinvested in the restoration and upkeep

of the harbour. Moreover, the previously abandoned plans to repair the sluice system and make the harbour operational, were again included in the scheme. This meant that the infill dumped into the channel that connects the pond to the harbour would have to be removed. Although this would reduce the surface of developable land, ING considered it worthwhile as it would go a long way in getting English Heritage on board. In addition to this, ING tried to please English Heritage by hiring an archaeology bureau to investigate South Quay and closely inspect the state of conservation of the slipways and the harbour walls.

The next month, ING submitted the new application. In an official press release, ING outlined the most important changes, including the new design for the supermarket and the intention to restart sluicing. The newly designed building was not an 'out-of-town style store', but an eye-catching "statement building" (A. Cocks, personal communication, October 22 2015). The architects claimed to have been inspired by the "rich industrial history of the area". The eastern façade of the building would, for example, be covered with brass sheet cladding, echoing the "copper mining and smelting which so influenced the town" (Cornish Mining World Heritage Partnership Board 2015, pp. 24–25). Moreover, the supermarket would be used to display information about the town's history and heritage, including large photographs and a specially designed timeline. In September, the Hayle Town Council unanimously voted in favour of the new proposal and in October the majority of the County's Planning Committee did the same. However, English Heritage still disapproved of the scheme. Therefore, the Council could not officially approve the plans yet, but was legally bound to forward the application to the Secretary of State of the Department of Communities and Local Government. In cases where national statutory consultees and local authorities disagree, the Secretary of State has the right to 'call in' the application for a public inquiry and make a decision on it. The County Council sent a letter to the Secretary of State Eric Pickles, which included a statement that a majority of the Council was in fact in favour of the scheme. This meant that the planning process was delayed. Several Cornish politicians blamed English Heritage for the delay and the subsequent economic loss. George Eustice therefore argued in favour of a Cornish Heritage organization that would take over from English Heritage. In an interview with the BBC, he stated that "We should be demanding that organizations like English Heritage should champion and promote our heritage. If they are not going to do that we should replace them with a Cornish Heritage group, just like they have for instance in Wales and Scotland" (Eustice 2011a, p. 1).

Eustice favoured the plans for Hayle, including the idea to restore the sluices and the harbour walls "However", he noted, "in a bizarre twist, the campaign against restoring Hayle harbour is being led by none other than English Heritage, the organization paid for by you and me and supposed to promote and celebrate heritage in Britain [. . .] In recent years there has been a growing feeling that Cornwall should have its own heritage organization, taking over from English Heritage. After all, how can a quango whose nearest office is in Bristol possibly understand issues in Hayle?" (Eustice 2011b, p. 3). The debates about the supermarket reinforced the Cornish claims for self-control and bolstered the idea that others decide on Cornish heritage.

Eustice felt Cornish heritage was misrepresented and not represented enough. He for instance complained that the English Heritage website showed hardly any pictures of Cornish industrial heritage: "Instead, what you get are pictures of pretty castles in the Home Counties. Cornwall's industrial heritage should be an attraction to the whole world, but it belongs to Cornwall, and Cornwall alone. It is time we started to make our own decisions about how best to bring it to life" (Eustice 2011b, p. 3).

A few months later, Pickles decided that the application should be "determined at the local level". The Secretary explained that this decision was in line with the government's commitment to "give more power to councils and communities to make their own decisions on planning issues" (Walton 2012, pp. 1–2). The Secretary's reluctance to get involved was probably also in anticipation of a 'devolution deal' that was being negotiated with the Cornwall Council at the time. Calling in this case could have undermined these ongoing negotiations and could have led to unfixable diplomatic damage. With this decision, however, the last legal threshold was removed; the supermarket could be constructed. Following this decision, ICOMOS and the World Heritage Centre advised the World Heritage Committee to place the site on the World Heritage in Danger List in 2014 "should the development project be implemented as currently planned". Furthermore, ICOMOS and the World Heritage Center urged the Committee to request the British delegation to invite a Monitoring Mission of international UNESCO, ICOMOS and ICCROM experts (ICOMOS 2013, p. 1). At its 37th meeting in June 2013, the Committee repeated the firm warnings of its advisory bodies and requested the British delegation to invite a Monitoring Mission to take stock of the situation (UNESCO 2013a). The Monitoring Mission paid a five day visit to the site in early October 2013. It was carried out by ICCROM delegate Joseph King, ICOMOS delegate Helen Lardner and World Heritage Center delegate Kirsten Manz—all of whom specialized in urban heritage. A group of representatives of the planning department of Cornwall Council, the World Heritage Partnership Board and the National Trust showed the international experts around and gave presentations.

Deborah Boden, the Cornish Mining World Heritage site coordinator, reported to a local newspaper that she was pleased to finally have had the chance to talk to UNESCO and ICOMOS experts about the developments in Hayle. As all communication with UNESCO had to go via the Department of Culture, Media and Sports, this was the first opportunity to speak to the international experts directly, she noted (Boden 2013, p. 1). The representatives of the World Heritage Partnership Board and the County tried to convince the Mission members of the benefits associated with the development and seemed under the impression that they did so successfully. Julian German, chairman of the World Heritage Site Partnership Board, told a reporter that: "We believe the inspectors went away with a positive impression of the extensive conservation, community outreach and tourism projects delivered since we were inscribed in 2006" (German 2013, p. 1).

On December 13, just a few months after the international experts had visited the site, construction works at South Quay began. Local and regional politicians who had supported the scheme, celebrated the occasion with a guided tour on the construction site. During this event, leader of the Cornwall Council John Pollard

stated: "It's an historic day for Hayle. For us who have been dealing with this for 40 years this is the moment we never thought would happen, but it has and it is [. . .] this is an example of what can happen when we work together" (Pollard 2013, p. 1). MP George Eustice agreed, noting that: "I think this project is proof that good things come to those who wait; we have certainly waited. It's a big decision to do such a development. It can be difficult to get a community behind you. It has taken a huge amount of perseverance, but we have focused on the details not the problems" (Eustice 2013, p. 1). Meanwhile, the Monitoring Mission experts finalized their report, which was presented to the British UNESCO delegation in late December. The inspectors' observations were in sharp contrast with the aforementioned celebratory comments of the local politicians. Even though the delegation was cheerful about the level of commitment and professionalism of the Partnership Board and the World Heritage management team, it formulated several recommendations and points of critique, some of which applied to Hayle specifically, others to the UK heritage regime more generally. Firstly, the Monitoring Mission report had recommended the British government to inform the World Heritage Center and ICOMOS sooner of any potentially impactful applications (UNESCO 2013b, p. 1). The Department of Culture, Media and Sports in principle agreed with this recommendation yet noted that the lack of staff at the World Heritage Centerand ICOMOS made this practically impossible: "if all bodies were adequately resourced, this would be an excellent idea. However, all too often, early notification does not produce timely response" (DCMS 2014, p. 7).

The Department of Culture, Media and Sports and the Partnership Board observed that the decision making process at the level of UNESCO was relatively slow in comparison to national and local decision making in the UK, noting that international advisory bodies in some cases took well over 10 month to reply. According to the Partnership Board, the two processes were "out of step" (Cornish Mining World Heritage Partnership Board 2014, p. 3). The County Council planning authority shared this opinion and requested the World Heritage Center office to "establish procedures to enable it to speed up its decision making process". Moreover, they noted that a more direct communication with the World Heritage Center would be desirable, because the current "indirect mechanisms of exchange" have made "a normal dialogue over the very complex issue" impossible (CCPA 2014, p. 17). Rather than adapting the law and making a legal exception for World Heritage site's, problems could be prevented, it was concluded, if UNESCO and its advisory bodies would make their own communicative and bureaucratic practices more "streamlined" (A. Cocks, personal communication, October 22 2015). Likewise, the Partnership Board stated that: "[i]t would be helpful for UK planning authorities seeking input from UNESCO if their advice process and timeframes took account of the requirement for timely responses and the avoidance of undue delays and associated costs" (Cornish Mining World Heritage Partnership Board 2014, p. 6).

A second recommendation of the international experts was to introduce longer review periods for large-scale development proposals within World Heritage site boundaries. The County Council planning authority, however, noted that it is legally bound to respond to applications within 8 to 12 weeks. The Department of Culture,

Media and Sports remarked that the planning law had been reviewed by the government not long before and as it was seen to function well, it was not likely to be changed any time soon. Moreover, the Department of Culture, Media and Sports did not see the need to extend the review period for planning application within World Heritage sites, arguing that UK policy guidelines already recognize World Heritage sites as particularly sensitive—even though they do not enjoy additional protective status. A recent consultation paper of DCMS explained that: "[N]o additional statutory controls follow from the inscription of a site onto the World Heritage List. Inscription does, however, highlight the outstanding international importance of the site as a key material consideration to be taken into account by all UK local planning authorities in determining planning and listed building consent applications" (DCMS 2008, p. 12).

Thirdly, the Mission report recommended halting the Hayle harbour project immediately. The planning authorities, however, pointed out that permission had already been granted and that applicants are entitled to financial compensation if planning permission is revoked. In the case of the Hayle harbour supermarket, such compensation would be calculated on the basis of the likely weekly income that the firm misses out on and on the investments already made. Given that the developer at this stage already invested some £30,000,000, the sum of money that the local authorities would have to pay would be considerable. To underpin its position, the planning authorities referred to a recent court case in which the judge ruled that authorities "as custodians of public funds" must have regard of the "costs to the public of its actions" (CCPA 2014, p. 19). The fourth recommendation of the Monitoring Mission experts was to seek funding elsewhere for the construction of the flood protection measures, restoration of the sluices and the harbour walls. In their report, the Mission experts repeated their earlier statement that they saw no inextricable link between the supermarket development and these other projects. The planning authorities were concerned with the "ease that the mission team disaggregates [these projects] from the proposed development, by suggesting that funding can readily be sourced elsewhere" (CCPA 2014, p. 16). Since the site is privately owned, it cannot fully benefit from public sector investment. Moreover, European State Aid legislation prevented the authorities from providing aid, even if they would have wished to do so. Also according to the Department of Culture, Media and Sports alternative funding options were excluded due to the aforementioned legal measures. "In practice there is no other way" (DCMS 2014, p. 5).

According to the World Heritage Site Partnership Board, the objections of ICOMOS and UNESCO were rather exaggerated. The Board claimed that Hayle harbour formed only a very small component of the mining heritage in Cornwall. "South Quay", the Board argued "is part of one of four surviving industrial harbours within the Site, and one of 991 features of Outstanding Universal Value within the whole World Heritage Site [. . .] The development only affects 3% of Hayle and 0.000016% of the Site" (Cornish Mining World Heritage Partnership Board 2014, p. 8). According to the Monitoring Mission, however, such statements undervalued South Quay. Dealing with heritage related issues, they argued, is not a question of the number of attributes affected "but rather [of] the *quality* of proposed

interventions" and their impact on the Outstanding Universal Value of the site as a whole: "all of the attributes of Outstanding Universal Value are important for our understanding of the overall Outstanding Universal Value. [The British government] cannot then pick and choose which attributes to protect and which not to protect based on a mathematical formula" (UNESCO 2015).

9.6 Conclusion: Whose Cornish Heritage?

The closure of the Cornish tin mines left many of the regions' inhabitants out of a job. This was not the result of diminishing resources, but of fundamental changes in the global economic system (Deacon 2010). The socio-economic consequences would be felt for years. Cornwall's average salaries, unemployment rates and gross domestic product would long remain below the national average. The regions experienced the fall from incredible richness to immense deprivation. Mines that once formed the powerhouse of economic growth—symbols of strength and craftsmanship—were now constant and pervasive reminders of the predicaments and sorrows caused by industrial decline (Berend 2014). The British government saw the abandoned mining sites as property with great economic potential and stimulated their transformation into heritage sites. Industrial heritage could attract tourists and associated businesses to the region.

Yet, the Cornish heritage industry arguably did not serve the Cornish. Politicians from the region argued that tourism could never form an economically sustainable alternative for mining. A heritage industry, they argued, could never compensate for the loss of real industry. Moreover, many Cornish felt excluded while others profited from the economic restructuring of their region. The Cornish heritage industry, in their perception, was run by foreign—including English—investors. The sentiments that the Cornish themselves barely picked the fruits of the new leisure industry fueled the critique on organizations like English Heritage and reinforced the call for Cornish autonomy. An increasing number of people in the region felt deprived of their heritage. English Heritage, as the perceived representative of English cultural dominance and an advocate of the commercial exploitation of heritage, was criticized. Several Cornish nationalists wondered how an organization that did not even have an office in Cornwall could say anything sensible about their heritage. In the late 1980s, the dissatisfaction with this situation led to several—sometimes violent—campaigns of Cornish separatists. The Cornish industrial heritage became a ball in a game of identity politics. Most actors and organizations involved agreed that the sites should somehow be preserved, but what meaning should be attributed to them remained highly disputed. Several commercial exploiters of heritage sites wanted to paint a romantic 'Poldark'-picture of the Cornish mining industry, hoping to attract more tourists. Critics, however, claimed that such an image belittled the Cornish and their global achievements. They wanted Cornwall to be remembered as a cradle of high-tech innovation and an engineering hotspot; as "the Silicon-valley of its day" (BBC 2003[1986]).

The national political landscape and economic developments had a major impact on debates about Cornish autonomy in the fields of heritage and planning. Under the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s the devolution of power from the national to the regional level was simply not an option. The Thatcher government took over many responsibilities that used to be in the hands of local or regional governments. Under New Labour, a devolution deal seemed within reach, but did not happen. The New Labour government did create regions with some degree of autonomy. However, these regions were rather artificial creations based on economic calculations. The Cornish politicians who lobbied for a devolution deal, however, wanted regions based on culture, history or heritage. The World Heritage title complicated the situation further. Several politicians in Cornwall welcomed the World heritage title, but argued that the Cornish people did not profit from it enough. This again reinforced the Cornish efforts for more autonomy and sovereignty in the field of heritage preservation and exploitation. Despite the attempts of Cornish lobbyists, heritage preservation is generally still firmly in hands of the national government. Although Scotland and Wales did get more independence in the field of heritage preservation, from a Cornish perspective the heritage regime—at least in term of who is pulling the strings—has hardly changed since the days of Margaret Thatcher. Only the establishment of the Cornish Council has led to some degree of devolution from the national to the regional level—yet this is by far not enough to satisfy the Cornish separatists. In recent years, the call for more Cornish autonomy seems to have become less loud—or at least has a different tone. While radicals in the 1980s 1990s and early 2000s were even prepared to use violence and foul language to support their case, nowadays the battle for Cornish autonomy takes place on the diplomatic level.

The case furthermore illustrates that the heritage regime of the United Kingdom had still not fully adapted to World Heritage. Many of the uncertainties and problems that existed in the period after Britain ratified the World Heritage Convention, were still unresolved in the early 2000s. The case discussed in this chapter provides several examples of continuing uncertainty and occasional incompatibility of British law and UNESCO guidelines. The case of Hayle, for example, shows that the responsible authorities in Britain are legally required to respond to planning applications within three weeks. If the application affects World Heritage, UNESCO simply does not have enough time to adequately respond. The World Heritage Committee meets only once a year and does not have the resources to investigate every planning application that potentially affects World Heritage.

The case also reveals how little UNESCO and its sister organizations can do to stop undesired developments in World Heritage sites. Although ING did make several minor concessions to ease the planning application process, in the end it was able to execute its plans without much change. It shows that UNESCO can do little more than make a moral appeal and that the national planning process is barely affected by the World Heritage site status. Cases like the Hayle supermarket led to renewed discussions about whether the World Heritage status should be incorporated into the UK planning legislation, or not. It was only in 2005 that World Heritage sites were mentioned in a government planning guideline as areas that

deserve extra consideration on the part of planners. Yet, World Heritage sites in the UK still do not have a special legal status and are still only protected by the already existing national and local laws. The UK legal system regarding the handling of planning applications seriously limits the potential for UNESCO to intervene. Whether or not World Heritage status should be more than just a honorific title continues to be debated in the UK.

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Chapter 10
Industrial Heritage Industry

10.1 Introduction

Substantial parts of the industrial remains were preserved in both Germany and Great-Britain, yet the niche actors had to deal with quite different regimes. The German heritage regime had a federalized structure. The power of the *Länder* to make their own heritage policy was firmly embedded in the German constitution. The bureaucratic arrangement of this regime was so robust that it withstood several attempts to create a national heritage law in the early 1970s. The dominant position of the *Länder* within the German regime was again confirmed by the different heritage laws that were adopted in all the *Länder* in the Federal Republic of Germany. North Rhine-Westphalia was the last to pass such a law in 1980. Although this firmly placed the responsibility for heritage preservation with the *Länder*, the governments of the *Länder* depended much on municipalities for the execution of their policies. In Britain, the structure of the regime was quite different. Here, the heritage regime was much more centralized. The national government in London was mainly responsible for heritage preservation, although it worked closely with lower levels of government.

Due to the different interactions between the heritage regimes in Germany and United Kingdom with the local stakeholders, the preserved heritage is endowed with different meanings. In the Ruhr area, debates on industrial heritage mainly revolved around class issues (Günter 2010). Industrial heritage, it was often argued, was important because it symbolized the working class. Many North Rhine-Westphalian politicians wanted to improve the Ruhr region's social and cultural coherence by means of industrial heritage preservation. Cornwall, on the other hand, already had a strong sense of identity which was not defined so much by class, but by ethnicity (Laviolette 2011). The central government in London had mainly economic motives for industrial heritage preservation and was not concerned with regional identity politics. If anything, the Cornish were deemed to have too much rather than too little regional identity. Thus, the interaction between niche actors and the respective

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_10

regimes was different in each case. I will now analyse the impact of accounting for industrial heritage on the respective regimes to highlight similarities and differences between the niche-regime interactions in both countries in more detail. I will especially focus on the growing acceptance of reuse, the changing relationship between different layers of government and, of course, the interactions with UNESCO.

10.2 Impact of Industrial Heritage on the German Regime

10.2.1 Growing Appreciation for Industrial Heritage

Although in Germany there was a growing interest in the historical importance of industrial buildings as of the beginnings of the twentieth century, its preservation was not part of regime procedures and practices. Initially, the focus was on the preservation of machines of technical or historical interest (Cossons 2012). Many abandoned industrial sites were ignored or demolished during the 1960s. In the late 1960s, the attitude towards industrial heritage slowly began to change. Industrial sites were increasingly appreciated for their specific aesthetic qualities (Becher and Becher 1970). This emerging appreciation led to the belief that such objects deserved the same treatment as other types of monuments. As authentic architectural expressions of beauty and grace, according to critics, these sites and objects deserved as much protection as any cathedral or castle (Günter 1975; Oevermann 2012).

However, not everyone shared the opinion that industrial sites should be preserved. Many former miners in the Ruhr, for example, seemed to have an ambiguous relationship with mines as industrial heritage. On the one hand, these sites were symbols of a grand and glorious industrial past. They were sources of pride in craftsmanship and ingenuity; tokens symbolizing the conquest of nature. On the other hand, they formed reminders of the painful loss of status, of hard manual labour, of bad health and death. This duality of meanings created emotional struggles for former miners and others who had been involved in the industry as they swung to between being proud of showing their heritage to others and shame of looking back on the dark sides of their mining past and the painful process of industrial decline. Many wanted the mines and factories to be removed—or at least cared little for their preservation. At the same time, the owners often wanted to remove industrial structures so they could sell the ground and scrap metal. Driven by the promise of new investments, many municipalities willingly cooperated in the demolition of old factories and mine shafts.

The lack of regulation and mutual understanding between stakeholders, turned Zollverein into a laboratory for artists and entrepreneurs to experiment with different forms of reuse. As the municipality and the government of North Rhine-Westphalia were quarrelling about whether or not Zollverein should become a listed monument, the site was used as theatre grounds, arts galleries and for dance events. Zollverein's experimental space also entailed potential threats, not least due to the municipality's

and the owners' refusal to protect such sites. A few years after the mine's closure, the government of North Rhine-Westphalia intervened by listing Zollverein as a monument, thereby bypassing the owners and the municipality. Although this ended the uncontrolled and informal use of the site, the government continued to stimulate creative reuse—albeit in a more formalized and regulated way (Dorstewitz 2014). The reuse of Zollverein arguably had a wider impact on the German regime as well as international preservation practices for industrial heritage. It has often, both nationally and internationally, been quoted as a leading example of sensible reuse and conservation through utilization.

10.2.2 The Consolidation of the Federalized German Regime

Industrial heritage was seen by the social-democratic government of North Rhine-Westphalia as an answer to the economic problems resulting from industrial decline, as well as a means to improve the socio-cultural coherence of the Ruhr region. The Ruhr was traditionally a region of migrant workers. Prior to the period of industrialization, it did not have a strong sense of identity. The communities that made up the Ruhr area never formed a social or cultural unity. These communities were, more or less artificially, forged together by the industrialization process. One of the government's motivations for industrial heritage preservation was thus to provide the population with a renewed sense of pride in their industrial past and working-class identity. At the same time, the government believed that industrial structures could be used for new purposes and thus stimulate investment. The preservation and creative reuse of sites like Zollverein was seen as essential to its dual economic and socio-cultural regeneration policy.

The initial refusal of the municipality to cooperate in attempts to save Zollverein from destruction, stimulated the government of North Rhine-Westphalia to further consolidate and broaden its mandate in the field of heritage preservation, as well as to take the lead in the Ruhr area's economic and socio-cultural transformation. In order to work out and execute its socio-cultural and economic agenda, the government of North Rhine-Westphalia established IBA Emscherpark in 1989. This semi-autonomous body operated under the notion that industrial heritage preservation, economic regeneration and identity politics should all be part of the same package. Much in line with the North Rhine-Westphalian government's agenda, IBA's aims were twofold. On the one hand, IBA saw former industrial structures as potential economic drivers. The businesses and organizations that would use these buildings would bring back the jobs and investments that the region so desperately needed. On the other hand, their reuse would provide these sites' continued recognition as places of production. Although the coal and steel industry had left, the region could at least produce art, design and knowledge. This would ensure that the social structures that had evolved around these buildings would not disappear and that the working class identity of the region would be maintained and strengthened (Oerters 2015).

IBA Emscherpark was a new type of actor in the heritage regime that helped further establish the dominant position of the North Rhine-Westphalian government. The leading position of the *Länder* within the German regime was already well-established, but it had little grip on the relatively new field of industrial heritage. By installing semi-autonomous organizations at its arm's length, the government of North Rhine-Westphalia was able to exercise control over fields that would otherwise have been difficult to control. Although IBA worked closely with local governments and other stakeholders, it had a broad mandate and could bypass or overrule municipal governments when necessary. The installation of semi-autonomous government bodies like IBA and the adoption a new heritage law in 1980, confirmed the *Länder's* dominant position in the heritage field in relation to the national government in Berlin.

10.2.3 Germany and UNESCO: Chilled Love?

The nomination of Zollverein for the World Heritage list was part of a more general effort towards internationalization of the industrial heritage field. In order to realize its ambitions IBA collaborated, for example, with a wide range of international actors and organizations, including internationally renowned architects and designers. It also worked with international conservation experts from 'The International Committee for the Conservation of the Industrial Heritage' (TICCIH). After IBA's mandate ended in 1999, many of these international actors remained involved. For example, the establishment of the 'European Route of Industrial Heritage', which included Zollverein, was an attempt to show the interconnectedness of industrial sites in Europe (ERIH 2016). Since the early 2000s, Zollverein has become an international hotspot for art and design that attracts many foreign visitors. The more recent renovations of Zollverein were led by internationally famous architects like Rem Koolhaas, Norman Foster and Kazuyo Sejima and Ryue Nishizawa (Dorstewitz 2014). The nomination of Zollverein for the World Heritage title thus aligned well within the international outlook of actors involved in industrial heritage preservation.

The 'conservation through utilization' philosophy that was propagated by these actors was generally supported by UNESCO, but in recent years several far-reaching adaptations to the structure have received criticism. The conversion of Zollverein's coal washing hall into the Ruhr Museum is an example of such criticism. The World Heritage Committee feared, for example, that a planned escalator gangway would harm the visual and material integrity of the building. It tried to halt this and other developments by threatening to place Zollverein onto the World Heritage in Danger list. However, it was unsuccessful in its attempts to prevent the site's redevelopment. While UNESCO has certainly influenced the discussions about industrial heritage, the German and North Rhine-Westphalian regime rules prevent it from having much influence on conservation practices. The 'conservation through utilization' philosophy was generally accepted by most local, regional and national stakeholders. This

norm was firmly embedded in formal and informal rules, which disabled UNESCO to exercise much influence in this regard.

The North Rhine-Westphalian heritage law, for example, provided many possibilities for the reuse of industrial heritage sites. Unlike any previous law it explicitly mentioned this as an important policy initiative of the government. Moreover, prior to its enlistment on the World Heritage list, Zollverein was already being used by entrepreneurs and project developers. They had a vested economic interest in the site's reuse and were unwilling to give up their position. The 'conservation through utilization' philosophy was thus ingrained both in formal legislation as well as in the mutual understanding between entrepreneur and the government. Due to the dominant position of the *Länder* within the German heritage regime, it was difficult, if not impossible for UNESCO representatives to change the 'rules' fundamentally. UNESCO representatives could—and indeed did—try to persuade and encourage the local and regional actors to act differently, but could do little more.

10.3 Impact of Industrial Heritage on the British Regime

10.3.1 Changing Motives for Industrial Heritage Preservation

In Great-Britain industrial heritage preservation was a well-established practice amongst amateur historians and archaeologists. Between the 1930s and 1970s, industrial heritage preservation and industrial archaeology were popular hobbies for men who liked to marvel at the workings of ancient machines: pumps, hoists and engines (Pendlebury 2009, pp. 70–71). Over the years these men formed clubs and organizations—many of which still exist—that successfully preserved both individual industrial objects and larger industrial sites. The main interest of amateurs and amateur clubs was in the history of technology. In the 1980s, the motives for industrial heritage preservation changed. From this time onwards, former industrial sites were no longer only an interest of amateur clubs that wanted to preserve them for historic reasons, but were also seen as potential drivers for the economic recovery of post-industrial regions. The mines in Britain had depended heavily on government help, but the Thatcher government largely stopped the financial support for declining mining regions and instead stimulated the creative, commercial reuse of (industrial) heritage. In many former coal, metallurgical or steel regions in the United Kingdom, the old industry was largely replaced by a heritage tourist industry. The Thatcher government took the lead in order to enable this economic transition.

10.3.2 National Government Ceases Control

English Heritage, established by the Thatcher government in 1983, became one of the key drivers behind the envisioned economic transition of post-industrial regions from centres of industrial production to centres of heritage tourism. The introduction of English Heritage changed the regulative and cognitive rules of the British heritage regime. Its impact was twofold. On the one hand, English Heritage stimulated the commercial exploitation of heritage, working closely with private investors. The focus of English Heritage on the commercial and economic potential of heritage led to a high degree of acceptance of the reuse of historic buildings, even if this required concessions to the material or physical authenticity. On the other hand, the creation of English Heritage enabled the central government to be in command of the selection, reuse, interpretation and financing of heritage.

The agenda of English Heritage met strong opposition from regionalists in Cornwall who felt that the national government had unrightfully ceased control over 'their' heritage and belittled and misrepresented them by creating an overly romantic image of Cornish mining in order to prepare it for tourist consumption. English Heritage's name and objectives fuelled the Cornish strive for more regional control over their heritage. Cornish nationalists already questioned the relatively centralized institutional arrangements in early the 1970s, but it was only after the establishment of English Heritage and the associated rise of the (industrial) heritage tourist industry that heritage became their main target. Cornish nationalists tried to gain control over the heritage process and the tourist industry by organizing petitions, removing English Heritage information plaques and occasionally by using violence. Several Cornish politicians also tried to lobby for more Cornish autonomy in the diplomatic arena. The successive Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major, however, were not willing to devolve sovereignty to the region.

10.3.3 New Labour, Old Approach

After the election of Tony Blair's New Labour government in 1997, many regionalist Cornish politicians hoped that they would gain control over (industrial) heritage and other policy fields. Several regions in the United Kingdom received more autonomy under the New Labour government. Cornish lobbyists were thus full of hope when they entered negotiations about self-determination. In many regards, however, New Labour's approach to heritage was not very different from that of its centralist Conservative predecessor. While New Labour did devolve power from the central government to regions, its ideas about how regions should be defined differed fundamentally from the Cornish regionalists understanding of their region. New Labour's decentralization policy was orchestrated at the central level and the identification of regions happened on the basis of economic calculations—not on the

basis of shared history, heritage or cultural identity. In fact, New Labour had little ear for such arguments and even structurally erased the term 'heritage' from its policy vocabulary. Instead, it rather referred to the field as the 'creative industry'. In this sense, there was little discontinuity with the Conservative governments of the decades before. Heritage was still deemed important for economic reasons and no real political power was transferred to Cornwall.

One novelty of New Labour's heritage policy was Britain's immediate return to UNESCO. This step may seem surprising given New Labour's general discard of heritage. However, the return to UNESCO made perfect sense in the light of its envisioned foreign policy. Shortly after New Labour's electoral victory, the government's foreign office published a mission statement. It noted that: "We shall through our international forums and bilateral relationships spread the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy which we demand for ourselves [...] Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension" (cited in Wickham-Jones 2000, p. 111). New Labour's ambitions thus matched UNESCO's internationalist outlook and its aspiration to promote peace and human rights on a global scale.

10.3.4 A Mismatch Between the British Regime and UNESCO?

New Labour's swift return to UNESCO, however, did not result in any fundamental changes in the existing national and local regulative rules for heritage and planning. World Heritage sites were not protected by any additional legal measures. Planning applications within UNESCO World Heritage sites had to go through the same procedures and were assessed in the same way as other planning applications. The British government claimed that additional legal measures were unnecessary, because World Heritage sites were sufficiently protected by national and local laws and regulations. The World Heritage Committee, according to the British government, implicitly agreed to this when it enlists sites onto the World Heritage list. UNESCO representatives, on the other hand, argued that the British World Heritage sites were not sufficiently protected and that extra legal provisions should be made for World Heritage sites. On several occasions since the early 2000s, there were mismatches between UNESCO's expectations regarding the protection of World Heritage in Britain and what was legally and practically possible in the British heritage regime.

One of the most telling examples of this mismatch occurred in the case of Hayle harbour. The construction of a supermarket in the centre of this historic town was generally supported by the responsible authorities, but received much criticism at the international level. The controversy about the plans for Hayle harbour unveiled procedural inconsistencies between the UK planning process and the workings of UNESCO. The World Heritage Committee only gathers once a year—usually in the summer. This means that it can take several months before UNESCO can formulate

an official statement on planned developments within World Heritage sites. On several occasions, UNESCO representatives have asked the UK authorities to postpone decisions regarding Hayle harbour. This, however, was legally and practically not possible within the UK legal framework because planning applicants have a legal right to receive a verdict of the responsible planning authorities within 21 days. If planning authorities do not meet this deadline they can be summoned by a judge to financially compensate the applicant. These rules are firmly embedded in the UK law and, at least in the case of Hayle harbour, outweigh the interests of UNESCO.

10.4 Comparing the Regime Changes

The preservation of industrial heritage in the Ruhr and in Cornwall, show remarkable similarities. Following the decline of coal and metallurgical mining in these regions respectively, a great variety of actors developed a range of ways to deal with the tangible and intangible legacies of the industrial era (Conlin and Jolliffe 2011). Several sites in both regions underwent neglect or deliberate removal, but other sites turned into museums, tourist attractions or cultural centres. This process could be observed in both Germany and the United Kingdom and should be seen as a consequence of partially similar socio-economic landscape developments. The closure of the tin mines in Cornwall and the coal mines of the Ruhr left many of these regions' inhabitants out of a job. In both cases this was not the result of diminishing resources, but of fundamental changes in the global economic system (Deacon 2010; Raines 2011). The socio-economic consequences would be felt for years. These region's average salaries, unemployment rates and gross domestic products would long remain below the national averages. Both regions experienced the fall from incredible richness to immense deprivation. This socio-economic situation formed the seedbed of many initiatives to creatively reuse industrial heritage in both regions. In both cases the World Heritage nomination was expected to contribute both to uplift the economic situation of these regions, as well as provide the communities with a sense of pride in their industrial past.

Although local and regional actors played an important role in the nomination and preservation of Zollverein and Cornwall, several initiatives started at the international level rather than the local. This is evident, for example, in the important position of organizations like 'The International Committee for the Conservation of the Industrial Heritage' (TICCIH) in the selection and preservation of industrial heritage sites. In the late 1970s, Zollverein and Cornwall were both already mentioned in this organization's first inventories of internationally valuable industrial monuments. The experts involved in making these inventories come from a range of countries, including the United Kingdom, Sweden and Japan. The 'European Route of Industrial Heritage' also exemplifies that the heritage field has generally become more international. However, the international reorientation occasionally led to confrontations with existing national guidelines.

While initially the status of UNESCO World Heritage created opportunities for preservation, in both the Ruhr area and Cornwall UNESCO's requirements and regulations for such preservation led to many disputes and conflicts with the national regimes. Although the World Heritage Committee in several statements addressed the importance of the intangible values associated with industrial heritage, it regularly expressed serious concerns over new developments. It was, amongst others, sceptical about the plans to re-open the South Crofty mine, about the construction of the Hayle supermarket, as well as the construction of a gangway to the Ruhr Museum and the Ferris wheel at the Zollverein coking plant. However, UNESCO has been rather unsuccessful in preventing redevelopment. While UNESCO has certainly influenced the discussions about industrial heritage, national and sub-national rules and regulations prevent it from having much influence on restoration and conservation practices. This confirms the image of UNESCO as a relatively toothless organization whose authority is moral rather than legal (Ashworth and Van der Aa 2002a, b). Despite objections and critique by UNESCO, both the German and the British heritage regime continue to tolerate and stimulate reuse of industrial heritage, even if this requires material changes to enable such new uses (Cossons 2012).

The reuse of monuments, which industrial heritage introduced into the heritage field, would become a lasting factor for the whole field (Bullen and Love 2011). The reuse of industrial heritage has opened up the traditional Hamlet-like dilemma 'to preserve or not to preserve', creating room for several more consensual concepts like 'heritage-led regeneration' and 'development-led conservation' (Oevermann and Mieg 2015, pp. 3–12). Due to the adaptive reuse of heritage, the role of real-estate developers and architects has become more prominent. Before the rise of industrial heritage, developers were seen as the worst enemies of heritage, but now they play a vital role in converting heritage buildings to new uses. Especially in the context of urban conservation, as the following chapters will show, the reuse of heritage would become an important part of regeneration strategies and a constant point of divergence between UNESCO and other stakeholders.

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Part IV
Historic Cities (1990s–2000s)

Chapter 11
Challenges of the Urban Age: Landscape Developments Between 1995–2010

11.1 Introduction

Between the 1960s and today, the scope and reach of the heritage regime expanded from individual monuments to ensembles of (industrial) heritage and ultimately, larger city areas. The widening of this scope occurred first in national contexts through the creation of legal means to protect conservation areas and heritage ensembles. UNESCO, somewhat lagging behind this trend, gradually introduced new and broader categories of heritage, including historic city centres and 'cultural landscapes'. Although historic cities like Kraków and Quito had been enlisted onto the World Heritage list as early as 1978, it is only in recent years that the number of urban areas enlisted has increased substantially in comparison to traditional individual monuments (UNESCO 1978). As a result of the introduction of new categories of World Heritage and its growing geographical coverage, more people are now directly affected (Evans 2002). This has further complicated the interaction between various stakeholders. The heritage regime now faces challenges from a growing number of local urban preservation groups as well as developers. Concurrently, the interests of local governments became stronger as much of the cities under their control came to fall under national and international protection. Their relationship with national governments and international organizations changed subsequently.

Apart from the growing number of stakeholders associated with the broadening scope of heritage, new landscape developments came to affect the heritage field. While the concept of the conservation area, as explained in chapter two, was primarily a response to the unscrupulous urban development in historic towns throughout Europe in the name of modernization, the challenges faced by historic cities around the turn of century are of a different kind. This chapter will discuss some challenges of 'the urban age'. The first section will focus on demographic and economic landscape developments, including urbanization. It will describe the new role of cities in the globalized world of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. The second section focuses on potentially impactful political landscape

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_11

developments that occurred. The last section analyses the most important international efforts to preserve urban heritage. It will reflect on various international charters and conventions regarding the preservation of historic cities. Moreover, it will assess the role of historic cities in the global economic landscape, focusing specifically on their role as visitor attractions.

11.2 Demographic and Economic Landscape Developments

One of the major landscape developments that influenced heritage conservation in the late twentieth and early twenty-first was the immense growth of cities. In 1980 there were only some 100 cities in the world with more than one million inhabitants, today that number has risen to well over 500. In the early 1980s only three cities worldwide had populations of more than ten million inhabitants—Mexico City, New York and Tokyo, today there are more than twenty such mega-cities. Overall, the number of people living in urban areas has increased by twelve percent between 1990 and 2010. Almost sixty percent of the world's population now lives in cities—about 4.2 billion people. In 2000, this number was still only 2.9 billion. In Europe, where almost seventy percent of the population was already living in cities, the increase has been less spectacular than elsewhere. Here too, however, the number of city dwellers has risen over the last twenty-five years and is expected to rise even further to three-quarters of the total population by 2030 (UN-Habitat 2016).

Urban development has provided people with immense opportunities. On average, urban residents have higher literacy rates, more economic opportunities and more access to services (Hall 1988). In 2000, the World Bank noted in a report that cities and towns were not only growing in size and number, but were also gaining new influence. Cities, according to the World Bank, are the leading centres of production in the new global economy that has emergence in the late twentieth century. In most countries, the industrial and commercial activities in cities accounted to four-fifth of the total gross domestic product. The World Bank also concluded that the economic activities in cities increasingly spread outward to the semi-urbanized hinterland. The distinction between the urban and rural has become less obvious as the development of urban areas is increasingly tied to the rural economy through the exchange of goods, labour, services, capital and social ties. As cities grow in importance, so does their autonomy (World Bank 2000). In recent years, many responsibilities that used to sit with national governments, have now been transferred to city governments. In many cases, these include responsibilities for heritage, planning and economic policy.

This increased relevance of cities can be observed around the world and is a direct consequence of the globalization of the economy. As Uri Savir noted: "paradoxically, in the global era, the one socio-political unit growing in power is the city" (Savir 2003, p. 30; see also King 1991). Cities not only took over many responsibilities from national authorities, their growing importance in the globalized world has arguably also undermined traditional political structures. According to

Christopher Kollmeyer the dual trend of economic globalization and the growing importance of cities has had a somewhat paradoxical effect on the democratic system. On the one hand, economic globalization went hand in hand with the global spread of democracy. On the other hand, this process has arguably undermined the nation-state—which formed the traditional base of the democratic system. Kollmeyer uses this observation to talk about a simultaneous rise and fall of democracy around the turn of the twenty-first century (Kollmeyer 2014). 'Glocalization', according to critics like Kollmeyer, undermines nation-state structures. Although national states generally still fulfil an important role in heritage preservation, one cannot deny that city governments have been gaining influence (Schofield and Szymanski 2011).

11.3 Political Landscape Developments

11.3.1 Consequences of the German Reunification

The trends described above can be observed in many countries, including Germany and the United Kingdom. Cities were growing both in size and in economic importance. More and more people have come to live in cities. In Germany, however, another migration took place that left its mark on the country's economic and political landscape. This was the relocation of people from the new *Länder* of the former Germany Democratic Republic to the richer *Länder* in the former Federal Republic of Germany. The driving force behind this demographic trend was primarily economic. When East- and West-Germany officially reunited on the first of June 1990, the two economic system were suddenly merged into one. The two systems were obviously very different. The *Länder* in former East-Germany were less productive by comparison, were mostly carried by state-owned companies and had close ties to the collapsing planned economies of the Soviet-Union and bloc-countries. West-Germany, on the other hand, was a prosperous market-economy which had experienced a wave of privatization of former state-owned companies. The attempts to merge both systems took various steps. Upon reunification, most of the former East-German state-companies were privatized (Pohl 1991).

Moreover, the currency of East-Germany—the *Ostmark*—was replaced with the currency of West-Germany—the *Deutsche Mark.* The rates at which the *Ostmark* could be exchanged for the *Deutsche Mark*, were relatively high. This was intended as a subsidy for the Eastern *Länder* that would speed up the merging of the two economic systems. However, this decision was controversial, because many economists feared it would make the Eastern *Länder* less competitive and thus in the long run hamper economic growth. Despite efforts by the government to stimulate the economy of former East-Germany, employment and average salaries would remain structurally higher in the West of the country. As a result, people started migrating out of the *Länder* in the East. In the few months between the fall of the Wall and the official reunification some 400.000 people moved from East to West. In 1990,

another 395.000 decided to try their luck in the West (Cohen 1995, p. 476). Although this internal migration stream would stabilize in the course of the 1990s, it would long continue to have a negative impact on the economy of former East-Germany.

The East-West migration also had socio-political consequences. Many former East-Germans had difficulty to adapt to the outward looking, capitalist and liberal West of Germany. While many former East-Germans embraced the democratic system that they had had to do without for so long, many former West-Germans increasingly lost confidence the traditional political system's ability to produce good and fair solutions. According to Kitschelt and Streeck (2004), many people in Germany became more pessimistic since the mid-1990s. They noted that: "a sense of malaise has spread across Germany since the mid-1990s, after the initial enthusiasm about German unification, the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of European integration. In the 1980s West Germany was widely celebrated, and indeed celebrated itself, as an island of economic prosperity, social peace and political stability in an increasingly turbulent world. Two decades later [. . .] the question [was raised] whether Germany can cope with the economic, demographic and cultural challenges of a new century" (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004, p. 1).

11.3.2 New Politics in Britain

In Britain, similar dissatisfaction with the existing political system led to a sweeping victory of New Labour in 1997. As chapter nine showed, Tony Blair's government not only claimed to be a new government, but to be a new *kind* of government. The name 'New Labour' was meant to set it apart from the old labour party—which had an unenviable reputation for broken promises and close ties to trade unionism. The core of New Labour's political philosophy consisted of a combination of free market economy and social security. This so-called 'third way' merged aspects of liberalism and socialism into one coherent ideology. As explained earlier, New Labour also wished to reform the democratic system—partially by giving a more prominent role to local and regional authorities. The British people, they argued, should not be governed from up high, but have a government that is close to them. For many cities in Britain, the political reforms of the new government meant that they could reclaim some control over various policy areas, including urban planning and heritage, which the Conservative governments had taken over in the course of the previous two decades.

New Labour's desire to be 'new' caused them to discard much of the old. From a heritage conservation point of view, the election of New Labour can be considered problematic. The Blair government structurally removed the word 'heritage' from its policy. Instead, it focused on 'the creative industry' (Nisbett 2014; Hesmondhalgh et al. 2015). Many of the responsibilities for heritage conservation was devolved to cities and regions. In some respects, the ambitions of New Labour mirrored the process of 'glocalization'. On the one hand, New Labour decentralized the

governance system, allowing cities and regions to make decisions more autonomously (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014). On the other hand, New Labour reached out to the world, for example by rejoining UNESCO as a full member in 1997. Although this decision seems at odds with New Labour's general lack of attention for heritage, it can be understood in the light of the government's desire to open up to the world and partake in international initiatives. Moreover, the desire to rejoin had already emerged under the government of Major. In 1993, for example, over one hundred and twenty British intellectuals for the fields of science, education, arts and culture gathered in the Grand Committee Room of the House of Commons to discuss the possibility of rejoining UNESCO. The intellectuals agreed that this would be most desirable: "Rejoining UNESCO would enable UK artists and experts once again to participate fully in international programs, thereby enhancing cultural understanding in addition to maintaining cultural standard e.g. in the preservation of national heritage. It would enable UK expertise and values to influence UNESCO's future direction and policy" (Dutt 1995, p. 67). This initiative shows that New Labour's decision built on sentiments that had been growing in Britain since the early 1990s. After Britain became a full member of UNESCO again, it could indeed participate in World Heritage Committee meetings and vote on resolutions. It also boosted the number of sites that were put forward for listing. In the twelve years of Britain's absence, only a handful of sites were listed. These sites were already under consideration for inscription before the Thatcher government decided to leave UNESCO.

11.4 Urban Conservation in the Twenty-First Century

In many countries—including Britain—a restructuring of the relationship between cities and national governments led to more autonomy for cities. Heritage preservation is merely one area that was affected by this trend. While cities arguably became more autonomous, international organizations like UNESCO and ICOMOS tried to find ways to protect historic urban fabric from threats like environmental pressure or intrusive new real-estate development. UNESCO had already drafted guidelines regarding the preservation of historic cities before the first sites were enlisted onto the World Heritage list (UNESCO 1976) and the body of guidelines and policy-documents have expanded ever since (ICOMOS 1987, 1999; UNESCO 2006). However, critics—also from within the organization—have argued that many of these paper strategies do not have the desired effects in practice. According to Van Oers and Bandarin of the UNESCO World Heritage Centre: "Urban conservators today have at their disposal a rich and diversified toolkit: a system of internationally accepted principles of conservation is in place, which is reflected in important international legal instruments such as the 1972 World Heritage Convention. Furthermore, elaborate planning frameworks are available, as well as the accumulation of an extensive body of experience over a century in different contexts" (Bandarin and Van Oers 2012, p. xiii). Yet, this toolkit has often proven to be inefficient when

it comes to dealing with present-day challenges. "The system", according to the authors, "often proves to be weak and powerless in the face of the types of change that characterize our contemporary world and its urban scene. These are linked to urbanization and environmental change, and to the shift of decision-making power from national to local governments, as well as from local to international actors in areas such as tourism, real estate or business" (Bandarin and Van Oers 2012, p. xiii).

In many cities, the rapid and unmanaged population growth caused environmental stress, pollution, excessive land consumption, as well as pressure on housing services such as electricity, sewerage and waste management. The fierce competition over developable land has resulted in the construction of ever more skyscrapers—especially in inner cities where outward expansion has become impossible. These downtown areas often receive vast real-estate investments, while other parts of the city are neglected when their location is less accessible or central. This trend has also resulted in pressure on the historic urban fabric. Many preservationists noted that, especially in the developing world, historic inner-cities are quickly vanishing due to urban development. Much of this pressure is the result of a new role of cities in the global economy. Franceso Bandarin and Ron van Oers (2012) claim that: "In the competition for economic market share and direct investment, cities have appropriated more power and become more autonomous, which in turn has had dramatic effects on other socio-cultural aspects that were previously the concern of national governments". Moreover, they observed that: "with economic restructuring and decentralization came rapid privatization and commercialization of space, and commoditization of culture and heritage, which is glaringly visible in historic inner cities today" (Bandarin and Van Oers 2012, p. 96).

City governments face the challenge of balancing between potentially harmful real estate investments and preserving the historic environment as a potential asset for the growing global tourist industry. The tourist industry has become booming business. According to the World Tourism Organization, international tourist arrivals have grown from some 438 million in 1990 to 684 million in 2000 to 922 million in 2008. Prospects are that the number of international tourist arrivals will grow to 1.6 billion by 2020 (World Tourism Organization 2012). Although the economic benefits associated with tourism has motivated local governments to protect historic inner cities, tourism—some critics argue—is an untameable beast. While tourism strongly depends on the public sector for the provision of its infrastructure—roads, airports, as well as heritage—it generally consists of fragmented small and medium sized, privately owned businesses, which makes it difficult to control and legislate for. Critics have also pointed to the harm that tourism can do. The new global tourist industry, in this view, is a destructive force that obliterates the very colour-locale and authenticity that brought tourism in the first place (Bandarin and Van Oers 2012; Porter 2008).

Bandarin and Van Oers observed an innate tension in today's role of historic cities. One the one hand, large-scale urban redevelopment—akin to the sanitation and modernization projects of the 1960s—were no longer a threat (at least not in Europe) and historic cities have "acquired high status in modern life, based on the quality of their physical spaces, the persistence of their sense of place, the

concentration of cultural artistic events that support local identity, and an increasingly important economic market, as historic cities have become icons of global cultural tourism" (Bandarin and Van Oers 2012, pp. xii–xiii). On the other hand, this new role and status has given rise to a new set of challenges. "Forces of change", Bandarin and Van Oers note, "gather momentum" (Bandarin and Van Oers 2012, p. xiii). These challenges include the loss of immaterial cultural value. Cities like Venice, for example, each year attract many millions of visitors from around the globe. Although its historic centre is materially well-preserved, it has arguably lost its local culture completely and has fossilized as a result of it economic focus on global tourism (Bandarin and Van Oers 2012, p. 71). The demographic and economic process described above hence forced a reassessment of the equilibrium between material authenticity and functional or immaterial authenticity. The main challenge facing historic cities in the twenty-first century is to find that delicate balance between growing as a living entities while still preserving their historic character. The two cases that will be analyzed in the next chapters both testify to this particular problem and will reflect on discussions around urban development within designated World Heritage sites.

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Chapter 12
Bridging Local Interests and International Obligations in Dresden

12.1 Introduction

Dresden, the capital of the Free State of Saxony, sprawls along both sides of the river Elbe. In the fifteenth century, the city developed into a political, economic and cultural centre. Especially in the early eighteenth century, under the rule of elector Augustus II and his son and successor Augustus III, the Saxonion capital gained international reputation as a centre of architectural splendour and high culture. Its impressive baroque and classicist buildings earned Dresden the epithet 'Florence of the Elbe' (Fig. 12.1). In the nineteenth century, Dresden became a manufacturing centre. As a result of industrialization, the population almost quadrupled in only half a century from 95,000 in 1849 to 396,000 in 1900 (Albert and Gaillard 2012, p. 325). Despite industrialization and population growth, the city never turned into a dense industrial agglomeration and sustained its fame as a prominent 'culture city' (Gaillard and Rodwell 2015, pp. 17–19; Joel 2012, p. 200).

On February 13 and 14, 1945, British and American aircrafts dropped almost 3500 tons of incendiaries and high explosives on central Dresden. Of the 700 monuments in Dresden that had been listed by the Saxonian authorities, more than 500 were levelled to the ground while the remaining 200 were heavily damaged (Neitzel 2006, pp. 62–78; Bergander 1998). Soon after the war, the Soviet military authorities began to restore the heavily damaged Zwinger palace (Fig. 12.2)—a task that was later continued under the leadership of the German Democratic Republic. Also other prominent historic buildings such as the Semper Opera House, the Katholische Hofkirche (Fig. 12.3) and the Frauenkirche were reconstructed in various phases between the late 1940s and early 2000s (Magirius 1983; Kluge 2002, pp. 26–35; Dieters 1979; Fischer 1998).

In 2004, UNESCO enlisted Dresden and the Elbe valley onto the World Heritage List (Boccardi and Kilian 2008, p. 7). However, only five years later, in the summer of 2009, the World Heritage Committee struck 'Dresden Elbe Valley' off the World Heritage List. The reason for this step was the construction of a motorway bridge in

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_12

Fig. 12.1 Dresden Elbflorenz. From left to right: Hochschule für Bildende Künste, Frauenkirche, Sächsisches Ständehaus, Dresdner Residenzschloß and the Katholische Hofkirche. In the foreground the Augustusbrücke. All these buildings were severely damaged during the war and reconstructed in various phases between the late 1940s and the early 2000s. Picture by the author (2013)

the core-zone of the World Heritage site. Debates about this so-called Waldschlößchen bridge (Fig. 12.4) took place at different levels of government varying from the municipality of Dresden, to the state of Saxony and the German federal authorities. Private organizations, civil movements and German intellectuals were also engaged in the often heated discussions. While representatives of the German federal government and UNESCO openly regretted that a compromise had not been reached, many officials and citizens in Dresden felt that UNESCO's interferences in the local democratic decision-making process had been inappropriate and misguided. Those in favour of the bridge stressed the importance of local self-determination and condemned UNESCO's threatening language. Polls showed that a majority of Dresdners saw the bridge as a much needed and long overdue infrastructural improvement (Streimelweger 2009). Other polls showed that most residents were of the opinion that the World Heritage title was something their city could easily do without.

This view was shared by Saxony's former Prime Minister Kurt Biedenkopf. He had held the office of Prime Minister between 1990 and 2002, which was the period when most important decisions regarding both the bridge and the World Heritage nomination were made. When he was asked about what he thought of the World

Fig. 12.2 Wall pavilion of the Dresdner Zwinger. This Rococo city palace was severely struck by the 1945 aerial raids. Restoration of the Zwinger started immediately after the war with support of the Soviet military administration. The restoration would continue until 1963. It was one of the first landmarks restored. Picture by the author (2013)

Heritage Committee's decision, he simply stated: "So what. Dresden is also beautiful without a title" (Biedenkopf 2009, p. 1).[1] For the self-acclaimed German *Kulturnation*, however, the delisting of Dresden was an international embarrassment (Schoch 2014, pp. 200–202). Eva-Maria Stange, the president of the German National Committee of Heritage Preservation—who also works for the Saxonian Ministry of Arts and Sciences—talked for instance about "a dark day for 'culture-land' Saxony and for Germany as a culture-nation" (Stange 2009, p. 2).[2] Dozens of artists, musicians and academics from all over the country, expressed their disapproval of the way Germany had squandered the World Heritage title. According to

[1] "Na und. Dresden ist auch ohne Titel schön".

[2] "Ein schwarzer Tag für das Kulturland Sachsen und Deutschland als Kulturnation".

Fig. 12.3 The Katholische Hofkirche. Built between 1738 and 1751. During World War II the nave was heavily damaged. Despite its general mistrust of religion and church symbolism, the East-German regime restored the church in the mid-1980s. Picture by the author (2013)

some of these critics, the case of Dresden had clearly shown the need for stricter (national) legislation.

This chapter will analyze the events that ultimately led to the delisting of Dresden, as well as the brief period following this decision. It will be argued that the conflict between the city and UNESCO has led to renewed discussions about the role of the German federal government in affairs related to heritage. Due to Germany's governmental structure, the federal authorities are responsible for foreign relations, including all matters related to UNESCO (M. Worbs, personal communication,

Fig. 12.4 Waldschlößchenbrücke. Construction of this 4-lane motorway bridge started in 2007 and finished in 2013. It connects the Radeberger Vorstadt and Neustadt north of the Elbe with Johannstadt and Blasewitz in the south. The bridge is located in the centre of the designated World Heritage Site. Picture by the author (2013)

September 27). Yet, due to the sovereignty of the *Länder* in almost all matters related to cultural heritage, the federal government lacks the constitutional means to ensure that the *Länder* indeed comply with UNESCO's conventions. It depends in this regard entirely on the goodwill and the corroborative attitude of the states. As a result of the Dresden controversy, the position of the *Länder* in relation to UNESCO has been reassessed. In fact, the functioning of the German heritage regime as a whole has been under critical review. Since the delisting of Dresden, efforts were made to strengthen the position of the federal government within the German heritage regime as well as to change the internal selection process for Germany's tentative list of potential World Heritage Sites. Through the analysis of the delisting of Dresden this chapter will not only show how heritage concepts and practices are affected by international negotiations, but also how these new concepts and practices henceforth

affect existing national, regional and local bureaucracies. This chapter will demonstrate the complexities of incorporating UNESCO's guidelines in the multilayered German bureaucratic context. It will also show how intervention by UNESCO can change the inner-state dynamics between regional and national actors.

The first part will discuss how Dresden became a World Heritage site. The second part will focus on the planning history of the Waldschlößchen bridge, particularly focusing on the controversial referendum that took place about the bridge. The third part will focus on the delisting of the World Heritage site. The concluding part of this chapter will analyze some of the consequences of the Waldschlößchen bridge controversy for the German heritage regime as a whole. It will place the debates about the Waldschlößchen bridge in the context of ongoing discussions about the pros and cons of sustaining a federal, decentralized heritage regime in an increasingly globalized world.

12.2 Dresden's Inscription on the World Heritage List

In 1999 Dresden and the Elbe Valley were placed on Germany's Tentative List. A Tentative List is a shortlist of sites that a UNESCO member state intends to put forward for inclusion on the World Heritage List. The actual nomination file was completed in 2002. The proposed site included the city centre and a 19.5 km long strip of land along both sides of the Elbe. Instead of nominating individual buildings or ensembles, this application focused on the relationship between the area's natural and cultural elements and the way this "harmonious interplay" had co-shaped an exceptional 'cultural landscape' (Boccardi and Kilian 2008, p. 7). The application was supported by most city leaders and councillors—although some were more sceptical, and feared that UNESCO would try to freeze all development.

After the dossier was submitted, the World Heritage Centre checked its completeness and forwarded it to ICOMOS for a content evaluation. The evaluation included a visitation of the proposed site by the Finnish heritage expert Jukka Jokilehto. He acknowledged that as a reconstructed city, Dresden would not be eligible for listing under any conventional category of cultural heritage, but would qualify as a cultural landscape (ICOMOS 2004, p. 3). During his field trip, Jokilehto discussed the envisioned management of the site with civil administrators of Dresden's planning and heritage departments. The management of a 'cultural landscape' is generally considered a challenge, because it involves a variety of heritage elements and potentially affects a wide variety of stakeholders.

It could be argued that the existing policy frameworks did not meet UNESCO's demands regarding 'cultural landscape' management. For instance, Saxonian heritage law only oversaw the protection of smaller conservation areas, individual buildings and ensembles. The Waldschlößchen bridge was planned outside existing conservation areas and did not affect any individually protected monuments. Construction of the bridge was thus not in conflict with the Saxonian heritage legislation. Dresden's leaders therefore simply assumed that as a 'developing cultural landscape'

the city was free to grow without restrictions other than those to which it was already subjected under state law and local regulations. Similar misassumptions regarding 'cultural landscape' management existed at the level of the state (Rößler 2003).

The local and regional authorities' misrepresentation of what the preservation of a 'cultural landscape' entails, worried ICOMOS experts. In a letter to the ambassador of the permanent German delegation to UNESCO, representatives of ICOMOS expressed their concern about the lack of a coherent management plan. Despite this concern, the World Heritage Committee enlisted the site during its 28th annual session. According to the committee: "the value of this cultural landscape has long been recognized, but it is now under new pressures for change" (UNESCO 2004, p. 1). Apparently, the committee was aware of the development pressures in the area and perhaps hoped the World Heritage status could help face these challenges. During the World Heritage Site's official inauguration ceremony the director of the World Heritage Centre, Francesco Bandarin, reminded the local authorities of the international obligations that came with enlisting. Even though the bridge had been widely discussed in local and national media, the issue was not mentioned during the ceremony. Soon after, in a press release the city hailed the title as something that would be beneficial in promoting Dresden to tourists and investors. It was also explained during a press conference that the status would not bring legal restrictions or obligations. However, as work on the bridge progressed, this assertion would be challenged.

12.3 'The Citizens of Dresden Have Decided'?

Plans for a bridge at the Waldschlößchen location date back to the 1900s, but it was only in 1996 that Dresden's city council decided to turn these plans into a reality. By the time Dresden Elbe Valley was nominated for the World Heritage List, these plans were well advanced. The nomination file mentioned the Waldschlößchenbrücke, especially praising public involvement in its planning: "The inhabitants of the city of Dresden have extraordinarily strong and emotional bonds to their town and the Elbe valley. This is shown by the vivid interest of the citizens in the traffic-planning, town-planning and politico-cultural decisions of the city. The planning of [. . .] the Waldschlößchenbrücke [has] been accompanied by commitment and critical attitude" (Land Sachsen 2003, p. 56). Up to this point, however, the government had hardly done anything with this 'vivid interest of the citizens'. Citizens were merely being informed, rather than being empowered to actively partake in planning.

Construction was anticipated to start in 2000. However, little construction work took place. The city had broken the ground without having received full approval of the regional council. Planners were concerned that the bridge's anticipated noise levels would exceed the norms, it took until 2004 before the necessary changes were made and planning approval was secured. Despite the approval, the work was further delayed by financial difficulties on the part of the municipality. After the 2004 local elections, a new City Council was formed. The majority of the council now consisted

of a coalition of Socialists (SPD), Social Democrats (PDS) and Green Party members. The new council voted to postpone construction works and use the allocated funds for the refurbishment of day-care facilities.

Those in favour of the bridge sought ways to force the city to proceed with the plans. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the German Automobile Club (ADAC) collectively started a petition for the organization of a referendum, collecting 69,500 signatures. Especially ADAC, with some 20 million members the largest Automobile Club in Europe, strongly promoted the Waldschlöchenbrücke. As a result of the petition the city council was legally forced to organize a referendum on the bridge. In the weeks that followed, both opponents and proponents of the project ran a campaign for their respective causes. The referendum was held on February 27, 2005. It simply asked: "Are you for the Waldschlößchen bridge?—including the route on the mapped depiction" (Landeshauptstadt Dresden 2005). A small, schematic map indicating the location was attached to the question. Over 50% of the electorate participated, with 67.9% of the voters in favour of the bridge. A total of 134.152 votes were cast in favour of the construction, which constitutes 34.1% of the electorate. This exceeded the required threshold of 25% to make the referendum legally binding (Hilbert 2013).

According to critics, the referendum was not about hearing the opinion of the population, rather driven by the wish to pursue the project. They argued that the map and the questions formulation predetermined the answer. Instead of asking what kind of traverse the population would prefer, it implied that the Waldschlößchen bridge was the only viable option. Moreover, critics argued, the population was not properly informed about the visual impact of the bridge, nor about the possible loss of the World Heritage status. Especially the role of ADAC's regional office in Leipzig was criticized by opponents of the bridge project. In their campaign ADAC had provided wildly exaggerated estimates of the number of cars that would cross the bridge, suggesting that this was a vital and long overdue infrastructural project. One may wonder whether a referendum in which citizens are both poorly informed and possibly mislead qualifies as genuine citizens participation.

Moreover, one can wonder whether the close involvement of an organisation such as ADAC—which bears no political responsibility and is not subjected to democratic control—is desirable. Also internationally, the referendum was perceived suspiciously. Especially the municipality's omission to timely inform the World Heritage Centre about the referendum was in conflict with UNESCO's guidelines. According to these rules State Parties—and subsequently local authorities—must inform the World Heritage Centre about intentions to authorize major projects in a protected area. Notice should be given before making decisions that are difficult to reverse (such as the organization of a binding public vote). In spite of critique, the outcome of the referendum was considered binding and the city began construction (Schoch 2014)—a decision that upset the World Heritage Committee.

In October 2005 it became apparent that the nomination dossier contained serious errors concerning the exact location of the bridge. According to the evaluation report that was drawn up by Jokilehto, the bridge would be situated 5 km *down* the Elbe from the city centre. In reality, however, it was 2.5 km *up* the Elbe. It remains unclear

whether this omission was the result of false information provided by the city of Dresden, or an oversight on behalf of the ICOMOS experts.. In any case, neither the German federal government, nor the city of Dresden had corrected it despite ample opportunity to do so. Therefore, the World Heritage Centre sent a letter asking for explanation. The Mayor of Dresden replied, sending documentation with a map showing the infrastructure plan of Dresden, as well as an extract from the bridge design competition that had been organized (Orosz 2005).

The error in the dossier had major consequences. It transpired that the bridge would be built in the heart of the 'cultural landscape' not beyond its outskirts. In order to assess whether the bridge would harm the outstanding universal value of the area, UNESCO requested a visual impact study. According to this study, conducted by the Technical University of Aachen, the bridge would indeed disturb the harmonious interplay between the city centre and its surroundings. It concluded that the bridge would obscure views of Dresden's skyline and split the area in two (RWTH Aachen University 2006). ICOMOS and UNESCO experts expressed similar concerns (ICOMOS 2006).

In May 2006, a delegation of Dresden politicians visited the World Heritage Centre to meet its Director and discuss possible solutions (Landeshauptstadt Dresden 2008). The meeting was unsuccessful. In July 2006, just days before the start of the World Heritage Committee's yearly gathering, former Saxonian Prime Minister Biedenkopf (CDU) expressed his discontent about the way UNESCO and ICOMOS were handling the situation. Referring to the referendum, he noted: "The citizens of Dresden have decided. And what is irritating me is the suggestion [. . .] that the citizens of Dresden could not make their own responsible decision, finding the right balance between the beauty of the meadows and the necessity of the Waldschlößchen bridge. Here is an institution that does not know Dresden at all, that claims to know better" (Biedenkopf 2006). Biedenkopf's fellow party member Arnold Vaatz even went as far as to accuse UNESCO of "disregarding democracy" (Vaatz 2007b). Playing the 'democracy card' was one of the most important strategies of the camp of bridge proponents. As many Dresdners had suffered undemocratic regimes they were particularly sensitive to these arguments (Vaatz 2007a).

12.4 Delisting Dresden

12.4.1 World Heritage in Danger

Meanwhile, UNESCO requested Germany to re-examine the bridge project and come up with feasible solutions by February 2007. Germany, however, failed to provide any alternatives. Initially, Germany's federal government distanced itself entirely from what it characterized as "an enduring conflict between the city, the Free State of Saxony and the World Heritage Committee" (Neumann 2009, p. 2). After the World Heritage Committee decided to designate the site to the 'in-danger' list, a

federal government representative stated that the government was willing to assist in finding a solution. However, the spokesperson stressed, both the decision to apply for the World Heritage title, and the decision to build the bridge, were state matters. The federal government was reluctant to intervene. It saw merely a mediating role for itself, ensuring a smooth flow of information between the international level and the level of the Länder. At the same time, however, representatives of Saxony stressed that the federal government is UNESCO's official partner—not Saxony.

The state government had hired lawyers to study the legal implications of the Waldschlößchen bridge. They concluded that: "UNESCO-treaties are not binding for the state of Saxony or its subordinate levels of government. The Federal Republic of Germany [. . .] may be obligated to protect and preserve World Heritage. The Free State of Saxony and its subordinate governments are, in any case not" (Brüggen 2006, p. 7). In a press release the state government further explained: "There are no direct relationships between the state capital Dresden and UNESCO. The treaty partner under the UNESCO agreement is the Federal Republic of Germany. [. . .] Subsequently, there are no binding legal consequences for the capital of Dresden" (Landesdirektion Sachsen 2006, pp. 1–2).

This assumption that the municipality had no legal obligation under the World Heritage Convention was being questioned. The federal government in turn hired a team of lawyers to investigate whether the obligations under the World Heritage Convention were then, by extension, applicable to the Länder. This team concluded that the Convention did apply to all levels of government in Germany. According to Chancellor Merkel: "The federal government has recently commissioned a report to clarify if the UNESCO World Heritage Convention is binding inner-stately. It was concluded that the UNESCO World Heritage Convention already legally applies to all levels of Germany's governmental structure – federal, stately, municipal – all to the same extent" (Merkel 2008). The federal government's interpretation of the binding effect of the World Heritage Convention was completely different from the interpretation of the Saxonian authorities. Apparently, this lack of clarity about who is responsible for World Heritage in Germany had not been on the agenda since Germany signed the convention in 1976—although there have been several attempts to strengthen the position of the federal government vis-à-vis the Länder.

What followed were various court cases at different levels of the German juridical system. Eventually, the State Administrative High Court granted permission to commence work on the bridge (Albert and Gaillard 2012, p. 340. It argued that the referendum expressed the will of the citizens and as such should be respected. The opinions within Germany about this decision were divided. The social-democratic vice-president of the federal parliament Wolfgang Thierse, called it a sad day for Germany, while the Christian-democratic Prime Minister of Saxony Georg Milbradt applauded the court's ruling. Some weeks later, the German federal court reached a similar conclusion and argued that the outcome of the referendum should prevail despite the possible negative consequences for Germany's international reputation. It considered the referendum an "authentic expression of immediate democracy". As earlier attempts to reach a compromise had failed, it was argued, "the loss of world

heritage status and the implicated loss of prestige, have to be accepted" (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2007, p. 35).

This court ruling is remarkable, because international concerns about World Heritage sites are generally given due consideration in Germany. In this case the court, as well as various politicians at local and central government level, openly questioned UNESCO's authority. Saxony's president Henry Hasenpflug, for example, noted that the outcome of the referendum was more important than the opinion of the World Heritage Committee: "we are on legally unexplored territory [but] we have a crystal clear court ruling, and it should be executed immediately [. . .] The 2005 referendum in favour of the construction of the Waldschlößchen bridge should prevail over potential obligation under the World Heritage Convention" (Hasenpflug 2007, pp. 1–3). Although Hasenpflug would still have preferred a compromise, he did urge to start the construction as soon as possible, at least before a new City Council would block the project again with a "simple municipal decision". This should be avoided, he claimed, because it would harm the democratic process. He even went as far as to accuse bridge opponents of "demagogy and dodging the law" (Ibid.).

The state's unwillingness and inability to act, and the federal government's constitutional limitations to intervene in Saxonian affairs meant that the World Heritage Committee saw itself forced to take steps. Not long after the federal court's decision, in the summer of 2007, the World Heritage Committee had its 31st annual meeting in Christchurch, New Zealand. During the meeting it was decided to remove Oman's Arabian Oryx Sanctuary from the World Heritage list. This was the first time ever that a World Heritage site was delisted. According to the committee, Oman had failed to protect the integrity of this natural heritage site. The government of the country had decided to decrease the size of the sanctuary by about 90% and had given permission to use it for the extraction of natural gas. Since the site's inscription in 1994, habitat degradation and poaching had already reduced the number of oryx' in the area substantially. For the German representatives involved in the Dresden case, this decision showed that the committee was not just bluffing (UNESCO 2007). During the same meeting, the World Heritage Committee decided to delist 'Dresden Elbe Valley' "in the event that the construction of the bridge has an irreversible impact on the outstanding universal value of the property" (UNESCO 2007). UNESCO offered Germany another four months to find a solution and to explore alternatives to the bridge. If Germany would omit this request, then the site would be removed from the list by 2008 (Stadelmann 2007).

Now that the World Heritage Committee had shown that it was willing to move from words to action, the German federal government started to become increasingly concerned. With the involvement of UNESCO, the Waldschlößchen bridge project was no longer just a regional or local issue, but a question of Germany's obligations under international law. Federal Culture Commissioner Bernd Neumann (CDU) acknowledged the precarious situation in which the federal government found itself when he noted that "delisting would have negative consequences not only for the 'Kulturstadt' Dresden, but also for Germany's reputation abroad" (Neumann 2007, cited in Schoch 2014, p. 208). Since it is ultimately the State Party (i.e. the federal

government) that is responsible for the failure of any of its constituents to comply with international law, the federal government was worried that Germany as a whole could be held responsible for Dresden's actions. The growing international pressure further reinforced existing debates regarding the rather marginal role of the federal government in heritage affairs.

Some wondered whether the federal government should play a more prominent role and whether it could or should force Dresden to comply with the World Heritage Convention and the associated Operational Guidelines. In a press conference, Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) was asked whether she believed that the federal government's obligations under the Convention should be extended to cities and municipalities in order to avoid cases like Dresden. Although the Chancellor dodged the question, she did comment that it was interesting, given the complicated situation of responsibility, that the *Länder* had never ratified the World Heritage Convention. And although she stressed that the bridge project was a regional matter and reiterated the binding effect of the referendum, she did suggest that efforts should be made to create a national legal foundation that would ensure a better implementation of the World Heritage Convention (Merkel 2007, see also Guratzsch 2007).

Shortly after the 2007 annual meeting of the World Heritage Committee, construction preparations for the Waldschlößchen bridge resumed. The city administration announced that construction works would begin in late August. However, on August 9, the Dresden Administrative Court ordered to stop the project. Several environmental NGOs had requested this, because the bridge endangered the so-called 'lesser horseshoe bat', a protected animal species which is found in the area. On June 6 2007 the construction was indeed halted. Following this decision, the various bridge opponent groups got their hopes up: "For three months the 'lesser horseshoe bat' was a symbol of hope for everyone fighting to sustain the World Heritage title that Dresden was granted in 2004", wrote the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2007, p. 1).[3] The Saxon Higher Administrative Court, however, overruled the decision of the Dresden Administrative Court and lifted the injunction on November 12 2007. Over the months that followed, the foundations for the bridge heads were laid. These works also involved the felling of trees on both sides of the Elbe. One particular tree that was threatened by the construction works was a 280-year-old red beech (Rosenlöcher 2008). Activists occupied the tree on December 12, but their efforts were in vein. On January 15 2008 the tree was eventually felled.

In February 2008, two international experts—Giovanni Boccardi of the World Heritage Centre and Jaroslav Kilian of ICOMOS—visited Dresden to take stock of the situation. Boccardi and Kilian were sent to Dresden by the World Heritage Committee with the task to determine whether the bridge had a negative impact on the site's outstanding universal value. The construction of the bridge was now progressing quickly, but the local authorities still hoped to maintain the World

[3] "Drei Monate war die 'Klein Hufeisennase' für alle, die für den Erhalt des Dresden 2004 verliehenen Welterbetitel kämpfen, ein Symbol der Hoffnung".

Heritage title by redesigning the bridge in a way that would be acceptable to UNESCO. A commission headed by Eberhart Burger, who had also led the reconstruction of the Frauenkirche, was asked to redesign the bridge (Heitkamp 2010). The commission proposed to narrow the deck, slim down the arches and reduce the visible volume of the footings. According to the German representatives the bridge was now "lighter and fit better within the landscape" (Boccardi and Kilian 2008: Annex 4, 28).

Yet, according to Boccardi's and Kilian's report, slight aesthetic changes did not make much difference, because the main problem was not in design details but in the location of the bridge. The mission experts agreed with all the points that were made in the earlier assessment by the Technical University of Aachen. Their official report read: "the Mission is of the opinion that the solution of the Elbe crossing which is being implemented would through its location have a considerable negative and irreversible impact on the Outstanding Universal Value of the World Heritage property. This would result from an encroachment upon the integrity of the 'cultural landscape' whose harmonious and picturesque combination of the urban and natural features appears to have been carefully preserved over the centuries-long history of the City of Dresden" (Boccardi and Kilian 2008, p. 20).

However, internal correspondence between the international experts reveals a different, less straightforward picture of the experts' opinion. In an email to Kilian, as well as to other UNESCO and ICOMOS colleagues, Boccardi doubted whether it made sense to even write a report since the World Heritage Committee had already made up its mind: "The Committee has already said that it did not like this bridge and would have delisted Dresden if it was built, so the whole exercise [of preparing an evaluation report] appeared somewhat irrelevant [. . .] If the Committee wishes to be consistent with its previous decisions, then it should logically delete the site from the List'. In any case, I foresee some uneasiness and frustration. Some Committee member will surely ask Germany to take the floor to say what they think. . .". Moreover, Boccardi questioned whether it was even possible to fulfil the task that he and his colleague were asked to accomplish—namely to determine the impact of the bridge on the site's outstanding universal value: "Personally I don't think such a question can be even answered, given that we admittedly do not know what Outstanding Universal Value really means. It is just a matter of degree and judgment and even this can change from year to year and person to person". Furthermore, in sharp contrast with the conclusions of his official report, Boccardi notes in his email that in comparison to many other sites, the situation in Dresden is not that problematic at all: "When I compare Dresden with many Asian or Arab sites I think that the latter are in much worse conditions" (Boccardi 2008, p. 1). Kishor Rao, at the time vice-director of the World Heritage Centre, also did not think the bridge had that much of an impact. "I had seen the drawings of the [. . .] bridge", he wrote "and I must say that it appears quite un-intrusive visually" (Rao 2008, p. 1).

Nonetheless, Boccardi and his colleagues of ICOMOS and the World Heritage Centre officially advised the World Heritage Committee to remove Dresden from the list. Local and regional politicians were furious and retorted fiercely to the experts' conclusions. Former Premier of Saxony Georg Milbradt argued for instance that the

way UNESCO had handled the situation "came close to blackmail" (Milbradt 2008, p. 1).[4] Moreover, he accused UNESCO of putting the local citizens under pressure and punishing them. The new Mayor of Dresden Helma Orosz also expressed her anger with the decision. She squarely contradicted the experts' conclusions: "this bridge does not affect adversely the World Heritage Dresden Elbe Valley" (Orosz 2008).[5]

12.4.2 A Last Attempt to Prevent International Embarrassment

The expert report had made abundantly clear that redesigning the bridge would not be enough to prevent the World Heritage Committee from delisting 'Dresden Elbe Valley'. One solution that could potentially satisfy the committee would be to build a tunnel instead of a bridge. The tunnel option had existed from the very beginning of the discussions but now that the threat of delisting became substantial, it was increasingly pushed for by the federal government, the World Heritage Centre, as well as local civil movements like Bürgerbegehren Tunnel and Verkehrsfluss. Especially the federal government tried to get the tunnel option back on the agenda. The State Secretary of Transport, Building and Urban Development Karin Roth offered financial assistance from the federal government to reimburse any additional costs of building a tunnel. In a letter of February 8 2008 she noted that: "the Free State of Saxony can be compensated by the federal government for the additional costs of a tunnel solution" (Roth 2008, p. 1).[6] Chancellor Merkel reacted via an official press release that, although the federal government cannot and will not intervene in this matter, it is willing to take on a mediating position, and expressed her preference for a tunnel. Even within the ranks of the state government, important politicians, including the Saxonian Minister of Transport Thomas Jurk, began to doubt whether it was wise to continue the bridge project (Jurk 2008, p. 1).

However, in a press release of January 31 2008 an expert committee of the Saxonian Chamber of Engineers—a stately advisory body—had stated that a tunnel was not a real option. Not only did this committee conclude that it was technically impossible due to the steepness of the river sloops, it also remarked that a tunnel would be financially unfeasible (Ingenieurkammer Sachsen 2008a, b). The arguments of the civil movements—such as that a tunnel would be better for the environment—were refuted one by one. In early March, hundreds of Dresdners gathered in front of the city hall to protest against the bridge. Some days later, on March 7 2008, another panel consisting of sixteen experts in architecture and

[4] "kommt einer Erpressung nahe".

[5] "Diese Brücke beeinträchtigt das Welterbe Dresdner Elbtal nicht".

[6] "Es gibt vom Bund aus unserem Ministerium ein Angebot an Sachsen, sich zur Erhaltung des Welterbes an der Finanzierung einer Untertunnelung zu beteiligen".

construction work met at the Technical University of Dresden to discuss alternatives of the bridge. The panel included Wolfram Jäger who had been involved in the reconstruction of the Frauenkirche, and now held the position of Dean of the Faculty of Architecture of Dresden University (Jäger 1992; Guratzsch 2010). In opposition to the Saxonian Chamber of Engineers, this panel concluded that a tunnel was not only feasible, but that it would take less than a year to draw plans and that the tunnel could be built on the foundations that were already laid for the bridge. Moreover, the experts concluded that no houses or other highlights in the area would be harmed in the process and that the construction and maintenance costs of a tunnel would approximately be the same as for a bridge. The experts also recalled the financial aid offered by the federal government.

Meanwhile, the protests against the bridge project became less and less friendly. According to the Saxonian Minister of Justice Geert Mackenroth the protests were "gradually becoming more criminal" and resembled a "bridge-Jihad" (Heitkamp 2008, p. 1).[7] Despite the increasingly loud protests, and numerous attempts of the federal government, the World Heritage Centre and several NGO's to get the tunnel option back on the agenda, the local administration remained inexorable and rigid in their decision to build a bridge. Nor the positive report of the panel of Dresden University, neither UNESCO's threat to delete Dresden from the World Heritage List, or the generous financial offer made by the federal government or the increasing popular civil protests could persuade the local authorities to further investigate the tunnel option. The city authorities' unwillingness to consider alternative infrastructural solutions could be seen as a consequence of 'path-dependency' and 'go-fever'. The bridge had a planning history of well over a century. Several times, the plans were obstructed by forces that were not under the authorities' control. Now that construction could finally began, the city was not willing to risk entering another planning procedure, despite several advantages (Berthod 2011).

Instead, the local authorities hardened in their conviction, caved in and came up with new arguments such as that a tunnel is not suitable for pedestrians. A member of the local urban development department stated for instance that: "After visiting the site of the Gotthard Tunnel construction, Friedrich Nietzsche described it in almost euphoric terms as an engineering masterpiece. The train trip through the completed tunnel, however, made him feel anxious [...] A tunnel is, and will always be, a claustrophobic experience" (Department for Urban Development 2008, cited in Berthod 2011, p. 201). Meanwhile, a representative of the City Council claimed that only a bridge could solve Dresden's traffic problems: "The greatest problems would then arise for the city of Dresden, if tourists spread the word that one doesn't move forward in the traffic jams of Dresden. That would be precisely the consequence if we don't build the bridge" (Vaatz 2008).[8] On March 11 2008 the Mayor received 40,000 signatures of citizens who were in favor of organizing a new

[7] "in einem schleichenden Übergang zur Kriminalität" and "Brücken-Dschihadidmus".

[8] "Der Stadt Dresden entsteht der größte Schaden dann, wenn sich unter Touristen herum spricht, dass man in der Stadt Dresden verkehrsmäßig nicht voran kommt, dass es ein einziger Stau und ein

referendum which would include the tunnel option. In April 2008, after several communications from the World Heritage Centre, ICOMOS, and the German Chamber of Architects, another 10,000 signatures were gathered. The City Council hence ruled for a new referendum. However, Mayor Vogel (CDU) appealed this motion. On May 10 2008, the World Heritage Centre, less concerned with the logics of local democracy, asked again for a new referendum and stressed the solution of a tunnel. "The Committee said it regretted the construction of the bridge underway and urged the authorities to opt for the digging of a tunnel in its stead" (UNESCO 2008a, p. 1).

Many observers, including the director of the World Heritage Centre Francesco Bandarin, expected that the Committee would remove 'Dresden Elbe Valley' from the list. Similarly, ICOMOS chief Michael Petzet warned that delisting was inevitable if the construction would continue. When he visited the construction site in the summer of 2008, he declared to a regional newspaper: "I wanted to see the crime scene. The decision of the World Heritage Committee is clear. Only due to the activities of several civil groups has the title not been removed yet. The only way is to stop this construction. If the bridge is build, delisting will follow" (Petzet 2008, p. 1).[9] However, the Committee decided otherwise and still expressed their hope that a compromise could be reached. Therefore, it was decided to postpone the verdict for another year in order to continue the dialogue with other stakeholders. At the same time, the Committee made abundantly clear that the title would still be lost in 2009 "if the planned works on the bridge continue and the damage already done is not reversed" (UNESCO 2008b).

The 33rd annual gathering of the World Heritage Committee took place in Sevilla, Spain between June 22 and June 30 2009 (UNESCO 2009a). Shortly before, the World Heritage Centre had advised the committee to remove Dresden Elbe Valley from the list. On June 25, Dresden's mayor Helma Orosz addressed the committee in an attempt to prevent delisting. She urged the members to consider the value of Dresden Elbe Valley as a whole and not just the small part where the bridge was being constructed. She also asked the committee members to take into account Dresden's legal situation, especially the fact the bridge project had been certified by Germany's highest court—the federal constitutional court. Moreover, the mayor draw the members' attention to the testimony of an expert before the Dresden administrative court, who had explained that the environmental consequences of a tunnel would be more severe than those of a bridge. The court had endorsed this expert's findings. Orosz explained that although the city would like to keep the World Heritage title, it also had an obligation under German law. Orosz was still convinced, however, that a compromise could be reached. She stated that in the days

einziges Hin und Her ist und dass die Bewegung durch die Stadt Dresden ein einziges Stressprogramm ist. Genau das wäre die Konsequenz, wenn die Brücke nicht stattfinden würde".

[9] "Ich wollte den Tatort sehen. Die Entscheidung des Welterbe-Komitees ist eindeutig. Nur durch die Aktivitäten einiger Bürgerinitiativen ist der Titel noch nicht aberkannt worden. Der einzige Weg ist der Stopp dieser Baumaßnahme. Wird die Brücke gebaut, erfolgt die Streichung".

before the meeting she had had the chance to talk to most of the committee members and had sensed that they were sympathetic towards the city's situation (Schoch 2014, pp. 211–212).

She had sensed wrong. The day after her speech the committee voted to delete Dresden Elbe Valley from the list. Of the 21 members of the committee, 14 had voted in favour of delisting, five members had voted to retain it and two members abstained. According to the committee, Dresden Elbe Valley had "failed to keep its outstanding universal value as inscribed" due to the construction of the Waldschlößchen bridge "in the heart of the cultural landscape". Germany, the committee noted, had been "unable to fulfil its obligation defined in the Convention to protect and conserve Outstanding Universal Value, as inscribed, of the World Heritage Property". The committee said it regretted the outcome. The chair of the committee remarked shortly after the decision that "every time we fail to preserve a site, we share the pain of the State Party" (UNESCO 2009b, p. 1).

Somewhat surprisingly, the entire controversy over the Waldschlößchen bridge did not put an end to Dresden's aspirations to be included on the World Heritage List, nor to the World Heritage Committee's willingness to take such new requests into consideration. When the committee decided to remove Dresden Elbe Valley from the list in 2009, it also explicitly mentioned that some parts of the site might still be considered of outstanding universal value and that a new application with new boundaries is not unimaginable (UNESCO 2009b). Since the delisting of Dresden Elbe Valley, several possibilities for a new application have been considered. One of these plans roughly corresponded with the site that was proposed for inclusion on the World Heritage List in 1989 (Heitkamp 2010). It was also proposed in 2011 to nominate Hellerau—a neighborhood on Dresden's outskirts and the first German example of a garden city (Block 2011; M. Worbs, personal communication, September 27; U. Noack, personal communication, September 27 2013). Although the state of Saxony forwarded the proposal for inclusion on Germany's Tentative List, it has thus far not been officially submitted to the World Heritage Centre.

12.5 Conclusion: What Role Is There for the Federal Government?

While connecting various parts of the city physically, the Waldschlößchenbrücke has divided its citizens—and indeed large sections of the country. One of the most striking aspects of the bridge controversy is the passive role of the federal government. In Germany, cultural affairs are traditionally the responsibility of the *Länder*. There are several federal laws concerning e.g. restoration subsidies, but most heritage policy is made at the sub-national level (M. Worbs, personal communication, September 27 2013; Brüggemann and Schwarzkopf 2001; Saxinger 2007). Each *Land* has its own heritage agency, in most cases called Landesamt für Denkmalpflege, its own Ministry of Culture and its own legislation. With sixteen

different heritage laws, sixteen different heritage agencies and as many responsible Ministries, there is a great need for coordination and harmonization, not only in order to prevent undesirable discrepancies within Germany, but also to act univocally vis-à-vis UNESCO (M. Worbs, personal communication, September 27 2013; see also Ringbeck and Rössler 2011). After all, UNESCO expects Germany, as an official 'State Party' under the World Heritage Convention, to speak and act as one. According to the German delegate to UNESCO Michael Worbs, "that's one of the complexities of a federal state. In a centralized state like France it will be completely different and in the UK I guess also. In our case, decision making is more delegated, not centralized". Furthermore, Worbs noted that: "the German federal system is one reason for our strength, economic strength. It guarantees a more equal distribution of resources, of development. I think it has advantages, but it certainly also has disadvantages, especially when it comes to international, to foreign politics, because we take more time to come nationally to a certain position" (M. Worbs, personal communication, September 27 2013; see also Ringbeck 2008).

As the Waldschlößchenbrücke case painfully made clear, the federalized government structure of Germany sometimes places the federal government in a rather difficult position when it comes to World Heritage. On the one hand it has the international duty to ensure proper implementation of UNESCO's regulations (Kilian 2008). On the other hand it depends entirely on the willingness of the *Länder* to incorporate these in their legislations and bureaucracies. Yet, few Germans—representatives of the *Länder* and the federal government alike—will admit that the way their heritage regime is organized, had anything to do with the Waldschlößchenbrücke controversy. Instead, most claim that the system works just fine and that the dispute over the bridge was merely the result of an unfortunate course of events and simple misunderstandings (M. Kirsten, personal communication, October 13 2013). In the aftermath of the delisting of Dresden, Günter Gloser of the Foreign Office tried to play down the size and profoundness of the problem by suggesting that "Dresden is a unique case" (Gloser 2009, p. 2).[10] Although the case of Dresden was indeed in many respects unique, it certainly does not stand on its own entirely. In the past several urban development projects threatened to compromise a World Heritage status in Germany. Before the Dresden controversy, local urban planning in other historic cities such as Lübeck, Quedlinburg and Potsdam evoked conflict with UNESCO-guidelines. Moreover, Cologne, where the local authorities planned to build a skyscraper that would harm the visual integrity of the city's cathedral (Die Welt 2003, July 31, p. 27) and recent plans to build a new bridge within the Upper Middle Rhine Valley World Heritage site, exemplify that the case of Dresden is not as unique as Gloser would like to suggest. It seems more likely that such conflicts are not simply the result of case specific courses of events, but that they are rather the result of structural organizational hazards somehow ingrained in the federalized German heritage regime.

[10] "Dresden ist ein Einzelfall".

When Michael Kirsten of the Saxonian Landesamt für Denkmalpflege was asked about the complexity of the German heritage regime, he answered: "Perhaps we should introduce the *Kaiserreich* again. That would make things a lot clearer" (M. Kirsten, personal communication, October 13 2013).[11] Although this was obviously a joke, many critics have indeed pointed to the advantage of a more centralized heritage regime—not unlike the way heritage preservation was organized in the days of the Kaiser. Especially in relation to World Heritage, the federalized heritage regime, according to these critics, proved to be vulnerable. In an open letter to the German Chancellor, Friedrich Darge—a classical musician from Dresden—claimed that: "Germany is one of the most important cultural nations worldwide [. . .] The only way to achieve full commitment to the protection of World Heritage, is a (voluntary) transformation of the articles of national law. Thus far, the Federal Republic of Germany has failed to do this. A legal gap that now backfires" (Darge 2008, p. 1).[12]

Chancellor Angela Merkel, however, did not see the need of a national heritage law and stressed that cultural policy should remain a capacity of the *Länder*—although she did suggest that the *Länder* should sign the World Heritage Convention too (Merkel 2008). Despite the national interests that were clearly at stake in the case of the Waldschlößchen bridge—such as Germany's international reputation and its working relation with UNESCO—the federal government remained reluctant to mingle in the debates and assumed a mere mediatory role. In March 2007, the issue of the Waldschlößchen bridge was debated in the Bundestag—the federal parliament in Berlin. The Bundestag requested the government to mediate between the Saxonian authorities and UNESCO, because the international credibility of Germany was threatened. The Bundestag stressed that it was not just about cultural and natural heritage, but about Germany's obligations under international law (Deutscher Bundestag 2007, pp. 1–2).

In the course of the conflict, the federal government indeed made several attempts to establish a constructive dialogue between the different stakeholders. It set up a meeting between the mayor of Dresden, the German delegation to UNESCO and representatives of the World Heritage Centre. During the dispute about the bridge, representatives of the federal government expressed their readiness to help solve problems. The Federal Commissioner for Culture and Media Bernd Neumann stated, for instance, that: "the federal government is, when this is wished for, always prepared to contribute to a constructive solution" (Neumann 2007).[13] The federal government also tried to persuade Dresden and Saxony to reconsider its plans. The Foreign Office, for example, sent a letter to the Mayor of Dresden to ask not to take

[11] "Vielleicht können wir das Kaiserreich wieder einführen. Das wäre viel klarer sein".

[12] "Deutschland gilt alseine der weltweit wichtigsten Kulturnationen. [. . .] Die einzige Möglichkeit, Verbindlichkeit bei der Wahrung von Weltkulturerbe zu schaffen, ist eine (freiwillig) Transformation der Statuten in nationales Recht. Dies hat die BDR bisher versäumt. Eine Gesetzeslücke, die sich nun rächt".

[13] "Der Bund ist, wenn es gewünscht wird, jederzeit bereit, zu einer konstruktiven Lösung beizutragen".

irreversible decisions that could harm Germany's international reputation. In this same letter, the federal government expressed a preference for a tunnel solution (von Schorlemer 2008, p. 376). The national authorities made generous financial offers to tempt the Saxonian government to reconsider the plans. In April 2007, the Federal Minister of Transport, Building and Urban Development, Tiefensee, expressed his reluctance to help finance a project that was in conflict with the World Heritage Convention to which Germany was bound and therefore offered monetary aid for any solution—for instance a tunnel—that would satisfy the World Heritage Centre.

All in all the federal government preferred strategies of inducement, rather than enforcement. As said, the German federal government lacks the means to force the *Länder* to comply with international heritage conventions, but UNESCO does not have those means either. UNESCO member states retain their sovereignty and cannot be compelled to act upon the World Heritage Committee's requests. Although some observers have described UNESCO as an institute that attempts to assert world control and pointed out that UNESCO has the option to "send a fleet of black helicopters flying over the protected area to compel national authorities to fulfil their obligations under the World Heritage Convention" (Zacharias 2006, p. 273), this is exaggerated and untrue. UNESCO lacks legal authority to intervene and can only try to motivate countries to act according to their guidelines. UNESCO has several means at its disposal to motivate member states to comply with the World Heritage Convention. It can try to persuade governments by offering technical or financial support or it can exercise political pressure by placing a site on the 'Red List', also called the 'World Heritage in Danger List'—a measure that was applied to 'Dresden Elbe Valley' in 2006. However, UNESCO is not entitled to sanction State Parties. In this respect, UNESCO's authority can be described as "purely moral" (Musitelli 2007, p. 325). Even if the Committee issues its concerns formally to national governments or the international community, it is "powerless to intervene directly against the will of the State Party concerned in order to protect our universal heritage" (von Schorlemer 2008, p. 386). After the World Heritage Committee had stated that Dresden would be delisted if the bridge was built, there was no going back. It had chosen a hard-line and despite serious doubts about the true gravity of the bridge project, the World Heritage Committee—if it was to maintain its credibility—had no longer the option to deviate from the path it took (Gaillard 2014).

One could argue that the limited power of UNESCO should be compensated for by a strong national state that ensures that the World Heritage within its boundaries is protected according to the internationally set standards, but this is hardly possible in a federalized country like Germany. It could also be argued, however, that despite these constitutional limitations, the federal government could and should have done more to prevent the Dresden debacle. Its rather passive strategy of mediation and consultation clearly failed. Nationwide discussions are taking place about the sovereignty of the *Länder* in other policy fields. A growing number of German politicians have questioned if it is sensible to sustain, for example, a federalized education system. Many Germans doubt whether having sixteen different school curricula is desirable and several attempts were made to homogenize the curricula. In the field of cultural heritage, however, attempts to achieve more uniformity and centralization,

generally meet a lot of opposition from the *Länder*. In the past, efforts to create national heritage legislation were blocked by the *Länder* (Naumann 2002). Although a national heritage law—which has been talked about since the drafting of the German constitution in 1949—is thus unlikely to be introduced any time soon, it is not inconceivable that cases like Dresden will reinforce public debate about the pros and cons of working in a federalized cultural heritage regime.

Some changes to the German regime were in fact already made in direct response to the case of Dresden. The World Heritage nomination process has, for example, been changed. Before the Waldschlößchen bridge controversy, the *Länder* were each allowed to submit two sites for Germany's Tentative List. The Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK)—the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the *Länder*—would then choose which sites would be eventually forwarded to UNESCO. This system could not guarantee that the 'best' sites were selected, because it involved a great deal of political negotiation. According to Michael Worbs, the selection method resulted in the submission of 'lesser' sites, or sites that lacked a decent management plan. He claimed: "it was more like this: 'Ah, I don't have one, and I must have one'. [. . .] And that is why we had some proposals which were not so fully convincing or had some problems". Sites were often nominated "without [. . .] screening or evaluation" (M. Worbs, personal communication, September 27 2013). In order to prevent that from happening in the future, the federal government has installed a committee of both German and foreign experts to evaluate the nominations prior to their submission. The federal government hopes that these experts will be less concerned with an 'equal distribution' of sites over the sixteen *Länder* and assess the proposal on a purely scientific basis.

Worbs explained that "the expert commission is a pre-screening which imitates a little bit what ICOMOS will later do anyway [. . .] in order to prevent us from proposing sites which are hopeless, which would never stand a chance". According to Worbs, this initiative was a direct consequence of the Dresden debacle: "It is one of the lessons we learnt from Dresden case" (M. Worbs, personal communication, September 27). The German National Committee for Heritage Preservation has argued that political commitment alone is not enough to protect the German World Heritage and has plead for stricter federal urban planning laws. Although such a federal law is not yet in sight, the Dresden debacle has moved several *Länder*—including Nord Rhine-Westphalia and Bremen—to voluntarily attribute special legal status to the UNESCO World Heritage Sites within their boundaries (Hönes 2013, pp. 22–32). Saxony is yet to follow this example.

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Chapter 13
Shanghai-Upon-Mersey. Conservation and Change in Liverpool

13.1 Introduction

The famous Swiss psychoanalyst Carl Jung visited Liverpool in 1927 and dubbed it the 'pool of life'—a nickname that was graciously adopted by the city's inhabitants. Even though Liverpool was already declining when Jung visited, it could still righteously claim to deserve its famous epithet (Hyde 1971). Its ports along the Mersey's shores formed a vast forest of masts and chimneys. It was a hub for migrants and traders from all over the world. After the Second World War, however, Liverpool went into steep decline and became known for its high unemployment rates and severe social problems. Jung's words were now nothing more than a faint echo of a time long gone. When the local economic and social situation reached an all-time low in the early 1980s, politicians were even toying with idea of evacuating the inhabitants, leaving Liverpool behind as a ghost town (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014; Travis 2011, p. 1; Vanstiphout 2012, p. 9).

In recent years, however, Liverpool has experienced a remarkable revival. Traditionally important sectors such as shipping and manufacturing grew. The port is made accessible to the world's largest container ships. The retail sector and catering industry are booming. From the late 1990s onwards the employment rates have increased for the first time in decades. Both foreign and domestic companies invested in Liverpool and the population is growing again (Allison 2010, pp. 174–177). At the dawn of the new millennium Liverpool had wind underneath its wings. The citizens were optimistic about the future and there was a general hope that Liverpool would reclaim its former glory. With re-gained self-confidence the local authorities set out to get the national and international recognition that Liverpool in their view deserved. The city submitted a successful bid to become the 2008 European Capital of Culture (Jones and Wilks-Heeg 2004).

Moreover, the City Council sought the World Heritage title, which it was indeed granted in 2004. Representatives of the local authorities saw this as the ultimate proof of Liverpool's revival and as a means to further promote their agenda of

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_13

regeneration and growth. Over the years that followed the City Council gave developers permission for numerous new buildings in the World Heritage buffer zone, as well as within the site itself. The city witnessed urban development projects of unprecedented scale. Within no time, Liverpool transformed from a grey working-class city into a "Shanghai-upon-Mersey" (W. Colquhoun, personal communication, January 31 2014).

Between 2004 and 2008 a new commercial district was constructed, including some of the tallest skyscrapers in the United Kingdom. The Echo Arena at King's Dock—a stadium used for music concerts, sports events and conferences—was completed in 2008. Also Liverpool ONE, a shopping and leisure centre of 170,000 m^2, opened its doors in 2008. Liverpool's Merseyside, known for its iconic docks and warehouses, was also redeveloped. A new ferry terminal was created and the nearby Mann Island was built up with apartment and office blocks, as well as a museum. Many abandoned buildings in the city centre were converted into fancy lofts, trendy shops or new office facilities. The number of inner-city residents grew significantly. Buildings that had no market value twenty years ago were transformed into A-grade retail property with a value of up to £250 per square meter in monthly rent. House prices in the city centre increased more quickly than the national rate, at an average of 30%. Liverpool's potential as a tourist destination is also increasingly being recognized. Instead of only large container ships, Liverpool's port now also receives luxurious cruise ships (Munck 2003).

Many inhabitants of Liverpool embraced the urban development and were happy to see their city revitalizing after long years of economic regression and mass unemployment. The Liverpool heritage agency also claimed that change should be allowed. Present-day generations should have a chance to build on their heritage—both literally and figuratively. New buildings, they argued, should be permitted as long as they capture the 'spirit' of Liverpool and add to the city's existing morphology (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014). The rapid urban changes within the site and its buffer zone, however, did eventually cost the city its World Heritage status. In the summer of 2021, during its 44th session in Fuzhou, the World Heritage Committee deleted Liverpool from the World Heritage list. In an interview, the recently appointed mayor of Liverpool, Joanne Anderson, called the decision "incomprehensible" (Anderson 2021). However, the delisting of Liverpool was not incomprehensible, but the foreseeable outcome of a series of event and decisions.

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the debates about heritage and new urban development in Liverpool and thereby coming to a better understanding of the World Heritage Committee's decision. The first section describes the city's rise and fall in the nineteenth and twentieth century. The most important economic, socio-political and demographic changes will be discussed. It will also describe some of the challenges that this context posed for heritage conservation in the city. The economic movement swinging between extreme highs to extreme lows, can help explain why the city authorities in recent years have focused so much on regeneration and on attracting investors. The second section will discuss the renaissance that the city has experienced. Since the early 2000s, the city authorities have tried to revitalize the city in several ways: through infrastructural and building projects, as well as through

Fig. 13.1 View from Gower Street towards Salthouse Dock and Albert Dock. From this area, one used to have an open view on the Pier Head and the Three Graces. Now this view is largely obscured by new building blocks. Critics have given the dark buildings in the centre of the picture rather unenviable nicknames like 'the three disgraces' and 'the black coffins'. Picture by the author (2014)

culture and heritage. The European Capital of Culture bid and the World Heritage nomination were the spearheads of the culture-led regeneration strategy envisioned by the City Council.

Although these various element were described as forming part of "the same package of things" (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014), they were certainly not always complementary. The city's revival and the associated construction boom has led to tensions between the City Council and UNESCO, as well as between the City Council and local and national heritage organizations. The third section will discuss two of the most controversial urban development projects: the Mann Island and the Museum of Liverpool scheme (Fig. 13.1), and the so-called Liverpool Waters scheme. The fourth section will place the discussions about these projects in a wider conceptual framework of the opposition between preservation and conservation. It could be argued that while UNESCO and many local heritage organizations strive for traditional 'preservation', the city authorities use the more dynamic concept of 'conservation'. This section will also discuss the impact of the UNESCO World Heritage title on the development of cities like Liverpool. The concluding part of this chapter will focus in more detail on some of the implications of these controversies for the English heritage regime as a whole.

13.2 Rise and Decline of a Metropolitan City

13.2.1 'A Wonder of the World'

In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Liverpool developed from an insignificant fishing town to a vibrant port city that came to play a vital role in the expansion of the British Empire (Travis 2011, pp. 60–61). Its port formed the centre of a global trade network that brought goods and slaves to all parts of the empire and beyond. Liverpool flourished and became one of Britain's most important port city (Bichard 2016, p. 174). Docks and warehouses stretched along the Mersey's shores, attracting thousands of mainly Irish migrant workers. Sugar barons, cotton merchants, slave traders and bankers displayed their newly acquired riches in beautifully decorated houses and offices. Writing in the late eighteenth century, the cleric William Enfield, noted that Liverpool captured the "spirit of modern times". Subsequently, it "cannot be supposed to afford many materials for the entertainment of the curious antiquarian" (Enfield 1773, p. 8). For many urban planners, on the other hand, Liverpool was a source of inspiration. Liverpool's administrators invested in prestigious and highly modern infrastructural projects: tunnels, inner city railways, subways, trams and wet docks. The city reached the peak of its supremacy by the end of the nineteenth century when one seventh of the total world's shipping was registered in Liverpool. Its port handled more cargo than any other in the world. (Wilks-Heeg 2003, pp. 40–41). Besides its key role in international trade, Liverpool was Europe's main hub for transatlantic passenger transport. From here, millions of migrants from Great-Britain, Ireland and the European mainland departed to the New World. Many others chose to stay. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Liverpool became the most multi-ethnic city in Britain. In 1886, the *Illustrated London News* described it as "a wonder of the world [. . .] the New York of Europe, a world-city rather than merely British provincial" (Illustrated London News, 1886, cited in Belchem 2006, p. 23).

Symbolic of Liverpool's wealth and global supremacy around the turn of the twentieth century are its three famous Edwardian waterfront buildings—the Liver building, the Cunard building and the Port of Liverpool building. The construction of these so-called 'Three Graces' started in 1906 and finished in 1917. This achievement turned out to be Liverpool's swan song as a city of global importance. While these buildings were being constructed, the world was changing. During the inter-war years, global trade closed down almost completely and the city was pushed into recession. The industrial production rates of Liverpool's hinterland dropped and with it the domestic trade in raw materials. Even though the pre-war demand for military-related products gave a short boost to the city's industry, the local economy was caught in a downward spiral (Meegan 2003, pp. 54–55; Lane 1987).

13.2.2 'A Beaten City'

After the Second World War, during which Liverpool was bombed by the German air force, the city's economy declined even more rapidly than before. Liverpool's rise in the eighteenth century was undoubtedly extraordinary, but its decline since the mid-twentieth century was arguably even more dramatic. For Liverpool—a city driven by colonialism and maritime trade—the slow but steady disintegration of the British Empire and the subsequent changes in the global division of labour had a devastating impact. The focus of Britain's trade shifted away from the commonwealth and the Atlantic to continental Europe and London's financial services. Liverpool found itself "marooned on the wrong side of the country" (Lane 1987, p. 45). Air travel outcompeted Liverpool's passenger ocean liners. Its port, once technologically advanced, became outdated and lost its prominent position to Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg. Multinationals based in Liverpool either closed down or moved abroad. Liverpool and the city region were "the losers of [the] global restructuring of production" (Meegan 2003, p. 59).

Population rates dropped drastically in the mid-sixties (ONS 2008). Many of the remaining citizens lived in poor conditions (Meegan 2003, pp. 58–59). By the early 1980s, the local unemployment rates had reached 17%, some 4.5% above the national average. Meanwhile, the exodus from Liverpool continued. In 1980, Liverpool counted only some 500,000 residents (ONS 2008). During its period of decline, Liverpool had been able to retain some of its international repute—not least due to the international successes of its pop bands—the Beatles, Gerry and the Pacemakers—and its football teams—F.C. Liverpool, Everton F.C (Sykes et al. 2013). Within the United Kingdom, however, the name 'Liverpool' had become a byword for poverty, dereliction and urban decay. In 1981, the socio-economic problems resulted in riots in the neighbourhood of Toxteth. The riots lasted for nine days and resulted in hundreds of police and public injured, one man dead, 500 arrested, seventy buildings destroyed and damage estimated at £11 million (Vulliamy 2011). At the time, certain London-based politicians advocated that Liverpool should be abandoned to "managed decline" (Rodwell 2015, p. 31). Gradually, Liverpool—once the richest city in the British Empire—became "a beaten city" (Sykes et al. 2013, p. 300) and a "self-pity city" (Bierbooms 2009, p. 144).

The economic free fall not only led to social unrest, but also posed "a heritage challenge without parallel elsewhere in the United Kingdom" (Rodwell 2008, p. 87). With a population virtually half its pre-war size, lack of occupancy formed a major problem. Buildings that used to house shipping companies, dockworkers and merchants were often abandoned and neglected. Even the neo-classicist Saint George's Hall was in such a terrible material state that it was being considered for demolition. In an attempt to turn the tide the local and national authorities launched projects like the 'Urban Programme' and several 'Community Development Programmes' (Meegan 2003, p. 57; Tallon 2010, pp. 12–16; Pendlebury et al. 2004, pp. 11–31). There existed a general conviction amongst both national and local politicians that it

was necessary to redevelop city centres to improve the general living condition of inner-city residents and ensure that they were not socially excluded. With its many unexploited and empty docks, Liverpool provided a perfect testing ground for such redevelopment. Moreover, the city received virtually every form of European and national subsidy for urban regeneration, giving the local authorities also the financial possibilities to experiment (Neild 2004a). Soon, the city became a laboratory for urban and social regeneration experiments—not all of which were equally sympathetic to the historic environment (Couch 2003b).

In retrospect many projects turned out to be failures. Some projects seemed driven by megalomania and were completely insensitive to the city's historic environment, while other projects seemed to show no ambition at all and were indeed 'merely British provincial'. Critics wondered how Liverpool—which had in the past served as an enlightening example for planners in cities like New York and Shangai—was able to produce such incoherent and inconsiderate plans (Sykes et al. 2013). In 1982 a reporter of the *Daily Mail* even suggested that: "They should build a fence around [Liverpool] and charge admission. For sadly, it has become a 'showcase' of everything that has gone wrong in Britain's major cities" (Daily Mail 1982, cited in Lane 1987, p. xii). The various Liverpool City Councils had always played a key role in managing the city's regeneration. However, they had the unenviable and persistent national reputation for mismanagement and a general lack of vision. They were often held accountable for urban planning failures. Initially it was believed that the best way to regenerate the city was through close local-national collaboration, but from the early 1980s onwards the national government took the lead in Liverpool's regeneration. Under the Conservative government, the Liverpool Council was "bypassed and their role marginalized" (Couch 2003a, p. 35).

The City Council had had several conflicts with the central government about how to spend the regeneration funds that were pouring into the city. Particularly the Trotskyist Militants who dominated the City Council in the mid-1980s, clashed with the Conservative national government over issues like housing, taxes, jobs and the role of the private sector. Despite high debts, the Militants did not want to cut back on jobs or services and executed their policies using command-and-control tactics, which have been characterized as "municipal Stalinism" (Ben-Tovin 2003, p. 232). Margret Thatcher's national government, however, was strongly hierarchical and centralized, and ensured that most disputes were settled to the Conservatives' advantage. Local authorities were "to play a subordinate role" in the city's regeneration process. The national government sought to restrain local spending and "encourage[d] a less interventionist role for local government" (Meegan 2003, p. 61). For the Conservative government, regenerating the economy of the inner city was still an important objective, but the old approach to accomplish this—"using local authorities as partners"—was not (Couch 2003a, p. 35). As the local authorities were deemed incapable of handling Liverpool's social and economic issues, the Thatcher government decided to appoint a special 'Minister for Merseyside'. This role was given to the national Minister for the Environment Michael Heseltine—who was also responsible for the creation of English Heritage (Cocks 2009, pp. 456–472; Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg 2000). In the wake of the 1981 riots,

Fig. 13.2 The old and the new Liverpool. The nineteenth century Pilots Office of Albert dock in front of the twenty-first century Museum of Liverpool. The museum houses, amongst others, exhibitions on the history of the docks and on the history of pop-culture in Liverpool. Picture by the author (2014)

Heseltine created the Merseyside Development Corporation, which aimed to regenerate the inner city. Much in line with the political mores of the time, Heseltine aimed to involve the private sector in the city's regeneration. Developers were offered a reduced tax burden in certain zones of the city. Also the re-use of historic buildings in the inner city area and the former docklands was financially encouraged (Couch 2003a; J. Hinchliffe, personal communication, January 29 2013).

One of the achievements of the Merseyside Development Corporation was cleaning up a fifty hectare derelict and polluted terrain for the purpose organizing the 1984 International Garden Festival. The old oil installations, nymphet tanks and domestic scrap heaps were removed and replaced with several greenhouses and gardens. With two million visitors, the festival was considered a major success (Avery 2007, pp. 155–156). Another often cited accomplishment of the Merseyside Development Corporation is the restoration and conversion of Albert Dock (Fig. 13.2). In the 1970s, Albert Dock had silted up and had become derelict. After being restored, this complex of nineteenth century warehouses opened to the public in 1984 (Mah 2014).

Despite its successes, Heseltine's brainchild was criticized for focusing too much on the success story of the Albert Dock, while this was merely a "beacon in the desert" (Rodwell 2008, p. 91). Especially the Leftist politicians in the Liverpool

Council complained that the efforts of the Merseyside Development Corporation focused too much on high-key projects in the city centre, and largely ignored the poor living conditions elsewhere in the city. Local historian Richard Meegan observed that while the Merseyside Development Corporation was spending some £30 million on just 11 hectares, the City Council had only £37 million to spend on the other 94,790 hectares (Meegan 2003, p. 68). Moreover, the lack of local involvement was a point of critique. This slowly began to change in the course of the 1990s. The Major government, that succeeded the Thatcher government in 1992, again began to involve the local authorities in the regeneration of the city. It introduced, for example, the City Challenge Fund—which encouraged local partnerships. It also invested a lot in the city's two universities, which also had a positive impact on the historic buildings occupied by these institutions (Biddulph 2009, pp. 101–102). It was, however, only when New Labour came to power in 1997 that the national political landscape changed in a way that placed local authorities again in charge of the city.

13.3 From 'Self-Pity' City to Overly Self-Confident City?

13.3.1 A New Attitude

Liverpool's heritage officer Rob Burns recalls that with Tony Blair in office the city began to change: "By the end of the 1990s, a different attitude started locally. A different political party came into power that were much more confident. A different national government, Tony Blair and the Labour government, with a much more positive outlook on things. [. . .] Put the two together and the time was right for something to happen in Liverpool" (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014). The Conservative centralization policy was largely undone by Tony Blair's newly elected New Labour government. Soon after coming into office Blair outlined his vision about the relationship between national and local government in a pamphlet entitled *Leading the Way: A New Vision for Local Government* (1998). He explained that well-performing councils could be granted "more freedom and powers to develop new initiatives to address local concerns" (1998, p. 3). The newly appointed Minister for Local Government Hilary Armstrong also gave expression to the central government's vision when she told local authorities: "We are not just a new government, we are a new type of government. Our decisions will not be handed down from on high. We do not have a monopoly of wisdom and ideas. We want to hear your ideas and want you to tell us what you think of ours" (Armstrong 1997, p. 18).

Following these statements, Blair's government implemented a series of decentralization acts. Especially the Local Government Acts of 2000 and 2002 significantly altered the nature of the liaison between the national government and local authorities in the United Kingdom. Certainly not all local and regional authorities profited from the decentralization policy. In regions like Cornwall, for example,

many politicians believed that New Labour's decentralization policies were a mockery. For large cities like Liverpool, however, it meant that after years of being bypassed and belittled, real political power was flowing their way. The new laws enabled the local government "to do anything" to improve the local economic, social and environmental conditions, and substantially diminished central control and inspection measures (Meegan 2003, p. 65). The amount of policy areas where local authorities needed the central government's consent was drastically reduced, leaving more room for local initiatives in fields like housing, business and finance. The strictly hierarchal governance structure that had marked the previous two decades was abandoned and replaced with a new type of multi-level governance in which local authorities were no longer confined to the margins of decision-making, but played a constitutive role (Stoker and Wilson 2005, p. 3). The changes in the national political landscape also provided local authorities with the opportunity to play a more prominent role in heritage conservation, as well as in associated policy areas like infrastructure and urban development—an opportunity that the political leadership of Liverpool would take on with both hands.

13.3.2 Planning for a Renaissance

One of the many proposal of the new national government was to establish local urban regeneration companies that would lead the envisioned renaissance of England's post-industrial cities. In 1999, the Liverpool City Council was the first in the United Kingdom to establish such a company: Liverpool Vision. Liverpool Vision was set up as a not-for-profit limited company charged with preparing and executing urban regeneration plans (Stonard 2003). It was funded with money from the European Union via the regional North-West Development Agency and the City Council. Its board consisted of representatives of both the public and the private sector. The strategic plan drafted by Liverpool Vision in the first twelve months of its existence expressed Liverpool's ambition to—once again—became a world-class city. Its first publication contained popular buzz-phrases seemingly unfit for a city that had barely recovered from decades of social and economic misery. It talked of the ambition to create "a high-quality safe urban environment", "a 21st century economy", "a world-class tourist destination", "a premier national shopping destination" and "inclusive communities" (cited in Couch 2003b, p. 48).

Liverpool Vision has been criticized for being a marionette of corporate developers. The company has always worked closely with private investors. Although the board of Liverpool Vision has several City Council representatives, the majority of its members represent real estate development corporations and investment companies. In relatively poor cities like Liverpool, the bargaining power of investors is relatively high because of a general fear of economic drain. The creation of a body with major regenerative powers and very little local accountability has, according to critics, led to unwieldy and uncontrolled construction projects. Chris Couch noted for instance that: "the balance of power has shifted towards private developers to an

extent almost unparalleled elsewhere in western Europe. Planning and the needs of the local community have become subordinate to the need to stimulate inward investment" (Couch 2003b, p. 49). Apart from stimulating the development of new real estate, Liverpool Vision focused on heritage-related projects. In 2002, it got involved in a partnership with English Heritage, the Liverpool City Council, the North West Development Agency, National Museums Liverpool, and the Liverpool Culture Company. This partnership launched the Historic Environment of Liverpool Project. The abbreviation generally used for this project, spelled out precisely what it was supposed to offer: HELP. Its activities included community education projects about Liverpool's history and heritage, and detailed studies of Liverpool's built environment and archaeology. It also made an extensive list of buildings at risk and developed a strategic plan to fight dereliction.

The information gathered for HELP was also used for the preparation of the World Heritage nomination file (Couch 2003b; Stonard 2003). The plan to nominate Liverpool for the World Heritage title came from the English Heritage regional office in Manchester. In 1999, Liverpool was placed on the United Kingdom's Tentative List (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014). After Liverpool was placed on this list, the city hired the heritage expert John Hinchliffe to prepare a nomination file and a management plan (Liverpool City Council 2004; J. Hinchliffe, personal communication, January 29 2013). The nominated site consisted of six distinct areas that roughly form a T-shape. Three areas are situated along the river: the Pier Head with the Three Graces, the Albert Dock and the Stanley Dock. The other three are further inland: the largely Georgian historic commercial centre, the Lower Duke Street area and the district around William Brown Street, including prominent public buildings like Saint George Hall. The nomination file, which was widely lauded as a very thorough and detailed study, was sent to the World Heritage Center in 2003. Apart from detailed descriptions of the various monuments that make up the World Heritage site, the document provided information about the redevelopment plans for the area. At its 28th session in Suzhou, China, the World Heritage Committee decided to enlist Liverpool.

With regards to plans for new urban developments, the Committee and the UNESCO advisory bodies expressed their confidence in the city's best intentions: "There is no doubt that the City is committed to ensure that the new buildings are to be acceptable in such a heritage area" (UNESCO 2004, p. 130). The enlisting was not welcomed by everyone in the city. Several critics feared that the World Heritage title would hamper the economic recovery of Liverpool. For one observer, the inscription was no reason for joy: "It's a sorry day for those of us that aspire for something more dynamic for Liverpool. Liverpool is a commercially-based city and many people in power have forgotten that. The World Heritage status is not about commercial urban growth – it's a different emphasis on the city's growth potential" (Rodwell 2015, p. 24). The government, however, was convinced that the World Heritage status would be beneficial for the city's economy as it would attract tourists and investors. Minister Tessa Blackstone of the Department of Culture, Media and Sports predicted that: "tourism and inward investment in the city will be boosted, and a new range of people will be attracted. Liverpool is already a world famous city;

World Heritage status will help bring alive its magnificent industrial heritage to a new international audience" (Pendlebury 2009, p. 159).[1]

The city authorities also strongly believed that the World Heritage title would strengthen rather than harm Liverpool's economic position. According to Liverpool's heritage officer Rob Burns: "the World Heritage Site was just a part of that general process of recognition [. . .] Liverpool is actually a really important place and it's really important that it's still here, that it's open for business [. . .] we need to make sure that the quality that's in Liverpool is identified and recognized" (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014). Another part of the same regeneration strategy was the plan to become the 2008 European Capital of Culture. The Capital of Culture bid and the World Heritage nomination went hand in hand (Armitage 2012). Burns claimed there was "an awful lot of complementarity" between the two (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014). In 2000, the British government launched a competition to determine which English city would become 2008 European Capital of Culture. The last British city to earn this title was Glasgow in 1990. The events organized in this Scottish city were widely considered a success and changed the perception of that city. The Liverpool City Council participated in the competition because it hoped that the European Capital of Culture title would benefit their city in the way it had benefitted Glasgow. It was hoped that the title would contribute to the regeneration of the city and improve the regional, national and international perception Liverpool. In June 2003, Liverpool was announced to host the year-long festival of cultural events. Mike Storey of the municipality responded enthusiastically to the success of Liverpool's bid: "This is like Liverpool winning the Champions' League, Everton winning the double and the Beatles reforming all on the same day – and Steven Spielberg coming to the city to make a Hollywood blockbuster about it" (Storey 2003, cited in BBC 2003, p. 1).

While the city authorities believed that this was the next big step in the city's regeneration, others feared it would go at the expanse of the historic built environment. The European Capital of Culture bid and the World Heritage nomination provoked debates about the fundamental question whether heritage conservation and urban regeneration are opposing forces or not. As the architect-planner Dennis Rodwell pointed out, the European Capital of Culture bid and the World Heritage status made clear that there is an innate tension in using heritage for regenerative purposes. He claimed: "'World Heritage City' and 'European Capital of Culture' are potent brand names that attract powerful financial interests that are not always sympathetic to the historic environment" (Rodwell 2008, p. 91). Discussions about the (im)possibilities of combining regeneration and growth with heritage and culture, would come into focus on two particular plans: the plan to redevelop Mann Island and the Liverpool Waters project.

[1] The use of the term 'industrial heritage' is rather peculiar in this context. Liverpool's port was primarily a trading port. Moreover, the Liverpudlians often contrasts their city to industrial Manchester.

13.4 Liverpool's Urban Revival

13.4.1 'Fourth Grace' and Mann Island

Among the many development plans in Liverpool, the plan to build a 'Fourth Grace' was one of the most controversial, especially because it would be situated prominently on the waterfront. This twenty-first century equivalent of the early twentieth century 'Three Graces' was supposed to form a new eye catcher at the Pier Head. According to a representative of ICOMOS-UK the location was unsuitable for a new building: "To seek to erect on the Pierhead a fourth building of such architectural pretention shows a fundamental misreading of the precious nature of the existing group" (Weston 2005, p. 1). The City Council, however, pursued the plans and organized a design competition. The famous architect Norman Foster—especially known for his design of the dome on the German Reichstag and 'The Gherkin' in London—proposed a tall glass structure combined with two triangular extensions. According to a poll by the 'Liverpool Architecture and Design Trust', Foster's design was very popular among the general public. However, the City Council—at the time dominated by Liberal Democrats—was afraid that the huge amount of office space in Foster's design would drain office space from other parts of the city, making it economically inappropriate. Moreover, the City Council deemed the scheme unfit to its surroundings as it would dominate the skyline and overshadow the existing buildings (Henshaw 2002; Jones 2011; Neild 2004b).

Therefore, the council and Liverpool Vision selected a much smaller and lower design by Will Alsop called 'The Cloud' (Fig. 13.3). This decision stirred a lot of debate among the general public, because according to the aforementioned poll this was the public's least favourite design. According its architect and the members of the City Council, however, the design was suitable because the organic shape of the structure would complement rather than harm the existing cluster of buildings. Liverpool's nomination for Cultural Capital of Europe also formed a driving force behind the decision-making process. The originality of Alsop's design was namely used as a key resource in Liverpool's bid to earn this title. In an interview with a national newspaper, the leader of the council Mike Storey, stated that: "The Cloud was one of the images which was key to the Capital of Culture bid. It symbolizes the traditions of Liverpool and more than anything it represents the new Liverpool" (Storey 2004, p. 1).

According to a report commissioned by the European Union, earning the title European Capital of Culture generally leads to infrastructural changes. Many host cities use the opportunity to renovate certain neighbourhoods or to create a permanent 'visible legacy'—usually an architecturally exceptional building (Palmer 2004, pp. 74–76). Such initiatives are not only appreciated by local construction companies, but also by the European Capital of Culture Committee. However, Liverpool's attempt to earn the title European Capital of Culture ran parallel to its nomination for the World Heritage list. Unlike the European Cultural Capital Committee, the World Heritage Committee is usually sceptical towards drastic infrastructural changes in a

Fig. 13.3 View from the tower of the Anglican Cathedral. Along the Mersey shores are from left to right: Albert Dock, Museum of Liverpool, Mann Island, the Three Graces, the existing cluster of tall building and the empty docklands to the north where 'Liverpool Waters' is planned. Picture by the author (2014)

potential World Heritage site. The council was thus in the difficult position to create a daring building scheme that would persuade the Cultural Capital Committee, while trying not to scare off UNESCO.

As noted above, both applications were part of the broader regeneration strategy. It was thus in the best interest of the local authorities to concede to both committees and play chess on two boards simultaneously. Therefore, several attempts were made to comfort UNESCO. In the preface of the official World Heritage nomination file, Story explained for example that: "A number of major developments are currently being proposed in Liverpool, such as the 'Fourth Grace' and the King's Dock Arena. They will inevitable have some impact on the character of the waterfront, but the great challenge that faces us is to ensure that they'll have a positive impact. Liverpool has a tradition and a continuity of change and I do not believe that World Heritage Status will seek to end that tradition" (Storey 2003, p. 5). A later chapter of the nomination file reflects in more detail on the development pressure and stresses that all plans should be fully considered "to ensure that they do not detract from the world heritage interest of the nominated site and, if possible, enhance that interest" (Liverpool City Council 2003, p. 224). The director of the World Heritage Centre, Francesco Bandarin, was also informed directly about the developments in a

letter by the national ministry of culture in which it was argued that urban development in Liverpool is necessary to meet the needs of present and future generations. It also noted that policies and procedures will be drafted in order to control "inappropriate development in the proposed site and its settings". A comprehensive Management Plan will ensure that any construction plans are "sympathetic to the site and do not compromise its outstanding universal value" (Pillman 2003, p. 1).

However, not everyone at the World Heritage Centre felt equally well informed. In February 2003, Peter Stott of UNESCO sent an email to Christopher Young at English Heritage to ask for clarification regarding the 'Fourth Grace': "This is an extremely UNOFFICIAL question but we have had several queries to us concerning a new development that Liverpool is planning for its waterfront, apparently in the middle of the proposed World Heritage site. Are you aware of this?" (Stott 2003, p. 1). Young replied: "We are aware of this but it is very early days yet and Liverpool is a site which is going to need sympathetic development to sustain its economic regeneration. The policies for coping with this will be set out in the Management Plan which is currently being drafted. So far, the concept of the Fourth Grace is at a very early stage and Liverpool Vision have accepted a possible architect, not necessarily his ideas at this time. There is a long way to go" (Young 2003, p. 1).

The way turned out to be less long than Young seemed to have expected or conveyed to UNESCO. In the summer of 2004, the council of Liverpool suddenly decided to halt the project supposedly due to spiralling costs. Some city officials, including Mike Storey, were worried by the decision and wondered what would happen to the site. In their view, Liverpool had lost one of its potential assets as the Cultural Capital of Europe. According to a majority of council, however, the decision was justified because the costs for 'The Cloud' had already risen by almost £100,000,000. It was therefore decided to develop the nearby Mann Island instead (Jones 2011; Storey 2004). This area south of the Three Graces was occupied by a car dealership and the parking lot of the Liverpool Maritime Museum. Plans were drawn for three multi-use buildings that would house offices, apartments and shops, designed by the firm Broadway Malyan. Moreover, the Danish architect Kim Nielsen designed a new museum that would house a collection on the history of Liverpool (Fig. 13.4). The Mann Island project and the museum were closely intertwined, not only in terms of their design rational but also financially. The gains from the commercial development of Mann Island would be used to finance the museum (Rodwell 2015, pp. 37–38).

Will Alsop was upset with the council's choice to draw a line under his project and complained that he was only informed about this decision via the press. According to the architect, the costs were not spiralling as drastically as the council suggested. Moreover, he claimed that his project had become the victim of a strategic move by the council and the organization 'National Museums Liverpool', both of which preferred a new museum over 'The Cloud'. In an interview with a local newspaper he furthermore called the design of the Mann Island buildings typical of the "general malaise of architectural mediocrity" (Alsop 2010). Besides criticism from professional architects like Alsop, the project was fiercely condemned by local and national heritage organizations. In an interview with a local radio station, Wayne

Fig. 13.4 The Port of Liverpool building (1907) reflected in the new office blocks on Mann Island. The Port of Liverpool building is the oldest of the Three Graces and was designed in an Edwardian Baroque style. Picture by the author (2014)

Colquhoun of the 'Liverpool Preservation Trust' provocatively claimed the Mann Island development to be: "the biggest risk to Liverpool's skyline since Goering sent the *Luftwaffe* over in 1943" (Colquhoun 2006, see also Elson and Leece 2009, p. 1). The architect, historian and preservationist Ptolemy Dean expressed a similar resentment. Dean became known to a wide audience in Britain as the presenter of the BBC TV-show *Restoration* in which viewers could decide what historic building should get funding for restoration. Dean was not only critical of the buildings in and of themselves, but also of their visual impact on the area (Fig. 13.2). Even the new museum's architect, Kim Nielsen, initially had his doubts about the location when he said: "Our first reaction was that you shouldn't build here" (Wainwright 2011, p. 1).

Meanwhile, representatives of 'Neptune'—the responsible development corporation—defended the design and argued that the structures are an enrichment for the area. According to the webpage of Neptune the "stunning" and "dramatic" black granite buildings form "an iconic element of Liverpool's waterfront" (Neptune 2013a). Unlike the critics, Neptune was convinced that: "the development respects the scale, height and setting of the neighbouring buildings and proposes simple elegant forms" (Neptune 2013b). The corporation's statement was backed up by officials of the 'Liverpool Urban Design and Conservation Advisory Panel'. Their spokesman Alistair Sunderland noted that the panel appreciated the architectural

properties of the buildings. Especially the complementary contrast between the shiny black granite of the apartment and office blocks and the matt white of the museum was considered a strong feature. Moreover, their unusual shape had a positive impact on the waterfront and made the area as a whole more vibrant (Sunderland 2009, p. 1).

Neptune also had the support of 'English Heritage'. According to Neptune's website: "Conservation and regeneration are key parts of many of our projects [. . .] We are noted for historical accuracy and traditional craftsmanship but we also apply cutting-edge research to contemporary projects to ensure integrity and efficiency. What sets us apart is our acknowledged record of success. Our skills are acclaimed not only by the commercial world but also by such bodies as English Heritage" (Neptune 2013c, p. 1). English Heritage received much criticism for supporting Neptune. A member of the Liverpool Preservation Trust even suggested that the national heritage organization sold its soul to the devil (W. Colquhoun, personal communication, January 31 2014). Although Neptune changed the design based on English Heritage's recommendation, many private heritage organizations believed that the changes were insufficient because the buildings still formed a dissonant feature at the waterfront. Apart from concerns about the design, there existed serious doubts about whether the buildings were really needed. As one observer opined: "That is the tragedy of the Fourth Grace saga. This is a site that did not need to be developed; it was and is a project that serves no real need or essential purpose" (Pollard 2009, p. 20).

The local discussions between opponents and promoters of the Mann Island development also caught the attention of international heritage organizations. The World Heritage Centre received a significant number of letters from private citizens and community groups—including the 'Liverpool Preservation Trust'—that expressed serious concerns about these developments. According to UNESCO, "the design has attracted some adverse comments locally for its prominent setting and dominant form and for its impact on the 'Three Graces' and the River Mersey waterfront" (UNESCO 2003). Some critics, for example, referred to the two Mann Island buildings and the Museum of Liverpool building as the 'Three Disgraces'. Both developments were even nominated for the infamous 'Carbuncle Cup'—an award for the ugliest new building in Britain. The World Heritage Committee had been alert regarding the development of the waterfront ever since it enlisted Liverpool onto the World Heritage List. At its 28th session the Committee insisted that new constructions should respect the qualities of the historic area. New structures should not dominate the existing buildings, but rather complement them (UNESCO 2004).

Two years later, the World Heritage Committee worried that the constructions on Mann Island were not in accordance with these recommendations: "[The Committee] notes with great concern that the new Museum building next to the Three Graces does not comply with the recommendation of the 28th session as it is designed to be dominant rather than recessive" (UNESCO 2006c, p. 1; see also UNESCO 2006b). In order to evaluate Liverpool's state of conservation and in order to assess the impact of the new developments on the site's outstanding universal value, the World Heritage Committee asked heritage experts of ICOMOS and UNESCO to carry out a

monitory mission. This visitation took place in October 2006. The international experts met with several representatives of the local government, experts of 'English Heritage' and the architect of the Liverpool Museum. The delegation also scheduled a meeting with Wayne Colquhoun of the 'Liverpool Preservation Trust' and inspected several plans and models (UNESCO 2006a).

During the mission the architect Kim Nielsen and the City Council defended their opinion that the museum did not dominate its surroundings and that the design took into account the sensitivity of the historic environment. The representatives of 'English Heritage' were also of the opinion that the new buildings complement the 'Three Graces' due to their high-quality design and materialization. The members of international delegation agreed to some extent. They observed, for instance, that the height of the proposed buildings was appropriate because it did not exceed the height of the surrounding structures. However, they believed that the "verticality" and "rhythm" of the 'Three Graces' should have served to inform the new design in order to bridge the historic environment and the contemporary architecture. According to the mission report: "the overall design, with slanting and sliding forms, massive scale and asymmetry, deviates from existing urban pattern and historic character of the locale" (UNESCO 2006a). The delegation shared the concern of local heritage organizations that the developments might have a negative visual impact. It noted that: "when taking into account building density, urban pattern and historic character of the Pier Head, potential threats to the functional and visual integrity of the site may exist" (UNESCO 2006a). It also claimed that the proposed management plan was not translated into detailed development plans for the waterfront.

Despite these points of critique, the ICOMOS and UNESCO delegation concluded that the Mann Island buildings and the museum do not form a threat to the site's outstanding universal value because "the site's protected areas with related structures and individual buildings were not under imminent danger of significant modification or degradation, nor would any of the development proposals obstruct views to them in any significant way" (UNESCO 2006a). The delegation saw no reason at this stage to enlist Liverpool onto the World Heritage in Danger list. The delegation did, however, provide some recommendations to improve the management of the site. It insisted that the council should improve the information supply and involve the local community in the decision making process. The council should also take measures to raise awareness about Liverpool's World Heritage status among the population—and particularly among property developers and building professionals. This, according to the delegation, would diminish polarization and lead to more informed decisions and public support. Moreover, the delegation stressed that the council should improve its methods for the management of the site and its buffer zone. Planning should be controlled more strictly and clear guidelines regarding the maximum height of buildings should be established. New buildings inside the World Heritage site and the buffer zone should not exceed the height of the new museum, and buildings in the backdrop of the 'Three Graces' should not exceed the height of the nave of the Anglican Cathedral (UNESCO 2006a). However, the plans for the redevelopment of the docks on the north side of

the Pier Head—a project called Liverpool Waters—included the construction of some of the tallest skyscrapers in Britain and would become a major concern for the World Heritage Committee.

13.4.2 Liverpool Waters

The Liverpool Waters scheme is a proposal for the development of the derelict land north of the Pier Head. This multi-billion pound project is the brainchild of the real-estate developers of Peel Holdings. A local newspaper wrote that the scheme came with the "mouth-watering prospects of 20,000 jobs, three million square feet of commercial space and homes for 9,000 people" (Liverpool Confidential 2012, p. 1; Hornby et al. 2013). Already before entering the official planning process, Peel published an animated picture of the plan in the Liverpool Echo. Rob Burns recalled it looked "like Dubai" (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014). In October 2010 Peel Holdings submitted an application to Liverpool City Council to secure an 'outline planning permission' for an urban mixed-use development to be implemented over a 30-year period. An estimated investment of £5.5 billion is involved with Liverpool Waters. The affected area stretches along a strip of 2 km along the waterfront from Princes Dock and the King Edward Triangle, north of Pier Head, up to Bramley Moore Dock, at the northernmost extent of the World Heritage site. It foresees to provide a total of 1,278,000 m^2 for housing, office space, cafés, restaurants, shops and community services, plus 413,000 m^2 of parking space both above and underground. The centre piece of the scheme would be the 192 meter high Shangai Tower (UNESCO 2011, p. 11). In 2017 these plans were complemented by a plan for the construction of a new football stadium for Everton at Bramley Moore Dock (Markham 2021, p. 1).

After Peel asked the municipality consent for their plans, the two parties entered a negotiation process. In this negotiation process, the heritage officers of the city tried to bring the plan back to acceptable proportions. The heritage officers tried to convince the developers of the idea that they could reach the same level of density without constructing so many skyscrapers. They were eventually able to negotiate some concessions. The number of tall buildings was brought down substantially, and rather than spread out over the entire property, the tall buildings would be clustered to form a distinct area of six skyscrapers. According to the organization Downtown Liverpool—an interest organization of entrepreneurs and developers—the concessions showed that the City Council was "pandering to the built heritage lobby". Instead the council should be "more forthright in making decisions about development proposals that benefit the people of the city" (Short 2012, p. 67).

The concessions, however, were still not enough to convince English Heritage. In March 2011, English Heritage published a critical report on the developments in which it argued that the scheme would form a threat to the outstanding universal value of Liverpool. In The Independent, an English Heritage official called the plans "muddled, badly drafted and insufficiently precise" (English Heritage 2013, p. 1; see

also English Heritage 2011; English Heritage 2012). Also the Victorian Society—a national non-governmental organization that campaigns to protect Victorian and Edwardian buildings—expressed its concern about the Liverpool Waters project and especially about the skyscrapers. It was concerned that the tall building would overshadow the existing docks and docklands. The Society not only feared the visual impact of the development, but also the loss of historic material—such as a 150-year-old dock wall that developers were planning to pull down in order to improve traffic flow in the area. Spokesman of the Victorian Society, Chris Costelloe noted: "If the Liverpool Waters development gets the go-ahead it will diminish and obscure the dockland character of what was once the world's greatest nineteenth century seaport. We support the regeneration of the area, but a fundamental rethink is required to protect Liverpool's heritage for future generations" (Costelloe 2011, p. 1).

In November 2011, the World Heritage Committee sent another monitoring mission to Liverpool to take stock of the situation. The mission was led by the Dutch urban planner Ron van Oers. The monitoring mission included meetings with representatives of English Heritage, Peel, the city authorities and NGOs like the Liverpool Preservation Trust. The ICOMOS and UNESCO experts were clear in their verdict and threatened to recommend placing Liverpool on the World Heritage in Danger list if the scheme was not fundamentally altered. In their report the mission members concluded if the plans would find way "the World Heritage property would be irreversibly damaged, due to a serious deterioration of its architectural and town-planning coherence, a serious loss of historical authenticity, and an important loss of cultural significance" (UNESCO 2011, p. 15). The main objection of the mission members was the visual impact of the skyscrapers on Liverpool's skyline. A group of tall buildings near the Pier Head would distract the view of the Three Graces—especially from on and across the river Mersey. Van Oers compared it to replacing the frame of the Mona Lisa with a blatant new frame. Although it would still be the Mona Lisa, an eye-catching frame would harm it nonetheless (van Oers 2013, cited in de Bruin 2013, pp. 6–12).

The very evening after the meeting with the monitoring mission, Rob Burns and a representative of the design team met to draft a new plan. Burns recalls that "me and one of the design team members went to a pub and we got the plan out and we redesigned it that night. We took it to the developers the next day and said: Look, Ok, you heard what UNESCO said. We think you can do this while still retaining the same levels of density. So we can get rid of the problem of UNESCO, we can get rid of the six tall buildings, we can give you a high density scheme, everybody's happy [. . .] They wouldn't do it" (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014). Peel Holding stuck to their plans and got the support of the City Council (Peel Holdings 2011). In spite of the many objections made by UNESCO, ICOMOS, English Heritage and other conservation groups, the City Council—dominated by the Labour Party—gave its permission for the project in March 2012. The then leader of the council Joe Anderson—a member of the Labour Party and the current Mayor of Liverpool—expressed his consent of the decision and his enthusiasm for the development project: "Today's decision to grant planning permission for

Liverpool Waters is one of the most significant and far-reaching made in Liverpool's recent history. It is a vote of confidence in a new beginning of a great city. Liverpool has to grow and redevelop if we are to thrive and succeed in the future. We do not live in the past, we are not a museum". Moreover, he declared: "I care passionately about the future of Liverpool and the opportunities and life chances we give our children. Today's decision is for future generations. The new investment, businesses and employment opportunities Liverpool Waters will bring is the future for our city" (Anderson 2012, p. 1).

Anderson clearly prefers to be at the 'giving' rather than the 'receiving' end of the heritage process and aspires to create a legacy for future generations. Fellow Labour councillor Tony Concepcion was equally excited about the opportunities to redevelop the northern docklands. He stressed that the local authorities should send out the message that Liverpool is open for business. Also Frank McKenna, a former regional politician for the Labour Party and acquaintance of Joe Anderson, was pleased with the decision. McKenna is a founding member and chair of Downtown Liverpool in Business (DLIB), a corporate club that aims to attract entrepreneurs, companies and investors and aspires to lobby for private businesses and their economic interests, as well as to stimulate the region's economic regeneration. Moreover, the club advises the local government as well as over 300 local businesses on economic issues. McKenna—once described as 'the most powerful politician of the North-West'—responded to the council's decision by saying that: "This is fantastic news for the city and even better that the scheme can begin in earnest from today. It is an opportunity that will transform and invigorate the city, providing jobs and inward investments on a massive scale, and it will change the face of Liverpool. The council has made the right decision for the long-term future of the city". Moreover, McKenna hoped for government backing: "I just hope that the government are equally supportive of this unique opportunity for Liverpool, and do not give in to the plea from the heritage lobby to call the application in. The scheme has been delayed for long enough. The sooner we get the project started the better" (McKenna 2012, p. 1).

In the summer of 2012, during its 36th session in Saint Petersburg, Russia, the World Heritage Committee expressed its concern about the Liverpool Waters scheme and urged the British government "to reconsider the proposed development to ensure that the architectural and town-planning coherence, and the conditions of authenticity and integrity of the property are sustained" (UNESCO 2012, p. 1). Moreover, it decided to place Liverpool on the list of World Heritage in Danger in the hope that it would encourage the different actors and organizations involved to work out a solution. The developers regretted the decision and stressed that halting the project would be unrighteous both towards Liverpool's future as well as to its past. Lindsey Ashworth of Peel Holdings said in an interview with the BBC that: "It's simply not right to expect derelict parts of cities with such a rich history to stand still and be fossiled" (Ashworth 2013a, p. 1). The decision to give Peel Holdings planning permission for Liverpool Waters was not only a major concern for the World Heritage Committee, but also for English Heritage. The legal procedure in case of disagreement between English Heritage and the responsible local planning

authority is to refer the case to the national government, which was represented in this case by Communities Secretary Eric Pickles, who had to decide whether to take over the case or to leave it up to the local authorities. Much to the disappointment of English Heritage, Pickles gave the municipality permission to proceed after which the planning for the Liverpool Waters project could officially begin. Ashworth responded enthusiastically to this decision: "A big thank you goes to the people of Liverpool who have been behind this project all the way. The weight of our argument has succeeded in overcoming significant objections from both English Heritage and the World Heritage Body UNESCO" (Ashworth 2013b, p. 1).

In the summer of 2021, after several warnings by the World Heritage Committee to abandon the development plans, the site was delisted. The direct reason for this decision was the plan build the new Everton football stadium at Bramley Moore Dock. However, as this chapter shows, the decision did not come suddenly. The plans about the Mann Island development and the Liverpool Waters project had already disturbed the relationship between UNESCO and the Liverpool authorities. At the root of this dragging conflict is a fundamental difference of opinion concerning the question how much change should be allowed in historic urban areas. The concluding paragraph will focus on this difference as it will help clarify why the World Heritage Committee decided to remove Liverpool from the World Heritage List.

13.5 Conclusion: Marrying Conservation and Change?

A few years before the controversy around urban development in Liverpool, the analysts of research bureau PricewaterhouseCoopers observed that: "An increasing local and regional focus on culture and heritage as a tool for regeneration has created an atmosphere where World Heritage site status is more likely to be supported for economic and social reasons that are not directly linked to its primary conservation objective" (PwC 2007, p. 45). In the case of Liverpool, economic growth was certainly a main reason to apply for the World Heritage title. At the time of the nomination, Liverpool was experiencing a remarkable economic revival (Hall 2003). Some believed that the World Heritage title could speed up the socio-economic recovery of the city, others feared the economic growth could lose momentum due to the restrictions that UNESCO would impose on urban expansion. According to John Pendlebury many local discussions about World Heritage boil down to a fundamental dichotomy between development and stasis: "Locally the scale politics of World Heritage can become polarized around positions perceived as pro- and anti-development with each side mobilizing around interpretations of the meaning of the World Heritage site" (Pendlebury et al. 2009, p. 357).

Clearly, in the case of Liverpool there was a mismatch between the expectations of UNESCO regarding the preservation of the World Heritage site and the municipality's ambitions to redevelop the city after decades of economic decline: "Cities are places where people live and work [. . .] We are not a monument. We are a

living city, we're an organism and we must keep evolving. [Liverpool] is an interesting place. And I don't think we should make it less interesting, just because UNESCO thinks it should be less interesting [. . .] It's our city" (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014). The city officials claimed the developments of Mann Island and Liverpool Waters were not a great threat to Liverpool's heritage but added to the already present intangible qualities of the city. Liverpool, it was argued, has always been a commercial city, a city of banks and money. The construction of a new commercial centre is a continuation of that tradition. Similarly, the construction of skyscrapers is justified by referring to Liverpool's reputation as an innovative city. In the 1860s, the Oriel Chambers in Liverpool was the first building in the world to use elevated windows, a technology still used for the construction of skyscrapers today.

Moreover, the Royal Liver Building was once the tallest storied structure in Europe and is generally seen as one of the first skyscrapers in Europe. According to Burns: "Liverpool invented skyscraper technology [. . .] And then we are told: 'no, no, you can't have a tall building because that's not Liverpool'. But it is Liverpool!" (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014). Another part of the city's intangible qualities, according to the city's heritage official, is its sense of purposefulness. In the past, whenever an old building or dock became obsolete, it would be removed and replaced with something new. According to Rob Burns, this intangible quality of the city should also inform present-day development: "a hundred years ago if there was a big project [. . .] that needed to be done, they'd say we do it and if that means we tear down that building there then tear down that building, because we got something new, we got something better. It was purposeful. [. . .] Now how do you acknowledge that in terms of physical environment? How do you add to those wonderful historic buildings without copying them, also saying something about where we are?" (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014).

This means that combining buildings from different period and design should not be discouraged: "here is a building from the nineteenth century and here is a building from the twenty-first century, and this looks like a twenty-first century building and this looks like a nineteenth century building, what's wrong with putting the two together? That's how cities evolve [. . .] There is a creative tension between the historic site of things and the new contemporary site of things [. . .] Just because it's a World Heritage Site doesn't mean to say that the city stopped evolving in 2004 when it was declared a World Heritage Site" (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014). According to Burns, the main problem with World Heritage Site designation is that it focuses too much on physical attributes. "It is about the plan forms, or the building types or the use of materials. And [although] it acknowledges that these are manifestations of commercial or maritime trade [. . .] what it doesn't do is say, what kind of city is Liverpool, let's go beyond the physical characteristics and let's go beyond the shipping buildings. What kind of people, what kind of culture developed that city? [. . .] What are the attributes, the real attributes? [. . .] I am interested in representation and manifestation of what cities are about. For me that goes much deeper than what a city just looks like. It goes to culture, it goes to ideas,

it goes to really odd things like feeling" (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014).

UNESCO and its advisory bodies generally do not recognize the importance of the intangible, immaterial side of heritage. They have, according to Burns, an old-fashioned notion of heritage that does not match the situation in economically and spatially dynamic cities like Liverpool: "I don't think UNESCO and certainly ICOMOS are very good with ideas, with bigger things. I don't think they recognize that. [. . .] I think there is a lack of understanding. I think UNESCO is twenty years behind conservation thinking in the UK" (R. Burns, personal communication, January 30 2014). Burns explains this difference as a clash between the notion of 'preservation' on the one hand, and 'conservation' on the other. According to Burns these terms are often falsely used interchangeably. 'Preservation' implies an approach to heritage that concentrates on trying to prevent change, while 'conservation' is an understanding of heritage in which change is seen as inevitable. Instead of focusing on trying to prevent change, a conservation-based approach tries to manage change in a sensible way (see also Larkham 1999). Burns points out that the conservation-based approach is widely accepted in the United Kingdom. The philosophy of UNESCO, however, is arguably based on the principle of 'preservation'. In recent years, as Chap. 11 outlined, UNESCO has set guidelines for the management of historic cities in which aspects like the intangible qualities of the built environment and interplay between old and new buildings do feature prominently (Bandarin and Van Oers 2012). Yet, according to Burns and several other critics, these guidelines are insufficient. Historic cities, they argue, should not become a fossil when they are inscribed on the World Heritage list.

The controversy about Liverpool's heritage reveals that there exist fundamental differences of opinion about how heritage should be dealt with. These intellectual quarrels coincide with different views on how to arrange heritage management institutionally. Liverpool's economic struggles since the beginning of the twentieth century makes it more difficult to resist the tempting offers made by real estate developers. While UNESCO and ICOMOS try to encourage the City Council to pursue the (in their view more sustainable) path of a heritage-led form of urban regeneration, it remains to be seen if the city is willing to give up on the developer's promise of billions of pounds (van Oers 2013, cited in de Bruin 2013, p. 11).

The debate between the city of Liverpool and international organizations like UNESCO and ICOMOS emerged in a global context in which cities became more autonomous and powerful. The Liverpool City Council had long been bypassed by the successive Conservative national governments. Since the rise of New Labour the City Council is again in control of important policy areas. Larger cities in the United Kingdom have the possibility to pursue their own economic and socio-political agendas and do not want to give up that privilege. In cases where these agendas are potentially threatening to the historic environment, the national government—through English Heritage—has been relatively lenient. In conflicts between local authorities and international organizations, the British government has often sided with the former. English Heritage representatives did try to convince the local authorities in Liverpool to find alternatives for the planned urban developments

that would satisfy UNESCO, but did not actively try to prevent the local authorities from executing their agenda of regeneration and growth, which eventually cost the city its World Heritage status.

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Chapter 14
National Regimes, Global Cities: Urban Conservation and Heritage Regimes in Germany and Britain

14.1 Introduction

Since the 1970s, planners, politicians and the general public have become more aware of the potential (economic) value of historic buildings and neighborhoods. Large-scale destructions of the kind that could be witnessed in cities only 50 years ago, have become almost unimaginable in Europe today. A patchwork of local and national laws ensures that historic buildings are generally well preserved. Yet while the material integrity of individual buildings is nowadays almost guaranteed, historic cities, critics argue, are still threatened by new developments. There exist, for example, numerous instances of controversial skyscrapers or infrastructural works in European historic cities today. Cities are at the centre of economic and cultural globalization, and are changing and expanding rapidly. Local authorities need to find ways of coping with these challenges in ways that do not harm the (touristic) attractiveness of their cities. The conceptual bases for combining the potentially conflicting interests of urban development and historic preservation were laid out in the 1990s. In this period, upcoming constructivist ideas about heritage opened the door for dynamic planning policies, allowing for more change within historic environments. The new attitude towards cultural values that came to dominate much of the international heritage discourse in the 1990s undermined the traditional notion that heritage objects possess innate and absolute value.

Somewhat ironically, by introducing less strict notions of authenticity, UNESCO and ICOMOS helped lay the conceptual grounds for many urban developments that it now resists. The Nara Conference (1994) organized by UNESCO and ICOMOS is a classic example of their work towards reconceptualizing authenticity. According to some observes, the statement issued at this gathering—the so-called Nara Declaration—formed a watershed in the reconceptualization of authenticity and "symbolized a general shift from the old-fashioned, dogmatic theory of the mid-century [. . .] to a greater flexibility and uncertainty of the post-1989 era" (Glendinning 2013, p. 429). The Australian conservation and planning expert Joan Domicelj

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_14

summarized the outcome of the Nara Conference: "Nara told us authenticity did not require any significant place to stay frozen as is – that the outstanding values of a place could be sustained dynamically, so long as the stories remained credible and truthful" (Domicelj, n.d., cited in Glendinning 2013, p. 429; see also Labadi 2010, pp. 74–84). The focus was thus no longer on the material authenticity alone, but also on immaterial values. Authoritative documents like the Nara Declaration retroactively legitimized reconstruction projects conducted in the past—for example in Dresden—and opened the way for new and more flexible heritage concepts—including 'intangible heritage' and the 'cultural landscape'.

The cognitive shift towards a more dynamic understanding of heritage was contested. Traditional forces within the international heritage scene argued that such notions potentially undermined the idea of 'outstanding universal value' and feared that they would be abused. Reflecting on the relativistic turn of the 1990s, the Finnish conservationist, Jukka Jokilehto, noted in a public lecture that: "If all values are equal, then there's no real value anymore" (Jokilehto 2006). Another leading UNESCO expert, the Belgian conservationist Raymond Lemaire, was afraid that the Nara Declaration would become "a shield [for] anyone determined to do anything they want" (Lemaire, n.d., cited in Glendinning 2013, p. 429). Critics like Lemaire were, for example, concerned that new notions of authenticity would be used by planners to justify potentially harmful urban developments. Jokilehto and Lemaire were certainly not alone in their critique. The text provided expert recommendations and conceptual insights, but had arguably little impact on international heritage practitioners who persisted in executing the World Heritage Convention on the basis of traditional preservationist norms and principles. UNESCO should thus not be seen as a univocal entity. Differences existed within the organization about the notion of authenticity and its practical implications for heritage selection, restoration and conservation. On the one hand, UNESCO provided a stage for international experts and ideologues to discuss innovative ideas. On the other hand, UNESCO's executive forces operated within an institutional framework that was not always open to such new ideas. The ingrained practices—fixed ways of dealing with heritage—were not necessarily in line with the abstract notions and expert recommendations of those involved in such initiatives like the Nara Conference. The ambitious and progressive ideas expressed in texts like the Nara Document did not all find their way into the day-to-day regulative practice of UNESCO's executive forces (Zijderveld 2000).

Despite its limited impact on the execution of the World Heritage Convention, dynamic views on heritage such as those expressed in the Nara Document did fuel debates about urban renewal at the local and national levels and provided progressive actors with new arguments and claims to legitimacy. Historic towns and cities, according to the new mores, should not be frozen in time, but should remain living entities. Cities should not turn into open air museums, but should be vivid places where people live and work. The aim of planners, according to this view, should be to ensure that the character of a place does not get lost. The communities living in the city should be allowed to renew as well as to use the old buildings. Heritage preservation was still an important aim, but should not obstruct revitalization and

should benefit the inhabitants. In this context, urban heritage was perceived as part of an economic strategy—creating improved living and investment conditions, increasing property value and attracting tourists. Cities became arenas where local stakeholders with diverse interests interacted with global investment partners and real-estate developers, orchestrated by local authorities and politicians. In order to combine the occasionally oppositional interests of heritage conservation and urban growth, local authorities used innovative heritage concepts including heritage-led regeneration and 'cultural landscape' conservation; notions that allowed for a higher degree of change than traditional notions of preservation and find their roots in the constructivist turn of the 1990s. In this sense, the Nara Document did form a 'shield' for ambitious urban planners.

Against this backdrop, the advantages and downsides of the World Heritage status were reassessed. World Heritage nomination was initially embraced by many local authorities as a potential asset in heritage-led regeneration strategies—especially in the 1990s. As heritage became increasingly tied up with commercial interests, World Heritage became a brand in the global competition for tourism (Meskell 2015; Glendinning 2013, pp. 421–422; Caust and Vecco 2017). Many local authorities not only anticipated the World Heritage title to boost the local tourism sector, but also expected it, to help tackle social problems, to improve the general investment climate and even to serve as a catalyst for architectural renewal (Harrison and Hitchcock 2005).

In recent years, however, the World Heritage title has become subject of political debate. Many local authorities see UNESCO as a far-away watchdog that is insufficiently adept in responding to the challenges and demands of modern globalised cities. As opposed to local expectations—not least resulting from the many progressive texts that UNESCO ideologues produced–, UNESCO in practice upholds a relatively traditional 'preservationist' view on heritage, which increasingly forms an obstacle for urban development projects. With the World Heritage list having passed the mark of 1000 enlisted sites, the World Heritage title arguably lost its significance both as an identifier of Outstanding Universal Value and as a brand in the global tourist economy. The market-value that the title still represents forms no match for the billions promised by international real-estate investors. This chapter investigates the impact of the changing notions of urban heritage and authenticity on the German and British heritage regime, as well as the changing perceptions of World Heritage in these contexts.

14.2 The German Regime: Between Local and International Interests

The changing notions of authenticity discussed above affected and legitimized the restoration—or rather reconstruction—of Dresden's many monuments after World War II. Before the war, adages like 'preserve don't restore' and 'preserve as found'

dominated the heritage discourse in Germany as well as abroad. Conservationists looked at the rare instances of reconstruction with disdain or discarded it as malpractice. In the course of the second half of the twentieth century, the practice of reconstruction became increasingly popular and more generally accepted. Art historian Tino Mager even considered reconstruction "the most successful architectural movement of the twentieth century" (Mager 2016, p. 3). Especially over the last decades, Mager argues, reconstruction has become "an established way of building". Furthermore, he observed that the "strict attitude towards reconstruction" has generally been loosened and that it has become an important element in city planning (Mager 2016, p. 4). Reconstruction was a way of engaging with the past and creating aesthetically pleasing—and thus economically valuable—property. The reconstruction of the Neumarkt in Dresden in the early 2000s, for example, was an initiative of private investment companies to house hotels and luxury apartments.

Apart from legitimizing reconstruction, the new notions of authenticity legitimized urban and infrastructural works. Local and regional authorities frequently tapped into the new international repertoire of more dynamic notions of heritage to justify new urban development. The construction of the Waldschlößchen bridge, for instance, was justified by referring to the region's long-established tradition of building state-of-the-art bridges. In this view, the bridge was not a threat to the heritage of Dresden but an expression of the city's intangible qualities. Moreover, those in favor of the bridge referred to the site's status as a 'living cultural landscape'. According to the bridge advocates, constant intervention was required to maintain this unique scenery. In this sense, international conservationists not only clashed with local and regional authorities but also with their own conceptual dilemmas from the past (Ruggles 2012).

The involvement of UNESCO in the German heritage regime, combined with the controversy over the Waldschlößchen bridge put pressure on the German federalized system and arguably changed the dynamic between the federal government and the *Länder*. While the federal government structure and the associated cultural autonomy of the *Länder* have clear advantages, it has arguably been a barrier for Germany in meeting its international obligations under the World Heritage Convention. The example of the Waldschlößchen bridge controversy clearly illustrates how the Saxon government was able to exercise its constitutional right to autonomously decide on this matter despite the international—and subsequently federal—interests involved. The cultural autonomy of Saxony thus placed the federal government in a difficult position. On the one hand, it was bound to the World Heritage Convention and obligated to ensure that Germany complied with this international treaty. On the other hand, it had hardly any say in heritage related matters and was entirely surrendered to the actions of the *Länder*. In the beginning of the Waldschlößchen bridge controversy, the federal government was reluctant to intervene and saw the issue as an affair of the Saxon government. In the course of the conflict it became increasingly clear that Germany's international credibility was at stake, which led the federal government to take on a more prominent role. It offered, for example, financial aid for an alternative infrastructural solution and actively engaged in debates about the bridge.

The status of UNESCO and the position of the federal government became contested in heated debates between local interest groups. The organizations involved in the case of Dresden were driven by a wide variety of interests, including nature conservation, heritage, mobility and tourism. These actors formed camps and, despite diverging interests, joined forces to either halt or promote the Waldschlößchen bridge project. The German automobile club, for instance allied with the local branch of the Christian Democratic Party to organize a referendum. Nature conservation activists who opposed the plans because it posed a threat to rare species of animals joined forces with those who objected to the project for aesthetic reasons.

The different alliances forged in the course of the conflict were born from opportunism and ran straight through local, national and international divides. This helped sharpen the split between bridge-opponents and bridge-proponents. These camps were not only divided by their respective positions on the bridge project but also advocated divergent views on the role of the federal government. While those in favor of the bridge stressed the importance of local autonomy, those opposing the project encouraged the federal government to take control. The two camps both exercised pressure on the regime either trying to change the interaction between the federal government and the *Länder*, or by trying to consolidate the regional autonomy. Each camp also attributed different meaning and value to the UNESCO status. Those opposing the bridge found the UNESCO status very important and valuable. Local preservation group 'Friends of Dresden' actively sought contact with the World Heritage Centre in Paris. The bridge proponents on the other hand, discarded the World Heritage title as something the city could easily do without and criticized UNESCO for intervening in the local decision-making process.

14.3 The British Regime: Dealing with New Urban Challenges

Once natural enemies, after the 1970s urban planners became more sensitive to heritage interests and vice versa. The British regime is generally lenient towards combing the old and the new. British conservationists and planners experimented with the creative reuse of heritage and with new designs within the historic built environment as early as the 1970s. Such conservation-based approaches—as opposed to more traditional preservation—are firmly embedded in the UK's legal system and in the mind set, training and attitude of most British heritage and urban planning experts. In comparison to many other countries in Europe—France and to a lesser extent also Germany—Great-Britain has been a forerunner in conservation-based heritage approaches (Davoudi 2015, pp. 88–136).

Supported by the decentralization policy of New Labour, post-industrial cities like Liverpool became grounds for experimentation with the creative reuse of abandoned buildings and modern architectural design within conservation areas.

Under the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s, local governments were bypassed and important decisions regarding planning and heritage were taken at the national level. Since New Labour, however, many cities and regions in the United Kingdom received *carte blanche* in planning and heritage related affairs. The decentralization of the late 1990s and early 2000s arguably did not serve rural areas like Cornwall. For the authorities of large cities, however, this political climate changed their role from being mere executers of national policy to driving forces behind experiments with urban renewal and the exploitation of urban heritage.

Having been bypassed and ignored by the centralized Thatcher government, many local authorities eagerly tried to make the most of their new role by actively engaging in regeneration projects. Much like the case of Dresden, the local authorities in Liverpool used dynamic heritage concepts to legitimize the city's regeneration. When it received criticism from UNESCO on the plans to construct skyscrapers near the historic city centre, it argued that Liverpool invented skyscraper technology and that the plans posed no threat to the city's heritage but in fact revived the old tradition of building skyscrapers. The local authorities also justified the urban renewal plans by claiming that Liverpool possessed an entrepreneurial spirit. References to 'esprit locale' fitted into to the conceptual framework that authoritative documents like the Nara Declaration provided, but clashed with conservative forces within UNESCO and ICOMOS, as well as established private heritage organizations like the Victorian Society and the Georgian Group. The local authorities were frequently accused of abusing dynamic heritage concepts to legitimize undesirable and unwieldy urban development.

Critics observed the devolution of authority from the national to the local level with skepticism. They noted that the economic and financial interests associated with globally connected cities comes with responsibilities to which local authorities are insufficiently equipped to handle. City authorities now had to decide on vast offers from international investors and real-estate developers. Critics doubted their ability to do so in a responsible manner. Organizations that strongly opposed the development plans—such as the Victorian Society and the Georgian Group—claimed that the national government should take over from the local authorities. Also local pressure groups like the Liverpool Preservation Trust, doubted the capabilities of local authorities, claiming they were mere amateurs and fearing that they would sell the city to investors at the expense of Liverpool's heritage.

Even though the local authorities also occasionally clashed with national heritage bodies like English Heritage, in the conflict situations with UNESCO the national government generally chose the 'side' of the local authorities. The responsible minister maintained that the decision regarding the development of Liverpool should be taken by the City Council. The national government has the legal ability to 'call in' impactful planning applications in case local authorities and English Heritage do not come to an agreement. In such cases, the responsible minister can bypass local authorities and can decide on the matter him- or herself. In practice, however, this legal possibility is seldom used. In the case of Liverpool—as in the case of Cornwall—important planning applications were not 'called in', despite the national

interests associated with the World Heritage title. As a result, urban experimentation has continued.

14.4 Comparing the Regime Changes

While both national governments initially maintained the position that the planning process was a local affair, the German government eventually did take on a more prominent role once the conflict with UNESCO about the Waldschlößchen bridge had gotten out of hand. Immediately following the delisting of Dresden in 2009, the federal government centralized the nomination process and installed a committee to pre-screen World Heritage nominations. This initiative was a direct response to the Dresden controversy. The thorough screening of nominations is intended to increase the involvement of international and national heritage experts. Before the installation of this committee, the nomination process was influenced by the internal logic of dividing the World Heritage sites equally amongst the German *Länder*. The regional political interests and the perceived economic benefits of the World Heritage title caused the nomination of sites that were "hopeless" (M. Worbs, personal communication, September 27 2013). The principle of a more or less equal distribution of resources—arguably inherent to a federal system—clouded the judgment and led to the nomination of 'lesser' sites or sites that could potentially cause conflict with UNESCO. Apart from the installation of an expert committee, the federal government made additional funding for cultural heritage available in 2011 and 2012 (Blumenreich 2016, p. 1). It also created funds exclusively for World Heritage sites. Like so, the federal government gained influence within the German heritage regime.

The British government, on the other hand, remained aloof—especially in comparison to its German counterpart. The roles assumed by the respective national governments in the conflicts with UNESCO unveiled how the interaction between different layers of government are changing in Germany and the United Kingdom. The regimes of Germany and the United Kingdom developed in oppositional directions and, arguably, became more alike. The traditionally centralized British system has become more decentralized as cities like Liverpool have more autonomy. The British government hardly intervened. In Germany, the existing decentralized system is increasingly disputed and the federal government has taken over several tasks from sub-national governments. The German government tried to mediate actively between the local authorities and UNESCO, offering financial support for alternative less harmful infrastructural solutions. Typifying the British heritage regime as strictly centralized and the German regime as strictly decentralized is, thus, no longer tenable.

Diversified notions of heritage, conservation and authenticity have undermined the uncontested status of UNESCO. The World Heritage title is more and more seen as dispensable (Meskell 2015). The cases of Dresden and Liverpool both show that local authorities no longer perceive the World Heritage title as essential in the global

tourism competition. The statement of former Saxon Prime Minister Biedenkopf that Dresden is 'also beautiful without a title' represents a growing local sentiment that the World Heritage status should only be cherished and maintained as long as it does not obstruct local economic growth and urban development. Although local authorities are generally willing to make concessions to their plans in order to satisfy UNESCO and ICOMOS representatives, the perceived inflation of the World Heritage title gives the latter less leverage in such negotiations. In this regard too, a difference can be observed between Germany and Britain. In the early years of the World Heritage Convention, the German government was eager to participate while the British government remained distant and sceptical. In recent years, German authorities—especially at the sub-national level—have become more sceptical as well.

Urban development fostered the dynamics of cities, its local stakeholders and global entrepreneurs; international institutions, such as UNESCO, following formal procedures, are no longer unequivocally accepted. The recent local criticism on UNESCO's politics points to a change in the perception of supranational organizations. The launch of the World Heritage project in the 1970s mirrored a globalization of the world in general and of the heritage field in particular. Critics today, however, do not see UNESCO as a global actor but a foreign institution based in a far-away capital. Although many local authorities still see the economic advantages of the World Heritage title, the cases of Dresden and Liverpool show that they have come to doubt the desirability of the status in response to UNESCO's interventions in local planning.

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Part V
Reflections

Chapter 15
Discussion and Conclusion: Usefulness of the Multi-Level Perspective

15.1 Introduction

This book began with the observation that it has become immensely difficult to find satisfying answers to Michael Hartfield's simple but eloquent question: "Whose heritage is it?" (Hartfield 2001, p. 1). From the inception of heritage as a concept in the mid-nineteenth century until well into the second half of the twentieth century, the histories and internal logics of national heritage organizations and institutions provided obvious entrances for answering this question. In recent decades, however, the heritage field has become wider and more diffuse. The involvement of a growing number of local, regional, trans- and international actors has made it nearly impossible to pin down who is precisely in charge of the selection, preservation, funding, restoration and interpretation of heritage. I argue that the changing contours and increasing complexity of the heritage field should not be seen as an isolated phenomenon, but rather needs to be examined in relation to a changing world. The major economic, political and cultural developments of the last half-century affected heritage practices and its institutional constellations.

A brief comparison between the first cluster of case-studies from the 1970s and 1980s and the last cluster of case-studies from the early 2000s already shows how immensely diffuse and complex the heritage field has become in the course of the period under scrutiny. The heritage status of traditional monuments such as Aachen and Durham Cathedral and Durham castle was undisputed. The preservation and restoration of these buildings was, of course, challenging, yet their management was lead by individuals within officially designated heritage agencies and organizations. The heritage value of Dresden and Liverpool, on the other hand, was controversial and it was unclear who was in charge. The controversies about urban and infrastructural developments in these cities mobilized people in great numbers. This transition illustrates that heritage became a widely disputed issue in the course of the past 45 years, with a larger variety of actors involved than in the past.

B. Zwegers, *Cultural Heritage in Transition*, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93772-0_15

The Multi-Level analysis conducted throughout this book is an attempt to complement the existing theoretical frameworks to analyse the exact nature of current complexities of heritage conservation and preservation. The aim of this concluding chapter is twofold. Firstly, I will return to the main research questions posed in the introduction: How did the nationally oriented heritage regimes in the United Kingdom and Germany change over the past 45 years? What landscape developments have put pressure on existing regime arrangements? And which niche activities helped change heritage regimes? In order to answer this question I will describe general trends and specific mechanisms in the changing heritage regimes of Germany and the United Kingdom based on the six case-studies on Aachen, Durham, Essen, Cornwall, Dresden and Liverpool. I analyse how landscape developments impacted the heritage regimes and assess the extent to which the cases described in this book can be framed as niches for regime change. While some cases functioned as cradles or catalysts for broader regime transitions, other cases merely reflected ongoing trends.

The introduction of this book, identified two main challenges to the traditionally nationally oriented heritage regimes: internationalization/globalization and regionalization/localization. The analysis will focus first on World Heritage as the embodiment of the globalization and internationalization of the heritage field. It will discuss UNESCO as an idealistic project, evaluate the implementation of the World Heritage Convention in the respective regimes and analyze local perceptions of World Heritage. The second part will focus on the changing dynamics between different layers of government. Regionalization and localization affected the interaction between national institutions and other sub-national actors. I will evaluate how changes between government layers affected the regulative, normative and cognitive regime rules, and how this ultimately affected what heritage was preserved and how. Lastly, the chapter aims to critically review what the Multi-Level Perspective can contribute to the study of heritage. It will assess how this perspective can complement existing heritage theories and discuss some of its potential pitfalls.

15.2 World Heritage: Changing Motives, New Opportunities and Challenges

15.2.1 The Broadening Scope of Heritage

Over the course of the decades that are studied in this book, the heritage concept has become more inclusive, ranging from individual monuments, to industrial sites and urban ‘cultural landscapes’. Traditionally, heritage preservationists focused primarily on the preservation of elitist architecture—stately homes, castles, cathedrals. Although efforts to include other types of heritage date back even to the pre-war era, it was in the 1970s that the broadening of the heritage scope accelerated. This process in part mirrored the changing societal landscape in which traditional social

structures and power relations were modified. A growing number of preservation groups and amateurs began to focus on preserving less elitist forms of heritage such as vernacular and industrial buildings. UNESCO largely followed this trend. The first heritage sites that were enlisted onto the World Heritage list in the 1970s were traditional monuments with almost undisputed historic and aesthetic value. In later years, the list was supplemented by industrial heritage sites. Unlike the traditional monuments that were registered before, the inclusion of industrial sites was disputed. In recent years the catalogue of World Heritage sites has been further expanded to include many larger (inner-)cities (Cossons 2012).

The broadening scope of heritage posed new possibilities for former industrial regions and cities to attract tourists, boast their international repute and improve the local investment climate. At the same time, the broadening scope of heritage posed new challenges in the context of previously less pressing issues related to reuse and urban planning. Preserving large urban areas required the introduction of new planning principles. Moreover, UNESCO's involvement in ever vaster and more complex sites made the interaction between this international organization and local, national and other transnational actors and organizations arguably more difficult. In the case of traditional monuments, the responsible local and national actors could largely continue the way they were used to. The same restoration and preservation principles could be applied when the first World Heritage sites were selected in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The UNESCO status changed little for those involved in the day-to-day management of these sites (H. Maintz, personal communication, June 24 2014).

In the case of later inscribed industrial and urban heritage sites, local and national actors were forced by UNESCO to develop and execute extensive management plans (UNESCO 2013). Drafting and executing these plans not only meant additional work for local and national authorities, it also meant that they had to manage sites differently than they did before. In the early years of the World Heritage Convention, local actors met UNESCO's involvement with either indifference or with considerable enthusiasm. In recent years—not least due to the broadening scope of heritage and the associated expanding interests involved—the enthusiasm for UNESCO's involvement has somewhat been tempered. While many local authorities still pursue the World Heritage title for the perceived economic benefits, in cases where the title became a break on economic growth, local authorities expressed serious doubts about the desirability of UNESCO's intervention. This does not imply, however, that heritage has become less important. On the contrary, I will argue.

In the beginnings of the World Heritage project, an obvious assumption and legitimization for enlisting was preservation. It was firmly embedded in the normative and cognitive rules of the heritage field. In fact, the foundations for the World Heritage project were laid in the 1960s when three different sites were in danger of destruction, each of which was followed by major rescue attempts led by UNESCO. First was the placing of the Aswan dam in Egypt, which endangered the temples of Abu Simbel. Second was the flooding of Florence in 1966 and third the annual winter flooding of Venice. According to UNESCO, especially the construction of the

Aswan Dam and the subsequent international campaign to salvage and save a range of cultural material from inundation and destruction, demonstrated "the importance of solidarity and nations' shared responsibility in conserving outstanding cultural sites" and thus the need for a World Heritage Convention (UNESCO 2005). According to Henry Cleere, the former ICOMOS World Heritage Coordinator, the document is characteristic of the spirit that reigned in the 1960s and 1970s. It largely reflects a growing public concern regarding the rapid cultural and social changes following the European post-war reconstruction and the economic developments in the world in general. The Convention responded in part to a rapidly changing social and cultural landscape, which was seen to exacerbate the threat to cultural sites. At the same time it reflected the idea that heritage preservation should be an internationally shared responsibility (Cleere 2001, p. 22).

Nowadays, preservation has become part of an intricate aggregation of interests. The aim of preservation no longer dominates the cognitive and normative framework of the heritage field (K. Ley, personal communication, June 28 2016). With preservation no longer forming an obvious aim of enlistment, what remains is a label that is predominantly pursued for economic gain and can be dismissed, as the cases of Liverpool and Dresden showed, once it becomes an economic burden. The next section will analyze the changing perception of World Heritage in national and local contexts, and evaluate the impact of World Heritage on the heritage regimes of Germany and the United Kingdom. On the one hand, in the period studied, it becomes clear that guidelines from the World Heritage Convention were not, or only partially, implemented at the regime level of these different nation-states on several occasions. On the other hand, policy debates stirred up by UNESCO were not always adopted on the executive level of UNESCO's bureaucracy. This has increasingly strengthened the perception of UNESCO's bureaucracy as a 'foreign' institute (see Chaps. 12 and 13).

15.2.2 World Heritage in Germany

In Germany, the World Heritage project was embraced in the 1970s by the Christian-Democratic government as a way to shake off the nationalist past and reinterpret Germany's national heritage. In the hands of Nazi-propagandists, heritage preservation had become a highly politicized affair. As Chap. 2 showed, heritage had become an ideological instrument to demonstrate the superiority of the German race and to glorify the German *Heimat*. After the war, heritage preservationists had great difficulty to win over the public for their cause (Koshar 1998). The past was contaminated and those who wished to protect its relics were suspect. It was only in the 1970s that the normative rules for heritage preservation began to change (Koshar 2004). Heritage again became a wide public concern, yet the ideological grounds for this renewed interest was fundamentally different from the ones that had motivated preservationists in the first half of the century. Rather than positioning it as a means for national aggrandizement, the efforts of heritage professionals and a

growing number of passionate amateurs focused on preserving and restoring heritage that expressed cultural plurality and internationalist ambitions. When UNESCO started the World Heritage project in 1972, the German government was quick to jump on the bandwagon as it could help Germany to finally leave the nationalist past behind and to further normalize its international relations (Duval forthcoming). Joining the World Heritage project allowed Germany to symbolically denationalize its heritage and to subsequently conclude the process of reconciliation. This ambition is most clearly reflected in the nomination of Aachen Cathedral that was discussed in Chap. 4.

The World Heritage project was not only strongly supported by the federal government but was also embraced by many local actors who used the World Heritage title to promote cities and regions to tourists and to attract national and international funding. Even though the owners of the traditional monuments that were enlisted in the early years of the World Heritage Convention expected the World Heritage title to change little regarding the day-to-day care for their property, they did not object to participating and indeed tried to use the newly acquired status to their advantage. The owners of Aachen Cathedral, for example, made strategic use of the UNESCO infrastructure to promote their monument on an international stage, hoping to attract foreign and domestic donors as well as to increase the number of visitors. The case study of Aachen showed that local actors were successful in using the World Heritage title and were able to increase corporate, private and governmental funding for the restoration and upkeep of the cathedral. The new international interpretation of Aachen's heritage was part of a general trend of reinterpreting Germany's past. The case of Aachen thus reflected ongoing political and cultural landscape developments rather than contributing to a fundamental regime change.

Despite the active involvement of the German government in the UNESCO World Heritage project and the initial local enthusiasm for it, the German heritage regime remained relatively maladjusted to the World Heritage Convention. The Convention's operational guidelines were never fully incorporated into the federal or the regional legal system. Although the international outlook became firmly embedded in the regime's cognitive and normative rules, the regulative rules were arguably not entirely attuned to the World Heritage Convention. The limited implementation of the Convention into the German heritage regime especially became an issue with the broadening of the heritage concept and the subsequent challenges related to reuse and urban development. Traditional monuments such as Aachen Cathedral were generally sufficiently protected—at least in Germany–, also by UNESCO's standards (L. Henning-Meyer, personal communication, June 6 2014). However, the potential for conflict and disagreement became apparent with the introduction of new types of heritage for which the regime rules were not clearly fleshed out. Especially for industrial heritage sites, such as the Zollverein mine discussed in Chap. 8, existing regime rules fell short (Cossons 2012). This left much room for innovation and experimentation, which brought regimes and niches into conflict with the bureaucratic procedures of UNESCO. Many of the adaptations that were made to the German heritage regime were not made directly after the German government signed the World Heritage Convention, but only later in

response to specific niche developments. In the early years of the World Heritage project, nominations were not accompanied by extensive management plans. It was only in the aftermath of locally emerging problems—undesirable urban development and issues of reuse—that such management plans became obligatory.

According to Frank Geels and Johan Schot, niches offer protection against regime forces. Niches are confined spaces where innovation is possible because the regime is not able to readily impose its rules. In this sense, sites like Zollverein could be perceived as niches that enabled more or less free experimentation with the use and reuse of heritage. Especially in the late 1980s, there was insecurity about which rules applied to sites like Zollverein, leaving much room for innovation to occur outside the reach and control of established regime actors like state-sanctioned institutions. These innovations institutionalized as the regime strengthened its grip on industrial heritage. Gradually, rules and institutional arrangements were created around sites like Zollverein. Initially, the authorities were not involved, but steadily these sites were submitted to the regime's protective measures. At first, industrial heritage sites were managed on the basis of cognitive and normative rules. In the course of the 1990s, the protection and management of such sites became more fixed in legislation and other regulative rules.

Yet, the innovation process that had started at Zollverein and other abandoned industrial sites was not entirely undone (Dorstewitz 2014). Instead, the regime rules were slightly changed in the process. Innovative approaches to heritage such as the 'conservation through utilization' philosophy became official policy and still largely apply to industrial heritage in the Ruhr region and elsewhere. With the enlisting of Zollverein onto the World Heritage list, this conservation through utilization philosophy was partially undermined, because UNESCO objected to several adaptations to the structure. This traditional preservationist approach of UNESCO representatives also formed the root of the conflict over the motorway bridge in Dresden discussed in Chap. 12. Due to its unique character—Dresden is the only cultural heritage site ever to be erased from the World Heritage list—the case of the Waldschlößchen bridge fundamentally changed the relationship between the German federal government and UNESCO. It also affected the established regime relations between the *Länder* and the federal authorities. As an unprecedented and unique case, the conflict in Dresden undermined the regulative rules regarding the division of responsibilities between the national and sub-national levels in Germany. The Dresden case directly led to reforms, including the changes in the German World Heritage nomination process and the funding of World Heritage sites by the federal government. Arguably, the case of Dresden has functioned as a niche for wider changes in Germany's relation to UNESCO as well regarding the interaction between different layers of government within Germany itself.

15.2.3 World Heritage in Britain

Unlike the German government, the government of the United Kingdom was initially skeptical towards the World Heritage project and only ratified the Convention in 1986. A number of contextual circumstances can explain the British government's reluctance to join the World Heritage project. First, Britain did not suffer from extreme, violent nationalism. Its government was therefore less ideologically driven to partake in the World Heritage project. Moreover, the British government believed that it was unnecessary to add another protective layer over sites that in their view were already efficiently protected by national legislation (Pendlebury 2000). Britain is traditionally known to have an extensive and well-established regulative system for heritage preservation (Delafons 1997). The government doubted whether the World Heritage Convention would add any value to its pre-existing regulative system. After it had somewhat reluctantly ratified the World Heritage Convention in 1986, it again left UNESCO in 1987 because it disagreed on the way the organization was run and the way it divided its budget. It was only in 1997, with the installation of the New Labour government, that Britain rejoined UNESCO (Dutt 1995).

Partly due to this ten-year gap in its UNESCO membership, the British regime long remained relatively unadapted to the World Heritage Convention and was in later years vulnerable to conflicts with UNESCO and ICOMOS. Mismatches between these international organizations and the regulative rules of the British heritage regime became particularly visible in cases where interests of urban planning and heritage preservation had to be merged (see Chaps. 9 and 13). The procedures of the British heritage regime were not always in line with the procedures of UNESCO. While the British authorities were, for example, legally required to respond to planning applications within a relatively short time span, the UNESCO World Heritage Committee meets only once a year to discuss ongoing affairs. Moreover, the British regime is generally lenient towards urban development within historic areas, while UNESCO upholds a more traditional preservationist view on heritage protection. The British regime is arguably maladjusted to the UNESCO World Heritage project both procedurally and conceptually. In the cases studied, the conflicts between UNESCO and the British authorities have generally been settled to the advantage of the latter. This testifies both to the hardness of the British heritage regime and to the limited means for intervention at UNESCO's disposal (Ashworth and Van der Aa 2002).

While the UNESCO World Heritage Convention had little direct impact on the British heritage regime, local niche actors actively used the World Heritage title for many purposes such as securing more funds for restoration work. Initially, the World Heritage title did not come with additional legal protection or funding. For local niche actors—particularly the owners of World Heritage sites—the title became symbolic leverage in negotiations with the national government. This mechanism is best illustrated in in Chap. 5 in documenting the case of Durham castle. The owners of this World Heritage site—Durham University—faced major financial troubles

because their property was affected by acid rain. The heritage regime was initially not equipped to offer financial help to this particular type of owners. The owners of the castle then pressured the government into changing the regime rules so that they would become eligible for additional funding. The government's alleged responsibility to care for the British World Heritage sites was a recurring argument used in these negotiations. The pressure of these niche actors on the heritage regime eventually helped change the funding rules for British heritage sites in semi-public ownership. This exemplifies the transition mechanism that regime changes are generally preceded by a period in which the regime is in flux, in which there is a lack of clarity about which rules uphold and in which regime actors are unsure about the division of responsibilities (Geels 2007).

For most of its 45 year history the World heritage title has been perceived by local actors as an advantage, but in recent years it is sometimes seen as a burden and a break on local and regional development. This changing perception can be observed both in Germany and in the United Kingdom. In the 1990s and early 2000s, when heritage became increasingly tied up with commercial interests, the World Heritage title was generally seen at the local level as an opportunity to stimulate local economies and propel regeneration. The reuse of industrial heritage sites in Cornwall exemplifies this. However, recent conflicts—like those that occurred in Liverpool and Dresden—show that the title is not only an economic opportunity but can also stand in the way of growth and development. As said, UNESCO generally maintains, at least in practice, traditional notions of preservation that can hinder regeneration projects by often global investors. Such situations regularly occur in relation to urban development of globalizing cities. Especially in the case of Liverpool, much like in the case of Dresden, the needs of local authorities and the interests of UNESCO drifted apart.

On the executive level, UNESCO maintained its traditional institutional way interacting with national member states. This posed a variety of problems for local actors. First, the communication between local authorities and UNESCO was generally slow because it formally had to go through national channels. Second, through the World Heritage project, national governments had an additional interest to protect sites and were thus more inclined to pressure local and regional authorities into taking measures to comply with the World Heritage Convention. The German and the British heritage regimes were hardly directly affected by UNESCO, but World Heritage did affect the interaction between local, regional and national actors within the regime by creating new opportunities and challenges. UNESCO was initially a token of internationalization and cosmopolitanism, but in recent years it is increasingly perceived by local actors as a sturdy, old-fashioned institution with a traditional governance structure. Several local actors, for example in the cases of Cornwall and Liverpool, complained that they were excluded from the process as all communications with UNESCO must go via national channels. Rather than a truly global institution, UNESCO is by some actors perceived as a Parisian watchdog with little sense of the needs and questions of local actors—a mechanism most clearly at play in the case of Liverpool in Chap. 13.

15.3 Interaction Government Layers: Germany and Britain Become More Alike

15.3.1 New Interactions Between Layers of German Government

Despite several attempts by the federal government over the past 45 years to assume more responsibility in the heritage field, the governments of the *Länder* have managed to consolidate and strengthen their legally and bureaucratically dominant position. After the Second World War, Germany introduced a decentralized system in which the *Länder*, and not the national government, were responsible for heritage selection and preservation (see Chap. 2). From its inception, this system was questioned by preservationists and government officials for its supposed lack of effectiveness. Although the decentralized system was seen to have advantages, several actors speculated that a more centralized government system would perhaps be more efficient. One of the main disadvantages turned out to be that it was more difficult for Germany to partake in international heritage initiatives because it could not speak with one voice. In the mid-1970s, the federal government tried to assume a more prominent role within the German heritage regime (see Chap. 4). The international heritage events and projects in which Germany was involved required at least some degree of national coordination. For example, the national government tried to use the European Architectural Heritage Year as an opportunity to draft a federal heritage law—an attempt that failed. In the course of the 1970s, the *Länder* drafted their own new heritage laws, thereby countering the federal government's attempts to gain control of heritage process. The case of Aachen, for example, testifies to the importance of the *Länder* within the regime, as well as their role in the process of suggesting World Heritage nominations to the federal government.

The *Länder* occasionally used their powerful position to bypass and overrule municipal authorities. This became especially apparent in the case of the Ruhr region, discussed in Chap. 8. On several occasions, municipalities in this region tried to obstruct the preservation of industrial buildings, which was in direct opposition to the *Land*'s economic transformation strategy of heritage reuse. Following the municipalities' unwillingness to cooperate, the government of North Rhine-Westphalia bypassed the municipalities in the Ruhr region and took full control over the regeneration process. It further enhanced its position by creating semi-governmental organizations like IBA Emscherpark. Although this organization worked closely with municipalities, its mandate was far greater. Organizations like IBA Emscherpark took over many tasks from local authorities, further strengthening and consolidating the *Land*'s position vis-à-vis municipalities.

While the governments of the *Länder* are still largely in charge of heritage-related affairs in Germany, the federal government has recently taken over several tasks following conflicts between UNESCO and the *Länder*. The direct reason for assuming this more prominent role is the debate around the Waldschlößchen bridge in Dresden that was discussed in Chap. 12. Despite objections from UNESCO and

ICOMOS, the municipality of Dresden and the *Land* of Saxony were both in favor of this controversial project. As the signatory of the World Heritage Convention, the federal government arguably had the international obligation to try to prevent the bridge project, but the regime rules prevented the federal government from overruling the *Land.* In order to protect its interests and international reputation, the federal government has created a national committee that pre-screens World Heritage nominations. It also created additional funding possibilities for German World Heritage sites. Despite these interventions the *Länder* arguably still form the most important actors within the German regime. The new role of the federal government should not be exaggerated.

15.3.2 Centralization and Decentralization in Britain

The already centralized British heritage regime was further centralized under the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s. The government did so by creating semi-autonomous national government agencies such as English Heritage (Pendlebury 2000). This allowed Westminster to control heritage policy even more firmly than before. The centralization of the heritage regime, however, met opposition in many cities and regions. In Cornwall, for example, local actors felt misrepresented by English Heritage and were in favour of creating an autonomous Cornish heritage organization (Eustice 2011). So far, these attempts have been unsuccessful. The case of Cornwall, in this sense, could be seen as a failed niche. Actors at the regional level tried—sometimes through violence but mostly through diplomacy—to change the regime. The niche movement, however, did not gain enough momentum to bring about regime change. Yet, opposition to the centralized government structure was certainly not confined to Cornwall. In cities such as Liverpool, the governmental centralization policy of the 1980s and 1990s was opposed because it almost completely ignored local authorities. Here too, the national government installed agencies—like the Merseyside Development Corporation—that were put in charge of the heritage process at the expense of the municipality's influence (Couch 2003). Despite this opposition from regions and cities, the governments of Thatcher and her successor Major were able to strengthen the dominant position of the national government within the British heritage regime. This would only begin to change in the late 1990s.

With the election of the New Labour government in 1997, municipalities and regional governments were again put largely in charge of heritage (Blair 1998). This decentralization, however, only served some cities and regions. The decentralization policy of New Labour was largely based on economic principles and ignored the history, identity and shared culture of regions. For regions like Cornwall, the decentralization did not have the desired effect, but for large cities like Liverpool it meant that they could exercise more control over both heritage and urban regeneration (Meegan 2003). This trend has continued into the twenty-first century. The national government, while still being a crucial actor within the British heritage

regime, now often abstains from getting involved in local planning and heritage issues. In recent years, the central government has been reluctant to intervene in local decision-making regarding heritage even when the World Heritage status was endangered. In both the case of the construction of the supermarket in Hayle (Cornwall) and the large-scale redevelopment of downtown Liverpool, for example, the national government decided not to interfere and leave important decisions to sub-national authorities. In conflicts with UNESCO about local urban development, the British government often sides with the local authorities (see Chaps. 9 and 13). As the British regime is relatively tolerant towards new urban development, it generally does not try to prevent this—not even under pressure from UNESCO. The British government does actively use its UNESCO channels to convince the World Heritage Committee of its lenient position towards urban development. The Committee recent decisions to place Liverpool on the World Heritage in Danger list and its threats to do the same with the Cornish mining site shows that the British government's lobbying had only limited success and that UNESCO in practice persisted in its traditional preservation-based approach to heritage.

Overall, the governance of heritage United Kingdom has arguably become more decentralized—devolving power to cities and regions–, while Germany has become more centralized—by increasing central government control and funding. The heritage regimes of Germany and Britain took different paths after the war. While the German regime reintroduced the decentralized system that existed before 1930s, Britain adapted a system in which the national government formed the spider in the web. Over the period that was studied in this book, however, the two regimes have become more alike. In both national contexts the interaction between different layers of government has changed—not least as a result of developments in social, political and cultural landscape. The British heritage regime is, in comparison to the German heritage regime, more sensitive to changes in the national political landscape. Political whims in Britain have direct consequence for the execution of heritage policy, as is demonstrated by landscape developments such as the rise of Thatcherism in the late 1970s and 1980s or the electoral victory of New Labour in 1997. Both had far-reaching consequences for the heritage field. In Germany, on the other hand, the regime has generally remained more stable. As a responsibility of the *Länder*, heritage preservation in Germany is to a lesser extent subjected to national political changes—even though the internationalisation of the heritage field has put a strain on this established institutional arrangement.

15.4 An Assessment of the Utility of the Multi-Level Perspective

The introduction of this book began with the observation that the young discipline of heritage studies might profit from a fresh theoretical approach to capture and analyze the increasingly complicated heritage field. In recent years theoretical work on

heritage has expanded steadily. In the early 2000s David Harvey (2001, p. 321) still accused heritage scholars of "producing endless present-centered case studies for little apparent reason", but today that critique would be most unjustified. Scholarship on heritage has become both theoretically rich and methodologically advanced. However, there is certainly no cause for resting on our laurels. Quite the opposite is true. As the heritage field is changing, so should the theoretical and methodological tools we use to study it.

The Multi-Level Perspective can complement existing heritage approaches in a number of ways. One advantage of the Multi-Level Perspective is that it has the potential to lead scholarship away from the seemingly endless and often unfruitful discussions about whether notions of heritage and its preservation are imposed from top down or whether they emerge bottom-up. The Multi-Level analysis conducted throughout this book shows that neither claim is true. The selection and interpretation of heritage is not controlled by an all-powerful cultural elite, nor by emerging grassroots organizations, but is the outcome of continuous negotiations between a wide variety of stakeholders who, sometimes, opportunistically forge and break alliances depending in the situation they find themselves in. The concepts of niches and heritage regimes as relatively non-hierarchical networks of actors, organizations and institutions capture the notion that the heritage process cannot be understood by focusing on power relations alone.

Due to the 'discursive turn' in heritage studies in recent years, the wider context in which heritage is selected and interpreted has not received much attention. Much research focuses almost exclusively on the discourse that is propagated in official charters and policy papers, mistakenly raising the suggestion that heritage practices take place in a political or economic void. The various cases discussed in this book show that it is vital to take landscape developments into consideration when analyzing heritage processes as these often have a major impact on the interactions between stakeholders and create gradients and affordances for their actions. While the analysis of discourse is undeniably indispensable for heritage studies, the Multi-Level Perspective allows for the analysis of discourse in a wider context, thus broadening and enriching the analysis. This research made clear that heritage regimes and niches can be impacted by a wide variety of landscape developments, including for instance changes in the environment, business cycles, political culture and demographics. Landscape developments do not serve as a mere background for certain actions of regime and niche actors, but form a crucial explanatory factor for them. The impact of landscape developments can differ from case to case. This part of the Multi-Level analysis is strengthened by a historical comparative viewpoint. Yet, my work also illustrates that the Multi-Level Perspectives has several ingrained pitfalls which require further attention.

The first challenge is to define the empirical boundaries of the regimes. Most regimes are 'carried' by a limited number of (mostly) national actors, organizations and institutions. The roles of these actors, organizations and institutions change only slightly with time. Overall these core actors remain important and ensure relative stability. Other actors, however, are less firmly embedded within the regime. These actors can be outside the regime in one period or situation, and be an integral part of

it in another period or situation. Certain NGOs, for example, that initially only acted locally and opposed the regime, might later be integrated into the regime. While key actors, organizations and institutions are relatively easy to identify, it is more challenging to identify the precise role of actors that operate on the edges of the regime. It is, thus, important to first identify 'primary' regime actors and then trace the networks around these in order to identify 'secondary' regime actors in order to define the empirical boundaries of the regime.

A second challenge in applying MLP to heritage is to define the niches. In MLP, the niches are generally seen as the starting point of innovation and regime change. While this might be the case for technological developments, the cases discussed in this book show that changes to heritage regime do not necessarily start within niches. Some changes to the regime are merely the result of the regime's internal dynamics or a direct response to landscape developments. It is therefore crucial not to focus on niches exclusively but pay equal attention to landscape and internal regime developments. All in all, however, the research has shown that with some theoretical refinement, MLP can make a contribution to heritage studies. In the future it would be useful to further investigate the utility of MLP by assessing, for example, to what extent the notion of a heritage regime applies to non-Western countries.

Another way in which heritage regimes could be studied is by analysing the precise impact of intangible heritage on debates about preservation. Traditionally, regime actors have focused on safeguarding buildings and other material artefacts. Recent debates about heritage, however, often revolve around its intangible qualities. The case studies presented in this dissertation show that the meaning and value that is attributed to heritage objects is not self-evident but the outcome of complicated negotiations between actors at different levels. This dissertation began by posing one of the most urgent questions in the field of heritage studies: "Whose heritage is it?" (Hartfield 2001, p. 1). Identity and ownership issues have become more complex in today's heritage field, because not only national actors, but also local, regional and international actors are involved.

The analysis of the six case studies shows that identity issues are addressed at different levels and affect the interrelation between various actors in multiple ways. In the case of Aachen, for example, local, regional, national and international actors aligned to create an international narrative of Germany's past and denationalize the German identity. In Durham, on the other hand, local actors aligned with international actors to form an alliance against the national regime. Durham castle's new status as a site of global importance played a vital role in this process. The case of Zollverein showed that identity can be a shared concern of local and regional actors. Here, local actors formed a coalition with the regional government in order to strengthen the cultural identity and social coherence of the Ruhr region, using industrial heritage as a tool to do so. In Cornwall, on the other hand, identity issues formed a bone of contention between local and national actors. Industrial heritage became the ball in a game of identity politics between a regionalist, separatist movement and a centralized, assimilationist government. Also in the cases of Dresden and Liverpool, identity was important. In Dresden, local actors invoked the city's long-established bridge-building tradition in their controversy with

international and national actors. Similarly, local actors in Liverpool referred to the city's identity as a 'money city' to legitimize internationally controversial urban development plans. All these examples show that in today's heritage field, identity issues play at different levels simultaneously. In some cases it has the potential to create alliances between various levels, while in other cases it disintegrates alliances. Due to its dual focus on top-down and bottom-up processes, the Multi-Level Perspective is a potentially fruitful avenue to study such issues of heritage ownership and identity.

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