

# Gilles Deleuze and the Philosophy of Sense

The Role and Development of the Concept of Sense  
in Deleuze's Early Thought

anchors the actualization in processes of dramatization  
engendering thought and anchoring differentiation, intensity remains  
Ideas, as it is implicated first in itself. Ideas and intensities  
involve and are imminent to each other, but in entailing difference  
it also remains indifferent to the other. therein lies a subtle dis-  
project of determining the conditions of real experience. This  
is to account for a triple genesis that includes the genesis of

Nathan Widder

# Gilles Deleuze and the Philosophy of Sense

SUNY series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy

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Dennis J. Schmidt, editor

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The Role and Development of the Concept of Sense  
in Deleuze's Early Thought

NATHAN WIDDER

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*To Robert and Emily*



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## Preface and Acknowledgments

This book was originally envisioned as a research monograph on Deleuze's *The Logic of Sense*. In that form, it would have been an analysis of a somewhat neglected work in a field of Deleuze scholarship that has mainly advanced through a combination of studies focused on individual works by Deleuze (or Deleuze and Guattari), meta-evaluative studies that tend to be synoptic and theme oriented and not built on close readings or book-by-book analyses, and studies applying Deleuze's thought to a particular field or subfield, such as Deleuze and politics or mathematics or cinema. After producing some 35,000 words on the role of the concept of sense in Deleuze's earlier works without even reaching *Difference and Repetition*, it became clear that the project had become a detailed study of the role and development of the concept of sense in Deleuze's philosophy. My intention at that point was to cover Deleuze's entire career, including his collaborations with Guattari. But that pursuit quickly became too unwieldy for a single project and would have taken substantially more time to complete. And so, working through a period that included the birth of my two children, a worldwide pandemic, and a number of difficult and disturbing social and political events and upheavals across the world—including a kind of ongoing collective political, social, and economic trauma in the country where I've made my home that is colloquially known as Brexit, and another in my country of birth linked to Donald Trump's elections and presidencies—the project eventually took its final form as a study of the role of sense across Deleuze's early works up to his encounter with Guattari.

Scholarly work is always a collective endeavor even when penned by one author. I want to thank Jeffrey A. Bell and Henry Somers-Hall, who read an early and still incomplete draft of the manuscript, and Nardina Kuar, who kindly provided feedback on my chapter on Deleuze's Proust and Sacher-Masoch books. Henry has been my colleague at Royal Holloway

since 2012, and particularly since his arrival I have been able to work with and supervise PhD students examining Deleuze and related thinkers, greatly benefiting my own understanding of Deleuze. These include Christian Gilliam, Edward Thornton, Emily Harding, David Ventura, Naomi Grotenhuis, Tom Waterton, Ian Jakobi, Kynthia Plagianou, Louis Matheou, Lenka Soukupova, Evrim Bayindir, Anca Pop, and Vlad Ivlev. I also supervised two external PhD students, Sotiria Gounari (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens) and Konstantinos (Costis) Neuma (Glasgow University), during this time.

Since January 2013 I have also convened a weekly Deleuze and Guattari reading group, first in central London and online since Covid-19, which has included students and academics from Royal Holloway and other institutions, independent scholars, some practicing psychoanalysts, and members of the general public. There are too many past and present participants to list here in full, and with the names that follow I am surely forgetting many who have made key contributions over the years, for which I apologize. But I want to acknowledge and thank Riad Akbur, Mike Ardoline, Riccardo Baldissone, Shaul Bar-Haim, Gertjan Buijs, Ollie Choi, Iddo Dickmann, Megan Fraser, Mahbub Gani, Francis Gilbert, Hugh Hammond, Eric Harper, Robert Heller, Anna Hickey-Moody, Christoph Hubatschke, Masa Kosugi, Matt Lee, Manhua Li, Craig Lundy, Matt Mahon, Ross McElwain, Andrea Mura, Helen Palmer, Andrew Royle, Louis Sandowsky, Matheus Lock Santos, Sigmund (Ziggy) Schilpzand, Jonas Schnor, Christoph Schuringa, Olga Shaumyan, Stephan Spahn, Martin Tanšek, Josephine (Josie) Taylor, Christopher (Tiff) Thomas, Dave Thomas, George Tsagdis, Katja Vaghi, Mark Walker, and Ai Yu.

Some material in the Nietzsche chapter and different chapters addressing *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense* was originally published in “Forget the Virtual, What Matters Is Intensity: Situating Intensity in Deleuze’s Early Thought,” in *The Deleuzian Mind*, ed. Jeffrey A. Bell and Henry Somers-Hall (Routledge, 2025), 251–63. I would like to thank the publisher, Taylor & Francis, for their permission to reuse that material here. I would also like to acknowledge that material in the Bergson chapter of this study was previously published in “The Mathematics of Continuous Multiplicities: The Role of Riemann in Deleuze’s Reading of Bergson,” *Deleuze & Guattari Studies* volume 13, no. 3 (2019): 331–54; and that material in the Spinoza chapter was previously published in “The Univocity of Substance and the Formal Distinction of Attributes: The Role of Duns Scotus in Deleuze’s Reading of Spinoza,” *Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy*, no. 33 (July 2020): 150–76.

Finally, I thank Li-E Chen for her love and support over these many years. I am truly grateful for the life and family we have built together.

# Abbreviations

|            |                                                                               |
|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>AO</i>  | <i>Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia</i>                             |
| <i>ATP</i> | <i>A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia</i>                      |
| <i>B</i>   | <i>Bergsonism</i>                                                             |
| <i>C2</i>  | <i>Cinema 2: The Time-Image</i>                                               |
| <i>CC</i>  | <i>Coldness and Cruelty</i>                                                   |
| <i>D</i>   | <i>Dialogues II</i>                                                           |
| <i>DI</i>  | <i>Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953–1974</i>                              |
| <i>DR</i>  | <i>Difference and Repetition</i>                                              |
| <i>EPS</i> | <i>Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza</i>                                   |
| <i>ES</i>  | <i>Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature</i> |
| <i>F</i>   | <i>Foucault</i>                                                               |
| <i>FB</i>  | <i>Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation</i>                                  |
| <i>KCP</i> | <i>Kant's Critical Philosophy</i>                                             |
| <i>LS</i>  | <i>The Logic of Sense</i>                                                     |
| <i>LO</i>  | <i>Letters and Other Texts</i>                                                |
| <i>N</i>   | <i>Negotiations</i>                                                           |
| <i>NP</i>  | <i>Nietzsche and Philosophy</i>                                               |
| <i>PS</i>  | <i>Proust and Signs</i>                                                       |

*SPP*     *Spinoza's Practical Philosophy*

*TRM*     *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews, 1975–1995*

*WIP?*     *What Is Philosophy?*

## Introduction

This study maps the development of Gilles Deleuze's early philosophy as a philosophy of sense through a book-by-book and thinker-by-thinker analysis up to and including *The Logic of Sense*. I cannot claim to have produced a complete account of Deleuze's thought in this period. However, I believe it to be a systematic account. Indeed, I contend that framing Deleuze's intellectual project as one of creating a philosophy of sense offers perhaps the best vehicle for a systematic exposition of his diverse and multifaceted corpus. This is not to say that Deleuze's works coalesce into a "system" but rather that they can be read systematically in relation to a fundamental problem—as Deleuze does in his reading of Nietzsche. As the following pages argue, the development of this philosophy of sense underpins the concepts and theses that define Deleuze's thought in this period, along with his approach to questions of philosophical method and system, to the history of philosophy, and to the structuralism and psychoanalysis of his day. Moreover, from Deleuze's earliest explorations, the concept of sense he pursues, though ontological in nature, is bound up with questions concerning language, value, power, and history (genealogy), and thus all the dimensions of politics implicit within these. If "politics precedes being," as Deleuze and Guattari declare in *A Thousand Plateaus* (ATP 203), it is because being is first and foremost sense. For this reason, I believe the focus on sense in Deleuze's early works can also sustain a coherent and systematic exposition of his later solo and collaborative works, providing a transversal line and univocal theme that crosses his whole philosophy. But that demonstration, of which I currently have only a rudimentary idea how to progress, must be the subject of another study.

Philosophy must be ontology, but there is no ontology of essence, only an ontology of sense. Such is Deleuze's position in one of his earliest

acknowledged publications, his 1954 review of his teacher Jean Hyppolite's *Logic and Existence*, which is examined in the second chapter of Part I.<sup>1</sup> This study reads Deleuze's early thought as a sustained response to Hyppolite's text, which credits Hegel with articulating an ontology of sense that completes immanence and secures Absolute Knowing by treating speculative negation as the maximum form of difference. Deleuze's counter to Hyppolite's Hegel is that sense and immanence require a difference that is "greater" than negation or contradiction, one that can be found in the very thinkers Hyppolite dismisses. The concept of sense expounded by Deleuze from his review of Hyppolite onward concerns layers of material and ideational differences and relations that constitute and give meaning and direction to things, actions, and states of affairs; it provides an ontological account of how these things, actions, and events gain their meaningfulness and sensibility. But it also both grounds and ungrounds a panoply of traditionally hierarchical conceptual binaries whose separate places and values are deemed unbridgeable by classical metaphysical thought and whose mediation and reconciliation are central to modern dialectical philosophy. In this way, Deleuze's philosophy of sense also aspires to the Absolute—and Deleuze, who always refused calls for modesty in postwar philosophy and sought avenues to take philosophical thinking in new speculative directions, is most certainly a philosopher of the Absolute, be it absolute difference, absolute deterritorialization, or the absolute immanence invoked in his final publication.<sup>2</sup>

Recent decades have witnessed an explosion of scholarly interpretations of Deleuze's thought. It is safe to say that no common thread connects these readings. Deleuze has been labeled a philosopher of difference and multiplicity, but also a thinker of the One.<sup>3</sup> He has been called a materialist, a vitalist, and one whose philosophy entails a renewed spiritualism.<sup>4</sup> Many consider him a post-Kantian, but to others he is a Spinozist or a Nietzschean.<sup>5</sup> The dominant interpretations of the last two decades are arguably those that take Bergson to be Deleuze's key inspiration.<sup>6</sup> But other notable scholarship seeks to uncover subterranean but significant debts to Jungian psychoanalysis and Western esotericism,<sup>7</sup> and a substantial body of work argues that Deleuze's thought aims to ground contemporary scientific chaos and complexity theory.<sup>8</sup> Across this vast literature, there are few if any attempts to identify and plot the unfolding of a sustained project from one work to the next, as this study does. There are meta-evaluative studies that seek to isolate a general project animating Deleuze's works (i.e., Buchanan 2000), to identify "the main idea that informs virtually all his works" (Hallward 2006, 1), or to illuminate the "recurrent logical configuration"

that “reappear[s] from one book to the next, though each time varied and displaced” (Zourabichvili 2012, 42). But these investigations remain synoptic and are not built on close book-by-book readings; moreover, by implying a fully formed philosophy present from the start, they help support, even if unintentionally, Alain Badiou’s charge of a monotony in Deleuze’s productions that leaves “the rights of the heterogeneous [. . .] simultaneously imperative and limited” (Badiou 2000, 15). Most studies of Deleuze focus on either a specific work (primarily *Difference and Repetition*, *The Logic of Sense*, and the *Cinema* books, but reader’s guides or critical introductions exist for almost all of his monographs), on Deleuze’s relationship to a specific philosopher (Kant, Hegel, Derrida, Foucault, etc.), his relationship to a subdiscipline of philosophy (ancient, medieval, analytic,<sup>9</sup> logic,<sup>10</sup> philosophy of science, Eastern philosophy), or his relationship and value to other disciplines such as architecture, evolutionary theory, mathematics, psychoanalysis, political theory,<sup>11</sup> literature, the arts, and more.<sup>12</sup>

I do not want to review this vast secondary literature, which continues to proliferate at a fantastic rate.<sup>13</sup> But I do wish to set out what I believe is distinctive about the reading to be presented here. First—and this is probably unsurprising given the project’s focus—*The Logic of Sense*, rather than *Difference and Repetition*, features as the key work and culmination of Deleuze’s early thought. The latter is predominantly considered Deleuze’s magnum opus, with *The Logic of Sense* frequently treated as an extension and refinement of *Difference and Repetition*’s key themes. Against that position, I maintain that *The Logic of Sense* executes a major reworking of Deleuze’s early thought by breaking with *Difference and Repetition* on key points. Central to these breaks—and this marks a second distinctive aspect of this study—is the notable absence of Bergsonian themes concerning duration and the virtual/actual in *The Logic of Sense*. As will be seen, this absence is part of a progressive circumscribing of Bergson’s role in Deleuze’s thought, one that, at least within English-language Deleuze studies, has been obscured by issues with the translation of the text.<sup>14</sup> Bergson becomes less important as Deleuze makes more explicit a distinction between virtual differentials and self-implicating intensities that originates in the distinction between force and the will to power found in his Nietzsche book. This contrasts with the way Deleuze’s early readings of Bergson at least imply an equivalence between the virtual and intensity, and between actualization and incarnation, and seem to position intensity as belonging to the virtual. This constitutes what I consider a third distinctive aspect of this reading, namely—and against a great deal of the literature—that there is no such

thing as “virtual intensities” in Deleuze—although nor, for that matter, are intensities aligned with the actual as opposed to the virtual. Intensity involves another, ultimately more machinic domain that Deleuze increasingly privileges even before Guattari makes the machinic character of intensity explicit in the review of Deleuze’s work that precipitated the pair’s first meeting. In Deleuze’s ultimate formulation of the problematic of sense prior to meeting Guattari, sense involves the implication and explication of intensities, not the actualization of a virtual domain; the latter process concerns only the categories of representation, which intensity both grounds and exceeds.<sup>15</sup> Other smaller challenges and contributions to the scholarship are made in the following pages, but rather than outlining them here, I let them present themselves as the work proceeds.

This study is divided into three main parts. The first maps Deleuze’s early readings of key figures in the history of philosophy in relation to Hyppolite’s *Logic and Existence* and Deleuze’s review of that work. Hyppolite’s text establishes the contours of the philosophy of sense that Deleuze will follow, so I provide a fuller elaboration of this central concept of sense when addressing Hyppolite’s study in the first substantive chapter of Part I. Deleuze’s review highlights a continuing equivocity, suggested by Hyppolite’s reading, in Hegel’s use of contradiction in the logical and phenomenological domains, leading Deleuze to propose that a philosophy of sense that genuinely reaches immanence must employ a difference that exceeds the terms of dialectical contradiction. An account of this difference is developed in Deleuze’s subsequent engagements with Hume, Bergson, Nietzsche, Leibniz, and Spinoza, each of which is built on a response to criticisms leveled by Hyppolite that these thinkers had failed to offer a conception of difference adequate to a philosophy of sense. Through these engagements, Deleuze also elaborates the key concepts of his philosophy of sense, including the externality of relations; the internality of difference; the inadequacy of contradiction and negation as forms of difference; the distinction between continuous and discrete multiplicities; the roles played by the virtual, the actual, incarnation, individuation, intensity, and simulacra; time as duration and as eternal return; the intensity of Nietzsche’s will to power and Spinoza’s modal existence; and the univocity of being.

Part II examines how Deleuze further progresses these concepts and adds new ones in *Difference and Repetition* through his analyses of organic and orgiastic representation, the syntheses of time, a thought without Image, the actualization of virtual Ideas, and the dramatization, individuation, and incarnation associated with intensity. Deleuze quite explicitly positions the

text as an anti-Hegelian treatise that completes Kant's critical project by going beyond representation to establish the conditions of real rather than merely possible experience. However, he also comes to admit his dissatisfaction in the way it frames its problem through Kantian points of reference that ultimately establish an opposition between a "classical height" and "archaic depth," and that position intensity in an originary dimension of depth. In this regard, the reconfiguration of intensity and sense as surface phenomena in *The Logic of Sense* engenders a fundamental shift in key aspects of Deleuze's early thought.

Part III examines *The Logic of Sense* as the early Deleuze's mature philosophical position. Reconfiguring sense as a surface product allows Deleuze to place it within the linguistic propositions that express it and to task it with mediating language and thought's relations to states of affairs in a way that grounds and ungrounds representation. It further allows him to articulate an ethics made possible by the production of sense and its associated series of paradoxes. Finally, *The Logic of Sense* prepares the way for Deleuze's later solo and collaborative works. In particular, and despite the view of certain interpretations that *Anti-Oedipus* represents a turn away from the surface and back to the idea of an intensity of the depths linked to schizophrenia, the *Logic of Sense*'s comparative analysis of Antonin Artaud's language of the depth and Lewis Carroll's language of the surface shows that Deleuze's first collaboration with Guattari is consistent with Deleuze's surface logic.

In addition to its three main divisions, an Interlude between Parts I and II examines Deleuze's two books on literary figures, exploring signs in Proust in relation to Saussure's linguistics, and Sacher-Masoch's and Sade's writings in relation to Freud's thesis on the death instinct operating "beyond" the pleasure principle. An epilogue reviews the development of Deleuze's attitude toward psychoanalysis and structuralism and then examines some of the ways Guattari's influence begins to shape the future direction of Deleuze's thought. All but one of Deleuze's books from his early period are addressed in detail, along with key shorter writings. There is no separate examination of Deleuze's Kant book, but it appears at various points in the study.

Deleuze scholars know well that one of the most intellectually challenging, if also enjoyable, aspects of studying Deleuze is the detective work<sup>16</sup> needed not only to decipher and understand, but also to defend and redeem, his engagements with—or, perhaps better, uses and abuses of—a myriad of thinkers, themes, and fields. Deleuze was certainly not a scientist, a mathematician, or an artist, and he certainly took substantial license in reading both these interlocutors and other philosophers. He nevertheless

was able to craft his own philosophy through appropriations that positioned these diverse authors, coming from their diverse fields, so that they could be read as addressing philosophical questions concerning difference, time, becoming, and sense. To the irritation of many specialists who condemn Deleuze for distorting or even outright misreading and misunderstanding those he engages, it is often difficult to tell where Deleuze's thought ends and that of the thinker he is reading begins. It certainly is not possible without significant independent knowledge that can allow one to discern a method and thinking behind Deleuze's heterodox interpretations and to assess their viability. This is perhaps another reason for the sheer diversity of readings of Deleuze, and the piecemeal nature of even the most substantial studies, as each one can only touch upon a limited range of the subjects and sources he deploys.

No doubt the limitations of my own knowledge of these subjects and sources is on display in what follows. As I say, I cannot claim to have produced a complete account of Deleuze's thought. But I do believe it is a systematic account—and I would like to think that it makes some sense. Ultimately, this is a matter for readers to decide.

## Part I



## Chapter 1

# Toward an Ontology of Sense

Hyppolite's *Logic and Existence* (1997) explores the relation between phenomenology and logic in Hegel's philosophy. It is difficult to overstate how strongly this text and Deleuze's short review of it establishes Deleuze's agenda for the next fifteen years. Hyppolite's text, rejecting the "anthropological" readings of Hegel associated with the likes of Kojève (1969), turns on the claim that Hegel's philosophy is an ontology of sense rather than essence. As Deleuze summarizes: "*Philosophy must be ontology, it cannot be anything else; but there is no ontology of essence, there is only an ontology of sense*" (DI 15). Placing Hegel's thought and what will become his own on this common terrain, Deleuze's challenge to Hegel focuses on a single question: What concept of difference can make an ontology of sense adequate to a philosophy of immanence?<sup>1</sup>

Hyppolite maintains that Hegel's understanding of difference as speculative contradiction provides the only viable answer to this question, as it establishes a genuine science able to grasp concretely both the singular and the absolute while eliminating all references to a second, transcendent world, so that "immanence is complete" (Hyppolite 1997, 176). This position underpins the Hegelian critiques Hyppolite levels against thinkers whom Deleuze later marshals against Hegel: Hume, Bergson, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Nietzsche. These thinkers, Hyppolite contends, retain moments of transcendence or abstraction because they fail to push difference up to contradiction. But Deleuze reverses this criticism: It is Hegelian dialectics that retains these moments because ultimately it is not difference that fails to extend itself to contradiction but contradiction that remains inadequate to difference. An ontology of sense requires a concept of difference that breaks

with the identity and representation that Hegel's dialectics of contradiction seeks to ground. Developing this concept of difference will involve new understandings of time, intensity, virtuality, multiplicity, the externality of relations, the univocity of being, and more.

Deleuze's readings of these thinkers, set out in a series of monographs and shorter writings up to and including, in the case of Leibniz, *Difference and Repetition*, are built on responses to Hyppolite's critiques. Key terms in Deleuze's vocabulary can also be traced to Hyppolite's text—not only sense, whose various dimensions are detailed in the next chapter, but also actualization, incarnation, immanence, essential difference, internal difference, and difference in itself. Deleuze describes his writings of this period as a response to being a member of “a generation, one of the last generations, that was more or less bludgeoned to death with the history of philosophy” (IV 5). This response involves him “doing” the history of philosophy with a focus on “authors who challenged the rationalist tradition in this history” and who kept him away from “what I most detested [. . .] Hegelianism and dialectics” (6). Deleuze's approach also (in)famously treats the history of philosophy “as a sort of buggery or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate conception. I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous” (6). In the preface to *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze writes that the history of philosophy is “the reproduction of philosophy itself,” and that a commentary on the history of philosophy “should act as a veritable double and bear the maximal modification appropriate to a double. (One imagines a *philosophically* bearded Hegel, a *philosophically* clean-shaven Marx, in the same way as a moustached Mona Lisa)” (DR xxi). This colorful imagery aside, Deleuze's approach, under the guise of appearing to reconstruct these thinkers' nuanced positions within their own historical context, places them within another, more contemporary—and decidedly anti-Hegelian—context. The monstrousness of his heterodox readings, however, results less from this recontextualization and more from the assertion of problematic if not outright spurious connections between these thinkers and others: Hume is presented as the originator of Bertrand Russell's doctrine of external relations; Bergson and Spinoza are held to be fundamentally influenced by nineteenth-century mathematician Bernhard Riemann and thirteenth-century theologian John Duns Scotus respectively, despite no evidence of the former having read the latter; and Nietzsche's theory of forces is held to be a direct challenge to Hegelian dialectics on the assumption that Nietzsche may not have known Hegel but would have understood the Hegelianism of his day.

Deleuze calls his book on Kant not a buggery but an exposition of an enemy's system (*N* 6). And he says that Nietzsche, whom he read "only later" (6), removed him from this approach altogether by getting behind his back and giving him "a perverse taste" for saying things in his own name while no longer seeing himself as an ego, person, or subject. Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy* was published in 1962, eight years after his Hume book. He calls this period "a hole in my life, an eight-year hole" in which he "produced nothing" (138). Subsequent works suggest that the Nietzsche effect was a delayed one, since Deleuze afterward published his Spinoza thesis and the *Bergsonism* that he identifies as a good example of his buggery method (6). Regardless, Deleuze holds that Nietzsche's influence enabled him to produce, even while still in some respects working with the history of philosophy, the two works of original philosophy, *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, that give full articulation to his version of philosophy as an ontology of sense.<sup>2</sup>



## Chapter 2

### Hegelian Sense

“Hegelian Logic,” Hyppolite declares, “starts with an identification of thought and the thing thought. The thing, being, is not beyond thought, and thought is not a subjective reflection that would be alien to being” (Hyppolite 1997, 3). By eliminating the thing-in-itself of Kantian transcendental logic and all other references to an unknowable beyond, this unity of thought and thing eradicates every form of “transcendence essentially irreducible to our knowledge” (3) and thus reaches Absolute Knowledge (3–4). The Absolute as truth—where “truth is, as Kant said, the agreement of knowledge with its object” (163)—presents itself as absolute Idea. Hegel’s Logic “is the genesis of the absolute Idea [. . .] which in the element of universality contains the whole life of thought” (165). Philosophy, as speculative logic, grasps the Idea’s most authentic mode (165) by comprehending the Absolute in its “actuality [*la réalité effective*]” (4) or in its reality as reflected into itself—in Hegel’s terminology, in its *Wirklichkeit* as opposed to *Realität*. This actuality is both “the proper object of philosophy” and “the category of the Logic which designates the concrete unity of essence and appearance, the presentation which presents only itself and tests its necessity not in a separate intelligibility, but in its own movement and development” (4). Philosophy thereby grasps the Absolute as sense: “actuality understanding itself and expressing itself as human language is what Hegel calls the concept or sense already immanent to the being of absolute knowledge” (4). Absolute knowledge, however, “does not exist without nature and finite spirit—for philosophy must alienate itself—but it comprehends its own alienation” (70). Logic thus also requires a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of consciousness or spirit.

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* presents “a recollection of human experience” that “demonstrates concretely that knowledge and the Absolute coincide” (Hyppolite 1997, 4). To actualize or accomplish this demonstration—Hyppolite uses the verb *effectuer*, and Deleuze, as we will see, eventually distinguishes this term in important ways from *actualiser*—it must first show “concretely (that is, by means of a description of experience) the nearly naïve error which turns knowledge and concepts into an intermediate medium or an instrument” (4). The *Phenomenology*’s first three chapters accomplish this task by demonstrating how sensible consciousness, in seeking to know the truth of phenomena appearing to it, sublates its separation from this phenomenal world and finds itself again within it, thereby becoming self-conscious. Its remaining five chapters trace how collective human spirit realizes itself as absolute in history. The *Phenomenology* thereby shows both how the Idea “actualizes itself [*s’actualise*] in history” (177) and how human history “incarnates [*incarne*]” this Idea’s highest form (185). Actualization is the Idea’s self-positing, whereby it attains objectivity—it becomes an object to itself—and thus becomes for itself what it already was in-itself, a “movement which actualizes at the end what it is at the beginning” (85). Incarnation embodies the Idea’s universality in the singular, engendering a concrete universal form that gives it spirit or life. Actualization, as a becoming objective, and incarnation, as a becoming singular and concrete, are interconnected. Indeed, Hegel considers them different perspectives of the same process by which the Idea goes beyond and realizes itself in time and space through Spirit—the living unity of the universal and the singular—positing itself objectively. While the Absolute is fully real and actual in its own Logic, the *Phenomenology* demonstrates its posited and living reality in a Spirit that is, literally, the Absolute made flesh and blood.

In this way, Hegelian thought surmounts the abstractions of earlier philosophies. Abstraction portrays reality in a one-sided and incomplete fashion that lacks actuality (Hyppolite 1997, 5) because a gap persists between this portrayal and what it is not. Thus, the sense certainty examined in the *Phenomenology*’s opening chapter is an abstraction that reduces reality to the singularity of immediate sense experiences, and so too are the concepts of being and nothingness that are considered in isolation in the early stages of both the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* (12–15). The Absolute remains abstract if its actualization is cut off from its incarnation in Nature and Spirit, and they too remain abstract when separated from it. Logic and phenomenology mediate and incorporate such abstractions, progressing through stages of increasing multidimensionality, actuality, and concreteness

to culminate in “the complete fusion of immediacy and mediation, of actuality [*la réalité*] and sense [*sens*]” (4). This makes philosophy’s chief concern “the being which is sense and the sense which is being” (5). Sense expresses the Absolute—the infinite unity of immediacy and mediation—through the Absolute’s mediation with itself, and thus through dialectic: “dialectical discourse is a progressive conquest of sense” (21).

This ontological role for the concept of sense is figured in the term’s diverse meanings, which encompass the physical or sensible (i.e., the sense of smell) and the meaningful or ideational (i.e., the sense of a word or idea). Hyppolite explains, quoting Hegel:

Sense is this wonderful word which is used in two opposite meanings. On the one hand it means the organ of immediate apprehension, but on the other hand we mean by it the sense, the significance, the thought, the universal underlying the thing. And so sense is connected on the one hand with the immediate external aspect of existence, and on the other hand with its inner essence. Now a sensuous consideration does not cut the two sides apart at all; in one direction it contains the opposite one too, and in sensuous immediate perception it at the same time apprehends the essence and the concept. But since it carries these very determinations in a still unseparated unity, it does not bring the concept as such into consciousness but stops at foreshadowing it. (Hegel, quoted in Hyppolite 1997, 24)<sup>1</sup>

Sense thereby invokes divergent realms of thought and thing, concept and reference, universal and singular, expression and the object of expression, while also indicating their unity by use of this common designator. It also refers to *direction*, a meaning found explicitly in the French *sens* and the German *Sinn* but also discernible in English phrases like “the sense of history,” which can be taken to mean the direction history is traveling. Finally, sense carries a meaning that becomes increasingly prominent as Deleuze’s thought advances: that of *surface*. A surface might be considered a cover that hides what is underneath, even if there is really *nothing* to hide—as Hyppolite writes, “the only secret [. . .] is that there is no secret” (90). Sense here might initially seem opposed to the idea of a deeper essence or being, even if for Hegel it ultimately sublates this being or shows sense to be the essence of being. However, the surface can also be considered an *excess* that constitutes or determines through separation, just as the surface

of the ocean connects but also separates and, in this way, delineates the respective domains of water and air. Surface sense constitutes, by separation and connection, both the sensible and the conceptual. But it also creates the illusion of a hidden supersensible realm, and of the division between appearance and essence that traditional metaphysics adopts and that Hegelian philosophy seeks to overcome.<sup>2</sup>

These diverse aspects combine in Hyppolite's thesis that Hegelian sense, as the Absolute's self-expression, is a dialectical movement of negation by which the empirical and essential, the singular and universal, subjective certainty and objective truth, the being who speaks and the being about which one speaks, are distinguished, united, and given direction. This movement surmounts the "ineffable," which holds the absolutely individual and the absolutely universal either to escape outright the expressive powers of language or to be presentable only indirectly and abstractly through poetry or mathematical symbolism. Philosophies of transcendence deploy the ineffable to set limits to possible knowledge and experience (Hyppolite 1997, part 1, chap. 1). Leaving nothing beyond sense in either the depths of things or the heights of Ideas, even nonsense becomes part of sense. On the one hand, there is no initially silent or inexpressive being from which sense and reflection subsequently arise: "One does not go from a silent intuition to an expression, from an inexpressible to an expressed, any more than from nonsense to sense. [. . .] Sense unfolds itself and determines itself without its being given previously in an ineffable form" (Hyppolite 1997, 21). On the other hand, the nonsense entailed by the unity of contradictories—by the notion of something that at once both is and is not essence and appearance, subject and object, singular and universal, etc.—is really the Absolute's most profound expression. Sense exceeds the empirical and conceptual without transcending the world of phenomena or thought; it grasps the totality of all there is even while being different from an empirical or conceptual totality. Sense is immanent to our world, but it resides in it as something different from both the world's immediate appearance and the (human) reflection that retroactively organizes that appearance. Being "between" and "beyond" these totalities of thing and thought, sense appears in the internal passage from one side of this divide to the other, in the movement from empirical to conceptual and back that expresses the Absolute's direction and becoming. As "the Absolute is not thought anywhere else than in the phenomenal world" (58), Hegelian sense expresses the "doctrine of complete immanence which Spinoza had not been able to realize" (59). While Spinoza retains

a dualism in his parallelism of Logos and Nature, Hegelian sense unites them in their absolute opposition by way of “dialectical evolution” (162).

### Sense and Contradiction

All this requires a concept of difference adequate to the multifarious moments of identity, opposition, and mediation posed by sense. Hyppolite contends that Hegel’s speculative contradiction, which brings being and thought into reflective unity, is the only viable candidate. Both empirical and transcendental reflection retain an abstract *indifference* between thought and being, reinstating a philosophy of essence by putting something outside the reach of reflective knowledge. Negations that fall short of contradiction provide only general determinations and cannot raise the Absolute from substance to subject, thus failing to make sense the Absolute’s self-expression. Spinoza’s *omnis determinatio est negatio* (all determination is negation) and Hegel’s contention “that what is *negative* for consciousness is at the same time related to it, that in the negative judgement the ‘*is*’ (copula) holds together as well as separates the terms” (Hegel 1977, §578) demonstrate how negation mediates identity and difference into a positive dialectical unity.<sup>3</sup> But negation’s movement must be both real and logical, ontic and ontological, “a negation at the very heart of being” (Hyppolite 1997, 108) and not merely one of human language and thought. On one or more of these requirements, Hyppolite maintains, Hegel’s predecessors and successors falter.

Naive unreflective empirical thought and its more mature reflective variant both recognize differences and similarities but cannot comprehend negation’s role as an internal, determining difference. Unable to grasp concrete identity, “for empirical thought, difference becomes [. . .] the indifferent diversity of things” (Hyppolite 1997, 114). Empiricism holds negation to have no power of determination, for declaring what a thing is not says nothing about what it is (101, 122–23). Knowledge must therefore derive from positive judgments that attribute properties to objects, since the world presents thought only with positive content. Contradiction, which is associated with error inasmuch as the object’s positivity cannot permit the dissimilarity of contradiction within it,<sup>4</sup> is not something worldly but rather what the mind encounters in itself when it attributes wrongly; it belongs to thought’s form and not its content.<sup>5</sup> This entire view is self-defeating, however, since: “the rule of empirical knowledge lies in not contradicting

itself in its object. [. . .] But to say that A is B is already to contradict oneself, because this is to come out of the A in order to affirm something else about it; it is to say that it is not-A and not merely A" (79). Empirical reflection on positive synthetic judgment shows that contradiction cannot be segregated from content, as naive empiricism intends, but this leads it to eschew all objectivity in predication, yielding "the empirical subjectivity of experience, such as Hume brought to light. There are connections, but they lack significance [*signification*]; they are subjective, contingent, and always susceptible to being negated. But this negation of empirical thought is reflected merely into empty tautology: A is A, B is B" (125). Reflective empiricism thus culminates in skepticism toward knowledge, absolute or otherwise, grounded in the ever-changing, indifferent positivity of sensible experience and the merely human subjectivity perceiving it (140).

Kant's critical revolution, advancing beyond empiricism's form/content distinction and its purely formal reflection on an alien content, determines sensible intuition according to the categories of the understanding (Hyppolite 1997, 80). Nonetheless, Kant replicates empiricism's divisions at the transcendental level, and instead of raising transcendental philosophy to the Absolute, he reduces it to the human (82, 84). On the one hand, transcendental reflection, even while grounding experience by determining its conditions of possibility (83), remains an external reflection on sensible appearances that are given to the understanding as phenomena but still refer to an irreducible noumenon beyond all understanding (86). As such, "transcendental reflection is even debased to anthropological reflection. This self-knowledge in the posited content [. . .] is nothing but a human knowledge of experience" (83). On the other hand, the unity of judgment constituted by transcendental reflection remains relative to an absolute identity of condition and conditioned, but since this unconditioned identity "is not able to be thought without contradiction as an object, it is merely an idea condemned to unreality. The contradiction of this totality thought as object, in the form of the substantial soul, of the world, and of God, is a subjective contradiction that leaves the thing in itself completely outside of it" (82). Thus, "what happens to Kant [. . .] is that for which he himself reproached Hume. He did not see the full scope of his question; he remained at the subjective and external significance [*signification*] of the problem, as if the response could be only found in the relative, ambiguous identity of a self-consciousness and of an experience whose source would remain always in the dark" (132).

Negation must therefore be involved in the object and take the form of opposition or contradiction. Things must be individual in order to sustain

both their identity in themselves and their diversity in relation to others, but to be individual they must differ from *everything* they are not: “Opposition is inevitable not because there is only a multiplicity of things, of finite modes, or of monads, but because each is in relation with the others, or rather with all the others, so that its distinction is its distinction from *all the rest*” (Hyppolite 1997, 115). Hegel refers to this negative or oppositional difference as “difference in itself”—the same terminology Deleuze uses for his ontological difference in *Difference and Repetition*—and as “essential difference”—as Deleuze will later say, it is a difference in the essence (*NP* 8–9; *DR* 45–46).<sup>6</sup> It is essential difference not because the thing hides an essence beneath its appearances but rather “because it is the difference posited in the identity of the thing; this difference is what puts the thing in opposition to *all the rest*” (Hyppolite 1997, 119). In other words, it is essential because it is individuating—it is the difference that makes the thing *this thing*. Inessential difference, in contrast, is a numerical difference between things grouped under the abstract identity of a species; it is “merely quantitative difference, the surface of being, that which does not allow the thing to be distinguished by its *absolute characteristic*, that by which it is made to be what it is” (118). Leibniz gestures toward essential difference with his principle of indiscernibles, which demands that each thing is only itself and cannot be confused with any other. But Leibniz “does not himself reach this consequence” (119) of oppositional essential difference because his monads express an entirely internal reflection, unrelated to any outside, requiring Leibniz to supplement the monads’ self-determination with a divinely guaranteed pre-established harmony, rather than an opposition that defines each monad immanently and internally against all the rest.<sup>7</sup>

The sensory experience of change would seem to confirm negation’s worldly existence. Nevertheless, Bergson tries to restrict negation to human perception or language, or to make it derive from a superior positivity.<sup>8</sup> He maintains that affirmative and negative propositions cannot have equal standing because affirmation comes first as “an act of pure intelligence” and negation follows as “an extra-intellectual element” (Bergson, quoted in Hyppolite 1997, 122) added to affirmative judgment. But these points, Hyppolite responds, apply only to empirical propositions that misunderstand the negative’s scope and that, in their affirmative form, are self-contradictory (Hyppolite 1997, 123–24). Bergson further argues that the perception of negation, of the “perpetual passage from one sensible ‘this’ to another sensible ‘this’ [ . . . ] a disappearance and an appearance” (108), is engendered by memory representing what has disappeared in such a way that its contrast

with the present becomes perceptible, whereas a mind that purely and simply followed the thread of experience would discern no emptiness or negation. Memory is here the subjective “faculty of dissociating and distinguishing” (109) that introduces negation. Yet Bergson, Hyppolite answers, also posits living things that, in their creative evolution, “individuate themselves [*s’individualisent*] more or less in the continuity of the real” (109), and, as such, “if Bergson grants that dissociation and distinction are also in the things, in being, in the duration, and perhaps in the absolute principle, he has to introduce negation into the universe and into the Absolute itself, because negation and distinction imply one another” (109). This is further confirmed by Bergson’s portrayal of matter as the interruption and inversion—that is, the negation—of the fully positive living force of *élan vital*. The core problem is that while paralleling Hegel in conceiving the real as creation, “Bergson [. . .] does not conceive creation as sense; he does not like Hegel therefore attempt a logic that is the generating movement of being; this logic would have led him to rediscover the weight and the seriousness of negation, instead of seeing there a human critique, connected to human conditions, which degenerates too often into a vain dialectic, into a sophistry that Hegel indeed denounces many times” (122; see also 162). He fails, in short, to advance to the speculative and ontological level.

The Absolute as sense thus demands a speculative reflection in which subject and object, thought and being, are reflected into each other, with negation and reflection featuring on both sides of these divides, leaving nothing consigned to an unreflective abyss: “Contradiction stops being formal and subjective when it is *the contradiction of the things themselves*. The content then is no longer received as an alien datum; it is posited. The self of reflection and the self of the content become identified” (Hyppolite 1997, 118). Contradiction within both the object and the subject ensures their distinction and unity: “Speculative knowledge can be simultaneously knowledge of being and self-knowledge only because *to know oneself is to contradict oneself*, only because these two moments that we ordinarily separate in order to attribute one to the object, the other to the subject, truth and reflection, being and the self, are *identical*. Their identity in their contradiction is the very dialectic of the Absolute” (76). The Absolute thus becomes Subject. Spinoza fails here because his Substance lacks self-reflection: it is “in itself pure activity, self-causing, but its activity did not exhibit itself as mediation, as self-becoming” (150); consequently, substance’s diversity remains external to it, and it remains a “substance beyond its expressions and its reflection” (138). While Leibniz’s monads are substances that are also subjects, they are

finite and disconnected, such that “Leibniz’s theological representation is an alienation of reflection. It stops the Absolute from actually being subject; it consecrates the separation of the in-itself and the for-itself” (150). Like all classical rationalists, Spinoza and Leibniz “remained at the inherence of the predicate in the subject, and this is why Being, although identical, was not the self. It did not contradict itself; therefore it did not posit itself as determination which, being negation—a self-negation however—negates itself in turn or negates its own negation” (91). We thus return to Hyppolite’s thesis that difference must be negation and negation must be contradiction: “Hegelian dialectic will push [. . .] alterity up to contradiction. Negation belongs to things and to distinct determinations insofar as they are distinct. But that means that their apparent positivity turns out to be a real negativity. This negativity will condense the opposition in negation; negation will be the vital force of the dialectic of the real as well as that of logical dialectic” (113).

### Logos and History

A central question Hyppolite addresses is where to locate the empirical world’s final sublation into the Absolute, the answer to this indicating how to understand the reverse movement of the Absolute actualizing and concretizing itself in the empirical. The Absolute appears twice in the *Phenomenology*: at the conclusion of the Dialectic of Consciousness, which comprises the first three chapters, and at the conclusion of the entire work. Hyppolite’s thesis in *Logic and Existence* leads him to focus on the second, though he refers frequently to the steps taken toward the first, which progress consciousness from Sense Certainty to Perception to Understanding, when addressing the inadequacies of empiricist and Kantian positions. A review of these steps is important, however, as the Absolute’s first appearance figures in Deleuze’s review of Hyppolite and illuminates his later use of Nietzsche against Hegel.

The close of the Dialectic of Consciousness, where consciousness transitions to self-consciousness, fulfills the promise set out in the *Phenomenology*’s Introduction that once consciousness is no longer burdened by some alien other, “it will signify the nature of absolute knowledge itself” (Hegel 1977, §89). The dialectic begins with consciousness’s immediate apprehension of a thing in Sense Certainty, which “appears as the *richest* kind of knowledge” and “the *truest* knowledge” (§91). Hegel maintains that this presentation’s truth is not found in its immediate appearance, as any attempt

to express this truthfulness in language—for example, by declaring “Now is Night”—becomes false, sometimes as soon as it is articulated or written down (§95–96).<sup>9</sup> What persists, however, even in this self-contradiction, is the presentation’s universal form: Whether it is day or night, and regardless of what is being experienced, what immediately appears to consciousness is always an object presented here and now to a subject. Immediate appearance is thereby always already mediated, its truth found in consciousness necessarily *perceiving* the immediate through universal categories. Sense Certainty thus transitions to the more concrete notion of Perception.

The truth of Perception is likewise not found within its object, which is both a unified independent entity and a multiplicity of universal and relational properties connecting it to others. Regarding the latter, an object, for example, is white *for me*, for the subject perceiving it, and also white *as opposed to* being some other color or to being colorless. The object’s internal contradiction here reflects dialectical negation’s twofold nature, as the object can be independent only by negating everything it is not, but this negation also relates it to others and disperses it in them.<sup>10</sup> As the object’s essence involves both unity and multiplicity, being-in-itself and being-for-another, its truth must emerge in “a perpetual alternation of determining what is true, and then setting aside this determining [. . .] in each single moment it is conscious only of this *one determinateness* as the truth, and then in turn of the opposite one” (§131). As this movement is incompatible with Perception’s static categories, consciousness must advance to a yet more concrete stage that accommodates this aspect of experience, just as Perception had accommodated the internal passage within Sense Certainty from seeming truth to seeming falsity.

The Dialectic of Consciousness now reaches the Understanding and its concept of Force, which encompasses the contradictory movement within the perceived object and carries out the synthesis required by judgment, wherein the object, while referring outside itself, nevertheless refers to itself alone—it becomes a being-for-itself through its being-for-another. Force achieves this synthesis by being essentially relational and negative: A force distinguishes itself by negating and separating itself from what it is not; yet being defined as a force by its capacity to affect and be affected by these others, it is also joined to them. Moreover, the others to which force relates must also be relational forces, into which the thing of Sense Certainty and the object of Perception have dissolved. The result is a reciprocal determination of one force by another in which “the interplay of the two Forces [. . .] consists in their being determined as mutually opposed” (Hegel 1977, §139). A gap seems to persist here between the subject and this world of forces,

which present themselves as mere phenomena to a seemingly independent consciousness. But the means to overcome this aporia are found within the terms setting it out. Just as the presentation of reciprocally determining forces dissolves the thing or essence that might seem to be hidden behind it, eliminating the essence/appearance distinction, the independent subject too is dissolved, as it is negatively related to and thus determined by this presentation. The negation that separates consciousness from the seemingly alien thing it apprehends, the object it perceives, and the forces it understands, also unites it with these, so that consciousness rediscovers itself in them and thereby realizes itself as self-consciousness.

If the Absolute is linked to self-consciousness in this way—and Hegel's Introduction says only that the discovery of self-consciousness will *signify the nature* of absolute knowledge, not attain it completely—then the subsequent chapters become the outline of this Absolute's realization in abstract (the dialectics of Self-Consciousness and Reason) and later concrete (the dialectics of Spirit, Religion, and Absolute Knowing) accounts of human history. Hyppolite, however, contends that this interpretation illicitly renders human self-consciousness as the Absolute Subject, resulting in an anthropological account that Hegel rejects: "In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel does not say man, but self-consciousness. The modern interpreters who have immediately translated this term by man have somewhat falsified Hegel's thought. Hegel is still too Spinozistic for us to be able to speak of a pure humanism; a pure humanism culminates only in sceptical irony and platitude" (Hyppolite 1997, 20). The anthropological reading continues to separate subject and object, what is said and the sense of what is said, thereby failing to reach the unity required by sense. As Deleuze explains in his review: "Anthropology aspires to be a discourse *on* humanity. As such, it presupposes the empirical discourse *of* humanity, in which the speaker and the object of his speech are separate. Reflection is on one side, while being is on the other" (*DI* 15). The *Phenomenology's* account of human experience and history, Hyppolite maintains, merely explicates the focal points where an Absolute beyond man posits and incarnates itself in time and space. Although it elaborates the Absolute's self-reflexivity, "the *Phenomenology* studies the anthropological conditions of this reflection; it starts from human, properly subjective, reflection in order to sublimate it, in order to show that this *Phenomenology*, this human itinerary, leads to absolute knowledge, to an ontological reflection which the *Phenomenology* presupposes" (Hyppolite 1997, 34).

Hyppolite thus turns to the Absolute's second appearance, where phenomenology transitions to logic, which expresses the Absolute's sense from

within the Absolute itself rather than externalizing it in nature and spirit. Although human language expresses sense—for how could any language, which interiorizes things in thought and exteriorizes thought in the world (26–27), not do so?—as merely human language it continues to separate what is said from the thing of which it is said (37), making it insufficient for this task. Philosophical language, in contrast, mediates this gap, and thus expresses sense *qua* sense, because it unfolds an ontological expression in its derivation of its categories from one another. Unlike empirical categories, which are abstract forms separate from their sensible content, and transcendental categories, which determine this content from outside, the Absolute's categories unify form and content in infinite mediation (90). Each category, like a Leibnizian monad, expresses the whole of being, but without being a substance and without being finite: “The category is not a substantial individuality like the monad; it is an expression of the Absolute, a *for-itself* which resolves itself into the *for-itself* of all the *for-itselfs*. The Absolute, however, does not exist outside of these expressions. It is the universal category which is what it is in its result and not in the first presupposition, the being which is only nothingness” (157). Philosophy thereby becomes *logos*, but *logos* becomes ontology. While the anthropological readings must limit themselves to the *Phenomenology*, the ontological reading encapsulates all aspects of Hegel's thought, with phenomenology, logic, and nature each being an expression of the Absolute Subject.

But here a new problem emerges. While consciousness achieves its passage to self-consciousness by mechanisms internal to its own Understanding, were the human history whose culmination is reached at the *Phenomenology's* conclusion similarly to have the internal means to pass into the Absolute, it would affirm the anthropological thesis that the Absolute is the realization of human self-reflection and self-knowledge. Hyppolite declares: “Humanity as such is not the supreme end for Hegel. When man is reduced to himself, he is lost” (Hyppolite 1997, 186). Yet if the Absolute is attained only by transcending the human, phenomenological, and empirical, the conclusion seems unavoidable that the logic is another essence and the dialectic another metaphysics, another Truth behind or beyond appearances. In this way, “the historicity of this absolute knowledge poses at the very heart of Hegelianism new and perhaps unsolvable problems” (36).<sup>11</sup>

Hyppolite attempts to negotiate this dilemma by holding the Absolute to be neither substance nor essence but difference and mediation, such that it surmounts the subject/object and essence/appearance dualisms without suppressing them (Hyppolite 1997, 60–61). *Logos*, phenomenology, and

nature each constitutes a unity with its counterparts: Nature unites spirit and logos immediately and without reflection; spirit connects logos to nature through finite human reflection; and logos expresses the infinite unity of immediacy and reflection, the highest form of the Absolute (103–4). Yet only by virtue of the Absolute does history have sense and direction, with historical forms of human self-consciousness progressing toward reconciliation and mutual recognition. Logos is “the eternal history of being” (158), a self-determining mediation and becoming, while human history, “in temporal dispersion, incarnates [*incarne*] this supreme sublation that is the absolute Idea” (185–86). However, while history attains sense as the eternal Logos’s self-negation into chronological time, no self-negation of history returns it dialectically to Logos: “History is indeed the place of this passage, but this passage is not itself a *historical fact*” (189). Nevertheless, Hyppolite insists, this eternal Absolute “is not another world behind history” (188).

### An Ontology of Difference and not Contradiction

It is here that Deleuze’s review posits a response and alternative to Hegel’s ontology of sense. On the one hand, “the relation of ontology and empirical humanity is perfectly determined, but not the relation of ontology and historical humanity” (*DI* 18). The passage from immediate experience to the Absolute in the *Phenomenology*’s first chapters shows empirical consciousness’s internal movement to the Absolute, but a gap remains between this consciousness’s development in historical time and the Absolute. On the other hand, the disconnect between history and the Absolute exposed by the latter’s second appearance “supposes in the very least that the moments of *Phenomenology* and the moments of *Logic* are not moments in the same sense, but also that there are two ways, phenomenological and logical, to contradict oneself” (18). In short, an equivocation persists between logic and phenomenology, a difference in their respective senses, each of which is meant to express the difference that goes “all the way” to contradiction. This equivocation is discernible when Hyppolite returns late in the text to his opening distinction between the logic as the Idea’s actuality and phenomenology as its actualization and incarnation in experience. “Logic,” he states, “is not concrete truth, that of the Idea in nature or in spirit, but the pure truth, the development of the concept in its actuality and of actuality in its concept, the life of the concept” (Hyppolite 1997, 164); in contrast, “history is the objectivity of spirit’s becoming, its temporal incarnation

(*its sense, without being yet the sense of sense*)” (188). Absent any dialectical mediation between this “pure” truth of actuality and the “objective” truth of the concrete, and thus between logic and history, this distinction seems only to reinstate the kind of standard metaphysical idealism the dialectic is meant to overcome.

The path is thereby cleared for Deleuze’s response to Hyppolite and Hegel. If “Being can be identical to difference only in so far as difference is taken to the absolute, in other words, all the way to contradiction” (*DI* 18), yet contradiction continues to yield an equivocity rather than a univocity of sense, the question becomes whether contradiction is adequate to express Being in the first place: “is it the same thing to say that Being expresses itself and that Being contradicts itself?” (18). Contradiction may be necessary to determine identity by distinguishing a thing from everything it is not, but if a thing’s identity can only determine and not express it, then negation or contradiction cannot be expressive difference. And so “one might ask whether an ontology of difference couldn’t be created that would not go all the way to contradiction, since contradiction would be less and not more than difference” (18). This problem of an ontology of expressive difference will set the direction—the sense—of Deleuze’s early period.

## Chapter 3

### Hume

#### Relations Must Be External to Terms

Deleuze's *Empiricism and Subjectivity* is based on the thesis for his *diplôme d'études supérieures*, prepared under the supervision of Hyppolite—whose lectures on Hume Deleuze attended (Dosse 2010, 110–11)—and Georges Canguilhem. It was published the same year as *Logic and Existence* and a year prior to Deleuze's review.<sup>1</sup> It does not directly address Hegel or dialectics, yet an anti-Hegelian strain and response to Hyppolite's critique still informs the text. Both are found in Deleuze crediting Hume with advancing a thesis on the externality of relations to their terms, this being the position Bertrand Russell develops in his “revolt” against Hegel and corresponding turn to empiricism and pluralism.<sup>2</sup> Deleuze writes: “Relations are external to their terms. When James calls himself a pluralist, he does not say, in principle, anything else. This is also the case when Russell calls himself a realist. We see in this statement the point common to all empiricisms” (*ES* 99).<sup>3</sup> By naming Hume as the originator of the thesis, Deleuze signals his determination to position Hume against Hegel.

Russell holds that “the doctrine of internal relations” entails ontological monism insofar as “every relation between two terms expresses, primarily, intrinsic properties of the two terms and, in ultimate analysis, a property of the whole which the two compose” (Russell 1959, 54). The doctrine of external relations, in contrast, holds any equivalence between relational propositions and subject–predicate propositions to be precluded by the distinction between logical types. Attribute-words and relation-words express different types of meaning and so relate to what they stand for in different

ways—an attribute expressed in the form of an adjective predicated of a subject differs from a relation expressed as a preposition or transitive verb between two subjects—and so one cannot be substituted for the other in a proposition without either entailing nonsense or requiring the meanings of the proposition's other words to change such that there would be no proper substitution (Russell 2010, 137–44). Terms do not thereby become independent of their relations,<sup>4</sup> but neither relations nor the terms they relate to a subject can constitute that subject's identity or being. While this is not sufficient to demonstrate real plurality, which Russell (140) holds can be asserted only on empirical grounds, it shows the a priori denial of plurality to be spurious.

For Deleuze, the externality of relations disconnects empiricism from the structure of judgment ascribed to it in Hyppolite's and Hegel's critiques. Hyppolite's reading, holding that empiricism's own reflection on the affirmative judgment "A is B" reveals the contradiction between A and B and thus the insignificant and merely subjective nature of their connection, assumes empiricism's fundamental problem to be epistemological. It thereby confuses empiricism's focus on conjunction—which gives priority to "and . . . and . . . and . . ."—with rationalism's aspiration to inherence and the unity of Being.<sup>5</sup> Assigning the doctrine of external relations to Hume, Deleuze holds that he "deserves the credit for breaking the bonds imposed by the form of the judgment of attribution, for making possible an autonomous logic of relations, and discovering a conjunctive world of atoms and relations, whose ulterior development can be seen in Russell and modern logic—relations are, after all, conjunctions themselves" (*DI* 163). Thus, for Hume, relations induce automatic or customary associations that move the mind from one distinct idea to another: "all relations are nothing but a propensity to pass from one idea to another" (Hume 2003, 220). Moreover, an association's necessity—with relations of causality here being the paradigm instance—is a product of the fancy or imagination and cannot be grounded in experience or derived by reason: "in no single instance the ultimate connexion of any objects is discoverable, either by our senses or reason, and [. . .] we can never penetrate so far into the essence and construction of bodies, as to perceive the principle, on which their mutual influence depends" (285).

For Hyppolite, Hegelian dialectics overcomes this Humean skepticism by grounding judgment and its required internal connection of subject and predicate through a mediation that demonstrates how their opposition entails both their separation and their unity. This ultimately secures Absolute Knowledge and an Absolute Subject by surmounting every appearance of the

ineffable, making speculative contradiction constitutive of all that is given. Although Deleuze does not make this point explicitly, Hume's associative principles offer a direct response to Hegel and Hyppolite as they entail that opposition or contradiction, far from establishing internal necessity, remains an external relation that merely schematizes independent ideas. The relevant relation is contrariety, which Hume effectively treats as contradiction, and which carries out the conjunction and associated transition between terms by way of their underlying resemblance. Hume writes: "The relation of *contrariety* may at first sight be regarded as an exception to the rule, *that no relation of any kind can subsist without some degree of resemblance*. But let us consider, that no two ideas are in themselves contrary, except those of existence and non-existence, which are plainly resembling, as implying both of them the idea of the object; tho' the latter excludes the object from all times and places, in which 'tis suppos'd not to exist" (Hume 2003, 11). Considered in these terms, opposition or contradiction cannot have a constitutive role. Indeed, as Deleuze will argue, particularly through Bergson, opposition or contradiction pertains only to constituted—that is to say, *actual*—terms. The constitution of this actuality accounts for the possibility of judgment but does not ground it, as judgment belongs to a representationalist problematic for which opposition or contradiction is merely a correlate.<sup>6</sup> Representation rests on illusions or fictions engendered by this domain's constitution.<sup>7</sup>

For Deleuze, the constitution of an actuality comprising externally related terms involves not contradiction but difference, which cannot be "pushed up to contradiction" because it differs in kind from opposition or contradiction. Difference, in short, is both distinct from and prior to relations—including relations of identity and contradiction. As we will see, this difference is internal, not in the sense that a thing's differences do not make it different from others, but rather in that these differences, being singular, cannot be specified or delineated by comparison with that from which they differ: A thing is concrete and singular because it is different *in itself* before it is different from or in relation to others. Indeed, when the differences "between" different things are measured or equalized relative to one another—that is, when they are treated as relations—they lose their singular and constitutive character. The only concrete comparisons such differences admit take the form of "more or less but not how much." Although, as we will see, Deleuze's internal difference is quantitative before it is qualitative, it is a difference of neither number nor kind, and so it does not refer to quantity or quality in the everyday sense.

Hume distinguishes everyday differences of number and kind from contrariety, arguing that they cannot be relations because they do not move the mind from one idea to another but instead make ideas separable and hence independent. Difference in these forms, Hume states, is “a negation of relation, [rather] than [. . .] anything real or positive” (Hume 2003, 11). Nevertheless, Hume provides a correlate to Deleuzian internal difference when distinguishing systems of ideas and systems of impressions or passions, wherein the former is a discrete multitude of separate terms while the latter is one of interpenetrating qualities. This corresponds to what Deleuze, through his reading of Bergson, calls the distinction between discrete and continuous multiplicities. Hume writes:

Ideas may be compar'd to the extension and solidity of matter, and impressions, especially reflective ones, to colours, tastes, smells and other sensible qualities. Ideas never admit of a total union, but are endow'd with a kind of impenetrability, by which they exclude each other, and are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction, not by their mixture. On the other hand, impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union; and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole. Some of the most curious phaenomena of the human mind are deriv'd from this property of the passions. (260)

While ideas comprise a system of external relations, impressions or passions involve differences that are constitutive—they vary the uniform impression that arises from the whole mixture—by virtue of being internal or, as Deleuze will later say, *intensive*.

### Empiricism and the Subject

The distinction between external relations of opposition and internal or intensive constitutive difference persists in Deleuze's developed anti-Hegelianism, informing core ideas and conceptual structures that already appear in his reading of Hume. Associative principles—the rules for determining the connections the mind draws between ideas—involve a subject of knowledge and a spatial and extensive schematism of the mind: “All knowledge is

indeed a system of relations between parts, such that we can determine one part by reference to another. One of Hume's most important ideas [. . .] is that there is no intensive knowledge; all possible knowledge is extensive and between parts" (*ES* 127). Extensive principles and their corresponding subjectivity, however, refer to other processes. Principles of association are known only in their effects, and no cause or origin can be assigned to them: "principles have neither cause nor an origin of their power. What is original is their effect upon the imagination" (25).<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, they depend on principles of the passions, as understanding emerges from a motivation and hence from passion (33).<sup>9</sup> The passions—"impressions of reflexion" produced by the ideas of pleasure or pain that arise from impressions of sensation (Hume 2003, 5–6)—give relations of association their sense and destiny (*ES* 63, 120) by assigning to certain impressions values that render them the ends of our activity (123–24).<sup>10</sup> Passions activate the mind when these value designations determine "which effect *interests me* and makes me seek out its cause" (124). The principles of the passions thereby form an intensive moral schematism (130–31). Association "does not define a knowing subject; on the contrary, it defines a set of possible means for a practical subject" (120–21). Indeed, "there is only a practical subject" (104). This subject is neither active nor passive but rather "activated" (26, 112).

This ethical/practical subject and the knowledge-seeking that serves as its means find not their cause but rather their immanent conditions of possibility in the given. For Deleuze, empiricism's central problem concerns how the subject, which transcends the given, is constituted within the given (*ES* 87), the empiricist answer refusing either to accord the given the capacity to transcend itself (88) or to follow transcendental philosophy in making the subject's conditions the same as the conditions by which the given is given (109–12).<sup>11</sup> Transcendental philosophy asks how the given can be given to a subject and how the knowing subject can give itself an object; its model is mathematics, reflecting its demand for a priori and apodeictic certainty (87). Empirical philosophy, in contrast, asks how this subject is constituted within the given, taking as its model physics and the determination of a dynamic given (87). This makes empiricism's primary concern not the epistemological problem of how knowledge derives from experience (107), but rather, as Hume puts it, how the mind can unite its "heap or collection of different perceptions [. . .] by certain relations" so as to suppose, "tho' falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity" (Hume 2003, 148). Or, in Deleuze's words, "how does the mind become a nature" (*ES* 28). In this task, experience of the given and habits

of the mind present distinct principles that together enable the mind to attain the consistency of a nature.<sup>12</sup>

Hume's given is "the flux of the sensible, a collection of impressions and images, or a set of perceptions. It is the totality of that which appears, being which equals appearance; it is also movement and change without identity or law. [. . .] Empiricism begins from the experience of a collection, or from an animated succession of distinct perceptions" (*ES* 87). This flux is conditioned by the regulative principle that "every idea derives from an impression," but it is constituted by a "principle of difference" that gives "a status to experience" by holding that "everything separable is distinguishable and everything distinguishable is different" (87).<sup>13</sup> This principle of difference is quantitative: "it is not under the category of quality that we must consider the mind as mind but rather form [sic] the viewpoint of quantity. It is not the representative quality of the idea but rather its divisibility that interests us at this stage. *The fundamental principle of empiricism, the principle of difference, had already stated this; such was its meaning*" (90). It follows that the constituents of experience are atomic in nature, the smallest impressions and their corresponding ideas being indivisible and as such unextended, but nevertheless tangible (90–91).<sup>14</sup> Extended space is a "quality of certain perceptions" that are "distributed in a certain order," and time is a similar order and quality, but one that, pace Kant's *Transcendental Aesthetic*, pertains to "any set of perceptions whatsoever" (91).

However, none of this constitutes a subject, which organizes the given into a system via relations that are external to the impressions and ideas constituted by the given. Experience's flux presents us with distance and contiguity, impressions bearing similarities to one another, and objects persisting over time. But these are not yet relations: "Contiguous or distant objects do not in the least explain that distance and contiguity are *relations*. [. . .] The resemblance between particular ideas does not explain that resemblance is a relation, that is, that an idea can evoke the appearance of a similar idea in the mind" (*ES* 99, 100). Indeed, even the principles of association do not explain the relations that follow from them (101). Given that no two ideas fail to bear some resemblance to each other, the mere fact of resemblance cannot be sufficient to move the mind from one idea to the other (102). Relations and their application to experience instead arise from habit, which is "a *principle different from* experience, although it also presupposes it," and which gives the understanding a means to "derive the faculty of drawing conclusions from experience, and also of transcending experience and making inferences" (67).

Here, “habit is not a mechanics of quantity” (*ES* 67, translation modified) but instead belongs to quality, the subject being “the qualification of a collection of ideas. [. . . A] given collection is qualified as a partial, actual subject” (64). Habits form over time and through experience, as the mind makes associations between objects and becomes accustomed to their repeatedly presented conjunction, expecting the same conjunction for similar future cases. The circumstances that activate the passions at the moment when an association is established make them the individuating factor in the mind’s systematizing of experience.<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless, habit’s principle is not experiential, but instead refers to “the habit of contracting habits” (66), as “the habit I adopt will never by itself explain the fact that I adopt a habit” (67). The habit of contracting habits—an originary power and tendency of the fancy to construct internal connections based on recurring ordered presentations of like instances or events—constitutes the time in which habits are formed. This makes empiricism “a philosophy of the imagination and not a philosophy of the senses” (110). This is where Kant reproaches Hume, holding that imagination must have a transcendental function of synthesis that relates the given to the subject, constituting the given as an object and providing the relations with which the given is understood (111). Hume, in contrast, insists that no transcendental subject or synthesis surpasses our empirical imagination, that the principles organizing our impressions “are simply principles of *our* nature, and [. . .] they render possible an experience without at the same time rendering necessary the objects of this experience” (111–12). Consequently, anything beyond an accidental agreement between human nature and the nature of things must assume purposiveness (112) and thus involve an idea—in the Kantian sense of an empty form that can be thought but not known—of a whole that gathers up and organizes the given into a nature (133).

While the principle of experience is difference, the principle of habit is *repetition*. It does not concern the objects repeated, as while experience “causes us to observe particular conjunctions” (*ES* 67), this repetition without progression “changes, discovers and produces nothing” (68). Hume identifies “two particulars, which we are to consider as essential to necessity, *viz.* the constant *union* and the *inference* of the mind” (Hume 2003, 284), adding that it is the “constant union alone, with which we are acquainted” (284). The leap to habitual association, Deleuze declares, thus falls to “the mind which contemplates it [the repeated conjunction], for it produces a new impression in it, ‘a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another’ and ‘to transfer the past to the future,’ that is, an anticipation or a

tendency” (*ES* 68, quoting Hume).<sup>16</sup> Habit thereby transforms bare empirical repetition into progression or production (68), constituting the subject by way of “*a synthesis of the mind*” (92), this subject in turn being “*the synthesis of time*” (94). This time is not simply an order of succession but a “fundamental dynamism” (92), Deleuze asserting that “most of the characteristics of the Bergsonian *durée* or memory” (92) are found in Hume’s thesis.<sup>17</sup> But for Hume the past belongs to experience rather than habit (96), as memory or recollection gives us only “the old present, not the past,” if by past we mean “not only that which has been, but also that which determines, acts, prompts, and carries a certain weight” (94–95). Habit alone gives the past this weight, and “habit has no need of memory, it does without it ordinarily, in one way or another. Sometimes no evocation of memories accompanies it, and sometimes, there is no specific memory that it could evoke” (95). Therefore, contra Bergson, “memory alone does not bring about a synthesis of time; it does not transcend the structure, its essential role becomes the reproduction of the different structures of the given. It is rather habit which presents itself as a synthesis, and habit belongs to the subject” (94). Habit brings about “the synthesis of the present and the past in light of the future” (95), making duration dependent on habit. It manifests as anticipation based on past and present experience, making possible understanding, practical subjectivity, and their respective schematisms. It also engenders the fictions associated with representation, particularly that of identity, as “we apply the idea of time to an invariable object, and we compare the representation of the immutable object with the sequence of our perceptions” (99–100). Experience and habit, difference and repetition, provide the conditions for judgment while exceeding the order of representation.

## Chapter 4

### Bergson

#### Difference Must Be Internal Difference

Through Hume, Deleuze presents a temporal synthesis that challenges dialectical synthesis by accounting for the constitution of the identities and oppositional relations prior to any dialectical mediation. This continues in Deleuze's reading of Bergson—developed across two 1956 essays and his 1966 *Bergsonism*—although Bergson himself, it should be noted, never engages directly with Hegel and consistently refuses to conceive duration as a synthesis.<sup>1</sup> Both Hegelian dialectics and Hyppolite's critique of Bergson in *Logic and Existence* are explicit targets in these readings.

The common entry point of Bergson's thought and dialectics is the problem of internal difference and philosophy's aspiration to grasp things in their singularity. Deleuze here echoes Hyppolite: "If philosophy has a positive and direct relation to things, it is only insofar as philosophy claims to grasp the thing itself, according to what it is, in its difference from everything it is not, in other words, in its *internal difference*" (*DI* 32). Difference being internal means that it "is not simply spatio-temporal, that it is not generic or specific—in a word, difference is not exterior or superior to the thing" (33).<sup>2</sup> It also means that difference cannot be grounded in a static and unchanging Good, à la Plato, wherein things "receive their very difference from outside themselves" (42). Yet while Bergson is silent about Hegel on this point, Deleuze holds that "we can imagine the objections he would have had to a Hegelian-inspired dialectics, from which he is even more removed than Platonic dialectics" (42). Put simply, "if Bergson could object that Platonism goes no farther than a conception of *difference as still*

*external*, the objection he would address to a dialectic of contradiction is that it gets no farther than a conception of *difference as only abstract*" (42).

As established through Deleuze's reading of Hume, opposition or contradiction is an external relation that mediates actual terms without examining their proper constitution. With respect to Bergson's philosophy, dialectics remains abstract because it is "always composing movement from points of view, as a relation between actual terms instead of seeing in it the actualization [*la réalisation*] of something virtual" (*DI* 28). The virtual is a domain of constitutive internal differences that are fully real but not susceptible to representation, differences that for Bergson relate to the temporality that makes things what they are. The virtual must not be confused with the possible, which accords with principles of resemblance, identity, and representation. The possible refers to a plurality of abstract potential realities that may be fully actual—they are actual possibilities—but are stripped of existence or reality, with the realization or coming to existence of some possibilities entailing the limiting or thwarting of others, which in turn become impossible. As the reality that emerges must resemble the possibilities it brings into being, "from the point of view of the concept, there is no difference between the possible and the real [*il n'y a pas de différence entre le possible et le réel*]" (*B* 97). Ultimately, the possible "is a false notion, the source of false problems," because it is merely a "sterile double" that is abstracted from a fully positive reality and projected behind that reality as a plurality of counter-images (98). The virtual, in contrast, is not a possibility that may or may not be realized: It is fully real itself, and so while the possible is opposed to the real, the virtual is opposed to the actual. The actualization of the virtual proceeds according to rules that "are not those of resemblance and limitation, but those of difference or divergence and of creation," as the virtual "must *create* its own lines of actualization in positive acts" (97). Consequently, the actual never resembles the virtual that it actualizes, making the actualization of this virtual a genuine production of the new.

Actualization renders a fully objective actuality—indeed, "the objective is *that which has no virtuality* [. . .] everything is actual [*actuel*] in the objective" (*B* 41)—and incarnates (*incarner*) the virtual in this objectivity. In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze several times indicates that "actualize" and "incarnate" are interchangeable terms (see *B* 53, 58, 63, 97, 100–1, 106; the English translation renders *incarnation*, *incarner*, and *s'incarner* as embodiment). As we will see, however, he later distinguishes them, associating incarnation with a process of individuation that is distinct from and prior to actualization.

Deleuze will also associate Bergson less and less with incarnation or individuation in what will consolidate a break with Bergson on issues concerning the nature of inner or intensive difference and its repetition. Nevertheless, Deleuze will continue to position the actualization of Bergson's virtual against the actualization of Hegel's absolute Idea, the latter presupposing the representational schema it purports to ground. Treating the external relation of contradiction as though it were an internal constitutive difference, and thereby leaving the genesis of this relation and the actual terms it relates still to be explained, Hegelian dialectics fails to grasp things in their concreteness. Opposition or contradiction ends up an abstract and one-sided formulation of internal difference, one that fits the world it seeks to grasp like "baggy clothes."<sup>3</sup>

### Riemannian Multiplicities

If dialectics, despite its pretension of working with a properly internal difference, is still playing an abstract game of using an external relation to mediate already actualized terms, then it is really mediating elements of a *discrete multiplicity*, losing sight of how these elements are constituted from a multiplicity of a different kind. Central to this aspect of Deleuze's reading is his claim in *Bergsonism* that the two multiplicities Bergson presents in *Time and Free Will* are an adaptation of the distinction between discrete and continuous manifolds introduced in Bernhard Riemann's 1854 thesis on the foundations of geometry.<sup>4</sup> Bergson does distinguish two kinds of multiplicity in this early work, similar to Hume's distinction between the system of ideas and the system of impressions or passions (Hume 2003, 260). The first multiplicity is extensive and involves numerically distinct discrete objects in space, while the second is internal or intensive and involves a continuous succession of interpenetrating but qualitatively distinct conscious states that cannot be quantified without being represented symbolically in space (Bergson 1910, 85–87). However, there is no proper evidence of Riemann's influence on Bergson's division,<sup>5</sup> and the distinction between the discrete and the continuous goes back at least to Aristotle's division of quantity into plurality and magnitude (see Aristotle 1984, *Categories*, 4b; *Metaphysics*, 1020a). Moreover, Riemann's project is not at all about conceptualizing an inner domain such as Bergson's virtual and showing how it constitutes a radically different extensity. Rather, Riemann seeks to outline the general foundations of multiply extended magnitudes, whose

constituents may be discrete or continuous, and thereby provide a rigorous conceptual formulation of space and the fundamental notions of its construction, which geometry presupposes but to which it gives only nominal definitions, determining them as axioms whose relations to one another remain opaque (Riemann 1929, 411). Deleuze's reading of Riemann is hardly comprehensive or faithful to its source, focusing on a brief concluding point in Riemann's thesis in order to connect Bergson and Riemann's otherwise radically different understandings of continuous multiplicities. Nevertheless, attributing a Riemannian inspiration to Bergson allows Deleuze to use both in his broader project against Hegel, and to introduce themes around the nature of intensive difference and quantity that he develops further through Nietzsche and in *Difference and Repetition*.

Riemann's thesis concerns "the general concept of multiply extended magnitudes [*der Begriff mehrfach ausgedehnter Grössen*], in which spatial magnitudes are comprehended," and seeks to construct "the concept of a multiply extended magnitude [*Grösse*] out of general notions of quantity [*Grössenbegriffen*]" (Riemann 1929, 411).<sup>6</sup> Inquiry into the conditions for constructing such magnitudes, he contends, demonstrates "that a multiply extended magnitude is susceptible of various metric relations and that space accordingly constitutes only a particular case of a triply extended magnitude. A necessary sequel of this is that the propositions of geometry are not derivable from general concepts of quantity, but that those properties by which space is distinguished from other conceivable triply extended magnitudes can be gathered only from experience" (411–12). While experience indicates the high probability that Euclidean propositions are valid within the observable domain, "the admissibility of protracting them outside the limits of observation, not only toward the immeasurably large, but also toward the immeasurably small" (412), remains an open question. Riemann remains agnostic about whether physical space is composed of discrete or continuous components, holding this to be an empirical matter belonging to the domain of physics (424–25). Regardless, in both cases he holds these components to be parts of extended, divisible, and quantifiable magnitudes.

The general notions of quantity from which the concept of multiply extended magnitudes is constructed presuppose "a general concept which allows various modes of determination" (Riemann 1929, 412). This concept is the manifold, which denotes a domain of forms or elements organized along multiple dimensions. Riemann introduces this as a philosophical and not merely mathematical concept.<sup>7</sup> Depending on whether one can progress from one of the manifold's constituents to another across an unbroken path or

not, the mode of determination will yield a continuous or discrete manifold, which will then be quantified accordingly. A discrete manifold comprises a set of enumerable elements, like animals in a field or leaves on a tree—or, in the case of space, if it were held to be constructed of atomic units, as some ancients believed, or to be constituted so as to be isomorphic with a compact and well-ordered infinity of mathematical points, as Russell (1926) maintains. “In the doctrine of discrete quantities,” mathematicians can “set out without scruple from the postulate that given things are to be considered as all of one kind” (Riemann 1929, 413). Conversely, a continuous manifold, examples of which include “the positions of objects of sense, and the colors” (413), involves one or more extended continua—such as the length, width, and height of the everyday conception of space—where quantity involves determinations such as the distance or area between points, with these points not constituting the continuum but rather marking externally the limits or the transitions from one location to another.<sup>8</sup>

Quantities within a discrete manifold are compared by simple counting—more sheep graze in one field than another, for example. Measurement or comparison in a continuous manifold, however, “consists in superposition of the magnitudes to be compared; for measurement there is requisite some means of carrying forward one magnitude as a measure for the other. In default of this, one can compare two magnitudes only when the one is a part of the other, and even then one can only decide upon the question of more or less, not upon the question of how many” (Riemann 1929, 413). There is much in this statement to explicate. Within a regular and “flat” manifold, a magnitude taken from any location can serve as the measure for all the rest, just as, in the space of everyday life, a straight edge marked off in centimeters can be superposed onto a straight line between any two points to measure the shortest distance between them. Such manifolds can be gridded in a Euclidean manner, and the distance between any two points can be the unit of measure. The same holds for regular but curved manifolds, such as the surface of a geometrical sphere, where a curved line taken from any part of the surface can be superposed cleanly over any other part because the curvature in all directions is everywhere uniform. In both cases, measurements are independent of location, and “the figures lying in them [the manifolds] can be moved without stretching” (420). A universal standard of measure, however, would be absent in manifolds whose dimensions were stretched or curved irregularly. Consider instead of the smooth surface of a perfect sphere the rough and irregular surface of the Earth, where no straight or curved line could be taken from one part

and overlaid onto any other because the curvatures of the two magnitudes would not necessarily correspond. Uniform measurement would obtain only locally, in regions of consistent curvature or stretch, and would still ultimately depend—as Riemann goes on to assume—on there being lines of sufficiently small magnitude to be superposable onto any part of the manifold. Were even this uniformity absent, however, no magnitude could be fixed as the measure for another. Two magnitudes could then only be compared if one were part of the other, and, with no consistency in the manifold to allow the larger merely to be a multiple of the smaller, the relation between the two magnitudes could only be one of more or less, with no specification of how much. Investigations of these last cases, Riemann holds, “form a general part of the doctrine of quantity independent of metric determinations, where magnitudes are thought of not as existing independent of position and not as expressible by a unit, but only as regions in a manifold” (413). Rather than explore the matter further, however, he merely states that he will use these considerations to determine how the construction of multiply extended magnitudes and the determination of positions in them should be conceived (413). Riemann thereby restricts himself to manifolds where metric determinations are possible.

Riemann first explores metric determinations within a regular manifold or region of manifold. These “require magnitude to be independent of location” (Riemann 1929, 415) and thereby assume “that the length of lines be independent of their situation, that therefore every line be measurable by every other” (415–16). They further assume that at an “indefinitely small” (418) level there obtains a “flatness in smallest parts” (419), meaning that at an infinitesimal level the shortest distances between points are rendered by straight lines with lengths equal to the square root of the sum of the squared distances between the points along each of the manifold’s dimensions, as holds for any straight line in Euclidean geometry.<sup>9</sup> Flatness in smallest parts therefore entails that the manifold is infinitesimally Euclidean and thus uniform in itself even if it is non-Euclidean at a larger scale. If each point’s location in the manifold is identified by numbers assigned to its dimensions—the way a point in Euclidean space is determined by the number lines setting out its X, Y, and Z coordinates, and in this way, relations of place form a discrete manifold even if relations of measurement form a continuous one (423)—then measurements of distance, area, volume, and so forth can be rendered as infinite sums of differentials following the procedures of integral calculus. Again, these formulations assume that the manifold or neighborhood under consideration is flat, that its curvature is

0, and while further determinations are required for a curved or stretched manifold, this remains compatible with measurement through the integration of differentials if “flatness in smallest parts is assumed” (422). For certain manifolds with a positive curvature, fragments can move within them without bending, just as a geometric figure projected onto a perfect sphere would retain the same shape regardless of where it moved on the sphere’s surface. However, only when the manifold’s curvature is 0 is the direction of movement also independent of position (421–22).

Riemann then considers the implications of his analysis for space as a particular three-dimensional manifold. The assumptions of lines, bodies, and their directions being independent of place, of flatness at an infinitesimal level, and of discreteness in location and continuousness in measurement seem to hold for observable space. But their extension beyond the maximum or the minimum of observability is uncertain. Concerning extension beyond the maximum, Riemann holds that immeasurably great space has unlimited extension but not necessarily infinite magnitude, since the observed independence of bodies from their position indicates that space must have a constant curvature, even if this is zero, but with even the slightest positive curvature space must close back upon itself so that its magnitude will be limited (Riemann 1929, 423). However, concerning what is beyond the minimum—that is, beyond the “spatially small” into which “the microscope permits” (424) the natural sciences to pursue phenomena, where the exactness given by the mathematics of Analysis is merely assumed—the situation is even more problematic. If the observable independence of bodies from position is only apparent, “then one cannot conclude to relations of measure in the indefinitely small from those in the large” (424). Space beyond the observable minimum may contain irregular curvatures with arbitrary values even while its curvature at the observable and measurable level remains at or close to zero (424). Moreover, it may even be the case that “the line element is not representable, as has been premised, by the square root of a differential expression of the second degree” (424). In other words, in real space, flatness in smallest parts may not obtain, meaning consistency in measurement at the infinitesimal level would not hold. For this reason, “the empirical notions on which spatial measurements are based appear to lose their validity when applied to the indefinitely small, namely the concept of a fixed body and that of a light-ray; accordingly it is entirely conceivable that in the indefinitely small the spatial relations of size are not in accord with the postulates of geometry, and one would indeed be forced to this assumption as soon as it would permit a simpler explanation of the

phenomena” (424). This would imply, however, that measurements in the observable domain would not be grounded in the procedures of integration, and other considerations would be needed to account for this reality.

The possibility that flatness in smallest parts does not hold, the implications of which Riemann had set aside to examine manifolds for which metric relations of not only more or less but also how much were possible, thus leads on to “the question concerning the ultimate basis of relations of size in space” (Riemann 1929, 424). In this respect, “while in a discrete manifold the principle of metric relations is implicit in the notion of this manifold, it must come from somewhere else in the case of a continuous manifold. Either then the actual things forming the groundwork of a space must constitute a discrete manifold, or else the basis of metric relations must be sought for outside that actuality, in colligating forces that operate upon it” (424–25). If space were really composed of discrete elements, then all measurements would be reduced to matters of counting, and the principle of space’s metric relations would be found in the very notion of its construction. However, if space were really continuous, then this principle would have to be imposed from the outside and with regard to the forces binding space together. This could entail forces composing space in a way that allowed for division into arbitrary but standard units of measure—a space whose continuous but regular form would accord with Euclidian postulates—or in a way that made all units of measure vary locally. Contrary to Riemann’s position that observation confirms the validity of Euclidean assumptions, Einstein’s general theory of relativity uses Riemann’s analysis to derive space’s metric principle from the bodies occupying it, a body’s gravitational force curving space–time and thereby determining the metrical principle within the region of its movement. This answer, however, applies only to macroscopic reality and not the infinitesimal world that prompted Riemann to ask his final question, and Einstein of course never managed to marry general relativity to the quantum world of discrete energy states, non-locality, and indeterminacy, to whose discovery he also contributed.

### Reading Bergson through Riemann

Deleuze links Bergson to Riemann on this final point regarding the metric principle in discrete versus continuous multiplicities: “Riemann [. . .] distinguished *discrete multiplicities* and *continuous multiplicities*. The former contain the principle of their own metrics (the measure of one of their parts

being given by the number of elements they contain). The latter found a metrical principle in something else, even if only in phenomena unfolding in them or in the forces acting in them” (B 39). However, Deleuze contends, Bergson “profoundly changed the direction of the Riemannian distinction” by holding that continuous multiplicities “belong essentially to the sphere of duration” (39–40) and therefore to internal difference. Bergson consistently portrays scientific and philosophical conceptions of space as involving a real infinity of discrete points, holding that they further engender a spatialized misconception of time as an infinity of instants.<sup>10</sup> Statements that seem manifestly to confuse and conflate countable and measurable quantities—for example, that “the very possibility of arranging the numbers in ascending order arises from their having to each other relations of container and contained” (Bergson 1910, 2) and that “every clear idea of number implies a visual image in space; and the direct study of the units which go to form a discrete multiplicity will lead us to the same conclusion on this point as the examination of number itself” (79)—would be absurd unless they meant to follow Riemann’s thesis that within discrete manifolds the principle of measure is grounded in the numerable units that constitute their extension, allowing for duration, as a continuous multiplicity, to have a different metric principle.

Bergson in *Time and Free Will* further insists upon the absolute separation of extensive quantitative space and intensive qualitative duration. The text opens with a critique of intensive magnitude, understood as a quantity that, while “not admitting of measure [. . .] can nevertheless be said that it is greater or less than another intensity” (Bergson 1910, 3). Bergson holds this idea to be self-contradictory, since “as soon as a thing is acknowledged to be capable of increase and decrease, it seems natural to ask by how much it decreases or by how much it increases” (72). He therefore concludes that “if magnitude, outside you, is never intensive, intensity, within you, is never magnitude” (Bergson 1910, 225). Despite retreating from this position in later works that propose various rapprochements between extensive quantity and intensive quality—though always with quality as the ground from which quantity emerges—Bergson arguably never overcomes the quandaries entailed by his initial stance.<sup>11</sup> However, by asserting that Bergson is following Riemann when treating space as a discrete manifold and time as a continuous manifold, Deleuze can claim—against many of Bergson’s own statements—that although Bergson holds continuous multiplicities to be qualitative, a form of quantity still pertains to them. He thus declares that “for Bergson, duration was not simply the indivisible, nor was

it the nonmeasurable. Rather, it was that which divided only by changing in kind, that which was susceptible to measurement only by varying its metrical principle at each stage of the division" (B 40). This allows Deleuze to hold that for Bergson "duration had [. . .] a 'precision' as great as that of science" (40), thereby lending credibility to Bergson's challenge to Einstein in *Duration and Simultaneity*. By holding that Bergson's continuous multiplicities—which, contra Riemann's, are intensive rather than extensive, virtual rather than actual, related to duration rather than space, and constitutive of discrete multiplicities—are indebted to Riemann, Deleuze can treat the issue between Einstein and Bergson as concerning the nature of time as a continuous multiplicity. Bergson's critique, Deleuze argues, reflects his Riemann-influenced view that Einstein has misinterpreted time as being extended and numerable in ways suitable only to discrete multiplicities. Yet for all this, duration still involves metric principles (78–89).<sup>12</sup>

Duration as a continuous multiplicity, then, is unextended, virtual, constitutive, qualitative, and does not divide without changing in kind, constituting a new immanent metrical principle with each division. This makes it an internal difference by which a thing differs from everything it is not. A thing is singular by virtue of the past and memory embedded in it, by virtue, that is, of its relation to a continuous synthesis of diverse qualitative states. This recording is more fundamental than Humean habit's synthesis of experience, as while Bergson may present the past and memory as psychological matters in *Time and Free Will*, Deleuze contends that from *Matter and Memory* onward they become ontological conditions without which memory could not be lived and the very passage of the present would be impossible. Habit for Bergson is the form of lived memory that acts the past in the present without recall; it contrasts with recollection, which represents the past in the present while keeping it placed in the past (Bergson 1991, 78–88). But habit-memory and recollection-memory both depend on the automatic, complete, and ordered recording of present images as they pass, a process in which the whole past changes without ever passing into nothingness—that is, it *endures*. Deleuze holds that this ontological recording accounts for the passage of the present, without which habit's memory of the past and expectation of the future would be impossible.

The present can pass only by becoming different from what it is, but it cannot constitute the past into which it passes if it is already passing away, nor can it "wait" for the past to be constituted, as a future present would then never be able to arrive and replace it; these impasses can only be overcome if the present is virtually past *at the same time* that it is actually present (B

56–60). Every present includes a virtual past encompassing the past in its entirety—“a pure past, a kind of ‘past in general’” (59). But the virtual past of one present is also a layer within the virtual pasts of subsequent presents, and the pure past comprises infinite layers resonating with and repeating one another up to the actual present, as Bergson famously portrays in *Matter and Memory* with the image of the cone (Bergson 1991, 152). This virtual past gives the actual present its sense and direction: Each present is what it is by virtue of all that comes before, and the infinite layers of pure past, ontologically contracted into the present, drive this present into an open future that “repeats” the past, but as a repetition of difference. Actualizing the virtual past in this repetition of difference—a creative evolution—the present and past switch ontological positions: “the present *is not*; rather, it is pure becoming, always outside itself. It *is not*, but it acts. Its proper element is not being but the active or the useful. The past, on the other hand, has ceased to act or to be useful. But it has not ceased to be. Useless and inactive, impassive [*impassible*], it IS, in the full sense of the word: It is identical with being in itself” (B 55).

Virtual internal difference thus constitutes an actuality that, while extended, discrete, and quantifiable, remains characterized by difference and novelty. Deleuze here notes how Bergson comes to see things themselves participating in duration. For Hyppolite, Bergson here must recognize the reality of negation, as living things dissociating and individuating themselves by way of *élan vital* must negate what they are not. Deleuze answers that the negative only appears when the actual is disconnected from its actualization: “If we concentrate only on the actuals that conclude each line [of actualization], we establish relationships between them—whether of gradation or opposition” (B 101). Negation is indeed added to an affirmative proposition or idea (17–18), but the error this Bergsonian reformulation corrects belongs to the first kind of false problem—that of confusing more and less—and rests on a more profound error of obsessing over differences of degree at the expense of differences in kind (19–20), losing sight of the real nature of internal difference. But if opposition fails as an internal difference, if internal difference must be a continuous multiplicity of virtual differences in kind, then it must be actualized “through differentiation [*différenciation*], through divergent lines, and creates so many [extensive] differences in kind by virtue of its own movement” (43). Differentiation—or what the English translation of *Difference and Repetition* renders “differentiation” to distinguish it from an infinitesimal or differential-based “differentiation” within the virtual<sup>13</sup>—is “actualization of a virtuality that persists across its actual divergent lines”

(95). It is a repetition, but not the bare repetition of matter that repeats the same to engender external differences between repeated cases. Such external repetition of the same depends on an internal contraction or synthesis of time that engenders the new (47–48). Actualization involves separation, and in evolution this creates a diversity of living species and individuals, each of which “turns on itself and *closes itself*. It cannot be otherwise, since the Whole is only virtual, dividing itself by being acted out” (104). Resemblances emerge, but only as effects of divergence, an “identity of that which differs from itself” (*DI* 40), and hence there is always “a point of view, or rather a state of things, in which differences in kind can no longer appear” (*B* 34). Such is the perspective of dialectics, which misinterprets opposition or contradiction as constitutive internal difference.

Duration’s actualization via divergence also explains the genesis of the matter that opposes it. Matter is internal difference relaxed and extended until what differs from itself becomes a difference outside itself—a discrete multiplicity. It is the most relaxed form of a duration whose multiplicity includes levels of contraction and dilation above and below the lived duration of human existence. In its *actualization*, the present is the virtual past’s most contracted form, compressed to the point where it explodes in creative evolution. But as an *actuality* of matter and space, it is duration relaxed and difference externalized to the point where it comes into opposition with the contracted force of this same *élan vital*. The actual seems to be nothing more than a world of discrete and extended material entities when the contracted force of actualization is forgotten. Duration here becomes an ontological monism underpinning experiential and methodological dualisms. Deleuze holds this to resolve the seemingly irreconcilable dualisms Bergson establishes between differences in kind and differences of degree, quality and quantity, recollection and perception, past and present, memory and matter. The dualisms reflect a method that initially distinguishes differences in kind from differences of degree, carving up the given according to its tendencies or lines of articulation (*B* 44–45; *DI* 33–34) and in this way constituting “a superior empiricism, capable of stating problems and of going beyond experience toward concrete conditions” (*B* 30). But this external difference in kind between distinct lines or tendencies—between internal difference in itself (difference in kind) and internal difference externalized into space (differences in degree)—ultimately becomes a monism, with one tendency becoming the condition of possibility for the other: “if there is a privileged half in the division [into tendencies], it must be that this half contains in itself the secret of the other” (*DI* 27). Both sides of the initial dualisms

thus turn out to be durational, each differing from its contrary in terms of relative contraction and relaxation, so that the dualism between actual tendencies becomes a monism at the level of their virtual unity (*B* 93).

However, Deleuze acknowledges, everything Bergson criticizes now seems to return to the heart of his philosophy, as the contraction and relaxation of duration appear to invoke the same sort of quantitative difference of degree Bergson associates with the abstract and faulty discrete multiplicities he says are erroneously used to interpret qualitative internal difference, this quantitative difference now being embedded in the virtual internal difference he submits to replace them (*B* 75–76). To say durations are more or less contracted or relaxed would seem naturally to lead to the question of by how much, thereby spatializing duration. Deleuze counters this by maintaining that duration's levels of contraction and relaxation are "degrees of difference" rather than "differences of degree" (*B* 93). As such, they introduce a new notion of quantity specific to the virtual. Here, the claim that Bergson's continuous multiplicities, being Riemannian in character, find their metric principle in the forces binding them together is cashed out in the claim that "one of Bergson's more curious ideas is that difference itself has a number, a virtual number, a numbering number" (*DI* 34), and that for Bergson, "there are numbers enclosed in qualities, intensities included in duration" (*B* 92).<sup>14</sup> Unlike differences of degree, which involve extensive and discrete magnitudes with fixed numerical differences between them, the virtual number associated with degrees of difference is a metrical principle that changes with each division made in the process of the virtual's creative actualization. Virtual intensive quantity, then, would accord with Riemann's account of situations where, in the absence of a fixed standard of measure, two magnitudes can be compared only when one is part of the other and only in terms of more or less but not how much—situations, in short, where magnitudes depend on the forces acting upon and holding together this multiplicity. Duration manifests this condition by immediately differing from itself, changing continuously and qualitatively with the syntheses of the past that compose it and the *élan vital* that actualizes and incarnates it. Virtual number, then, refers to tendencies or forces of differentiation correlated with this actualization and embodiment.

This thesis of a virtual intensive quantity of more or less but not how much accords with the "difference in quantity" Deleuze draws from Nietzsche's account of force and the will to power. But the claim that Bergson reintroduces quantity into quality in this way is tenuous. That Bergson does not recognize himself making such a move is evidenced by the lack of

textual evidence Deleuze can muster to support it.<sup>15</sup> Deleuze's often noted turn from Bergson to Nietzsche is usually treated as either a deployment of Nietzsche to deepen Bergson or a Bergsonization of Nietzsche.<sup>16</sup> However, the way the constitutive role of intensity as intensive quantity is found explicitly in Nietzsche and must be attributed to Bergson against his most explicit statements suggests more the limitations Deleuze finds in Bergson when seeking to develop a conception of intensive internal difference adequate to an ontology of sense. In later works that explore intensity, Bergson is largely relegated to the background or given only an intermediate role in its elaboration, even in prominent counterexamples such as Deleuze's defense of Bergson on intensive quantity in *Difference and Repetition* (*DR* 239–40).<sup>17</sup> Though often unnoticed by commentators, these later works also limit the role of the virtual and its actualization in the production of difference: The virtual certainly remains a multiplicity and its actualization a production of difference by difference, but what is engendered by this actualization are the forms and categories of representational thought, and even here this process refers to other factors. The virtual and actual retain a place in Deleuze's theorization of the production of the new, but they cease being the source of this production, instead operating adjacent to it.

## Chapter 5

### Nietzsche

#### Sense and Force

Deleuze's seminal Nietzsche book presents his most direct and polemical attack on Hegelian dialectics. This has led critics, who rarely consider Deleuze's engagements with Hegel beyond *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, to dismiss Deleuze as a poor and uninformed reader of Hegel—and sometimes of Nietzsche too. Deleuze writes: "There is no possible compromise between Hegel and Nietzsche. Nietzsche's philosophy [. . .] forms an absolute anti-dialectics and sets out to expose all the mystifications that find a final refuge in the dialectic" (*NP* 195). This statement and others have been taken to imply a total disconnect between the two thinkers, and presumably between Hegel and Deleuze himself, which is susceptible to a dialectical rejoinder that this assertion of absolute separation implies the interrelation and identity of the opposing positions. Nevertheless, if Hyppolite's reading of Hegel is kept in mind, then beneath the rhetoric can be seen a subtle critique of dialectics built upon Hegel and Nietzsche's rival stances regarding the requirements of an ontology of sense. This critique centers on a challenge to Hegel's conception of force.

As previously discussed, the concept of force, introduced in Hegel's *Phenomenology* in the final stage of the Dialectic of Consciousness, provides the mechanism to reach the Absolute's first appearance, achieved when Consciousness attains Self-Consciousness. Hegelian force is virtual in the Bergsonian sense of being constitutive, though it is formulated in terms of relations that, as already seen, would be considered from the Bergsonian and Humean positions Deleuze advances to be external, abstract, pertaining only to the actual, and part and parcel of a representationalist problematic.

A force for Hegel is essentially and negatively related to another, opposing force, but this negativity between forces is negated by a higher unity formed through their opposition. By accounting for the unity and multiplicity of Perception's object, force realizes the synthesis required by Kant to ground judgment. But it also provides the hinge to transition to the Absolute that for Kant remained merely an idea: Insofar as both subject and object are nothing but forces, nothing remains outside the dialectical movement between them as a hidden essence behind appearances. Deleuze's review of *Logic and Existence* suggests that the relation between the Absolute and empirical man is fully determined, but not that between the Absolute and historical man, and thus he follows Hyppolite in identifying the Absolute's second appearance as posing the dialectic's greatest difficulty. The failure to transition internally from history to the Absolute, Deleuze argues, indicates that contradiction has different phenomenological and logical senses, and so cannot underpin an ontology of sense.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Deleuze really thought the Absolute's first appearance was unproblematic, as that would imply, even if in a limited way, an adequacy of dialectical negation that he otherwise consistently rejects. Regardless, his reading of Nietzsche does reject any such adequacy, Deleuze arguing that Nietzsche provides a synthesis of forces that breaks with dialectics as such. Deleuze here places Nietzsche within the post-Kantian lineage, holding that Nietzsche resolves the difficulty, identified by Kant's critics, that Kant failed to provide an account of the immanent genesis of experience, remaining at the level of the conditions of possible rather than real experience and positing miraculous harmonies between the faculties of sensibility, imagination, and understanding whose syntheses underpin judgment and experience. To the problem outlined in *Empiricism and Subjectivity* that transcendental philosophy holds the conditions by which the given is given to be the same as those by which the subject is given, Deleuze adds another: "Kant does not realise his project of immanent critique. Transcendental philosophy discovers conditions which still remain external to the conditioned. Transcendental principles are principles of conditioning and not of internal genesis" (*NP* 91). "If Nietzsche belongs to the history of Kantianism," Deleuze therefore contends, "it is because of the original way in which he deals with these post-Kantian demands. He turned synthesis into a synthesis of forces—for, if we fail to see synthesis in this way, we fail to recognise its sense, nature and content" (52). Force also being Hegel's answer to the problem of immanent genesis, the issue between Hegel and Nietzsche concerns the form that this synthesis, and thus

the direction post-Kantian thought, must take. Hyppolite limits Nietzsche's philosophical role to articulating critiques of anthropomorphism and the old metaphysics, both of which, he holds, Hegel anticipates and resolves by transforming metaphysics into logic (Hyppolite 1997, 57–59, 186). Against this reductive view, Deleuze insists that Nietzsche's whole philosophy is a critique of dialectics, with his thesis concerning force being aimed directly at Hegel, or at least at the Hegelianism of his day: "It has been said that Nietzsche did not know his Hegel. In the sense that one does not know one's opponent well. On the other hand we believe that the Hegelian movement, the different Hegelian factions were familiar to him. Like Marx he found his habitual targets there. [. . .] Anti-Hegelianism runs through Nietzsche's work as its cutting edge. We can already feel it in the theory of forces" (*NP* 8).

### Sense, Value, and a Concrete Synthesis of Forces

Deleuze opens his study proclaiming that "Nietzsche's most general project is the introduction of the concepts of sense [*sens*] and value [*valeur*] into philosophy" (*NP* 1). Both concepts are fundamentally connected to force as an internal constitutive difference. Regarding sense, Deleuze declares: "We will never find the sense of something (of a human, a biological or even a physical phenomenon) if we do not know the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it" (3). This sense is necessarily plural as multiple forces compete for dominance such that "the history of a thing, in general, is the succession of forces which take possession of it and the co-existence of the forces which struggle for possession" (3).<sup>1</sup> However, forces are not external to what they appropriate; instead, "the object itself is force, expression of a force" (6; see also 40). The idea of essence is not invalidated, Deleuze continues. Instead, a thing's essence refers to the dominant sense among the many it can have, this sense giving it affinity with certain forces and thus being a function of power. Religion, for example, has affinity with negative forces, making it essentially life-denying and nihilistic (4–5).

Like its essence, a thing's value denotes "the hierarchy of forces which are expressed in it as a complex phenomenon" (*NP* 8). Nietzsche demands a revaluation of our values starting from an assessment of what value these values have had (Nietzsche 1967, Preface 3; 1968, Preface 4). For Deleuze, this task implies a "critical reversal" (1) whereby values are not starting principles on which evaluations are made but instead depend on evaluations.

Evaluations in this context are the differential elements from which values emerge, the differences between evaluations and their resulting values being articulated in terms of “high” and “low,” “noble” and “base.”<sup>2</sup> This differential element can be linked to Deleuze’s discussion of the “degrees of difference” that he holds are the new form of quantity Bergson introduces into the virtual, particularly if one notes an archaic meaning of “degree,” found in both English and French, that refers to social rank. The difference between noble and base evaluations is not akin to different degrees of temperature; rather, noble and base both have a degree or rank that makes them irreducible to each other or to any common measure—their difference is one of more or less but not how much.<sup>3</sup> Nietzsche maintains that simplistic evaluations based on identity and opposition must be replaced with a more complex and subtle order of rank and power, declaring nihilism to be a condition in which “opposites replace natural degrees and ranks. Hatred against the order of rank. Opposites suit a plebeian age because easier to comprehend” (Nietzsche 1968, § 37). Values are expressed qualitatively as high or low, noble or base, but they remain immanent to the domain of quantity as they refer to and emerge from a struggle among forceful relations.

Just as for Hegel the self-contradictory thing of Sense Certainty and object of Perception are accounted for only by the relational concept of force, so too for Nietzsche substantive notions such as the atom or the ego cannot explain their plurality and action at a distance unless they are reinterpreted as forces (*NP* 6–8). As with Hegel, therefore, “every force is [. . .] in an essential relation with another force” (6, translation modified). Nonetheless, despite clear resonances with Hegel’s concept, Deleuze insists that Nietzsche’s must not be confused with it.

In Nietzsche the essential relation of one force to another is never conceived of as a negative element in the essence. In its relation with the other[,] the force which makes itself obeyed does not deny the other or that which is not, it affirms its own difference and enjoys this difference. The negative is not present in the essence as that from which force draws its activity: on the contrary it is a result of activity, of the existence of an active force and the affirmation of its difference. [. . .] For the speculative element of negation, opposition or contradiction Nietzsche substitutes the practical element of *difference*, the object of affirmation and enjoyment. It is in this sense that there is a Nietzschean empiricism. (8–9)

This statement easily connects to and builds on Deleuze's review of Hypolite, where he proposes an ontology of difference that would not go up to contradiction because contradiction is less than difference and not more. Contradiction, an external relation that dialectics improperly treats as a constitutive internal difference, is exceeded by a concrete and fully affirmative difference. While force's essence is determined by external relations of affinity or incompatibility with other forces, what is expressed by force and manifested in its relations is an internal difference whose order of rank or degree is affirmed. Where negation and contradiction appear, they are only effects of difference, and if taken to be internal to force or its essence, they become misrepresentations of this difference arising from a certain perspective, just as, pace Bergson, from a certain point of view differences in kind no longer appear. The dialectician's "profession and mission" is "to establish *antitheses* everywhere where there are more delicate evaluations to be made, *coordinations* to be interpreted" (15).

Being internal and constitutive, affirmative difference is not naive empiricism's positive content, which Hegel condemns as an abstraction whose truth is found in concrete negation. Rather, for this Nietzschean empiricism, Deleuze argues, negation is the abstraction: "Hegel wanted to ridicule pluralism, identifying it with a naive consciousness which would be happy to say 'this, that, here, now'—like a child stuttering out its most humble needs. The pluralist idea that a thing has many senses, the idea that there are many things and one thing can be seen as 'this and then that' is philosophy's greatest achievement, the conquest of the true concept, its maturity and not its renunciation or infancy" (*NP* 4). Contradiction is an "abstract thought" (10), and forces cannot be measured "in terms of an abstract unity" (58) or "an abstract relation which is supposed to express them all" (74), as Hegel's dialectical mediation attempts to do. Opposition is "the law of the relation between abstract products, but difference is the only principle of genesis or production; a principle which itself produces opposition as mere appearance. Dialectic thrives on oppositions because it is unaware of far more subtle and subterranean differential mechanisms" (57); "the labour of the negative is only a course approximation to the games of the will to power" (157–58).

As previously noted, abstractions for Hegel are one-sided and incomplete portrayals of a multidimensional reality. Dialectics seeks increasing levels of actuality and concreteness by mediating abstractions through their opposition, ultimately reaching a concrete actuality that distinguishes, unites, and gives meaning and direction to all that is. Mediation pushes difference up

to contradiction because only by opposing everything that it is not can a thing be individual, but opposing also involves the thing in everything else. To say the dialectic remains abstract, then, means it remains one-sided and incomplete, its mediation of opposites leaving something unincorporated. For Deleuze, this something is difference, which dialectics misses because, in aspiring to ground a paradigm of representation, it ends up mediating only an abstract passage between subject and predicate in which each becomes the other (*NP* 157).

Because difference exceeds the negation and contradiction of dialectical synthesis, its intercalation into a synthetic structure entails new categories and descriptors able to speak to the concrete as Hegel had sought to do. These displace the question of essence, “What is . . . ?,” in favor of empirical questions such as “Who?,” “How much?,” etc.<sup>4</sup> But they also seem illicitly to personify forces. Nevertheless, the passage quoted above about a commanding force affirming and enjoying its difference from the force it commands, along with claims that “all force is appropriation, domination, exploitation of a quantity of reality” (*NP* 3) and that “a new force can only appear and appropriate an object by first of all putting on the mask of the forces which are already in possession of the object” (5), is neither a fanciful rhetorical flourish nor a thoughtless attempt simply to invert Hegel’s language of the negative. Rather, this language corrects an austere analytical or philosophical language that removes the *forcefulness* that makes forces what they are. Two forces are equal or opposed to each other only in abstraction; concretely, forces appropriate, dominate, submit, resist, lure, evade, deceive, trap, etc. What Deleuze calls Nietzsche’s “method of *dramatisation*” (78), which seems to anthropomorphize forces by assigning them personae, thereby challenges the dialectical language of force. It articulates a fundamental asymmetry and agonism between forces that follows from constitutive difference being irreducible to opposition.<sup>5</sup>

### Quantity, Quality, and the Will to Power

This new synthesis of forces also entails a rethinking of quantity and quality. Deleuze insists strongly in his Nietzsche reading that internal difference, as a forceful difference, must be considered quantitative before being considered qualitative, even if quantity and quality are inseparable within it. Hegel and Bergson both treat quantity as an abstract, external, inessential and merely numerical difference between things that are primarily qualitative.

In Hegel's logic, quantity emerges from the opposed moments of limit and alternation found in determinate being or quality, the synthesis of which engenders a being whose quantitative change remains indifferent to qualitative determination; quantity's externality and indifference to quality is then negated and sublated by the synthesis of quantity and quality into measure, whereby sufficient changes in quantity yield changes in quality (Hegel 1975, §§89–111). Deleuze's unevidenced assertions about Riemann's influence aside, Bergson too consistently treats quantity as an abstraction and externalization of quality, even in later works where he proposes a common ground between them, though he also refuses the dialectical maneuver of joining quantity and quality in measure.<sup>6</sup> Through Nietzsche, Deleuze reverses this order, holding that it is quality in these formulations that makes an abstraction of quantity.

Riemann posited the idea of a domain of quantity involving more or less but not how much, independent of metric determinations and not expressible as a unit. Hegel similarly defines quantity in general—referring to the mathematical definition—as an increase or decrease that is indifferent to a thing's determinate qualities or essence, so that a shade of red becomes more or less intense but remains red, or a person grows larger or smaller but their human essence remains unchanged (Hegel 1975, §99).<sup>7</sup> Only when posited as determinate quantity or quantum, the “how much” (§101) of quantity, does it involve number, and number, in turn, contains two qualitative moments of “annumeration” and unity, which find their principle in equality (§102). Number, the “how much” of quantity, thereby requires an equalization of quantities that treats them as being all of one type: Numbering entails “a colligation of as many units as we please” (§102), which allows number to be applied to both discrete and continuous magnitudes (§102A). As a determination or qualification of quantity in general, then, quality, in the form of equality, is imposed onto quantity, allowing quantity to be applied to metric determinations but thereby annulling a difference germane to it. When Nietzsche raises these issues of the equalization of quantities and their use in measurement, he targets mechanistic worldviews that reduce all qualities to quantities—treating colors as nothing more than light vibrating at certain frequencies, etc. Deleuze, however, holds that Nietzsche's critique applies also to the dialectical treatment of quantities as discrete, external, and equalizable, which leaves dialectics “unaware of the real element from which forces, their qualities and their relations derive” (*NP* 157).

Deleuze thus sets out to show how Nietzsche inverts this relationship so that quality emerges from quantity within force relations. “Nietzsche always

believed that forces were quantitative and had to be identified quantitatively,” but he “was no less certain that a purely quantitative determination of forces remained abstract, incomplete and ambiguous” (*NP* 43). There is no contradiction between these claims: The latter refers to discrete and extensive quantities signified by a cardinal form of number that counts units (1, 2, 3), while the former concerns intensive and continuous differences in quantity signified by an ordinal form of number expressing an order of rank (1st, 2nd, 3rd).<sup>8</sup> “If a force is inseparable from its quantity,” Deleuze continues, “it is no more separable from the other forces which it relates to. *Quantity itself is therefore inseparable from difference in quantity*” (43). Forces have quantities of strength or forcefulness, but since each force is what it is only through its relations to other forces, the singularity of its internal difference entails that in its external relations to other forces this quantity must manifest as a non-metric difference in quantity, a more or less but not how much. Forces are not strong or weak as such, but rather stronger or weaker, and this difference is constitutive.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, these internal differences cannot be oppositional, as this would entail treating them as external relations. Instead, they involve domination, submission, and reversal, so that they cannot be equalized: “To dream of two equal forces, even if they are said to be of opposite senses is a coarse and approximate dream, a statistical dream in which the living is submerged but which chemistry dispels” (43).<sup>10</sup>

Quality, Deleuze holds, is “nothing but the corresponding difference in quantity between two forces whose relationship is presupposed” (43). In short, internal difference in quantity *is* quality, being both what cannot be equalized in quantitative differences and what thereby exceeds the terms of these differences and so must be distinct from quantity. Quality is difference in quantity insofar as it pertains to forces when they are considered distinct and externally related, expressing the moment of independence that the constitutive nature of each force’s singular internal differences entails for it. Difference in quantity proper then pertains to the internal constitutive difference that, in relating to others, manifests as the ineliminable inequality between forces: “Difference in quantity is therefore, in one sense, the irreducible element *of* quantity and in another sense the element which is irreducible *to* quantity itself” (44). Employing dialectical terms that might be helpful here, we could say that force’s quantitative difference expresses what it is in its being-for-others, while its quality expresses its being-for-itself.

Forces whose order of rank make them dominant have the quality of being “active,” meaning they command, create, transform, and overcome; dominated forces have the quality of being “reactive,” meaning they submit,

adapt, compromise, and calculate (*NP* 40–42). Each force's quality thereby expresses how it behaves or manifests its difference in quantity, how its quantum of force is articulated or deployed (54). Forces “express their difference in quantity by the quality which is due to them,” and thus, “as the difference in quantity is irreducible in every case, it is pointless to want to measure it without interpreting the qualities of the forces which are present” (53). Weaker reactive forces may prevail over powerful forces, but an interpretation of the quantities and qualities expressed in this outcome indicates that they do not cease being reactive and weak, and thus their “victory” does not make them dominant (56–57). Assessing forces involves “the art of interpreting difference and quality independently of fact” (58)—an empiricism, to be sure, but not a positivism.

Nevertheless, this Nietzschean empiricism involves more than the weighing of ordered quantities and the interpretation of individual qualities, as “relations of forces remain indeterminate unless an element which is capable of determining them from a double point of view is added to force itself” (51). “Before” force's inner difference is different from others, it is *different in itself*. Beyond its being-for-others (difference in quantity) and its being-for-itself (quality), force has a being-in-itself. This in-itself of force, as Deleuze states explicitly in *Difference and Repetition*, is the will to power (*DR* 125). It provides the immanent principle of the genesis of experience by determining both the difference in quantity of related forces and the distinct quality of each in the relation: “it is added to force as the internal principle of the determination of its quality in a relation ( $x+dx$ ) and as the internal principle of the quantitative determination of this relation itself ( $dy/dx$ )” (*NP* 51). It is thereby also “the principle of the synthesis of forces,” a synthesis that “relates to time” and by which “forces pass through the same differences again or diversity is reproduced” (50). Nietzsche argues that the will to power is necessary because forces require an affectivity that the mechanistic account cannot provide: “mere variations of power could not feel themselves to be such: there must be present something that wants to grow and interprets the value of whatever else wants to grow” (Nietzsche 1968, §643).<sup>11</sup> For this reason, “the will to power is not a being, not a becoming, but a *pathos*—the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge” (§635). The will to power is the impulse or compulsion that must be imputed to forces to make them differ from and relate to others, and thus to make them what they are: No force, whether active or reactive, could be or become without a non-subjective compulsion to discharge its strength against resistances, thereby affirming itself in an order of rank or

degree. It is directional, thereby determining the sense of forces and their clash, and always expressing an interpretation through which the world is given value and a metrical principle.<sup>12</sup> But as it does not itself become, the will to power is not kinetic: As Deleuze explains elsewhere, it occupies and shapes an unextended or intensive space or *spatium*, acting as an internal difference or intensity that explicates itself in, and so determines the shape of, extended space and time, along with the things and forces occupying them.<sup>13</sup> Though one force may be stronger or weaker than another, their wills to power have no such difference in their strength or intensity: forces are “equal *in that*” (§643).

As a pathos allowing variations of power to feel themselves to be such, the will to power for Deleuze manifests itself as force’s “capacity for being affected” (*NP* 62) and thus “as the sensibility of force; the differential element of forces manifests itself as their differential sensibility” (63). It is therefore as much a product of force relations as their fundamental determinant—“it simultaneously determines and is determined, simultaneously qualifies and is qualified” (85; see also 49–52)—making the will to power “an essentially *plastic* principle that is no wider than what it conditions, that changes itself with the conditioned and determines itself in each case along with what it determines” (50). It is thereby also a principle that “reconciles empiricism with principles”—as Hume had sought to do, but without appreciating the need for a genetic account based on principles<sup>14</sup>—and “constitutes a superior empiricism” (50). One could easily conclude from this that the will to power is an empty principle that explains everything and therefore explains nothing. But that view misinterprets the will to power as a causal principle determining the facts of a situation. Nietzsche’s empiricism, like Hume’s, is not primarily concerned with epistemological problems, but with interpretive principles that determine a situation’s plural *sense*. The will to power is a principle that can remain the same across divergent factual situations or differ between factual situations that otherwise seem to be the same.

Deleuze holds the will to power to be the element within any phenomenon from which “the signification [*la signification*] of its sense and the value of its value derive” (*NP* 85). That is, it is what this phenomenon, as a complex of forces, *expresses*. This expression is either affirmative or negative: “What a will wants, depending on its quality, is to affirm its difference or to deny what differs” (78). Affirmative and negative wills to power are closely related but not identical to active and reactive qualities of force: Affirmation expresses active forces becoming dominant, while negation expresses forces becoming reactive. Affirmation and negation are therefore

“the immediate qualities of becoming itself” (54), and the will to power expresses sense understood as meaningfulness, sensibility, and direction. In determining sense, the will to power is a principle that “does not suppress chance but, on the contrary, implies it, because without chance it would be neither plastic nor changing” (53). Affirming chance is also an affirmation of destiny, which is “never the abolition but rather the combination of chance itself” (26). Every clash of forces is a chance event whose outcome is never preordained. Yet however it is resolved, it expresses a sense that “this is what had to be”—*amor fati*. Nietzsche holds that the resolution of a forceful conflict follows from “the fact that [. . .] a certain force cannot be anything other than this certain force; that it can react to a quantum of resisting force only according to the measure of its strength” (Nietzsche 1968, §639); as such, “a new arrangement of forces is achieved according to the measure of power of each of them” (§633). The sense of destiny is thus independent of the factual outcome and would obtain even if the opposite outcome had occurred: The sense of what Nietzsche calls the slave revolt in morality, for example, would persist even if slave morality had not become dominant, as it would still manifest a seemingly inevitable becoming-reactive of forces. Deleuze holds that this coupling of chance–destiny, expressing the sense occasioned by the clash of forces, is opposed to that of causality–finality or probability–finality (*NP* 27), the latter involving external causation.

### The Subject and the Eternal Return

Nietzsche’s empiricism, pace Hume’s, is also concerned with the constitution of subjectivity from within the given. Nietzsche’s given is a chance clash of forces<sup>15</sup> and thus, like Hume’s, is based on a principle of difference. The will to power, which is not a psychological or anthropomorphic will (*NP* 51, 91, 145; see also Nietzsche 1968, §692), thus also determines the subject in a way that exceeds the differential clash, since, once again, as Nietzsche states, mere variations of forces could not feel themselves to be such. Investigating the subject’s emergence—or, rather, the sense expressed by this emergence—involves a genealogical method of dramatization in which the fundamental question is “which one?” in contrast to the epistemological question, which is also the question of judgment and “the contradictory question *par excellence*” (*NP* 197), “what is?”: “Any given concept, feeling or belief will be treated as symptoms of a will that wills something. What does *the one that* says this, that thinks or feels that, will? It is a matter of

showing that he could not say, think or feel this particular thing if he did not have a particular will, particular forces, a particular way of being” (78). The subject, expressed by a dramatic persona associated with the will to power’s manifestation, emerges in a becoming-active or becoming-reactive of forces, these defining noble and slave forms in Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality. The will to power, expressing the sense of this emergence, is both interpretive and evaluative (54). It gives rise to values, and “we always have the beliefs, feelings and thoughts that we deserve given our way of being or our style of life” (1)—that is, given how our subjectivity is constituted within force relations. On these terms, both the master and slave of Hegel’s Dialectic of Lordship and Bondage are slaves whose wills to power interpret and judge in terms of opposition, treating power as an object of representation, an object to be possessed (10).

Becoming-reactive expresses a denial that reduces difference to opposition and makes it compatible with identity. It receives moral formulation in the binary of good and evil, where good is defined in opposition to its counterpart: They are evil; we are not like them; therefore, we are good. This formulation originates in the weak who, unable to act and affirm themselves in action, are filled with *ressentiment*, the spirit of revenge. In contrast, while an opposition exists in the noble morality of good and bad, good is not defined by comparison to the bad that it is not. Rather, the noble affirms himself as good in agonistic competition with another who is strong enough to provide a challenge. This other is not opposed to the noble, and so does not warrant comparison, but is simply *different*. The affirmation of goodness is immediate, as it does not go outside the noble exercising power against resistance. Any comparison comes later, when those who do not measure up are dismissed as lowly and bad. Noble morality’s good “qualifies activity, affirmation and the enjoyment which is experienced in their exercise,” and “no comparison interferes with the principle. It is only a secondary consequence, a negative conclusion that others are evil [bad] insofar as they do not affirm, do not act, do not enjoy” (*NP* 119–20). This makes noble morality “a question of an ethic and a typology—a typology of forces, an ethic of the corresponding ways of being” (120). This account is not psychological or even historical, but ontological: the becoming-active of forces underpins not only noble psychology but affirmation as such, while becoming-reactive underpins not only its slavish counterpart, but all of human history and culture—insofar as the latter are reactive and negating, the becoming-reactive of forces gives them their sense and direction (34).

Slave morality's triumph elevates nothingness and the negative to the highest value, amounting to nihilism. It accounts for the appearance of abstract opposition, expressing the sense and sensibility of a limited perspective that annuls difference. The slaves are victorious without ceasing to be slaves because the fact of their victory is distinct from the nihilistic sense of the situation. While forces are inseparable from a constitutive differential element, "reactive forces give an inverted image of this element: the difference between forces seen from the side of reaction becomes the opposition of reactive to active forces" (NP 125). From this perspective, "opposition appears as the genetic element of force" (159). Dialectics is the philosophical expression of this error: "The Hegelian dialectic is indeed a reflection on difference, but it inverts its image" (196). But inasmuch as knowledge involves abstract and oppositional principles, not only is it underpinned by the negative will to power, but this negative will is the only knowable will: nihilism, the becoming-reactive of forces, "is not only a will to power, a quality of the will to power, but the *ratio cognoscendi of the will to power in general*. All known and knowable values are, by nature, values which derive from this *ratio*" (172). In contrast, affirmation, and therefore difference, "is the *ratio essendi of the will to power in general*" (173). But it is therefore unknowable, and thus easily confused with the false affirmation of a negation of negation (121). Critique must not seek justification but instill "a different way of feeling: another sensibility" (94). It must engender a new image of thought that breaks with a dogmatic image that links thought to (transcendent) truth (103–10). It must cultivate sensibility toward rather than knowledge of difference.<sup>16</sup>

The will to power is the principle of the synthesis and becoming of forces. The eternal return is the *being* of this becoming. Or, rather, all being is becoming, becoming is what *is*, and returning is the form of this becoming, the form and the temporality of what is: "What is the being of that which becomes, of that which neither starts nor finishes becoming? *Returning is the being of that which becomes*" (NP 48). Against numerous interpretations that hold Nietzsche's doctrine to assert the infinite repetition of identical events across an infinite time, Deleuze maintains that the eternal return expresses a principle "which serves as an explanation of diversity and its reproduction, of difference and its repetition" (49). Deleuze offers several formulations to elaborate this eternal return of difference. He holds it to be the necessity that ties together chance and necessity, the chance taken in the throwing of dice and the necessity of their falling back or returning (27–29). He also

maintains, akin to Bergson's duration, that it offers "an answer to the problem of *passage*" (48) by way of the returning of the present moment, which is simultaneously present, past, and yet to come: "The present must coexist with itself as past and yet to come. The synthetic relation of the moment to itself as present, past and future grounds it [sic] relation to other moments" (48). Deleuze further highlights the eternal return's function as an ethical and selective thought, one as unyielding as Kant's categorical imperative, but commanding that one will only that of which its eternal return can also be willed, selecting only what is fit to return (68–72). Finally, he calls it a second-order affirmation or a doubling of affirmation (186–89): The will to power affirms difference, but the eternal return affirms affirmation, raising difference "to its highest power" (189)—hence Nietzsche's formulation that one transform everything that was into "thus I willed it," but from there into "thus I will its eternal return." When Zarathustra teaches his doctrine of overcoming to cripples, he holds that the first moment of affirming eternal return—re-creating all "it was" into "thus I willed it"—is yet another form of *ressentiment*, as it reconciles the will with its past by burdening it with responsibility for its suffering. "That will which is the will to power," he continues, "must will something higher than any reconciliation" (Nietzsche 1966, "On Redemption"), and so it must will the eternal return of what was. This expunges *ressentiment* and gives birth to a new innocence. Similarly, as Deleuze explains the double affirmation of eternal return, Ariadne's femininity expresses the spirit of revenge until she moves her love from Theseus, the higher man, to Dionysius, who affirms becoming and "demands another affirmation which takes it [Dionysian affirmation] as its object" (*NP* 187).

These formulations transform the eternal return from a repetition of the same to a creative evolution: "it makes willing a creation" (*NP* 69). It returns difference, and never opposition, because "only becoming-active has being; it would be contradictory for the being of becoming to be affirmed of a becoming-reactive, of a becoming that is itself nihilistic. The eternal return would become contradictory if it were the return of reactive forces" (71–72). Reactive forces do not return without being transmuted, as the eternal return always involves transmutation, but active forces necessarily return because they are nothing but forces of transmutation or "active destruction" (174). The opposition reactive forces present in their reactivity is merely a surface effect or symptom of difference and its becoming, of affirmation and its transmutation (157).<sup>17</sup>

However, the eternal return is also *a doubling of sense*. If a thing's sense expresses the forces that appropriate it and the will to power expresses the sense of the becoming of these forces, then the eternal return expresses a second-order sense—a sense of sense or, perhaps better, a sense that underlies all sensible forces and allows them to “make sense.” It presents a form common to every synthesis of forces, one related to their temporality. The eternal return thereby returns a *sameness*, but this “return of the same” is a *sameness of that which differs*. This sameness is the object of the second affirmation. Deleuze maintains: “Being ought to belong to becoming, unity to multiplicity, necessity to chance, but only insofar as becoming, multiplicity and chance are reflected in the second affirmation which takes them as its object. It is thus in the nature of affirmation to return or of difference to reproduce itself. Return is the being of becoming, the unity of multiplicity, the necessity of chance: the being of difference as such or the eternal return” (*NP* 189). Deleuze elsewhere refers to the eternal return's sameness as a univocity that is not a common identity but a common sense. Univocity is the expressive form taken by a concept of being as affirmation—and “Nietzsche does not do away with the concept of being. He proposes a new conception of being” (186). Here ontology becomes an ontology of sense rather than essence, an ontology that completes immanence. Despite sharing this aspiration, dialectics cannot reach this univocity of being, and achieves immanence only in abstraction. This is why “there is no possible compromise between Hegel and Nietzsche” (195), nor between Deleuze and Hegel. This irreconcilability is a product of their shared aims as much as their different means.



## Chapter 6

### Spinoza and Univocal Expression

In *Expressionism in Philosophy*, his major work on Spinoza and the accompanying thesis submitted with *Difference and Repetition* for his *Doctorat d'Etat*, Deleuze holds the concept of expression to be the basis of a broader anti-Cartesian movement to which both Spinoza and Leibniz belong. Expression is both ontological and epistemological, for knowledge is expressive (*EPS* 14). With the intellect and understanding, expression involves the metaphor of a mirror or reflection. But it also goes beyond this, invoking the metaphor of a seed that remains within and expresses the whole it will become, speaking to the genesis of what representation later takes up and organizes (80–81). In this way, “what is expressed is sense: deeper than the relation of causality, deeper than the relation of representation” (335).

Sense is “deeper” than causality and representation because it involves a unity of internal differences underpinning the exterior relations between cause and effect and between representing sign and represented referent. With respect to causality, expression demands an immanent rather than an emanative cause.<sup>1</sup> Both conceptions involve a cause that remains in-itself, not going outside itself to produce an effect and remaining unchanged by the effects it causes. But while an emanative cause’s effect is both external to it and of a lesser order of being, with an immanent cause, “its effect is in it—in it, of course, as in something else, but still being and remaining in it. The effect remains in its cause no less than the cause remains in itself. From this viewpoint the distinction of essence between cause and effect can in no way be understood as a degradation” (*EPS* 172). These internal effects of expression’s immanent causality produce entities that are later related externally by the common understanding of cause and effect. With respect

to signification, at least for Spinoza if not for Leibniz,<sup>2</sup> expression concerns an order of attributes that is prior to and different from signification's order or properties. Properties, or *propria*, touch only the most superficial aspects of reality, even in the case of divine properties such as infinite perfection, which characterizes all of God's attributes without saying anything about what God *is* (69–70). Properties “express nothing” (50), and the signs representing them are ultimately senseless—they *make no sense* (58). They follow from a thinking that, dividing up the world according to conceptual distinctions of genus and species, subject and predicate, “carries over mere *distinctions of reason* into substantial reality” (36), leading to merely nominal definitions (73). Confusing signification with expression makes expression something mysterious (57), contributing to “a sort of genesis of an illusion” (58). Expression here involves a conception of truth that no longer defines it representationally, in terms of either a correspondence between thought and thing or an idea's clarity and distinctness, but rather in terms of adequacy, the true and adequate idea of a thing including its immanent cause and thus the sufficient reason for its existence.<sup>3</sup> This may seem like a rationalist endeavor, but Deleuze contends that it reflects a Spinozist empiricism that asks how we can achieve adequate ideas when we begin with so many inadequate ones, and thus concerns how the knowing and acting subject is constituted in the given so as to attain truth and freedom. In this way, Spinoza “rediscovered the concrete force of empiricism in applying it in support of a new rationalism, one of the most rigorous versions ever conceived” (149).<sup>4</sup>

All this requires an objectivist rather than subjectivist view of the attributes. Deleuze thus privileges Spinoza's definition of God as “substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which *expresses* eternal and infinite essence” (Spinoza 1992, *Ethics*, 1d6, emphasis added) over both the definition of the attribute as “that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence” (1d4) and the statement that “nothing exists except substance and modes” (1p15p).<sup>5</sup> Expression proceeds from substance through its attributes and to its modes. In doing so, it includes the ideas of manifestation or demonstration, which accord with the mirror metaphor, but more importantly, Deleuze argues, it entails involvement and evolution, implication and explication, which follow from the seed metaphor (*EPS* 15–16).<sup>6</sup> Involvement and implication do not oppose evolution and explication, but rather “imply a principle of synthesis: *complicatio* [complication]” (16). Implication and explication are really the same synthetic process understood from different levels or perspectives, akin to the way that, in

weaving or knitting, the intertwining of individual threads simultaneously produces the larger garment.<sup>7</sup> Spinoza's substance involves and explicates itself in an infinity of attributes that express its essence and an infinity of modes that express this expression (14), with substance complicating all of these (16) in a production where the expressed has no existence outside its expression (42). Substance is the immanent cause and the sufficient reason for all attributes and modes, while attributes and modes entail a real positive and non-numerical infinity that is "the 'secret of grand Rationalism'" (28). In its positive and unconditioned infinitude, substance is expression expressing itself.<sup>8</sup>

By presenting expression as the expression of sense, Spinoza and Leibniz develop notions of the Absolute that go beyond Descartes's clear and distinct idea of infinite perfection. This makes them "Postcartesians in the same sense that Fichte, Schelling and Hegel are Postkantians" (*EPS* 325), as they seek a foundation for Cartesian thought just as these later thinkers seek the foundations of Kantian philosophy. In each case, the Absolute accounts for the genesis of what Cartesian and Kantian philosophy each takes for granted. For Deleuze, Spinoza offers an alternative to post-Kantian conceptions of the Absolute that has been ignored because of prejudgments against Spinoza. Although Hyppolite is not named, what Deleuze identifies as the post-Kantian critiques of Spinoza and Leibniz are the same as those found in *Logic and Existence*: first, against both Leibniz and Spinoza, that they remain at the level of predication, of properties inhering in substance, and so fail to reach the dialectical movement of negation that raises substance to self-reflective and absolute subjecthood (Hyppolite 1997, 91); and second, against Spinoza specifically, that he fails to reach an immanent ontology because his substance remains external to its productions. The latter criticism also entails substance's failure to become subject, as Deleuze makes clear when attributing it to post-Kantians in general.

Postkantian philosophers would seem to have been well placed to recognize the presence in Spinozism of that genetic movement of self-development for which they sought anticipations everywhere. But the term "explication" confirmed their view that Spinoza had been no more able to conceive a true evolution of substance, than to think through the transition from infinite to finite. Spinoza's substance seemed to them lifeless, his expression intellectual and abstract, his attributes "attributed" to substance by an understanding that was itself "explicative." (*EPS* 18)

The concept of expression, Deleuze contends, answers these criticisms because expression's explication is not an emanation that externalizes substance's products; rather, substance continues to complicate these products, which cannot be without it. For Deleuze, this makes Spinoza a key contributor to the development of an ontology of sense and immanence.

Expression's immanence is ensured by the univocity of being and formal distinction, two theses not found in Spinoza but ascribed to him by Deleuze in a reading that has Spinoza adopting them from medieval theologian John Duns Scotus. "It takes nothing away from Spinoza's originality," Deleuze contends, "to place him in a perspective that may already be found in Duns Scotus" (*EPS* 49). Indeed, in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze traces a lineage of univocity from Duns Scotus through Spinoza to Nietzsche. This lineage, he holds, challenges analogical conceptions of being that retain an equivocality in being's sense in order to sustain some form of eminence or transcendence. It also challenges philosophies of judgment that link truth to predication inasmuch as the adherence of predicates to subjects either appeals to a transcendent ground or retains an equivocal sense of being.<sup>9</sup> This includes Hegel, who seeks an immanent ground of judgment but ultimately, as Deleuze argues in his review of Hyppolite, falls into an equivocation between logical and phenomenological senses of contradiction. The question of being's univocal or analogical character, in relation to which the matter of formal distinction also derives, originates in Aristotle and is addressed most directly in *Difference and Repetition*, but it is central to the connections Deleuze draws between Duns Scotus and Spinoza in *Expressionism in Philosophy*, and so is addressed here.<sup>10</sup>

### Univocity versus Analogy

The matter in Aristotle relates to definition understood in terms of classification, and to the question of what form of constitutive difference is compatible with the finite identity posited in what Deleuze, in *Difference and Repetition*, calls "organic representation" (*DR* 30–35). A definition, Aristotle holds, is the formula for a substance's essence (Aristotle 1984, *Metaphysics* 1017b), and it specifies that substance's place within broader categories by dividing the indeterminate identity of its genus into the determinate identities of contrary species via specifying differentiae. Thus, "bipedal rational animal" and "winged animal" define the essences of man and bird, with "animal" denoting their common genus and "bipedal," "rational," and

“winged” specifying their differences. Definitions exhibit a reciprocal adequacy, wherein a man is never anything other than a bipedal rational animal and a two-footed rational animal can only be a man. Further predication is superfluous as it only qualifies an already defined entity: “white man” is not a definition because the qualification “white” is being added to an already fully delineated nature. “White man” is nevertheless a formula, and anything that can be named can be given a formula that describes it, but only at the level of species is this formula a definition (1030a). Specific differences are contraries that mark the extreme forms species can take while remaining within the common identity of their genus: An animal can be bipedal, quadrupedal, winged, etc., and still be an animal. Aristotle thus declares that contrariety is the greatest and most perfect form of difference (Aristotle 1984, *Metaphysics*, 1055a; *DR* 30–32). While contradiction is certainly a larger difference, contradictory pairs cannot both be predicated of species within the same genus, making them imperfect and extraneous to definition and essence (Aristotle 1984, *Metaphysics*, 1055a–b). Specific difference is constitutive—it makes the species *this* species—but only insofar as it accords with the broader commonality of a genus.

This arrangement’s precariousness is underscored by difficulties that emerge when moving beyond the identities and differences involved in nestling species within a genus, moving in one direction toward the individual and in the other direction toward the most general categories and ultimately to being itself. Regarding the individual, as definition applies to substance understood as formula or essence but not as “the concrete thing” capable of generation and destruction, “there is neither definition nor demonstration of sensible individual substances” (Aristotle 1984, *Metaphysics*, 1039b).<sup>11</sup> The predicates describing an individual member of a species cannot fulfill definition’s requirement that each predicate applies generally even while together they refer only to a single being (see Aristotle 1984, *Posterior Analytics*, 96a–b), and no inventory of general predicates can achieve the reciprocal adequacy for the individual that obtains for the species. The same predicates might describe Socrates’s identical twin or a fictitious Socrates with the same traits and life story as the real one. Ultimately, the individual retains an irreducible “thisness,” an existence *hic et nunc* that cannot be signified by general predicates. Individuals permit no definition but only designation: Socrates is a man with these distinguishing features *who is standing over there*. Aristotle effectively concedes this point, admitting that while species can be known, individuals can only be recognized as being members of a species (1035b–1036a). He thus identifies but leaves unresolved the problem

of accounting for the primary diversity of individuals within a species—the way that Socrates and Plato remain irreducibly different despite their common human essence, and thus the way that, as human beings, they belong under a shared identity, and yet, as unique beings, they also do not, with no basis for giving priority to what they share over how they differ. The unrecuperable differences this diversity entails thereby compromise the possibility of gathering fully constituted individuals under a broader category without abstracting away what makes them what they are.

Regarding the second quandary, one proceeds from species to genera and on to the highest categories of substance, quantity, quality, location, time, etc., but no unifying category subsumes them all. In short, neither being nor oneness, which is coextensive with being, is a highest genus. As Deleuze summarizes, this is the case for Aristotle “because differences *are*” (*DR* 32). While the genus is predicated of its species as their common identity, but not to its specific differentiae—we say, “man is an animal” and “bird is an animal” but not “winged is an animal”—being is predicated of them all, of designations of identity and designations of difference, since differentiae are species within the genera of other categories such as quality. Hence, we do say, “winged is.” Aristotle states: “But it is not possible that either unity or being should be a genus of things; for the differentiae of any genus must each of them both have being and be one, but it is not possible for the genus to be predicated of the differentiae taken apart from the species (any more than for the species of the genus to be predicated of the proper differentiae of the genus); so that if unity or being is a genus, no differentia will either be one or have being” (Aristotle 1984, *Metaphysics*, 998b). All this indicates an equivocation in being’s sense, an irreducible plurality of its meanings as it applies to its categories, and thus an irreducible diversity among the categories themselves, ultimately threatening the ontological unity demanded by representation and judgment. Definition as specification within a larger identity is imperiled, as identity does not obtain at higher levels of generality. Yet being still seems to be more than a shared epithet attached to irreducibly different types or senses of being. It is not a homonym like “dog,” which names entities as distinct and unrelated as an animal and a star, or “bank,” which names the edge of a river, a financial institution, and the cushion of a pool table. Certain rules pertain to all of being’s varied uses, such as the law of contradiction: No being can both be and not be at the same time and under the same relation. Aristotle thus declares: “There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be,’ but they are related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not homonymous”

(Aristotle 1984, *Metaphysics*, 1003a). But the nature of this “central point” and the commonness without identity it involves still require elaboration.

Analogy and univocity initially serve as solutions to this problem of being’s relation to its categories, but they then shape the solutions for not only the problem of individual diversity but also a later Christian theological problem of the relationship between God and his creatures. The latter predicament requires that creatures connect to God without compromising divine transcendence. Without some connection, no known or knowable qualities could be positively attributed to God, resulting in a negative theology widely rejected by the Scholastics; but were the connection to entail these qualities being the same for God and creatures, then God’s exteriority to the world could not be maintained, resulting in an equally intolerable pantheism. Analogy aims to negotiate this dilemma by establishing a proportion between creatures and God. Deleuze contends that this maneuver does not simply follow from a similar proportion being posited between the different senses of being’s categories, but is grounded by the latter, since without this “quasi-identity of the most general determinable concepts” (*DR* 33), the attribution of predicates to any subject, be it God or creatures, would lack a common sense.

Aquinas, who establishes the benchmark for reconciling Aristotelian metaphysics with Christian theology, proceeds by way of analogy.<sup>12</sup> He starts with Aristotle’s statement that being’s many senses are said with reference to a single idea, which Aristotle’s elaborates with the term “health,” whose different senses when referring to healthy organisms, to diets that cause health, and to physical signs that indicate health, all express a common primary notion of well-being.<sup>13</sup> From this, Aquinas maintains that substance expresses a primary sense of being, and the other categories, whose being depends on their adherence to substance, express derivative but analogous senses; he then asserts a similar relation of priority and derivativeness between God and the creatures whose being and existence depend on him. An analogy or proportion is then conceived for predicates positively attributable to both God and creatures. An analogy of proportion, for example, obtains between God’s infinite wisdom and humanity’s finite wisdom, the latter reflecting and depending on the former even if their infinite distance makes them incomparable.<sup>14</sup> Analogy thus ensures a unidirectional resemblance: Just as “a portrait can take after a man but a man does not take after his portrait” (Aquinas 1989, 18), so creatures, bearing the mark of their creator, resemble him, but God, remaining transcendent, in no way resembles them. Analogy entails that Socrates’s finite wisdom is “like” God’s, but God’s wisdom, being

infinite, is nothing like Socrates's. It thereby offers a middle position, Aquinas contends, between the extremes of equivocity, which denies any connection between God and creatures, and univocity, where transcendence is wholly undermined: "Words are used analogically of God and creatures, not purely equivocally and not purely univocally" (Aquinas 1993, 225).

However, Deleuze contends, the analogical solution falters when addressing the primary diversity of individuals, because members of a species are essentially equal rather than proportional: What makes Socrates this individual man does not make him more or less of a man than Plato. Consequently, under the analogical conception, the individual difference that grants a thing singular and concrete existence must be treated as an inessential or accidental element: "It is henceforth inevitable that analogy falls into an unresolvable difficulty: it must essentially relate being to particular existents, but at the same time it cannot say what constitutes their individuality. For it retains in the particular only that which conforms to the general (matter and form), and seeks the principle of individuation in this or that element of the fully constituted individuals" (*DR* 38). Against this, Deleuze argues, univocity provides a positive conception of individual difference, but at the cost of imperiling divine transcendence by entailing an immanent causality (*EPS* 67, 166). Duns Scotus is thus driven by theological requirements both to limit the univocity of being and to apply formal distinction in a selective manner. To avoid pantheism, Deleuze says, he must "conceive univocal Being as a *neutralized, indifferent* concept" (67). He must also apply formal distinction differently to the problems of divine and individual diversity.<sup>15</sup> In contrast, Spinoza gives formal distinction "a range it didn't have in Scotus" (66) and conceives univocity as both expressive and "the object of a pure affirmation" (67). This results in an extension of univocity to the domain of individuation and a renewed application of formal distinction to the Absolute.

While analogy, Duns Scotus argues, pertains to judgment, and so to complex propositions of attribution such as "Socrates is wise," this attribution presupposes apprehension, the simple cognition of being, where the middle position offered by analogy is impossible: Even granting that Socrates's wisdom is analogous to God's, between the statements "God is [a being]" and "Socrates is [a being]" there can be only equivocity or univocity, with equivocity entailing an incoherent negative theology and indeed precluding the connection being sought. Any analogy of predicates must therefore be grounded in a prior univocity between infinite and finite substance: "we must look beyond all our ideas of attributes or quasi-attributes, in order to

find a quidditative concept to which the former may be attributed” (Duns Scotus 1987, 19).

Like Aquinas with analogy, Duns Scotus claims Aristotle as the source for the univocal conception of being. Referring to the same passage from the *Metaphysics* quoted earlier, he holds that, in arguing that being cannot be a genus because it is predicated of its differentiae, Aristotle shows that this is “not [. . .] because of any equivocation, but because it [being] has a greater commonness and univocation than the commonness of a genus” (Duns Scotus, quoted in Prentice 1970, 54). Univocal being can ground definition because it “possesses sufficient unity in itself, so that to affirm and deny it of one and the same thing would be a contradiction” (Duns Scotus 1987, 20). But as its commonness is not an identity, it does not reduce the diversity of the differences it encompasses; indeed, it sustains an order among them. This makes being’s univocity a transcendental commonness rather than the generic univocity of identity that characterizes being’s categories and subcategories. This transcendental univocity remains indifferent to the differences it brings together and organizes, so that, as Deleuze explains, “univocal being is understood as neutral, *neuter*, indifferent to the distinction between the finite and the infinite, the singular and the universal, the created and the uncreated” (*DR* 39). Univocity first applies to and organizes the categories of finite being. It is then applied to the commonness and order between God and creatures, that is, infinite and finite, or uncreated and created being.

Univocity pertains firstly to quidditative being, whereby it is predicated *in quid* and signifies the entire essence of a subject, be it a generic, specific, or individual subject: an animal; a man; this man; God. It therefore refers, in accordance with its role in apprehension, to the being of substances, or to the sense of being as substance, to anything for which the question “what is it?” has the answer “it is a being.” It thereby applies before any inquiry into a being’s finitude or infinity, and therefore into whether its essence can be known (Duns Scotus 1987, 20). In contrast, specific, individual, and accidental differentiae, which qualify or modify essence, are predicated *in quale* rather than *in quid*. There is no univocity between the sense of their being and that of substance, and so no single sense of being applies to all that is intelligible (4). Nonetheless, Duns Scotus holds, the quidditative sense has a direct priority by applying univocally to substances that need not share anything positive in common, and an indirect or “virtual” priority inasmuch as the *in quale* senses, which refer to substance as that which has the power—the *virtus*—to give them being, are “virtually included”

(4) under it. The quidditative sense of being, even if limited to the being of substances, thereby traverses the other senses of being without reducing their heterogeneity.

As Deleuze (*DR* 39–40) notes, Duns Scotus further extends univocity beyond substantial and self-identical quidditative being to terms displaying a similar neutrality. Unlike being itself, these non-quidditative predicates need not be predicated of all things, but must simply avoid being subsumed by a genus: “not to have any predicate above it except ‘being’ pertains to the very notion of a transcendental. That it be common to many inferior notions, however, is purely incidental” (Duns Scotus 1987, 3). Oneness and goodness, which are coextensive and convertible with being—all that “is” also has unity and is good—are therefore held to be univocal. So too are disjunctive pairs such as act/potency and necessary/contingent, which together apply to all infinite and finite beings, making them coextensive with being: Although there is only one necessary being, the statement “all beings are either necessary or contingent” covers all substantial beings. Finally—and this is the focus of Deleuze’s claim that in Duns Scotus, “univocal being is related, by itself, to difference in itself” (*DR* 40)—univocity applies to “pure perfections” such as wisdom or potency, which can be predicated of God and of at least some of his creatures. In their infinite form, these perfections are formally distinct divine attributes that God possesses without compromising his unity. But they are also capable of modal variation, which produces an order of degrees of intensity, i.e., from infinite wisdom down to its weakest finite forms. In all these cases, predicates beyond being are said univocally of different beings, but with modal variations or distinctions, being is also said univocally of them, as the degrees of intensity distinguishing the modes do not create separate types the way *differentiae* divide a genus into diverse species: Different intensities of white express the *same* whiteness; different luminosities are all light (Gilson 1955, 456–57; Harris 1927, vol. 2, 64–68; see also *DR* 39–40). The theological upshot is that one can say, “God is wise” and “Socrates is wise,” with wisdom carrying a common sense and mode of being but without this establishing a common identity: “And so ‘wisdom,’ or anything else, for that matter, which is common to God and creatures, can be transcendental. A transcendental, however, may also be predicated of God alone, or again it may be predicated about God and some creature. It is not necessary, then, that a transcendental as transcendental be predicated of every being, unless it be coextensive with the first of the transcendentals, namely ‘being’” (Duns Scotus 1987, 3).

The indifference enabling univocity to respond to the problem of the categories and the relation between infinite and finite being, and by which it extends to modal distinctions, also justifies its limitations regarding the primary diversity of individuals. Predicates such as materiality, which apply only to finite creatures, do not count as transcendentals and cannot be considered univocal. More significantly, univocity is denied to individuating differences or “haecceities,” meaning that while a common sense is expressed in the being of God, Socrates, and their respective wisdoms, there is none with respect to the “Socraticity” that makes Socrates concretely what he is. Duns Scotus bases this claim on how God’s individuality follows from his infinity and simplicity while that of creatures involves materiality and composition (Duns Scotus 1994, nn. 190–91). Haecceity therefore cannot be brought under univocal being, and the problem of individual diversity must be segmented off from the univocality relating the transcendent and mundane. In Spinoza’s extension of Duns Scotus’s concept, Deleuze argues, univocity is attributed directly to individuating differences.

### Formal Distinction and Individuation

For Duns Scotus, the problem of individuation concerns how to understand the relation within the finite individual between its common nature and its haecceity. Common nature is not a thing’s species, which the intellect abstracts from and then predicates of individuals, but a real unity that is less than numerical unity and that is implied by the real similarities and differences between individuals. It therefore exists independently of the intellect, whereas species are products of the intellect. Real individuals, Duns Scotus argues, must have real similarities and differences between them, which implies generalities that serve as their measures; these generalities must be real “because what are measured are real and are really measured” (Duns Scotus 1994, n. 12). The absence of such real measures would entail the absurdity of all things being equally distinct, making it impossible to say, for example, that Socrates is more like Plato than a line (n. 23). Moreover, unless things are *really* similar in some ways and *really* different in others, they cannot be *really* individual.

Haecceity is a positive element that ensures a thing’s ultimate distinction from everything else, making it different from the similarities and differences that compose the thing’s common nature. It has numerical unity and therefore

is incommunicable, applying to one thing only, whereas common nature with a unity less than numerical unity is communicable and so compatible with being part of many things (n. 169). Haecceities are therefore primarily diverse, and nothing may be abstracted from them to form a common notion or general idea (n. 185), making them the reason individuals are irreducibly singular even if they belong together at higher levels of identity (n. 170). Duns Scotus opposes haecceity as a principle of individuation<sup>16</sup> to accounts of individuation based on formless matter; quantity or some other accidental trait of the concrete thing; an existence added to a thing's essence; or a twofold negation that unifies the thing and separates it from everything it is not.<sup>17</sup> Although haecceity "constitutes something precisely in material being" (n. 182), it is neither matter, form, nor a combination of these (n. 188), as matter and form are principles falling on the side of common nature and the composition of quiddities. It is nevertheless a formal principle, or a principle of a form's final reality—as Deleuze states, haecceity is "the 'ultimate actuality [*ultime actualité*] of form'" (DR 38)—and thus belongs to the lowest order of a formal, categorical hierarchy passing through genus and species to reach the individual.<sup>18</sup> Duns Scotus holds that haecceity is "added" to common nature and "contracts" it into an existence with numerical unity, similar to the way specific difference contacts a genus into a species. In both cases the differentia or haecceity is the active principle for a nature that is potentially further determinable (nn. 176–80). Haecceity is thus a difference that, distinct from the differences and similarities relating individuals, acts upon the common nature constituted by these relations to make a singular being. In doing so, however, it constitutes a reality beyond the quidditative, and thus, pace Aristotle, beyond essence understood as definition: Whereas quiddity marks the thing as a thing, haecceity marks it as *this* thing.<sup>19</sup>

The common nature and haecceity that compose the individual are not really distinct, since they form a single reality, but nor are they merely conceptually distinct, since they are not products of the mind but the real foundation for the mind's acts of abstraction and recognition. Duns Scotus calls their distinction a formal distinction (Duns Scotus 1994, n. 188), this being his contribution to medieval debates aiming to formulate a distinction that is weaker than the real distinction between things but stronger than the conceptual distinction between beings of reason.<sup>20</sup> He applies formal distinction not only to individuation but to a range of issues, including the problem of divine attributes or names (how Wisdom, Goodness, Omnipotence, etc., can be said of God without compromising his simplicity) and

the Trinity (how God can be both Three and One), and to consider the relations between genus and differentiae, essence and its proper attributes, the faculties of the soul and the soul itself, and more (see King 2003, 23). But important differences lie in these various applications.

Interpreters often understand formal distinction from its use in the *Ordinatio* to explain the relation between divine attributes or essential perfections.<sup>21</sup> Here formal distinction obtains between two realities (*realitates*) or formal reasons (*rationes formales*)<sup>22</sup> within a thing where the essences of these realities—and thus their definitions where these can be formulated in terms of genus and differentiae—do not include each other and yet no real distinction obtains between them as would between thing and thing. Formally distinct relata, then, can be *essentially* disparate but *really* the same, making formal distinction an internal difference that does not render a thing composite. God's infinite attributes are distinct without compromising divine simplicity, as each attribute's infinity entails that none can be a potentiality made actual by any of the others, meaning no composition is involved in their uniting in the divine essence. It is all very different, however, with the Trinity, where the divine essence is shared but forms no composition with the personal property that formally distinguishes each divine figure, making relation between the divine persons one of essential identity within formal diversity: Unlike the case of divine properties, the Father essentially *is* the Son and the Son essentially *is* the Spirit.<sup>23</sup> In both cases, though, Scotist formal distinction within the divine reflects a neutrality and indifference of relata comparable to that asserted in the univocity between God and creatures.

Such neutrality, however, is not possible with the finite individual, where formal distinction is required not to sustain simplicity but to explain composition. The individual's formally distinct common nature and haecceity are not only *neither* essentially the same *nor* essentially distinct—since essence does not apply to either term—but also actively related, as one is the principle that actualizes the other. Furthermore, no real identity can be posited alongside their formal difference, as this would entail the kind of absurdities Ockham attributes to Duns Scotus: For Ockham, if common nature and haecceity are *only* formally distinct, then they must be *really* identical, implying either that common nature is really individual and thus not common to several things or that individual difference is common and thus not unique to each thing.<sup>24</sup> Formal distinction in the individual must therefore involve a proper, non-neutral difference between its component realities.

Formal distinction in the individual thereby becomes a principle of *synthesis*, as the formalities brought together “form not a mere aggregate of

intelligible items which the mind lists in catalogue fashion, but [. . .] are so ordered to one another that they constitute a single intelligible whole” (Wolter 1965, 54). No real distinction obtains between common nature and haecceity, as real distinction applies only to fully formed individuals. Nevertheless, the real similarities and differences between individuals that yield their common natures, along with the singular differences that make each unique, necessitate another form of difference within the individual’s composition so that individuals and the concepts abstracted from them can correspond. Consequently, despite Duns Scotus’s description of formal distinction, offered in his discussion of divine persons (see Duns Scotus 2012, I, d. 2, p. 2, q. 4, nn. 388–410), as being weaker than the real distinction between things but stronger than the conceptual distinction between beings of reason, it is not simply a halfway house between the real and conceptual. Rather, as it applies to individuals, it is a second-order difference—what Deleuze will call a “differenciator”—grounding how individuals are both similar to and different from what they are not. It holds together the orders of identity and primary diversity, common nature and haecceity, without being subsumable under the former (since it is not a distinction comprising a common nature) and without fulfilling the requirements of the latter (as it is not a unique difference or “thisness”; rather, formal distinction is a principle). In doing so, it constitutes their concrete unity.

### Spinoza’s Adaptations of Univocity and Formal Distinction

Deleuze’s account of how Spinoza pushes univocity and formal distinction past their limited uses in Duns Scotus works from the concept of expression. His presentation of Duns Scotus seems manifestly to confuse Duns Scotus’s distinctions between quidditative and qualitative, and to conflate the formal reason for qualities, which is the quiddity in which they inhere, and the formal distinction between contracting individuating qualities (haecceities) and their quidditative foundation (common nature). Thus Deleuze holds that “rational” and “animal” are distinct quiddities composing the unity “man,” and that when taken to infinity they designate distinct but ontologically identical quiddities composing the divine (*EPS* 63–64), which prefigures the claim that Spinoza’s picture of substance consisting of an infinity of formally distinct but ontologically identical attributes is Scotist in origin.<sup>25</sup> This might seem to be a Scotism bereft of its fundamental distinctions. But Deleuze maintains that these distinctions are theological in origin and

have no further justification. As a theologian, Duns Scotus maintains the equivocation and eminence characteristic of analogy, along with “a subtle anthropomorphism” (46) that assigns human qualities to God.<sup>26</sup> For Deleuze, this entails misunderstanding divine attributes as properties, which cannot say what God is but only what he has (49–51, 66–67). Spinoza breaks with Duns Scotus by distinguishing attributes from properties, insisting on the expressive nature of the former and holding the latter to belong to the inessential realm of signification.<sup>27</sup>

If Spinoza’s attributes, which most certainly are qualitative, can be considered quidditative, a sense of being pertaining to substance, it is because an attribute expresses *the entirety* of God’s essence, not merely a part or a modification of it. This allows Deleuze to claim a Scotist inheritance for Spinoza when holding that the being of Spinoza’s attributes and modes has the same sense as the substance that produces them. But this post-Scotist univocal being is no longer neutral, common to God and creatures through its indifference to the infinite/finite divide. Instead, it is expressive, with the common sense between God and creature, substance and mode, resulting from their immanent connection through the attributes. This common sense does not reduce a creature’s essence to an eternal Idea thought by God, or in some other way make the creature an image or copy of the divine. Instead, attributes are “*forms of being common to creatures and to God, common to modes and to substance*” (EPS 46), so that univocity ensures “the identity of form between creatures and God, while permitting no confusion of essence” (47). The attributes constitute God’s essence and cannot be thought without him, but they are only implied by the modes that involve them, meaning they “can very easily be conceived outside their modes” (47).<sup>28</sup> In effect, modes are virtually included in the attributes, “*belonging to them insofar as they [the attributes] constitute the essence of God*” (47), but this *virtus* is the power of an immanent causality, as attributes “contain or comprehend the essences of modes, and this formally, not eminently” (47). There is thus an equality among substance’s products, attributes being prior to but not higher than modes. In contrast, analogical conceptions of being confuse the essences of God and creatures by distinguishing them only by proportion or degree (48), leaving the essences of finite creatures to be copies, emanations, or degradations of the divine essence.<sup>29</sup>

If formal distinction, in turn, can be pushed beyond the neutral character Duns Scotus retains when applying it to divine perfections, it is because of expression’s genetic aspect. As concrete expressions of substance’s sense, Spinoza’s attributes are, pace Duns Scotus, formally distinct, and so

cannot be separated into distinct realities apprehended under different subjects or treated as different orders of abstraction of the same reality (*EPS* 64). Spinoza (1992, *Ethics*, 1p10s), however, calls this a real rather than a formal distinction between the attributes. What allows Deleuze to infer a Scotist inspiration here is his insistence that formal distinction *is* real distinction, not only because, in being more than conceptual distinction, it is already “a minimally real distinction” (*EPS* 64) in Duns Scotus,<sup>30</sup> but because the Absolute is now conceived as a synthesis—a position that, in Duns Scotus’s account of formal distinction in the individual, entails a non-neutral difference relating irreducible components. This formulation of formal distinction as real distinction, synthetic without implying separate entities or substances,<sup>31</sup> also underpins Spinoza’s critique and reformulation of Descartes’s notion of real distinction. This critique, Deleuze contends, is based on the claim that Descartes confuses real and numerical distinction by treating real distinction as what obtains between finite substances. This allows two substances to share the same attribute, which makes them only numerically distinct and demands an external cause to explain why they exist in this particular number, contradicting substance’s fundamental character as self-sufficient being (32).<sup>32</sup> This is another consequence of erroneously treating attributes as properties, Descartes holding that only a distinction of reason exists between a substance and its attributes, a distinction that results from abstraction (29). And it leads to a fundamental ambiguity in the Cartesian idea of attributes, which are sometimes qualifications of substance and sometimes modalities that diversify substance (29–30).<sup>33</sup> Against all this, Deleuze continues, Spinoza insists that taking real distinction and the definition of substance seriously demands that “numerical distinction is never real,” and, “conversely, real distinction is never numerical” (34). Real distinction is “purely qualitative, quidditative or formal,” and “excludes any division” (38). In this way, it is carried into the Absolute. Even for Descartes, real distinction is a positive or affirmative difference, as “the terms distinguished each retain their respective positivity, instead of being defined by opposition, one to another” (60). Real distinction in the Absolute thus corresponds to the internal difference that is missed by dialectical conceptions of the Absolute whose negative difference pertains properly only to the external relations between actual, constituted entities.

As a dynamic production, substance’s expression corresponds in certain respects to Deleuze’s account of the actualization of Bergson’s virtual. Production, an internal genesis, differs from both divine and human creation (*EPS* 104), as “the things that are produced are not imitations any more

than their ideas are models" (180–81; see also Spinoza 1992, *Ethics*, 2p6c). Expression thereby engenders difference and novelty and is not subsumable to signs or representations (*EPS* 181). Substance's self-expression, through which it involves and explicates itself in attributes that it also complicates, is formal and qualitative (185), as its attributes are indivisible and qualitative. But inasmuch as attributes are the matter or pure potentiality of the modes that further explicate them, they have a corresponding non-numerical infinite quantity that allows them to be divided through the production of modes (191). This production, the expression of substance's expression, is thereby quantitative (186), with modes being divisible and hence numerical (33–34). Although they are part of an immanent production, modes are externalizations of this process, essences posited "*outside* the attribute" (213). They are expression going outside itself to produce the numerically distinct and externally related, akin to the way extended quantity is, for Bergson, duration's internal difference relaxed to the point where it becomes a spatial difference outside itself.

Nonetheless, this account of production as internal genesis is incomplete. Spinoza's method is tripartite, and it starts from a critique of Descartes's analytic method, where clear and distinct knowledge of an effect clarifies and distinguishes an initially confused knowledge of the cause implied in knowing the effect. Spinoza's critique maintains that Descartes's method can provide clear but never adequate knowledge of the cause (*EPS* 155–57). The latter requires a synthetic method that moves from cause to effect but avoids the pitfalls of an Aristotelian synthetic method that takes an effect's formal cause to be a universal abstracted from confused sensory perceptions (158–60). Spinoza's parallelism entails that an idea's cause must belong to an order of ideas that makes no reference to bodies. More generally, Spinoza's formal cause is not an abstract universal but a power—in the case of ideas, a power of thinking. This power, considered in terms of the method's reflexive aspect, "gives us knowledge of our power of knowing" (161); considered as the method's second, "constructive or genetic" aspect, it takes us to "the idea of God as the source of all other ideas" (161). In a sense, Spinoza's method does not start with the idea of God as the wholly adequate cause of all effects, "but we reach it very quickly" (137). On reaching it, however, a third aspect of the method appears that is no longer "genetic definition" but "productive deduction" (139). What follows from the idea of God as wholly adequate cause is an order of modes under each attribute that "is at the same time the deduction of reality" (161). Although they are part of the same method, genesis and deduction refer to distinct forms of necessity.

Genesis concerns the eternal necessity of the producer and its power to produce, or how “from *the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite ways*” (Spinoza 1992, *Ethics*, 1p16). It corresponds to Bergson’s *élan vital* driving the passage from the virtual to the actual. Productive deduction, in contrast, concerns the enduring power and necessity of the produced as singular and concrete, or the determinate necessity of the effects insofar as they are really existing beings (*EPS* 212).

Regarding this latter power, Deleuze identifies two forms of quantity pertaining to the modes, one extrinsic and the other intrinsic or intensive. The first relates to the mode’s actuality, its existence as a thing divisible into extrinsic parts and enduring in time and space (*EPS* 191–92, 196). The second relates to the mode’s essence or being, and thus to its conatus, its power to affirm its essence in existence.<sup>34</sup> A mode’s power, like all power for Spinoza, “bears with it a corresponding and inseparable capacity to be affected” (93), and Spinoza holds this intensive quantity to be an infinity or indefiniteness of things such that “they cannot be equated with any number, yet they can be conceived as greater or less” (Spinoza 1992, Letter 12, quoted in *EPS* 192). With extrinsic or numerical quantity, modal distinction is a distinction between discrete individuals, but intensive quantity presents modal distinction as “an intrinsic principle of individuation” (*EPS* 196), where individuation is not the simple individual but a positive constitutive difference—a haecceity, but very different from the haecceity of Duns Scotus that establishes the uniqueness of the fully constituted individual within the numerical diversity of its common nature. Intensive haecceity ensures that the modes’ individuality is consistent with their univocal connection to one another and to substance. Modes are distinct and singular through intensive differences—degrees of difference rather than differences of degree—in the same way that, pace Duns Scotus’s discussion of modal variation, singular intensities of white univocally express the same whiteness (196). The univocity between substance and primarily diverse individuating differences is a common sense of power expressed by intensive quantities: “each finite being must be said to *express the absolute*, according to the intensive quantity that constitutes its essence, according, that is, to the degree of its power” (197).<sup>35</sup> Modes express and explicate substance’s essence according to their intensity of power, which corresponds to the infinite quality of the attributes that express and constitute divine essence (199). This is how the distinction of essences is consistent with the community of form, as “only a quantitative distinction of beings is consistent with the qualitative identity of the absolute” (197).

## Toward a Univocity of Difference

Spinoza's univocity is expressive, but when Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition* traces the lineage of univocity beyond Spinoza to Nietzsche, he attributes to Spinoza a continuing priority of identity over difference: "Spinoza's substance appears independent on the modes, while the modes are dependent on substance, but as though on something other than themselves. Substance must itself be said *of* the modes and only *of* the modes" (*DR* 40).<sup>36</sup> While substance is defined as that which exists and is conceived only through itself—only substance *is* substance—modes are defined as being dependent on substance and existing only through it—they are precisely *substance's* modes.<sup>37</sup> An equivocation thus persists between substance and modes, wherein they express different senses of being and ultimately a sense of difference belonging to identity. For substance to be said of the modes and only of the modes would entail identity being said of difference—in short, for it to be *differences' identity*, a commonness and univocity of differences, and specifically a univocity of intensive quantitative differences. "Such a condition can be satisfied," Deleuze contends,

only at the price of a more general categorical reversal according to which being is said of becoming, identity of that which is different, the one of the multiple, etc. That identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a second principle, as a principle *become*; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general already understood as identical. (40–41)

Nietzsche's eternal return is for Deleuze this being of becoming, the sameness of that which differs. Only difference can be said in a univocal sense of itself and of that which differs from it. The latter case would be difference said of what differs from difference, i.e., identity or the self-same, but also extensive difference, going all the way up to the contradiction that is less than difference rather than more. Sense is difference, said of all things univocally, in a world of difference produced immanently. The mechanics of this generation of difference by difference has been a consistent theme of Deleuze's works reviewed so far, and it is the central guiding thread of *Difference and Repetition*.



## Interlude

### Works on Proust and Sacher-Masoch

Besides his writings on figures in the history of philosophy, Deleuze's early period features two studies on literary figures: *Proust and Signs* (1964), which analyzes Proust's *In Search of Lost Time* as an apprenticeship in the interpretation of signs and their temporality; and *Coldness and Cruelty* (1967), which examines Sacher-Masoch, as well as Sade, to challenge psychoanalytical interpretations of masochism as a simple inversion of sadism. These studies provide accounts of difference, repetition, time, and sense that are developed further in *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*. They also offer an early formulation of Deleuze's "critical and clinical" project, which enlists literature and psychoanalysis to diagnose the modern condition and which resonates strongly with themes from Deleuze's Nietzsche book. Deleuze indeed frames the subjects of his studies in Nietzschean terms: Proust "sets up an image of thought in opposition to that of philosophy" through a "critique of philosophy [that] is eminently philosophical" (*PS* 94, 100); Masoch and Sade are "great anthropologists, of the type whose work succeeds in embracing a whole conception of man, culture and nature; they are also great artists in that they discovered new forms of expression, new ways of thinking and feeling and an entirely original language" (*CC* 16).

Signs are symptoms—"Every symptom is a word [*une parole*], but first of all every word is a symptom" (*PS* 92)<sup>1</sup>—making the interpretation of signs also the diagnosis of a condition. Insofar as a philosophy of sense, pace *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, analyzes a phenomenon's sense through the forces that constitute and are expressed in it, it holds that "a phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning [*sens*] in an existing force. The whole of philosophy is a symptomatology, and a semeiology. The sciences are a symptomatological

and semeiological system" (*NP* 3). Philosophy here becomes "an art, the art of interpreting and evaluating" (197) an existence that is "an *aesthetic phenomenon* rather than a moral or religious one" (23). The same is the case with the "*literary approach*" (*CC* 14) Deleuze finds in Masoch and Proust. The hero of Proust's *Search* "realizes the defects of an objectivist literature" that "interprets signs by referring them to objects that can be designated (observation and description)," that "surrounds itself with pseudo-objective guarantees of evidence and communication (*causerie*, investigation)," and that "confuses meaning [*sens*] with intelligible, explicit, and formulated signification (major subjects)" (*PS* 32, 33). Disappointment with this objectivist approach leads to the revelation of an art of essences that constitute signs and sense (38).

Literary analysis of Sade and Masoch corrects clinical and psychoanalytic prejudices that reduce sadism and masochism's disparate mechanics to a single abstract syndrome: "Symptomatology is always a question of art; the clinical specificities of sadism and masochism are not separable from the literary values peculiar to Sade and Masoch. In place of a dialectic which all too readily perceives the link between opposites, we should aim for a critical and clinical appraisal able to reveal the truly differential mechanisms as well as the artistic originalities" (*CC* 14). The idea of a sadomasochistic syndrome treats symptoms common to sadism and masochism as proof of a single entity containing both, a maneuver as foolish as that of a doctor who would "treat a fever as though it were a definite symptom of a specific disease" and not as "an indeterminate syndrome common to a number of possible diseases" (132).<sup>2</sup> Signs here connect closely to the new image of thought Deleuze announces through Nietzsche, as "what forces us to think is the sign" (*PS* 97). The thinking engendered opposes philosophy's presumption of thought's goodwill toward truth (94–95).

## Proust: Signs and Their Incarnation

### SAUSSURE AND THE SIGN

Like others of the period, Deleuze works within and against Saussure's account of the sign. The problem of language, for Saussure, involves establishing associative links across the heterogeneous domains of sound and thought. Without these links, both domains remain nebulous. On the one hand, "our thought is simply a vague, shapeless mass [. . .] like a swirling cloud,

where no shape is intrinsically determinate,” and “were it not for signs, we should be incapable of differentiating any two ideas in a clear and constant way” (Saussure 1986, 155). On the other hand, “the substance of sound is no more fixed or rigid than that of thought. It does not offer a ready-made mould, with shapes that thought must inevitably conform to” (155), and even when organized into a sequence of speech patterns, it “is merely a line, a continuous ribbon of sound, along which the ear picks out no adequate or clearly marked divisions. In order to do so, recourse must be had to meanings [*significations*]” (145). Language takes shape “in between” these “two amorphous masses” (156) that it connects in arbitrary ways—“There is no internal connexion, for example, between the idea ‘sister’ and the French sequence of sounds *s-ø-r* which acts as its signal. The same idea might as well be represented by any other sequence of sounds” (100). Moreover, these links are wholly psychological: It is a sound pattern, rather than the physical sound, that is associated with an idea, and the sound pattern “is the hearer’s psychological impression of a sound, as given to him by the evidence of his senses” (98);<sup>3</sup> the concept too is a mental representation of a referent whose presence is unnecessary for language to function. What language accomplishes “is neither a transformation of thoughts into matter, nor a transformation of sounds into ideas” (156). It is more akin to a meeting of air and water where “changes in atmospheric pressure break up the surface of the water into series of divisions, i.e., waves” (156).

Sound patterns act as signals whose reception triggers meaningful or significant ideas of concepts. The language system’s essential aspect “is the union of sense [*sens*] and sound pattern” (Saussure 1986, 32). The unity of signal and significant—or, more commonly, signifier and signified—constitutes the sign as a real object and the concrete entity of the science of linguistics (144). This entity “disappears the moment we concentrate exclusively on just one or the other [on signifier or signified]” (144). Although the link made by the sign is an arbitrary matter of social convention—“the individual has no power to alter a sign in any respect once it has become established in a linguistic community” (101)—it is nonetheless immediate, that is, unmediated. Saussure thus declares: “a language might also be compared to a sheet of paper. Thought is one side of the sheet and sound the reverse side. Just as it is impossible to take a pair of scissors and cut one side of paper without at the same time cutting the other, so it is impossible in a language to isolate sound from thought, or thought from sound” (157). Deleuze similarly holds that the “direct sign” (*DR* 8) substitutes for “mediate representations” (10). It “flashes” across an intensive or unextended

“interval” when a communication takes place between disparates, and, in so doing, it marks an immediate “productive dissymmetry” that implies “an internal difference (while leaving the conditions of its [the sign’s] reproduction still external)” (20). The sign, as a unity of signifier and signified, is for Deleuze therefore an event. It marks the limit of sensibility (140), signaling not what can be represented to a subject but what cannot be perceived but must be sensed.

Despite Saussure’s explicit statement about the sign’s concrete nature, frequent misunderstandings arise on this point, and the view commonly attributed to him is that language is a system of negative differences. Deleuze too takes this position, asking, “why does Saussure, at the very moment when he discovers that ‘in language there are only differences,’ add that these differences are ‘without positive terms’ and ‘eternally negative?’” (*DR* 204).<sup>4</sup> Certainly Saussure lacks the sort of non-negative inner difference that Deleuze deploys, but his thinking is more subtle than the common reading suggests. Saussure states:

Everything we have said so far comes down to this. *In the language itself, there are only differences.* Even more important than that is the fact that, although in general a difference presupposes positive terms between which the difference holds, in a language there are only differences, *and no positive terms.* Whether we take the signification or the signal, the language includes neither ideas nor sounds existing prior to the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonetic differences arising out of that system. (Saussure 1986, 166)

Thus, for example, the signifying sound pattern “cat” is defined wholly by not being any other sound pattern, be it “bat,” “mat,” “sat,” etc.—in short, simply by the fact that these sound patterns “cannot be mistaken for one another” (164)—and the same is true of the signified idea, that it is what it is simply by not being any idea or concept other than that of a cat. Yet Saussure immediately follows these claims with a clarification that “in a sign, what matters more than any idea or sound associated with it is what other signs surround it” (166). Consequently:

To say that in a language everything is negative holds only for signification and signal considered separately. The moment we consider the sign as a whole, we encounter something which is

positive in its own domain. A linguistic system is a series of phonetic differences matched with a series of conceptual differences. But this matching of a certain number of auditory signals and a similar number of items carved out from the mass of thought gives rise to a system of values. It is this system which provides the operative bond between phonic and mental elements within each sign. Although signification and signal are each, in isolation, purely differential and negative, their combination is a fact of a positive nature. It is, indeed, the only order of facts linguistic structure comprises. For the essential function of a language as an institution is precisely to maintain these series of differences in parallel. (166–67)

In other words, although the sound pattern and idea of “cat” each is what it is by not being any other sound pattern and signaled idea, the sign “cat” cannot be defined simply by not being any other sign. It is thus inappropriate to use (negative) difference when considering signs: “The moment we compare one sign with another as positive combinations, the term *difference* should be dropped. It is no longer appropriate. It is a term which is suitable only for comparisons between sound patterns (e.g., *père* vs. *mère*), or between ideas (e.g., ‘father’ vs. ‘mother’). Two signs, each comprising a signification and a signal, are not different from each other, but only distinct. They are simply in *opposition* to each other” (167).

The concrete analysis of language therefore involves neither signifiers nor signifieds but signs with positive value (*valeur*). Exclusive focus on signifiers and signifieds reduces language to a nomenclature, “a list of terms corresponding to a list of things” (Saussure 1986, 97; see also 158) and cuts signs off from the system to which they belong by supposing that “a start could be made with individual signs, and a system constructed by putting them together” (157). The problems of language are better approached by considering value, as language’s various units and identities otherwise remain ambiguous; in fact, these units can be explained only by value, as the identity of any linguistic element is its value within a relational system (Saussure 1986, 150–54). And so “language itself can be nothing other than a system of pure values” (155) rather than a system of ideas and sound patterns, even if these are involved in language’s functioning. Value and meaning (*signification*) are not synonymous, “although it is easy to confuse them” (158). A chess piece’s value is based on how it can move in a chess game, and if the piece is lost or destroyed it can be replaced by any object

whatever in an entirely arbitrary substitution: A lost knight's replacement need not look like a horse or invoke any idea of jumping (153–54). More generally, something has value based on similar things to which it can be compared and dissimilar things with which it can be exchanged: “to determine the value of a five-franc coin [. . .] what must be known is: (1) that the coin can be exchanged for a certain quantity of something different, e.g., bread, and (2) that its value can be compared with another value in the same system, e.g., that of a one-franc coin, or of a coin belonging to another system (e.g., a dollar)” (159–60). With a language unit such as a word, its “content [. . .] is determined in the final analysis not by what it contains [its meaning/signification] but by what exists outside it” (160). Two words may have the same meaning but different values, as the French *mouton* means the same as the English “sheep,” but English uses another word, “mutton,” to signify the animal's meat (160). This is true also for grammatical entities whose meaning may be the same but whose values differ (161). Although Saussure does not make this point, the same holds for the relation between referent and value: Two words or phrases may have the same referent but different values, as with Frege's (1960, 57) example of Venus being both the morning star and the evening star. Ultimately, “the value of a sign may change without affecting either meaning [*sens*] or sound, simply because some neighbouring sign has undergone a change” (166).

If value entails that relations among signs are not negative and differential but positive and oppositional, this indicates that they are external relations, even if they are internal to language (Saussure 1986, 157). Saussure identifies two forms of these relations. Syntagmatic relations determine a sign's value sequentially by the signs that precede and follow it in a proposition, so that the value—as well as the meaning and reference in this case—of “dog” changes if it is preceded by “barking” or followed by “star.” Associative relations, which reside in the mind and memory, connect a sign to others according to commonalities and differences that determine the nature and possibility of substitutions: Thus “feline” might substitute for “cat” without changing a statement's meaning where the signs in their use have equivalent value, whereas substituting “triplex” for “quadruplex” might alter a meaning substantially because of their different values (see 170–84). A sign's associative relations are always multiple and diverse: “quadruplex” links to one chain of signs that includes “quadrupes,” “quadrifons,” and “quadraginta,” and to another that includes “simplex,” “triplex,” and “centuplex” (178–79). The sign is thereby a nexus where divergent chains of meaning and value converge, ensuring that the sign's value, akin to Deleuze's understanding of

the sign, is irreducible to its representational meaning. As we will see, this pragmatic and extra-representational notion of value, which for Deleuze is what the sign *expresses* rather than signifies or represents, is deployed within *The Logic of Sense*. But it also appears in earlier works—in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, as already seen, but also in the works on Proust and Masoch: “It would appear that both for Sade and for Masoch language reaches its full value when it acts directly on the senses” (CC 17).<sup>5</sup> To interpret a sign is to interpret its value—that is, how it functions within what Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 111–48) will later call a regime of signs. Interpretation, as an interpretation of sense, is a search for value rather than signified meaning.

### PROUSTIAN SIGNS

For Proust, Deleuze contends, the interpretation of signs is a search for essence and truth. Essence, which is “alogical or supralogical” (PS 37) and “transcend[s] the states of subjectivity no less than the properties of the object” (38), is an “absolute and ultimate Difference [. . .] an internal difference” (41). Truth, in turn, invokes a reality beyond objective experience: “Combray appears as it could not be experienced: not in reality, but in its truth; not in its external and contingent relations, but in its internalized difference, in its essence” (61). Philosophy, for Proust, errs in considering truth to be naturally desired; in fact, it is sought only when the pressure and violence of a contingent encounter with the sign forces us to think (15–16) and to seek truth by an interpretation and explication that “is identified with the development of the sign in itself” (17). Explication entails that “the Search is always temporal” (17), that “truth has an essential relation to time” (15), and that since “it always takes time to interpret a sign [. . .] all time is the time of an interpretation, that is, of a development” (86). The sign’s value is a temporal value—past, present, eternal, etc. The typology of signs in Proust’s text accords with the interpretive goal of explicating types of signs that each express a form of time while straddling and participating in the temporal forms of other types (24–25).

There are, first, worldly signs (*signes de la mondanité*), which refer to the world of high society and status (*mondain* relating to the society of wealth and to its diversions or entertainments) and which, despite promising happiness and exaltation, are ultimately factitious and empty. Worldly signs are emitted to gain entry or to demonstrate or maintain status or appearances: A sign is emitted in place of saying something funny, and a fake laugh is emitted as a sign in response, as nothing funny was said (PS 6).

Signs thereby usurp action and thought, so that “worldliness, judged from the viewpoint of actions, appears to be disappointing and cruel, and from the viewpoint of thought, it appears stupid. [. . .] The worldly sign [. . .] annuls thought as it does action, and declares itself adequate” (6). Although the worldly sign “claims to be equivalent to its meaning [*sens*]” (6), it is “empty, but this emptiness confers upon [it] a ritual perfection, a kind of formalism we do not encounter elsewhere” (7). Being always linked to the presently fashionable, “worldliness, at each moment, is alteration, change” (*PS* 18), and, consequently, its signs “force us to conceive lost time, that is, the passage of time, the annihilation of what was” (17).

Next are signs of love, which are deceptive rather than empty, as they “can be addressed to us only by concealing what they express” (*PS* 9). Signs emitted by the beloved introduce difference by individuating her from others and expressing a possible world that the lover seeks to explicate and know. But these signs also entail jealousy, as the lover is excluded from this possible world (7–9). Insofar as signs of love “anticipate in some sense their alteration and their annihilation,” they “implicate lost time the purest state” (18). Worldly signs and signs of love are signs of time lost also in the sense of a “wasted time” spent chasing empty social status or the love of mediocre partners, even if truths are revealed by these pursuits (21–22).<sup>6</sup> They call upon an intelligence that deciphers and interprets them, on condition that this intelligence “‘comes after,’ obliged to function under the pressure of that nervous exaltation that worldliness affords or that pain that love inspires” (52).

In contrast to these first two domains, sensuous signs constitute a regime of impressions or qualities that act not as properties defining an object but as signs “of an *altogether different* object that we must try to decipher [. . .] Combray for the madeleine, young girls for the steeples, Venice for the cobblestones” (*PS* 11, 12). These signs “mobilize an involuntary memory (or an involuntary imagination born of desire)” (98). They make present a past, even if it differs from the experienced past, and thus regain time from within or by way of lost time itself—“time regained at the heart of lost time” (46).<sup>7</sup> This is the case even where the memory involves unrecoverable loss, as with the boots that invoke the hero’s memory of his dead grandmother (19–20). The ambiguous way this memory “implies ‘the strange contradiction of survival and of nothingness’” (20, quoting Proust) nonetheless “gives us an image of eternity” (17). Despite referring to faculties of memory and imagination, sensuous signs remain material, with the sensuous signs that invoke imagination and desire being “less ‘material’” (40). Materiality pertains to both the object that emits signs and the objects

toward which the signs beckon, with the latter appearing in a splendor that was never present in the experience of them (13, 56–57).

Against all this, signs of art go beyond the faculties of memory, imagination, and desire to “mobilize pure thought as a faculty of essences” (*PS* 98). For this reason, “*only the signs of art are immaterial*” (39). Works of art are composed of material constituents, but the signs they emit express “a veritable transmutation of substance” (47) into the spiritual. A musical phrase of “five notes very close together, two of which recur [. . .] explains nothing,” but it serves as a ritual necessary for the appearance of another kind of artistic expression (39). In art, essence is the “unity of sign and meaning [*sens*]” (40): It is sense itself, or expression expressing itself. Transcending their material form, artistic essences express “*a qualitative difference* that there is in the way the world looks to us, a difference that, if there were no such thing as art, would remain the eternal secret of each man” (41, quoting Proust).

In this way, “essences are veritable monads, each defined by the viewpoint to which it expresses the world, each viewpoint itself referring to an ultimate quality at the heart of the monad” (*PS* 41). The singularity of these perspectives is such that “viewpoints toward a world supposedly the same are as different as the most remote worlds” (42). Art does not express a subjective perspective that would remain hidden in the artist if no artistic means existed to express it. Rather, the perspective, how the subject sees the world, makes the subject what it is—just as for Nietzsche, the slaves’ lowly perspective makes them subjects who judge the world in terms of good and evil, while the nobles’ perspective from on high makes them subjects who affirm it. For Proust, therefore, “it is essence that constitutes subjectivity” (43), and “the viewpoint is not identified with the person who assumes it” (43), but rather, “in art, essence individualizes the subject in which it is incorporated, and absolutely determines the objects that express it” (89). Expressing disparate worlds in a purely spiritual way, art constitutes “the ultimate world of signs,” as artistic signs “find their meaning [*sens*] in an ideal essence” (13) that also expresses itself deficiently in the other signs. It is only with art “that Essence is revealed” (88). Consequently, “all the signs converge upon art; [. . .] At the deepest level, the essential is in the signs of art” (14). Artistic signs present not a mere image of eternity, but “an absolute, original time, an actual eternity [*veritable éternité*] that is affirmed in art” (17) and that includes all the other times (24). This eternity is not “the absence of change, nor even the extension of a limitless existence, but the complicated state of time itself” (45).

## AGAINST BERGSON

This status of art and its signs makes clear that Proust's *Search* is not centrally concerned with "recollection, memory, even involuntary memory [. . .] memory intervenes as a means of search, of investigation, but not the most profound means" (*PS* 3). The interpretation of signs is in this regard profoundly anti-Bergsonian, and despite its being published before his *Bergsonism*, it is in his Proust text that Deleuze begins to outline limitations in Bergson's thought that will be further articulated in *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*. Once articulated, these limitations will circumscribe Bergson's role in Deleuze's thought more generally.

Bergson and Proust share a conception of memory involving a pure past or past in general that preserves the entire past in itself—a past that for Bergson is virtual and for Proust is "real without being present, ideal without being abstract" (Proust, quoted in *PS* 58).<sup>8</sup> But Bergson, Deleuze holds, is content with ensuring that the past is preserved in itself: "Despite his profound pages on dreams or on paramnesia, Bergson does not ask essentially how the past, as it is in itself, could also be saved for us. [. . .] While Proust's problem is, indeed: how to save for ourselves the past as it is preserved in itself, as it survives in itself?" (*PS* 59). This is a matter of how the pure past is *lived*, and for Proust it is lived through involuntary memory, which provides a way for essence, as an "ideal reality" and "virtuality," to be "realized or incarnated [*réalise ou s'incarne*]" (61). This incarnation is *not* an actualization—contra *Bergsonism*, where, as noted earlier, Deleuze indicates that actualization and incarnation or embodiment are interchangeable.<sup>9</sup>

Incarnation is not a movement that takes a continuous multiplicity's internal difference outside itself to constitute a discrete multiplicity, the way *élan vital* becomes matter and thus becomes embodied. It is rather a spiritualization of matter or substance, described by Deleuze in Spinozist terms of implication, explication, and complication. Essence, which "is in itself difference" (*PS* 48), is an "original complication" (48) that "complicates the sign and the meaning [*sens*]; it holds them *in complication*; it puts the one in the other" (90). Essence is incarnated when this complication is replicated within what it envelops as it presides over the movements of sign and sense (90). This incarnation "spiritualize[s] substance and render[s] it adequate to essence, [it] reproduces the unstable opposition, the original complication, the struggle and exchange of the primordial elements that constitute essence itself" (48). Art reproduces this original complication and struggle, as seen in a painting, for example, "where the sea becomes land, the

land sea, where the city is designated only by ‘marine terms’ and the water by ‘urban terms’” (49); or in music when “we hear two motifs struggling, as if in bodily combat” (48). With involuntary memory, it occurs with the flavor of the madeleine enveloping Combray in a way that “internalizes the context, it makes the past context inseparable from the present sensation” (60), before introducing a difference into the experience, so that “Combray rises up in a form that is absolutely new” (60). What is fundamental in this last incarnation of essence “*is not resemblance, nor even identity, which are merely conditions, but the internalized difference, which becomes immanent*” (60).

All signs incarnate essence, but with empty worldly signs and deceptive signs of love, “essence is led to assume an increasingly general form and an increasingly greater generality. At its limit, it tends to be identified with a ‘law’ [. . .] Essences can therefore be incarnated in the signs of love, precisely as the general laws of the lie, and in worldly signs, as the general laws of the void” (PS 67). With signs of love, “essence is incarnated [. . .] necessarily in a serial, and hence a general, form” (75), in relation not only to a single beloved but to a series of beloveds who are loved in succession. Despite this generality, “an original difference presides over our loves” (67) and, indeed, over all that signs bring together to express. Incarnation via involuntary memory may lean toward greater specificity, yet it remains partial: “essence is realized [*se réalise*] in involuntary memory to a lesser degree than in art; it is incarnated in a more opaque manner” (61). This is not simply because of memory’s still material points of reference. Essence, regardless of the generality of its incarnation, always “*individualizes*” (43) what it spiritualizes, but memory’s individualizing remains at the level of the particular and does not reach the singular: “essence no longer appears as the ultimate quality of a singular viewpoint, as did artistic essence, which was individual and even individualizing. Doubtless it is particular, but it is a principle of localization rather than of individuation. It appears as a local essence: Combray, Balbec, Venice” (61). Involuntary memory’s incarnation thus operates through “a sensation ‘common’ to two places, to two moments” (62), and so the connection remains not only abstract but external and contingent. That the madeleine should invoke Combray implies both that there is “a real contiguity between the madeleine as it was tasted and Combray as it was present” and that the madeleine’s flavor and Combray’s qualities “still have distinct substances that resist envelopment, resist mutual penetration” (64). In contrast, with art, despite the common or univocal qualities that might appear in the objects it brings together, essence has “lost nothing of its singularity, was not alienated, because the two objects and their relation

were entirely determined by the point of view of essence, without any margin of contingency" (62). In art, we no longer "discover a sign's meaning [*sens*] in something else" (40), and essence's intrinsic difference is no longer inadequately expressed by "an empirical difference between two things or two objects, always extrinsic" (41). This is how art exceeds the materiality of its constituents.

The temporality of involuntary memory's incarnation of essence also leaves it partial and opaque. The pure past that it makes present offers only an image of eternity, one that operates as a ground: It "transcends all the empirical dimensions of time," but "in its very ambiguity, it is the principle starting from which these dimensions are deployed within lost time, as much as the principle in which we can regain that lost time itself, the center around which we can coil it anew in order to have an image of eternity" (*PS* 63). In the contradiction of survival and nothingness, involuntary memory "gives us eternity, but in such a manner that we do not have the strength to endure it for more than a moment nor the means to discover its nature" (63). Hence "the revelations of involuntary memory are extraordinarily brief and could not be extended without damage for us" (62). The pure past becomes a ground that, as *Difference and Repetition* explains, remains transcendent, mysterious, and withdrawn. Essence remains obscure.

Difference and repetition are essence's "two inseparable and correlative powers" (*PS* 49). Repetition might appear to be a recurrence of the same that promotes identity rather than difference, but difference and repetition "are only apparently in opposition. There is no great artist who does not make us say: 'The same and yet different'" (*PS* 49). Difference is "the quality of the world [that] is affirmed only through a kind of autorepetition that traverses the various media and reunites different objects" (49). Difference and repetition appear in all signs that incarnate essence, but in different configurations. With signs of love, essence's generality separates its two powers, such that the difference that presides over our loves becomes an image, ideal, or archetype that is diversified by the series of loves that repeat this ideal as their law (67–69). The generality, and therefore the separation of difference and repetition, is even greater with worldly signs, where essences are incarnated "at a last level of contingency and generality. They are immediately incarnated in societies, their generality is no more than a group generality: *the last degree of essence*" (81). The separation or unification of essence's powers corresponds to the nature of incarnation and the relation between sign and sense that essence complicates by holding together: "this relation was all the closer when essence was incarnated with more necessity

and individuality; all the looser, on the contrary, when essence assumed a greater generality and was incarnated in more contingent data” (89). Hence it is in art that, as Deleuze writes in *Difference and Repetition*, “repetition is, for itself, difference in itself” (DR 94).<sup>10</sup>

### Sadism, Masochism, and the Death Instinct

Deleuze contends that Freud’s attempts to conceive sadomasochism as a single syndrome falter because Freud is unable to show how one perversion directly transitions into the other. The initial theory holds that an aggressive component of sexual instincts develops into either sadism or masochism depending on whether it is directed outward or turned back against the subject. The turning back results from either fear of a loss of love (a matter of the reality principle operating from the ego’s earliest stages) or feelings of (Oedipal) guilt (CC 103–4). This portrayal, however, presupposes “the ego itself being masochistic” (104), as having a *desire* to be punished, and thus must posit a primary masochism independent of and alongside the sadistic aggression said to be thrust outward and then turned around. It further requires that the sadistic aggression that was desexualized when being forced to relinquish its sexual aims is resexualized in masochism, first in the way punishment serves “to resolve guilt and the corresponding anxiety and make sexual gratification possible” (104), and second in the way physical pain becomes erotically charged (105). The latter point leads Freud to suggest that not only is masochism a result of sadism turned back on the self, but that a certain kind of hedonic sadism is a projection of masochism’s discovery of pain’s sexual and pleasurable nature (105). Finally, in addition to any reversal of sadism that is said to constitute it, masochism requires an independent mechanism of projection whereby another figure—often the mother—assumes the role of subject and punisher of the masochist (105–6). The same troubles appear in Freud’s later explanation, which separates aggression from sexual instincts and associates it with an independent death instinct. Here, sadism is linked to this death instinct thrust outward and masochism to a residue of the instinct remaining libidinally bound to the self, but masochism is also treated again as a product of sadism’s being turned back on the self. The first aspect of this later account reinforces the notion of primary masochism, while the second entails the same problem of additional unexplained mechanisms required to make this turning back possible (109–10).

Sadism and masochism cannot be united around a common theme of violence or aggression because “each is complete in itself” (CC 67). Uniting them comes at the cost of abstractions that cut them off from their distinct worlds (42). Any proposed transition between them ignores how the conditions of such transfers demolish the logic of one and replace it with the wholly different logic of the other, which in turn “severs it [masochism] from all communication with sadism” (108) and vice versa. Nonetheless, as each perversion relates to negation, they become, at least on the terms of Freud’s later metapsychology, distinct but indirect means to glimpse the operation of the death instinct “beyond” any reference to the pleasure principle. Freud’s “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1957b), which introduces the concept, is not only central to Deleuze’s analysis of Sade and Masoch but plays a crucial role in *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*.

#### THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE AND THE DEATH INSTINCT

Freud defines pleasure and unpleasure in terms of “the quantity of excitation that is present in the mind but is not in any way ‘bound’; [. . .] unpleasure corresponds to an *increase* in the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a *diminution*” (Freud 1957b, 8). The pleasure principle is an economic rule according to which “the mental apparatus endeavours to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant” (9). Asserting the pleasure principle’s dominance does not mean that mental processes consistently result in pleasure. Rather, “there exists in the mind a strong *tendency* towards the pleasure principle, but that tendency is opposed by certain other forces or circumstances, so that the final outcome cannot always be in harmony with the tendency towards pleasure” (9–10). Nonetheless, even those internal forces that seem to hinder or block the achievement of pleasure appear to be consistent with pleasure as mental life’s operative principle.

Freud refers to these internal forces as instincts (*Trieb*).<sup>11</sup> They are “the most abundant sources of this internal excitation” and “the representatives of all the forces originating in the interior of the body and transmitted to the mental apparatus” (Freud 1957b, 34). They are also “at once the most important and the most obscure element of psychological research” (34). Freud famously refers to the instincts as “mythical entities, magnificent in their indefiniteness” (Freud 1965, 95). But, as Lacan (1981, 163) notes, he also calls them “conventions,” which are not arbitrary impositions insofar as they are chosen based on their strong relation to observable evidence, but which are nonetheless impositions on that evidence, used to make sense of

phenomena when demonstrative understanding of them is not yet possible (Freud 1957a, 117–18). Instincts or drives are thus invoked to account for what cannot be explained solely by the available evidence. Observing a constant compulsion to chew on a pencil or pen, despite it not serving as a substitute for food or drink and so not explained by needs such as hunger or thirst, and despite its persistence even when it has become unpleasurable, leads to the assertion of there being an insatiable oral instinct that serves no rational function and merely seeks to discharge itself on any available object. Despite their importance, Freud acknowledges that the development of the theory of instincts persistently lags behind the rest of psychoanalytic theory because observation is able to illuminate only the most overt erotic or sexual instincts, which are quite obviously pleasure-seeking and said to originate in the impersonal id and to be hindered by the ego. Instincts running counter to these overtly pleasure-seeking ones necessarily remain hidden: “The difficulty remains that psycho-analysis has not enabled us hitherto to point to any [ego-] instincts other than the libidinal ones” (Freud 1957b, 53).

Various instances of the psyche imposing displeasure on itself clearly do not oppose or act outside the pleasure principle. The ego’s repression of sexual instincts in accordance with the reality principle is a sacrifice of short-term pleasure for the sake of self-preservation and longer-term pleasure; the displeasure caused by repressed instincts breaking free from their repression reflects how the returning instincts are seeking pleasure in accordance with the principle (Freud 1957b, 10–11). While the ego might cause displeasure in pushing these instincts into the unconscious, “unpleasure for one system [is] simultaneously satisfaction for the other” (20). A more complicated situation arises with victims of war trauma, who, while generally unaffected in their waking lives, repeat the most traumatic events of their past in nightmares, contradicting the view of dreams as pleasurable wish fulfilments (12–14). But this phenomenon is clarified by analysis of the child’s *fort-da* game, where the child who throws away and recovers his toy repeats but also reverses his mother’s abandonment of him. The child thereby promotes a new source of pleasure in mastering this trauma and loss.<sup>12</sup> In war trauma, the repetition concerns fright (*Schreck*), understood as “the state a person gets into when he has run into danger without being prepared for it,” as opposed to anxiety (*Angst*), which “describes a particular state of expecting the danger or preparing for it, even though it may be an unknown one” (12). The soldiers’ repetitive dreams “are endeavouring to master the stimulus retrospectively, by developing the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis” (32).

There are, of course, many pleasurable forms of repetition, of “the re-experiencing of something identical” (Freud 1957b, 36). But Freud contrasts such cases, along with those of war trauma and the *fort-da* game, to repetitions appearing in the analytic situation in which the patient, particularly in transference, “is obliged to *repeat* the repressed material as a contemporary experience instead of, as the physician would prefer to see, *remembering* it as something belonging to the past” (18). This resistance to remembrance clearly comes from the ego, indicating that “the compulsion to repeat must be ascribed to the unconscious repressed” (20) whose recognition in memory the ego seeks to prevent. What appears within this repressed material that the patient seems compelled to repeat, Freud contends, are “past experiences which include no possibility of pleasure, and which can never, even long ago, have brought satisfaction even to instinctual impulses which have since been repressed” (20). Patients in analysis “repeat all of these unwanted situations and painful emotions in the transference and revive them with the greatest ingenuity. [. . . T]hey contrive once more to feel themselves scorned, to oblige the physician to speak severely to them and treat them coldly” (21). They continue, moreover, to resist treatments even though “it might be supposed that they would cause less unpleasure to-day if they emerged as memories or dreams instead of taking the form of fresh experiences” (21). Similar repetitions are found outside of analysis in people who may display no signs of neurosis but who, for example, repeatedly destroy friendships and love relationships (21–22). In none of these cases can the repetition be interpreted as being either pleasurable itself or a way of converting displeasure into pleasure.

Returning to traumatic neurosis, Freud proposes an account based on considerations of the perceptual consciousness system, or the system *Pcpt.-Cs.* Consciousness, lying at the boundary separating inner psychic life from external reality, perceives external stimuli but, unlike other psychic systems that retain permanent traces of what affects them, transfers these perceptions to a separate system of memory so that it can receive the next round of stimuli (Freud 1957b, 24–26). In this way, the system is analogous to the skin, or to the physical surface of any living organism that receives stimuli and renews itself. The top layer of this surface becomes a hardened crust, something “thoroughly ‘baked through’ by stimulation” (26), inorganic or dead but serving both to receive and to blunt stimuli so that they do not overwhelm the recipient (27–28). Beneath this dead layer, consciousness resides as a cortical layer (28) that remains in a fluid state, transmitting perceptions to a memory system that records them as traces while retaining

no trace itself. This portrayal of the system *Pcpt.-Cs.* “can be brought into relation with Breuer’s distinction between quiescent (or bound) and mobile cathectic energy in the elements of the psychical systems; the elements of the system *Cs.* would carry no bound energy but only energy capable of free discharge” (26–27). In normal functioning, the organism, in accordance with the pleasure principle, depends on the psyche having to “deal only with very small quantities of external stimulation” (28) relayed to it through perception but blunted by its hardened, dead crust.

Trauma is now conceived as a breach of the psychic surface by an overwhelming encounter that ruptures the hardened layer, like a breach of the skin. The psyche is then exposed to continuous excitations of the sort “as could normally arise only from *within* the apparatus” (30),<sup>13</sup> and, resultantly, “the pleasure principle is for the moment put out of action” as “there is no longer any possibility of preventing the mental apparatus from being flooded with large amounts of stimulus” (29). The consequent task is to repair the breach and, much as blood coagulates to seal off a breach of the skin, “cathectic energy is summoned from all sides to provide sufficiently high cathexes of energy in the environs of the breach” (30). The fluid, mobile, and unbounded energy invading the organism is thereby transformed into a quiescent and bound sort (31), repairing the crust and allowing the organism to return to normal functioning. This binding precedes the operation of the pleasure principle, but nonetheless “occurs on *behalf* of the pleasure principle; the binding is a preparatory act which introduces and assures the dominance of the pleasure principle” (62).

Trauma demonstrates that while psychic life is governed by the pleasure principle, the principle only operates with a sufficient cathexis of unbound energies. The instincts’ fluid and unbound dynamic reflects their state within the primary processes that structure the dynamic unconscious, where they are “*freely mobile*,” “press towards discharge,” and have no necessary connection to their object, so that their cathexis or investment, “can easily be completely transferred, displaced and condensed” (Freud 1957b, 34). In contrast, the secondary processes that regulate conscious life carry out “the task of the higher strata of the mental apparatus to bind the instinctual excitation reaching the primary process. A failure to effect this binding would provoke a disturbance analogous to a traumatic neurosis; and only after the binding has been accomplished would it be possible for the dominance of the pleasure principle [. . .] to proceed unhindered” (34–35). But the repressed negative experiences that exhibit a compulsion to repeat in analysis “exhibit to a high degree an instinctual character” (35), as the

compulsion to repeat them “must cause the ego unpleasure, since it brings to light activities of repressed instinctual impulses” (20). And since these impulses are repressed precisely because they cannot be bound to memory traces that would consign them to the past, it indicates that this compulsion to repeat is part of the primary processes of the unbound instincts. Freud thus declares that “we cannot escape a suspicion that we may have come upon the track of a universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of organic life in general” (36). Since the repetition repeats the past in the present, its force suggests “*that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things* which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces” (36). If this conservative nature of the instincts is accepted and we then work backward to the earliest forms of life, we must reach the conclusion that, since “*inanimate things existed before living ones* [. . .] the attributes of life were at some time evoked in inanimate matter,” and so the earliest instinct would have to be “to return to the inanimate state” (38).

Freud considers whether this death instinct could explain all of life’s compulsions, including self-preservation, which would then aim “to assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death, and to ward off any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in the organism itself” (Freud 1957b, 39). But he decides that this “cannot be so” (39), as other instincts clearly run counter to any tendency toward death. Although “there is unquestionably no universal instinct towards higher development observable in the animal or plant world” (41), there are, for example, the sexual instincts, which, through the activity of the germ cells, “work against the death of the living substance and succeed in winning for it what we can only regard as potential immortality, though that may mean no more than a lengthening of the road to death” (40). A precursor to sexual reproduction is observable in animaculae that can “rejuvenate” one another through acts of “conjugation” (47–48). Freud thus proposes to counter Thanatos, the death instinct, with Eros, the life instinct, which aims “to combine organic substances into ever larger unities” (42–43). This opposition sustains Freud’s commitment to a dualism of component instincts—“Our views have from the very first been *dualistic*, and to-day they are even more definitely dualistic than before” (53)—after the earlier dualism between id and ego instincts became untenable once the ego was recognized as being the product of the investment of libido instincts, and self-preservation became the product of a prior self-love.<sup>14</sup> Id and ego are

now modifications of Eros; later, Freud (1961a) links the superego to the death instinct.

Nonetheless, the death instinct remains mere speculation, as no empirical evidence demonstrates its existence. All Freud can say after his review of research mostly on single-celled organisms is that biology does not “flatly contradict the recognition of death instincts” (Freud 1957b, 49). While aggressive or destructive instincts are easily found in both behavior and the unconscious, these manifest a death instinct only indirectly, since nothing in their activity indicates their origin in a specific compulsion in the organism to return to an inorganic state. If sadism implies a death instinct, it is because the aggression it directs at sexual objects does not seem to be derived from Eros; if masochism implies a death instinct, it is because it is regarded as an inversion of sadism back onto the ego (53–55). Neither condition displays the death instinct in anything like a pure form because Eros is always wrapped up in their appearances—and, indeed, every apparent operation of death instincts can only ever be interpreted as some combination of Eros and Thanatos.

Moreover, the purported irreconcilability of Eros and Thanatos, along with the fundamental dualism it sustains, is imperiled at the conclusion of Freud’s text. Freud had held the death instinct to be beyond the pleasure principle because of its location within the primary processes that are “at the beginning of mental life” (Freud 1957b, 63) and because of the need to bind the mobile energies of these processes before the pleasure principle could function. But in the closing pages of the text, he admits that “if the pleasure principle had not already been operative in [these primary processes] it could never have been established for the later ones” (63). Moreover, since pleasure is defined by the discharge of instinctual energies, “the pleasure principle seems actually to serve the death instincts” (63), with the “final elimination” of these energies “in the pleasure of discharge” (62) seeming to be exactly what these instincts strive to realize. But in that case, even the instinct toward death would function in accordance with pleasure, and the struggle between life and death instincts would be one over how pleasure will be achieved, with Thanatos seeking it through the final discharge of a return to an inorganic state and Eros seeking to block up these competing impulses, build up displeasure, and then attain pleasure by their release onto objects of desire. Regarding the mechanics of this struggle, “the life instincts have so much more contact with our internal perception—emerging as breakers of the peace and constantly producing tensions whose release is felt

as pleasure—while the death instincts seem to do their work unobtrusively” (63). Or, as Freud later says in *The Ego and the Id*, “the death instincts are by their nature mute and [. . .] the clamour of life proceeds for the most part from Eros” (Freud 1961a, 46).

#### EROS, THANATOS, AND TRANSCENDENTAL REFLECTION

Despite his earlier critical portrayals of transcendental philosophy, when Deleuze addresses the death instinct’s silence and relation to the pleasure principle, he supports the coherence of Freud’s approach by framing it as a “philosophical reflection” that “should be understood as ‘transcendental,’ that is to say concerned with a particular kind of investigation into the question of principles” (CC 111). As such, the validity of Freud’s speculative thesis does not turn on any empirical evidence of either the death instinct’s existence or its escaping the pleasure principle. It is unsurprising, Deleuze states, that after all of Freud’s explorations, “there are no exceptions to the [pleasure] principle—though there would indeed seem to be some rather strange complications in the workings of pleasure” (111–12), nor that death, should it be an instinct, would accord with a search for pleasure. Observation indeed only confirms the existence of pleasure-seeking instincts, and what appears in all instances of repetition is Eros. The death instinct is the solution not to a scientific problem about the principles governing a field, but rather to a philosophical problem concerning how principles come to govern.

This is precisely where the problem arises, for though nothing contradicts the pleasure principle and everything can always be reconciled with it, it is far from obvious that it can account for all the various elements and processes which go to make its application so complicated. Everything might well be governed by the pleasure principle without therefore being finally dependent on it, and since the demands of the reality principle are no more adequate to account for the complications involved, these being more often the products of fantasy [i.e., the dreams found in traumatic neurosis], we must conclude that the pleasure principle, though it may rule over all, does not have the final or highest authority over all. There are no exceptions to the principle but there is a residue that is irreducible to it; nothing

contradicts the principle, but there remains something which falls outside it and is not homogeneous with it—something, in short, *beyond*. . . . (112)

Transcendental reflection addresses an empirical field governed by a principle and seeks for it “a second-order principle, which accounts for the necessary compliance of the field with the empirical principle. It is this second-order principle that we call transcendental” (CC 112). That psychic life distinguishes pleasure from pain does not entail any necessity for a principle by which pleasure is systematically sought and pain avoided.<sup>15</sup> Thus, “there is in short *something* that the pleasure principle cannot account for and that necessarily falls outside it, namely its own particular status, the fact that it has dominance over the whole of psychic life. [. . .] Freud [. . .] is concerned not with the exceptions to the principle but with its *foundation*” (113). This foundation is not Thanatos, but rather Eros, which, by seeking to build larger unities, sees through the binding of excitations required for the pleasure principle to function: “It is the binding process which makes pleasure as the principle of mental life possible. Eros thus emerges as the foundation of the pleasure-principle” (113). This constitutive binding “may and indeed must, be characterized as ‘repetition’” (113), so that Eros also grounds the instinctual compulsion to repeat.

Transcendental inquiry, however, does not end with the grounding of the empirical and instead goes on to seek “the absolutely unconditioned, the ‘ground-less’ from which the ground itself emerged” (CC 114). Transcendental reflection here discovers Thanatos as the absolute groundlessness from which Eros as ground is given. It is a demonic repetition that Eros binds with its own repetition—and Freud says that the individual who repeats experiences that can never have been pleasurable behaves as if “possessed by some ‘daemonic’ power” (Freud 1957b, 21; see also 36). Thanatos thus becomes the reason for Eros’s being: “How indeed could excitation be bound and thereby discharged except by this double action of repetition, which on the one hand binds the excitation and on the other tends to eliminate it?” (CC 114). It is for that reason silent, while Eros similarly never appears but nevertheless makes itself heard: “Eros, although it is no more given in experience than Thanatos, at least makes its presence felt; it is an active force. Whereas Thanatos, the ground-less, supported and brought to the surface by Eros, remains essentially silent and all the more terrible” (116). Thanatos is what Deleuze will later call “impassive”—neither active nor

passive, and not of the nature to act or be acted upon. Aggression, which can be active or passive, is therefore at best only an indirect manifestation.

Deleuze holds that Eros and Thanatos's repetitions are each "in and of itself a synthesis of time—a 'transcendental' synthesis" (CC 115). Eros's binding is a synthesis of the present that, pace the constitutive repetition of Hume's habit, constitutes the weightiness of the past that, along with the present, shapes the future through anticipation. In this way, and consistent with the transcendental perspective, "past, present and future are constituted in time *simultaneously*" (115), even if they are naturally experienced in succession. Eros is "repetition of the very moment of excitation, the moment of the emergence of life; repetition is what holds together the instant; it constitutes *simultaneity*" (114). Thanatos is a negation or erasure that "repeats *what was before the instant*—before excitation disturbed the indifference of the inexcitable and life stirred the inanimate from its sleep" (114). It constitutes a past (115), but not the past of Eros that weighs upon the present. By virtue of being "absolutely before" Eros and life, Thanatos constitutes a *pure* past that was never present. Deleuze adds that there must be a third repetition that concerns the future, "because these two correlative structures cannot constitute the synthesis of time without immediately opening up to and making for the possibility of a future in time" (115). This is a future not of anticipation in the present, but of openness, a future "that saves or fails to save, depending on the modes of combination of the other two [repetitions]. (Hence the decisive role of transference as a progressive repetition which liberates and saves—or fails)" (115). *Difference and Repetition* will associate the death instinct with this third, futural repetition.

#### PERVERTED KANTIANISMS

Sadism and masochism can now be approached as irreducibly distinct transcendental reflections on a death instinct conceived as absolute groundlessness. The distinction between life and death instincts, as affirmative and negative forces only visible when mixed, depends on "a further and more profound distinction between the death or destructive instincts [*les pulsions de mort ou de destruction*] and the Death instinct [*l'instinct de mort*]," where the latter "cannot be *given* in psychic life" (CC 30). Sade expresses this by distinguishing between partial negations and "pure negation as a totalizing Idea" (26–27). The former relate to secondary (i.e., social and habituated) nature and to the rules and laws that bind it, and present cases where "destruction is merely the reverse of creation and change, disorder is another form of order" (27).

The latter relates to a “primary nature [. . .] that override[s] all reigns and all laws, free even from the necessity to create, preserve or individuate” (27). Sadism seeks to apprehend pure negation in “a speculative and analytical manner” (35) by progressing from partial negations to pure violence. It proceeds “in a demonstrative form [. . .] by multiplying and condensing the activities of component negative or destructive instincts [*pulsions*]” (31). Sade’s writings offer instruction on deploying “demonstrative reason” to reach an impersonal violence identified “with an Idea of pure reason” (20). This approach is a perverted Kantianism. For Kant, the Idea is discovered by reason’s impulse to extend the application of concepts of the understanding, systematizing still partial understandings by leading them toward an unrepresentable and unrepresentable focal point onto which they seemingly converge. But this perversion of the demonstrative method is “spinozistic” (22), as Sade displays “a surprising affinity with Spinoza—a naturalistic and mechanistic approach imbued with the mathematical spirit” (20). As an Idea, the endpoint of this reasoning process can only be thought, but it tasks thinking with acquiring “maximum aggressive power, systematization and capacity of intervention in the real world: the Idea is projected with extraordinary violence” (73).

Masoch, in contrast, works by education rather than instruction (CC 19). He does not deploy demonstrative reason to reach an Idea of pure reason, but “proceeds by dialectical imagination” (22) toward “an Ideal of pure imagination” (35). The reference to imagination is again Kantian. For Kant, the transcendental imagination, when released from the task of schematizing concepts and intuitions to support reason’s speculative interests, assumes the role of representing in negative fashion a sublime beyond all sensual and conceptual determinations. This activity conflicts with reason, whose Idea of totality confronts imagination with the limit of its reproductive powers, and thus “the feeling of the sublime seems to be pain rather than pleasure. But [. . .] the pain makes a pleasure possible” (KCP 51). Masoch’s *dialectical* imagination, however, is also Platonic, involving “the ascent to the realm of the intelligible” and “the whole technique of dialectical reversal, disguise and reduplication” (CC 22), but including a “mythical dimension” (128) that complements and completes the dialectical process. It is in myth that the ideal is presented—i.e., the ideal woman (94).

Rather than elevating negation to a pure form of destruction, masochism deploys disavowal, which “is a reaction of the imagination, as negation is an operation of the intellect or of thought” (CC 127). Disavowal “is nothing less than the foundation of imagination, which suspends reality and

establishes the ideal in the suspended world” (128). While it might seem more superficial than negation or destruction, disavowal consists “in radically contesting the validity of that which is: it suspends belief in and neutralizes the given in such a way that a new horizon opens up beyond the given and in place of it” (31). We should note that Freud himself remains quite circumspect about attributing negation to the death instinct.<sup>16</sup> Disavowal highlights the importance of the fetish in masochism. For Freud, the fetish object is an “image or substitute of the female phallus” and “the means by which we deny that the woman lacks a penis,” the choice of object being determined by the last thing the child saw “before becoming aware of the missing penis” (31). It is “the fantasized object par excellence” (72), and whereas “fetishism only occurs in sadism in a secondary and distorted sense [ . . . ] there can be no masochism without fetishism in the primary sense” (32). The Ideal of pure imagination and its fetish object constitute Masoch’s “supersensualism” (32). His counterpoint to Sade’s two natures is, on the one hand, a secondary or “coarse” nature that is “ruled by individual arbitrariness: cunning and violence, hatred and destruction, disorder and sensuality are everywhere at work” and, on the other hand, a “great primary nature, which is impersonal and self-conscious, sentimental and supersensual” (54). *Venus in Furs* presents this supersensual primary nature via Severin’s pain in being whipped by the Greek.<sup>17</sup>

## IRONY AND HUMOR

Sadism and masochism also embody comical perversions of law made possible by Kant’s reconfiguration of law’s relation to morality. A classical conception that “found its perfect expression in Plato” subordinates law to the Good, for “if men knew what the Good was, or knew how to conform to it, they would not need laws” (CC 81). Obedience to the law in turn defines “the righteous man [who] obeys the law for the sake of the Best” (84). Comic elements appear in the (Socratic) irony used to trace laws back to their foundation in the Good and the humor used to highlight how obedience is ultimately an inadequate approximation of righteousness made necessary by human failings (82). Humor and irony are brought together in the absurd scene of Socrates’s death, where “the laws place their fate in the hands of the condemned man, and ask that he should sanction their authority by submitting to them as a rational man” (81–82). Kant’s deontological moral philosophy reverses the classical priority by making the Good dependent on a law that derives its authority simply from its own empty form of lawfulness.

ness or duty (82–83). Such duty, Kant contends, is what remains after all empirical, subjective, or utilitarian motivations to obey moral commands are stripped away, revealing a pure and unconditioned categorical imperative.<sup>18</sup> But as a result, “the object of the law is by definition unknowable and elusive” (83), and, as such, “it defines a realm of transgression where one is already guilty, and where one oversteps the bounds without knowing what they are, as in the case of Oedipus” (83–84). In these modern conditions, as Freud diagnoses, obedience to the law does not promote feelings of righteousness but only a more severe sense of guilt (84). Kant’s moral revolution parallels his Copernican revolution in the realm of knowledge and “may even have foreshadowed a return to the pre-Socratic (Oedipal) conception of the law” (83). With this revolutionary inversion, however, “irony and humor immediately take on a different, modern aspect [. . .] they are now directed at a subversion of the law” (85, 86).

Sade uses irony to transcend law as Plato had done, but to reach “its opposite, the Idea of Evil, the supreme principle of wickedness, which subverts the law and turns Platonism upside down” (*CC* 87). This accords with the prioritization in Sade’s political thought of institutions over law: The latter are grounded by a contract that presupposes free individuals but that also enables tyranny by binding and moralizing actions; whereas institutions, based on authority and power, render laws unnecessary and promote free, anarchic, and revolutionary action (76–79, 87). Masoch, in contrast, attacks the law through humor, which, “in contradistinction to the upward movement of irony toward a transcendent higher principle [. . .] is a downward movement from the law to its consequences” (88). The humor of the masochist contract is that “by scrupulously applying the law we are able to demonstrate its absurdity and provoke the very disorder that it is intended to prevent or to conjure” (88). The law prohibiting desire’s satisfaction under the threat of punishment morphs into a demand for punishment as a condition for satisfaction, so that “the masochist [. . .] stands guilt on its head by making punishment into a condition that makes possible the forbidden pleasure” (89). Masochism thereby combats the mystification that allows law to violate the contract meant to be its foundation. It subverts the patriarchal form of contract, which typically makes the woman its object, by instead making her a party to the contract, and it subverts the law’s paternal character by excluding the father and entrusting its application to the mother (91–93).

Sadism and masochism’s distinct logics of perversion, Deleuze contends, subvert what in Oedipal terms would be “normal” psychic and sexual

development. In this regard, Deleuze's text on Masoch, alongside *The Logic of Sense*, defines an early an-Oedipal or anti-Oedipal position prior to his collaborations with Guattari. While irony and humor are both comic modes (CC 86) that contest not only the law's power and authority but its association with purity and truth, ultimately, for Deleuze, humor is the more powerfully subversive, as it eschews any return to transcendence or the replacement of one Idea with another, even if contrarian, Idea. Humor, in short, remains immanent. Its downward movement—which becomes a surface movement in *The Logic of Sense*—associates it with intensities, singularities, and the expression of sense.<sup>19</sup>

## Part II



## Chapter 7

### *Difference and Repetition*

*Difference and Repetition* is in many respects a consolidation of Deleuze's earlier works. But it is also, he says, his first attempt "to 'do philosophy'" (*DR* xv). Deleuze identifies its context as that of "a generalized anti-Hegelianism" (xix) that challenges both the primacy given to identity and the negative and the treatment of judgment and recognition as models of thought. These all emerge from a problematic of representation taken to be the structure of thinking and foundation of knowledge.

Representation connects concepts to objects under an inverse relation between the concept's comprehension and its extension. Infinite comprehension means the concept applies to a single object, and partial or finite comprehension means it extends more broadly but remains abstract (*DR* 11–12). Representation's ideal would see every determination of an object as "conceptual in the last instance, or actually belong[ing] to the comprehension of a concept" (12), such that there would be one and only one concept for each individual thing and vice versa. Representation thereby promises to be able, at least in principle, to grasp the concrete. Infinite comprehension and singular extension correspond to the Kantian principle of complete determination, which involves the "synthesis of all predicates which are intended to constitute the complete concept of a thing" (Kant 1965, A572/B600), and wherein "to know a thing completely, we must know every possible [predicate], and must determine it thereby, either affirmatively or negatively [of the thing]" (A573/B601). For Kant, "the complete determination that necessarily belongs to all that exists" (A576/B604) entails a totality of possibility for all things. This totality "can never be exhibited *in concreto*" (A573/B601) but rather exists as an idea of pure reason that is *a priori* completely

determinate—an idea without content serving as the undemonstrable ground of reality and conceived ontotheologically and ideally or archetypally as an *omnitudo realitatis* (the “All” or Absolute) and *ens realissimum* (an ultimately real entity, or God) (A573–76/B601–4).<sup>1</sup>

Hegel’s Concept, as Hyppolite explains, seeks to surmount the problem of this ground remaining an empty ideal form by pushing difference up to contradiction, securing the Absolute as an unconditioned totality in which no difference remains ineffable or unknowable. Hegelian dialectics thus aims to make every difference and every determination of identity via difference internal to the Notion of the Absolute, formulated as the Identity of identity and difference. Thinking the Absolute as a mediated unity of form and content, it overcomes the aporias Kant reinstates at a transcendental level and brings philosophy to its culmination in an ontology of sense. Against all this, *Difference and Repetition* reconceives the Kantian problematic to challenge the direction taken by Hegel, aiming to complete Kant’s project in a form that leaves behind identity and representation, akin to the way Nietzsche, according to Deleuze, aims to rival and rethink Kant’s critical project (*NP* 62, 88). The result is an ontology of sense founded on difference rather than contradiction. Deleuze’s earlier theorizations of difference, repetition, multiplicity, virtuality, intensity, univocity, and expression all contribute to this project. The most prominent two terms, of course, are reflected in the work’s title.

Representation’s principles “expound a theory of difference as conceptual difference, or develop the account of representation as mediation” (*DR* 12). The result, however, is a wholly negative explanation of repetition that attributes it to the failure of conceptual comprehension to reach the infinite. Deleuze identifies four insurmountable “blockages” to representation’s ideal of infinite comprehension and singular extension, each of which entails a form of repetition. The first is an artificial or logical blockage—linked to logos or language, and hence anthropological in Hyppolite’s sense—arising from the way the generality of the predicates used to delineate concepts precludes any concept, even when accorded infinite comprehension and singular extension in its actual use, from grasping its object’s singularity, so that other objects may always fall under the concept and constitute repetitions of it.<sup>2</sup> The other three “natural” blockages refer “to a transcendental logic or a dialectic of existence” (12) that invokes a real identity of concept and object rather than the merely formal identity involved in the first blockage (16). These are a blockage of discrete extension, where the forced assignation of a general concept with finite comprehension onto a discrete object in time and

space reveals a gap between the concept and the actually existing thing;<sup>3</sup> a blockage of alienation that follows from the possibility of positing absolutely identical individuals that would fall under the same concept regardless of its degree of comprehension;<sup>4</sup> and a psychoanalytical blockage of repression, where the concept of a thing or event can have infinite comprehension and singular extension yet remains unrepresentable because it cannot be brought to conscious recognition (12–15).

The first, artificial blockage is less significant as it is a matter of human language's inability to move beyond generality and live up to representation's ideal, rather than a failure of representation to meet its own ontological commitments. While the first three blockages engender repetitions of individuals falling under the same concept, repression engenders repetition through a lack of recall—those who cannot remember their mistakes are bound to repeat them, etc.—which establishes an inverse relation between remembrance and repetition (*DR* 18) corresponding to the inverse relation of comprehension and extension to which the first three blockages refer. All four blockages result in repetition being treated as a “bare” repetition or “repetition of the same,” where the differences between repeated cases are non-conceptual, indeterminate, and unknowable: “repetition is attributed to elements which are really distinct but nevertheless share strictly the same concept. Repetition thus appears as a difference, but a difference absolutely without concept; in this sense, an indifferent difference. [. . .] As long as we invoke absolute conceptual identity for distinct objects, we suggest a purely negative explanation, an explanation by default” (15).

Repetition remains inexplicable under the terms of representation's conceptual difference and mediation, which provide “no direct and positive criteria for distinguishing between repetition and the order of generality, resemblance or equivalence” (*DR* 270). Neither scientific/natural law nor moral law properly accounts for repetition, even if they would seem to require repeated or repeatable cases, because they remain on the order of generality, of abstract and external principles (1–5). An account that provides repetition with the “superior ‘positive’ principle” (19) it demands calls for a principle of “difference in itself” that is “greater” than even the greatest form of conceptual difference—that is, greater than contradiction, which representation employs to secure its mediating role. Repetition, as creative becoming, opposes all forms of generality, law, and mediation. The inadequacy of representation's account of repetition as “bare repetition” leads Deleuze to declare that “the law of an inverse relation between repetition and remembering” that characterizes the psychoanalytical blockage “is in

every respect hardly satisfactory, in so far as it makes repetition depend upon repression” (18). The psychoanalytical account nevertheless provides the hinge to transition away from representation: “when Freud shows—beyond repression ‘properly speaking,’ which bears upon *representations*—the necessity of supposing a primary repression which concerns first and foremost pure *presentations* [. . .] we believe that he comes closest to a positive internal principle of repetition” (18). Freud’s abandonment of “the hypothesis of real childhood events, which would have played the part of ultimate disguised terms [that are repressed and repeated]” (17), results in a reversal of the relationship of repression and repetition, providing repetition with a positive principle linked to life: “I do not repeat because I repress. I repress because I repeat, I forget because I repeat. I repress, because I can live certain things or certain experiences only in the mode of repetition. I am determined to repress whatever would prevent me from living them thus” (18).

Deleuze expounds a “fourfold root” (*DR* 29) or “four iron collars” (262) upon which representation functions, each of which reflects issues analyzed in earlier works: identity in the concept (be it the abstract identity of an Aristotelian genus divided into species or the dialectical and purportedly concrete identity of Hegel’s Absolute); opposition in the predicate (be it the contrary predicates that determine Aristotle’s species or the opposition pushed to contradiction that becomes Hegel’s essential difference and ground of predication); analogy in judgment (pace Scholasticism’s analogical conception of being that organizes the largest genera so that predicates can be applied positively to God and creatures, or the equivocation between the senses of logical and phenomenological contradiction that undoes dialectics’ claim to concreteness); and resemblance in perception (apprehension of which presupposes a continuity and self-sameness of objects, without which representation would not be possible [34]). These “aspects of mediation” (32) domesticate difference’s “monstrosity” (28), the way its immediacy and power entail its excess over every identitarian principle. Difference cruelly separates itself from a ground that does not separate itself in return, making it an affirmative or positive difference in the Nietzschean sense (28–29).<sup>5</sup> Representation’s iron collars enforce a “sedentary distribution” that organizes differences in accordance with a categorical hierarchy—indeed, “the world of representation presupposes a certain type of sedentary distribution” (303). Identity, conceptual difference, unity, and continuity each has a degree of reality, which is how representation is possible in the first place. But they are not ontologically foundational. They not only find their genetic conditions in the play of difference and repetition, but also have the status of *simulations*, of surface effects, fictions, or optical illusions through which

difference and repetition are hidden. Representation is thus “a site of transcendental illusion” (265), as the conditions that engender its principles endow these principles with an appearance of substantiality and necessity they do not really have. They make sense of the world, but this “simulated sense” derives from an “ontological sense” (302), the elaboration of which puts representation in its proper place.

Representation is inaugurated by Aristotle, whose use of difference to classify species and genera provides a table of categories that, continuing up to Kant, “takes judgement for its model” (*DR* 33). But the taming of difference is established through an earlier Platonic move, which “has no motivation apart from the moral” (265), to denigrate simulacra as false and unreal differences. This is often missed when Plato’s project is subsumed into Aristotle’s, as Plato’s method of division then appears as a faulty attempt to identify contrary species by dividing their common genus, and Plato’s turn to myth is then taken as an admission of defeat, its role seeming to be to provide the mediation that was missing in the initial attempt to define by means of division (59–62). When Platonic division and myth are no longer interpreted through an Aristotelian lens, Deleuze contends, their real function in Plato’s thought appears—namely, to enact a selection that distinguishes true claimants from false pretenders, what genuinely copies the Idea or Form serving as a model from what feigns likeness and only appears to emulate the Form. While genuine copies, for Plato, maintain an internal resemblance to their model, the simulacrum is an image lacking internal connection. But this gives simulacra a positive “power of the false” (128) that precludes their being dismissed as weak and degraded copies. Hence Plato’s ambivalence toward simulacra. On the one hand, he treats them as mere simulations, as copies of copies of copies whose obvious imperfections place them on the lowest order of being. Yet, on the other hand, he acknowledges that their deceptiveness allows them to masquerade as forms of truth. Socrates, in the last book of the *Republic*, holds that the physical bed copies the ideal Form of a bed, which itself emulates the Form of the Good, while the painting of the bed is merely a copy of the physical bed, having a truth and reality corresponding to this derivative position (Plato 1961, *Republic*, 596b–599). Yet earlier, in the second book, he had held that actors are dangerous and must be banished from the ideal polis because they can appear to play many different roles equally well, seeming to be more than they are supposed to be (396a–b, 398a).

Considered positively, simulacra are structures of differences that generate only further differences yet also simulate the appearance of identity. Deleuze thus defines them as “systems in which different relates to

different through difference itself” (*DR* 277) while holding that identity and resemblance “are ‘simulated’: they are products of systems which [. . .] are themselves simulacra” (126). It is not that identity and resemblance—along with limitation, opposition, and other categories of recognition and representation—are unreal, but rather that “the form which difference assumes here is illusory” (240). Systems of simulacra are characterized by the same play of difference and repetition that exceeds representation while providing its conditions of possibility. Against representation’s sedentary and hierarchical distribution of differences, they present “a completely other distribution which must be called nomadic, [. . .] without property, enclosure or measure” (36). Simulacra follow “a model of the Other [*Autre*]” (128), but this means they follow no model at all, as the Other connotes a flux and impurity incompatible with any sort of exemplar. They provide the conditions of real and not merely possible experience that representation cannot grasp.

## Chapter 8

### Difference in Itself

Deleuze contends that philosophy has never formulated a concept of “difference in itself” because it has consistently confused it with “a merely conceptual difference” (*DR* 27). It has been content “to inscribe difference in the concept in general,” finding only “a difference already mediated by representation” (27). It has not realized that “a difference can be internal, yet not conceptual” (26)—indeed, that proper internal difference exceeds any identitarian figure of conceptuality yet remains fully positive and determinate. The concept of difference in itself “demands its own Idea, its own singularity at the level of Ideas” (27), indicating that this difference cannot be an object of experience and eludes representation, but nevertheless figures, in Kantian fashion, as an ultimate principle for the systematicity of experience or a condition for sensible experience to “make sense.” However, contra Kant, and reflecting his reading of Nietzsche, Deleuze holds that difference in itself is the condition for real rather than merely possible experience (68–69). Its concept paradoxically involves something non- or extra-conceptual, a “(non)-being” or “?-being” without negation (64), making it the concept of a fully affirmative difference in the Nietzschean sense.<sup>1</sup>

Deleuze distinguishes finite organic representation and infinite orgiastic representation as the two approaches in the history of philosophy seeking to make difference compatible with identitarian conceptuality. Organic representation (see *DR* 30–42) is the previously discussed Aristotelian attempt to incorporate difference into the order of species and genera. In it, contrariety is the greatest and most perfect difference because it is compatible with the abstract identity of a genus that it divides into the determinate identities of the genus’s species. The limited nature of this incorporation of difference

into identity, however, is exposed by quandaries regarding the unity of the categories and the diversity of individuals, leading to analogy and univocity as competing routes to encompass these “broader” differences. Deleuze holds univocity to be the only way to relate being concretely to difference, once the limitations placed on it by Duns Scotus to protect divine transcendence are removed. But the development of the ontological proposition of being’s univocity<sup>2</sup> from Duns Scotus to Spinoza to Nietzsche shows that what must be common to all differences is neither a transcendental sense indifferent to the distinction between finite and infinite being nor a sense of substance and identity that these differences positively express; rather, univocal being must express a sense of difference itself as a “sameness” common to all that differs. This univocity of difference expresses the being of the simulacrum, whose nomadic distribution of differences exceeds representation and identity, such that “univocal Being is at one and the same time nomadic distribution and crowned anarchy” (37).

Orgiastic representation aims to surmount these impasses by securing representation’s ground, leading it to explore the Absolute via a difference that is either infinitely large or infinitely small. Hegel takes the first route, pushing difference up to the infinity of a contradiction that, negating but also passing into identity, becomes the mediating ground for judgment. But the assumption that contradiction is difference’s maximum, Deleuze contends, “is true only to the extent that difference is already placed on a path or along a thread laid out by identity” (*DR* 49–50). Furthermore, and reiterating the thesis of his review of Hyppolite, Deleuze holds that “it is not difference which presupposes opposition but opposition which presupposes difference,” since opposition or contradiction “is not more but less profound than difference” (51). Leibniz, in contrast, pushes difference toward the infinitesimally small. This route, like Hegel’s, focuses on “the infinite movement of evanescence as such—that is, to the moment at which difference both vanishes and is produced” (42). Here Deleuze responds to Hyppolite’s claim that Leibniz falls short of a difference adequate to the Absolute, that he “stopped at a purely relative maximum without reaching the absolute maximum of difference, namely contradiction” (44). Contra Hyppolite, Deleuze argues that “Leibniz goes further or deeper than Hegel” (51), and that even if he remains within representation’s orbit, Leibniz provides a path to reach a concept of difference in itself.

Pace Hyppolite, Hegel’s contradiction is an “essential difference” or “difference in the essence” because it both distinguishes a thing from everything it is not and incorporates even its infinitely distant other into its identity—it

contains the other essentially, it contains it *in essence*" (DR 45–46). In this way, Hegel positions contradiction, an external relation, as a constitutive internal difference. Conversely, Leibniz's infinitely small concerns not essences but individual or singular "cases" (46). Essences remain distinct, but by virtue of each essence being "inessential to the other" (46), related only externally, and thus differentiated and determined entirely internally. Deleuze explains Leibniz's version of the empiricist principle of the externality of relations as a function of his theological aim "to avoid any admixture of God and his creatures, for the modesty of those creatures" (45), as against a Hegelian pantheism that applies "the infinitely large of theology" (45) to finite determination. While Hyppolite argues that Leibniz here only gestures toward a notion of essential internal difference, for Deleuze it allows Leibniz to theorize a proper internal difference, with each monad being completely determined by virtue of reflecting and thus including its entire universe within it. But it also allows Leibniz to go beyond predication and judgment, as these no longer figure in a thing's individuation, in what makes it this thing and nothing else.

Deleuze holds that Leibniz's inessential, infinitely small difference effects a "vice-diction" rather than a contradiction between essences, such that their external relation to each other is not misconstrued as an internal difference that would mediate and unify them (DR 46). Vice-diction introduces a new *internal* relation that follows from the way inner differences, here formulated as infinitely small virtual differences—the  $dy$  and  $dx$  of the calculus—lack determination in themselves, whereas empiricism's principle of external relations concerns actual terms already determined by their inner differences.<sup>3</sup> Infinitely small vice-dicting differences vanish at the level of sensible intuition—they are not found in extended time and space, and so do not belong to a discrete multiplicity—and they remain minimal and undetermined in relation to every determinate  $x$  and  $y$ , since they refer to indefinitely small differences/distances from these determinations (172). But they receive determination within the differential relation  $dy/dx$ , which expresses, first, the reciprocal determination of an "internal qualitative relation" (46) that defines the direction—the sense—of change of a curve at a point, and, second, a complete determination, not of individual ordinary points—which, while being fully determined by the differential, are the product of a derived determination, a derivative of the curve's equation—but of distinctive points that define the curve and act as a complementary aspect of the integration of differentials (46–47).<sup>4</sup>

Reciprocal and complete determination compose a twofold principle of sufficient reason that sustains the discreteness of each point and the

continuity of the curve they form, as “Leibniz, for his part, never saw any contradiction between the law of continuity and the principle of indiscernibles” (*DR* 47). Discreteness and continuity are not reconciled through a negative separation and connection of essences à la Hegel, but by the vanishing of the smallest difference as one “passes” from one point or essence to “the next.” Discreteness, or the principle of indiscernibles, concerns the singularity of “essences understood as completed individual notions” (47)—that is, understood as monads, each of which expresses its entire world, but “precisely under a certain differential relation and around certain distinctive points which correspond to this relation” (47). The clarity of this expression is thereby limited to the “neighborhood” that the monad occupies and that determines its perspective. Continuity concerns the world’s inessential differentials—“properties, affections or complete cases” (47), which can be summarized as “pre-individual singularities” (47) or, anticipating *The Logic of Sense*, as “events”—that constitute the monads at the moment of their (the differentials’) vanishing; this world preexists the monads without existing apart from them (47–48). Each monad, having “no windows” (Leibniz 1979, “Monadology,” §7) to relate it to others, includes the whole continuum of events, but in a way that makes each monad unique, just as each perspective on a city is unique even while being a view of the same whole.<sup>5</sup> Distinctness and continuity thereby complement each other.

But the role of infinitely small difference extends further, beyond the vice-diction that establishes discreteness and continuity within a world and to the divergences between the infinity of possible worlds from which Leibniz’s God chooses our world as the best possible. This divergence is a matter of impossibility, which designates something that is logically possible in itself but incompatible with the things and events—the discreteness and continuity—of this world. Unlike vice-diction’s virtual and determining internal relation between differentials, which reconciles discreteness and continuity and ensures the convergence or compossibility of a world’s monads and events, impossibility expresses a fundamental non-relation, or a relation of non-relation, between completely determined but disparate worlds. However, like vice-diction, impossibility involves neither essence nor contradiction. Adam sins in this world and not in another, but “sinner” and “non-sinner” are not essential predicates, and so this divergence does not imply essentially distinct Adams. Adam’s essence, as Leibniz argues against Arnauld, is an incomplete concept that pertains to divine understanding and remains the same across diverse worlds that

include him, while the completely determined individual concept of Adam, which involves his real existence in relation to the series of events chosen by God, does not (see Leibniz 1979, "Correspondence with Arnauld," 110–11, 121–29). The non-sinching Adam does not contradict the sinching Adam but rather the world in which the sinching Adam sins; this makes the non-sinching Adam impossible with this world, or perfectly possible in himself but incompatible with God's choice of world. The inherence of the predicate "sinner" in the subject "Adam" in our world depends on this world's compossibility as it is expressed by Adam and all its other subjects (*DR* 48)—in other words, predication depends on God's choice of a world, from which subjects and the actions/events they realize follow. God's choice of this Adam is therefore simply shorthand for God's choice of this world in which his sin occurs.<sup>6</sup> In this way, "the notion of impossibility in no way reduces to contradiction and does not even imply real opposition: it implies only divergence, while compossibility is only an analytic continuation which translates the originality of the process of vice-diction" (48).

The sufficient reason ensured by convergence and vice-diction underpins Leibniz's claim that ours is the best possible world, since, he argues, this world combines "the greatest possible variety, together with the greatest order that may be; that is to say, through this means has been obtained the greatest possible perfection" (Leibniz 1979, "Monadology," §58).<sup>7</sup> Conversely, the impossibility between worlds invokes a smallest difference that is simultaneously the greatest chasm. A concept of difference no longer colored by the principles of representation can here emerge. On the one hand, as this world's sinching Adam is essentially the same as the other world's non-sinching one and yet also completely different, the two Adams present a repetition of difference where neither one can be considered the original that the other copies either well or badly. The divergence of Adams and their worlds thereby forms a system of simulacra. On the other hand, by defining each world by convergence, Leibniz "linked difference to the negative of limitation, because he maintained the dominance of the old principle, [. . .] without seeing that divergence itself was an object of affirmation, or that impossibles belonged to the same world" (*DR* 51). Deleuze thus maintains that even while going beyond negative forms of difference such as the contrariety of organic representation and the contradiction of Hegelian organic representation, Leibniz's infinitely small still subordinates "to the identical and the other requirements of representation that part of difference which escaped them in the first sense [that is, which escaped finite

organic representation]" (273). Removing this requirement of representation entails that divergence does not separate distinct worlds but instead includes impossibles within a single world, making that world a simulacrum.

Affirming such a world, and thereby taking divergence as an object of affirmation, means affirming a world that includes the greatest possible variety *without* the greatest possible order. It affirms a world of chaos—"a *chaosmos*" (DR 57)—that contains such radical differences that ideas of simple causality and moral truth break down. This is a world where Adam both sins and does not sin, or where the question of his sinning is undecidable, *because it depends on one's point of view*. It is thus a world of Nietzschean rather than Leibnizian perspectivism, where perspectives are not diverse views of a single and selfsame world but products of immanent forceful struggles in a world of difference. Perspectives belong to the "same" world, but this sameness signifies a univocity and not an identity. Impossibles are thereby "affirmed as the greatest crime and the greatest virtue of the one and only world, that of eternal return" (51). For Deleuze, such a world is precisely *our* world when conceived immanently and without reference to the transcendent truths and values that subordinate difference to identity: "The primacy of identity, however conceived, defines the world of representation," but "the modern world is one of simulacra" (xix); the eternal return "is said of a world *without identity*, without resemblance or equality. It is said of a world the very ground of which is difference, in which everything rests upon disparities, upon differences of differences which reverberate to infinity" (241).

Difference in itself ensures this structure of impossibles belonging to the same world, but it is not the impossibility itself. It is rather the conduit that effects divergence and gives sense to the way these impossibles "belong together."<sup>8</sup> In Leibniz's example, this difference in itself is Adam. If Adam is the figure who, for Leibniz, belongs to disparate worlds but remains essentially the same Adam, for Deleuze he connects impossibles belonging to the same world precisely because *he has no identity*, or because *his only "identity" is found in his always differing from himself*. *Difference and Repetition* refers to this conduit in various ways: as a "differenciator," a "primary difference," or a "second-degree difference" (DR 117) that "separates as much as [. . .] unites" (65), connecting differences directly through their difference without any mediation by identity or representation.<sup>9</sup> He also associates it with an intensive depth from which the extensive space of limitation, opposition, and negation arises (50–51), and to "mobile individuating factors" (41) that are the "pure intensities" (41) of the will

to power. In the last case, the differentiator is an individuating difference and a haecceity that, pace Deleuze's work on Spinoza, is distinguished from Duns Scotus's haecceity by its relation to intensive quantities of power. In this way, the concept of difference in itself becomes a positive principle of difference that, laying claim to the concrete that representation cannot reach, becomes the condition for real rather than merely possible experience.



## Chapter 9

# Repetition for Itself

Deleuze declares that in the eternal return, “repetition is, for itself, difference in itself” (*DR* 94). This formulation might suggest a movement of difference engendering difference. Against a dialectical progression in which an abstract being-in-itself negates itself into being-for-another and then negates this negation to reach concrete being-for-itself *through* being-for-another, Deleuzian repetition would involve difference in itself going beyond and returning to itself, but, as it exceeds any identity, this difference would return only further difference. Deleuze speaks along these lines when noting that “modern life is such that, confronted with the most mechanical, the most stereotypical repetitions, inside and outside ourselves, we endlessly extract from them little differences, variations and modifications” (xix), and when locating in art and language a “dynamic repetition” within any “static repetition” that repeats the same (20–26). In this way, he says, we must distinguish an external and extensive repetition of particulars both similar to and different from one another from an internal and intensive repetition within the singular that “is at the heart of the first [extensive repetition]; it is the vital, positive, active procedure” (20).<sup>1</sup>

Static and dynamic repetitions occur in time, but time, for Deleuze, has its own synthesis and repetition: Time itself repeats, not merely what occurs in time. An account of time *as* repetition of difference, however, begs the question of the time in which this repetition transpires. Deleuze here follows Kant in maintaining that if time were to move, change, or repeat, it would require another time in which this dynamic occurs, and if that second-order time were to move, change, or repeat, it would necessitate yet another time, and so on *ad infinitum*.<sup>2</sup> To avoid this impasse, time must

be understood not as a succession used to measure movement, change, or some other passage, but as the unchanging synthetic form of any ordered succession: “The synthesis is necessarily static, since time is no longer subordinated to movement; time is the most radical form of change, but the form of change does not change” (*DR* 89). Extensive static repetition and intensive dynamic repetition both refer to a time whose synthetic structure is static, but this stasis is not the self-sameness of identity; rather, it indicates a structure that imparts univocal sense to all repetitions and becomings. Time, here, is temporality: the structure that relates time’s dimensions to one another and provides the conditions for the passage of time and of things in time.

*Difference and Repetition* positions the eternal return as the last of three syntheses of time. The first two are associated with Hume and Bergson respectively, and together with the third, Nietzschean synthesis, they further refine Deleuze’s earlier readings of all three thinkers. Deleuze also associates each synthesis with a component of Freud’s tripartite model of the psyche—id, ego, and superego—for although Freud’s unconscious is neither affected by nor has any awareness of chronological time, it is nonetheless constituted by a temporal structure in which past, present, and future events coexist (*DR* 114). Each synthesis is a static structure of repetition, but the first repetition merely “draws off” a difference while the second only “includes difference as a variant” (94); in neither case is repetition “for itself, difference in itself” (94). Each synthesis also underpins a certain aspect of time—its continuity through the present, the weight of its past, and the openness, and hence discontinuity, of its future—corresponding to time’s foundation, grounding, and ungrounding (114). Together, they elaborate the ecstatic character of things existing in time, the ways they go outside and immediately differ from themselves as the condition of their becoming.

### The First Synthesis of Habit

In Deleuze’s early reading of Hume, difference, as a principle of the given and experience, is distinguished from repetition, as the principle of habit and the mechanism by which the subject emerges from the given under conditions that differ from those by which the given is given. Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated—indeed, with reference to the appearance of similar given cases, “we cannot yet properly speak of repetition” (*DR* 70), as the independence of cases means that the disappearance of one and

its replacement with another offers no basis for saying “‘the second,’ ‘the third’ and ‘it is the same’” (70). Repetition instead alters not the given but the mind that contemplates it by “drawing off” the given’s difference in a process of synthesis, “*contracting* the cases or the elements into one another, in order that they can subsequently be reconstituted within a space or time of conservation which belongs to representation itself” (286). There is no in-itself of repetition here—or, rather, the in-itself is nothing.

The self becomes a subject through acts of memory and expectation by which it reflects on itself and its world. But these presuppose a static line of time founded by “the originary synthesis which operates on the repetition of instants. This synthesis contracts the successive independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, present” (*DR* 70). This synthesis establishes a “temporal space” (71) in which things and events are placed at specific points in the past, present, and future, and represented via active syntheses of memory and expectation, all of which together constitute a “for-us” of repetition (71). It brings about “an originary subjectivity [. . .] by virtue of a difference that the mind *draws from* repetition” (70).<sup>3</sup>

This repetition, empty in-itself but constitutive for us, is passive, constituting time as a subjective phenomenon, “but in relation to the subjectivity of a passive subject” (*DR* 71). Put differently, the static temporal line is constituted passively by “a contemplative soul adjacent to the subject” (75) that is really a multiplicity of “little selves which contemplate and which render possible both the action and the active subject. [. . . I]t is always a third party who says ‘me’” (75). Contemplation here is a presubjective process of synthesis or “contraction” (73). It forms the habit of contracting habits (73–74), an originary power of connecting and contracting, and it provides the foundation of a “Transcendental Aesthetic” more profound than Kant’s, whose passive self is defined “in terms of simple receptivity, thereby assuming sensations already formed” (98). If repetition changes nothing in the given, it nevertheless constitutes sensible objects alongside the subject. Deleuze maintains that “matter is, in effect, populated or covered by such souls, which provide it with a depth without which it would present no bare repetition on the surface” (286). Although Humean repetition takes place “at the level of sensible and perceptual syntheses” (72), it refers “to organic syntheses” (73) that serve as “the sensibility of the senses; [. . .] a primary sensibility that we *are*” (73).

Constituting both sensations and the temporal space in which they are reflected, Deleuze further associates this foundational habit with the investment and binding of libido drives that for Freud allows the pleasure principle

to function: It provides “the conditions under which pleasure effectively becomes a principle” (*DR* 96), and, as such, “habit underlies the organisation of the Id” (97). As examined earlier, Freud’s analysis of traumatic neurosis in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” leads him to the idea that freely mobile instincts associated with unconscious primary processes must be bound and quieted by higher mental faculties for pleasure to operate as the economic rule governing psychic behavior. Deleuze states: “This binding or investment of difference is what makes possible in general, not pleasure itself, but the value taken on by pleasure as a principle: we thereby pass from a state of scattered resolution to a state of integration, which constitutes the second layer of the Id and the beginnings of an organisation” (*DR* 96). Unlike the account in *Coldness and Cruelty*, Eros is not associated with this synthesis of the present, but instead with the second synthesis of the past, leaving Thanatos, associated in the earlier work with the synthesis of the past, to be linked to the third synthesis that concerns only the future.

In this first organic synthesis, the present alone exists, but as a “living present” (*DR* 76) that, pace Bergson, contracts a series of instants into a durational period (77), since the present is never lived instantaneously.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, signs in the first synthesis—and so the meaningfulness belonging our sensibility—are always signs of the present, even where they represent the past or future: A scar is a present sign of a past wound; storm clouds are a present sign of future inclement weather (77). Passive synthesis thereby gives sense and direction to our organism while also “imparting direction to the arrow of time” (71). It reveals, underneath the active subject that remembers and expects, a multiplicity of “little selves” (75) or “larval subjects” (78) that emerge from the way “the world of passive syntheses constitutes the system of the self, under conditions yet to be determined, [. . . as] the system of a dissolved self” (78).

### The Second Synthesis of the Pure Past

In Deleuze’s Hume book, habit grounds duration by establishing the line of time that allows duration and memory to have weight, while in his Bergson works, duration grounds habit by providing the ontological recording that allows habit to act the past in the present. The differences between these positions are resolved in *Difference and Repetition* by the distinction between active and passive syntheses of memory. Habit’s static line of time

finds an active, subject-based synthesis of reflective memory, but its passive synthesis cannot account for the passage of the living present into the past it constitutes. Time's originary synthesis thereby points to a second passive synthesis of memory, which "is the fundamental synthesis of time which constitutes the being of the past (that which causes the present to pass)" (DR 80). This second synthesis grounds lived and living time.

Reiterating arguments from *Bergsonism* that the present can pass only by paradoxically being already past (DR 81–82), Deleuze posits a virtual "pure past" (81) or "past in general" (80) that is "the in-itself of time" and "the final ground of the passage of time" (82). This pure past is not a former present belonging to empirical time. Rather, it is the milieu in which former presents preserve themselves and through which subjects can focus on them (80). Contra the first synthesis, the past is not a dimension of a living present, but "the synthesis of all time of which the present and the future are only dimensions" (82). Each present contains the whole past and is contained together with its past in each "subsequent" present. The pure past thereby comprises an infinity of layers contracting and repeating the previous layers, with "the present present being only the maximal contraction of all this past which coexists with *it*" (82). This repetition is more than an organic process—it is part and parcel of "a spiritual life" (83). It "unfolds in the being in itself of the past" (84), no longer drawing off a difference found in the given but instead including difference as its own internal variation: "The former [Humean synthesis] is a repetition of successive independent elements or instants; the latter [Bergsonian synthesis] is a repetition of the Whole on diverse coexisting levels" (84). The in-itself of the pure past is thus also the for-itself of its repetition. Difference now "has two faces" (287), one extensive, countable, and related to habit's static line, and the other intensive and involving the pure past's degrees of difference rather than differences of degree. But extensive difference is simply intensive difference that has gone outside itself. The repetition of the first synthesis now becomes for the second synthesis a "bare repetition [. . .] understood as the external envelope of the clothed: that is, the repetition of successive instants must be understood as the most relaxed of the coexistent levels, matter as a dream or as mind's most relaxed past" (84). The signs of the present in the first synthesis now find their sense in the second's more fundamental repetition of inner difference. This repetition of inner difference, however, remains circumscribed inasmuch as "however strong the incoherence or possible opposition between successive presents [that repeat one another by

repeating the past as a Whole], we have the impression that each of them plays out ‘the same life’ at different levels [. . .] the same past at different levels of a gigantic cone” (83).<sup>5</sup>

The limits Deleuze finds in the Bergsonian synthesis, even while it advances beyond the Humean synthesis by incorporating the difference that Hume kept as a principle of experience distinct from repetition as a principle of habit, lies in this sameness. The second synthesis grounds time through reminiscence or involuntary memory, which enables the being-in-itself of the pure past to be lived—although, Deleuze notes, pace *Proust and Signs*, it is Proust rather than Bergson who takes this problem forward (*DR* 84–85). Reminiscence refers not to an empirical past but to something that may never have existed but must be positioned as past even while also being ever present. Deleuze here invokes Plato’s account of anamnesis (87–88), which takes the soul outside chronological time to the eternity on which the chronological succession of past, present, and future is modeled, and where the soul is said to have had, prior to its embodiment, direct contact with the Forms. Reminiscence involves “an in-itself—that is, [. . .] the pure past of the Ideas which arranges the order of presents in a circle according to their decreasing or increasing resemblances to the ideal” (88). This pure past is also, ambiguously, “necessarily expressed in terms of a present, as an ancient *mythical* present” (88). All this entails an “equivocation” that

was already implicit in the second synthesis of time. For the latter, from the height of its pure past, surpassed and dominated the world of representation: it is the ground, the in-itself, noumenon and Form. However, it still remains relative to the representation that it grounds. It elevates the principles of representation—namely, identity, which it treats as immemorial model, and resemblance, which it treats as a present image: the Same and the Similar. It is irreducible to the present and superior to representation, yet it serves only to render the representation of presents circular or infinite (even with Leibniz or Hegel, it is still Mnemosyne which grounds the deployment of representation in the infinite). The shortcoming of the ground is to remain relative to what it grounds, to borrow the characteristics of what it grounds, and to be proved by these. (88)<sup>6</sup>

In this way, the second synthesis, though exceeding linear, chronological time, operates to secure that time and the representation it makes possible,

thereby remaining attached to that time. Its static form is not the straight line of the Humean synthesis but a circle that arranges presents as if in orbit around this hidden origin (88, 109). The Sameness of the life repeated across the past's infinite levels becomes the identity of the Absolute sought by orgiastic representation. The pure past is characterized by convergence—the “same life” repeating across all levels and perspectives—rather than divergence and impossibility.

The reasoning behind the transition from the first to the second synthesis with respect to the problem of time's passage also governs the move from the id to the ego, and from the first process that goes beyond Freud's pleasure principle—the binding of drives—to the second, which grounds it (*DR* 108). The organization of libido drives through the first synthesis provides the foundation for an active synthesis that unifies the ego. Deleuze associates this active synthesis with the reality principle and its internal constitution of real objects.<sup>7</sup> Freud (1957b, 10–11, 51–52) holds that the reality principle extends rather than contradicts the pleasure principle by protecting the individual from immediate danger, ensuring the later pursuit of pleasure. Deleuze, however, contends that it also moves beyond the pleasure principle by an extension of passive synthesis “in which it utilises the bound excitation in order to attain something else—albeit in a manner different from the reality principle—even while it remains a passive and contemplative synthesis” (99). Because self-preservative drives not only emerge from but also react back upon libido drives, blocking and frustrating them, the disinvestment of desire from real objects compelled by these ego drives is accompanied by the creation of a phantasy world where thwarted sexual drives passively construct and are invested in virtual or ideal objects, each of which “governs and compensates for the progresses and failures of its real activity” (99). Crucially, since they emerge from the frustrations encountered in active syntheses, they manifest what the drives seek in phantasy rather than what the real objects are: The others who reject or are denied to us always become sublime and beautiful in the resulting phantasies in ways that never reflect their real qualities. Consequently, real and virtual objects “do not resemble one another” even though they “cannot exist without each other” (100).

“The virtual object,” Deleuze maintains, “is a *partial* object [*objet partiel*]—not simply because it lacks a part which remains in the real, but in itself and for itself because it is cleaved or doubled into two virtual parts, one of which is always missing from the other. In short, the virtual is never subject to the global character which affects real objects” (*DR* 100–1).

Deleuze here invokes post-Freudian psychoanalyst Melanie Klein's theory of part-objects (101), which will be discussed in detail when analyzing Klein's role in *The Logic of Sense*. A virtual object, as a partial object, is "a fragment, a shred or a remainder. It lacks its own identity" (101). As the passive synthesis develops, it "points beyond itself towards the contemplation of partial objects which remain non-totalisable" (101). These partial objects feature in the second synthesis because, as lost objects that substitute for present frustrations, they "belong essentially to the past" (101). The ego, consolidated in relation to them, is thereby grounded by reminiscence of a past that is not and never was a former present, "*it is always a 'was'*" (102). Like habit's initial binding of drives, the ego's constitution of virtual partial objects in the pure past is prior to and thereby goes beyond the pleasure principle (108–9). While the former functions as a new Transcendental Aesthetic, the latter "may properly be defined as the equivalent of an 'analytic'" (109), providing the ideal models by which objects are judged.

The unconscious lives the pure past through the resonance of real objects and their virtual counterparts. The unconscious remains unsettled, for Klein and Deleuze, because real objects and virtual phantasy objects never correspond. But it is further unsettled, for Deleuze, by the way each virtual object, as a partial object, lacks not only something in relation to the real object "from which it is subtracted," but also "something in itself, since it is always half of itself, the other half being different as well as absent," yet this absence "is the opposite of a negative" (*DR* 102). The unconscious lives the pure past erotically because its repetitions relate to a hidden prohibition that cleaves each virtual object in itself (85, 102–3). The second synthesis is thus a synthesis of Eros. Prohibition is associated with the phallus as the symbol of paternal power, and its repression of erotic desire introduces an "amorous [. . .] game of repetition" (103). The phallus too is a virtual object, since the trauma and repression it initiates, though being unrepresentable, is linked to an event that may have never really occurred but that must be positioned as coming from the past.<sup>8</sup>

On the level of bare repetition, the subject moves from one real object to another through masquerades, with the loves of later life seemingly repeating in veiled form an original repressed love of the mother, etc. But these disguises always supplement their repetitions and are not original to them: "if this material model is in fact perturbed and covered over with all kinds of disguises, with a thousand and one forms of disguise or displacement, then these are only secondary even if they are necessary: the distortion in the majority of cases does not belong to the fixation, or even to the repetition, but

is added or superimposed on to these" (*DR* 103). Repetition of love objects disguised to hide their relation to an original love implies the unconscious of a solipsistic subject, which Freud often presupposes when asserting the reality of childhood events of repression. This invites questions about how an earlier real present could act at a distance on a later one (104, 124). "However," Deleuze argues, "while it may seem that the two presents are successive, at a variable distance apart in the series of reals, in fact they form, rather, *two real series which coexist in relation to a virtual object of another kind*" (104). Beyond the disguises supplementing bare repetitions that seem to occur in chronological time is another masquerade involving the phallus, which operates as an "object = x" (105)—Kant's (1965, A108–10) term for the concept of a transcendental object in general, determined solely as an empty unity able to receive the determinations of our representations and thereby provide the condition for knowledge's objectivity. As an object = x, the phallus "constantly circulates and is displaced in" (104) real presents and their bare repetitions, but it "can no longer be treated as an ultimate or original term" because "this would be to assign it a fixed place and an identity repugnant to its whole nature" (105). The phallus exists only in hiding itself, its only identity being that it differs from itself, making its displacement a dynamic repetition of difference in which disguise is no longer secondary because the phallus has no identity that might be hidden underneath. Consequently, "the displacement of the virtual object is not [. . .] one disguise among others, but the principle from which, in reality, repetition follows in the form of disguised repetition" (105). This repetition ensures that the unconscious no longer belongs to a solipsistic subject but an intersubjective multiplicity.

Repetition is no more secondary in relation to a supposed ultimate or originary fixed term than disguise is secondary in relation to repetition. For if the two presents, the former and the present one, form two series which coexist in the function of the virtual object which is displaced in them and in relation to itself, *neither of these two series can any longer be designated as the original or the derived*. They put a variety of terms into play in a complex intersubjectivity in which each subject owes its role and function in the series to the timeless position that it occupies in relation to the virtual object. [. . .] In short, there is no ultimate term—our loves do not refer back to the mother; it is simply that the mother occupies a certain place in relation

to the virtual object in the series which constitutes our present, a place which is necessarily filled by another character in the series which constitutes the present of another subjectivity, always taking into account the displacements of that object = x. [. . .] The parental characters are not the ultimate terms of individual subjecthood but the middle terms of an intersubjectivity, forms of communication and disguise from one series to another for different subjects, to the extent that these forms are determined by the displacement of the virtual object. Behind the masks, therefore, are further masks, and even the most hidden is still a hiding place, and so on to infinity. The only illusion is that of unmasking something or someone. (105–6)

This revised unconscious “cannot be understood in the overly simple form of opposition or conflict” (*DR* 106). Rather, its “conflicts are the result of more subtle differential mechanisms (displacements and disguises)” in relation to which “the negative expresses only within consciousness the shadow of fundamentally unconscious questions and problems, and owes its apparent power to the inevitable place of the ‘false’ in the natural positing of these problems and questions” (106). These statements reflect Deleuze’s claim in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* that “dialectic thrives on oppositions because it is unaware of far more subtle and subterranean differential mechanisms” (*NP* 157), and his contention earlier in *Difference and Repetition* that Leibniz’s vice-diction goes beyond and gives rise to limitation and opposition (*DR* 50–51). Nevertheless, the previously outlined shortcomings of the second synthesis remain: The phallus’s movement and disguise merely “includes difference at the heart of repetition” (109), while the phallus itself, functioning as a primordial event of prohibition, inevitably assumes “the status of a former present, albeit mythical,” and reconstitutes “the illusion it was supposed to denounce, resuscitating the illusion of an original and a derived, of an identity in the origin and a resemblance in the derived” (109). As discussed earlier, after finding Eros and Thanatos, the life and death instincts, through his speculations of what might lie beyond the pleasure principle, Freud reestablishes them within a representational schema by invoking a simple opposition between them as competing routes to pleasure. The second synthesis grounds representation and its principles of identity, opposition, analogy, and resemblance; it continues to borrow from these and is demonstrated to be their ground through its borrowings.<sup>9</sup>

### The Third Synthesis of the Eternal Return

Time's third synthesis relates to the second in the same way that systems of simulacra relate to the simulations they engender. The pure past's in-itself, which is "a correlate of representation" and serves as representation's ground, is "a kind of 'effect,' like an optical effect, or rather the erotic effect of memory itself," and it is generated by a third synthesis "which denounces the illusion" (*DR* 88). The ground is a transcendental illusion, a semblance of hidden identity arising from a groundlessness of difference. This groundlessness is incompatible with an ego or subject—it refers instead to an "aborted cogito" (110) or "a Cogito for a dissolved self" (xxi). Yet it is not incompatible with thought, understood as a forceful event exceeding the subject and expressing time's unchanging structure. Time's third synthesis, Deleuze holds, introduces time into thought—and, indeed, introduces time as the force of thought—at the cost of the subject's dissolution. In contrast, the second synthesis, whose repetition constitutes spiritual life, "introduces movement into the soul rather than time into thought" (88). As the for-itself of difference, "repetition in the eternal return is the highest thought" (243), but only because it is also "that which is most opposed to thought. [. . .] With the identical, we think with all our force, but without producing the least thought: with the different, by contrast, do we not have the highest thought, but also that which cannot be thought?" (226). All this requires what *Nietzsche and Philosophy* called a new image of thought and what *Difference and Repetition* calls "a thought without Image" (132). In both cases, thought is an event that affirms eternal return.<sup>10</sup>

Kant's critique of the Cartesian cogito (*DR* 83–84) demonstrates how time enters thought and dissolves the subject. Descartes's "I think, therefore I am" is incomplete, Kant argues, because the conclusion "I am" affirms only an undetermined existence that cannot be further specified: My apprehension of thinking in me secures only the indubitableness of my existence—or even simply *an* existence—but apprehension cannot ground a judgment, in this case that "I am a thinking thing." This judgment, which is neither an apprehension nor an intuition but a representation, requires a sensible manifold to be organized by time, which is the empty a priori form in which the determinable is determinable. In short, I can be determined only in time, only as a temporal being. But the result is a split between the empirical and temporal existence of a self that must be grasped as a passive phenomenon—since all phenomena, for Kant, fall under the a

priori rules of causality that determine them as effects of prior causes—and a spontaneous and active force of thinking that this self represents to itself as what makes possible its existence. Thinking relates to an I, but this I is an Other to the empirical self.

The consequences of this are extreme: my undetermined existence can be determined only *within time* as the existence of a phenomenon, of a passive, receptive, phenomenal subject *appearing within time*. As a result, the spontaneity of which I am conscious in the “I think” cannot be understood as the attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being, but only as the affection of a passive self which experiences its own thought—its own intelligence, that by virtue of which it can say *I*—being exercised in it and upon it but not by it. Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: *I* is an other [*autre*], or the paradox of inner sense. The activity of thought applies to a receptive being, to a passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it, which experiences its effect rather than initiates it, and which lives it like an Other [*Autre*] within itself. (86)<sup>11</sup>

Kant, of course, attempts to reunify the self by associating this thinking with a transcendental subject whose active syntheses of the sensible manifold are the conditions for judgment and knowledge. The subject, Deleuze says, undergoes a “practical resurrection” (87), as does God, since “God survives as long as the I enjoys a subsistence, a simplicity and an identity which express the entirety of its resemblance to the divine” (86). Nevertheless, this argument proves only that the transcendental unity of the “I think” must always accompany our representations, making it a condition of possible but not real experience. Furthermore, the required division between the active transcendental subject carrying out all syntheses and the passive and receptive empirical self without synthesis cannot be sustained once the passive syntheses of habit and memory—which, independently of the understanding, constitute the erotically tinged sensations the subject receives and the reflective categories it applies to them—are admitted (87).<sup>12</sup> The split is thereby irreparable. Transcendental philosophy’s “greatest initiative” is its introduction of time into thought, but “this pure and empty form [of time] in turn signifies indissolubly the death of God, the fractured I and the passive self” (87). Strictly speaking, the third synthesis is not even passive since it no longer relates to a passive self but to an aborted cogito.

It is better understood as being neither active nor passive but impassive, a static form that can neither act nor be acted upon.<sup>13</sup>

The pure form of the third synthesis is a “time out of joint” that is no longer cardinal but ordinal: “The joint, *cardo*, is what ensures the subordination of time to those properly cardinal points through which pass the periodic movements which it measures (time, number of the movement, for the soul as much as for the world). By contrast, time out of joint [. . .] ceases to be cardinal and becomes ordinal, a pure *order* of time” (*DR* 88). As discussed earlier in respect to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, cardinal number (1, 2, 3) relates to extensive quantities and thus, in this case, to a spatialized conception of time that treats it as the measure movement and change, while ordinal number (1st, 2nd, 3rd) concerns an order of rank and so intensive differences in quantity that involve more or less but not how much. Here, Deleuze states, non-metric quantitative difference manifests itself in the synthesis of time’s dimensions: “We may define the order of time as this purely formal distribution of the unequal in the function of a caesura. We can then distinguish a more or less extensive past and a future in inverse proportion, but the future and the past here are not empirical and dynamic determinations of time: they are formal and fixed characteristics which follow *a priori* from the order of time, as though they comprised a static synthesis of time” (89). Deleuze refers here to Hölderlin, for whom the inequality of past and future distributed on each side of the present understood as a caesura—a pause or breathing point within the rhythmic division of a melody; but also, for Deleuze, “the caesura is exactly the point at which the fracture [in the I] appears” (89)—precludes the possibility of time being “rhymed,” because “beginning and end no longer coincide” (89). Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, however, offers perhaps a better image—and one Deleuze subsequently invokes (298)—when describing the eternal return in terms of a gateway, inscribed as “Moment,” from which two infinite paths of past and future extend and at which they meet and “offend each other face to face” (Nietzsche 1966, “On the Vision and the Riddle,” §2). Zarathustra asks whether this contradiction at the gateway is eternal, and admonishes his interlocutor, the dwarf representing the Spirit of Gravity, for suggesting that time’s circularity, through which its beginning and end coincide, ensures it is not. If the eternal return resolves time’s internal contradiction, it is because it repeats not simply events in time, but the gateway itself.

“Behold,” I continued, “this moment! From this gateway, Moment, a long, eternal lane leads *backward*: behind us lies an

eternity. Must not whatever *can* walk have walked on this lane before? Must not whatever *can* happen have happened, have been done, have passed by before? And if everything has been there before—what do you think, dwarf, of this moment? Must not this gateway too have been there before? And are not all things knotted together so firmly that this moment draws after it *all* that is to come? Therefore—itsself too? For whatever *can* walk—in this long lane out *there* too, it *must* walk once more.” (“On the Vision and the Riddle,” §2)

If the Moment itself returns, if it is not simply a present instant dividing past and future but also past and future itself, then it is no longer a marker on a temporal continuum; rather, it is *untimely*. The Moment stitches together time's dimensions by moving time out of joint. The contradiction between past and future is then resolved by an affirmation of their divergence. The third synthesis, as a static order of time, forms a straight line, but unlike the line of contracted instants of the Humean synthesis, this Nietzschean synthesis is a “straight-line labyrinth which is, as Borges says, ‘invisible, incessant’” (*DR* 111). It undoes any circle of time that would return identity, including that of the second synthesis, but as a disjointed, labyrinthine straight line, it also “reconstitutes an eternally decentred circle” (115).

The third synthesis constitutes this decentered circle because it is not only a static order without empirical content or ground but also “defined [. . .] by a totality and a series” (*DR* 89). Totality concerns the caesura “determined in the image of a unique and tremendous event, an act which is adequate to time as a whole” (89); this act, in turn, “creates the possibility of a temporal series” (89) that gives sense to time's dimensions as they are ordered in the third synthesis. The series expresses a becoming that is not a movement or change in time but an intensive transmutation, “a strange leap on the spot or vicious circle” (161).<sup>14</sup> In it, the past “is always a time at which the imagined act is supposed ‘too big for me’” (89), while the present, the caesura, is the time “of metamorphosis, a becoming-equal to the act and a doubling of the self, and the projection of an ideal self in the image of the act” (89). But the future, where the act that defines all of time is realized, “signifies that the event and the act possess a secret coherence which excludes that of the self; that they turn back against the self which has become their equal and smash it to pieces, as though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth: what the self has become equal to is the unequal in

itself" (89–90). The becoming culminates, then, with the self's dissolution and destruction. Deleuze associates this tripartite series with the stories of Hamlet and Oedipus (*DR* 88–90, 92). But it can also be associated with the act of affirming eternal return, which for Nietzsche turns every "what was" into "thus I willed it," and from there into "thus I will its eternal return." This double affirmation is initially too great for the subject of *ressentiment*, but in becoming equal to it, the subject overcomes itself. Affirmation does not expunge past suffering but instead demolishes the subject whose *ressentiment* defined it in relation to past injuries. This subject is nothing more than a nihilistic fiction created by *ressentiment's* separation of the doer from the deed (see Nietzsche 1967, 1.13). The irony of Nietzsche's formulation is that no "I" wills the eternal return. It is rather the will to power, which, in willing, destroys unity and affirms difference. The conventional circle that appears in the way the past is seemingly remarked by the subject willing the eternal return gives way to "a constantly decentred, continually tortuous circle which revolves only around the unequal" (*DR* 55).

Thanatos is this becoming's unconscious correlate. Whereas the second synthesis, associated with Eros, concerns the phallic prohibition that represses erotic drives but only to channel them into a repetition that grounds the self in the pure past, the third synthesis invokes a Nietzschean active destruction, symbolized by the Oedipal murder, which goes beyond the ego and its reality principle to erect the superego. Freud holds that while the superego can absorb renounced aggressions to intensify feelings of guilt, it still requires an unrenounced "first quantum of aggressiveness with which the super-ego was endowed" (Freud 1994, 56). He further argues that while this unrenounced aggression could conceivably come from the father figure internalized through the superego, the child is the more plausible source, which explains why children often develop strong superegos without experiencing strict upbringings (56–57). This leads Freud to claim that civilization must originate from a real primal patricide, since conscience and guilt must be founded on an aggression that was acted out rather than denied (57–59). Freud's errors, Deleuze maintains, are his insistence on the reality of childhood and other events, which Freud deems necessary for psychoanalysis to claim scientific rigor (see Freud, 1966, 350), and his reduction of death to a personal and material model where it "has only an extrinsic, scientific and objective definition" (*DR* 111) as the simple opposite to life. Here, Deleuze introduces Blanchot's idea of an impersonal death that "refers to the state of free differences when they are no longer subject to the form imposed upon them by an I or an ego, when they assume a shape which excludes

*my* own coherence no less than that of any identity whatsoever. There is always a ‘one dies’ more profound than ‘I die’” (113).

Impersonal death excludes the personal form of the narcissistic ego, which emerges in the second synthesis from the interplay between “the essentially lost character of virtual objects and the essentially disguised character of real objects” (*DR* 110). This interplay “is inseparable not only from a constitutive wound [caused by phallic prohibition] but from the disguises and displacements which are woven from one side to the other” (110) as the subject seeks objects for its desire. The narcissistic ego is a passive ego formed by the cathexis of libido drives onto the self that lies at the heart of the ego’s reality principle: as Freud argues—and this is how primary narcissism undercuts his initial opposition between the id and the ego—self-preservative ego drives are the product of self-love. But this passive ego apprehends an internal activity of desire in the way libido drives are perpetually displaced in relation to virtual phantasy objects and perpetually disguised in relation to real objects (110). This is the psychoanalytic correlate of the Kantian empirical subject experiencing the spontaneity of its thinking as an auto-affection it does not author. This activity “must be *thought*” (110), and thus “the narcissistic ego is related to the form of an I which operates upon it as an ‘Other’ [*Autre*]” (110). This Other is not a transcendental subject: It is Thanatos. For Freud, Thanatos engenders thinking by desexualizing and sublimating erotic drives into a new force. But this is the thinking of a subject. In contrast, Deleuze insists “that Thanatos is completely indistinguishable from the desexualisation of Eros, with the resultant formation of that neutral and displaceable energy of which Freud speaks. This energy does not serve Thanatos, it constitutes him” (113). In other words, Thanatos does not give rise to thought as a separate force; rather, it is indistinguishable from thought. It is constituted in a forceful act by which it tears itself and is torn away from Eros, thereby exceeding and splitting the subject. “It is not a question of acquiring thought, nor of exercising it as though it were innate, but of engendering the act of thinking within thought itself, perhaps under the influence of a violence which causes the reflux of libido on to the narcissistic ego, and in the same movement both extracting Thanatos from Eros and abstracting time from all content in order to separate out the pure form. There is an experience of death which corresponds to this third synthesis” (114). Thought expresses the same structure of free differences as found in both Thanatos and the pure form of time.

## Systems of Simulacra and the Production of Difference

This unconscious force of thought achieves the same transmutation associated with the eternal return—and of course it is the *thought* of eternal return that transmutes the self—such that “the present is no more than an actor, an author, an agent destined to be effaced; while the past is no more than a condition operating by default” (*DR* 94). The narcissistic ego, defined by the wound from its pure past, is the default condition for an overcoming that thinks and affirms eternal return. Yet the act of overcoming initially appears too great for the wounded ego to carry out. The performance of the act thus requires the consolidation of the ego in relation to an ego ideal that makes it equal to the task at hand (110, 115). But this moment of unity is only a simulation engendered by the eternal return. Deleuze thus argues that the eternal return concerns only the future, whose openness it secures by demolishing the past that would condition it and the agent who would impose a telos or destiny on it through expectation. It thereby serves as the guarantor of novelty, of the possibility of extracting differences from even the most mechanical and stereotypical repetitions, and of these differences being more than the indifferent differences of representation’s purely negative explanation of repetition. In short, it is the guarantor of the production of difference by difference. The eternal return gives repetition the superior, “positive” principle it demands by “making it the thought and the production of the ‘absolutely different’; making it so that repetition is, for itself, difference in itself” (94).

The system of simulacra engendered by the eternal return “must be constituted on the basis of two or more series, each series being defined by the differences between the terms which compose it” (*DR* 117). These series “communicate under the impulse of a force of some kind [. . .] constituting differences between differences within the system” (117). These “differences between differences” are second-order differences that “play the role of the ‘differenciator’—in other words, they relate the first-degree differences to one another” (117). The differenciator is a “dark precursor which ensures the communication of peripheral series” (119) and an “object = x” that circulates in the series without being an identity for them because it has no identity of its own. If psychic experience is structured like a language, Deleuze holds, it is because in both systems this precursor has the paradoxical status of an “esoteric word” that states its own sense by representing itself and its sense as nonsense (122–23), again precluding an identity or fixed

meaning being assigned to it. This differentiator, dark precursor, esoteric word, or object =  $x$  is difference in itself. Its role, and indeed the entire system, is explained in Spinozist terms of expression: “The trinity complication—explication—implication accounts for the totality of the system—in other words, the chaos which contains all, the divergent series which lead out and back in, and the differentiator which relates them to one another” (123). The communication of series through the differentiator gives rise to the larval subjects and passive selves that carry out time’s first passive syntheses (118–19).

The third synthesis and its dark precursor appear quite close to the second synthesis and its phallus. Like the differentiator, the phallus is an object =  $x$  circulating through series—in its case series of real and virtual objects—while having no identity itself. But whereas the repetitions of the second synthesis play out “the same life” on different levels, those of the third synthesis express impossibility: “each series tells a story: not different points of view on the same story, like the different points of view on the town we find in Leibniz, but completely distinct stories which unfold simultaneously” (*DR* 123). In both syntheses, too, “the essential point is the simultaneity and contemporaneity of all the divergent series, the fact that all coexist” (124). But Deleuze holds that from the coupling of heterogeneous series in the third synthesis “is derived an *internal resonance* within the system, and from which in turn is derived a *forced movement* the amplitude of which exceeds that of the basic series themselves” (117). That is, the third synthesis produces an *intensification* that is absent from the second. Moreover, “Eros designates the specific state of internal resonance which results; and the death instinct amounts to the forced movement whose psychic amplitude exceeds that of the resonating series themselves” (118). In other words, Thanatos is the intensifier, and consequently, “Thanatos stands for a synthesis of time quite unlike that of Eros” (113).

Yet while being irreducibly different syntheses, the second synthesis finds its conditions in the third, as the third synthesis of difference by difference engenders the illusions of identity and resemblance that the second synthesis organizes and grounds: “the same and the similar are only an effect of the operation of systems subject to eternal return. By this means, an identity would be found to be necessarily projected, or rather retrojected, on to the originary difference and a resemblance interiorised within the divergent series” (*DR* 126). The difference between the syntheses is therefore not of type or degree but perspective: The second synthesis forms from the perspectival illusions that the third synthesis generates, illusions that allow the dark

precursor, difference in itself, to appear as a mysterious and unrepresentable ground for differences taken up by representation: “It is under the same conditions that the in-itself of difference is hidden, and that difference falls into the categories of representation” (117). The second synthesis becomes a reflection on difference that inverts its image, articulating a ground that, while heterogeneous and withdrawn, still borrows from and is formed in the image of what it grounds. The two syntheses irreconcilable in the same way as Hegelian opposition and Nietzschean difference. There can be no dialectic between them, no way for Eros and Thanatos to “be combined or made to alternate within the same ‘synthesis’” (113).

Systems of simulacra are rooted in the communication between their series. A sign is produced that “flashes across the intervals when a communication takes place between disparates” (*DR* 20), and this sign expresses both a “productive dissymmetry” and what “tends to cancel” this dissymmetry (20). The sign implies “an internal difference” (20) that ensures that whatever the seeming proximity or resemblance between the system’s series, they are separated by the greatest chasm. In this regard, “the important thing is not that the difference [between series] be large or small, and ultimately always small in relation to a greater resemblance. The important thing, for the in-itself, is that the difference, whether large or small, be internal” (120–21). The sign of the third synthesis is the will to power, “the flashing world of metamorphoses, of communicating intensities, differences of differences” (243); it is the intensifier of difference. But the eternal return “is the being of this world” (243). Beyond the physical, organic repetition of the first synthesis and the spiritual repetition of the second lies the eternal return as “an *ontological* repetition” (293). The eternal return, as an ontology of becoming, is also an ontology of *sense*. While the will to power expresses the sense of the system it flashes across, the eternal return expresses a univocal sense that underlies all systems of simulacra and allows them to “make sense.” The in-itself of difference thus finds its for-itself in the eternal return.

The eternal return has no other sense but this: the absence of any assignable origin—in other words, the assignation of difference as the origin, which then relates different to different in order to make it (or them) return as such. In this sense, the eternal return is indeed the consequence of a difference which is originary, pure, synthetic and in-itself (which Nietzsche called will to power). If difference is the in-itself, then repetition in the eternal return is the for-itself of difference. (125)



## Chapter 10

### Thought, Ideas, and the Actualization of the Virtual

Affirming the thought of eternal return, as the thought of difference in itself, breaks the model of thought associated with the subject and linked to judgment, knowledge, and recognition. Thinking is now an ontological rather than a psychological activity, expressing an ontological sense that constitutes the thinking and subjectivity normally associated with these terms and upon which the traditional model of thought relies. This ontological thought demands as its correlate “a thought without Image” (*DR* 132)—a thought that is without any model because it has the structure of a simulacrum.

The traditional image of thought is a humanist and anthropological image. Its sense is encapsulated in its postulates of “good sense” and “common sense” (*DR* 132–35). The first assumes thought’s good nature in seeking knowledge and the equal capacity for thinking in all humans. Its most common expression is the assertion that “everybody knows” or “no one can deny” certain basic facts of the matter. Good sense presupposes that quantities can be compared in terms of equality and inequality, and qualities can be compared in terms of resemblance and dissimilarity (266). Through sedentary distribution and repartition—“‘on the one hand’ and ‘on the other hand’ are the characteristic formulae of its false profundity and platitude” (224)—it “tends to banish difference from the distributed” (224). The measure of good sense is one’s ability to make good predictions about the future (225). Common sense complements good sense by assuming the harmonious exercise of different cognitive faculties on the selfsame object that thought “re-cognizes,” so that it is the same object that is seen, touched, remembered, and so forth (133). It presupposes the thinking subject and “its

subjective concomitants: memory, recognition and self-consciousness" (266). Good sense's forward orientation and common sense's enduring subject and object both rely on habit's synthesis of time and its static line going from past to present to future (225–26). Together, common sense and good sense "constitute the two halves of the *doxa*" (134) or "the orthodoxy" (226) that philosophy traditionally upholds, allowing philosophy to "claim innocence" (130) and align itself with pre-philosophical public opinion even while it "refuses every particular *doxa*" (134). And yet, in truth, "'everybody' knows very well that in fact men think rarely, and more often under the impulse of a shock than in the excitement of a taste for thinking" (132).<sup>1</sup>

The traditional image further entails "taking error to be the sole 'negative' of thought" (*DR* 148). If thinking has a good nature and everyone is naturally inclined both to think and to seek truth, then error expresses thought's failure to function properly. Nevertheless, Deleuze argues, traditional philosophy's examples of error, such as greeting Theodorus when Theaetetus enters, or declaring  $7 + 5 = 13$ , "refer to thoroughly artificial or puerile situations, and offer a grotesque image of thought because they relate it to very simple questions to which one can and must respond by independent propositions. Error acquires sense only once the play of thought ceases to be speculative and becomes a kind of radio quiz" (150). Finding and correcting errors in addition or recognition hardly amounts to thinking.

Deleuze calls all this a "dogmatic" and "moral" image of thought—moral because "what is recognised is not only an object but also the values attached to an object" (*DR* 135). He calls for a "radical critique of this Image [. . . to] discover its authentic repetition in a thought without Image, even at the cost of the greatest destructions and the greatest demoralisations, and a philosophical obstinacy with no ally but paradox, one which would have to renounce both the form of representation and the element of common sense" (132). This task of critique and discovery entails a rethinking—along the lines of difference, repetition, and paradox (what is *against doxa*)—of thought's origins and development, offering new portrayals of what gives rise to thought, the operation it instigates in the faculties, and the structure of Ideas that elaborate it. Critique results in the discovery of "the new," which, "with its power of beginning and beginning again, remains forever new" (136), the new here being another word for difference (136). Hence, "the conditions of a true critique and a true creation are the same" (139), and "to think is to create—there is no other creation—but to create is first of all to engender 'thinking' in thought" (147).

## Thought, Encounter, and the Transcendent Exercise of the Faculties

*The Critique of Pure Reason* opens by declaring that knowledge begins with experience, its faculty being awakened to action by objects affecting the senses, “but though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience” (Kant 1965, B1). This leads Kant to explore the *a priori* operation of the faculties to condition the reception, recognition, and organization of experience into a system of knowledge. In contrast, Deleuze states: “Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental *encounter*. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whatever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition” (DR 139).

Within what is the recognized, Deleuze contends, we encounter something that “is imperceptible precisely from the point of view of recognition—in other words, from the point of view of an empirical exercise of the senses in which sensibility grasps only that which also could be grasped by other faculties, and is related within the context of a common sense to an object which also must be apprehended by other faculties” (DR 140). It can be sensed but not perceived, and so cannot be imagined, remembered, or conceptualized. Plato proceeds along apparently similar lines when posing the paradox of contrary qualities appearing in the same sensible object: “Whereas a finger always calls for recognition and is never more than a finger, that which is hard is never hard without also being soft, since it is inseparable from a becoming or a relation which includes the opposite within it (the same is true of the large and the small, the one and the many)” (141). Plato uses this paradox to spur reminiscence of a pure past, leading the soul to its connection, outside chronological time, to eternal Ideas. But reminiscence, pace its role in time’s second synthesis, “only appears to break with the recognition model when in fact it is content to complicate the schema” (141). It “confuses the being of the past with a past being, and since it is unable to assign an empirical moment at which this past was present, it invokes an original or mythical present” (142), thereby offering recognition a ground.

Deleuze contends that by focusing on contrary qualities, Plato domesticates the encounter by treating qualitative sensible being—*aisthēton*, which

Plato opposes to *noēton*, or intelligible being—with “the being *of* the sensible,” or *aisthēteon* (*DR* 139–42). The being *of* the sensible “is not a quality but a sign” (140). It is “intensity [. . .] where different relates to different” (266)—that is, it is “pure difference in itself” (144), a differentiator of difference and a dark precursor that gives structure and sense to a system of differences. In contrast, “qualitative contrariety is only the reflection of the intense, a reflection which betrays it by explicating it in extensity [that is, in extended space and time]” (236). Thinking is engendered by an encounter not with contrariety, nor even contradiction, but with “difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity” (57). And yet “the expression ‘difference in intensity’ is a tautology” (222) since intensity as such is the in-itself of difference.

For Deleuze, the encounter initiates a “disjointed, superior or transcendent exercise” (*DR* 143) of the faculties. In contrast, as set out in his earlier Kant book, “the so-called transcendental method is always the determination of an *immanent* employment of reason, conforming to one of its interests” (*KCP*, 36). For Kant, an immanent employment of reason makes possible the empirical as opposed to the transcendental exercise of the faculties of sensibility, imagination, and understanding within a model of recognition. Conversely, a transcendental as opposed to empirical employment or exercise of the understanding involves the understanding claiming to grasp things in themselves, while a transcendent as opposed to immanent employment of reason involves reason claiming to be not merely regulative but constitutive of and applying directly to objects that cannot be given in experience (God, Self, and World). With a transcendental exercise of empirical faculties meant to act only upon objects of possible experience or a transcendent exercise of reason meant only to regulate the employment of empirical faculties in accordance with a legitimate end, then, the faculty in question oversteps the boundaries that limit knowledge to the sphere of phenomena (24–26). In their proper use, then, the faculties are employed so as to address themselves only to sensible intuition and to provide a priori necessity to the constitution and organization of experience, resulting in objects of common sense that are perceived, imagined, remembered, and so forth.

“Despite the fact that it has become discredited today,” Deleuze states, “the doctrine of the faculties is an entirely necessary component of the system of philosophy” (*DR* 143). Deleuze’s concern in this regard “is not to establish such a doctrine,” by, for example, identifying and expounding each separate faculty, but “only to determine the nature of its [the doctrine’s] requirements” (144). Contra Kant, a transcendent exercise “in no

way means that the faculty addresses itself to objects outside the world but, on the contrary, that it grasps that in the world which concerns it exclusively and brings it into the world” (143). The faculty, in other words, addresses itself in its transcendent exercise to the immanent encounter with intensity. The doctrine of the faculties requires that this encounter pushes each faculty to its limit.

Each faculty must be borne to the extreme point of its dissolution, at which it falls prey to triple violence: the violence of that which forces it to be exercised, of that which it is forced to grasp and which it alone is able to grasp, yet also that of the ungraspable (from the point of view of its empirical exercise). This is the threefold limit of the final power. Each faculty discovers at this point its own unique passion—in other words, its radical difference and its eternal repetition, its differential and repeating element along with the instantaneous engendering of its action and the eternal replay of its object, its manner of coming into the world already repeating. (143)

The notion of faculty is used expansively here. Just as something encountered within sensibility forces the faculty of sensibility to grapple with an imperceptible that must be sensed, so too there is an imagining (*imaginandum*) or a being of appearances (*phantasteon*) that pushes the faculty of imagination toward what is impossible to imagine yet must be imagined, and an expression within what is said (*loquendum*) that pushes the faculty of speech toward what is silent yet must be spoken (143–44). There is a monstrosity that is an object for vitality but transcends it, an anarchy that is a transcendent object for sociability, and such is the case “even for faculties yet to be discovered, whose existence is not yet suspected” (143). Paradox places each faculty “before its incomparable: thought before the unthinkable which it alone is nevertheless capable of thinking; memory before the forgotten which is also its immemorial; sensibility before the imperceptible which is indistinguishable from its intensive” (227). All this makes Kant’s transcendental approach, developed only with regards to the limited number of faculties applicable to the paradigm of a common sense, “answerable to a superior empiricism which alone is capable of exploring its domain and its regions” (143), as each faculty finds the intensity that exceeds and dissolves it within the empirical. This superior empiricism is framed by a transcendental reflection that, pace Deleuze’s earlier discussion in *Coldness*

and *Cruelty*, moves from the empirical to its foundation in a second-order principle that submits the empirical to principles, and further to an absolute groundlessness from which this foundation as a ground emerges. The resulting “transcendental empiricism is the only way to avoid tracing the transcendental from the outlines of the empirical” (144)—the only way, that is, to avoid tracing the ground in the image of what it is grounding. The ground must be thought in relation not to what it grounds but to an unconditioned groundlessness: difference in itself.

Deleuze contends that “on the path which leads to that which is to be thought, all begins with sensibility” (*DR* 144), because “what forces sensation and that which can only be sensed are one and the same thing, whereas in other cases [of a faculty encountering what pushes it to its limit] the two instances are distinct” (144–45). What is raised in each faculty, however, through either the primary encounter in sensibility or the derivative encounters involving other faculties, is a violence. This violence, which is “difference in intensity, disparity in the phantasm, dissemblance in the form of time, the differential in thought” (145), carries each disjointed faculty to its limit, and each faculty communicates the violence of its encounter to the others. Though this communication between faculties might seem to imply a common sense, “neither the order nor the series implies any collaboration with regard to the form of a supposed same object or to a subjective unity in the nature of an ‘I think’” (145). Any harmony among the faculties “can appear only in the form of a *discordant harmony*, since each communicates to the other only the violence which confronts it with its own difference and its divergence from the others” (146). Kant provides an example with the relation between imagination and reason in the encounter with the sublime (146), where reason’s demand to unite the immensity of the sensible world into a Whole forces imagination to confront its limits but also gives it a “suprasensible destination” (*KCP* 50–52). More generally, discordant harmony indicates “a point at which thinking, speaking, imagining, feeling, etc., are one and the same thing, but that *thing* affirms only the divergence of the faculties in their transcendent exercise. It is a question, therefore, not of a common sense but, on the contrary, of a ‘para-sense’ (in the sense that paradox is also the contrary of good sense)” (*DR* 194).

### Virtual Ideas and Their Actualization

The violence communicated across disparate faculties forms a milieu for Ideas (*DR* 146). Platonic Ideas are eternal forms that serve as models for

the empirical objects that resemble them. Linked to reminiscence, they are part and parcel of a commonsense view of objects of experience, even if, for Plato, they are discerned only in contemplation. Kantian Ideas are “pure concepts of reason” that “determine according to principles how understanding is to be employed in dealing with experience in its totality” (Kant 1965, A321/B378). They arise when reason, which “does not really generate any concept,” is able “to *free* a concept of *understanding* from the unavoidable limitations of possible experience, and so to endeavour to extend it beyond the limits of the empirical,” in accordance with “the principle that if *the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and consequently the absolutely unconditioned* (through which alone the conditioned has been possible) *is also given*” (A409/B435–36). Ideas transcend the categories, which are pure (that is, formal and empty) concepts of the understanding applicable only to objects of possible experience (A327/B383), and extend them into a unity of experience that cannot be given (“for the concept of the absolute totality of conditions is not applicable in any experience, since no experience is unconditioned” [A326/B383]). This makes Kantian Ideas—or at any rate those belonging to pure speculative rather than practical reason (A327–28/B384)—not eternal identities but perpetual problems: “The absolute whole of all appearances—we might thus say—*is only an idea*; since we can never represent it in an image, it remains a *problem* to which there is no solution” (A328/B384; see A328–29/B384–86). Ideas, Kant maintains, have a regulative but not a constitutive function: they govern the categories’ employment with respect to objects of possible experience and allow understanding to proceed toward its unconditioned conditions, but they constitute nothing themselves and thus perform a merely external conditioning.<sup>2</sup>

For Deleuze, because Ideas are responses to the violent encounter with a difference that cannot be recognized or represented but only sensed, “the exploration of Ideas and the elevation of each faculty to its transcendent exercise amounts to the same thing” (*DR* 164). Ideas are differential, but they cannot copy or represent the unrepresentable difference of the encounter, and so they can only be a simulacrum of a simulacrum, but this is how they compel a transcendent exercise that goes beyond the sensible. Whereas Kant associates Ideas only with pure reason’s relation to the understanding, whose rules it helps to extend and unify, Deleuze contends that “Ideas occur throughout the faculties and concern them all. [. . .] Ideas correspond in turn to each of the faculties and are not the exclusive object of any one in particular, not even of thought” (193). Deleuze further maintains that “Ideas are problems, but problems only furnish the conditions under which the faculties attain their superior exercise” (146). Ideas as problems are capable

of “solutions,” but solutions never eliminate the problematics from which they arise (168). They are regulative, but “‘regulative’ means ‘problematic’” (168), and their regulative character does not mean Ideas are not also constitutive. As Deleuze argues in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, transcendental philosophy can grasp the conditions of real experience only by providing a genetic account of this experience, meaning that Ideas must do more than condition experience externally. “The reciprocal synthesis of differential relations” that define Ideas must perform “a triple genesis”: of the qualities that differentiate real objects; of time and space, which condition how these objects are given; and of concepts that allow knowledges of these objects to be distinguished (173).

Nevertheless, for all Ideas do to generate and determine real objects and the real relations between them, “the Idea is not the element of knowledge but that of an infinite ‘learning,’ which is of a different nature to knowledge” (*DR* 192). The empiricism of this new doctrine of the faculties and its corresponding notion of Ideas, like the empiricisms Deleuze associates with Hume, Bergson, Nietzsche, and Spinoza, is not epistemologically oriented. Ideas eschew the epistemological question, which is also the question of essence, “What is X?” (188); they have a “necessarily unconscious nature” (192); and they relate to “that fracture in the I” (199) that makes them always the Ideas and thought of another in me (199–200). They are incompatible with common sense and any ideal of knowledge, but that does not leave them mere fictions (192–93). But if Ideas are “the source of the production of real objects” (173), what they constitute is not the objects as such but those aspects that allow these realities to *make sense*. An Idea’s problematic structure “is constituted of structural elements which have no sense themselves, while it constitutes the sense of all that it produces (structure and genesis)” (155); yet it “nevertheless cannot be reduced to sense, since in turn it is also non-sense” (155). “Non-sense” refers not to a meaningless absence of sense, but instead to the paradoxical nature of ontological sense—a notion that will be elaborated more fully in *The Logic of Sense*. The conditions by which Ideas come into being and are actualized are objective, as “Ideas no more than Problems do not exist only in our heads but occur here and there in the production of an actual historical world” (190).<sup>3</sup> But this is an objectivity of sense—and non-sense—that cannot be reduced to an anthropological thesis about the constitution of meaningfulness because it is ontological in nature.

A clue to how Deleuze conceives Ideas being constitutive and not simply regulative is found in Kant’s account of the Idea of philosophy in

his discussion of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method. Having previously demonstrated that every attempt to flesh out determinately the Ideas of Self, World, and God leads reason to dialectical quandaries and illusions, here Kant maintains that no science is possible unless its Idea is realized in a schema whose manifold of separate knowledges and order of parts are “determined *a priori* from the principle defined by its [the Idea’s] end” (Kant 1965, A833/B861). This end, for Kant, is always practical and moral: how one *ought* to live as a free being rather than what there *is* for one to know (A797–804/B825–32). Thus, there is an Idea of philosophy that is “the system of all philosophical knowledge” but that is also only “a mere idea of a possible science which nowhere exists *in concreto*” even though, eventually, we can find “one truth path” to an image of philosophy that most closely matches its archetype (A838/B866). This Idea entails, merely by being thought, a structure that subdivides philosophy in accordance with branches such as the natural and moral, pure and empirical, speculative and practical, transcendental and physiological, etc. (A840–47/B868–75). While Kant describes this organization as architectonic rather than technical, and thus necessary rather than contingent (A833/B861), Deleuze would hold it to be only one possible solution to the problematic Idea of philosophy. Moreover, as a structure of separate branches of knowledge, this solution is a discrete multiplicity of actual and externally related terms, which necessarily refers to a virtual domain of internal or immanent differences and thus to a continuous multiplicity whose actualization constitutes it. The complete determination of this Idea of Philosophy—or indeed any Idea for Deleuze—is thus inseparable from a two-level account of its virtual differential field and the actual distinctions that emerge from it.

To account for how Ideas are internally determined and provide sense for real experience, Deleuze returns to Leibniz’s calculus. Ideas express “an internal problematic objective unity of the undetermined, the determinable and determination” (*DR* 170). Kant attributes these three moments to all concepts, which are undetermined with respect to what is not (analytically) contained within them; determinable in accordance with the law of contradiction regarding opposing predicates that may be attributed to them; and subject to a principle of complete determination in relation to a sum total of possibility that is grounded in the ideal thought of a highest being (Kant 1965, A571–73/B599–601). Deleuze, however, holds that Kant both distributes these moments into the separate Ideas of Self,<sup>4</sup> World, and God,<sup>5</sup> respectively, and treats determinability and determination as extrinsic characteristics of Ideas in their relations to objects of experience and concepts

of understanding, thereby failing to account for the internal genesis of these (170). However, the three moments come together and become constitutive, Deleuze continues, in the differential of calculus understood as an Idea. As noted previously, the differentials  $dx$  and  $dy$  are undetermined in themselves, since, being indefinitely small quantities, they are nothing in relation to the actual  $x$  and  $y$  values of the function to which they refer. Being undetermined in themselves, their determinability “must itself be conceived as pointing towards a principle of reciprocal determination” (171), which is attained through their internal relation in the derivative  $dy/dx$ . Finally, differentials are completely determined where specific values are yielded for the derivative (170–71). The differential thus presents a threefold principle of sufficient reason (171) as against the twofold principle that Deleuze attributes to Leibniz when discussing the application of vice-diction to worlds characterized by convergence and compossibility.

The triple principle also expresses pure elements of quantifiability, quality, and potentiality: The undetermined and quantitatively insignificant  $dx$  defines both fixed quantities of intuition and variable quantities of the understanding by expressing the vanishing point where these are annihilated; the reciprocally determining  $dy/dx$  is not a simple fraction relating fixed quantities but, as an internal qualitative relation, expresses an intrinsic property of the function at a point (the gradient of its tangent line); finally, complete determination corresponds to pure potentiality—or, as will be seen in the next chapter, an intensive power of individuation—that determines the singular points that define entire series, anchoring the effectively determined values of the differential equation and the quantities and qualities that follow therefrom (171–76).<sup>6</sup> Deleuze’s discussion of the calculus here expands on its brief appearance in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, where it describes how the will to power is “added to force as the internal principle of the determination of its quality in a relation ( $x+dx$ ) and as the internal principle of the quantitative determination of this relation itself ( $dy/dx$ )” (NP 51). The earlier work’s association of  $dx$  with qualitative determination and  $dy/dx$  with quantitative determination is obviously different. But the role it assigns to the will to power to determine forces completely in terms of their quantitative difference, qualitative distinctness, and overall sense corresponds to pure potentiality’s role as a principle of complete determination in *Difference and Repetition*.

“An Idea,” Deleuze writes, “is an  $n$ -dimensional, continuous, defined multiplicity” (DR 182). As with Riemann’s original understanding of the term, this multiplicity is defined and measured intrinsically, needing no external

principle of unity; and as with what Deleuze considers Bergson's adaptation of Riemannian manifolds, it is virtual (182–83). This virtuality, however, is not so much a matter of Ideas being positioned within a pure past—indeed, as problematic structures, Ideas are static, though a temporality pertains to their actualization<sup>7</sup>—but rather their being constitutive, unextended yet fully real and embedded in the given, qualitative inasmuch as they cannot be divided without changing nature, and quantitative in the sense of intensive and ordinal number. Physical, biological, social, and other Ideas are structural systems exhibiting these features, and contain undetermined, reciprocally determined and completely determined elements or relations. Epicurean philosophy expounds an Idea of the atom as an indiscernible and indivisible chunk of plenum whose movements are determined by a swerve or *clinamen* that occurs in a time and place smaller than the minimum thinkable time and place—a becoming in intensity. The location of the *clinamen*, though undetermined or unassignable, enables the reciprocal determination of the atoms. Nonetheless, the Idea is incomplete, as Epicurus's atom “still retains too much independence, a shape and an actuality” (184).<sup>8</sup> Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire develops a biological Idea of the animal defined not by its parts but by “ideal relations of reciprocal determination” (185). Althusser's structuralist Marxism explicates a social Idea of differential relations and ideal connections within the conditions of productivity, where “‘the economic’ is never given properly speaking, but rather designates a differential virtuality to be interpreted, always covered over by its forms of actualisation” (186). In each case, structured differential relations give sense to the real objects—visible structures of atoms, fully formed organisms, existing social systems—that refer back to them.

Deleuze's account of the virtual and its actualization draws on a distinction between the verbs *différencier*, which refers to making or becoming different or discrete, and *différentier*, which refers to differentiation as found in the calculus (see *DR*, Translator's Preface, xi–xii). As virtual continuous multiplicities, Ideas are internally determined by differentiation: Their relations are established by infinitely or indefinitely small differences that vice-dict rather than contradict one another (*DR* 189–92). Deleuze contrasts this process to differentiation, which actualizes Ideas by separating—differentiating—their vanishing differences into a discrete multiplicity of extensive quantitative and qualitative differences that can be recognized and represented. In this way, following Kant's definition of the actual (*wirklich*), Ideas become “bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation” (Kant 1965, A218/B265). As virtual multiplicities, Ideas “combine the greatest power of being differentiated with an inability to be differentiated” (*DR*

187). In being actualized into a “solution” to the problem it expresses, the differentiation of an Idea’s differentials remains incomplete, and actual differences can be organized by representation’s principles of identity, opposition, analogy, and resemblance “only in so far as these [actual terms] are cut off from the virtuality which they actualise, and from the movement of their actualisation” (207). Consequently, “the negative appears neither in the process of differentiation nor in the process of differentiation” (207).

The relation between the virtual, problematic, and continuous Idea and its actual, discrete solution is that of “a double series of events which develop on two planes, echoing without resembling each other” (*DR* 189). Actualization repeats the virtual, but the virtual, being a simulacrum, is not an original that can be copied well or badly. Consequently, “actual terms never resemble the virtuality they actualise [*la virtualité qu’ils actualisent*]” (212),<sup>9</sup> and, for this reason, “actualisation or differentiation is always a genuine creation” (212). But actualization also synthesizes and integrates virtual singular points and the differential relations from whose values the points arise (210), so that every real object has virtual and actual halves “without it being the case that the two halves resemble one another. . . . They are unequal odd halves” (209–10). Deleuze employs Leibniz’s example of hearing ocean waves to illustrate how these halves relate and together exceed the terms of representation, using Descartes’s terminology of clarity versus obscurity and distinctness versus confusedness, but challenging the criteria of clarity and distinctness that Descartes uses to validate the truth of ideas and perceptions on the grounds that there is “a difference between the clear and the distinct, not just of degree but in kind” (213).<sup>10</sup> When hearing the waves, we really perceive the sound of each drop crashing against the rest, but these micro-perceptions are distinct yet obscure because no individual perception can be clearly discerned. Integrating these micro-perceptions into the sound that is actually heard, however, yields a clear and discernible sound, but one whose components remain confused rather than cleanly separated, the clarity resulting only from the totality of sounds taken together. Virtual differentials are distinct because they are singular but obscure because, as vanishingly small differences, they are not discernible in their distinctness, while actualized discrete differences are clearly perceived but discerned from a confused or indistinct background of virtual components.<sup>11</sup> Thought moves from virtual vanishing differences to actual distinctions akin to the way Borges’s Pierre Menard creates a new *Don Quixote* from an inchoate backdrop of a confused and vanishing memory of Cervantes’s original.<sup>12</sup> Virtual and actual halves are in this way wrapped together while being wrapped up within real experience.

## Chapter 11

# Dramatization, Individuation, and the Incarnation of Intensity

### The Dramatization of Spatio–Temporal Dynamisms

Differentiation, Deleuze declares, actualizes virtual differential relations and singular points into qualitatively diverse species and quantitatively or numerically distinct parts: “Differentiation is always simultaneously differentiation of species and parts, of qualities and extensities: determination of qualities or determination of species, but also partition or organisation” (*DR* 210). It thereby constitutes the discrete multiplicities organized by representation, but the objects so represented are grasped only abstractly in their external relations. Thus, although it is a positive and creative process, differentiation is also the source of the illusion of the negative.<sup>1</sup> However, aside from engendering only generalities of quantity and quality, differentiation also only expresses the Idea’s pure quantifiability and qualifiability, not its pure potentiality. Moreover, while differentiation determines Ideas in their virtuality and differentiation determines them in their actuality, the combination of differentiation “remains completely indeterminate” (245), since Ideas, being multiplicities, can be determined in many ways. Consequently, the combination of differentiation and differentiation remains insufficient to account for the genesis of real experience.

Deleuze’s argument here again reflects one from *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, where forces in their quantitative difference and qualitative distinctness require an internal element—the will to power—able to determine them from the double point of view of their quantity and quality (*NP* 51). Differentiation, Deleuze contends, similarly remains abstract and incomplete

without an internal element that can determine the quantitative and qualitative multiplicities it unfolds: “Just as there is a difference of difference [the differentiator] which gathers up the different, so there is a differentiation of differentiation which integrates and welds together the differentiated” (*DR* 217). “Beneath the actual qualities and extensities, species and parts,” he proclaims, “there are spatio-temporal dynamisms [. . .] ordinarily hidden by the constituted qualities and extensities” (214). For Kant, dynamic as opposed to mathematical principles concern not the constitution of objects in accordance with the forms of intuition but their relations to one another and the modalities of their existence, all this involving a connection and synthesis of heterogeneous elements that belong together necessarily (Kant 1965, B110, A160–61/B199–200, B201–2). While for Kant this makes the dynamic regulative rather than constitutive, for Deleuze the dynamisms realize Ideas in a way distinct from but indispensable to the differentiation or actualization that constitutes species and parts. Dynamisms reside beneath actualities, but they are not virtual.

Deleuze holds that the dynamisms enact a “dramatization” that “resembles the Kantian schema” (*DI* 99). Kant’s schema are procedures of the transcendental imagination that operate on and create homogeneity between sensible objects of intuition and concepts of the understanding so that they can be brought together (Kant 1965, A137–47/B176–87). Contra Kant, however, these dynamisms do not operate on intuited objects but on the space and time conditioning their appearance. They explicate the space and time undergirding how the internal qualitative relations of reciprocally determined virtual differentials, and the singular points that provide the virtual’s complete determination, exceed themselves to actualize the virtual in an extended multiplicity. In this way, they provide for a concept “a material system beneath all possible representation” (*DI* 98). Dynamisms are “agitations of space, holes of time, pure syntheses of space, direction, and rhythms,” and they establish “directions of development” without which “the most general characteristics of branching, order, and class” that organize actualized multiplicities could not be given (96).<sup>2</sup> Also unlike the schema, the dynamisms operate not on concepts but Ideas—they “dramatise the Idea,” and thereby “determine the actualisation of Ideas” (*DR* 216).<sup>3</sup> In its double determination, “dramatisation is the differentiation of differentiation, at once both qualitative and quantitative” (217). The subjects of such dynamisms are larval subjects,<sup>4</sup> which “are the supports or the patients of the dynamisms” (118) and the only subjects capable of undertaking the “terrible movements” (118) released by the dynamisms.<sup>5</sup>

In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Nietzsche's method of dramatization applies noble and slave personae to the will to power's affirmative and negative becomings to illustrate the thinking and acting that these becomings determine. Kant offers his own example of dramatization with his account of the philosopher, which accompanies his discussion of the determination of the Idea of philosophy discussed earlier. Kant's philosopher is a lawgiver who takes us beyond the merely logical and scholastic concept of philosophy by personifying a living and cosmical concept (*conceptus cosmicus*) formed from philosophy's Idea (Kant 1965, A838–39/B866–67). In this way, noble, slave, and philosopher as dramatic or dramatizing figures each show how their respective Idea is not simply actualized but concretely *lived*. For Deleuze, in expressing a dynamism that “comprises its own power of determining space and time” (218), dramatization fulfills the demands to constitute both time and space while also explicating “the third element of sufficient reason” (221) of Ideas. It is “pre-quantitative and pre-qualitative” (221), and it finds its ground in the difference associated with the (will to) power it dramatically expresses. Dramatization expresses intensity, which, encountered in the sensible, is also the starting point of thought and Ideas.

### Intensity and Intensive Quantity

Intensity, the in-itself of difference, is “the reason of the sensible” (DR 222). Grounding the dynamisms, it determines extended space and time but is also seemingly lost or canceled in this extensity, as differences come to be perceived under the equality of quantities and resemblance of qualities characteristic of good sense (223–28). This cancellation “is a transcendental illusion,” because while “it is entirely true that difference is cancelled qualitatively and in extension,” it is nevertheless the case that “the nature of difference lies neither in the quality by which it is covered nor in the extensity by which it is explicated” (266). Intensity's explication in extensity leads to its apparent cancellation because intensity is primarily a power of implication: Intensity is implicated, first in itself (237), and then in the explicating extensities that it both complicates and unfolds (228). As the Spinozist terminology indicates, intensity replaces substance, involving, explicating, and complicating itself in the world while remaining always within itself—“Difference in the form of intensity remains implicated in itself” (228)—as an immanent cause.

Pace Spinoza and Nietzsche, intensive difference, as a pure potentiality or will to power, is a difference in quantity—it is intensive quantity. As a difference implicated first in itself, “intensive quantity includes the unequal in itself” (*DR* 232). This inequality is “the properly qualitative content of quantity” (222) and “the uncancellable in difference of quantity” (233). It ensures that concrete quantitative differences cannot be equalized except in abstraction. In this sense—and contra Bergson’s claim that “quantity is always nascent quality” (Bergson 1983, 191)—“intensity is an implicated, enveloped, or ‘embryonised’ quantity” and it is “not implicated in quality, for it is only secondarily so” (*DR* 237). Deleuze declares that Bergson’s critique of intensive quantity “seems unconvincing” because Bergson “has [. . .] already attributed to quality everything that belongs to intensive quantities,” thereby “attributing to quality a depth which is precisely that of intensive quantity” (239). While he then repeats the defense from his earlier *Bergsonism* that intensive quantity returns through Bergson’s theorization of differences of degree that account for “the double genesis of quality and extensity” (239), here Deleuze concludes that this theorization of intensity remains limited because “this fundamental differentiation (quality–extensity) can find its reason only in the great synthesis of Memory which allows all the degrees of difference to coexist as degrees of relaxation and contraction” (239). This Memory, being implicated first in itself and subsequently in the actuality that explicates it, might seem to express adequately the three traits of intensive quantities, namely, “the enveloping difference, the enveloped distances, and the unequal in itself which testifies to the existence of a natural ‘remainder’ which provides the material for a change of nature” (238). Nevertheless, as with the pure past’s role in time’s second synthesis, the synthesis of Memory ends up serving as extensity’s ground (230).

Intensive quantity is also “energy in general” (*DR* 240). However, although it features this way in discussions of thermodynamics and entropy, and while the energetics of Carnot, Curie, and others “defined a particular energy by the combination of two factors, one *intensive* and one *extensive*” (223), intensive quantity “is a transcendental principle, not a scientific concept” (241). Indeed, the scientific treatment of intensity gives “a final satisfaction to good sense” (224) and ultimately portrays “intensive quantity as a badly grounded empirical concept, an impure mixture of a sensible quality and extensity, or even of a physical quality and an extensive quantity” (223). Against this, and pace the discussion of the function of transcendental principles in *Coldness and Cruelty*, intensive quantity “does not govern any domain but gives the domain to be governed to a given empirical principle;

it accounts for the subjection of a domain to a principle” (241). Intensive quantity fulfills this role of submitting such a domain—the latter being “a qualified and extended partial system” (241)—to empirical principles by constituting the shape of the domain’s extensity.

Intensive quantity involves ordinal number, which is “originally intensive and vectorial” (*DR* 232) and which denies the homogeneity and bare repetition of cardinal numbers that mark extended distances. Indeed, cardinal numbers are really explicated ordinal numbers (232). Distance, however, still pertains to ordinality: Ordinal numbers imply “an irreducible notion of distance—the distances implicated in the depth of an intensive *spatium* (ordered differences)” (232–33). The Latin *spatium* designates not only a space, expanse, or distance, but also a route that returns to itself such as a circuit or racetrack, and an interval of time. Its spatial connotations can be associated with the geometries proposed by Riemann where flatness in smallest parts does not obtain and quantities are “independent of metric determinations” (Riemann 1929, 413); its temporal connotations can be associated with the caesura that orders the unequal distribution of time’s dimensions in Deleuze’s third synthesis of time.<sup>6</sup> And, indeed, Deleuze outlines three spatial syntheses that “repeat the temporal syntheses previously specified” (*DR* 230): First, from within the depth of this intensive *spatium*, a spatial difference in itself in which the smallest distance is also the greatest chasm, is explicated in extensity by habit’s extended line of time; it is then implicated in what explicates it through memory (the Bergsonian synthesis of Memory mentioned above); finally, it announces a “universal ‘ungrounding’” in a third synthesis (230).

“Extensity can emerge from the depths,” Deleuze holds, “only if depth is definable independently of extensity” (*DR* 230). Depth here is the ontological aspect of sensation or perception. It is not an extended length, width, or height, though it is explicated in them. These dimensions, along with the implicated depth, are judged not “by the apparent magnitude of objects, but [. . .] are fundamentally linked to the intensity of the sensation: it is the power of diminution of the intensity experienced that provides a perception of depth (or rather, provides depth to perception)” (230). It is not by an enormous object’s physical size that it dominates our perception, but by how the intensity of our encounter with it informs our perception of its magnitude, this intensity always open to being displaced in another encounter. I stand in awe before a colossal object of nature or humanity until my partner whispers something the intensity of which makes it shrink into insignificance. Encounters with intensity thereby shape and reshape the

extended space and time of our perceptual field, determining the manner in which we perceive objects and the unfolding of the Ideas we bring to bear upon them. Spatio-temporal dynamisms thus reside in the *spatium* (*DI* 97) whose “intensity [. . .] envelops distances, is explicated in extensity, while extensity develops, exteriorises and homogenises these very distances” (*DR* 230). Intensity is the being *of* the sensible that can only be sensed, while depth is the being of perception and “simultaneously the imperceptible and that which can only be perceived” (231). For this reason, “depth is the intensity of being, or vice versa” (231).

### Incarnation and Individuation

Dramatization, grounded in the spatio-temporal dynamisms of intensity’s *spatium* of depth, is both the differentiation of differentiation and the incarnation of the Idea. Now, even in *Difference and Repetition*, actualization and incarnation often appear together and seem interchangeable: Thus by way of its solutions, a virtual problem’s “liaisons or relations are incarnated [*s’incarnent*] in the actual relations which do not resemble them” (*DR* 163); “a multiple ideal connection, a differential *relation*, must be actualised [*doit s’actualiser*] in diverse spatio-temporal *relationships*, at the same time as its *elements* are actually incarnated [*s’incarnent actuellement*] in a variety of *terms* and forms” (183); “when the virtual content of an Idea is actualised [*s’actualise*], the varieties of relation are incarnated [*s’incarnent*] in distinct species while the singular points which correspond to the values of one variety are incarnated in the distinct parts characteristic of this or that species” (206); and so on. Clearly the Idea is both actualized and incarnated. But are these the same process? If the link between incarnation and individualization outlined in Deleuze’s Proust book is brought to bear on the question, the answer seems quite clearly to be that they are distinct. It is worth recalling how Hyppolite distinguishes the actualization and incarnation of Hegel’s Absolute. The Absolute is fully complete and actual in the unity of concept and object within its speculative logic, but in externalizing itself it becomes at once objective through actualization and a living concrete universal through incarnation. The continuing transcendence in Hegel’s philosophy, despite its aspiration to attain immanence and sense, arises from its inability to secure an internal passage between the Absolute’s actuality and its incarnation/actualization in the movement from logic to phenomenology and back. As Deleuze argues in his review, this entails distinct logical and

phenomenological senses of contradiction; and as he maintains in *Difference and Repetition*, Hegel's failure stems from the way "he represents concepts instead of dramatizing Ideas" (10).

For Deleuze, the virtual can be fully determined without any actualization (*DR* 46–47). But it can be actualized only by being incarnated through dramatization, which "inseparably incarnates [*incarne*] the two traits of the Idea, differential relations and corresponding singular points, the latter being actualised [*s'actualisant*] in parts while the former are actualised in the species. [. . . T]he role of dramas is to specify concepts by incarnating the differential relations and singularities of an Idea" (*DR* 217–18). Dramatization/incarnation involves a process of individuation that "always governs actualisation" (251). Individuation is an explication of intensive quantities, and it is "after a fashion (but, as we shall see, only after a fashion) [that] the movement and the categories of differentiation reproduce those of explication" (245). Individuation "takes the form of unilateral distinction" (28), where the individuated distinguishes itself from a ground that does not distinguish itself in turn. In this way, it differs from the reciprocal and complete determination of the virtual's differentiation, as well as the mutual indifference of the virtual's differentiated products.<sup>7</sup> Differentiation cannot explain individuation because "the individual is neither a quality nor an extension[, . . .] neither a qualification nor a partition, neither an organisation nor a determination of species. [. . .] Qualitative or extensive interpretations of individuation remain incapable of providing the reasons why a quality ceases to be general, or why a synthesis of extensity begins here and finishes there" (247). Individuation is independent of and prior to differentiation.

All this may seem like a simple materialist inversion of Hegel, an assertion, against the priority he gives to speculative logic, that the dialectical development of that logic's categories is grounded in the "real individual." And indeed, Deleuze holds: "It is not the individual which is an illusion in relation to the genus of the species, but the species which is an illusion—inevitable and well founded, it is true—in relation to the play of the individual and individuation" (*DR* 250). Yet Deleuze also insists that "the individuating is not the simple individual" (38), whose identity or definition might exceed the species to which it belongs and the parts it comprises but which still remains determinate.<sup>8</sup> Nor is the priority of individuation over actualization a phenomenological assertion of the sensible over the logical, as phenomenology rests on "a fourth common sense, this time grounded upon sensibility as a passive synthesis—one which, even though it constitutes an

Ur-*doxa*, remains no less prisoner of the form of *doxa*” (137). It is, however, an assertion of the primacy of intensity, of the being *of* the sensible, because individuation is intensity’s “essential process” (246) and the reason intensity is “independent of the differentiation” (246).

Individuation is usually considered a final determination of a species’ members through individual differences that divide the species analogously to the way specific differences divide a genus. Deleuze states: “Because there are individuals of different species and individuals of the same species, there is a tendency to believe that individuation is a continuation of the determination of species, albeit of a different kind and proceeding by different means. In fact any confusion between the two processes, any reduction of individuation to a limit or complication of differentiation, compromises the whole of the philosophy of difference” (*DR* 247). Duns Scotus makes these stakes clear by invoking haecceity as a positive individuating difference and treating individuation as the contraction of a thing’s common nature and haecceity into a singular nature, thereby completing a hierarchy of forms. The result, which Duns Scotus intends as a way to protect divine transcendence, is that univocity cannot extend to these individuating differences. Against this, Deleuze maintains:

It is not enough to say that individuation differs in kind from the determination of species. It is not even enough to say this in the manner of Duns Scotus, who was nevertheless not content to analyse the elements of an individual but went as far as the conception of individuation as the “ultimate actuality of form.” We must show not only how individuating difference differs in kind from specific difference [that is, contrariety], but primarily and above all how individuation properly *precedes* matter and form, species and parts, and every other element of the constituted individual. (38)

Univocity demands that “being is related immediately and essentially to individuating factors” that are not “individuals constituted in experience, but that which acts in them as a transcendental principle [. . .] contemporaneous with the process of individuation” (38). This entails “a prior field of individuation within being [that] conditions at once the determination of species and forms, the determination of parts and their individual variations” (38). In short, it requires that intensity’s essential process individuation has its own multiplicity.

The multiplicity of the intensity that gives rise to thought as a milieu for Ideas and carries out the individuation that realizes these Ideas must not be confused with that of Ideas themselves, nor with any virtuality. Deleuze holds: “Ideas are problematic or ‘perplexed’ virtual multiplicities, made up of relations between differential elements. Intensities are implicated multiplicities, ‘implexes’ made up of relations between asymmetrical elements which direct the course of the actualisation of Ideas and determine the cases of solution for problems” (*DR* 244). “Perplexed” refers to “perplication,” which designates how virtual Ideas coexist in such a way that they are clear, in the sense of being fully determined in their virtuality, but obscure, in that they are never fully separated from other Ideas the way actualized entities are distinct and externally related (*DR* 187, 252). “Implex” refers to the way intensities are always implicated, first in themselves and then in the extensities that explicate them. Put differently, the Idea’s vice-dicting differentials, even while being internal differences brought into reciprocally determining internal relations, are not second order differences in themselves that connect impossibles through their difference or in a relation of non-relation. Virtual Ideas and intensive depths are nevertheless both systems of simulacra. There are affinities between differentials and intensities, and between their respective multiplicities, as they engender comparable illusions—that of problems disappearing in solutions and that of intensity being canceled in extensity. For this reason, “the aesthetic of intensities [. . .] develops each of its moments in correspondence with the dialectic of Ideas” (244). But these affinities do not change the order in which intensities, as second order differences, relate disparates in such a way as to diagram the spatio-temporal vectors underpinning the domain of extended and externally related differences, thereby determining the differentiation of differentiation that actualizes Ideas.

The Idea is fully determined virtually by its singular points and the reciprocal synthesis of its differentials:  $dy/dx$ . But it becomes actual through a determination of the effective values of the differentials in their connection to a  $y$  and an  $x$ . Deleuze states: “the intensive factor is a partial derivative or the differential of a composite function” (*DR* 244).<sup>9</sup> Supposing a complex function whose  $x$ ,  $y$ , and  $z$  variables define a curved surface on which each point has an infinity of tangent lines, a partial derivative of that function would fix two of the variables and thereby select one tangent line and determine its slope. The individuating intensive factor “chooses” the line to be actualized from the infinity of tangent lines virtually included in the function. Individuation thus answers the “Who?” question concerning the

Idea's actualization, while Ideas themselves answer the "How?" and "How much?" questions (246), both thereby evading the "What is . . . ?" question of essence. The relationship between differentials and intensities is comparable to that of force and will to power, where "force is what can, will to power is what wills" (*NP* 50). Just as "the will to power [*la volonté de puissance*] cannot be separated from force without falling into metaphysical abstraction" (50), so too "the power [*puissance*] of intensity (depth) is grounded in the potentiality [*potentialité*] of the Idea" (*DR* 244).

The field of individuation is "a prior metastable state" of "disparateness" comprising "at least two orders of magnitude [*grandeur*] or two scales of heterogeneous reality between which potentials [*potentiels*] are distributed" (*DR* 246). These orders are series of pre-individual singularities—pre-individual because individuals follow from them—and the metastable state expresses the Unequal in itself (120, 222–23, 246). Metastability—a term Deleuze adopts from Gilbert Simondon—refers to a system with an energy level capable of engendering dynamic change but whose dissymmetrical structure produces an equilibrium or stasis that bars the release of this energy absent a disturbance significant enough to engender it. Everyday examples of metastability include bowling pins or a ball resting in a hollow of a sloped surface. A minor disturbance would cause the pins to wobble or the ball to be displaced within the hollow, but ultimately each would settle back in place. However, a significant disturbance would cause the pins to fall or the ball to start rolling, discharging the system's energy. Deleuze contends that metastability "implies a fundamental *difference* [. . . that] is like *potential energy*, like a *difference of potential* distributed within certain limits" (*DI*, 87). Individuation is a synthesis of these disparate series that establishes communications between them across an intensive interval that separates and connects them. The system's so-called potential energy plays this integrating role by distributing potentials across the series. Individuated multiplicities are "signal–sign systems" (*DR* 246) that manifest as flashes occurring when connections are made.<sup>10</sup> Such flashes distinguish themselves from a dark background of pre-individual singularities of the depth without this background distinguishing itself in turn. They incarnate a precarious stability of connections or relations able to endure some degree of internal or external disturbance, shaping and stabilizing a spatio–temporal organization that anchors the integration of differentials that actualizes the Idea in species and parts. All this yields an order of reasons of "differentiation–individuation–dramatisation–differentiation" (251): reciprocal and complete determination of vanishing differentials; determination by unilateral distinction; explication

of a material system of space and time; and determinations of “this” and “that” of an actual, discrete multiplicity.

“Nevertheless,” Deleuze maintains, “we have not advanced with regard to the principal difficulty. We invoke a field of individuation or individuating difference as the condition of the organisation and determination of species. However, this field of individuation is posited only formally and in general” (*DR* 251–52). Individuation remains a general process seeming to be “the same” across all intensities and incarnations, so that what makes a person this person seems no different from what makes another person another person, and at best only different in degree from what makes a raindrop this raindrop (252). Deleuze therefore declares: “the individuating difference must not only be conceived within a field of individuation in general, but must itself be conceived as an individual difference” (252). Intensive second order individuating difference must also be a haecceity, a positive difference ensuring that real individuals cannot be fully absorbed into higher orders of identity. It must satisfy the final demand of the principle of sufficient reason: the identity of indiscernibles, “no two eggs or grains of wheat are identical” (252).

Individuating difference can be individual difference because signal–sign systems are not fully formed individuals composed of parts and qualities shared with others. Individuation constitutes not a substantial entity but a *perspective*. Perspectives are inherently limited—there is no “God’s eye view”—and no two can be the same, whether they be perspectives on the same world, impossible worlds, or a world of impossibles. Ideas are distinct but obscure in their virtuality, and clear but confused in their actuality. The individual is an intensity that envelops and clearly expresses a region of the multiplicity from which it emerges while expressing the totality of this multiplicity confusedly (*DR* 252–53). Their limited scope of clear expression means that each individual actualizes their Idea differently: Individuated perspectives being irreducibly different, the actualizations they determine are irreducible too.

### The Other-Structure and De-Differentiation

The individual is a thinker (*DR* 253), but “every body, every thing, thinks and is a thought to the extent that, reduced to its intensive reasons, it expresses an Idea the actualisation of which it determines” (254). Nonetheless, more complex systems of individuation, such as living systems, increasingly

interiorize their constitutive differences and implicating intensities, becoming less dependent on exterior conditions. In doing so, they increasingly interiorize the disparateness that their intensities envelop (256–57). In psychic systems, the I and Self, as figures of the individual's identity, are always fractured and dissolved by the incorporation of an abyss of differences that are undifferentiated but not undifferentiated. An impersonal death is thereby always already inscribed within the I and Self, which are products of differentiation (257–59). These complex individuations related to this impersonal death go beyond the identitarian figures of I and Self, which no longer determine any differentiation. They do not intervene between the virtual and its actualization in a differentiation–individuation–dramatization–differentiation order of reasons. Individuation here becomes a process of “de-differentiation” (259).

The differentiation that engenders the I and Self conceals the fractures beneath them through an explication of these intensities. The discrete multiplicity that underpins representation subsumes differences that differ from it in kind. Representation configures intensities as “centres of envelopment which testify to the presence of individuating factors” (*DR* 259–60) in a way that distorts the intensive factors themselves. These centers of envelopment, Deleuze holds, are constituted by a “structure belonging to the I–Self system” that “should be designated by the name ‘other’ [*autrui*]” (260). Within the psychic system, “the Other [*Autrui*] is not confused with the individuating factors implicated in the system, but it ‘represents’ or stands for them in a certain sense” (281, translation modified). What matters is not whether the other is human or not—the French *autrui* often refers to human others and particularly to familiar others such as neighbors—but its relationship to the self. Most theories of the other have “oscillate[d] mistakenly and ceaselessly from a pole at which the other is reduced to the status of object to a pole at which it assumes the status of subject,” with the consequence that “the structure of the other, as well as its role in psychic systems, [has] remained misunderstood” (260).

As a stand-in for individuating factors, “the other who is nobody, but who is self for the other and the other for the self” is defined by “its expressive value [. . .] its implicit and enveloping value” (*DR* 260), which is explicated to become part of the Self's perceptual architecture. The other becomes “*the expression of a possible world [monde possible]*” (261), and the I or Self “tend to explicate or develop the world expressed by the other, either in order to participate in it or to deny it” (260). The Other's possible world is explicated as another perspective: What is an object's depth

for me is its length for this Other (281; on this point see Somers-Hall 2013a, 186–88). The Other’s terrified face expresses a possible terrifying world, which “I either develop [. . .] into a frightening world the reality of which seizes me, or I denounce its unreality” (DR 260). This expression need not involve resemblance—“by ‘possible,’ [. . .] we do not mean any resemblance [. . .] the terrified face does not resemble what terrifies it” (260)—but the expressed nonetheless does not exist outside this expression, and “the Other cannot be separated from the expressivity which constitutes it” (260). In this way, the structure provided by the Other “grounds and ensures the overall functioning” (281) of the perceptual world. It “ensures individuation within the perceptual world,” but it does so by presenting the Other as though it “*integrated the individuating factors and pre-individual singularities within the limits of objects and subjects*, which are then offered to representation as perceivers or perceived” (281–82). That is, it brings unrepresentable individuating differences within the world of representation, testifying to the presence of individuating factors but in a way that cancels their difference. The further “explication of the other by the self represents a degradation in accordance with law” (261), because “it is not the other [*autrui*] which is another I, but the I which is an other [*autre*], a fractured I” (261). Love carries this danger of explication and degradation insofar as “there is no love which does not begin with the revelation of a possible world as such, enwound in the other [*autrui*] which expresses it” (261). Love seeks to explicate a possible world found in the beloved, transforming the beloved “now into a fascinating subject, now into a deceptive object” (261). Language can counteract this danger insofar as it is “a means to endow the possibles that it expresses with reality, independently of the development we cause them to undergo” (261).

To move beyond representation and rediscover pre-individual intensities and individuating factors, this “Other-structure [*structure-autrui*]” (DR 281) must be dismantled. The path of envelopment and explication, which allows complex psychic systems to internalize disparity, “must be followed in reverse so that, departing from subjects which give effect to the Other-structure, we return as far as this structure in itself, thus apprehending the Other as No-one, then continue further, following the bend in sufficient reason until we reach those regions where the Other-structure no longer functions, far from the objects and subjects that it conditions, where singularities are free to be deployed or distributed within pure Ideas, and individuating factors to be distributed in pure intensity” (282). To dismantle the structure of perception is to move beyond recognition and toward thought, not as a

subjective faculty but as the forceful dissolution of the self. Thought occurs in a world without others (*autrui*), and “in this sense, it is indeed true that the thinker is necessarily solitary and solipsistic” (282). In this de-differentiated world, the fractured self makes contact with another Other, not that of “the self for the other I and the other I for the self” (260), but that of the “I is an other [*autre*]” (86).



Nietzsche's genealogical account of the origins of morality, invoked earlier with regard to dramatization, illustrates all these processes of encounter, Idea, individuation, dramatization, and actualization. An agonistic clash of unequal forces is the violent encounter that spurs thought to engage a problem—which is fully real and objective, and not simply contrived in the heads of the antagonists—of making sense of the event. From the encounter thus emerges a virtual Idea of morality that is actualized in the competing moralities of “good and bad” and “good and evil.” These two solutions to the moral problem are associated with noble and slave types but are not invented by these characters as self-reflecting subjects. Rather, they emerge alongside or subjacent to these subjects and shape their subjectivities by determining the thinking and being demanded by their respective moral systems. Nonetheless, the associations point to processes distinct from those that actualize the virtual Idea, as the terms of each moral system remain vague and abstract absent their incarnation: We might define good and evil, as differentiated and externally related categories, with reference to ideas of intentional harm, selflessness, and self-sacrifice, but these remain little more than meaningless clichés unless we can anchor them in figures who enact them—unless we can make reference to heroes and villains, to characters who express concretely what it is to be a selfish or self-sacrificing person, and thereby answer the “who?,” “which one?,” and “how?” questions needed to fully articulate these terms. Hence the need to dramatize these moralities via personae, which in turn refer to individuations that constitute the perspectives of the strong and weak and express the wills to power that will the existence and dominance of each morality, determining the sense of an entire world, including the quantitative differences between that world's related forces and the distinct qualities of each force.

Noble and slave realities are impossible—in one the nobles are good and in the other they are evil; in one the weak are impotent and in the other they are strong—but they belong to the same world. Noble and slave perspectives express these irreconcilable realities, as the nobles' moral

values follow from their high station (Nietzsche 1967, 1.2) and the slaves' opposition of good and evil reflects their "frog perspective" or perspective from below (Nietzsche 1989, §2). Each perspective also generates illusions by enveloping the individuations and pre-individual singularities of the other in centers of expression that conform to its own framework. Thus, the nobles see the slave's *ressentiment* within their framework of affirming difference, while the slaves see noble affirmation as another negative opposition.<sup>11</sup> Nobles and slaves necessarily misunderstand each other, although for Nietzsche the nobles' sins against reality pale against those of the slaves (Nietzsche 1967, 1.10). This is because the slaves' illusion is that of the negative as an inverted image of difference, which allows them to envision the world in terms of black and white binaries and the self as a doer separate from and behind its deeds. Theirs is the greater error because it leads them to create and immerse themselves in a world of essences and representations.

A univocity persists between these disparate actualized moralities by virtue of being expressions of the will to power. This determines their respective fates in a world of simulacra governed by the eternal return. In this world, "the Negative does not return. The Identical does not return. The Same and the Similar, the Analogous and the Opposed, do not return. Only affirmation returns—in other words, the Different, the Dissimilar" (*DR* 299). Negative forces and their will to power do not return without transmuting themselves, while affirmative forces and their will to power return because they are the forces and will to power of transmutation. This speaks to the final aspect of the will to power's relation to individuation and individual difference—namely, that it installs in individuals that share no common identity a compulsion to overcome themselves, to become by repeating, and thus to become different. Intensity envelops disparate series and causes them to communicate, but pace time's third synthesis, this produces not only resonance between the series but a forced movement that exceeds and dissolves them. The becoming compelled by this forced movement is the univocal sense of the individual in "a world of differences implicated one in the other, [. . . in] a complicated, properly chaotic world *without identity*" (57). There is thus "a single clamour of Being for all beings" only "on condition that each being, each drop and each voice has reached the state of excess" (304).<sup>12</sup> The eternal return guarantees the possibility of this becoming. What begins with an encounter culminates in an overcoming through the thought and affirmation of the eternal return. The thought of eternal return is a thought without model and without Image that challenges models of thought based on recognition and representation, these being mere reflections of this more primordial ontological thought.



## Chapter 12

# From the Depths to the Surface

### Schema and Dynamisms

Thinking arises from an encounter with intensity, but the reciprocal relations and singularities of thought's unconscious Ideas are fully determined in their virtuality even if the principle of their complete determination lies elsewhere. That principle, also linked to intensity, is a primordial groundlessness of the depths that anchors the Idea's actualization in processes of dramatization and individuation. In engendering thought and anchoring differentiation, intensity remains independent of Ideas, as it is implicated first in itself. Ideas and intensities necessarily involve and are immanent to each other, but in entailing distinct multiplicities, each also remains indifferent to the other. Herein lies a subtle difficulty in the project of determining the conditions of real experience. This project requires Ideas to account for a triple genesis that includes the genesis of space and time. Yet this genesis ultimately refers to intensity's spatio-temporal dynamisms, to that by which the given is given, and so to an asymmetrical synthesis of the sensible that is heterogeneous to the Ideas' differential synthesis. The dynamisms relate to the Idea's pure potentiality, its capacity to go outside itself and to be externalized via differentiation and explication. But this pure potentiality, though an internal element of the Idea, is not accounted for by the Idea.

Could the Kantian problematic that shapes *Difference and Repetition* play a role in these shortcomings? The problem of relating heterogeneous syntheses of intuition and thought is central to *The Critique of Pure Reason*, and Deleuze's adoption of Kant's outline of the problem is particularly evident in the French titles of the fourth and fifth chapters of *Difference*

*and Repetition*: They deal respectively with the ideal synthesis of difference (*Synthèse idéelle de la différence*) and the asymmetric synthesis of the sensible (*Synthèse asymétrique du sensible*). In this regard, Deleuze's later reflections on *Difference and Repetition* are telling and can be usefully compared to Heidegger's later reflections on *Being and Time*. Heidegger holds that the post-Kantian framework and phenomenological context in which *Being and Time* was written hampered its ability to elaborate fully the question of Being (Heidegger 1972, 44). Deleuze seems similarly to acknowledge that the way the aim of providing a genetic account missing in Kant remained wedded to Kantian reference points hindered *Difference and Repetition's* broader attempt to work out an ontology of sense.

As noted earlier, Deleuze positions the dynamisms within the Kantian problematic by relating them to the schematism. Kant calls the transcendental schema a "third thing" (Kant 1965, A138/B177) that, by means of time determinations, fleshes out and mediates pure concepts and sensible intuitions so that the former can be applied to the latter and the latter can be subsumed under the former. Only through this mediation can a unity of the sensible and meaningful—that is, sense—be attained.<sup>1</sup> Schematization ensures that the roundness intuited in the sensible apprehension of a dinner plate corresponds to thought's pure geometric concept of a circle (A137/B176) and that the pure category of substance is not simply an empty logical form of a subject that can never be a predicate, but is applicable to sensible objects determined as having a permanence of the real in time (A143/B183). Neither sensible nor conceptual, yet also homogeneous with both domains, schemata are products of an a priori rather than empirical imagination, making them representations distinct from images: When thinking of a large number or of number in general, or when thinking of a dog in general or a triangle in general, I give myself not an empirical image that I count or recognize, but a plan or diagram of relations for the construction of an object in space and time that would correspond to the conceptual relations being thought (A140–42/B179–81). Schematization, Kant says, "is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul" (A141/B180–81), a portrayal Deleuze similarly invokes when calling the dynamisms "agents [. . .] which act within or beneath [concepts], like a hidden art" (*DR* 218). Moreover, certain schema for Kant are architectonic, deriving from and realizing Ideas not by giving the understanding a sensible object (Kant 1965, A664–66/B692–94) but rather by directing it toward the unification of a manifold of knowledges (A832–33/B860–62). As such, and against the

contingent unities of concept and object established by empirical schema, they provide principles for the systematicity of this unity.

For Deleuze, “a schema is indeed a rule of determination for time and of construction for space,” and “it brings spatio-temporal relations into correspondence with the logical relations of the concept” (*DR* 218). Nevertheless, “since it remains external to the concept [that it schematizes], it is not clear how it can ensure the harmony of the understanding and sensibility, since it does not even have the means to ensure its own harmony with the understanding without appeal to a miracle” (218).<sup>2</sup> In short, “the schema does not account for the power *with which* it acts” (218), a power that makes it “an ideal schema [the schema of an Idea] and no longer the schema of a concept” (174). This power, Deleuze contends, is found in the dynamisms, which “are posited no longer as schemata of concepts but as dramas of Ideas. For if the dynamism is external to concepts—and, as such, a schema [for them]—it is internal to Ideas—and, as such, a drama or dream” (218). Contra concepts, whose principles are unity and identity, Ideas, being differential, can receive spatio-temporal coordinates through internal differentiation rather than a schematism imposed from without. Intensive, directional dynamisms, implicating themselves in the extensities that explicate them, can thus incarnate the Idea’s differential relations and differentiate its differentiations, whereas schema can only mediate between already given empirical relations and their conceptual counterparts.<sup>3</sup> By determining the actualization of species and parts within the sensible, articulating them via dramatization, these intensive dynamisms, embedded within the Idea, provide the fleshing out necessary for the schema’s mediation, thus providing the immanent forcefulness required for the triple genesis that ensures the connection of thought and intuition. In doing so through intensive processes of individuation, it also goes beyond the remaining abstractions of Kant’s project, providing the principle for the systematicity of real rather than merely possible experience. Nonetheless, while this solution overcomes “the Kantian duality between concept and intuition” and the consequent “external relation between the determinable (Kantian space as a pure given) and the determination (the concept insofar as it is thought)” that “the intermediary of the schematism only reinforces” (173), it seems to carry its own problematic duality between Ideas and intensity. It thus begs the same kind of question that the schematism sought to resolve: How do intensity and Idea relate? What is the “third thing” that connects them in their difference?

### Eschewing the Classical Height and the Archaic Depth

Deleuze perhaps has this problem in mind when he states that “*Difference and Repetition* still aspired [. . .] toward a sort of classical height and even toward an archaic depth,” while “in *Logic of Sense*, the novelty for me lay in the act of learning something about surfaces” (*TRM* 65). It is perhaps also behind his identifying a shortcoming in the earlier work’s presentation of intensity as “stemming from the depths” (65). The discovery made by Lewis Carroll’s Alice, who had sought the secrets of the event and becoming deep in the Earth, is that depth is always a “false depth” because everything happens at the border and on the surface (*LS* 9–10). In *The Logic of Sense*, the surface becomes the “third thing” relating Ideas and depths through their difference. An intensity of the surface now challenges not only intensity’s earlier positioning in the depths, but also the equivalence twice drawn in *Difference and Repetition* between intensity and depth (*DR* 231, 244). Neither depth nor Ideas can engender sense unless each forms a surface, one being a physical surface of or constituted by simulacra and the other being an ideal or metaphysical surface of the phantasm, the terms simulacrum and phantasm having previously been interchangeable in *Difference and Repetition* (see *DR* 126–28, 265).<sup>4</sup> And sense itself, as an expression of the Absolute, encompasses everything, such that ultimately “there is neither height nor depth” (*LS* 77) but only surface. *The Logic of Sense* thereby reverses *Difference and Repetition*’s portrayal of the surface as a flat dimension on which the illusions of opposition and negation are projected and where the synthesis of these abstract differences occurs “only in a false depth” (*DR* 50). The earlier work associates this flat surface with “Lewis Carroll’s mirror where everything is contrary and inverted on the surface, but ‘different’ in depth,” a surface on which “the negative is the image of difference, but a flattened and inverted image, like the candle in the eye of the ox” (51). This portrayal of the surface as a mere surface effect that distorts the intensive depths that constitute it informs a short discussion in *Difference and Repetition* on the relation between sense, truth, and propositions. Though sometimes considered a compressed version of the account given in *The Logic of Sense* (see Somers-Hall 2013a, 122), this discussion in fact reveals what is at stake in the difference between the two works.

Sense, according to *Difference and Repetition*, has been understood as a condition of truth, since senseless propositions are neither true nor false. Russell, among others, isolates sense by distinguishing what a proposition expresses from what it designates. Conceived in this way, sense “only found[s]

the truth of a proposition while remaining indifferent to what it founds,” because “the true and the false are supposed to continue in the same state as before—in other words, as if they were independent of the condition assigned to them or of the new value which is added to them” (*DR* 153). Moreover, “sense is defined as the condition of the true, but since it is supposed that the condition must retain an extension larger than that which is conditioned, sense does not ground truth without also allowing the possibility of error. A false proposition remains no less a proposition endowed with sense” (153). Sense is therefore not yet a plastic principle that is no wider than what it conditions. The introduction of sense into the analysis of the proposition thus remains abstract and “serves only to justify traditional ways of thinking” (153–54). With designation left unaffected by expression, the proposition retains a form reflecting the recognition-based image of thought (154). Nevertheless, because it extends sense to falsity—thereby granting power to the false—this formulation offers a way to conceive a sense that not only conditions but also constitutes immanently,<sup>5</sup> and that grounds only by transforming what is grounded.<sup>6</sup>

The distinction between the proposition’s sense and what it designates—and Deleuze here also distinguishes the proposition’s sense from its signification, the latter involving its deployment of concepts to represent objects (*DR* 154–55)—entails that “we can never formulate simultaneously both a proposition and its sense; we can never say what is the sense of what we say” (155). Only nonsense words of the sort found throughout Carroll’s writings—these being central to the relation between sense and nonsense outlined in *The Logic of Sense*—can state their own sense. Since a proposition cannot state its own sense, we can only “take the sense of a proposition—in other words, the *expressed*, as the *designated* of another proposition—of which in turn we cannot express the sense, and so on to infinity” (155). This “paradox of proliferation,” with its endless series of propositions each stating the sense of the previous proposition, is avoidable only by refusing to allow sense to be absorbed into the next proposition. But this leaves sense suspended outside any propositional form, a “double of the proposition [that] appears distinct at once from the proposition itself, the formulator of the proposition [the speaking subject] and the object which it concerns” (156).

Sense now becomes “an ideal event” that “insists or subsists, possessing a quasi-being or an extra-being, that minimum of being common to real, possible and even impossible objects” (156). Although “it does not exist outside of the proposition which expresses it” (156), it is nevertheless

positioned between the proposition and its referent, entailing new paradoxes in which contradictory propositions can express the same sense and even propositions that do not signify because they reference impossible objects (i.e., “square circle”) can still have sense. These paradoxes also all appear when sense is positioned as a surface phenomenon in *The Logic of Sense*. In *Difference and Repetition*, however, Deleuze holds that this account of sense leaves it “a simple phantom [. . .] a vapour which plays at the limit of things and words. Sense appears here as the outcome of the most powerful logical effort, but as Ineffectual, a sterile incorporeal deprived of its generative power” (156). Sense is thereby disarmed, Deleuze contends, in a way that preserves the representational account, because the sense standing between propositions and their referents does nothing. While nothing might seem to be gained by giving sense the interrogative form of a question or problem, moving sense into the realm of problems and Ideas makes it constitutive. Placed within the problem, sense remains “extra-propositional [. . .] it differs in kind from every proposition,” but it is now involved in “the genesis of the act of thought, the operation of the faculties” (157). Sense is thereby positioned in the depths, where intensity engenders thinking and the production of Ideas. Whereas when located on the surface it is impotent and neutral, sense placed in the depths is generative.

*The Logic of Sense* is often thought to represent a fleeting middle phase in Deleuze’s philosophical journey rather than being a work of lasting importance. Deleuze does seem to give priority to *Difference and Repetition*, stating that all his subsequent solo and co-authored writings are connected to it (DR xv). And many theses of *The Logic of Sense* seem quickly to disappear: Neither the logic of surfaces nor the Stoic philosophers who inspire it play a prominent role in subsequent texts;<sup>7</sup> the language of simulacra, which features prominently also in *Difference and Repetition*, fades into oblivion;<sup>8</sup> and after extensive positive engagements of both *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze starts taking an increasingly critical stance toward psychoanalysis, having been “rescued” from his earlier interest in it by Guattari.<sup>9</sup> All this seems to confirm the view that the ideas and concepts of *The Logic of Sense* divide into those that elaborate what is already found in *Difference and Repetition* and those that form quickly abandoned experiments.

Nevertheless, when considered in relation to the development of an ontology of sense, *The Logic of Sense* appears as the magnum opus of Deleuze’s early period, completing the project that informs all his previous works and setting the stage for later works where sense, surface, simulacra, and other concepts are further transformed. Even though Deleuze says that in *The*

*Logic of Sense*, “the concepts remained the same [as *Difference and Repetition*]: ‘multiplicities,’ ‘singularities,’ ‘intensities,’ ‘events,’ ‘infinities,’ ‘problems,’ ‘paradoxes’ and ‘propositions’—but reorganized according to this dimension [of the surface]” (*TRM* 65), this change of dimension reconfigures the nature of the concepts, often quite radically. Deleuze holds *The Logic of Sense* “to represent a turning point: it was the first time I sought, however tentatively, a form that was not in keeping with traditional philosophy” (63). In this way too it goes beyond *Difference and Repetition*, which only poses rather than takes up the problem of “the search for new means of philosophical expression” (*DR* xxi). But it also demonstrates how the philosophical project Deleuze pursues throughout his early works, where philosophy must be an ontology of sense and the stakes concern the direction post-Kantian thought must take, is realized only by leaving behind the philosophical framework that inspired it.



## Part III



## Chapter 13

### *The Logic of Sense*

Notably absent from *The Logic of Sense* are two Bergsonian themes that were prominent in *Difference and Repetition* and earlier works. Together they indicate an absence of Bergson from the text in more than name only.<sup>1</sup> First, while *The Logic of Sense* is centrally concerned with intensities—and specifically intensity as a surface phenomenon—it shows almost no interest in the virtual and its actualization. As previously noted, Bergson's role in theorizing intensity declines substantially after Deleuze's early essays and his *Bergsonism*, and in *The Logic of Sense* it disappears altogether. The absence of this key Bergsonian thesis of the virtual and actual—around which many interpreters organize Deleuze's entire philosophy—is frequently missed. No doubt this is partly due to the commonly held presumption that *The Logic of Sense* largely carries forward theses found in *Difference and Repetition*, which might suggest that the same concepts persist and have the same status in the later work even if they remain unnamed. However, within Anglophone scholarship at least, it is almost certainly also due to confusions encouraged by the English translation of *The Logic of Sense*, which erroneously insinuates a predominance of the concept of actualization in the text. By consistently rendering the French *effectuation* and *contre-effectuation* as “actualization” and “counter-actualization,” the translation implies an equivalence with the *actualisation* Deleuze uses for the actualization of virtual in both *Difference and Repetition* and *Bergsonism*. This rendering even appears where Deleuze uses *effectuation* alongside *actualisation*, with both terms sometimes being translated with the same word. Elsewhere, the translation distinguishes *actualisation* from *effectuation* by rendering the latter as “realization,” adding further confusions insofar as Deleuze holds the virtual and actual both to be real.

Both *actualisation* and *effectuation* express a notion of realization and in everyday usage would understandably be considered interchangeable. But *Difference and Repetition* had distinguished two processes of realization, namely, the virtual's actualization and intensity's essential process of individuation. Whereas the former involves an Idea's continuous virtual multiplicity of differentiated vanishing or vice-dicting differences being differentiated into a discrete multiplicity of actually existing and externally related differences able to be taken up by representation, the latter is a synthesis of impossible or heterogeneous orders within the sensible that establishes the perspectives through which actualized multiplicities are determined. Actualization moves thought from a condition of indiscernible interpenetrating differences where the law of contradiction does not apply to a condition where the distinctions of "this is this and not that" obtain. This allows thinking to be brought to bear on the given, while also subjecting it to representation's transcendental illusions. Intensity, by contrast, is that by which the given is given, and its process of individuation, explicating the time and space of different perspectives, constitutes the "thisness" or *haecceity* needed for actual distinctions of "this" and "that." The relation between actualization and individuation accords with Kant's understanding of the actual as being bound up with the material conditions of experience—that is, with sensation, which for Kant is always accompanied by an intensive magnitude or degree (Kant 1965, A166–76/B207–18, A218/B266). For Deleuze, the intensity of sensation establishes the material conditions for actualization by shaping the time and space that species and parts come to occupy. This involves a dramatization and incarnation of the Idea that plays out the process of individuation and is distinct from the Idea's actualization. Although actualization and individuation are intimately involved with each other and with the production of difference and sense, they are distinct and irreducible processes, and, as *The Logic of Sense* makes clear, it is through individuation rather than actualization that the sense of sense is produced.

Interpreters frequently read *The Logic of Sense* through the relation between virtual and actual, often asserting that the work positions sense in the virtual realm.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the work's main text makes only three passing references to the virtual or actual: one stating that language—whether conceived as *langue* or *langage*<sup>3</sup>—is a virtual totality (i.e., never apprehended as an actuality) insofar as regardless of how language is obtained, its elements must be given all together; one holding that "the pure event is both tale and novella, never an actuality"; and one holding that the portmanteau word that regulates and ramifies series of differences consists of two virtual halves

(LS 48, 63, 67). Where *actualisation* appears alongside *effectuation*, they are presented as distinct processes emerging from a domain of pre-personal and pre-individual singularities, with *actualisation* referring to the constitution of an I or Self that takes place alongside the effectuation/realization, via individuals and persons, of both events and the potential energy that serves as their milieu. Thus, these singularities “are distributed in a ‘potential’ [*potentiel*] which admits neither Self nor I, but which produces them [Self and I] by actualizing or effectuating itself, although the figures of this actualization do not at all resemble the effectuated potential” (103, translation modified). The difference between actualization and effectuation here corresponds to the distinction in *Difference and Repetition* between the differentiations of the I and Self, to which belongs a structure that “should be designated by the name ‘other’ [*autrui*]” (DR 260), and the de-differentiating process of individuation, which does not see through the determination of actualization but instead presents “a protest by the individual which has never recognised itself within the limits of the Self and the I, even where these are universal” (259). In *The Logic of Sense*, this distinction is elaborated further in the fourth appendix’s examination of Michel Tournier’s *Friday*, where, as we shall see, virtual, actual, and actualization, as elements in the production of the conditions of representation, stand or fall with this structure designated as other. Actualization and effectuation are, of course, wrapped up in each other, but this is because the virtual’s actualization must be accomplished—that is, effectuated. While the virtual, the actual, and the process of actualization still have roles to play, in *The Logic of Sense* the production of sense is fundamentally a matter of individuation, which anchors but also exceeds and dissolves the actualizations that accompany it, and whose processes are elaborated under the terms effectuation and counter-effectuation. The temporal effectuation of pure events engenders their incarnation in bodies and their incorporation within states of affairs (63), while their counter-effectuation returns these same events to an ideal and positive resonance with all others. In the discussions that follow, the English translation is modified accordingly to reflect Deleuze’s use of *effectuation*.<sup>4</sup>

In *The Logic of Sense*, intensive processes of individuation and the actualization of figures such as the I and Self both occur via the surface. The text ultimately elaborates two surfaces—a physical if incorporeal surface of simulacra and an ideal or metaphysical surface of the phantasm—that communicate and resonate with each other.<sup>5</sup> A surface tension distinguishes these surfaces from the depths upon which they are formed (LS 95). *Difference and Repetition*’s distinction between the virtual’s “perplicated”

multiplicities and intensity's "implexed" multiplicities becomes the multiplicity of a single impersonal and pre-individual field that is actualized at the same time that its potential energy is effectuated, with the components that actualize or give objectivity to a structure of representation bearing no resemblance to the effectuated individuals and persons that incarnate it. The surface tension is an intensity engendered by the organization of pure events into two or more series that are nomadically distributed to form the surface, along with a "paradoxical instance [that] is the Event in which all events communicate and are distributed" (56). This Event expresses a second-order sense of the sense of pure events, which are effectuated or counter-effectuated in relation to bodies and states of affairs: "the temporal effectuation of the event" is "its incarnation in the depth of acting bodies and its incorporation in a state of affairs" (63), while the totality of events in communication with one another "form one and the same Event [. . .] where they have an eternal truth" (64). Although this paradoxical instance serves as a second-order difference, Deleuze declines to call it a differentiator (*différenciant*) and instead refers—only once—to a differentiator (*différentiant*) that is a necessary paradoxical component of any structure that ramifies the structure's differences (50–51), in this way perhaps further indicating that differentiation or actualization is not of particular interest in the text. Here too, effectuation aligns not with the actualization of virtualities but with the implication, explication, complication, and individuation of intensities, the processes by which pure events are incarnated and thus *lived*.

The second noticeable Bergsonian absence in *The Logic of Sense* is any concern with duration as a form of time that is anything more than a period of extended chronological time. As outlined in Deleuze's earlier writings, such a duration for Bergson is both the virtual itself and—as *élan vital*—the intensive driving force of actualization. *Difference and Repetition's* triadic account of time is replaced in *The Logic of Sense* by a dyadic account whose forms, Chronos (time) and Aion (eternity), correspond somewhat to the earlier work's first and third syntheses. *The Logic of Sense* does outline three forms of synthesis, but while they bear strong family resemblances to the three syntheses of *Difference and Repetition*, with the last in both texts being associated with eternal return, their deployment in *The Logic of Sense* does not involve an articulation of three different temporal forms. Chronos is the time of a present that divides past and future, yet only the present exists for it, as "the past and future indicate only the relative difference between two presents" (LS 62), and "whatever is future or past in relation to a certain present (a certain extension or duration) belongs to a more

vast present which has a greater extension or duration" (162). Chronos is both finite—since the present is extended rather than instantaneous, but nonetheless always of a limited extension—and infinite—as time is “cyclical, animating a physical eternal return as the return of the Same, and a moral eternal wisdom as the wisdom of the Cause” (61). All finite presents are relative to one another in the chronological sequence of time, but they are encased by Chronos as an infinite—though not unlimited—present (162–63).

Aion is the time of a present reduced to an instant by being subdivided infinitely by the past and future. This time is “not infinite, since it never comes back upon itself; it is unlimited, a pure straight line the two extremities of which endlessly distance themselves from each other and become deferred into the past and the future” (*LS* 62). Aion is “the eternal truth of time: *pure empty form of time*” (165), making it the time of another eternal return—that of the “straight-line labyrinth” invoked in *Difference and Repetition*. It accords with Zarathustra’s portrayal of the eternal return, discussed earlier, as a gateway inscribed as “Moment,” where two infinite paths of past and future meet and contradict each other, and where the Moment itself, and not simply the things and states of affairs within it, repeats and returns, making the present both past and future as well. So too with Aion, “the instant [. . .] perverts the present into inhering future and past” (165). Deleuze holds Aion to be the time of the event insofar as the event is never present, but always yet to be *and* already past: “jam tomorrow and jam yesterday—but never jam *to-day*” (*LS* 3, quoting Carroll 2010, “Through the Looking Glass,” 181). It thus “follows the figures of the nomadic distribution wherein each event is already past and yet in the future, at once more and less, always the day before and the day after, inside the subdivision which makes them communicate with one another” (77). This makes Aion antithetical to the unidirectionality that characterizes both good sense and common sense (75–79). It is the temporality of pure events of the surface that remain distinct from their effectuation in bodies and states of affairs, this effectuation leading to their submission to a chronological order. As pure events, they relate to a paradoxical Event that is their truth. If events donate sense to bodies and states of affairs through their effectuation, they nevertheless find their own sense—a univocal sense of sense—in this Event. In this way, Aion and the Event engender the will—or will to power—of counter-effectuation. Herein lies the possibility of an ethics of the event.

In *The Logic of Sense*, sense and its intensity are not simply events of the surface: They are a surface effect and an achievement of the successful

constitution of the surface. They establish an ideational “secondary organization” that is “proper to language [*langage*]” (LS 81) and that arises from a “primary order” of bodies and materiality. Sense is also an “an ‘optical effect’ or a ‘sound effect,’ or, even better, [. . .] a position effect and a language effect [*effet du langage*]” (70), but it is not for all that “an appearance or an illusion” (70) because it is also constitutive. Sense, Deleuze contends, is discovered twice in the history of philosophy: first as an empirical surface by the Stoics, who broke with Aristotelian propositional logic to discover extra-propositional events or happenings; and second as a metaphysical surface by transcendental philosophy, which broke with the metaphysics of essences (105). With the latter, however, its transcendental field is determined in either the personal form of a Self, the individual form of an I, or both at once, with sense presumed to be an originary good and common sense. Repeating his early Hume book, Deleuze holds that transcendental philosophy continues to demand that “the conditions of the real object of knowledge must be *the same as* the conditions of knowledge” (105). In this way, it remains aligned with the old metaphysics, imposing the alternative of “*either* an undifferentiated ground [*un fond indifférencié*], a groundlessness, formless nonbeing, or an abyss without differences and without properties, *or* a supremely individuated Being and an intensely personalized Form. Without this Being or this Form, you will have only chaos” (106). Even in those “always extraordinary [. . .] moments in which philosophy makes the Abyss (*Sans-fond*) speak and finds the mystical language of its wrath, its formlessness, and its blindness [. . .] the alternative imposed by transcendental philosophy and by metaphysics is not left behind” (106, 107). An alternative comes only with the discovery, initiated by Nietzsche, of a world of impersonal and pre-individual singularities, and the realization that “Being is not an undifferentiated abyss [*abîme indifférencié*], it leaps from one singularity to another, casting always the dice belonging to the same cast, always fragmented and formed again in each throw” (107). This is a discovery of the surface, in which Nietzsche glimpses “the means of treading over the earth, of touching it lightly” (107) and through which he eventually discovers a more profound way to explore the depths and make its voices speak (108). We recover the depths, and explore it in this new way, through an always fragile surface.

The surface is possible only insofar as events achieve an independence from the bodies and states of affairs that give rise to them and onto which they are effectuated. This independence requires that there obtains a special relationship between sense and nonsense and a “positive distance” among

events themselves. Bodies are associated with the depths, which in *Difference and Repetition* had been the seat of sense, intensity, and, through the encounter, the origin of thought, but here it always threatens to swallow up both thought and sense. “The idea of positive distance belongs to topology and to the surface” and “excludes all depth and all elevation, which would restore the negative and the identity” (*LS* 173). The surface, once constituted, provides an intensive “frontier” that organizes and separates orders of physical bodies and sonorous words so that they can be “articulated”—in the sense not simply of expressing but of forming a hinge or a joint, a connection and a determinate differentiation—one to the other (91).<sup>6</sup> “‘The deepest is the skin,’” Deleuze declares, because “the skin has at its disposal a vital and properly superficial potential energy” that puts other dimensions into contact and communication (103). Conversely, with the collapse of this surface into the primary order of corporeality that engenders it, “words are no longer anything but affections of the body” (125), “the entire world loses its meaning [*sens*]” (87), and “every event is effectuated, be it in a hallucinatory form” (87).

In its representational functions, language is used to denote states of affairs, manifest or express the intentions of a language user, and signify moments of a conceptual order—this is the “tertiary arrangement” that the secondary organization of sense makes possible. But language as such does not require a surface, and Deleuze identifies not only a language of surfaces associated most closely with the paradoxes and puzzles of Carroll’s fictions and Stoic thought, but also a language of the depths associated with Artaud and a (Platonic) language of the heights (*LS* 87, 140). He nevertheless contends that the languages of the depths and heights remain abstract and empty, the former reaching only an infra-sense and the latter a pre-sense, with sense itself still missing. Hence, “signs remain deprived of sense as long as they do not enter into the surface organization which assures the resonance of two series” (104), though, by implication, even without a surface they remain signs. This does not stop Deleuze from proclaiming that “we would not give a page of Artaud for all of Carroll” because of how Artaud “explored the infra-sense, which is still unknown today” (93). Nevertheless, in lacking sense, these languages lack not only a grounding of their relations—the heights relying on a miraculous connection between Ideas and their participants, and the depths collapsing sounds back into the actions and passions of bodies (134)—but also an ethics, as ethics requires a surface construction and an event that can bring it about and to which it responds. This, at least, is Deleuze’s view while he is, in his own words,

still engaged in a project of identifying routes out of psychoanalysis (and so too out of structuralism) that would be reconcilable with it (*N* 144). As we will see later, one of the principal changes brought about by Guattari's intervention in Deleuze's thought is a radical rethinking of this arrangement between surface and depth.

## Chapter 14

# Pure Becoming and Incorporeal Surfaces

## Reversing Platonism

### Plato and the Problem of Pure Becoming

Aion's temporal bivalence accords with a "pure becoming" or an unlimited becoming in two directions that characterizes both sense and the sensible. Deleuze refers this paradoxical becoming to Plato, who often notes how worldly things partake of dualisms in their relations to others and to themselves. In relations to others, "when you say that Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, you mean that at that moment there are in Simmias both tallness and shortness" (*Phaedo*, 102b).<sup>1</sup> In their transience, and thus their difference from themselves, beautiful things sometimes appear ugly, the just sometimes is unjust, the pious sometimes seems to be impious, double things sometimes appear as halves of other doubles, and what is great or small, light or heavy, expresses its opposing quality too (*Republic*, 479a–b). Such cases pose no difficulties for knowledge once one admits the distinction between the physical things that partake of contraries and the Forms or Ideas in which they participate, these Forms being nothing other than themselves and their contraries being nothing but a lack of the quality the Forms hold primarily (*Parmenides*, 128e–30a). The experience of changing things holding contrary qualities can then lead the soul toward the unchanging Ideas that are their foundation. But there is more. In *Charmides*, a discussion of wisdom as knowledge not only of other sciences but of wisdom itself leads Socrates to assert the contrary character of anything that, in relating to an object—be it another thing or itself—retains the nature

of that object. A hearing that hears itself would thus also have a voice, a vision that sees itself would have color, and what is greater or older would also be lesser or younger. Socrates leaves open the question of whether such a science or wisdom could exist (*Charmides*, 166e–169c).

In *Parmenides*, such considerations are brought to bear on being and becoming as part of a larger discussion of the various opposing conclusions entailed by the presumption of there being a “one.” On the one hand, as the one is not many it should have no parts, location, or movement, it should not be or become in time, etc. Yet, on the other hand, that the one both “is” and “is one” implies its plurality, and hence its having parts and all the other previously denied traits. All this entails that the one must be both the same as and different from itself and others, touching and not touching itself and others, equal to, greater than, and less than itself and others, etc. (*Parmenides*, 137c–157b). Regarding temporal relations to others, a thing that is older than another will over time become closer in age and so younger in relation to the younger without ever being younger, while the younger will become older in relation to the older without ever being older; and yet their relation also will not change, since their age difference remains the same throughout (154a–155c). Regarding temporal relations to self, becoming in time becomes truly paradoxical.

Whatever occupies time must always be becoming older than itself, and “older” always means older than something younger. Consequently, whatever is becoming older than itself, if it is to have something *than* which it is becoming older, must also be at the same time becoming younger than itself. [. . .] If one thing is already different from another, there is no question of its becoming different; either they both are now, or they both have been, or they both will be, different. But if one is in the process of becoming different, you cannot say that the other has been, or will be, or as yet is, different; it can only be in process of becoming different. Now the difference signified by “older” is always a difference from something younger. Consequently, what is becoming older than itself must also at the same time be becoming younger than itself. Now, in the process of becoming it cannot take a longer or shorter time than itself; it must take the same time with itself, whether it is becoming, or is, or has been, or will be. So, it seems, any one of the things that occupy

time and have a temporal character must be of the same age as itself and also be becoming at once both older and younger than itself. (141a–d)

The ultimate consequence of this pure becoming is the loss of identity for all things. This follows regardless of whether an enduring principle or Form can be ascertained, as Plato states in the dialogue's conclusion: "whether there is or is not a one, both that one and the others alike are and are not, and appear and do not appear to be, all manner of things in all manner of ways, with respect to themselves and to one another" (166b). For Deleuze, this problem of pure becoming dovetails with Carroll's *Alice*: "All these reversals as they appear in infinite identity have one consequence: the contesting of Alice's personal identity and the loss of her proper name. The loss of the proper name is the adventure which is repeated throughout all Alice's adventures. For the proper or singular name is guaranteed by the permanence of *savoir*" (LS 3).

Every becoming manifests this paradoxical bi-directionality, since no end or culmination can be inserted into becoming without transforming it into being. Deleuze quotes from *Parmenides*: "the younger becoming older than the older, the older becoming younger than the younger—but they can never finally become so; if they did they would no longer be becoming, but would be so" (LS 2, quoting *Parmenides*, 155a). The implication here is that any end or single direction of change can be added only after the fact and from outside. Deleuze relates the matter to the question of the limits of the Idea's command over material entities: "is there an Idea of everything, even of hair, dirt, and mud—or rather is there something which always obstinately escapes the Idea?" (7).<sup>2</sup> He also links it to Plato's account of language, and to a relation, "perhaps [. . .] essential to language" (2), between names expressing stopping or stasis and names expressing motion. In the concluding discussion of *Cratylus* (436e–440e), Socrates argues that words related to knowledge, certainty, inquiry, and memory signify stasis (437a–c), implying that the original "givers of names," even while being faithful to a Heraclitean idea that "all things were in motion and flux" (439c), found the truth of these things to be in absolutes that are always beautiful, true, etc. (439c–440b). For Deleuze, this points to a division within the Heraclitean world itself, with static names "designating the pauses and rests which receive the action of the Idea" and names of flux "expressing the movements or rebel becomings" (LS 2).

All this reveals “a subterranean dualism between that which receives the action of the Idea and that which eludes this action. It is not the distinction between the Model and the copy, but rather between copies and simulacra” (*LS* 2). Opposing both Idea and copy, then, is this pure becoming, “a veritable becoming-mad” (1), expressing the being of the simulacrum, a system of differences related through their difference, but one that also “simulates” the appearance of identity. Whereas a copy retains an internal resemblance to its Idea, what merely simulates resemblance amounts to “an unfounded pretension, concealing a dissimilarity which is an internal unbalance” (257). This unfounded pretension emerges because the simulacrum implies “huge dimensions, depths and distances that the observer cannot master. It is precisely because he cannot master them that he experiences an impression of resemblance. [. . .] In short, there is in the simulacrum a becoming-mad, or a becoming unlimited” (258). In this way, “if the simulacrum still has a model, it is another model, a model of the Other (*l’Autre*) from which there flows an internalized dissemblance” (258). As previously explained, however, having a “model of the Other” means that simulacra have no model, as the Other connotes a flux and impurity of pure becoming inconsistent with any archetype. Simulacra can only be simulations—that is, not even copies—of simulacra.

Plato clearly seeks to close off the implications of this paradoxical bivalent becoming. In *Philebus*, which Deleuze quotes when describing it (*LS* 2), Socrates dismisses Protarchus’s formulation of the duality as inappropriate to the problem of the one and the many, calling it “childish, obvious, and a great nuisance to argument” (*Philebus*, 14d). More generally, the post-*Parmenides* dialogues can be seen as setting down the necessary conditions for the theory of Ideas to surmount the problem that pure becoming poses—namely, that it precludes the possibility of Ideas and copies connecting, since Ideas would seem to have being only in relation to other Ideas and things only in relation to other things (*Parmenides*, 134d–e). Thus, in *Philebus*, Socrates holds that any relation between the one and an unlimited many must be mediated by a limited plurality: “we are not to apply the character of unlimitedness to our plurality until we have discerned the total number of forms the thing in question has intermediate between its one and its unlimited number. [. . .] It is the recognition of those intermediates that makes all the difference between a philosophical and a contentious discussion” (*Philebus*, 16d, 17a). Ideas become accessible only after this ordering and, conversely, their grounding function presupposes it. *Sophist* and *Statesman* carry forward what Deleuze considers Plato’s chief

motivation behind the Ideas: to separate legitimate copies from illegitimate simulacra (*LS* 253). In *Sophist*, defining the false philosopher, which proceeds by separating the imitative copy from the semblance that merely appears to imitate (*Sophist*, 235d–236e), entails “that what is not, in some respect has being, and conversely that what is, in a way is not” (241d). A power of the false is thereby granted to defeat the sophist’s defense that he cannot be condemned for producing non-beings because these have no existence in reality or language (236e–239d, 260a–261b).<sup>3</sup> In *Statesman*, granting being to what is not is linked to the existence of fixed norms enabling absolute and not simply relative measure: statecraft, requiring excess and deficiency to be measured against the standard of the good man, requires the existence of that which is not (*Statesman*, 283d–284c). Finally, in *Timaeus*, time’s (*chrónos*) stable order of past, present, and future, which “imitates eternity and revolves according to a law of number” (*Timaeus*, 38a), allows temporal things to mimic their eternal Ideas.

These maneuvers domesticate pure becoming even while granting it standing within being. Plato, Deleuze argues, seeks to ensure that what obstinately escapes the Idea is “driven back, pushed deeply into the depth of the body, or drowned in the ocean” (*LS* 7). Pure becoming is buried within the sensible so that sense can be the expression of the genuine copy’s conformity with its Idea. It is a matter “of repressing simulacra, keeping them completely submerged, preventing them from climbing to the surface, and ‘insinuating themselves’ everywhere” (257). And yet “the unlimited returns” (7). By burying simulacra, “Platonism [. . .] founds the entire domain that philosophy will later recognize as its own: the domain of representation” (259). Against this, pure becoming must be recovered from the depths and brought to the surface: “‘to reverse Platonism’ means to make the simulacra rise and to affirm their rights among icons and copies” (262). Nevertheless, Deleuze distinguishes the pure becoming of the depths from a similar bi-directional becoming belonging to events of the surface. Both becomings undo identity, but in entirely different ways. Depth *subverts* identity through its chaos and immediacy, while the surface *perverts* identity through the paradoxes of sense: “perversion [is] distinguished as an art of the surface from subversion as a technique of depth” (243). Hence, the rise of simulacra to the surface does not amount simply to a “shift of orientation,” but implies “radical differences in every respect” (165). Aion, as the time of the surface, opposes not simply Chronos, but both the Chronos whose temporal order allows Plato’s Ideas to function and the “bad Chronos” (164) of a subversive becoming of the depths.<sup>4</sup>

## The Stoic Reversal of Platonism

Deleuze contends that “the Stoics are the first to reverse Platonism and to bring about a radical inversion” (*LS* 7). On the face of it, this is a strange claim. The Stoics hold to a conventional conception of truth as a correspondence between thoughts or mental impressions that are expressed in language and the external bodies or events that are their object, and they never doubt the possibility of infallible knowledge, including the wise man’s ability to distinguish true impressions (*phantasia*) from false figments (*phantasma*) (see Diogenes Laertes 7.49–51, 39A, 236–37).<sup>5</sup> Moreover, they endorse not a pure becoming in two directions but a cyclical notion of time and an eternal return of the same.<sup>6</sup> While the Stoics deny that the destiny expressed in this return of the same entails any necessity, this is not based on any bivalence of becoming but on assertions that possibilities exist that neither are nor will be true (see Epictetus, *Discourses*, 2.19.1–5, 38A, 230–31). Although they do, as Deleuze discusses, hold the physical world to consist of mixtures, these express no becoming-mad of the corporeal, as the differences and dissonances of these mixtures are subordinate to their unity.<sup>7</sup> Despite all this, Deleuze’s finds support for his thesis in Émile Bréhier’s reading of the role of incorporeals (*asōmatos*) in Stoic thought. Bréhier holds incorporeals—non-bodily elements inhering in physical things and language—to be part of a broader post-Aristotelian rejection of intelligible causes (Bréhier 1997, 1), and his account allows Deleuze to portray them as components of an ontology of surface sense.

The Stoics hold being’s categories to apply solely to corporeal entities. Being’s founding category is substance or substrate, but qualifications or dispositions that are given in substantial terms and that directly affect bodies are likewise corporeal, as are relations between bodies. Thus qualifications such as “rational” and “animal,” which modify substance; “virtue,” which expresses a body’s internal disposition; and “fatherhood,” which expresses a relation of one body to another, are all corporeal (see Seneca, *Letters*, 133.2, 27B, 176; Simplicius, *On Aristotle’s Categories*, 166.15–29, 27C, 176; and Galen, *On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s Doctrines*, 7.1.12–15, 27E, 176–77). Being’s four genera are therefore “substrates, the qualified, the disposed, and the relatively disposed” (Simplicius, *On Aristotle’s Categories*, 66.32–67.2, 27F, 163). Being, however, belongs to a wider and indeed all-encompassing category of “something” (*aliquid*), which includes four genera of incorporeals: place, time, void, and “sayables” (*lekta*) (see Seneca, *Letters*, 58.13–15, 27A, 162; Alexander, *On Aristotle’s Topics*, 301.19–25,

27B, 162; and Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors*, 10.218, 27D, 162). Platonic Ideas are mere “figments of the soul” (Stobaeus, 1.136.21–137.6, 30A, 179) that cannot fully determine the finite entities participating in them (Bréhier 1997, 3–4), and the Aristotelian alternative of defining entities by genus and specific difference is also uncertain. Although incorporeals are radically distinct from corporeal bodies, they play an indispensable role in determining the full significance of bodily things.<sup>8</sup>

The relation between corporeal and incorporeal domains is explained in the Stoic account of causality. Causes are corporeal and refer to one body’s actions on another, but effects are of another, incorporeal order. Thus, “causes are not *of* each other, but there are causes *to* each other” (Clement, *Miscellanies*, 8.9.30.1–3, 55D, 334), and “every cause is a body which becomes the cause to a body of something incorporeal. For instance the scalpel, a body, becomes the cause to the flesh, a body, of the incorporeal predicate ‘being cut.’ And again, the fire, a body, becomes the cause to the wood, a body, of the incorporeal predicate ‘being burnt’” (Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors*, 9.211, 55B, 333). Incorporeal effects are impassive, “not of a nature either to act or to be acted upon” (8.263, 45B, 272), and they differ from new corporeal realities that might accompany them. The scalpel splits flesh and burning wood becomes ash, but the first change is simply an impression made by an active body on a passive one and the second comes from mixing the bodies of wood and fire (Bréhier 1997, 11–12). Such modifications remain corporeal. Incorporeal effects, however, are not bodies but happenings: being or becoming cut or burnt. Effects, then, are *events*, and they “frolic on the surface of being, and constitute an endless multiplicity of incorporeal beings” (Bréhier 1997, 13, quoted in *LS* 5).<sup>9</sup> They delineate states of affairs constituted by interacting bodies, and these states of affairs are *sayable*, meaning that language—which is corporeal sound—can express them: “For utterances are voiced but it is states of affairs which are said—they, after all, are actually sayables” (Diogenes Laertius, 7.57, 33A, 195).

For Deleuze, these neutral or impassive events, characterized by “impenetrability, sterility, or inefficacy, which is neither active nor passive” (*LS* 95) and playing on the surface of being, are best expressed by the infinitive form of verbs: to burn, to cut, to be burnt or cut. Events/effects have correlates in language because, through the Stoics’ inversion, “simulacra cease to be subterranean rebels and make the most of their effects (that is, what might be called ‘phantasms,’ independently of the Stoic terminology)” (7–8). The infinitive form expresses the event’s pure, bivalent becoming by virtue

of its indifference to the event's subject, object, and direction: "to burn" carries the same sense of burning whether the wood is becoming more or less burnt; "to green" carries the same sense of greening whether the tree is becoming more or less green, becoming or not becoming green, etc. (*LS* 21). The Stoic theory of language supports this special role of the infinitive by dividing sayables into nominative and appellative elements, which denote subjects and common qualities, respectively, and verbs, which correspond to the incorporeal events that attach themselves to nominative cases (Diogenes Laertius, 7.58, 33M, 198). This division parallels that between names of stasis and names of motion found in *Cratylus*. For Bréhier, the "incomplete sayable [*l'exprimamable incomplete*]"—that is, the verb standing alone and independent from the subjects to which it can be attached—plays the foundational role for complex propositions or statements (Bréhier 1997, 22–23; see also Diogenes Laertius, 7.63, 33F, 196 and 7.64, 33G, 197). For Deleuze, the "pure infinitive" (*LS* 184) or "undetermined infinitive, without person, without present, without any diversity of voice" (185) expresses language's univocity, whereas "equivocity is always the equivocity of nouns" (185). Univocity obtains between the sayable, as incorporeal happening, and the infinitive verb, which subsists within language and thought: "Univocity means that it is the same thing which occurs and is said: the attributable to all bodies or states of affairs and the expressible of every proposition" (180). Univocity thus expresses "the identity of the noematic attribute and that which is expressed linguistically—event and sense. It does not allow Being to subsist in the vague state that it used to have in the perspectives of the analogy" (180). This identity implies no correspondence between word and referent, because sense is an effect that follows only from the successful construction of a surface, and because, pace Deleuze's previous discussions of univocity, this "identity" is a sameness of that which differs (180–81).

Incorporeals may seem merely to be the effects of bodies, but their subsistence in the intersections where corporeal substances interact gives them a constitutive role. This is the crux of Bréhier's thesis and the key to Deleuze's interpretation. Bodies interact and sayables emerge from them only because of the incorporeals of place, void, and time. The Stoics reject Aristotle's definition of a body's place as the surface of the body containing it, holding that the surface extremities of bodies are incorporeals that cannot touch one another (Plutarch, *On Common Conceptions*, 1078E–1080E, 50C, 299).<sup>10</sup> In also rejecting the possibility of void within the world (Galen, *On Incorporeal Qualities*, 19.464.10–14, 49E, 295), the Stoics conclude that bodies must interpenetrate. For Bréhier (1997, 52–53), this makes place

the site of interpenetration, an effect of bodies but also a precondition for their interaction. The Stoics consider time to be a dimension or interval of the world's motion (Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories*, 350.15–16, 51A, 304; Stobaeus, 1.106.5–23, 51B, 304), which Bréhier (1997, 55) interprets to mean that time is the structure, rather than the measure, of the world's movement, and so of movement and change in general. For Deleuze, this temporal structure is Aionic, involving an interpenetration or mixture of the past and future that absorbs the present into these dimensions.<sup>11</sup> As an incorporeal, Bréhier continues, time applies to events and verbs (58), serving as an empty form (*"une forme vide"* [59]) that structures their flow.

For Deleuze, the event's neutrality and impassivity imply its independence from corporeal causes, so that when the events are organized on the surface, they assume the power of an "ideational cause" (LS 95) that carries out a genesis of sense and makes representation possible (95–96). While the relation of events to their corporeal causes is unidirectional, their independence gives them a reversible relation of "quasi-causality" with one another (8). Events are thereby submitted to a "double causality" (94) involving an "interiority of destiny as a connection between causes" and an "exteriority of events as a bond of effects" (6). The "quasi-causal" relation of event to event is in this way not a casual relation at all, but an external relation: "incorporeal effects are inseparable from a form of exteriority" (169). Hence, in contrast to the mixture and interpenetration of bodies that are causes to one another, these "relations of quasi-causality" express "an unreal and ghostly causality" (33), which is to say, a false causality. Nonetheless, this false causality is indispensable for events to achieve the freedom necessary to engender sense: "incorporeal sense, as the result of the actions and the passions of the body, may preserve its difference from the corporeal cause only to the degree that it is linked, at the surface, to a quasi-cause which is itself incorporeal" (94). The externality of the event's relations to others means there is no necessary order among them—hence the Stoics, in their reversal of Platonism, are able "to affirm destiny and to deny necessity" (169). As Bréhier (1997, 26–27) explains, the Stoics treat facts as atomic and dispersed, able to be combined in diverse ways through frameworks of empty categories, limited only by the rules of logic. For Deleuze, organized events form series, with every series being "a *conjugation* of effects" (LS 6), so that even while being ideational they are part and parcel of an empiricist approach.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, Deleuze declares: "The logic of sense is inspired in its entirety by empiricism. Only empiricism knows how to transcend the experiential dimensions of the visible without falling into Ideas, and how

to track down, invoke, and perhaps produce a phantom at the limit of a lengthened or unfolded experience” (20). Only empiricism, that is, can bring us to the surface and its events/effects.

Inasmuch as “in whatever manner language [*langage*] is acquired, the elements of language must have been given all together, all at once” (*LS* 48), two distinct accounts of the surface and how it engenders sense are required. The first is a static account—both ontological and logical—of how pure ideal events are organized in their external relations into a structure that allows them to be effectuated and to engender, all at once and entirely, the various representational dimensions of language. Being ideational, this structure exists and is engendered only in and through thought, and so it also presupposes the genesis of thought, or of thinking within thought, through an encounter that raises incorporeal yet still physical event-effects to ideality. The second account is a dynamic psychoanalytical account of how an incorporeal metaphysical surface of thought emerges in time from the depths of bodies and their incorporeal but physical surfaces. While the first account establishes how the event of sense exceeds but also grounds representation, the second shows how it exceeds and ungrounds Oedipal accounts of selfhood, sexuality, and thought. Both rest on and culminate in a notion of structure as a system of differences related through their difference.

## Chapter 15

### Sense and the Proposition

#### Paradoxes, Structure, and Static Genesis

“Sense,” Deleuze writes, “is never only one of the two terms of the duality which contrasts things and propositions, substantives and verbs, denotations and expressions; it is also the frontier, the cutting edge, or the articulation of the difference between the two terms, since it has at its disposal an impenetrability which is its own and within which it is reflected” (*LS* 28). Sense is distributed across words and things, inhering or subsisting in propositions while being attributed to bodies and states of affairs: “the event subsists in language, but it happens to things” (*LS* 24; see also 125). This makes it the “sayable something” *in* propositions and *of* things. But as an intensity that inheres or subsists first in itself, sense remains independent of propositions and things (19). Sense’s fundamental paradoxes follow from this combination of duality and independence.

#### The Paradoxes of the Proposition

Because sense subsists in language while being said of things, the analysis of the surface organization that makes possible its effectuation must begin with the proposition. Similar but insufficient cases of duality and impenetrability are found within things and between things and language. Deleuze starts with a duality between bodies and their incorporeal events-effects, with language being extraneous. But while the relation between bodies and incorporeals is indispensable to sense, its role comes in the later account of dynamic

genesis. And so he quickly moves on. “Insofar as events—effects do not exist outside the propositions which express them,” Deleuze explains, “this duality is prolonged in the duality of things and propositions, of bodies and language” (*LS* 23). This prolongation, then, incorporates language into the duality and makes it one between things and words. Nonetheless, as sense lies at the frontier between them, “the duality is reflected from both sides and in each of the two terms” (24). It thus becomes a duality between, on the one side, bodies, their associated corporeal qualities and relations, and their incorporeal yet physical effects, and, on the other side, nouns, adjectives denoting corporeal states of affairs, and verbs expressing incorporeal effects or events (24).<sup>1</sup> Yet this formulation too is problematic, because it posits a correspondence between words and things, even if the former cannot fully grasp the latter. Sense is again missed, since, as Frege argues, the different cognitive values of names designating the same object remain unregistered unless their *manner* of designation—that is, their expressed sense—is also considered.<sup>2</sup> Deleuze thus declares:

Duality’s last word is not to be found in this return to the hypothesis of *Cratylus*. The duality in the proposition is not between two sorts of names [*noms*], names of stasis and names of becoming, names of substances or qualities and names of events; rather, it is between two dimensions of the proposition, that is, between denotation and expression, or between the denotation of things and the expression of sense. It is like the two sides of a mirror; only what is on the one side has no resemblance to what is on the other. [. . .] This is the final displacement of the duality: it has now moved inside the proposition. (25)

Sense’s constitutive paradoxes are therefore isolated only by locating the duality in the proposition.<sup>3</sup>

Deleuze identifies “three distinct relations within the proposition” (*LS* 12) corresponding to language’s three representational functions and constituting “the tertiary arrangement of language” (119). Propositions relate to referents by denoting states of affairs that may be true or false, possible or impossible; they relate to a subject by manifesting or expressing a speaker’s beliefs and desires; and they relate to conceptual objects by signifying properties that form an order of generality from the particular to the universal. Each relation has claims to primacy but ultimately depends on the others: Denotation refers to manifestation, since words must express

a speaker's beliefs and desires about objects and states of affairs before they can designate them;<sup>4</sup> manifestation and denotation both require the constancy of signified concepts; and yet signification must ultimately refer to a state of affairs affirmed as true or false, making it dependent on denotation (12–16). Exceeding the universal and particular of signification, the subject of manifestation and the object of denotation, lies sense, which cannot be subsumed under these identitarian orders: Propositions denoting opposite states of affairs (“God is” and “God is not”) can have the same sense, while propositions designating the same object (Frege’s “morning star” and “evening star,” or “Socrates” and “the gadfly of Athens”) may have completely different senses; and false propositions or those signifying conceptually incoherent or absurd objects (“square circle”) can nevertheless have sense. Though manifestation may seem to underpin sense by determining meaning in its immediate use, this obtains only in the order of speech (*parole*), which depends on the order of language (*langue*) and its significations; but while the latter might therefore seem to engender sense by providing the conditions for the proposition, these conditions remain indifferent to the proposition’s truth or falsity and thus cannot account for the genesis of what they condition (17–19). Deleuze’s account here resonates with Frege’s (1960, 54–62), where sense is similarly distinct from truth and falsity, lies between the physical and the ideal, the objective and the subjective, and applies even to absurd or impossible objects. But while Frege treats sense within declarative sentences as the expression of thought attributing a predicate to a subject—an expression of judgment—Deleuze maintains that sense expresses an event through the infinitive form of the verb.<sup>5</sup>

Embedded in propositions, sense gives rise to various paradoxes, including some used in *Difference and Repetition* to dismiss surface sense. Sense being presupposed by designation or denotation, it follows that propositions never state their own sense: There is a difference between what is said and the sense of what is said, and so no matter how much I speak, I never say what I mean. The sense of what is said can only be designated by another proposition, whose sense can only be designated by yet another, and so on ad infinitum.<sup>6</sup> Deleuze calls this “*the paradox of regress, or of indefinite proliferation*” (LS 28), and he says it combines the greatest power of language to speak about itself with the greatest impotence of the speaker to state the sense of what he says (27–28). Although he says also that it is commonly known as “Frege’s paradox” (29),<sup>7</sup> Deleuze considers it to belong more to Carroll, who shows, in the proliferation of nominal entities for the song the Knight proposes to sing to Alice, that two distinct series can arise from

it. As the Knight explains, the song is really “A-Sitting on a Gate” but it is called “Ways and Means,” and the song’s name is really “The Aged Aged Man” but this name is called “Haddock’s Eyes” (Carroll 2010, “Through the Looking Glass,” 224; *LS* 29–30). There is therefore not one series consisting of “proposition X,” “the sense of X,” “the sense of ‘the sense of X,’” etc., but a mixture of two types of propositions, one setting out what the song and the song’s name “really are” and one setting out what these realities “are called.” Taken in a single order, they form an “alternation of a real name and a name which designates this reality” (*LS* 30). But they can also be arranged into two orders or series, one of named realities and the names of these names, and the other of the sense of those realities and names. Carroll thereby “decomposes each couplet and freezes it, in order to draw from it a supplementary couplet” (30).

This splitting apart of propositions into two series arrests the first paradox’s indefinite proliferation by establishing two parallel orders, one of propositions and the other of sense-events extracted from them to form a “neutralized double” (*LS* 31). A double is not a copy or replica of an original, and it need not resemble what it doubles: A stunt double need not look like the actor for whom they are the substitute, and regardless of any resemblance, the double is a completely different person. Hence, “doubling up does not at all signify an evanescent and disembodied resemblance, an image without flesh—like a smile without a cat” (125). Propositions—i.e., “the tree is green”—are now doubled by sense-events—i.e., “to green” or “greening”—that are indifferent to their subjects, objects, affirmative or negative polarities, and directions. This introduces a new, “Stoic paradox” (32) of “*sterile division, or of dry reiteration*” (31). Deleuze asks regarding the doubling move: “What have we done [. . .] aside from disengaging [. . .] a phantom, and a phantasm without thickness?” (31). *Difference and Repetition* responded to the same question by dismissing this phantom sense as “a sterile incorporeal deprived of its generative power” (*DR* 156) and located sense instead in the depths. But here Deleuze affirms that sense’s sterility is also “its productivity, its noematic service” (*LS* 32). Akin to the regression paradox’s combination of power and impotence, the Stoic paradox forces us “to combine the sterility of sense in relation to the proposition from which it was extracted with its power of genesis in relation to the dimensions of the proposition” (32). The Stoic paradox leads on to a “paradox of neutrality,” wherein sense is the same for propositions that differ and are even opposed in terms of quantity, quality, modality or relation—“God is” and “God is not”; all men, some men, and no man is white; some future is contingent,

necessary, or impossible, etc.—and finally to the paradox that even absurd or impossible objects have sense (32–35).<sup>8</sup>

### Sense as a Surface Structure

Sense's first paradox is regressive, and "regress has, necessarily, a serial form," while Carroll's splitting of the regress means that "*the serial form is necessarily realized in the simultaneity of at least two series*" (LS 36). The dry and sterile nature of sense extracted from propositions further implies its atomic nature—"dryness is what shall later on be named impenetrability" (32)—and thus the externality of the relations of sense-events to one another and to whatever determines their serial order. All this sets the stage for conceiving surface sense as a structure. Deleuze holds that common to all structuralisms is "sense, regarded not at all as appearance but as surface effect and position effect, and produced by the circulation of the empty square in the structural series" (71). "The importance of structuralism in philosophy, and for all thought," he continues, "is that it displaces frontiers" (71). In this way, it challenges the philosophical dividing line that, even when philosophy turns from essences to sense, links sense to either "a new transcendence, a new avatar of God and a transformed heaven" or an anthropology of "man and his abyss, a newly excavated depth and underground" (71)—linking it, that is, to either the classical height or the archaic depth to which Deleuze felt *Difference and Repetition* still aspired.

As the structure's two series "are never equal" (LS 37), one stands over the other as a series of signifiers and a series of signifieds. Here, "we call 'signifier' any sign which presents in itself an aspect of sense; we call 'signified,' on the contrary, that which serves as the correlative to this aspect of sense, that is, that which is defined in a duality relative to this aspect. What is signified therefore is never sense itself" (37). This means that "the signifier is primarily the event as the ideal logical attribute of a state of affairs" (37), but that it "is also the entire proposition, insofar as it includes dimensions of denotation, manifestation, and signification in the strict sense" (38). The signified, then, corresponds to the state of affairs with its corporeal bodies, qualities, and relations, or to the denoted thing, manifested subject, or signified concept corresponding to the proposition's representational dimensions. The series can also be organized as "two quite distinct stories [that] are developed simultaneously, or when the characters have a vacillating and ill-determined identity" (38). Lacan demonstrates this

with his reading of Edgar Allen Poe's "The Purloined Letter," whose two storylines consist of the King who cannot see the letter hidden in plain sight by the Queen, who cannot act as she witnesses the Minister discern the situation and steal the letter; and the Minister who deceives the police for months by hiding the letter in plain sight, but who loses it to Dupin, who steals it for himself.<sup>9</sup> Carroll illustrates it too through the alternation of real world and fairy tale stories in *Sylvie and Bruno*. What matters is not how similar or disparate the stories or series are but that "small *or* great differences predominate over resemblances and become primary" (38).

Structure arises when the series begin to communicate. The predominance of difference over resemblance entails that "the terms of each series are in perpetual relative displacement in relation to those of the other" (*LS* 39), so that "there is an essential lack of correspondence" (39) and "thus a double sliding of one series over or under the other, which constitutes both, in a perpetual disequilibrium vis-à-vis each other" (40). Partial stabilities result from connections engendered via events within each series. These events associate terms of one series with those of the other, uniting signifiers and signifieds into signs with corresponding values. Value must be understood in Saussurean terms as a positive aspect of externally related signs whose uses are determined by pragmatic rules of substitutability and non-substitutability. Events are "*singularities* which are assignable within the structure" (50). They are "turning points and points of inflection" (52), as opposed to ordinary points that mark no change of direction. Zero degrees Celsius is one example, a transition point at which water is freezing and melting at once.<sup>10</sup> Another is the *clinamen*—the foundational indeterminate and unassignable swerve of the Epicurean atom that causes the collisions leading to larger atomic combinations. The *clinamen*, Deleuze holds, occurs in a time and space smaller than the thinkable minimum of continuous time and space—a space (*spatium*) so infinitesimal as to preclude oblique or extended movements, and an Aionic time of an instant endlessly subdivided into past and future.<sup>11</sup> Singularities, becoming in two directions at once, are determined by forceful inner differences that cannot be equalized or measured by fixed external scales. They accord with neither good sense nor common sense, and are prior to denotation, manifestation, and signification, making them "essentially pre-individual, non-personal, and a-conceptual" (52). "The singularities attached to a series determine in a complex manner the terms of the other series" (50). Prior to language's meaningful signs, then, are events that establish connections between signifiers and signifieds: An unrepresentable event of "greening," for example, associates signifier

and signified in propositions concerning the tree that becomes or does not become green. These events form a history, so that “it is imprecise to oppose structure and event: the structure includes a register of ideal *events*, that is, an entire *history* internal to it” (50).

However, a further determination is required. A complete structural form comprises two or more series, whose internal differences can range from slight to wholly disparate, regulated by a second order component. Heterogeneous series thereby “converge toward a paradoxical element, which is their ‘differentiator’ [*différentiant*]” (LS 50–51). This element “is a value ‘in itself void of sense and thus susceptible of taking on any sense, whose unique function would be to fill the gap between signifier and signified’” (50, quoting Levi-Strauss). Linguistic examples of this element that, being void of sense, can take on any sense, include terms like “it, that, thing, gadget, or ‘whatchamacallit’” (44; see also 49–50), which are deployed when words are lacking for the object under discussion, in this way highlighting a disparity between signifier and signified while also prompting the creation of new terms that ramify the series: “Bring me that whatchamacallit—you know what I mean, that gadget, that thingamajig.” It thereby serves as “the principle of the emission of singularities” and “belongs to no series; or rather, it belongs to both series at once and never ceases to circulate through them. It has therefore the property of always being displaced in relation to itself, of ‘being absent from its own place,’ its own identity, its own resemblance, and its own equilibrium” (51). It presents “two dissymmetrical halves of an ultimate instance” (66), being “equally present in the signifying and the signified series. It is a mirror. Thus, it is at once word and thing, name and object, sense and *denotatum*, expression and designation, etc. It guarantees, therefore, the convergence of the two series which it traverses, but precisely on the condition that it makes them endlessly diverge” (40). Within the signifying series, the element is an excess, a signifier detached from any determined signified and functioning as “an extremely mobile *empty place*” (41), since it is a signifier that means nothing and so can mean anything; while within the series of signifieds, it is a lack that manifests as “a rapidly moving object, an *occupant without a place*, always supernumerary and displaced” (41), a something that seems meaningful but cannot be put into words. Emerging from series communicating through this strange object, the complete structure exhibits three forms of synthesis: “the connective synthesis (if . . . , then), which bears upon the construction of a single series; the conjunctive series (and), as a method of constructing convergent series; and the disjunctive series (or), which distributes the divergent series: *conexa, conjuncta, disjuncta*”

(174). Regression forms the connective series, singularities-events carry out conjunctions, and the paradoxical instant enacts disjunctions that affirm the distance between the series. Despite being last in order, the disjunctive synthesis “proves to be the truth and the destination of the others, to the degree that the disjunction attains its positive and affirmative use” (229).

Deleuze offers various formulations of the paradoxical element. He calls it a “primary intensity” that functions “to distribute difference and to obtain the doubling up of two series” (*LS* 39). He associates it with Lacan (39) and names it “Lacan’s paradox” (338n.6), with the “purloined letter” serving as the strange object—a signifier without signified, both in and missing from its place and regulating two distinct stories by being hidden in plain sight in both.<sup>12</sup> He also associates it with portmanteau words as the last of three types of esoteric word found in Carroll’s literature, all of which regulate communicating series. Other esoteric words connect and contract terms of a single series to extract a global sense—“*y’reince*,” for example, being a contraction of “Your royal Highness”—or ensure the conjunction of heterogeneous series—such as “Snark,” which in its content refers to a composite of shark and snake but in its function refers to heterogeneous series of composite animal and incorporeal sense. Portmanteau words, in contrast, are second order esoteric words that are “grounded upon a strict disjunctive synthesis” (46) and regulate series by ramifying or extending them, introducing new disjunctions (43–47, 67). Deleuze highlights “frumious,” which Carroll describes as “two meanings packed into one word like a portmanteau” (Carroll 2010, “The Hunting of the Snark,” 678), explaining that “if your thoughts incline ever so little towards ‘fuming,’ you will say ‘fuming-furious’; if they turn, by even a hair’s breadth, towards ‘furious,’ you will say ‘furious-fuming’; but if you have that rarest of gifts, a perfectly balanced mind, you will say ‘frumious’” (678, also quoted in *LS* 46). Frumious thus names a position not between two affective states but rather between two tendencies or inclinations, in turn ramifying the series it connects by offering further possibilities for thought, such as a fuming-furious that tends back toward furious without becoming frumious, etc. In this way, it “beckons to other portmanteau words which precede or follow it, and which show that every series is already ramified in principle and still further ramifiable” (*LS* 47).<sup>13</sup>

In all these portrayals, the element paradoxically denotes its own sense, breaking with principle that produces the regressive series that it regulates, and indeed putting it outside all series. We derive the element by following a variation of the regress that orients it away from denotation

and toward signification.<sup>14</sup> Signification involves an order of classes or sets where every class refers to a higher class to which it belongs. This entails the well-known Russellian paradoxes of the set of all sets that do not include themselves as members, and the member that divides the set to which it belongs—the case of “the barber of the regiment” (*LS* 68–69).<sup>15</sup> Belonging and not belonging to its class, the element is “stripped of signification” (69) and denotes only its own absurdity and impossibility. This makes it “a word that denotes exactly what it expresses and expresses what it denotes. It expresses its *denotatum* and designates its own sense. It says something, but at the same time it says the sense of what it says: it says its own sense. It is therefore completely abnormal” (67). It thereby expresses nonsense as its sense—“the entire word says its own sense and is, for this reason, nonsense” (67)—making it not simply a paradox of signification but a paradox of sense, and thus involving it in the constitution of a surface structure.<sup>16</sup> Sense ultimately depends on how the regressive paradoxes of denotation and signification lead to this special relationship between sense and nonsense, “which can not copy that of the true and false, that is, which can not be conceived simply on the basis of a relation of exclusion” (68). This nonsense is not a lack or absence of sense. Rather, in its relation to sense, it “enacts the donation of sense,” and thus “is opposed to the absence of sense” (71). It is a nonsense that *makes sense*.

### The Static Genesis of Sense

The donation of sense occurs through processes of effectuation and individuation that make possible language’s denotation, manifestation, and signification. “In the first place, singularities-events correspond to heterogeneous series which are organized into a system which is neither stable nor unstable, but rather ‘metastable,’ endowed with a potential energy wherein the differences between series are distributed” (*LS* 103). As in *Difference and Repetition*, individuation occurs when an intensity flashes as a sign across a metastable field of disparities, here connecting signifying and signified orders that share nothing in common. But now, “everything happens at the surface” via “membranes” that “place internal and external spaces into contact, without regard to distance” (103). In its neutrality, sense hangs over the proposition’s tripartite determinations and “does not yet imply unity of direction or community of organs. The latter requires a receptive apparatus capable of bringing about a successive superimposition of surface planes

in accordance with another dimension" (104). Sense's neutrality therefore cannot be the end of the matter. To the question "How can we maintain both that sense produces even the states of affairs in which it is embodied, and that it is itself produced by these states of affairs or the actions and passions of bodies (an immaculate conception)?" (124), Deleuze answers that while only interacting bodies can produce incorporeal sense, only sense can individuate bodies. This is accomplished by static genesis, which is also a "passive genesis" (116). "The idea itself of a static genesis dissipates the contradiction. When we say that bodies and their mixtures produce sense, it is not by virtue of an individuation which would presuppose it. Individuation in bodies, the measure in their mixtures, the play of persons and concepts in their variations—this entire order presupposes sense and the pre-individual and impersonal neutral field within which it unfolds. It is therefore in a different way that sense is produced by bodies" (124).

Involving both thought and language, the surface of this static genesis is both a metaphysical surface distinct from the physical if incorporeal surfaces of bodies and a transcendental field of impersonal and pre-individual singularities.<sup>17</sup> It has a problematic status akin to *Difference and Repetition's* virtual Ideas, with the aleatory point or Event serving as a question that envelops problems and is developed in them (52–57, 104). Being impersonal and pre-individual, this surface or field avoids "the error of all efforts to determine the transcendental as consciousness," namely, "think[ing] of the transcendental in the image of, and in the resemblance to, that which it is supposed to ground" (105). Determinations of the transcendental field in the personal form of an "I" or subject either presume, pace Husserl, an originary sense in the rational form of good sense and common sense, or, following Kant, treat this transcendental consciousness as regulative rather than genetic, in either case simply raising an empirical exercise of thinking to a transcendental condition (96–99, 101–2, 105). The error also appears in Sartre, who, criticizing Husserl in *The Transcendence of the Ego*, argues that consciousness's intentionality toward objects accounts sufficiently for its unity and its capacity to synthesize past and present consciousnesses, making the transcendental ego nothing more than a product of consciousness's self-reflection and giving it the same transcendent status as the ego of another.<sup>18</sup> "Sartre's objections are decisive" (105), Deleuze maintains. But while they demonstrate that transcendental conditions are impersonal,<sup>19</sup> they nevertheless "define this impersonal consciousness by means of pure intentionalities and retentions, which still presuppose centers of individuation" (105).<sup>20</sup> The generation of individuation from pre-individual conditions, however, must also be explained.

Their connection having no necessary order, singularities-events are distributed nomadically on the surface: “a singularity is inseparable from a zone of perfectly objective indetermination which is the open space of its nomadic distribution” (*LS* 113). Nonetheless, “singularities possess a process of auto-unification, always mobile and displaced to the extent that a paradoxical element traverses the series and makes them resonate” (103). Events can auto-unify according to rules because, rather than contradictions obtaining between them, there “seem to be formed extrinsic relations of silent compatibility or incompatibility, of conjunction or disjunction” (170). The externality of these relations provides principles for the organization of singularities-events without imposing any strict necessity on their order.

These principles are Leibnizian. A singularity marking an inflection or change extends over a series of ordinary points to the vicinity of another singularity. Where these are compatible, they help form a world defined by convergence and compossibility. Where they are incompatible, they mark a divergence where the series form impossible worlds (109–11). Individuation constitutes a monad whose perspective envelops and expresses clearly the singularities-events within a neighborhood of its world and relates them to singularities incarnated in the monad’s body (109). In this way, “an individual is [ . . . ] always in a world as a circle of convergence, and a world may be formed and thought only in the vicinity of the individuals which occupy or fill it” (110). This individuation is the first stage of effectuation.

From the point of view of the static genesis, the structure of individual-world-interindividuality defines the first level of effectuation. At this first level, singularities are effectuated both in a world and in the individuals which are parts of the world. To be effectuated or to effectuate oneself means to extend over a series of ordinary points; to be selected according to a rule of convergence; to be incarnated in a body; to become the state of a body; and to be renewed locally for the sake of limited new effectuations and extensions. Not one of these characteristics belongs to singularities as such; they rather belong to the individuated world and to the worldly individuals which envelop them. (110)

This individual–world organization precedes the inherence of predicates in the subject. Though the world “does exist within the monads as the series of predicates which inhere in them” (110), this predication is merely the way the world is expressed, and it differs from the “differential relations

and [. . .] contiguous singularities” that define the expressed world itself (110–11). The individual’s predicates are analytic predicates, because the monad contains the entire world. They are constituted in relation to pure events expressed by verbs, so that “‘*To green*’ indicates a singularity-event in the vicinity of which the tree is constituted. ‘*To sin*’ indicates a singularity-event in the vicinity of which Adam is constituted” (112). These predicates are absolutely individual and so admit no generality: A tree is always *this* green and is always *this* color, and so “having color” is no more general than “being green.” An order of generality occurs with the transition to propositional forms of expression that involve logical considerations of genus and species, where the predicate of one proposition can become a subject predicated in another proposition: Adam is a man, man is an animal, etc. (112–13). With analytic predicates, however, “there is not yet an order of concepts and mediations, but rather an order of mixtures only according to coexistence and succession” (112)—that is, there is only a succession of the tree being *this* green and then *that* green, with the general notion of green being simply an aggregate of these individual states.

Individuation is an “immanent transcendence” of the transcendental field that remains internal to a world, whereas the second stage of effectuation realizes an “*objective transcendency*” that crosses and connects impossible worlds (LS 113). The second effectuation is that of the person as “a knowing subject [that] appears when something is *identified* inside worlds which are nevertheless impossible, and across series which are nevertheless divergent” (113). This is a thinking subject who is split across impossibles. In addition to the example of Adam, Deleuze references Borges’s story of *The Garden of Forking Paths*, whose author, Ts’ui Pen, chose to include all possible storylines, resulting in a chaotic work in which a character murdered in a previous chapter reappears in a later one, etc.<sup>21</sup> Adam is “objectively indeterminate” across different worlds, a “vagabond” or a “nomad,” since he is “positively defined *solely* through a few singularities which can be combined and can complement each other in a very different fashion in different worlds (to be the first man, to live in a garden, to give birth to a woman from himself, etc.)” (114). He is less the differentiator or aleatory point as “that which represents this sign, and which holds good for many of these worlds, or, in the last analysis, for all worlds, despite their divergences and the individuals which inhabit them” (114). Although objectively indeterminate, Adam establishes a univocal commonness across divergence, but this nonetheless provides the germinal condition for a commonness of

an identity attained through “the formation of the principle of a ‘common sense’ as the function of identification” (116).

Persons are “objects = x” (LS 115) that are not described by analytic predicates but defined synthetically by the minimal predicates—the “few singularities” (114)—that “open different worlds and individualities to them as so many variables or possibilities” (115). The “primary possibilities or the categories” realized in various impossible worlds become “the synthetic predicates of persons defined in relation to disjunctive syntheses” (115). Synthetic predicates also do not imply a conceptual order of increasing generality, because the multiplicity of worlds ensures that different cases remain singular—Adam’s “garden may contain a red rose, but there are in other worlds or in other gardens roses which are not red and flowers which are not roses” (115)—and because persons “are primarily *classes having one single member*, and their predicates are *properties having one constant*” (115).

Individuals expressing their world, persons crossing worlds as knowing subjects, and the multiple classes and variable properties that derive from persons are precursors for the proposition’s three representational dimensions. However, while individuals and persons are the products of an ontological genesis, classes and properties are simply matters of logical possibility. The proposition undergoes a logical genesis in which individuals and persons are “material instances which realize the possibility and determine within the logical proposition the relations necessary to the existence of the conditioned” (LS 118). There is no simple correspondence between, on the one hand, the individuals, persons, and the classes or properties that result from the effectuation of pure events, and, on the other hand, language’s designation, manifestation, and signification (119). The former are the “objective correlates” (120) of the proposition’s dimensions, but they are engendered by other means. The logical proposition, then, is not an ontological product of the transcendental field but a response to the field’s problematic status, a solution to a problem that “*is not* propositional” (122), making it radically heterogeneous to the propositional answers in which it inheres.

The problematic field of sense is an “ideational objectivity” (LS 120) whose conditions are “an open space of [. . .] nomadic distribution” (113) of its singularities and “a time of decomposition” (121) that splits spaces into sub-spaces. Moreover, “a problem is determined only by the singular points which express its conditions. We do not say that the problem is thereby resolved; on the contrary, it is determined as a problem” (54). Pure events, as “ideational singularities which communicate in one and the same

Event [. . .] bear exclusively upon problems and define their conditions” (53, 54). Propositions as responses or solutions, therefore, cannot determine their problem. The problematic field is misunderstood if it is defined by its “resolvability,” treating it, à la the television game show *Jeopardy*, as an empirical problem to be determined or discerned by its proposed answers (122). It is further misunderstood if the solution, once given, is seen to dissipate the problem (121). The problematic is not “a subjective category of our knowledge or [. . .] an empirical moment which would indicate only the imperfection of our method and the unhappy necessity for us not to know ahead of time” (54). Nevertheless, “the synthesis of the problem with its conditions engenders propositions, their dimensions, and their correlates” (121).

The problematic field does not give being to the proposition the way ontological genesis gives being to individuals and persons. Instead, it donates sense to it—it enables the proposition to “make sense.” Against the logical principle that a proposition may be either true or false, sense conditions propositional solutions through the “transcendental principle according to which a proposition always has the truth, the part and the kind of truth which it merits, and which belongs to it according to its sense” (*LS* 96). Propositions are constructed from logical possibilities arising alongside ontologically engendered individuals and persons, and they respond to and partially resolve a problematic field and its animating question. This is a process of thinking that brings thought to bear on things and states of affairs. A full account of how the transcendental field assumes this problematic status and of the birth of this thinking that responds to it is provided by the account of dynamic genesis Deleuze outlines later in the text.<sup>22</sup> That account makes the static genesis more complex than simply the effectuation of impersonal and pre-individual structural elements, as it shows how the structure of sense develops from several structural forms or levels. At this point, however, we can note that with the transcendental field being an impersonal, pre-individual, and extra-propositional dimension immanent to the proposition, “solutions are engendered at precisely the same time that the problem determines *itself*” (121)—an immediate or static genesis.

## Chapter 16

### Counter-Effectuation, Perversion, and the Ethics of the Event

Either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us. To grasp whatever happens as unjust and unwarranted (it is always someone else's fault) is, on the contrary, what renders our sores repugnant—veritable *ressentiment*, resentment of the event. There is no other ill will. What is really immoral is the use of moral notions like just or unjust, merit or fault. What does it mean then to will the event? Is it to accept war, wounds, and death when they occur? It is highly probable that resignation is only one more figure of *ressentiment*, since *ressentiment* has many figures. If willing the event is, primarily, to release its eternal truth, like the fire on which it is fed, this will would reach the point at which war is waged against war, the wound would be the living trace and the scar of all wounds, and death turned on itself would be willed against all deaths. We are faced with a volitional intuition and a transmutation.

—LS 149

Deleuze elaborates the structure of pure events communicating through an Event with the example of “the battle,” which “*hovers*” over the field of conflict and “is not an example of an event among others, but rather the Event in its essence” (LS 100). The battle is “neutral in relation to all of its temporal effectuations, neutral and impassive in relation to the victor and the vanquished, the coward and brave; because of this, it is all the more terrible” (100). It is “never present but always yet to come and already

passed” (100), expressing itself in the multifarious ways that the battle is lived. The soldier discharging his weapon, the one fleeing from danger, and the one lying mortally wounded each effectuates a verb-event—to attack, to flee, to kill, to die. They incarnate these events as individuals embodying perspectives on a world and as thinking persons connecting impossible worlds (or impossible realities belonging to the same world). These effectuations share nothing except a problematic animated by the question the Event poses: “‘Where’ is the battle?” (101). The battle as Event is “graspable [. . .] by the will of anonymity which it itself inspires” (100). This will, Deleuze says, presents “in the mortally wounded soldier who is no longer brave or cowardly, no longer victor or vanquished, but rather so much beyond, at the place where the Event is present, participating therefore in its terrible impassibility” (101). We find here a becoming-equal to the Event occurring via the subject’s dissolution, attained through “a long struggle” and “by means of a ‘volitional intuition,’ that is, by means of the will that the event creates in” the dying soldier (101). There is an ethics that uses the event to reach the Event.

Deleuze cites Joe Bousquet, a soldier paralyzed in the First World War whose catastrophic injury motivated a body of poetic work “which is in its entirety a meditation on the wound, the event, and language” (*LS* 348n.1). Bousquet’s writings affirm the event and its Aionic temporality: “My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it” (148, quoting Bousquet). They express *amor fati*, a love of fate that does not resign itself to what has happened but embraces a truth within these events. As Zarathustra teaches, overcoming does not simply turn “what was” into “thus I willed it,” but culminates in “thus I will its eternal return.” This second willing expunges *ressentiment* toward the event and transmutes the self. It is directed not toward the returning event but the Aionic temporality that makes it always past and yet to come. Willing the event’s eternal return “wills now not exactly what occurs, but something *in* that which occurs, something yet to come which would be consistent with what occurs, in accordance with the laws of an obscene, humorous conformity: the Event. It is in this sense that the *Amor fati* is one with the struggle of free men” (*LS* 149).

### The Ideal Game and the Affirmation of Chance

Willing the eternal return affirms an “ideal game” played only in thought. Deleuze’s portrayal of the eternal return as a dice throw that affirms the

necessity of chance and the chance conditioning all necessity appears in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*. In *The Logic of Sense*, it receives an extended elaboration through comparison with ordinary games played according to preexisting rules, where chance is apportioned and related to various gains and losses, and the gameplay involves multiple, numerically distinct throws (*LS* 58–59). Such games are always “partial” and “mixed” because they limit chance to specific moments, balance it with other considerations such as skill or the calculation of consequences, and ultimately “refer to another type of activity, labor, or morality, whose caricature or counterpart they are” (59). This is even true of games with transcendent outcomes, like Pascal’s wager or Leibniz’s chess-playing God, where moral considerations are clearly involved. These games always provoke *ressentiment* in the player who demands several throws so that chance can compensate for or reverse the negative results of “unlucky” throws. A “pure” game of chance, in contrast, is played without preexisting rules or extraneous considerations, including considerations of “winning” or “losing.” Each throw only furthers the endless ramification of chance (59). It is thereby “a game of innocence” that “finds it possible to affirm all chance and to make chance into an object of affirmation” (60). The ideal game may involve successive throws, but they are all simultaneous in relation to an aleatory point that “insinuates chance over the entire length of each series” (59).

Deleuze refers to Borges’s “The Babylon Lottery” (Borges 1993, 45–51), which describes a game that originally has players purchase tickets for a regular drawing, then becomes one where every free man is automatically entered, then one where draws determine each player’s fate for seventy days, and finally one where everything is submitted to chance and the necessities that accompany it: A draw determining a death sentence is followed by further draws determining the executioner or reversing the condemned man’s fate, etc. In the game’s final form, then, “the number of drawings is infinite,” which requires not an infinite extension of time but rather “that time be infinitely subdivisible” (49). Here, for Deleuze, the lottery becomes a game of pure surface events and their Aionic temporality (*LS* 61). These events, being distinct from their incarnation in bodies and chronological time, are wholly subject to chance in both their singularity and the series they form. Chance is their eternal truth and their common link with all other events in a univocal Event (64). The ideal game in this way not only affirms all chance but grasps the sense of all events.

Affirming the event in its chance and necessity means eschewing the quest for reasons or causes “behind” it. “Joe Bousquet must be called Stoic”

(*LS* 148), as “Stoic ethics [. . .] consists of willing the event as such, that is, of willing that which occurs insofar as it does occur” (143). There is an element of divination here, as events are effects of corporeal causes whose unity entails the destiny of what happens—affirming the event thus affirms that it was always meant to be. But such affirmation does not grasp the event’s sense, which involves not a physics of incorporeals but a metaphysics of language and thought. Thus, “it is not accidental that Stoic ethics was unable (and had no desire) to trust in physical methods of divination” (144). Events must be grasped not simply as incorporeal effects of corporeal causes but *expressively*, in terms of the impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field they constitute. Expression goes beyond representation, which relates to its object—here the event that happens to us—extrinsically and through resemblance (145). Grasping the event intrinsically, expression achieves an adequate and true idea of it in the Spinozist sense. Deleuze here returns to Blanchot’s two deaths, one being material and personal, and the other ideational and impersonal: “The perception of death as a state of affairs and as a quality, or the concept ‘mortal’ as a predicate of signification, remain extrinsic (deprived of sense) as long as they do not encompass the event of dying as that which is effectuated in the one and expressed in the other. Representation must encompass an expression which it does not represent, but without which it itself would not be ‘comprehensive,’ and would have truth only by chance or from outside” (145).

Affirming the event and grasping its sense are thereby one and the same. The Stoic wise man identifies with and becomes the event’s quasi-cause by willing its occurrence and effectuation. But the sage could not “be the quasi-cause of the incorporeal event, and thereby will its embodiment, if the event were not already in the process of being produced by and in the depth of corporeal causes, or if illness were not prepared at the innermost depth of bodies” (*LS* 147). The sage “does not create, [but] ‘operates [*opère*],’ and wills only what comes to pass” (147). The French verb *opérer* used in this passage refers to accomplishing an action or effectuating a transformation. The sage acts as a quasi-cause to effectuate and incarnate an event that, in itself and independently of all other events, is already in the process of coming about.

### The Event and the Silent Crack

The Event is the eternal truth of events because it is nothing more than that within every singularity-event that allows it to transcend its corporeal

causes. It is the in-itself of the event (will to power), its becoming in two directions at once, and that by which the event, through its quasi-causal external relations to all others, escapes reduction to corporeality. It is thus what remains paradoxical in every answer to paradox, what remains a problem in every solution. In contrast, events themselves, as dice throws, “are not really, numerically distinct. They are qualitatively distinct, but all of them are the qualitative forms of a single cast which is ontologically one” (*LS* 59, translation modified). Events are formally distinct, but in terms of the same non-numerical real distinction Deleuze invokes to reconcile the multiplicity of Spinoza’s attributes with the unity of his substance. The Event, however, is not substance but difference. It is also not an event *on* the surface but a crack *of* the surface—“the order of the surface is itself cracked” (*LS* 157)—and a crack of thought—“the cerebral crack in a vigorous body or the crevice of thought” (322). This crack circulates among surface events and their potential energy, repeating itself as a “perpetual heredity of the Other [*Autre*]” (325). It is also a crack within Being, insofar as event and sense join in univocal Being (180). It is a “nonbeing” that is “not the being of the negative; it is rather the being of the problematic” (123). For this reason, “we should perhaps write [it] as (non)-being or ?-being” (123).

A couple with all the looks, charm, riches, and—most importantly—superficiality needed to be “happy” glide along until an event derails and shatters them (*LS* 154). This catastrophic event is a “noisy accident” (155), but it would not be sufficient to shatter them unless it dug down and connected to a silent ontological crack “at the frontier” (155) that preexists it and has a totally different nature: imperceptible, incorporeal, impassive, neither inside nor outside, revealed “only at a distance and when it is too late” (155), and in this way relating to the temporality that ensures we are never self-identical beings. The silent crack differs from its noisy counterparts in the same way that Blanchot’s impersonal death differs from the personal one (156). It designates the death instinct operating silently in the background (326). Though never effectuated as such, remaining the paradoxical becoming of an Aionic temporality, an ethics that makes us worthy of what happens to us demands that the Event’s effectuation be willed. Willing the Event’s effectuation also wills the event’s counter-effectuation, as it releases the event from its present effectuation in the body and returns it to a state where it is both past and yet to come.

Willing the Event affirms impossibles, since all events communicate in the Event. It transforms disjunction—the either/or—into “a veritable synthesis, instead of being a procedure of analysis which is satisfied with the exclusion of predicates from one thing in virtue of the identity of its concept.

[. . . D]ivergence is affirmed in such a way that the *either . . . or* itself becomes a pure affirmation” (LS 174). Leibniz failed to achieve this because he used impossibility only to exclude what was incompatible with the world he deemed the best possible one God could choose (171–72). Consequently, his perspectivism was one in which the monads—despite being windowless and never communicating with one another, instead having only their own internal perspectives on the others—all held unique points of view, but as if of the same town. In contrast, affirming impossibles and disjunction as a “positive distance” (173) affirms a (Nietzschean) perspectivism where “the point of view is opened onto a divergence which it affirms: another town corresponds to each point of view, each point of view is another town, the towns are linked only by their distance and resonate only through the divergence of their series, their houses and their streets” (174). Positive distance entails that “everything happens through the resonance of disparates, point of view on a point of view, displacement of perspective, differentiation [*différenciation*] of difference, and not through the identity of contraries” (175). “Adam the sinner” and “Adam the non-sinner” do not contradict each other; they are “alogical incompatibles” (171) that negate each other only indirectly. Hence Adam can both sin and not sin, as it turns on the perspective.

With this, “impossibility is now a means of communication” (LS 174), and impossibles can belong to the same world. Disjunction now not only becomes a synthesis but takes priority over the syntheses of connection and conjunction that had priority when disjunction was used simply to regulate conjunctive syntheses by delineating those series that did not converge with them (175). Impossibility and disjunction are sustained in the one who wills them. “The actor’s paradox,” Deleuze says, is that he “maintains himself in the instant in order to act out something perpetually anticipated and delayed, hoped for and recalled” (150). The actor never simply plays a character but “open[s] himself up to the impersonal and pre-individual role. The actor is always acting out other roles when acting one role” (150). The free man “grasps the event, and does not allow it to be effectuated as such without enacting [*sans en opérer*], the actor, its counter-effectuation” (152).

### Ethics, Perversion, and the World without Others

Ethics operates on the surface to counter-effectuate the event, returning it to its quasi-causal relations with all others. Humor and perversion are two of its

crucial operations. The connection between humor and perversion outlined in Deleuze's *Masoch* book is here reconsidered in terms of the surface. As in that work, as well as *Difference and Repetition*, humor is contrasted with irony as an operation of the heights and Ideas. But while humor had been positioned as "an art of consequences and descents, of suspensions and falls" (*DR* 5), now it is "the art of the surface, which is opposed to the old irony, the art of depths and heights" (*LS* 9). Humor might appear still linked to the depths because its first action is to subvert irony's heights. Humor is Diogenes the Cynic answering Plato's definition of man as a bipedal, featherless animal with a plucked fowl, subverting signification's conceptual order "with a designation and a pure 'monstration'" (135). This initially "hurls us into the ground of bodies and the groundlessness of their mixtures" (135). But a second movement quickly leads "back to the surface where there is no longer anything to denote or even to signify, but where pure sense is produced" (136). Humor thereby differs from satire, which "is a prodigious art of regressions" (246) that enters and remains in the depths. Irony has various forms beyond the Platonic, and its ascent need not lead to transcendence. But it always "confine[s] the singularity within the limits of the [effectuated] individual or the [effectuated] person" (139), cutting it off from its pre-individual and pre-personal nature and thereby sustaining the world of representation. Consequently, irony "has at its disposal the dimensions of a language before having at its disposal the corresponding principle of organization" (247). Humor, in contrast, works within this organizing principle, but emerges "when one undoes the individual and the person" and makes way for "a new type of esoteric language [. . .] which is its own model and reality" (141). Humor reaches the pre-personal and pre-individual by expressing "the co-extensiveness of sense with nonsense" (141).

Perversion too opposes both heights and depths, "Platonic conversion and pre-Socratic subversion" (*LS* 133). It is "an art of the surface," distinguished "from subversion as a technique of depth" (243). Perversion is not reducible to the criminal acts that are often associated with it and sometimes effectuate it. Carroll, for example, is "perverse but without crime, perverse but nonsubversive" (243). Instead, perversion develops the "ethics of intensive quantities," previously outlined in *Difference and Repetition*. This ethics "has only two principles: affirm even the lowest, do not explicate oneself (too much)" (*DR* 244), Deleuze explaining that the second rule means, "above all, not to explicate oneself too much with the other [*autrui*], not to explicate the other [*autrui*] too much, but to maintain one's implicit values and multiply one's own world by populating it with all those

expresseds that do not exist apart from their expressions" (261). As already seen, explication involves an "Other-structure"—or, as *The Logic of Sense* translates *structure-autrui*, a "structure-Other"—that appears alongside the actualizations of the I and Self in a way that envelops and distorts intensive individuating factors. Hence the importance of the distinction between actualization and effectuation that is formalized in *The Logic of Sense*. As explained earlier, impersonal and pre-individual singularities, which preside over the genesis of individuals and persons, "are distributed in a 'potential' which admits neither Self nor I, but which produces them by actualizing or effectuating itself, although the figures of this actualization do not at all resemble the effectuated potential" (*LS* 103). What is actualized are the I, the Self, and related categories of representation, whose structure is that of the Other (*Autrui*); what is effectuated, through individuation, are individuals as perspectival monads expressing a compossible world and persons as objects = x connecting impossible worlds. The "theory of singular points," which takes singularities-events to be organized into metastable heterogeneous series from which individuations arise, allows us to transcend "the synthesis of the person and the analysis of the individual as these are (or are made) in consciousness" (103)—that is, as these are made within the I-Self psychic system.

The structure-Other's role and the consequences of its absence are elaborated in Deleuze's discussion of Michel Tournier's *Friday*, a retelling of the Robinson Crusoe story that frames it as an exploration of a "world without others [*autrui*]" (*LS* 304). Tournier's Robinson, after an initial period of despair, constructs a vessel to escape the island, but his isolation has already hampered his ability to think fully through his plan, and he builds a boat too large and too far inland to be launched. Accepting his fate, he turns to organizing and exploiting the island, establishing agriculture, keeping livestock, writing a charter of laws, constructing a water clock, keeping a calendar, and writing a journal. These help him stave off a terrifying collapse into insanity and animality but also begin his transformation into another life. Robinson comes to view the island, Speranza, in feminine terms, first as a mother figure and then as a lover and spouse. He seeks to penetrate her depths by exploring a deep cave and considers the appearance of new mandrake flowers to be a product of his seed and union with her. The arrival of Friday, whom he rescues from natives who brought him to the island as a sacrifice, disrupts Robinson's order. The boy ignores the island's rules, ruins the rice harvest, seems to begin his own relationship with Speranza, and, finally, accidentally detonates the black powder stores, destroying Robinson's

cultivated world completely. But this destruction, and particularly the water clock's obliteration, which leaves time frozen in an eternal present, completes Robinson's transformation, releasing him from an elemental yet still too human desire for Speranza and the earth and elevating him to a solar joy and ecstasy. When a European vessel arrives, Robinson discovers how each crewman presents "a *possible* world [*monde possible*]" (Tournier 1997, 220) that expresses its own values and coherence and that "naïvely proclaimed itself the reality. That was what other people were: the possible obstinately passing for the real" (220). The otherwise disparate viewpoints of these others, however, converge in petty desires and a casual and superficial view of the island and its contents. Offered rescue, Robinson chooses to remain on Speranza and is joined by the ship's often abused cook boy, who saw the transformed Robinson's kindness and chose escape to the island when Friday joined the departing ship.

Deleuze contends that Defoe's aim of placing Robinson in an original state of isolation and following his reconstruction of a civilized order is falsified from the start by Robinson's having access to civilization's tools from the shipwreck and having already repressed his sexual desire as required for work (*LS* 302–3). In Defoe's story, the civilized world "is the equivalent of the *real*—that is, economic—world, or the world as it would be, as it would have to be if there were no sexuality (see the elimination of all sexuality in Defoe's Robinson)" (303). In contrast, Tournier's story recounts Robinson's achievement of a "great elemental Health" that is "inseparable from desert sexuality" and a "dehumanization" that involves "the essential *deviation* which this Health implies" (303). Instead of an asexual Robinson delivered into isolation and reproducing a world like ours, Tournier's Robinson, by way of sexuality, attains "*ends quite different and divergent* from ours, in a fantastic world which has itself deviated" (303). The deviation of this great Health is inseparable from perversion, and although "Robinson does nothing perverse, properly speaking," Deleuze contends that he gives "the impression that he is himself perverse, according to Freud's definition of the one who deviates with respect to aims" (303). Here too, Tournier's story differs from Defoe's, as the latter's Robinson, related to a problem of origins, "must necessarily reproduce our world," while the former's Robinson, "related to ends, [. . .] must deviate" (304). Tournier's Robinson is a pervert "who introduces desire into an entirely different system and makes it play, within this system, the role of an internal limit, a virtual center [*d'un foyer virtuel*] or zero point" (304). This system is a world without Others, and Robinson discovers that the absence of Others and their civilizing order does not entail chaos but

another kind of order. If, pace Defoe's work, "neurosis is the negative of perversion" (304)—that is, perversion is negated through neurotic repression of desire—then Tournier's novel demonstrates, in contrast, how "perversion, for its part, [is] the *elemental* aspect of neurosis" (304)—that is, it is that from which neurosis, the fundamental condition of civilization and its discontents (Freud 1994), emerges under certain conditions.

Nevertheless, Tournier's novel is neither a study of perversion, a character-driven story, nor an "internal analysis, since Robinson has very little interiority" (*LS* 304). Instead, it is "an amazing novel of comic adventures" concerning "what is going to happen in the insular world without Others" (304). "The first of effect of Others," Deleuze states, "is that around each object that I perceive or each idea that I think there is the organization of a marginal world, a mantle or background, where other objects and other ideas may come forth in accordance with laws of transition which regulate the passage from one to another" (305). Transitions divert consciousness and expand it beyond its immediate relation to its object. They provide alternative perspectives that fill out the subject's perceptual framework and enable it to embed objects and itself in its world: "The part of the object that I do not see I posit as visible to Others, so that when I will have walked around to reach this hidden part, I will have joined the Others behind the object, and I will have totalized it in the way that I had already anticipated. As for the objects behind my back, I sense them coming together and forming a world, precisely because they are visible to, and are seen by, Others" (305).<sup>1</sup>

Others also relate the subject to objects of desire: "my desire passes through Others, and through Others it receives an object. I desire nothing that cannot be seen, thought, or possessed by a possible Other. That is the basis of my desire. It is always Others who relate my desire to an object" (306).<sup>2</sup> This is a relation of temporal discontinuity, as "the Other causes my consciousness to tip necessarily into an 'I was,' into a past which no longer coincides with the object" (310). The subject is thus grounded by Others in its past, in the (lost) objects of its desire: "I am nothing other than my past objects, and my self is made up of a past world, the passing away of which was brought about precisely by the Other" (310).<sup>3</sup>

The Other is not another person or subject, nor part of a dialectic between subjects who stand as objects for each other. Indeed, "the Other [*autrui*] is neither an object in the field of my perception nor a subject who perceives me: the Other is initially a structure of the perceptual field, without which the entire field could not function as it does" (*LS* 307).<sup>4</sup> This structure comprises perspectives or possible worlds. "Possible" here does not

denote an abstract potential reality that is stripped of existence, projected behind a real world that it resembles, and left open to realization—this being the possibility the critique of which Deleuze draws from Bergson when distinguishing the virtual from the possible (*B* 17–18, 96–98; *DR* 211–12). Rather, it is an expression of sense: “Let it be understood that the possible [*possible*] is not here an abstract category designating something which does not exist; the expressed possible world certainly exists, but it does not exist (actually) outside of that which expresses it [*le monde possible exprimé existe parfaitement, mais il n'existe pas (actuellement) hors de ce qui l'exprime*]” (*LS* 307). An expressed possible world may be effectuated in concrete human others. However, “that this structure may be effectuated by real characters [*personnages réel*], by variable subjects [*sujets variables*]—me for you and you for me—does not prevent its preexistence, as the condition of organization in general, to the terms which actualize it in each organized perceptual field—yours and mine” (307). Organizing the subject’s perceptual field, its desiring connections to objects, and its temporalization, the structure-Other makes possible the world of representation. It thus gives rise to “an entire field of virtualities and potentialities which I already knew were capable of being actualized” (305), the Other both expressing a possible world and rendering possible a series of dualistic categories on which the perceptual field functions (309–10). The structure-Other persists for Robinson even after he no longer “encounters any actual terms or characters to effectuate it” (309). But eventually it vanishes.

The absence of the texture and mediation provided by others results initially in “a harsh and black world, without potentialities or virtualities: the category of the possible has collapsed” (*LS* 306).<sup>5</sup> All that seems to remain is “the brutal opposition of the sun and earth, of an unbearable light and an obscure abyss: the ‘summary law of all or nothing’” (306). Robinson first despairs of a world turned harmful, but over time he “discovers (slowly) that it is the Other who disturbs the world. The Other was the trouble” (311), until “suddenly there is a click” (310).<sup>6</sup> Eventually he discerns a certain height, as “things [. . .] are no longer being pulled down by Others one on top of the other” (311), and desire is “no longer being drawn down on top of a possible object or a possible world expressed by Others” (311–12). In this way, “the de-structuration of the Other is not a disorganization of the world, but an upright organization as opposed to the recumbent organization” (312–13). Without the temporal discontinuity effected by Others, “consciousness and its object are one” (311) and chronological time is suspended—Tournier’s Robinson proclaims: “I seem to be

ceaselessly reliving the same day” (311, quoting Tournier 1997, 204)—leaving consciousness and its object “to coincide [. . .] in an eternal present” (311). In this new organization, each earthly thing releases a celestial double that “is not a replica” but a “new upright image” (312). Robinson’s deviation is completed when “the object of desire is neither the body nor the thing, but only the Image” (313). This double or Image is the other Speranza, whose discovery Robinson had sought within the cave (Tournier 1997, 172) before being transported to it after the explosion. There, he can “*live perpetually in a moment of innocence*” (205).

For Deleuze, Robinson’s early neurosis, caused by the persisting structure-Other driving him back into memory, and his subsequent psychotic attempts to organize his earthly world and compensate for the structure’s eventual disappearance (*LS* 313–15), constitute an “adventure of depth” that reveals how “the structure-Other organizes and pacifies depth. It renders it livable” (315). It does so by pulling down the elements and leaving them “imprisoned [. . .] within the limits of bodies and, further still, within the limit of the earth” (312). In these circumstances, “the agitations of this structure imply a disorder, a disturbance of depth, as an aggressive return of the bottomless abyss that can no longer be conjured away. Everything has lost its sense, everything becomes *simulacrum and vestige*” (315). Robinson would be left endlessly fighting off all disturbances to his cultivated world, seeing them as threats from a bottomless abyss, “unless there be some sort of salvation for Robinson; unless he invents a new dimension or a third sense [beyond neurosis and psychosis] for the expression ‘loss of Others’” (315). Robinson must discover a “pure surface” where “an unknown image of things is detached” (315).<sup>7</sup> If, in escaping from the depths, this surface seems to involve height, it “does not at all signify a height which would merely be the inverse image of depth” but instead expresses “the generalized erection [. . .] the erection of surfaces, their rectification—the disappearance of the Others. At the surface of the isle and the overarching sky, simulacra ascend and become *phantasms*. Doubles without semblance and elements without constraint—these are the two aspects of the phantasm” (315). This surface is “perhaps what Others were hiding from us” (315).<sup>8</sup>

Robinson is led to this surface by Friday, who “alone is able to guide and complete the metamorphosis that Robinson began and to reveal to him its sense and its aim. He will accomplish all of this innocently and superficially” (*LS* 315–16). Crucially, “Friday does not function at all like a rediscovered Other” (316)—he is neither another subject who would secure Robinson’s subjectivity through recognition, an object to be placed within

Robinson's ordered world, nor a possible world or perspective that widens and secures this world for Robinson. Finally, Friday is not a sexual other, "an object of desire for Robinson" (317).<sup>9</sup> Instead, "he indicates *another*, supposedly true world, an irreducible double which alone is genuine, and in this other world, a double of the Other [*autrui*] who no longer is and cannot be. Not an Other [*autrui*], but something wholly other (*un tout-autre*) than the Other; not a replica but a Double" (317). Whereas "the Other is a strange detour [that] brings my desires down to objects, and my love to worlds" (317), Friday is the "otherwise-Other (*de l'Autre qu'autrui*)" (319) able "to separate desire from its *object*, from its detour through the body, in order to relate it to a pure *cause*" (317). This is desire's perversion, which manifests a "perverse structure [. . .] which is opposed to the structure-Other and takes its place. [. . .] The world of the pervert is a world without Others" (319, 320). Releasing desire from its object and directing it toward its Double, perversion effects a "desubjectivation" (320). This is "the sense of the 'Robinson' fiction" (318).



Deleuze holds that we can see in suicide, madness, and drug and alcohol use the aim of making the impersonal death coincide with its personal and material counterpart, of making the impassive Event coincide with the corporally inscribed event. The attempt, as Blanchot argues, is both illusory and inevitable, not only because of the disparity between the two sides that are to be brought together but also because of the assumption of a subjectivity capable of bringing this coincidence about (*LS* 156 and 348–49n.3). But this is only how the abstract thinker sees the problem (156), and the real issue lies elsewhere. Willing the Event would seem necessarily to entail willing its complete effectuation in the body, and this must be explored in action and not simply academic thought (156–57). "'Crack' remains a word as long as the body is not compromised by it" (160). The question is whether we should "go a short way further to see for ourselves, be a little alcoholic, a little crazy, a little suicidal, a little guerilla—just enough to extend the crack, but not enough to deepen it irremediably [*sic*]?" (157–58). A certain alcoholism, Deleuze suggests, is exemplary in neither seeking pleasure nor corresponding to a lack or need, but instead aiming to hold together and live two times at once: a hardened present and an imaginary and "very special" (158) past perfect, these coming together in an "I have-loved, I have-done, I have-seen" (158).<sup>10</sup> The drinker first identifies with the past in the form

of an “I have lived” or “I have loved,” but this eventually becomes an “I have drunk” that is equally distant from the present and through which “everything culminates in a ‘*has been*’ ” (159). When “everything has become equally remote” (159), then “the necessity of drinking anew, or rather, having drunk anew” becomes the means “to triumph over this hardened and faded present which alone subsists and signifies death” (160). This same distancing can also be achieved by losses of money, love, or success, independently of alcohol (160). In splitting the past and present in this way, the crack is extended and inscribed in the body.

If this inscription of the crack is desirable, even if it damages health, it is because thought occurs “only by means of the crack and at its edges” (*LS* 160), and only by thought is affirmation of the ideal game and eternal return realized. The crack therefore keeps us from losing sight of a “grand heath” (161). But effectuating the silent crack is insufficient, for ethics demands counter-effectuation: “The eternal truth of the event is grasped only if the event is also inscribed in the flesh. But each time we must double this painful effectuation by a counter-effectuation which limits, moves, and transfigures it” (161). Counter-effectuation turns death against death and “create[s] instincts which would be evolutive rather than alcoholic, erotic, or financial” (332). We must “give to the crack the chance of flying over its own incorporeal surface area, without stopping at the bursting within each body [. . .] to give us the chance to go farther than we would have believed possible” (161). We risk the body, via alcoholism, drug use, or something else, in order to overcome, via humor, perversion, and counter-effectuation on the surface.

## Chapter 17

# From the Depth of Bodies to the Surface of Thought

## Dynamic Genesis

Sense arises because the sayables engendered in states of affairs and stated by propositions entail paradoxes—and ultimately a paradoxical element—that organize a surface whose intensity separates and connects the physical and the metaphysical, articulating a disjunctive relation between things and words. This surface is an intensive *spatium* across which signs flash when communications take place between heterogeneous series, one standing over the other as signifier to signified. What is expressed *in* sayables and said *of* things has meaning through its proximity to pure events and to an ultimate Event that are irreducible to but expressed within linguistic acts of judgment and reflection. It is in proximity to a paradoxical “greening” that propositions denote a green tree, in proximity to a paradoxical Event of battle that different subjects incarnate and live the conflict, and in proximity to a paradoxical time of Aion that the “I” thinks. One does not say “Adam sins” without invoking not only the bivalent sense of the infinitive “to sin,” but the world in which the sin occurs. But this world is not invoked without connecting it to impossible worlds, the affirmation of which releases the event of sinning from its effectuation in any particular world.

All this, however, presupposes language, and thus the separation of meaningful sounds from empty physical noise so that they can name, manifest, and signify. The mouth breaks free of its alimentary function and assumes a semiological one—it speaks rather than simply eats—through an event that can be expressed only by an esoteric word (*LS* 44, 186). The corresponding

task, Deleuze says, is “to retrace the history which liberates sounds and makes them independent of bodies” (*LS* 186), to show how language and its surface emerge and free themselves from corporeal mixtures. This requires some physical happening—which need not have ever really occurred—that can accomplish the transition from the physical to the metaphysical, from bodies and their incorporeal excesses to thought.

“Depth is not by itself constituted in series,” Deleuze states, but under conditions pertaining to thought’s metaphysical surface, “it accedes to the serial form” (*LS* 361n.1). This is the static genesis through which bodies receive and effectuate sense and the senseless depths are recovered via the surface. However, surface sense can be constituted from the interplay of “bodies taken in their undifferentiated depth” only because “this depth acts in an original way, *by means of its power to organize surfaces and to envelop itself within surfaces*” (124).<sup>1</sup> This power makes possible “a dynamic genesis which leads directly from states of affairs to events, from mixtures to pure lines, *from depth to the production of surfaces*” (186). The account of this process “must not implicate at all the other [static] genesis” (186)—that is, it must not assume individuals, persons, the separation of eating and speaking, or anything else that follows from the surface/frontier having been constituted.<sup>2</sup>

### Melanie Klein and Pre-Oedipal Development

The story of dynamic genesis is a psychoanalytic story that Deleuze proposes using Melanie Klein’s theories of pre-Oedipal development. This turn to Klein is significant because it indicates how Deleuze is operating independently of Lacan in a text that is sometimes—quite wrongly—considered a Lacanian work.<sup>3</sup> Klein holds a distinctive position within post-Freudian analysis in contesting the castration complex’s centrality and taking the death instinct’s existence seriously, seeing the latter as an internal force of negation operating from birth.<sup>4</sup> She also refers the Freudian Oedipal complex of the third and fourth years back to processes of object relations in the first months of life. The infantile death instinct, for Klein, entails early anxiety and paranoia (the infantile superego arouses mainly anxiety rather than guilt [Klein 1998, 252]) as its aggression is projected onto the parents who are then perceived as persecutors. Consequently, contra Freud, “the infantile danger-situation” does not require a prior “loss of the beloved (longed-for) person,” and the

castration complex “is a modification, in the course of development, of the earliest anxiety-situation [brought about by the infantile death instinct]” (213).

With object relations operating from the start, the thesis of an original auto-eroticism and narcissism—a self-love that underpins self-preservative instincts and is prior to desiring relations to external objects—is untenable (see Klein 1975, 51). Instead, early narcissism results from the threatening nature of these objects. These initial relations, however, are with part-objects—first the mother’s breast, and later the father’s penis (31–32)—as the infant lacks the ego structures needed to see itself and others as complete objects or whole beings. The infant’s anxiety and persecution complex ensure that these part-objects have a bivalent status and are sometimes good and sometimes bad. Early life is henceforth dominated by processes of splitting, introjection, and projection, as the infant seeks to separate good from bad and to incorporate the former and expel the latter. But the persistence of this bivalence leaves the infant unable to complete this Manichean separation, which is also a separation of inside from outside and of psychic imagos and phantasies from real objects and situations.

There is therefore a constant fluctuation between the fear of internal and external bad objects, between the death instinct acting within and deflected outwards. Here we see one important aspect of the interaction—from the beginning of life—between projection and introjection. External dangers are experienced in the light of internal dangers and are therefore intensified; on the other hand, any danger threatening from outside intensifies the perpetual inner danger-situation. This interaction exists in some measure throughout life. The very fact that the struggle has, to some extent, been externalized relieves anxiety. Externalization of internal danger-situations is one of the ego’s earliest methods of defence against anxiety and remains fundamental in development. (31–32)

This situation defines the initial paranoid-schizoid position. The Kleinian infant first encounters a chaotic world of part-objects, from which “springs [. . .] the phantastic and unrealistic nature of the child’s relation to all objects. [. . .] The object world of the child in the first two or three months of its life could be described as consisting of hostile and persecuting, or else of gratifying parts and portions of the real world” (Klein 1998, 285).

Phantastic and real objects mirror each other, albeit in severely distorted fashion. Thus, “for all children in the beginning external reality is mainly a mirror of the child’s own instinctual life” (233), and “there is a constant correlation of real objects with those installed within the ego” (266). Splitting, incorporation, and expulsion involve both real and imagined actions, the infant being unable to tell the difference and thus, for example, taking its most sadistic phantasies to be real acts it has inflicted on its parents (308). Part-objects, being intractable mixtures of good and bad, become both loved and hated, and this ambivalence is internalized through introjection. Both parents are seen as castrators and even unite into a single menacing imago (190, 253). Meanwhile, the infant cannot project its aggression onto external part-objects without also identifying with and consequently introjecting them, making all attempts to introject good part-objects ultimately ambiguous (264–65). As “the ego is incapable of splitting the object—internal and external—without a corresponding splitting taking place within the ego” (Klein 1975, 6), its own defense mechanisms weaken it. This dialectic of inner and outer worlds thus reinforces infant anxieties, and, indeed, “quite little children pass through anxiety-situations (and react to them with defence-mechanisms), the content of which is comparable to that of the psychoses of adults” (Klein 1998, 262).

As the infant’s ego strengthens and its sexual development approaches the genital phase, sexual instincts gain independence and the libido gains predominance over the death instinct’s aggression (Klein 1989, 154–55). The infant can now better synthesize part-objects into complete objects and comes to see its mother, for example, as a person. But this advance begets a manic-depressive position characterized by a new anxiety and guilt, as the infant’s earlier violent attacks now lead him to feel that “he has destroyed or is destroying a whole object by his greed and uncontrollable aggression” (Klein 1975, 50). The infant now feels the loss of the loved object, as “not until the object is loved *as a whole* can its loss be felt as a whole” (Klein 1998, 264). However, this new position and the ego’s stronger internal unity also brings a sense of omnipotence that is easily linked to the megalomania Freud associates with secondary narcissism. This supports the child against depressive feelings by instilling a confidence that it has the power to make reparations. A quest now begins to repair the damaged parent, its specific form guided by the choice of primary sexual object at the genital stage (186). However, the new sense of omnipotence is “so closely bound up in the unconscious with the sadistic impulses with which it was first associated” (350) that it also leads the child to feel “again and again that his attempts at reparation have not succeeded, or will not succeed. [. . .] As a result of

the failure of the act of reparation, the ego has to resort again and again to obsessional and manic defences" (350, 351).

The penis comes to represent this restorative power. For the boy, it is "a good and curative organ, which shall afford the woman pleasure, cure her injured genital and create babies in her" (Klein 1998, 315). For the girl, her lack of the organ indicates that she cannot make reparations and leads to penis-envy (216). This sets the stage for the Freudian Oedipus complex, with whose resolution "the demarcation between conscious and unconscious is more distinct" (Klein 1975, 86). This, in turn, "make[s] it possible for repression to take a leading part among the [child's] defences" (86). Repression also enables symbol formation, which further sublimates libido energies toward non-sexual interests (Klein 1998, 86; see also 221, and 1975, 83, 115, 137–38). The next years include vacillations and regressions but culminate in the Oedipus complex's resolution and the superego's final form.

### Dynamic Genesis in a World of Simulacra

For Deleuze, Klein's account of early infantile life describes a world of simulacra: "We call this world of introjected and projected, alimentary and excremental partial internal objects the world of *simulacra*" (LS 187).<sup>5</sup> Introjection and projection are forms of "communication of bodies in, and through, depth" in what amounts to "a universal cesspool" (187). For Klein, psychic development leads to the increasing correspondence between phantasy objects and their real counterparts—to the infant's "growing perception of reality and adaptation to it" (Klein 1975, 15). The increasingly secure ego is able "to make real objects and their imagos interchangeable" (Klein 1989, 154) by correcting the misrepresentations of earlier good and bad part-objects that were "a phantastically distorted picture of the real objects upon which they are based" (Klein 1998, 262). Against this, Deleuze holds that the child never outgrows the chaos of part-objects because corporeal reality is a simulacrum. Consequently, phantastic objects and indeed the phantasm itself cannot copy this reality either well or badly, and the question of whether phantasms have real or imaginary causes is displaced: "The question of whether particular events are real or imaginary is poorly posed. The distinction is not between the imaginary and the real, but between the event as such and the corporeal state of affairs which incites it about or in which it is effectuated. [. . .] The fact is [. . .] that phantasms, even when they are effects and because they are effects, differ in nature from their real causes" (LS 210–11).

Deleuze makes two further modifications to Klein's framework that completely change how the passage through pre-Oedipal positions and the Oedipus complex occurs. Both follow from his claim that Klein's thesis about pre-Oedipal positions "implies the idea of the orientations of psychic life" (*LS* 188), which allows Deleuze to align Klein's paranoid-schizoid and manic-depressive positions with the dimensions of depths and heights.<sup>6</sup> From this, he contends, first, that there are no good part-objects in the deep world of simulacra associated with the paranoid-schizoid position. Instead, all part-objects are bad: "every piece is bad in principle [. . .] only what is wholesome and complete is good" (188). It follows that the processes of splitting, introjection, and projection cannot constitute any good object, and consequently the relationship between the two pre-Oedipal positions "must be revised" (188). Instead of emerging as these processes gain strength, Deleuze continues, "it seems to us that the good object is not introjected as such, because it belongs from the very start to another dimension. The good object has another 'position'" (189). In short, "the good object as such is a complete object" (190) and so belongs to the depressive position.

Second, and following from the first point, Deleuze maintains that the real opposition in the paranoid-schizoid position is not between good and bad part-objects, but rather, all part-objects are opposed to "an organism without parts, a body without organs" (*LS* 188). From this, "two depths are opposed: a hollow depth, wherein bits whirl about and explode, and full depth" (188–89), and so there are also two opposing forms of schizophrenic language, "two nonsenses of pure noise" (189). The body without organs—whose initial appearance earlier in *The Logic of Sense* is discussed in the next chapter—is not a whole or complete object, but it functions as a preliminary to it within the depths. It exhibits something akin to wholeness in being a body without extrinsic or separable parts and in being opposed to fragmented part-objects. Deleuze associates this body without organs with the urethral attacks of the anal-sadistic phase (188–89), noting that Klein herself makes no such distinction between urine and feces (351–52n.3).

The good object "belongs to the heights," and this height is not "an inverted depth. It is rather an original dimension distinguished by the nature of the object which occupies it, and by the instance which circulates in it" (*LS* 189). Nonetheless, both the object and its dimension are generated immanently by virtue of the depths' power of organization. Depth exhibits "an internal tension determined by dynamic categories" (189) between part-objects and the body without organs. The good object brings together the former's substantiality and the latter's purity. Consequently, it "is not

the successor of the schizoid position, but rather forms itself in the current of this position, with borrowings, blockages, and pressures which attest to a constant communication between the two" (190). From within this intersection, then, an image of wholeness is formed that is then projected onto this new dimension as an "*idol on high*" (192). The good object is thus a simulation of wholeness arising from the depths like a kind of shadow play. Once projected, it "inserts itself in the paranoid-schizoid position" (192) and "maintains a struggle with the partial objects" (190). But it nonetheless "holds itself aloft" (189), giving rise to the superego and thereby providing a mechanism for the ego to turn away from its submersion in the world of introjected and projected part-objects and instead identify with the heights (191–92). This raises the infant to the new depressive position and so to "a total change of orientation and a central reorganization of psychic life" (189).

Projected into the heights, "the good object is by nature a lost object. It only shows itself and appears from the start as already lost, as *having been lost*," and it "posits itself as having always preexisted in this other dimension" (LS 191). This gives it an ambivalence and a cruelty fundamentally different from those of the part-objects of the paranoid-schizoid position: It is both loving and threatening because it is pure, mysterious, and good, but it is also beyond love and hate. Its cruelty thereby accords with masochism, whereas paranoid-schizoid cruelty is sadistic (191–93). Characterized as transcendent, the good object begins the separation of incorporeal and corporeal: "the depressive position prepares us for something which is *neither action nor passion*" (192). From among the senseless noises of the depths it "extracts a Voice" (193), giving authority to what are really the voices of the infant's parents—a preexistent "familial voice which conveys tradition" and "affects the child as a bearer of a name and demands his insertion even before the child begins to understand" (193). As a hidden source, the good object lacks the connection to subjects, objects, and concepts required for language. Thus, even while the Voice it extracts "has at its disposal all the dimensions of organized language" (193), seeming to denote, signify, and manifest, it nevertheless lacks "its condition; it awaits the *event* that will make it a language. It is no longer noise, but is not yet language" (194). A surface is still required.

This surface is prepared within the depressive position by the physical organization of erogenous zones. Partial, Deleuze holds, refers not only to the introjected and expelled objects onto which drives are invested in pregenital stages, but also to corresponding bodily zones that provide a territory and source for these drives (LS 196). The zones emerge alongside the stages,

but they alone “are *facts of the surface*” whose “organization implies the constitution, the discovery, and the investment of a third dimension which is no longer either depth or height” (197). This organization of the body’s physical surface originates from the way that, “from the point of view of height” (198), the chaotic depths appear to be a surface organized around an orifice. This optical illusion, which is made possible by the projection that establishes height, begins the separation of sexual drives from the conservative and destructive drives, with the depressive position constituting not a complete surface but a multiplicity of partial surfaces (197–99). The oral stage of sexuality that acts on the simulacrum of part-objects in the depths now has a corresponding zone on the surface inhabited by sexual drives alone (199). Sexual drives here achieve liberation, forming “a veritable *superficial energy*” (199), raising the ego of primary narcissism out of the paranoid-schizoid position of the depths and constituting an auto-eroticism and secondary narcissism of the surface (203, 208).

Deleuze now contends that “the pre-genital erogenous zones or surfaces cannot be separated from the problem of their coordination” (LS 200). Here is where Lacan appears in the dynamic genesis, with the mirror stage “indirectly” (200) resolving this problem by giving the infant a specular image that both unifies and splits it by taking it outside of itself (see Lacan 2006, 75–81). But this is only a preparatory stage, as, for both Lacan and Deleuze, “the direct and global function of integration, or of general coordination, is normally vested in the genital zone. It is this zone which must bind all the other partial zones, thanks to the *phallus*” (LS 200). The phallus “does not play the role of an organ, but rather that of a particular image projected [. . .] onto this privileged (genital) zone” (200). It paradoxically marks both an excess, by doubling the boy’s penis and projecting itself over the genital zone, and a lack, by designating the absence of the penis in the mother (227–28). It does not simply organize the child’s physical surface, but, pace Klein’s thesis, functions as “an instrument of the surface, meant to *mend* the wounds that the destructive drives, bad internal objects, and the penis of the depths have inflicted on the maternal body, and to reassure the good object, to convince it not to turn its face away” (201). Contra Lacan, therefore, it is not a signifier of a transcendent paternal Law.

The phallus gives “to the child’s penis the force of embarking on the venture” (LS 206) of restoration. No incest desire lies behind the drama, but rather the child’s “good intentions,” making it a moral venture where the child aligns himself with the heights (202–3). However, in substituting himself for his father in this loving attempt to repair his mother, the child

introduces murder and castration into the scene: “by wishing to restore the mother, the child has in fact castrated and eventrated her; and [ . . . ] by wishing to bring back the father, the child has betrayed and killed him, transformed him into a cadaver” (206). A new Oedipal anxiety morphs the superego from a figure of a good if withdrawn object into a guilty conscience condemning the libidinal drives (205–6). Guilt establishes “intention as an ethical category” (206) and splits action across two surfaces: The child’s intentions concern the mother’s physical surface, but, through Oedipus, castration and murder as consequences of these intentions are projected onto “an already metaphysical or ‘cerebral’ surface” (207) that forms “a second screen” (218) on which thought unfolds.

Oedipus, then, is the event that compels the “leap” (*LS* 218) into thought and sense. The actions of murder and castration “concern bodies,” and “they do not by themselves constitute a metaphysical surface and [ . . . ] they do not even belong to it” (208). However, through them, sexual drives that had been freed from the depths in the pregenital stages are desexualized so that, pace Freud, they can be reinvested on a “new metaphysical surface, or surface of pure thought” (208). A trace of castration appears on the corporeal surface as a wound of both the mother and the surface ego of secondary narcissism. But it also becomes a “crack of thought” (208), a paradoxical Event organizing a problematic field around an unresolvable question that is the question of the event par excellence: “What has happened exactly?” (154). (“Have I really just murdered my father and castrated my mother?”) This happening presents something that cannot be represented yet must still be thought, bringing thought to sense by way of nonsense.

Death, castration, and murder now become elements of a phantasm of thought. The phantasm doubles the superficial physical images arising from the corporeal simulacrum of part-objects without resembling them or the simulacrum. The phantasm’s elements are pure events that are neither active nor passive but impassive (*LS* 210). The phantasm “represents” these events as noematic attributes distinct from any states of affairs, concepts, or subjective interiority that might be designated, signified, or manifested. It introduces Aionic time by inspiring “an unbearable waiting—the waiting of that which is going to come about as a result, and also of that which is already in the process of coming about and never stops coming about” (211). Unsaid and unsignified, the phantasm does not exist outside of propositions and is inseparable from the infinitive form of verbs, making it “independent not only of all persons but of all time, of every mood and every voice (active, passive, or reflective)” (214). Despite Klein’s use of the term when

considering the infant's violent phantasies in the paranoid-schizoid position, "the phantasm, properly speaking, finds its origin only in the ego of the secondary narcissism" (216) and in the desexualization and symbolization that follow from it. The Oedipal phantasm circulates between the physical surface of sexuality and the metaphysical surface of thought, bringing sexuality into thought as a trace of castration retained in the sublimation of sexual energies, and reinvesting thought's desexualized energies, via symbolization, onto the body, thereby recovering the corporeal surface, the depths, and the idols on high (219, 242–43).

### Phantasm and Intensification

The phantasm ensures that a sexual dimension will always persist within language and thought: "throughout all of that which language will designate, manifest, or signify, there will be a sexual history that will never be designated, manifested, or signified in itself, but which will coexist with all the operations of language, recalling the sexual appurtenance of the formative linguistic elements. This status of sexuality accounts for repression" (*LS* 243). It is tempting to make each vocalized element of language—phonemes, morphemes, and semantemes—correspond to a stage of sexual development, as proposed by Lacan's disciple Serge Leclair, who "defines the surface of the entire body as an aggregate or sequence of letters" (231).<sup>7</sup> The infant's first grasp of phonemic distinctions—minimal linguistic sounds whose differences can be as slight as the "buh" and "puh" sounds of the letters "b" and "p"—would correspond to the construction of the partial surfaces of erogenous zones; its stringing together of its first morphemes—minimal and indivisible meaningful linguistic units, such as the "ing" ending of verbs—to make word sounds would correspond to the phallic coordination of the physical surface; and its discovery of semantemes—words or word bases that express complete images or ideas—would correspond to the Oedipus complex and the (physical) threat of castration. These three developments might further be associated with connective, conjunctive, and disjunctive syntheses and a passage from letter to esoteric word to portmanteau (230–32). "Nevertheless," Deleuze maintains, "there is still no language; we are still in a prelinguistic domain" (232) because these elements lack the necessary organization to denote, manifest, and signify, and have no reference beyond a sexual one. Although the proposed arrangement goes beyond the "infra-sense" or "under-sense of the depths," and the "pre-sense" of the heights, it

presents at best a physical “co-sense” to the metaphysical sense that doubles the physical surface (233). The leap into sense is still missing.

What accounts for the leap is the phantasm’s capacity to effect a forced movement that sweeps away the basic physical and sexual forms from which it emerges. The phantasm’s extrinsic beginning is castration (*LS* 219), but castration trauma, following Freud’s theory, “presupposes the existence of at least two independent events, separated in time, one of them infantile and the other post-pubescent. [ . . . ] Under a different aspect the two events are presented as two series, one pregenital and the other oedipal, with their resonance being the process of the *phantasm*” (226). The phantasm’s intrinsic beginning is this resonance between these pregenital and post-Oedipal sexualities (239). Thus, rather than castration threat, “it is the resonance of the two independent and temporally disjointed series that is essential” (226). Here the role of the phallus—contra *Difference and Repetition*, where it forms the erotic ground of the second synthesis—is that of an object = x that, rather than being “an agent of convergence and coordination,” instead “gets involved in Oedipal dissociations” (227). Belonging to neither sexual series, the phallus leads them to “diverge and resonate” so that “they constitute ramified disjunctions and give rise to a disjunctive synthesis” (226). Disjunction might appear to be only the culmination of the process, but it has actually been involved throughout: As a dimension of simulacra, depth already comprised differences without identity, and though the good object might appear to function primarily as a principle for the coordination and conjunction of partial surfaces, as a lost and withdrawn object “it always acts only as the source of disjunctions” (227). The metaphysical surface thus emerges in the dynamic genesis from disjunctions built upon prior disjunctions.

Resonance generates harmonic amplification, where a vibrating system or force causes another to vibrate with increased amplitude at certain frequencies. In acoustics, an amplifying harmonic resonance causes an increase in volume—the sound becomes more *intense*. An analogous intensification results from the forced movement that takes sexuality beyond itself in desexualization and sublimation. This intensification results from Thanatos, the death instinct, rather than Eros, which remains bound up in the basic sexual series (*LS* 239). Thus, “we can therefore name the entire forced movement ‘death instinct,’ and name its full amplitude ‘metaphysical surface’” (240). On this new surface, the struggle between eating and thinking, depths and surface, continues. Where the latter gains the upper hand, sound is liberated from bodies, “the verb is inscribed on this surface” (240), and the paradoxes

and effectuations of the static genesis enable language's denotation, manifestation, and signification. But the nature of the forced movement means that the phantasm "does not eternally recommence its intrinsic movement of desexualisation without turning back on its extrinsic sexual beginning" (242), and this means that "a desexualized energy invests or reinvests an object of sexual interest as such and is thereby re-sexualized in a new way. Such is the most general mechanism of perversion" (242–43). The phantasm of thought thus leads to an art and ethics of the surface.

The leap from the physical to the metaphysical, from sexuality to thought—and from there to a resexualization of this desexualized thought—is ultimately artistic rather than psychoanalytical. It is achieved by the artist who, pace the clinical and critical project introduced in *Coldness and Cruelty*, serves as a "clinician of civilization" (*LS* 237). This role is obscured by the psychoanalytic diagnosis of the artist and his work. Such diagnoses "have very little interest" (237), and "the encounter between psychoanalysis and the work of art (or the literary-speculative work) cannot be achieved in this manner" (237). The novel as a work of art rather than a familial novel accomplishes the leap not only by replacing "*psychic regression by speculative investment*" (238) of the metaphysical surface, but also by determining both the effectuation of the symptom and the disengagement of the event that enacts its counter-effectuation (359n.2). The artist is thus "not only the patient and doctor of civilization, but is also its pervers" (238). In contrast to the scenario where thinking gains the upper hand, when the artistic leap fails and the depths gain advantage, sense's fragile surface gives way to regressions that subvert rather than pervert the surface and return us to the primary order of bodies (244–46).

At stake in the ascendancy or subversion of sense is the status of the subject. Its continuing connection to its sexual and erotic origins entails "the risk [. . .] that the phantasm falls back on the poorest thought, on a puerile and redundant diurnal reverie 'about' sexuality," where sublimation remains incomplete and thinking "falls back in the 'in-between' of the two surfaces" (*LS* 220). But where the phantasm sustains the resonance between sexuality and thought, it finds its "path of glory" in becoming "the site of the eternal return" (220). The thought of eternal return, of course, is incompatible with the subject. Thus, although "the phantasm finds its point of departure (or its author) in the phallic ego of secondary narcissism," it "has the property of turning back on its author" (212). Within the phantasm, where death is always an impersonal Event, "the ego is dissipated" (213) in a way distinct from what occurs with a dialectical identity of opposites or

a subversion that returns everything to the depths. The phantasm dissolves the ego by bringing it into contact with an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field, with “singularities liberated from the ego through the narcissistic wound” (213). In this way, “the individuality of the ego merges with the event of the phantasm itself, even if that which the event represents in the phantasm is understood as another individual, or rather as a series of other individuals through which the dissolved ego passes. The phantasm is inseparable therefore from the toss of the dice or from the fortuitous instances which it enacts” (213–14).

Dynamic genesis thus culminates with the destruction of Oedipal Law. Its outcome parallels that of the action that realizes time’s third synthesis in *Difference and Repetition*, where, in becoming equal to an act that initially appeared too great for it, the self is demolished by the force of the multiplicity it engenders when it becomes equal to the unequal in itself (*DR* 89–90). Raised to its highest level, thought as the thought of eternal return is inseparable from a revaluation of values and a dissolution of identity. These, of course, have been the ethical thrust of Deleuze’s ontology of sense from his earliest writings.



## Chapter 18

### From *The Logic of Sense* to *Anti-Oedipus*

As already noted, Deleuze came to feel that *Difference and Repetition* remained oriented toward a classical height and an archaic depth, while *The Logic of Sense* turned away from this opposition by repositioning its concepts on the surface (*TRM* 65). This move, as has been discussed, is not simply a shift of Deleuze's thought from an opposition of height and depth to an equally uncertain opposition of surface and depth, but instead corrects and completes Deleuze's mature philosophy of sense. With this shift, the movement from depth to surface reveals them to be "differential levels at which nonsense changes shape, the portmanteau word undergoes a change of nature, and the entire language (*langage*) changes dimension" (*LS* 83). Surface/depth is also the opposition Deleuze identifies between Carroll and Artaud, the former's language being "emitted at the surface" and the latter's being "carved into the depth of bodies" (84), and the stakes of this philosophy of sense follow from Deleuze's discussion of the two figures. There is, of course, also a dimension and a language of the heights in *The Logic of Sense*, but these feature primarily as a projection and an intermediary that makes possible the transition from the sense-destroying nonsense of Artaud's depths to the nonsense that donates sense on Carroll's surface.

After *The Logic of Sense*, the terminology of sense and surface rarely appears in either Deleuze's solo works or his collaborations with Guattari. Nevertheless, interpretations that consider these absences as signaling Deleuze's turn away from the text are mistaken, as are interpretations that treat Deleuze's later invocations of the body without organs signaling a rejection of Carroll. Issues related to sense and the surface persist, with the surface concept in particular conspicuously reappearing in the themes of folds and

enfolded developed most prominently in Deleuze's 1980s monographs on Foucault and Leibniz.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, considerations already expressed in *The Logic of Sense* concerning the crack of the surface and the deep split of the depths make clear that the later uses of the body without organs continue rather than turn away from Deleuze's final pre-Guattari monograph.

### Artaud and Carroll

Deleuze holds that "crude similarities" between Artaud's schizophrenic language of the depth and Carroll's language of surface perversion paper over the "clinical problem [. . .] of sliding from one organization to another, or a problem of the formation of a progressive and creative disorganization" (LS 83). Certainly, both begin from "the basic oral duality (to eat/to speak) [that] is sometimes displaced and passes between two kinds or two dimensions of propositions" (86), and Artaud seems comparable to Carroll in having a duality of series (86) and "words which would be equivalent to portmanteau words" (90). Carroll's series, however, "are articulated at the surface" (86), where they relate to incorporeal events that liberate themselves from corporeal causes through relations of quasi-causality, and to the surface itself as an incorporeal frontier between the various dualities within the proposition and between propositions and things. Articulation is a differentiation of differences that forms a secondary organization of events/effects. It engenders sense, which then "traverses the entire surface, although it remains on its own line" (86). For Artaud, in contrast, "*there is not, there is no longer, any surface*. [. . .] Things and propositions have no longer any frontier between them, precisely because bodies have no surface. [. . .] The consequence of this is that the entire body is no longer anything but depth" (86–87). Without the surface and thus any secondary organization, words are rendered "incapable of being decomposed and incapable of disintegrating: *language without articulation*" (89). With no impassive incorporeality to support such articulation, there are only the actions and passions of bodies in depth. Artaud's apparent portmanteau words "do not secure the ramification of series on the basis of sense" (90). In other words, they do not intensify. Instead, Artaud's words "enact a chain of associations between tonic and consonantal elements, in a region of infra-sense" (90), resulting in the collapse and reabsorption of the surface. Despite initial appearances, then, with Artaud "*there are no longer any series at all*; the two series have disappeared" (91).

With the subversion of all incorporeality and sense, “the pinned-down word loses its sense, it bursts into pieces; it is decomposed into syllables, letters, and above all into consonants which act directly on the body, penetrating and bruising it” (*LS* 87). A “pure language-affect” (88) replaces incorporeal language effects. Artaud’s language divides into “passion-words,” whose phonetic values (which relate to word sounds, and particularly to the cutting sounds of consonants that block the flow of the breath) reflect the body’s wounding and fragmenting, and “action-words,” whose tonic values (which relate to the syllable carrying the greatest change of pitch in the spoken word) remain inarticulate—that is, undifferentiated.<sup>2</sup> Action-words and passion-words transmit violent sonic forces, carrying corporeal actions and passions into language by associating sounds directly with them, rather than expressing the sense of incorporeal event/effects that might emerge from them. They still function as signs—albeit signs devoid of sense—and so maintain “a certain power” (87) of denotation, manifestation, and signification. Together they “refer to the two theaters, the theater of terror or passion and the theater of cruelty” (90). Schizophrenic language’s tonic side consists of “breath-words (*mots souffles*)” and “howl-words (*mots-cris*)” that transform “the painful passion of the body into a triumphant action” (88). Artaud dismisses Carroll as “an English snob” and “a man who ate well” (Artaud, quoted in *LS* 84), someone who never experienced bodily torment or “felt the real problem of a language in depth—namely, the schizophrenic problem of suffering, of death, and of life” (*LS* 84).<sup>3</sup>

The phonetic values of passion-words correspond to fragments or part-objects of a body cut up by these values, while the “*exclusively tonic* and not written” values of action-words correspond to “a glorious body [. . .] a new dimension of the schizophrenic body, an organism without parts which operates entirely by insufflation, respiration, evaporation, and fluid transmission (the superior body or body without organs of Antonin Artaud)” (*LS* 88). The body without organs, as a body without parts, might initially seem to be a fluid principle opposing the solidity of harmful fragments. Yet “fluids, in fact, do not seem less harmful than fragments” (88), and fragments and liquid are always mixed together. The contradiction lived in schizophrenia is one in which “passion and action are the inseparable poles of an ambivalence” (88). Schizophrenic language reflects this by dividing into two distinct languages that correspond to two possible mixtures of fragments and liquids, one imperfect and partial and the other perfect and complete. This duality of languages is a schizophrenic correlate to Stoicism’s distinction between two types of corporeal mixture (89).<sup>4</sup>

The body without organs therefore corresponds not to a liquid principle alone but to the active mixture of fragments and liquid into perfect unity, its principle being “like the ‘principle of the Sea,’ in opposition to the passive mixtures of the encased parts” (*LS* 89). The “triumphant action” (88) performed by tonic words brings corporeal fragments into a unity and inseparability akin to fish in the sea (89, 92). It is the unity of a body not without organs or organ-fragments but without an organization of its fragments—i.e., without a sense-making secondary organization of this primary order.<sup>5</sup> Howl-words and breath-words compose the active language of the body without organs because “rather than separating the consonants and rendering them pronounceable, [. . . it] renders the consonants indissociable from one another, by palatizing them. It leaves them illegible and even unpronounceable, as it transforms them into so many active howls in one continuous breath” (89). Hence Artaud’s portmanteau-like words fuse and liquify fragments rather than ramify or intensify series (90).

### After *The Logic of Sense*: Entering the Crack of Thought

In these ways, Deleuze says, “we can oppose Artaud and Carroll point for point” (*LS* 91) on the dualities and nonsenses of their respective languages. In particular, “the break (*coupure*) of the surface has nothing in common with the deep *Spaltung* [of the depths]” (91). Given the centrality of the body without organs in Deleuze’s collaborations with Guattari, it might seem that after *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze abandons Carroll for Artaud—that *Anti-Oedipus*, as a book exploring the material unconscious, embraces the materiality of the depths and its primary order of bodies and noise. Daniel W. Smith proposes this interpretation, holding that in *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze “dove into the depths” (Smith 2006, 146) and renounced the “implicit presupposition of *Logic of Sense* [. . .] that we do not have access to the primary order, since this is precisely the domain of language that belongs to the mad” (143–44). For Smith, *Anti-Oedipus* challenges the Lacanian portrayal of the Real as lack by using “the model of schizophrenia to describe the Real in all its positivity: [. . .] The domain of the Real is a ‘sub-representative field,’ but Deleuze does not hesitate to claim that ‘we have the means to penetrate the sub-representational’” (146–47). Lacan, Smith notes, “insisted that the unconscious, or the Real, is revealed in its purest and least mediated form in psychosis” (146), and as *The Logic of Sense* had already linked schizophrenia to the depths, it follows that this is the domain Deleuze enters

with *Anti-Oedipus*'s invocation of Artaud's body without organs. The reason *Anti-Oedipus* then makes no reference to the depths, Smith concludes, is because "the concept of depth has relevance only from the viewpoint of a theory of surfaces" (147) that Deleuze had cast off.

Yet the claim that it is only with Guattari that Deleuze reaches for the sub-representative is belied by the fact that the passage Smith quotes about our having the means to penetrate it comes from Deleuze's 1967 "The Method of Dramatisation" (*DI* 115). Moreover, while the sub-representative certainly includes the dimension of the depths, it is hardly coextensive with it, since the transcendental field of pre-personal and pre-individual singularities is sub-representative too. Smith takes as evidence of Deleuze's positive move with Guattari into the depths the hesitations expressed in *The Logic of Sense* about remaining on "the shore" by treating the problem of the silent crack as an academic one in the face of others—Nietzsche, Bousquet, Fitzgerald, Lowry, and Artaud—who risked their bodies to attain a "great Health." Deleuze, Smith notes, asks in that discussion whether we should not seek to "be a little alcoholic, a little crazy, a little suicidal, a little guerilla—just enough to extend the crack, but not enough to deepen it irremediably?" (*LS* 157–58, quoted in Smith 2006, 145–46). But whatever else the surface crack is, and even while "we can always find schizoid fragments" (*LS* 92) on the surface, it cannot be equated with the depths of bodies, since the problem it poses is how to will its effectuation onto bodies. Hence Deleuze calls on us to widen "the silent crack [*la fêlure silencieuse*]" (155) or "surface gash [*la coupure de surface*]" (156) using "external blows [*coups extérieurs*]" that "inscribe or effectuate it in the thickness of the body" (156), putting the crack into contact with "a deep *Spaltung*" (156) or "deep break [*coupure profonde*]" (164) of the body. This is nothing less than a call to bring Carroll into contact with Artaud.<sup>6</sup> But Deleuze also maintains that we must not entertain the illusion of bringing about their total coincidence, as Blanchot—albeit in a purely academic manner—portrays the act of suicide (156). Later with Guattari, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze casts the problem along similar lines, asking how to make oneself a body without organs while cautioning that "dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself" (*ATP* 160). In both texts, however, Deleuze poses the possibility that drugs and alcohol might not even be necessary.<sup>7</sup>

Rather than conclude that after *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze dives into the depths, we might instead consider that he enters the silent crack of the surface of thought, and therefore enters the intensity that, occupying different locations from *Difference and Repetition* onward, serves as thought's

immanent outside. The primary order of bodies certainly plays a role in this maneuver, but this is because thought and the unconscious relate to this order and its materiality as that from which they emerge and onto which they are effectuated. But Deleuze, with Guattari, then finds in this cerebral crack a body without organs very different from that of *The Logic of Sense*, one no longer associated with a depth lacking intensity but conceived instead as the zero point on which events and intensities occur. The body without organs thereby provides the mechanism to penetrate the sub-representative, but this is due to its having completely different coordinates from those of its earlier presentation. Deleuze and Guattari, then, do not dive into the depths to explore the body without organs, but relocate and repurpose it to explore the crack within thought.

This new body without organs retains important elements of the surface, despite Deleuze acknowledging his turn away from this language. Reflecting on his work with Guattari, he states: “*Anti-Oedipus* no longer has height or depth, nor surface. In this book everything happens, is done, the intensities, the events, upon a sort of spherical body or scroll painting: The Organless Body” (*TRM* 65–66). But the Japanese scroll painting to which Deleuze refers here is only two pages earlier associated with Carroll’s *Sylvie and Bruno* and what Deleuze sees as the greatest development of Carroll’s surface logic: “two surfaces coexist, with two adjoining stories—and one might say that these two surfaces roll up in such a way that the reader passes from one story to the other, while they disappear on one side, only to reappear on the other, as if the chess game had become spherical. Eisenstein speaks in these terms of Japanese scroll paintings” (64). The spherical body without organs may not be a surface, but only because it develops the surface into something more: a *fold*. This fold will become a new formulation of intensity, where it no longer ramifies series but produces multiplicities: “A *rhizome*, instead of series, says Guattari” (66).

## Epilogue

### From Structure to Machine

Deleuze's essay "How Do We Recognize Structuralism?" (*DI* 170–92) was published in 1972 but written in 1967.<sup>1</sup> Placing the essay in its proper chronological order, where it predates *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, offers a way to see how Deleuze's thought develops in relation to structuralism and psychoanalysis in the period prior to his encounter with Guattari. Deleuze in this period is clearly critical but supportive of psychoanalysis and structuralism to the extent that they can be molded to support an affirmation of difference consistent with an ontology of sense.<sup>2</sup> This is evident in Deleuze's essay, which in many respects defines structuralism in terms that more aptly define post-structuralism. Guattari's intervention in Deleuze's thought is focused precisely on the question of whether this salvaging of structuralism and psychoanalysis is possible. Guattari insists it is not, because what matters is not the structure but the machine that is the structure's immanent outside. Deleuze, with Guattari, will seek to extract this machine from the structure, but the process will also extract many important aspects of a philosophy and ontology of sense.

### How to Recognize Structuralism

Deleuze maintains that the "formal criteria of recognition" (*DI* 171) that link diverse authors, texts, and domains—linguistic, familial, economic, sexual, and more—under the structuralist umbrella include invocation of the symbolic as a "third order" (171) that is "deeper" (172) than the orders of the real and imaginary and that serves as "the principle of a genesis," being "incarnated

[*s'incarner*] in realities and images according to determinable series" (172). This symbolic neither designates a preexisting reality nor signifies conceptual contents but instead comprises combinations of non-signifying elements and a nonsense that engenders "a positional sense" that is "an optical effect, a language effect, a positional effect" (175). Within the structure, these elements are reciprocally determined within differential relations, and the structure's whole space is completely determined by the distribution of singularities. These elements and relations are "incarnated [*s'incarnent*]" and "actualized [*s'actualisent*]" in the "real beings and objects of the domains considered" and the "real relations between these beings," which, in turn, "come to realize [*effectuer*] them" (177) in a process of differentiation.

The differentiation, actualization, incarnation, or effectuation of these elements and relations, however, cannot fully account for the structure's functioning: "we have [so far] only been able to define half of the structure. A structure only starts to move, and become animated, if we restore its other half" (*DI* 182). Differentially related elements must further be organized into at least two series, one signifying and the other signified, where the "second series [. . .] maintains complex relations with the first" (183), and "no general rule" (183) governs how the structure they form is determined and evaluated. A structure is animated by "a development in terms of series" (182), which first results from the way "the terms of each series are in themselves inseparable from the slippages [*décalages*] or displacements that they undergo in relation to the terms of the other" (183). More significantly, the structure is animated by "a wholly paradoxical object or element" that acts as an "empty square [*case vide*]" or "Object = x" (184). This second order element is "always displaced in relation to itself" (185), amounting to a void that cannot be filled, but "this void is [. . .] not a non-being; or at least this non-being is not the being of the negative, but rather the positive being of the 'problematic'" (189–90). The element sustains the independence of the symbolic's differentiating mechanisms from the imaginary's mechanisms of mirroring, assimilating, and identifying, by ensuring that no fixed or steady correspondences obtain between the terms of the different series, thereby "preventing the one from imaginarily falling back on the other" (185; see also 180–81).

The relative displacements of the terms of different series follow from each term's absolute place in relation to this always displaced paradoxical agent. Because of the agent, displacement "does not constitute a characteristic added from the outside, but [is] the fundamental property that allows the structure to be defined as an order of places subject to the variation of

relations" (*DI* 186). Belonging to neither series but circulating in both, a signifier without signified or signified without signifier, it remains "eminently symbolic" (184) yet has "a symbolic zero value" (186). It can thus present itself, pace Carroll's work, as a portmanteau word that "is of another order than words possessing a sense. It is the nonsense which animates at least the two series, but which provides them with sense by circulating through them" (186). It can also be presented, pace Lacan, as the phallus, which "appears not as a sexual given or as the empirical determination of one of the sexes. It appears rather as the symbolic organ that founds sexuality *in its entirety* as a system or structure, and in relation to which the places occupied variously by men and women are distributed, as also the series of images and realities" (187). This empty square or object = x is neither contingent nor indeterminate. It is fully determinable yet unassignable: "it cannot be fixed to one place, nor identified with a genre or a species. Rather, it constitutes itself the ultimate genre of the structure or its total place: it thus has no identity except in order to lack this identity, and has no place except in order to be displaced in relation to all places" (188).

Finally, there is a type of subject that does not occupy the empty place but accompanies it as "an eminently symbolic instance which follows all of its displacements" (*DI* 190). "Structuralism is not at all a form of thought that suppresses the subject," Deleuze declares, "but one that breaks it up and distributes it systematically, that contests the identity of the subject, that dissipates it and makes it shift from place to place, an always nomad subject, made of individuations, but impersonal ones, or of singularities, but pre-individual ones" (190). Although, following Lacan, "it is less subject than subjected [*assujetti*]"—subjected to the empty square, subjected to the phallus and to its displacements" (190), it is nevertheless an "agency [*instance*]" (190) that effects "structural 'mutations' (Foucault) or 'forms of transition' from one structure to another (Althusser)" (191). This subjected subject—a nomad subject, a passive or impassive subject, perhaps even a larval subject—is a "structuralist *hero*" (191) and a figure immanent to the structure that "assures the break-up [*l'éclatement*] of a structure affected by excess or deficiency" (191). It makes structuralism, in the final instance, "a practice in relation to the products that it interprets" (191), a practice that "designates a point of permanent revolution, or of permanent transfer" (191), and so a practice defined by reference to "the future" (192).

Beyond a couple of undeveloped references to non-personal individuations of this subject, no mention of intensity appears in the essay, even though the theme of intensity constituting a field of individuation is central

to Deleuze's contemporaneous paper, "The Method of Dramatization" (DI 94–116). Nor is any distinction made between what could be considered two forms of structure soon to be outlined in *Difference and Repetition*, one consisting of series organized around a lost virtual object always differing from itself, and the other consisting of series converging upon a differentiator that drives their ramification. These nonetheless rapidly gain prominence in Deleuze's doctoral thesis and are developed further in *The Logic of Sense*. These later works also exhibit, as already mapped in detail, an increasing separation of the virtual and intensity, and of actualization and incarnation/individuation, where virtual differentiation and actualizing differentiation are ultimately explained as processes that engender the figures of representation, and intensity's implication, explication, and complication are explained as what determines, exceeds, and dissolves them. Nonetheless, what remains constant throughout these changes is what Deleuze in *The Logic of Sense* calls the three "minimal conditions for a *structure* in general: 1) There must be at least two heterogeneous series, one of which shall be determined as 'signifying' and the other as 'signified' (a single series never suffices to form a structure). 2) Each of these series is constituted by terms which exist only through the relations they maintain with one another. To these relations, or rather, to the values of these relations, there correspond very particular events, that is, *singularities* which are assignable within the structure. [. . .] 3) The two heterogeneous series converge toward a paradoxical element, which is their 'differentiator [*différentiant*]' " (LS 50–51).<sup>3</sup>

### Machinic Intensity

Guattari's "Machine and Structure," a review of *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense* that was the vehicle for the pair's first meeting, highlights the statement above that sets out structure's conditions when arguing that the paradoxical element, the element of intensity, should be removed from the structure altogether: "Deleuze's third condition," he writes, "relates [. . .] exclusively to the order of the machine" (Guattari 2015, 382n.2). Although "in reality, a machine is inseparable from its structural articulations and, conversely, [. . .] each contingent structure is dominated [. . .] by a system of machines, or at the very least by one logic machine," it is "vital to start by establishing the distinction in order to make it easier to identify the peculiar positions of subjectivity in relation to events and to history" (318).

Guattari establishes the distinction between machine and structure using *Difference and Repetition's* opening distinction between repetition and generality, holding that structure belongs to the order of generality defined by the exchange or substitution of particulars, while the machine belongs to the order of repetition defined by non-substitutable singularities.<sup>4</sup> Insofar as heterogeneous series, signifying and being signified through their complex relations to each other, are cashed out as signs, they express values determined by their exchangeability or non-exchangeability with other signs. By relating its elements in this way, a structure can be “related as an element to other structures” in a “structural process of de-totalized totalization” that “encloses” an “agent of action” or “the subject” (Guattari 2015, 318). This “subject of the structure, considered in its relationship of alienation to a system of de-totalized totalization, should [. . .] be seen in relation to a phenomenon of ‘being an ego’” (319). The machine, in contrast, “remains essentially remote from the agent of action,” and so remote also from the structure, which belongs “to the order of ideology” (319). It relates instead to an “unconscious subject of desire” (326) that is “on the same side as the machine, or better, perhaps, *alongside* the machine” (319), although this subject is ultimately indistinguishable from the machine (326). The “essence of the machine” is its function as a “differentiator [*différenciant*],” which establishes a “causal break, different in kind from the structurally established order of things” (322), in the chain of signification.

Just as for Deleuze repetition is inexplicable under the terms of representation, which cannot distinguish it from generality (*DR* 270), so too machinic repetition cannot be explained in structural terms, which “lead to wrongly locating the truth of the break, the truth of the subject, on the level of representation, information, communication, social codes and every other form of structural determination” (Guattari 2015, 322). The machine consists of part-objects and specifically what Lacan calls the *objet petit “a,”* the object of desire, which Guattari renames *objet-machine petit “a”* (323–24). The *objet a* opposes the Lacanian phallus as Master Signifier, which even in Deleuze’s earlier solo works held only an intermediary role. The *objet-machine petit “a”* is a “‘self for itself’ that relates to the elements of the structure only by means of splitting and metonymy” (324). It is thus a difference in itself and a differentiator. Structures, which lack this “differentiating factor [*élément différenciant*],” are condemned “to a perpetual process of merging into one another” (325). Consequently, “any change is precluded, and can be seen only *between* structural levels. Essentially, no break is any longer

accepted” (325). This is the condition of group phantasy, whose multiplicity of identifications is the death of desire as a machinic process (325–27). Structures assimilate machines by absorbing them into “a pure signifying space where the machine would represent the subject for another machine” (327) just as any other signifier does.<sup>5</sup> Affirming difference no longer involves passing through structuralism but instead starting with the machine located outside the structure. This is the case for ethics and politics no less than for thought: “the problem of revolutionary organization is the problem of setting up an institutional machine whose distinctive features would be a theory and practice that ensured its not having to depend on the various social structures—above all, the State structure” (Guattari 2015, 328).

### Sense and Machine

The machine concept seems incompatible with continuation of sense as a central concept. The semiotics of machines is asignifying, which entails that machines can be assessed only in terms of how they work, not what they mean. As Deleuze says when discussing the ideas behind *Anti-Oedipus*: “Without any sense, there is nothing to interpret. Interpretation is meaningless here [*Il n’y a pas de sens, il n’y a aucune interprétation à donner, cela ne veut rien dire*]. The problem is knowing how the unconscious works. It is knowing how ‘desiring-machines’ work, and knowing how to use those machines” (DI 232). Guattari often explicitly equates sense with signification and holds that machinic intensities create asignifying ruptures in signifying regimes by crossing a barrier of non-sense. Thus: “we can see that a collapsus of sense [*sens*] will always be associated with the promotion of a-signifying links of discursivity dedicated to the ontological weaving of an auto-consistent world” (Guattari 1995, 82); “the production of a new real-other-virtual complexion always results from a rupture of sense, a short circuiting of signification” (85–86). Associating sense with signification, structuralism is criticized for demanding a generalized signifying translatability of heterogeneous domains: “Structuralists have been content to erect the Signifier as a category unifying all expressive economies: language, the icon, gesture, urbanism or the cinema, etc. They have postulated a general signifying translatability for all forms of discursivity. But in doing so, have they not misunderstood the essential dimension of machinic autopoiesis?” (37)

Yet Guattari also writes of “a new sense of sense [*sens du sens*]” that “just fucks signification up! A shizo sense” (Guattari 2006, 210, translation

modified), and of a “*sense without signification* [*sens sans signification*] that is produced by a diagrammatic economy of signs [and] is capable of thwarting the impasses proper to semiologies of signification” (Guattari 2016, 132). In *What Is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari state that “the concept is neither denotation of states of affairs nor signification of the lived; it is the event as pure sense [*l'événement comme pur sens*] that immediately runs through the components” (WIP? 144). And, of course, Deleuze’s earlier works never equated sense with signification to begin with. Indeed, as it unfolds in those works, sense becomes a result or a product, where production, pace the discussion of Spinoza’s method in *Expressionism in Philosophy*, goes beyond genesis and creation. Sense’s development also includes the introduction of a second order sense, or a sense of intensity and its production, associated with the eternal return and its affirmation of difference. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the work done by sense and related concepts in Deleuze’s early thought continues in his later works through the changes of theme, focus, and vocabulary. Perhaps the most obvious starting point for mapping this continuation is in the machinic element of intensity, the body without organs that acts as an intensifier of desire, being similarly conceived as an effect in *Anti-Oedipus*, as something “produced, at a certain place and a certain time in the connective synthesis” (AO 8).

Much of this continuation is also visible in the addition Deleuze writes for the second edition of *Proust and Signs*, which was originally published in 1972 as a single extended chapter and was then divided in 1973 into five shorter chapters and a conclusion, constituting a second part of the work titled “The Literary Machine.” Deleuze writes in the “Preface to the Complete Text” that the original part “concerns the emission and the interpretation of signs as presented in *In Search of Lost Time*” while the later part “deals with a different problem: the production and the multiplication of signs themselves, from the point of view of the composition of the Search” (PS ix). In the “Preface to the 1972 Edition, he states that “interpretation is the converse of a production of signs themselves” and that “the work of art not only interprets and not only emits signs to be interpreted; it *produces* them, by determinable procedures” (xi). But the production and the interpretation of signs—where the latter does not seek what signs signify—are necessarily wrapped together. Unsurprisingly, despite what the two prefaces state, the additional text still devotes substantial space to the problem of interpretation.

On the side of interpretation, “the Search is constructed on a series of oppositions,” including Proust’s counterpoising of “explicit significations with implicit signs and involuted meanings [*les sens enroulés*]” (PS 106). It

is “the being of truth that forces us to seek it in what is implicated or complicated and not in the clear images and manifest ideas of the intelligence” (107). Truth, then, is sought in this involuted or rolled up—perhaps even folded up—sense. Sense is associated not with “conventional significations” but with “mute, fragmentary, and subjacent signs,” with “pure signs” that the Search finds “under the explicit significations employed” (107). A sign is “a part [that] is valid for itself [. . .] a fragment [that] speaks in itself” (112), and “the sign is always a fragment without totalization or unification” (129). Signs express symptoms to be interpreted through pathos rather than logos, in a manner “closer to the parlor sibyl than to the learned dialectician” (108). The sign opposes Logos and its analytic expression, phonetic writing, and rational thought (108).

The fragmentary nature of the world and its signs makes the Search “an experimentation with reminiscences and essences” brought about by “the disjunct use of the faculties in their involuntary exercise” (*PS* 108)—that is, by their exercise under the force of the sign’s violence. Proust, according to Deleuze, displays a certain Platonism, but one that eschews stable Essences and transcendent Ideas existing prior to a world that imitates them and accessed by anamnesis; hence, the Search is not about discovery but creation (108–9). Departing from an encounter, reminiscence establishes a chain of subjective and signifying associations, which “exists only in relation with a force that will break it” (120). Reminiscence is thereby “transcended in the direction of Essence” (109–10), but Essence is “a kind of superior *viewpoint*” that a person may assume, not as an identity but as “a principle of individuation” (110). This viewpoint unifies fragments by making transversal connections—“interpreting has no other unity than a transversal one” (128)<sup>6</sup>—and in this way a modern conception of reminiscence emerges as “*an associative, incongruous chain [that] is unified only by a creative viewpoint that itself takes the role of an incongruous part within the whole*” (114). Viewpoints are effectively Leibnizian monads but without any pre-established harmony, perspectives on disparate worlds rather than of a single consistent and compossible world (163–64). They are non-communicating or communicate only transversally (141, 168). And the transversal connector of incommensurables is the form of time: “time signifies [. . .] that system of nonspatial distances, that distance proper to the contiguous or to the continuous, *distances without intervals*. [. . .] Time is precisely the transversal of all possible spaces, including the space of time” (129, 130).

Displacing subjective associations and breaking signifying chains, a superior viewpoint establishes an objectivity that “can no longer exist except

in the work of art; it no longer exists in significant content as states of the world, nor in ideal signification as stable essence, but solely in the signifying formal structure [*la structure formelle signifiante*] of the work, in its style" (PS 111). Style defines art, and "style is the explication of the signs, at different rates of development, following the associative chains proper to each of them, gaining in each case the breaking point of essence as Viewpoint" (166). Art too thereby operates "within this dimension of transversality [. . .] it is a dimension in time without common measure with the dimensions they [the characters, events, and parts of the *Search*] occupy in space" (169). In correspondence with the pure sign, art is a "pure *interpreting* that [. . .] has no other unity than a transversal one" (128), that is, an interpretation that dissolves both subject and object (161) and that "neither collects nor unites the fragments [but] carries them on the contrary to the highest, most acute state, preventing them from forming a whole" (128). Art ties memory to creation, so that "to remember is to create, [it] is to reach that point where the associative chain breaks, leaps over the constituted individual, is transferred to the birth of an individuating world" (111).

Ultimately with regard to interpretation, the Search is an instrument, and specifically a telescope that allows us to discern "a distance without interval, according to an ever astronomical, ever telescopic law that governs the fragments of disparate universes" (PS 144). It reveals an intensive *spatium* that separates viewpoints no matter how proximate they may be, where the smallest interval is also the greatest chasm. Nonetheless, "the Search is not only an instrument, but a machine" (145), and so interpretation gives way to production—or, rather, "'interpreting,' 'deciphering,' and 'translating' [are] here the process of production itself. It is because the work of art is a form of production that it does not raise a special problem of meaning [*problème particulier de sens*], but rather of use" (147). The work of art "is essentially productive—productive of certain truths. No one has insisted more than Proust on the following point: that the truth is produced, that it is produced by orders of machines that function within us" (146). Production and interpretation share a starting point in the encounter with the sign, and so with sensibility: "All production starts from the impression because only the impression unites in itself the accident of the encounter and the necessity of the effect, a violence that it obliges us to undergo. Thus all production starts from a sign and supposes the depth and darkness of the involuntary" (147). Yet, on the one hand, "memory and creation are no more than two aspects of the same production" (146), while, on the other hand, "art is not only a matter of discovery or creation, but of production"

(155). The machinic production of signs exceeds their interpretive creation, because production works by determinable procedures.

These procedures distinguish three machinic orders of truth and production in a “great final systematization” (*PS* 148). They are all productions of time and correspond to the temporal syntheses of *Difference and Repetition*. Thus, the first machine, which concerns the production of time regained, “is defined chiefly by a production of *partial objects* as they have been previously defined, fragments without totality, vessels without communication, partitioned scenes” (150). These fragments are signs interpreted by an intelligence that comes after, according to a general law of a group or series. The first machine groups together “the values of worldliness with their frivolous pleasures, the values of love with their sufferings, and even the values of sleep with their dreams” (149). It produces signs in serial form: “the notion of a general law in Proust is inseparable from the production of partial objects and from the production of group truths or of corresponding serial truths” (151).

The second machine, which concerns a first version of lost time, “produces resonances, effects of resonance,” most prominently “those of involuntary memory, which affect two moments, a present moment and an earlier one. But desire too has effects of resonance. [. . .] Further, art produces resonances that are not those of memory” (*PS* 151). The second machine neither presupposes nor develops the first machine’s production of partial objects, but “extracts its own fragments itself and sets up a resonance among them according to their own finality” (152). It mobilizes “a singular essence, a local or localizing essence in the case of the signs of reminiscence, an individuating essence in the case of signs of art” (152), but in both cases it produces a never present and never experienced past: “Combray in its essence, as it was never experienced; Combray as Viewpoint, as it was never viewed” (152). Although the first two machines evoke different faculties and produce different effects, “Proust sees no opposition between the two but defines the production of partial objects as supporting and reinforcing that of resonances” (152). They correspond to a natural or organic production and an equivalent artistic or spiritual production (155).

Finally, the third machine is “that of universal alteration and death” (*PS* 156). It seems “catastrophic and unproductive,” presenting “the gravest objections” to the first two orders (158). But it too is productive of “a certain effect of Time” (158), namely, its power to effect “a *forced movement of greater amplitude*” (159) that sweeps away the first two machinic orders. Machinic production now becomes intensification. Whereas resonance contracts a past

and a present moment, forced movement “emphasizes the gap between them, and pushes the past still farther back into time,” it “dilates time infinitely” (159). It produces a second form of lost time that gives it “its place in the work of art” by the way death makes time become “sensuous” (160).



The addition to his Proust text is an early attempt by Deleuze to incorporate Guattari's machinic ideas, and it certainly does not encompass the further developments of his later solo and collaborative works. Tracing these developments would require another study that must be undertaken at another time. But I want to close this work by highlighting potential issues it might include: how machinic accounts of intensity in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* eventually take the form of abstract machines that are effectuated by machinic assemblages;<sup>7</sup> how diagrammatics as a mapping of the forces constituting these machines accords with the work previously done by spatio-temporal dynamisms—Deleuze holds that Foucault's diagrammaticism, like the dynamisms, is analogous to Kant's schematism (*F* 82); Deleuze and Guattari's frequent use of Foucault's concept of the statement (*énoncé*), which, they explain, has its conditions of possibility not in a linguistic subject but in collective assemblages of enunciation,<sup>8</sup> and which is central to their accounts of “regimes of signs,” “faciality,” “molar segments,” and “apparatuses of capture”—as Foucault explains in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, the statement is what allows propositions, sentences, and speech acts to “make sense [*font sens*]” (Foucault 1989, 86); the aesthetics of sensation Deleuze develops particularly in his works on cinema and Francis Bacon's paintings, where art's role is to capture forces (*ATP* 342; *FB* 56) or, in the case of music, to render duration sonorous, with the eternal return as a refrain (*ATP* 343); and finally the theme of the fold that, as highlighted earlier, is in Deleuze's own words a reinvocation of the surface.

From structure to machines, from dynamisms to diagrams, from sense to the statement and collective assemblages of enunciation, from an asymmetrical synthesis of the sensible to a logic of sensation, from the surface to the fold, and ultimately from sense to machinic becoming—these are some of the key directions Deleuze's thought takes through his encounter with Guattari.



# Notes

## Introduction

1. Deleuze renounced several texts published prior to 1953 that are now part of the posthumous *Letters and Other Texts* (LO 253–306).

2. “A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete beatitude” (*TRM*, 386).

3. Badiou (2000) is the most influential of those who declare Deleuze to be secretly a thinker not of the multiple but of the One. See also Hallward (2006).

4. Goodchild (1996) argues that Deleuze rejects ontology in favor of a “philosophy of life” or vitalism but maintains that his philosophy’s critical power is incomplete because of its materialism, even though it establishes the foundations for a spiritualism that would overcome its deficiencies. Deleuze himself encourages the vitalist interpretation, declaring: “Everything I’ve written is vitalistic, at least I hope it is” (*N* 143).

5. Descombes declares that “Gilles Deleuze is above all a post-Kantian” (Descartes 1980, 152), and this sentiment is common among those who frame Deleuze as primarily a transcendental philosopher, such as Smith (1997) and many of the contributors to Lundy and Voss (2015). Deleuze refers to himself as a Spinozist (*EPS* 11) and says that his early works in the history of philosophy “all tended toward the great Spinoza-Nietzsche equation” (*N* 125).

6. Badiou’s view that “Deleuze is a marvelous reader of Bergson, who, in my opinion, is his real master” (Badiou 2000, 39) is taken up explicitly by Ansell-Pearson (1999, 20) and implicitly or explicitly by far too many scholars to list here.

7. See Kerslake (2007) and Ramey (2012).

8. See, in particular, DeLanda (2003), which has an unfortunate tendency to assert equivalences between Deleuzian concepts (focusing specifically on the virtual/actual distinction and the mechanisms by which the virtual is said to be actualized) and concepts and theories in contemporary mathematics and physics (such as those concerning vector fields, attractors, linear and non-linear oscillators,

etc.). The result is an account that tends to work only when Deleuze's ideas are construed in narrow enough terms to be transferred directly to the scientific realm. Others who put Deleuze's thought into conversation with contemporary scientific theory include Bell (2006) and Bonta and Protevi (2004).

9. Bell's two-volume study (2022a and 2022b) puts Deleuze's thought into conversation with analytic philosophy in both the metaphysical and ethical/political domains.

10. See in particular Shores (2020), which links Deleuze's thought to dialetheism.

11. For example, Widder (2012b).

12. Roffe (2020) offers perhaps the only comparable book-by-book approach, at least in English, to this study. But it is pitched as a series of free-standing summaries of Deleuze's early books, and it leaves out Deleuze's large Spinoza book altogether, arguing that the knowledge of Spinoza required to present it makes it unsuitable for a "skeletal summary" (4).

13. Two valuable attempts to organize and evaluate the secondary literature are Smith, Protevi, and Voss (2023) and Somers-Hall (2013c).

14. These translation issues are discussed at the start of Part III. While they certainly contribute to the secondary and derivative status generally accorded to *The Logic of Sense*, an additional reason is almost certainly the sheer speed with which the later text was produced, being essentially written over a five-month period between the publication and defense of Deleuze's doctoral thesis and during a time of severely deteriorating health. On the timeframe of the production of *The Logic of Sense*, see Hughes (2025, 177–78).

15. Deleuze as far as I am aware never speaks of intensities being virtual, but references to "virtual intensities" or a "virtual-intensive domain" embedded in and constitutive of actual and extended things are found in Baugh (2013, 93), Boundas (2006, 5; also Boundas in Parr 2005, 134), Kaufman (2012, 90), Parsa (2022, 10), Sauvagnargues (2013, 48), Williams (2003, numerous pages), Zourabichvili (2012, 180), and many more studies. Roffe (2012, 142–43) takes up the opposing view that intensity concerns the actual. Clisby (2015) helpfully reviews these positions, but despite recognizing the differences between intensive processes of individuation or incarnation and the virtual's process actualization, he nonetheless reduces intensity to being an intermediary that sees through the virtual's actualization. This accords with the order of reasons Deleuze outlines in *Difference and Repetition* for virtual's determinate actualization, which Deleuze summarizes as differentiation–individuation–dramatization–differentiation, but not with discussions later in the text where individuation becomes a process of de-differentiation. Further discussions of these issues are found in Clisby and Bowden's (2017) edited collection.

16. Deleuze holds that "a book of philosophy should be in part a very particular species of detective novel, in part a kind of science fiction" (*DR* xx).

## Chapter 1

1. Deleuze and Guattari also acknowledge Hegel's proximity to their thought in *What Is Philosophy?* when they align Hegel's Concept with their own but criticize Hegel's for overreach: "In this way Hegel showed that the concept has nothing whatever to do with a general or abstract idea, any more than with an uncreated Wisdom that does not depend on philosophy itself. But he succeeded in doing this at the cost of an indeterminate extension of philosophy that, because it reconstituted universals with its own moments and treated the personae of its own creation as no more than ghostly puppets, left scarcely any independent movement of the arts and sciences remaining" (*WIP?* 12).

2. "It was Nietzsche, who I read only later, who extricated me from all this. Because you just can't deal with him in the same sort of way. He gets up to all sorts of things behind *your* back. He gives you a perverse taste—certainly something neither Marx nor Freud ever gave anyone—for saying simple things in your own way, in affects, intensities, experiences, experiments. It's a strange business, speaking for yourself, in your own name, because it doesn't at all come with seeing yourself as an ego or a person or a subject. Individuals find a real name for themselves, rather, only through the harshest exercise in depersonalization, by opening themselves up to the multiplicities everywhere within them, to the intensities running through them. [. . .] So anyway, I got to work on two books along these meandering lines, *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*" (*N* 6–7).

## Chapter 2

1. The limitation stated in the quote relates to Hegel's subject matter here being art, which expresses sense but not the sense *qua* sense that only philosophy grasps (Hyppolite 1997, 25).

2. Hyppolite does not deploy the language of surface, but it is implied by Hegel's navigation and overcoming of the essence/appearance distinction. When the dialectic progresses to the revelation that no supersensible essence lurks behind appearances, a new kind of appearance with all the characteristics of a constitutive surface emerges: "The supersensible is the sensuous and the perceived posited as it is *in truth*; but the *truth* of the sensuous and the perceived is to be *appearance*. The supersensible is therefore *appearance qua appearance*. We completely misunderstand this if we think that the supersensible world is *therefore* the sensuous world, or the world as it exists for immediate sense-certainty and perception; for the world of appearance is, on the contrary, *not* the world of sense-knowledge and perception as a world that positively *is*, but this world posited as superseded, or as in truth an *inner world*. It is often said that the supersensible world is *not* appearance; but

what is here understood by appearance is not appearance, but rather the *sensuous* world as itself the really actual” (Hegel 1977, §147).

3. “Hegel’s philosophy is therefore a philosophy of negation in a double sense. On the one hand, it deepens Spinoza’s theme ‘which is of infinite importance’: *all determination is negation*; it apprehends the lack or insufficiency in what is presented as positive. On the other hand, it exhibits, at the very heart of this negation, a repetition of negation, a negation of the negation which alone constitutes authentic positivity” (Hyppolite 1997, 106).

4. “To state that the water is hot as well as cold would be to attribute to the object, which can only be what it is, a self-dissimilarity, a difference of the self to itself, which is an impossibility given its absolute position. In the contradiction, empirical thought grasps nothing other than itself as subjectivity, and not the object” (Hyppolite 1997, 79).

5. “Empirical thought is naively dogmatic. For empirical thought, the content is always a *content alien* to the thought which apprehends it. It is merely positive. When this thought reflects on itself, when it criticizes itself under the shock of error, it is only a *formal* thought which can merely dispel the contradiction of its object. ‘Self-contradiction’ belongs only to the subject, to its illusory dialectic, alien to all content. The opposition of the formal, as merely formal, to the content, as merely content, is characteristic of this thought” (Hyppolite 1997, 80).

6. “Difference in itself is essential difference, the positive and the negative such that the positive is the identical self-relation in such a way as not to be the negative, and the negative is the different by itself so as not to be the positive. Thus either has an existence of its own in proportion as it is not the other. The one is made visible in the other, and is only in so far as that other is. Essential difference is therefore opposition; according to which the different is not confronted by *any* other but by *its* other. That is, either of these two (positive and negative) is stamped with a characteristic of its own only in relation to the other: the one is only reflected into itself as it is reflected into the other. And so with the other. Either in this way is the other’s own other” (Hegel, quoted in Hyppolite 1997, 120).

7. “If Leibniz had not limited the monads’ reflection from the outside, if he had not alienated the absolute position of the self into a God external to the monads themselves, he would have seen this principle of distinction being actualized [*s’actualiser*] into opposition, and opposition positing its own ground” (Hyppolite 1997, 119).

8. Bergson’s *Time and Free Will* denies the reality of worldly change on grounds that things, lacking memory and duration, can only exist in the present. But he must then treat the undeniable appearance of change as a mystery: “we must not say that external things *endure*, but rather that there is in them some inexpressible reason in virtue of which we cannot examine them at successive moments of our own duration without observing that they have changed” (Bergson 1910, 227).

In the later texts that Hyppolite addresses (primarily *Creative Evolution*), Bergson admits external change but denies or seeks to restrict its negativity.

9. “If *now, this noon*, we look again at the written truth [stating it is now night] we shall have to say that it has become stale” (Hegel 1977, §95).

10. “The Thing is posited as being *for itself*, or as the absolute negation of all otherness, therefore as purely *self*-related negation; but the negation that is self-related is the suspension of *itself*; in other words, the Thing has its essential being in another Thing” (Hegel 1977, §126).

11. “If ontology is an ontology of sense and not essence, if there is no second world, how can absolute knowledge be distinguished from empirical knowledge? Do we not fall back into the simple anthropology which we just criticized? Absolute knowledge must at one and the same time include empirical knowledge and nothing else, since there is nothing else to include, and yet it has to include its own radical difference from empirical knowledge” (*DI* 17).

## Chapter 3

1. Various sources are split on listing the publication date of *Logic and Existence* as 1952 or 1953. The front matter indicates that the date for the *dépot légal* for the first edition—when a copy was deposited in the national reference library—is the fourth quarter of 1952, but that the copyright year and year of publication for the general public is 1953.

2. “It was towards the end of 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against both Kant and Hegel. Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his footsteps. [. . .] I think that Moore was most concerned with the rejection of idealism, while I was most interested in the rejection of monism. The two were, however, closely connected. They were connected through the doctrine as to relations, which Bradley had distilled out of the philosophy of Hegel. I called this ‘the doctrine of internal relations,’ and I called my view ‘the doctrine of external relations.’” (Russell 1959, 54).

3. Russell, by his own comments, is probably best considered a pluralist: “For my part, I do not regard the issue between realists and their opponents as a fundamental one; I could alter my view on this issue without changing my mind as to any of the doctrines upon which I wish to lay stress. I hold that logic is what is fundamental in philosophy, and that schools should be characterized rather by their logic than by their metaphysic. My own logic is atomic, and it is this aspect upon which I should wish to lay stress. Therefore, I prefer to describe my philosophy as ‘logical atomism,’ rather than as ‘realism,’ whether with or without some prefixed adjective” (Russell 2010, 126).

4. “It is useless to say ‘terms are independent of their relations,’ because ‘independent’ is a word which means nothing. Two events may be said to be causally

independent when no causal chain leads from one to the other; this happens, in the special theory of relativity, when the separation between the events is space-like. Obviously this sense of ‘independent’ is irrelevant. If, when we say ‘terms are independent of their relations,’ we mean ‘two terms which have a given relation would be the same if they did not have it,’ that is obviously false; for, being what they are, they have the relation, and therefore whatever does not have the relation is different” (Russell 2010, 140).

5. “Of course, every history of philosophy has its chapter on empiricism: Locke and Berkeley have their place there, but in Hume there is something very strange which completely displaces empiricism, giving it a new power, a theory and practice of relations, of the AND, which was to be pursued by Russell and Whitehead” (*D* 15). Also: “Substitute the AND for IS. A *and* B. The AND is not even a specific relation or conjunction, it is that which subtends all relations, the path of all relations, which makes relations shoot outside their terms and outside the set of their terms, and outside everything which could be determined as Being, One, or Whole. [. . .] AND . . . AND . . . AND, stammering. Empiricism is nothing other than this” (57, 59).

6. Deleuze identifies “the four iron collars of representation” as “identity in the concept, opposition in the predicate, analogy in judgement and resemblance in perception” (*DR* 262).

7. “Representation is a site of transcendental illusion” (*DR* 265). *Empiricism and Subjectivity* discusses the issue primarily with respect to the false identity that arises from a problematic but indispensable fiction of continuous existence (*ES* 78–81).

8. When introducing the associative principles, Hume notes that they cannot be explained by any necessary connection between ideas, which would contradict the imagination’s capacity to separate and connect ideas as it pleases, or by some limit to the mind’s ability to forge connections. Thus, he concludes, “we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each other; nature in a manner pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one” (Hume 2003, 7–8). Hume, Deleuze contends, has no interest in questions of genesis, which he considers merely psychological, but only with principles that condition experience and subjectivity, again belying the claim that empiricism is primarily concerned with how knowledge derives from experience (*ES* 107–9).

9. “The [associative] relations find their direction and their sense in the passion; association presupposes projects, goals, intentions, occasions, an entire practical life and affectivity” (*ES* 120). See also Hume’s (2003, 319–23) discussion of the passions associated with the love of truth, and his discussion of belief as a manner of conceiving ideas that includes a feeling of their force and vivacity approaching that of impressions (68–77; 443–44).

10. “Causality [. . .] is passion, an impression of reflection, and a ‘resemblance effect.’ Causality is *felt*. It is a perception of the mind and not a conclusion of the understanding” (*ES* 26).

11. Deleuze outlines transcendental philosophy’s position in his 1963 book on Kant: “If we go beyond that which is given to us in experience, it is by virtue of principles which are our own, necessarily *subjective* principles. The given cannot be the basis of the operation by which we go beyond the given. It is not, however, sufficient that we have principles, we must have the opportunity to exercise them. I say: ‘The sun will rise tomorrow,’ but tomorrow will not become present without the sun actually rising. We would quickly lose the opportunity to exercise our principles if experience did not itself confirm and, as it were, give substance to our going beyond. The given of experience must therefore itself be subject to principles of the same kind as the subjective principles which govern our own moves. [. . .] The same principles must account for our subjective moves, and for the fact that the given submits itself to our moves. That is to say, the subjectivity of principles is not an empirical or psychological subjectivity, but a ‘transcendental’ subjectivity” (*KCP* 12, 13). In *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, Deleuze quotes extensively from the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the First Edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, focusing on the role Kant assigns to the transcendental imagination to impose a priori a law of reproducibility that guarantees that we reproduce previously apprehended appearances as subsequent ones arrive, giving unity to both objects and the manifold organizing our intuitions (Kant 1965, A100–3). This mediates the synthesis of apprehension to enable the understanding’s pure concepts to be brought to bear on appearances in a synthesis of recognition. In this way, “for Kant, relations depend on the nature of things in the sense that, as phenomena, things presuppose a synthesis whose source is the same as the source of relations” (*ES* 111). Against this, empiricism maintains a separation between the ideas and experience given to the subject on one side, and the subject whose associative relations, activated by the passions, turn its collection of ideas into a system on the other. Hence, “We will call ‘nonempiricist’ every theory according to which, *in one way or another*, relations are derived from the nature of things” (109), and “this is why critical philosophy is not an empiricism” (111).

12. “Experience is a principle, which instructs me in the several conjunctions of objects for the past. Habit is another principle, which determines me to expect the same for the future; and both of them conspiring to operate upon the imagination, make me form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner, than others, which are not attended with the same advantages” (Hume 2003, 189; partially quoted in *ES* 67).

13. “Whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and [. . .] whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination. And we may here add, that these propositions are equally true in the *inverse*, and that

whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable are also different. For how is it possible that we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different?" (Hume 2003, 13).

14. See Hume's critique of mathematical points as "mere scholastick quibbles, and unworthy of our attention" (Hume 2003, 24) and his insistence that real space and time must consist of tangible indivisibles because "if a point be not consider'd as colour'd or tangible, it can convey to us no idea; and consequently the idea of extension, which is compos'd of the ideas of these points, can never possibly exist" (28).

15. "If the principles of association explain that ideas are associated, only the principles of the passions can explain that a particular idea, rather than another, is associated at a given moment. [. . .] Everything takes place as if the principles of association provided the subject with its necessary form, whereas the principles of the passions provided it with its singular content. The latter function as the principle for the individuation of the subject" (*ES* 103–4).

16. Repetition is thereby the essence of experience (*ES* 67) even if difference is the principle under which the experience's flux is determined. Experience "manifests a multiplicity and a repetition of similar cases" (96), but only through habit do these similarities become the relations of resemblance the mind uses to organize experience.

17. Akin to Bergson, Hume also speaks of time as a "changeable succession of connected qualities" (Hume 2003, 157).

## Chapter 4

1. Bergson maintains that duration is both a unity and a multiplicity (Bergson 1983, 168–69) but not a synthesis of these (175). Synthesis constitutes number and motion—which themselves depend on duration—and conceiving duration as a synthesis reduces it to a homogenous medium, confusing it with space (Bergson 1910, 75, 93, 124–25). Synthesis, unifying separate elements, is incompatible with duration's combination of unity and indivisibility (Bergson 1998, 29n).

2. Generic and specific difference is discussed in chapter six.

3. "We are told that the Self is one (thesis) and it is multiple (antithesis), then it is the unity of the multiple (synthesis). Or else we are told that the One is already multiple, that Being passes into nonbeing and produces becoming. The passages where Bergson condemns this movement of abstract thought are among the finest in his oeuvre. To Bergson, it seems that in this type of *dialectical* method, one begins with concepts that, like baggy clothes, are much too big" (*B* 44).

4. Riemann's *Mannigfaltigkeit* is translated directly into English as "manifold" but into French as *multiplicité* and then to "multiplicity" in English translations of the French. I therefore use manifold when addressing Riemann's work but multiplicity when dealing with Bergson and Deleuze.

5. Bergson never refers to Riemann, leaving Deleuze to assert: “It is clear that Bergson, as a philosopher, was well aware of Riemann’s general problems. Not only his interest in mathematics points toward this, but, more specifically, *Duration and Simultaneity* is a book in which Bergson opposes his own doctrine to the theory of Relativity, which is directly dependent on Riemann” (B 39).

6. I use Henry S. White’s translation of Riemann, found in Smith’s *A Source Book in Mathematics* (Riemann 1929), rather than the original William Kingdon Clifford translation of 1873 (Riemann 1882) used by Deleuze scholars such as Calamari (2015), Duffy (2013), Durie (2004), Plotnitsky (2006 and 2009), and Voss (2013). White’s translation is generally clearer and demonstrates sensitivity to the various meanings of *Grösse*, which can be translated as “magnitude” or “quantity,” and in its mathematical sense refers to quantity in general, to anything that can be increased or diminished (“*als fache Ausdruck der mathematik viel gebraucht, und zwar als Verdeutschung von quantitas: quantitas, eine größe, heisset in der mathematik alles, was sich vermehren und vermindern lässt*” [Grimm and Grimm 1935; thanks to Julia Ng for pointing me to this usage]). Particularly by rendering *Grössenbegriff* primarily as “notion of quantity” (it could also be “concept”) and *Grössenbestimmung* as “determination of quantity” or “determination of magnitude” as appropriate to the context, White positions magnitude as a subset of quantity, the latter being divisible into discrete and continuous forms. Such nuances make the translation consistent with mathematical and philosophical distinctions that Riemann, acknowledged to be well trained philosophically (Plotnitsky 2009, 191), would have known well. Clifford, in contrast, almost always uses “magnitude” in places where “quantity” is more appropriate, though he translates *Grössenbestimmung* largely the same as White. Compare, for example, Clifford’s translation of the passage just quoted, which has Riemann describing his project in the circular and unilluminating way as “constructing the notion of a multiply extended magnitude out of general notions of magnitude” (Riemann 1882, 55–56). The French translation of Riemann referenced by Deleuze (Riemann 1898, 280–99) translates *Grösse* and related terms with *grandeur*, which ordinarily refers to magnitude but whose mathematical usage denotes “*Quantité, tout ce qui est susceptible d’augmentation ou de diminution*” (Littré 1957).

7. “While I now attempt in the first place to solve the first of these problems, the development of the concept of manifolds multiply extended, I think myself the more entitled to ask considerate judgement inasmuch as I have had little practise in such matters of a philosophical nature, where the difficulty lies more in the concepts than in the construction” (Riemann 1929, 412).

8. Individual modes of a continuous manifold are “points” and those of a discrete manifold are “elements” (Riemann 1929, 412), and a manifold’s determinate parts are accordingly distinguished either by a superficial “mark” or a substantive “boundary” (413).

9. In Euclidean geometry, given two points positioned at  $X_0, Y_0, Z_0$  and  $X_1, Y_1, Z_1$ , the distance  $S$  between them is  $\sqrt{(X_1 - X_0)^2 + (Y_1 - Y_0)^2 + (Z_1 - Z_0)^2}$ , and similarly with a higher number of dimensions. Flatness in smallest parts assumes this

formulation holds at an infinitesimal level even if a manifold's stretch or curvature precludes it at greater magnitudes—in short, that  $ds = \sqrt{dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 + \dots}$ .

10. See, for example, Bergson (1983, 142–58; 1991, 206; 1998, 154–57), and Bergson's (erroneous) assertion in his Latin thesis that for Aristotle the division of a body into parts containing other parts “will go on into infinity” (Bergson 1970, 70).

11. On this point see Widder (2012a).

12. Bergson's critique of Einstein, however, is directed at the special theory of relativity, whereas it is Einstein's general theory of relativity that builds on Riemann's thought.

13. Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition* uses two distinct French verbs, *différentier* and *différencier*, with the former referring to the virtual and the latter to the virtual's actualization. Patton's translation marks the difference by rendering the two processes as “differentiation” and “differentiation,” while translations of writings such as “The Method of Dramatization” in *Desert Islands* distinguish a virtual that is completely “differential” from its “differentiation” into an actuality. As Deleuze has not yet articulated this distinction, I here follow the English translations and refer to *différenciation* using the proper English word, differentiation. From *Difference and Repetition* onward, it will be important to make the distinction clear where the translations do not.

14. Aristotle distinguishes numbering number and numbered number, defining the first as “that with which we count” and the second as “what is counted or countable” (Aristotle 1984, *Physics* 219b). Twelve, for example, is a numbered number when referring to a collection of discrete things but a numbering number when referring to a single magnitude. One can see why Deleuze associates numbering number with the virtual number he attributes to Bergson, as Aristotle holds that the numbering number twelve is not “composed” of smaller numbers such as seven and five, let alone the number one taken twelve times, whereas the group of discrete entities is composed of separate units counted to that total; nonetheless, this counting of units depends on the numbering number taken as an indivisible whole.

15. On this point, see Widder (2012a, 134–36).

16. See, for example, Ansell Pearson (2002, chap. 7), Borradori (2001), Boundas (1996), and Moulard (2002). Against such readings, see Hardt (1993, 19–25), who treats Deleuze's turn to Nietzsche as a break with Bergson.

17. Contra Lundy (2017), who argues that Bergson plays a fundamental role in Deleuze's theorization of intensity in *Difference and Repetition* and later works.

## Chapter 5

1. Compare with Nietzsche's summary of the struggle of wills to power that determines the complex and changing meanings of the concept of punishment, and where “the form is fluid, but the ‘meaning’ is even more so” (Nietzsche 1967, 2.12).

2. “Evaluations, in essence, are not values but ways of being, modes of existence of those who judge and evaluate, serving as principles for the values on the basis of which they judge. This is why we always have the beliefs, feelings and thoughts that we deserve given our way of being or our style of life. There are things that can only be said, felt or conceived, values which can only be adhered to, on condition of ‘base’ evaluation, ‘base’ living and thinking. This is the crucial point; *high* and *low*, *noble* and *base*, are not values but represent the differential element from which the value of values themselves derives” (NP 1–2).

3. Deleuze does invoke temperature when explaining degrees of difference or, as he will say in later works, of intensity. *Difference and Repetition* refers to “orders of difference: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, *difference of intensity*” (DR 222), and distinguishes temperature and entropy as intensive and extensive factors of thermal energy (223). Nevertheless, these differences in temperature, being intensive, are never differences between two temperatures, as one might say that the difference between 10 degrees Celsius and 20 degrees Celsius is 10 degrees. Rather—and akin to the claim that there are no differences of intensity because intensity itself is difference (222)—“when it is pointed out that a temperature is not composed of other temperatures, or a speed of other speeds, what is meant is that each temperature is already a difference, and that differences are not composed of differences of the same order but imply series of heterogeneous terms” (237). Deleuze elsewhere explains: “An extensive quantity is easy to recognize. What you take simultaneously, in an instant, by definition is a unit. The length of this table is an extensive quantity: whatever division I make of its length, I apprehend it in an instant. As soon as I apprehend it in an instant, I constitute it as a unity. Intensive quantity is the opposite. It is a multiplicity that you take in an instant as multiplicity. When you say: it is 20 degrees warm, you do not mean 10 degrees plus ten degrees. It means: it makes the multiplicity of 20 degrees that I apprehend in an instant. A multiplicity apprehended instantly as multiplicity is an intensive quantity” (LOT 229–30).

4. “Nietzsche reproaches the dialecticians for going no further than an abstract conception of universal and particular; they were prisoners of symptoms and did not reach the forces or the will which give to these sense and value. They moved within the limits of the question ‘What is . . . ?’, the contradictory question *par excellence*” (NP 197).

5. Deleuze writes similarly in *Difference and Repetition*: “Hegel [. . .] proposes an abstract movement of concepts instead of a movement of the *Physis* and the *Psyche*. Hegel substitutes the abstract relation of the particular to the concept in general for the true relation of the singular and the universal in the Idea. He thus remains in the reflected element of ‘representation,’ within simple generality. He represents concepts instead of dramatizing Ideas” (DR 10).

6. On the difficulties this creates and how they lead Deleuze away from Bergson and toward Nietzsche, see Widder (2012a).

7. Hegel here follows the scholastic reworking of Aristotle's distinction between quantity and quality. Whereas for Aristotle changes in intensity are qualitative rather than quantitative—it is quality rather than quantity that admits of a more or less (Aristotle 1984, *Categories*, 6a, 10b)—the scholastics demand that these changes be treated quantitatively. On this medieval background in relation to Deleuze's theorization of intensive quantity, see Mader (2014).

8. Ordinal number does not involve a scale of fixed extensive differences—the ranking of the places in a race, for example, does not indicate how far behind the second and third place runners were from the winner. Nietzsche distinguishes these two forms of quantity when he attacks mechanism for building its worldview on “the injection of the concept of number, the concept of the thing (concept of the subject), the concept of activity (separation of cause from effect), the concept of motion (sight and touch),” but still argues that “if we eliminate these additions, no things remain but only dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, in their ‘effect’ upon the same” (Nietzsche 1968, §635).

9. Nietzsche states: “it should be kept in mind that ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ are relative concepts” (Nietzsche 1974, §118).

10. Nietzsche declares in *Human, All Too Human* that we must move beyond simplistic oppositions whose existence is merely presumed by metaphysical philosophy and develop “a *chemistry* of the moral, religious and aesthetic conceptions and sensations, likewise of all the agitations we experience within ourselves in cultural and social intercourse, and indeed even when we are alone” (Nietzsche 1986, §1).

11. Also: “The victorious concept ‘force,’ by means of which our physicists have created God and the world, still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as ‘will to power,’ i.e., as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or as the employment and exercise of power, as a creative drive, etc.” (Nietzsche, 1968, §619).

12. “Every center of force adopts a perspective toward the entire remainder, i.e., its own particular valuation, mode of action, and mode of resistance” (Nietzsche 1968, §567).

13. This is the role played by spatio-temporal dynamisms, which Deleuze outlines in *Difference and Repetition* and “The Method of Dramatization” (DI 94–116) and which is addressed in chapters 11 and 12.

14. “We may mingle, and unite, and separate, and confound, and vary our ideas in a hundred different ways; but ‘till there appears some principle, which fixes one of these different situations, we have in reality no opinion: And this principle, as it plainly makes no addition to our precedent ideas, can only change the *manner* of our conceiving them” (Hume 2003, 69). Deleuze writes: “We see why Hume never showed any interest in the problems of genesis or in purely psychological problems. Relations are not the product of a genesis, but rather the effect of principles. Genesis must refer to the principles, it is merely the particular character of

a principle. Empiricism is not geneticism: as much as any other philosophy, it is opposed to psychologism" (*ES* 108).

15. "Chance is the bringing of forces into relation, the will to power is the determining principle of this relation. The will to power is a necessary addition to force but can only be added to forces brought into relation by chance" (*NP* 53).

16. Nietzsche writes: "We have to *learn to think differently*—in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: *to feel differently*" (Nietzsche, 1982, § 103).

17. "Every time we understand the eternal return as the return of a particular arrangement of things after all the other arrangements have been realised, every time we interpret the eternal return as the return of the identical or the same, we replace Nietzsche's thought with childish hypotheses. No one extended the critique of all forms of identity further than Nietzsche. [. . .] We can thus see how the eternal return is linked, not to a repetition of the same, but on the contrary, to a transmutation" (*NP* xi–xii).

## Chapter 6

1. "*God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things*" (Spinoza 1992, *Ethics*, 1p18).

2. In the conclusion of *Expressionism in Philosophy*, Deleuze argues that Leibniz extends expression "to cover everything, including the world of signs, of similarities, of symbols and harmonies—while Spinoza greatly refines its sense, and strictly opposes expressions to signs or analogies" (*EPS* 328). Leibniz's philosophy consequently remains one of analogy, equivocity, and transcendence (329–30). This view of Leibniz changes in Deleuze's subsequent works, arguably as a result of Guattari's influence (see Hammond 2010).

3. Spinoza defines an adequate idea as one considered solely in itself and without relation to anything external, including its object, so that it has "all the properties—that is, intrinsic characteristics—of a true idea" (Spinoza 1992, *Ethics*, 2d4). Adequate knowledge fully expresses the nature of a thing (2p29p), and an idea that does not involve adequate knowledge is not clear and distinct but rather confused (2p27–28).

4. "Our problem is now transformed. The question is no longer 'Why do we have inadequate ideas?' but rather 'How do we come to form adequate ideas?' In Spinoza it is the same with truth as with freedom: they are not given to us in principle, but appear as the result of a long activity through which we produce adequate ideas, liberated from the sequence of external necessity. Spinoza's inspiration is in this respect profoundly empiricist" (*EPS* 148–49).

5. Deleuze maintains that "if the attribute necessarily relates to the intellect, this is not because it resides in the intellect, but because it is expressive and because what it expresses necessarily implies an intellect that 'perceives' it" (*SPP* 51). He

further holds that Spinoza's initial definitions of substance and attribute (Spinoza 1999, *Ethics*, 1d3 and 1d4) are merely nominal, and that the sixth definition alone is a real definition (*EPS* 20, 61–62).

6. “By the attributes of God must be understood that which expresses the essence of the Divine substance (Def. 4), that is, that which pertains to substance. It is this, I say, which the attributes themselves must involve” (Spinoza 1992, *Ethics*, 1p19p). Furthermore, “the same attributes of God that explicate his eternal essence (Def. 4) at the same time explicate his eternal existence” (1p20p). Finally, “Particular things are nothing but affections of the attributes of God; that is, modes wherein the attributes of God find expression in a definite and determinate way” (1p25c).

7. Implication and explication are separate only in the inadequate idea, which does not include the immanent cause of its object and thereby “lacks a ‘comprehension’ that would be concerned with causes” (*SPP* 68).

8. In a 1981 lecture (Deleuze 2016), Deleuze clarifies this connection between rationalism and empiricism by holding that Spinoza pushed seventeenth-century ideas of the infinite toward an “infinitist conception of the individual” that “is perhaps the first time in the history of the individual that an attempt to think relation in the pure state will be sketched out,” this being an attempt “to think relation independently of its terms.” The secret of this grand rationalism, then, is its conceptualization of the externality of relations, which for Deleuze is the essential thesis of all empiricisms.

9. Heidegger's turn to Duns Scotus is similarly motivated, first, to counter medieval conceptions of analogy that are merely “a welcomed means of formulating a religious conviction in philosophical terms” (Heidegger 1995, 38), and, second, as outlined in the conclusion of his *Habilitationsschrift* on Duns Scotus, because of how the Aristotelian quandary concerning the unity of the categories links to post-Kantian concerns regarding the ground of judgment (Heidegger 1978, 242–57).

10. Deleuze admits that “it is hardly likely that” Spinoza ever read Duns Scotus (*EPS* 359n.28) and bases his claim of Duns Scotus's influence on Spinoza's obvious interests in scholastic metaphysical and logical treatises, the “probable influence” of Scotist-informed Franciscan priest Juan de Prado on his thought, and the fact that the problems Duns Scotus addresses need not be confined to Christian thought (359–360n.28).

Deleuze's association of Duns Scotus and Spinoza might be his most surprising maneuver. Smith (2012, 368n.9) believes Deleuze to be the first commentator to have proposed it. However, specific if passing references by sources influential to Deleuze indicate some inspiration for it. Étienne Gilson's *John Duns Scotus: Introduction to His Fundamental Positions*, which is Deleuze's primary reference for Duns Scotus's philosophy, twice mentions Spinoza, the first time holding that Spinoza's substance, acting as the complete cause of all its effects, entails the kind of absolute monism Duns Scotus rejects by reserving power for secondary causes, and the second time aligning Spinoza and Hegel as exemplars of a modern dialectical systematization

that Duns Scotus does not pursue (Gilson 2019, 208, 492n4). Martial Gueroult, whose work Deleuze admired (Dosse 2010, 97, 109), twice mentions Duns Scotus or Scotism in his major study of Spinoza's divinity, first to reject Scotist formal distinction being applicable to substance's attributes, and later, after endorsing a univocity between substance and its attributes, to reject it between substance and its modes to maintain substance's transcendence ("*une certaine transcendence*") and ontological distinctness (Gueroult 1968, 238n38, 299–300). Deleuze's reading of Spinoza rejects all four claims: Modes, he argues, are not subsumed by substance but instead are univocal in form with it by virtue of their power or conatus; Spinoza's system challenges modern dialectical philosophies; formal distinction is real distinction, and so not "merely formal" in the way Gueroult suggests; and univocity obtains between substance, its attributes, and its modes.

Gueroult's study, published the same year as Deleuze's *Expressionism*, is based on lectures given at the Collège de France from 1950 to 1962 (Peden 2013, 67), coinciding with the time Deleuze is thought to have largely completed his Spinoza thesis (Dosse, 2010, 143).

11. Concrete things are separate and individual, and "separability and individuality are thought to belong chiefly to substance" (Aristotle 1984, *Metaphysics*, 1029a).

12. Duns Scotus's critique of analogy can be applied to Aquinas, but its direct target is Aquinas's neo-Augustinian critic, Henry of Ghent (see Tonner 2007, 140).

13. "Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it. [. . .] So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point" (Aristotle 1984, *Metaphysics*, 1003a–b).

14. "Such words [predicates that are said of God and creatures] apply to God and creatures neither univocally nor equivocally but by what I call analogy (or proportion). This is the way a word like *healthy* applies to organisms (in a primary sense) and to diets (as causing health) or complexions (as displaying it)" (Aquinas 1989, 32).

15. Deleuze acknowledges both points: "It has often been noted that univocal being allows the distinction of its 'modes' to subsist: when it is considered in its individuating modalities (infinite and finite), rather than in its nature as Being, it ceases to be univocal" (*EPS* 359n.19); "the comparison between Spinoza and Scotus here bears only on the theme of intensive quantities or degrees. The theory of individuation attributed to Spinoza, as set out in the next paragraph, is altogether different from that of Scotus" (379–80n.14).

16. But see Gracia's (1996) argument that despite the common use of "principle of individuation" at the time, Duns Scotus avoids the terminology and only occasionally speaks of a "cause of individuation."

17. These positions, whose advocates include Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Aquinas, are addressed in Duns Scotus (1994, nn. 43–141).

18. The individual reality constituted by haecceity is unlike specific reality in that “it is never taken from an added form, but rather precisely from the last reality of the form” (Duns Scotus 1994, n. 180). Haecceity’s formal status also makes it intelligible, albeit only to a divine intellect (n. 192).

19. “This reality of an individual is primarily diverse from every quidditative entity. [. . .] Therefore, this [individual] entity, which of itself is another entity than the quiddity or the quidditative entity, cannot constitute the whole of which is it [sic] a part in its quidditative being, but only in another kind of being” (Duns Scotus 1994, n. 181; see also nn. 193–94).

20. See Duns Scotus (2012, I, d. 2, p. 2, q. 4, nn. 398–408). On Duns Scotus’s place within this historical context see Grajewski (1944).

21. See Duns Scotus (2016b, I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 4, n. 193). Adams’s (1976, 34–35) translation of the definition of formal distinction found here is taken up by Henninger (1989, 82) and Waller (2009, 94) and is supplemented by further translation by Schmidt (2009, 90n.33). Deleuze too largely draws on the account of formal distinction involved in divine names and generally avoids consideration of its role in individuation, though his deployment more closely reflects the latter use.

22. Duns Scotus uses no fewer than seven different terms for the non-identical elements involved in formal distinction (see Adams 1976, 31–32; King 2003, 23–24).

23. See Duns Scotus (2012, I, d. 2, p. 2, q. 4, nn. 411–39) and Duns Scotus (2016b, I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 4, nn. 192–93); also Adams (1976, 36–37). On the changes Duns Scotus makes between the *Ordinatio* and the *Reportata*, considered by some to be a response to criticisms that formal distinction is incompatible with divine simplicity, see Adams (1976, 37–43).

24. See Ockham (1994, nn. 24–90). Ockham also rejects formal distinction for divine attributes but accepts it for the Trinity.

25. Deleuze’s claims here seem to reflect a hasty and compressed reading of Gilson’s account of how Duns Scotus seeks to reach divine attributes using the concepts taken from finite creatures. Normally an attribute affirmed of a subject “designates a property or something like a property that perfects a nature as a second act,” so that “the concept of any attribute presupposes a *quidditative concept*, that is to say, the concept of a certain quiddity or essence to which this attribute belongs” (Gilson 2019, 168). However, Gilson contends, Duns Scotus considers this an issue peculiar to finite beings. When inquiring into the divine nature, these concepts must be stripped of the imperfections they have in creatures and considered solely in terms of the quiddity that is their formal reason. They can then be attributed to God immediately and without any separation or second act. Duns Scotus argues: “every metaphysical inquiry about God proceeds in the following way: it considers the formal notion (*ratio*) of something, then it removes from that formal notion the imperfection that it has in creatures while retaining the formal notion [as such], to which it then attributes completely the highest perfection and in this way it

attributes that notion to God” (Duns Scotus 2016a, 56; quoted in the original Latin and left untranslated in Gilson 2019, 169). In this way, an attribute “taken in the last degree of abstraction [. . .] is conceived as a quiddity without relation to anything but what its proper formal reason of quiddity includes” (Gilson 2019, 190). “Rational,” then, is a quiddity only when raised to the infinite. Indeed, by treating it as a quiddity “in the order of finitude” (EPS 64), Deleuze undercuts his own criticism that Duns Scotus continues to treat attributes merely as properties.

26. “Subtle anthropomorphism” is Kant’s term for a description of the supreme being “without which we could not think anything whatsoever in regard to it [. . .], namely as a being that has understanding, feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and desires and volitions corresponding to these, but also in ascribing to it a perfection which, as infinite, far transcends any perfection that our empirical knowledge of the order of the world can justify us in attributing to it” (Kant 1965, A700/B728).

27. “Spinoza is able on this basis to distinguish attributes and *propria*. His starting point is Aristotelian: a *proprium* is what belongs to a thing, but can never explain what it is. Thus the *propria* of God are just ‘adjectives’ which give us no substantial knowledge; God would not be God without them, but is not God through them. Spinoza could, in accordance with a long tradition, give to these *propria* the name of attribute; but there would then still be, according to him, a difference of nature between two sorts of attribute” (EPS 49).

28. An attribute’s modes all agree through their involving the conception of that attribute—thus, for example, “all bodies agree in this, that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute [extension]” (Spinoza 1992, *Ethics*, 2L2p). However, being equally common to all its modes, an attribute cannot constitute the essence of any of them (2p37), for it could not then be conceived outside that particular thing (2p37p).

29. Deleuze thereby reconciles Spinoza’s seemingly contradictory claims that God’s essence and existence are distinct from those of his creatures (Spinoza 1992, *Ethics*, 1p17s), and yet that all things are in the divine nature and can only be conceived through it (1p15). Spinoza contends: “individual things can neither be nor be conceived without God, and yet God does not pertain to their essence” (2p10s2).

30. Contra Gueroult’s contention that Duns Scotus’s concept, being definitional and nominal, is inadequate to Spinoza’s substance: “*C’est pourquoi Dieu n’est pas un être absolument simple où les attributs cesseraient de se distinguer. Leur distinction n’y est pas simplement virtuelle, et actuelle seulement dans leurs effets,—comme le professent les thomistes,—ni simplement formelle (par leur définitions),—comme le veulent les scotistes,—car il y demeurent des réalités diverses, incommensurables, ne s’intégrant dans un être, indivisible et non pas simple, que par l’identité de l’acte causal par lequel ils se donnent l’existence et produisent leurs modes*” (Gueroult 1968, 238n.38). When considering why Spinoza speaks only of real and not formal distinction, Deleuze argues that “it was to Spinoza’s advantage to use a term that Descartes, by the use

he had made of it, had in a sense neutralized theologically. So the term ‘real distinction’ allowed great audacity without stirring up old controversies which Spinoza doubtless considered pointless or even harmful” (*EPS* 66).

31. While not employing the terminology of synthesis, Gilson (2019, 362–70) refutes interpretations of Duns Scotus’s understanding of the concrete as a “mosaic” (*mosaïque*) of disparate pieces or substances.

32. Descartes states: “two substances are said to be really distinct, when each of them may exist without the other” (Descartes 1986, Appendix, 230). But as finite beings depend upon God for their creation and conservation (*Meditations*, 107–8), only the latter can actually be a substance. Descartes elsewhere holds that “the [finite] things which God can separate or conserve separately are really distinct” (*Principles*, 189).

33. The ambiguity is encapsulated in Descartes’s statement: “And indeed, we here understand by modes the same with what we elsewhere designate attributes or qualities. But when we consider substance as affected or varied by them, we use the term modes; when from this variation it may be denominated of such a kind, we adopt the term qualities [to designate the different modes which cause it to be so named]; and, finally, when we simply regard these modes as in the substance, we call them attributes” (Descartes 1986, *Principles*, 186). See also 190–91 where Descartes describes how thought and extension may be considered either as attributes constituting the essences of thinking and bodies or as modes of substance.

34. “Thus *conatus* is not in Spinoza the effort to persevere in existence, once existence is granted. It designates [an] existential function of essence, that is, the affirmation of essence in a mode’s existence” (*EPS* 230).

35. “The power whereby each single thing, and consequently man, preserves its own being is the very power of God, or Nature [. . .] the power of man in so far as it is explicated through his actual essence is part of the infinite power of God, or Nature, that is, of God’s essence” (Spinoza 1992, *Ethics*, 4p4p).

36. Deleuze nevertheless tells the English translator of *Spinoza et le problème de l’expression*, in a statement composed at the time he was working on *What Is Philosophy?*, that “the hope of making substance turn on finite modes [. . .] already appears in this book” (*EPS* 11).

37. “By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it has to be formed” (Spinoza 1992, *Ethics*, 1d3). In contrast, “By mode I mean the affections of substance; that is, that which is in something else and is conceived through something else” (1d5).

## Interlude

1. *Une parole* refers specifically to a word as articulated in language, as uttered or expressed.

2. “To assume that there is an underlying common ‘substance’ which explains in advance all evolutions and transformations is surely to proceed by abstraction. [. . .] We are inevitably led back to the problem of syndromes: some syndromes merely attach a common label to irreducibly different disturbances” (CC 46).

3. “In any case, it is impossible that sound, as a material element, should in itself be part of the language. Sound is merely something ancillary, a material the language uses” (Saussure 1986, 164).

4. More generally, Deleuze holds that “linguists constantly speak in negative terms and assimilate the differential relations between phonemes to relations of opposition” (DR 204). But Saussure, as we will see, treats opposition as a positive relation that is linked not to phonemes but to values and that is not a “particularly pluralised and relativised” (204) form of negation. Deleuze’s reference to the eternally negative (*éternellement négatives*) character of linguistic differences appears not in the student notes of 1908–1911 that constitute the *Cours de linguistique générale* but rather draft notes from 1894 for a never published response to William Dwight Whitney’s *Life and Growth of Language*. Those notes, which famously refer to a “complex of eternally negative differences [*plexus de différences éternellement négatives*]” (Saussure 2006, 153), predate Saussure’s distinguishing of value and signification, as evidenced by a statement in his draft text, *On the Dual Nature of Language*, that “we do not find any significant difference between the terms *valeur* [*valeur*], *meaning* [*sens*], *signification* [*signification*], *function* [*function*] or *use* [*employ*] of a form, nor even with the *notion* or *content* of a form: these terms are synonymous” (12; on the likely date of Saussure’s draft of *De l’essence double du langage*, discovered among the Orangerie Manuscripts in 1996 and included in the *Ecrits de linguistique générale*, see Sanders’s introduction to the English translation of the text [xiii]).

5. Passage modified as the English translation renders *valeur* as “signification.”

6. “Now a mediocre or stupid person, once we love that person, is richer in signs than the most profound intelligence” (PS 21).

7. Conversely, voluntary memory solicited by an intelligence trying to decipher worldly signs and signs of love “always comes too late in relation to the signs to be deciphered” (PS 52).

8. Proust, however, rejects Bergson’s understanding of change as duration, holding all change, pace the temporality of worldly signs, to be “a defection, a race to the grave” (PS 18).

9. In his 1956 essays on Bergson, Deleuze uses *actualisation* and *realisation* interchangeably, with both terms usually being translated as “actualization” (DI, 22–31, 32–51).

10. In contrast to the analysis of *Proust and Signs*, where repetition alters under conditions in which essence takes on increasing generality, Deleuze opens *Difference and Repetition* by declaring: “Repetition is not generality. Repetition and generality must be distinguished in several ways. Every formula which implies their confusion is regrettable” (DR 1).

11. Freud's English translators consistently translate *Trieb* as instinct, whereas Nietzsche translators, for example, have variously used "drive," "instinct," and sometimes "impulse." Lacan (1981, 49; 2006, 851) convincingly argues that in Freud's case the translation is poor and misleading insofar as "instinct" suggests a purposeful and possibly moral compulsion in relation to a predetermined object. Lacan and Deleuze nevertheless refer to the death instinct (*Todestrieb*) as *l'instinct de mort* even if they frequently—though not always—use *pulsion* rather than *instinct* to refer to drives generally. To maintain consistency with the English translation, I use instinct in relation to Freud and the death instinct but use drive where appropriate in other discussions of Deleuze and psychoanalysis in later chapters.

12. "Throwing away the object so that it was 'gone' might satisfy an impulse of the child's, which was suppressed in his actual life, to revenge himself on his mother for going away from him. In that case it would have a defiant meaning: 'All right, then, go away! I don't need you. I'm sending you away myself.' [. . .] We know of other children who liked to express similar hostile impulses by throwing away objects instead of persons. We are therefore left in doubt as to whether the impulse to work over in the mind some overpowering experience so as to make oneself master of it can find expression as a primary event, and independently of the pleasure principle" (Freud 1957b, 16).

13. Consciousness faces even more powerful internal forces that "give rise to feelings in the pleasure-unpleasure series" but that are generally "more commensurate with the system's method of working than the stimuli which stream in from the external world" (Freud 1957b, 29). When internal excitations cause significant displeasure, "there is a tendency to treat them as though they were acting, not from the inside, but from the outside, so that it may be possible to bring the shield against [external] stimuli into operation as a means of defence against them. This is the origin of *projection*" (29).

14. "The ego now found its position among sexual objects and was at once given the foremost place among them. [. . .] Thus the original opposition between the ego-instincts and the sexual instincts proved to be inadequate. A portion of the ego-instincts was seen to be libidinal; sexual instincts—probably alongside others—operated in the ego" (Freud 1957b, 52).

15. Hume, Deleuze notes, already recognized this problem, and "remarked that though psychic life clearly exhibits and distinguishes between pleasures and pains, we could never, no matter how exhaustively we examined our ideas of pain and pleasure, derive from them a *principle* in accordance with which we seek pleasure and avoid pain" (CC 112–13).

16. Freud's hesitancy is due partly to the death instinct's speculative character and how its observable manifestations in sadism and masochism are at best indirect, and partly to his position that no negation resides in the unconscious: no forgetting or erasure; no firmly distinct objects that do not easily condense into one another; no linear time with its negative separations of past, present, and future; and no

death, which is a complex concept belonging to the mind's higher strata (see Freud, 1961a, 57–8; 1966, 178). Instead, there are the pleasure-ego's processes of introjection and projection, which reflect compulsions to internalize what is considered good and expel what is considered bad. Freud thus locates negation's source in external frustrations such as the loss and return of the mother, and in the realistic (if not necessarily real) threat of castration by the father, which together consolidate the ego and the separation of inner and outer realities (see Freud 1965, 85–86, 93–94; 1994, 3). Linking affirmation and negation to the primordial instincts in his "Negation" essay, he declares: "Affirmation—as a substitute for uniting—belongs to Eros; negation—the *successor* to expulsion—belongs to the instinct of destruction" (Freud 1961b, 239, emphasis added).

17. "I was dying of shame and despair. What was most humiliating was that I felt a wild and supersensual pleasure in my pitiful situation" (Sacher-Masoch, quoted by Deleuze in *CC* 49; see 268 for the passage in context).

18. "Since I have deprived the will of every impulse that might arise for it from obeying any particular law, there is nothing left to serve the will as principle except the universal conformity of its actions to law as such, i.e., I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law" (Kant 1993, 402).

19. The association of irony and humor with the directions of height and depth respectively correlates with Bergson's account of laughter: "The most common of these contrasts is perhaps that between the real and the ideal, between what is and what ought to be. Here again transposition may take place in either direction. Sometimes we state what ought to be done, and pretend to believe that this is just what is actually being done; then we have *irony*. Sometimes, on the contrary, we describe with scrupulous minuteness what is being done, and pretend to believe that this is just what ought to be done; such is often the method of *humour*. Humour, thus defined, is the counterpart of irony. Both are forms of satire, but irony is oratorical in its nature, whilst humour partakes of the scientific. Irony is emphasised the higher we allow ourselves to be uplifted by the idea of the good that ought to be: thus irony may grow so hot within us that it becomes a kind of high-pressure eloquence. On the other hand, humour is the more emphasised the deeper we go down into an evil that actually is, in order to set down its details in the most cold-blooded indifference" (Bergson 1911, 127).

## Chapter 7

1. Heidegger (1969, 42–74) defines ontotheology as the metaphysical position that holds the ground of being also to be the highest being. Kant declares: "The object of the ideal of reason, an object which is present to us only in and through reason, is therefore entitled the *primordial being* (*ens originarium*). As it has nothing

above it, it is also entitled the *highest being* (*ens summum*); and as everything that is conditioned is subject to it, the *being of all beings* (*ens entium*)” (Kant 1965, A578–79/B606–7).

2. In the first blockage, “the concept is thus constituted in such a fashion that, in its real use, its comprehension extends to infinity, but in its logical use, this comprehension is always liable to an artificial blockage” (*DR* 12). An individual thing’s concept—i.e., the concept of Socrates—is really applied only to that thing, implying infinite comprehension, but the logical structure of predication means it retains “a generality such that no existing individual *can* correspond to it *hic et nunc*” (12).

3. Deleuze gives the example of Epicurean atoms, each type of which, in accordance with its concept, is infinite in number yet also has real existence in time and space. This “implies a natural blockage of the concept, different in kind from a logical blockage: it forms a true repetition in existence rather than an order of resemblance in thought” (*DR* 13). This natural blockage pertains to nominal concepts, or to words taken as concepts of things, which “possess a comprehension which is necessarily finite, since [. . .] we define a word by only a finite number of words” (13).

4. Deleuze references Kant’s thesis concerning objects whose corresponding concepts have indefinite or only virtually infinite comprehension because they include non-conceptual differences—or differences found within intuition that cannot be further conceptualized—such as left- and right-handedness. The result is that “however far you go in the concept, Kant says, you can always repeat—that is, make several objects correspond to it, or at least two: one for the left and one for the right, one for the more and one for the less, one for the positive and one for the negative” (*DR* 14). In contrast to the nominal concepts involved in the blockage of discrete extension, Deleuze calls these concepts of Nature, which reside in the mind that contemplates Nature but which relate to a Nature that “is alienated mind or alienated concept, opposed to itself. Corresponding to such concepts are those objects which themselves lack memory—that is, which neither possess nor collect in themselves their own moments” (14). On these points see Somers-Hall (2013b).

5. A thing’s (inner) difference being prior to its (external) relations to others entails its indifference to these others, such that “difference is this state in which determination takes the form of unilateral distinction,” like the lightning that distinguishes itself from the black sky without the sky distinguishing itself in return (*DR* 28). Deleuze here identifies two forms of indifference—an “undifferentiated abyss [*l’abîme indifférencié*],” which, as we will see, is a virtual multiplicity that is fully differentiated without being in any way differentiated, and a surface consisting of “unconnected determinations like scattered members,” which is an actuality of discrete and externally related entities—and asks: “Is difference intermediate between these two extremes? Or is it not rather the only extreme, the only moment of presence and precision?” (28). Here, difference refers neither to the virtual nor to

the actual but to an intensity operating prior to them and determining the passage from one to the other.

## Chapter 8

1. “This is what the philosophy of difference refuses: *omnis determinatio negatio*. . . . We refuse the general alternative proposed by infinite representation: the indeterminate, the indifferent, the undifferentiated or a difference already determined as negation, implying and enveloping the negative (by the same token, we also refuse the particular alternative: negative of limitation or negative of opposition). In its essence, difference is the object of affirmation or affirmation itself. In its essence, affirmation is itself difference” (*DR* 52).

2. “There has only ever been one ontological proposition: Being is univocal. [. . . F]rom Parmenides to Heidegger it is the same voice which is taken up, in an echo which itself forms the whole deployment of the univocal. A single voice raises the clamour of being” (*DR* 35).

3. Deleuze’s articulation of this internal relation does not seem to appear prior to *Difference and Repetition*, though it is outlined in all but name in “How Do We Recognize Structuralism” (*DI* 170–92), which was composed in 1967 though not published until 1972, and where such relations are declared to be symbolic and differential (176).

4. In the text’s later discussion of Ideas, these distinctive points become singularities that define series at the virtual level. The complete determination of singular points refers to a virtual process of differentiation, while their integration refers to a process of differentiation that actualizes them (*DR* 209). For these reasons, Deleuze holds that “We must take great care here not to confuse ‘complete’ with ‘completed.’ [. . . A]n object can be completely determined—*ens omni modo determinatum*—without, for all that, possessing the integrity which alone constitutes its actual existence” (46–47).

5. “Every simple substance has relations which express all the others and [. . .] it is consequently a perpetual living mirror of the universe. [. . .] And as the same city regarded from different sides appears entirely different, and is, as it were multiplied respectively, so, because of the infinite number of simple substances, there are a similar infinite number of universes which are, nevertheless, only the aspects of a single one as seen from the special point of view of each Monad” (Leibniz 1979, “Monadology,” §§56, 57).

6. “It is not so much because God has resolved to create this Adam that he made all his other resolutions, but because the resolution which he made in regard to Adam, as also that which he made in regard to other particular things, are consequences of the resolve which he made in regard to the whole universe

and to the principal designs which determine its primary concept” (Leibniz 1979, “Correspondence with Arnault,” 110).

7. As Deleuze states, reciprocal and complete determination together “relate difference, both as infinitely small difference and as finite difference, to sufficient reason as the foundation which selects or chooses the best possible world” (*DR* 48).

8. This is Heidegger’s phrase in *Identity and Difference*, a text Deleuze references when setting out Heidegger’s contributions to an ontology of difference, where he concludes that Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche’s eternal return suggests he does not truly disengage being from its subordination to identity and representation (*DR* 64–66). Heidegger explains: “If we think of belonging *together* in the customary way, the meaning of belonging is determined by the word together, that is, by its unity. In that case, ‘to belong’ means as much as: to be assigned and placed into the order of a ‘together,’ established in the unity of a manifold, combined into the unity of a system, mediated by the unifying center of an authoritative synthesis. [. . .] However, belonging together can also be thought of as *belonging* together. This means: the ‘together’ is now determined by the belonging. Of course, we must still ask here what ‘belong’ means in that case, and how its peculiar ‘together’ is determined only in its terms. [. . .] Enough for now that this reference makes us note the possibility of no longer representing belonging in terms of the unity of the together, but rather of experiencing this together in terms of belonging” (Heidegger 1969, 29).

9. “In accordance with Heidegger’s ontological intuition, difference must be articulation and connection in itself; it must relate different to different without any mediation whatsoever by the identical, the similar, the analogous or the opposed. There must be a differentiation of difference, an in-itself which is like a *differenciator*, a *Sich-unterscheidende*, by virtue of which the different is gathered all at once rather than represented on condition of a prior resemblance, identity, analogy or opposition” (*DR* 117).

## Chapter 9

1. Also: “To repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent. And perhaps this repetition at the level of external conduct echoes, for its own part, a more secret vibration which animates it, a more profound, internal repetition within the singular” (*DR* 1).

2. “Time is no longer defined by succession because succession concerns only things and movements which are in time. If time itself were succession, it would need to succeed in another time, and on to infinity” (*KCP* vii). Kant himself writes: “For change does not affect time itself, but only appearances in time. [. . .]”

If we ascribe succession to time itself, we must think yet another time, in which the sequence would be possible" (Kant 1965, A183/B226).

3. Humean repetition, Deleuze argues, is thereby constituted by cases where difference is already given—an AB, AB, AB—and thereby differs from Bergson's preferred example, an A, A, A, A shorn of such alternation (*DR* 71–72).

4. Bergson writes: "However brief we suppose any perception to be, it always occupies a certain duration, and involves, consequently, an effort of memory which prolongs, one into another, a plurality of moments" (Bergson 1991, 34). For Deleuze, the living present being produced by contraction and contemplation makes fatigue "a real component of contemplation. [. . .] Fatigue marks the point at which the soul can no longer contract what it contemplates, the moment at which contemplation and contraction come apart. We are made up of fatigues as much as of contemplations" (*DR* 77).

5. This is another reference to Bergson's cone image from *Matter and Memory* (Bergson 1991, 152).

6. Deleuze also links Platonic reminiscence and Bergsonian memory in *Bergsonism* (B 59).

7. "It would be completely wrong to consider the positing of reality to be an effect induced by the external world, or even the result of failures encountered by passive syntheses. On the contrary, the test of reality mobilises, drives and inspires all activity of the ego: not so much in the form of a negative judgement, but in moving beyond the binding in the direction of a 'substantive' which serves as a support for the connection" (*DR* 98).

8. Deleuze's account focuses on Lacan, but Bergson draws a similar connection between the pure past and a foundational prohibition at the base of habit morality in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (Bergson 1956, 9–10).

9. "Eros leads its life as a cycle, or as an element within a cycle, where the opposing element can only be Thanatos at the base of memory, the two combining like love and hate, construction and destruction, attraction and repulsion. Always the same ambiguity on the part of the ground: to represent itself in the circle that it imposes on what it grounds, to return as an element in the circuit of representation that it determines in principle" (*DR* 109–10).

10. The difference in terminology seems largely a matter of Deleuze's commitment in this period to the language of simulacra, which cannot be images of anything. In the preface to the 1994 English translation of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze states that its chapter on the thought without image was preparatory for "the research undertaken with Guattari where we invoked a vegetal model of thought: the rhizome in opposition to the tree, a rhizome-thought instead of an arborescent thought" (*DR* xvii).

11. Deleuze here references Kant's footnote in §25 of the second Transcendental Deduction: "The 'I think' expresses the act of determining my existence.

Existence is already given thereby, but the mode in which I am to determine this existence, that is, the manifold belonging to it, is not thereby given. In order that it be given, self-intuition is required; and such intuition is conditioned by a given *a priori* form, namely, time, which is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable [in me]. Now since I do not have another self-intuition which gives the *determining* in me (I am conscious only of the spontaneity of it) prior to the act of *determination*, as time does in the case of the determinable, I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of the determination; and my existence is still only determinable sensibly, that is, as the existence of an appearance. But it is owing to this spontaneity that I entitle myself an *intelligence*" (Kant 1965, B158n).

12. Kant's subjection of the transcendental syntheses of apprehension and imagination to the synthetic unity of apperception and its categories of understanding is, of course, a major aspect of his total rewrite of the Transcendental Deduction in the second edition of the *Critique*. See Kant (1965, B129–69, and particularly B159–65).

13. Deleuze states that the Freudian unconscious is ignorant of time because it "carries out the passive syntheses of an original time. *It is these three syntheses which must be understood as constitutive of the unconscious*" (DR 114). I would nevertheless contend that the language of impassivity found in *The Logic of Sense* is more appropriate to the third synthesis and is notably connected in the later work to the eternal return. Among secondary authors it is common to speak of three passive syntheses in Deleuze's theory of time, not only as elaborated in *Difference and Repetition* but more generally. See for example Faulkner (2006) and Williams (2003).

14. Deleuze elsewhere speaks of such transmutations as "a curious stationary journey" (D 127), as "spiritual voyages effected without relative movement, but in intensity, in one place" (ATP 381), and as "false movements" (C2 136), which, as such, are not really movements at all.

## Chapter 10

1. Descartes's *Discourse on Method* opens by defining good sense as "the power of judging aright and of distinguishing truth from error" and declaring it to be, "of all things among men, the most equally distributed [. . .] by nature equal in all men" (Descartes 1986, *Discourse*, 3). Although the *Meditations* defines common sense (*sensus communis*) as "the imaginative faculty" (*Meditations*, 93) alone, its closing pages conclude that God's existence guarantees that in truthful perceptions the faculties converge on their object: "I ought not in the least degree to doubt of the truth of those presentations, if, after having called together all my senses, my memory, and my understanding for the purpose of examining them, no deliverance is given by any one of these faculties which is repugnant to that of

any other: for since God is no deceiver, it necessarily follows that I am not herein deceived" (142–43).

2. In contrast to the understanding, "Reason is never in immediate relation to an object, but only to the understanding" (Kant 1965, A643/B671). While a transcendental idea is given in accordance with reason's laws, "its object [. . .] is something of which we have no concept" (A338/B396), and, indeed, the illusions of reason result when it is seen to be "supplying concepts of certain objects" (A644/B672)—that is, seen to be providing real knowledge of the soul, cosmos, or God. Consequently, ideas cannot serve as constitutive principles but only as regulative principles that provide rules for the understanding to proceed empirically through the series of conditions toward the unconditioned (A508–9/B537). Being absolute or unconditioned, ideas cannot offer any knowable object and so cannot constitute any knowledge, but in merely being thought they provide a vehicle for the understanding to bring its powers to bear on the problem of the unity of knowledge and thus to extend itself to a new domain. The unity of knowledge reflects reason's interests and imparts subjective necessity to the ideas, and as such these rules are better called maxims than principles of reason (A667/B697). Were their unity constitutive of objects they would also carry objective necessity (A648/B676). Nevertheless, it is enough to uphold the regulative character of ideas, which provides "the greatest possible empirical use of understanding," to yield an outcome that is "much the same" as if pure reason provided constitutive principles that "determined *a priori* the objects [or appearances viewed as things] in themselves" (A516–17/B544–45).

3. Also: "Problems have an objective value, while Ideas in some sense have an object. [. . .] Problems *qua* problems are the real objects of Ideas" (*DR* 169). Kant says that Plato understood that Ideas "must none the less be recognised as having their own reality, and [. . .] are by no means mere fictions of the brain" (Kant 1965, A314/B371).

4. The "I am" being undetermined existence, as seen in Kant's reformulation of the cogito.

5. Deleuze's association of complete determination with the Idea of God is justified inasmuch as the sum total of possibility, whose transcendental content contains all concepts within it and does not merely comprehend them under it (Kant 1965, A577/B605), is itself "a concept that is completely determinate *a priori*" (A574/B602).

6. Deleuze distinguishes singular or distinctive points from ordinary or regular points (*DR* 24, 47, 153, 163, 176, 181, 190). A triangle is composed of an infinity of ordinary points but is defined by three singular points corresponding to its vertices. Singular points mark changes of direction, and thus breaks or discontinuities—in short, events. With respect to determination: "Complete determination must not be confused with reciprocal determination. The latter concerned the differential relations and their degrees or varieties in the Idea which correspond to diverse forms. The

former concerns the values of a relation—in other words, the composition of a form or the distribution of singular points which characterise it” (175).

7. “The Idea is thus defined as a structure. [. . .] Following Lautman and Vuillemin’s work on mathematics, ‘structuralism’ seems to us the only means by which a genetic method can achieve its ambitions. It is sufficient to understand that the genesis takes place in time not between one actual term, however small, and another actual term, but between the virtual and its actualisation—in other words, it goes from the structure to its incarnation, from the conditions of a problem to the cases of solution, from the differential elements and their ideal connections to actual terms and diverse real relations which constitute at each moment the actuality of time. This is a genesis without dynamism, evolving necessarily in the element of a supra-historicity, a *static genesis* which may be understood as the correlate of the notion of *passive synthesis*, and which in turn illuminates that notion” (DR 183). Deleuze also calls the time in which Ideas are actualized “a purely logical time” (205) and “a purely logical, ideal or dialectical time” (211), these undoubtedly referring to Lacan’s notion of logical time as a set of temporal relations and a sequence of instantaneity, comprehension, and anticipation built into static logical structure of intersubjective (and therefore dialectical) relations. Lacan links logical time to the structure of the unconscious that has no awareness of chronological time (Lacan 1981, 31–32, 39–40) and elaborates its features in relation to the solution to a problem (Lacan 2006, 161–75). Experience in chronological time may reflect these logical counterparts, but the former expresses “a spatialized conception” (166) of time and is an externalization “of something intrinsic to logical ambiguity” (165), Lacan’s conception in these ways paralleling the static temporal structures Deleuze identifies in the order and series associated with time’s third synthesis.

8. See also Widder (2002, 76–87).

9. Translation corrected from “actual terms never resemble the singularities they incarnate.”

10. See Descartes (1986, *Principles*, 177), Leibniz (1996, 54).

11. “Consider Leibniz’s famous passages on the murmuring of the sea. Here too, two interpretations are possible. Either we say that the apperception of the whole noise is clear but confused (not distinct) because the component little perceptions are themselves not clear but obscure; or we say that the little perceptions are themselves distinct and obscure (not clear): distinct because they grasp differential relations and singularities; obscure because they are not yet ‘distinguished,’ not yet differentiated. These singularities then condense to determine a threshold of consciousness in relation to our bodies, a threshold of differentiation on the basis of which the little perceptions are actualised, but actualised in an apperception which in turn is only clear and confused; clear because it is distinguished or differentiated, and confused because it is clear” (DR 213).

12. When Borges’s Menard decides to author *Don Quixote* in a way that would not be “a mechanical transcription of the original; he did not propose to copy it”

(Borges 1993, “Pierre Menard, Author of *Don Quixote*,” 32), he opts against his initial plan of adopting the language, history, and experience of a seventeenth-century Spanish Catholic as being “too easy” (33). Instead, he chooses to memorize, forget, and then write the text, reasoning that “my general memory of *Don Quixote*, simplified by forgetfulness and indifference, is much the same as the imprecise, anterior image of a book not yet written” (34). The result, as Deleuze notes, is repetition as a genuine creation: “The text of Cervantes and that of Menard are verbally identical, but the second is almost infinitely richer” (36, see also *DR* xxii).

## Chapter 11

1. “The critique of the negative is radical and well grounded only when it carries out a genesis of affirmation and, *simultaneously*, the genesis of the appearance of negation” (*DR* 206).

2. “No concept could receive a logical division in representation, if this division were not determined already by sub-representational dynamisms; we see this in the Platonic process of division which works only in two directions: left and right, and—to take an example from fishing—with the help of determinations such as ‘surround and strike,’ ‘strike from top to bottom, bottom to top’” (*DI* 96; see also *DR* 216).

3. If spatio-temporal dynamisms also “have the power to dramatize *concepts*,” this is “because first they actualize, incarnate *Ideas*” (*DI* 99).

4. “When you assign such a system of spatio-temporal determination to a concept, in my view you’re replacing a logos with a ‘drama,’ you’re setting up the drama of this logos. [. . .] Take the case of an obsessive compulsive, where the subject keeps shrinking: handkerchiefs and towels are perpetually cut, first in two, then the halves are cut again; the cord for the bell in the dining room is regularly shortened, and the bell gets closer to the ceiling; everything is gnawed at, miniaturized, put into boxes. This is indeed a drama, in the sense that the patient organizes a space, agitates it, while in this space he expresses an Idea of the unconscious. An angry fit is a dramatization that stages larval subjects” (*DI* 108).

5. Thus, “the destiny and achievement of the embryo is to live the unlivable, to sustain forced movements of a scope which would break any skeleton or tear ligaments” (*DR* 215). Also: “every embryo is a chimera, capable of functioning as a sketch and of living that which is unlivable for the adult of every species. It undertakes forced movements, constitutes internal resonances and dramatises the primordial relations of life” (250).

6. See Vermeiran (2021) on the influence of Leibniz’s use of *spatium* as a “space of internal differences” (322) on Deleuze.

7. “Indifference has two aspects: the undifferentiated abyss, the black nothingness, the indeterminate animal in which everything is dissolved—but also

the white nothingness, the once more calm surface upon which float unconnected determinations like scattered members: a head without a neck, an arm without a shoulder, eyes without brows. The indeterminate is completely indifferent, but such floating determinations are no less indifferent to each other. Is difference intermediate between these two extremes? Or is it not rather the only extreme, the only moment of presence and precision?" (DR 28).

8. Although Aristotle's primary understanding of definition concerns the division of genera into species via specific difference, he also considers other understandings that would be determinate at the individual level, in particular defining a thing through an account of the parts that compose it or its causes. See Aristotle (1984, *Metaphysics* 998b, 1042a–1045b).

9. Although this is a correct rendering of the French original, I believe Deleuze likely meant to write "the derivative of a composite function."

10. "More generally, every field of forces refers back to a potential energy, every opposition refers to a deeper 'disparateness,' and oppositions are resolved in time and extensity only to the extent that the disparities have first invented their order of communication in depth and rediscovered that dimension in which they envelop one another" (DR 236).

11. Descombes (1980, 156–67) argues that Deleuze cannot distinguish the noble affirmation of difference from the slavish affirmation through opposition because the nobles and slaves themselves cannot do so.

12. Badiou (2000) uses this statement about "a single clamour of Being for all beings" to justify a willful misunderstanding of Deleuze's entire philosophy as a Platonist ontology of a transcendent One, ignoring Deleuze's subsequent qualification that this univocal clamor obtains only "on condition that each being, each drop and each single voice has reached the state of excess—in other words, the difference which displaces and disguises them and, in turning upon its mobile cusp, causes them to return" (DR 304).

## Chapter 12

1. "We therefore demand that a bare concept be *made sensible* [*sinnlich zu machen*], that is, that an object corresponding to it be presented in intuition. Otherwise, the concept would, as we say, be without *sense* [*ohne Sinn*], that is, without meaning [*ohne Bedeutung bleiben würde*]" (Kant 1965, A240/B299).

2. This externality arises because "although the schemata of sensibility first realise the categories, they at the same time restrict them, that is, limit them to conditions which lie outside the understanding, and are due to sensibility" (Kant 1965, A146/B185–86). Pure concepts also remain independent because while they cannot represent an object without the schemata, they still carry "a meaning

[*Bedeutung*],” even if this “is purely logical, signifying only the bare unity of the representations [of thought]” (A147/B186).

3. In his earlier Kant book, Deleuze indicates that for Kant the schema incarnate concepts: “the schema is a spatio-temporal determination which itself corresponds to the category, everywhere and at all times: it does not consist in an image but *in spatio-temporal relations which embody or realize [incarnent ou réalisent] relations which are in fact conceptual*” (KCP 18).

4. An ambiguity around simulacra persists in *The Logic of Sense*, which sometimes positions them in the depths while referring to the surface formed from the depths as an Image, and elsewhere—particularly the first two appendices on the simulacrum in ancient philosophy—holds that the simulacra of the depths rise to the surface, Deleuze noting that in Epicurean philosophy the sheets of atoms thrown off the surfaces of bodies and interacting with our senses of sight and hearing are called idols by Epicurus and simulacra by Lucretius (LS 273). What is consistent throughout the text, however, is that simulacra are linked to the physical rather than metaphysical domain.

5. “If sense points beyond itself towards the object, the latter can no longer be posited in reality exterior to sense, but only at the limit of its process” (DR 154).

6. “In fact, the condition must be a condition of real experience, not of possible experience. It forms an intrinsic genesis, not an extrinsic conditioning. In every respect, truth is a matter of production, not of adequation. It is a matter of genitivity, not of innateness or reminiscence. We cannot accept that the grounded remains the same as it was before, the same as when it was not grounded, when it had not passed the test of grounding. If sufficient reason or the ground has a ‘twist,’ this is because it relates what it grounds to that which is truly groundless. At this point, it must be said, there is no longer recognition. To ground is to metamorphose” (DR 154).

7. The Stoics make brief appearances in *A Thousand Plateaus* and *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, but while the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal is raised, it is done while avoiding the surface/depth opposition, holding instead that the incorporeal event is said on the same level as the corporeal state of affairs it expresses. See, for example, ATP 85–87.

8. Regarding simulacra, Deleuze writes in his 1990 “Letter-Preface” to Jean-Clet Martin’s *Variations: La philosophie de Gilles Deleuze*: “Similarly, you grasp the importance I assign to the notion of multiplicity: it is essential. As you say, multiplicity and singularity are intimately connected (‘singularity’ being at once different from ‘universal’ and ‘individual’). ‘Rhizome’ is the best term to designate multiplicities. On the other hand, it seems to me that I have totally abandoned the notion of simulacrum, which is all but worthless” (TRM 362).

9. “Oddly enough, it wasn’t me who rescued Félix from psychoanalysis; he rescued me. In my study of Masoch, and then in *The Logic of Sense*, I thought

I'd discovered things about the specious unity of sadism and masochism, or about events, that contradicted psychoanalysis but could be reconciled with it. Félix, on the other hand, had been and was still a psychoanalyst, a student of Lacan's but like a 'son' who already knew that reconciliation was impossible" (*N* 144).

## Chapter 13

1. Bergson is named only once (*LS* 28), and his work referenced in only one note (352n.6).

2. Žižek (2004, 20–21) holds that Deleuze in *The Logic of Sense* was struggling with two opposing logics embedded in his ontology of the virtual. Świątkowski (2015, 16) maintains: "A similar distinction [between the virtual as a realm of problems and the actual as a realm of its solutions] plays a role in *The Logic of Sense*. Sense belongs to the realm of the virtual. It is real but at the same time never fully actualised." Boundas describes the virtual and actual using the oppositions specific to *The Logic of Sense*, namely bodies, bodily mixtures, and states of affairs on one side and incorporeal events on the other (Boundas in Parr 2005, 299–302). Many more examples could be provided, including scholars who recognize the different terminology of *effectuation* but still consider it interchangeable with *actualisation*.

3. Deleuze follows Lacan (2006, "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," 197–268) rather than Saussure (1986) in setting *langage* rather than *langue* against *parole* (speech). Thus: "We always begin in the order of speech [*parole*], but not in the order of language [*langage*], in which everything must be given simultaneously and in a single blow" (*LS* 181). Contra Lacan, however, Deleuze distinguishes *langue* by associating it not with a specific language but with the order of signification or conceptual hierarchy—while associating *parole* with the order of manifestation or subjective expression—indicating that he is following Benveniste's argument against Saussure that within *langue* there is a necessary rather than arbitrary connection between word (signifier) and concept (signified). See *LS* 15–16; Benveniste (1971, 43–48).

4. Deleuze's early essays on Bergson do not use *effectuer*, but it is equated with actualization in one of its few uses in *Bergsonism* (*B* 123n.12). In *Difference and Repetition*, *effectuation* and variations of the verb *effectuer* are used a handful of times, but never in any consistent technical sense. They are translated variously as "achieve," "assume," "bring about," "effectuate," "give effect to," "give rise to," "implement," and "realize." In *Expressionism in Philosophy*, *effectuation* is used in connection to the finite mode's power of existing, its capacity to affect and be affected, with this power being effectuated by the same external cause that brings the mode into existence (*EPS* 89–90, 316, 319). It is also used with regard to the relation among an infinity of parts that constitutes the actually existing mode (208, 211, 233–34, 236). The English translation of *Expressionism* sometimes renders the term

as actualization, but not in ways that give the same misleading impression that it is the actualization of the virtual. Lawlor (2022) notes Deleuze's use of *effectuation* and even declares it to be "an innovation found first in *Logic of Sense*" (131n.10), but treats it as another term for actualization possibly used by Deleuze to better reflect the text's concern with the Stoic division between cause and effect (incorporeals, as effects, are effectuated and counter-effectuated in the production of sense).

5. The modifications made to the previously published four articles and book introduction whose republication comprises *The Logic of Sense's* five appendices illustrate well how this play of surfaces departs from Deleuze's earlier thinking. The first appendix, "Plato and the Simulacrum," adds descriptions of simulacra being kept submerged and later climbing to the surface (*LS* 257, 261, 262; compare with Deleuze 1966, 429, 432, 434), removes references to the virtual and actual (compare *LS* 260 with Deleuze 1966, 431), amends passages that had equated simulacra and phantasms (hence "we have become simulacra" [*LS* 257] replaces "*nous sommes devenus des simulacres, des phantasmes*" [Deleuze 1966, 430]), adds material that holds the phantasm to be built on the simulacrum or to be a simulation engendered by the simulacrum, and adds material that relates the phantasm to the eternal return (*LS* 261, 265, compare with Deleuze 1966, 432, 437). "Lucretius and the Simulacrum" rewrites the discussion of simulacra to distinguish surface emissions from emissions coming from the depths of things and to distinguish the phantasm from both of these (*LS* 273–75, compare with Deleuze 1961, 26–28). "Klossowski or Bodies–Language" includes additions that introduce the terminology of the phantasm, explain the relation between intensity and intentionality as one of simulacra becoming phantasms, describe singularities as pre-individual and impersonal (compare *LS* 297 and 298 with Deleuze 1965, 213, 215, and 216), and link the phantasm to the eternal return (see *LS* 301, which concludes several paragraphs that replace the concluding paragraphs of the original publication; the opening paragraphs of this appendix also replace the original's introduction, and *The Logic of Sense* version adds an extended discussion of the disjunctive syllogism in Kant). "Michel Tournier and the World Without Others" includes modifications that characterize bodies in terms of depths and relate cosmic energy to the surface (compare *LS* 302 with Deleuze 1967a, 504), and completely rewrites the paragraph describing Robinson's return to the surface to include a surface–depth opposition and a process in which simulacra ascend to become phantasms (compare *LS* 315 with Deleuze 1967a, 517–18). Finally, "Zola and the Crack-Up" adds two paragraphs elaborating the "scientific inspiration" behind the two heredities found in Zola's work, these being a heredity of historically and socially conditioned instincts and a heredity of the silent crack, where the crack refers to a "diffuse potentiality" that is actualized (*s'actualiserait*) in each body only by way of "a transmissible acquired property [found in the instincts]" that can be "internal or external" and that "give[s] it some particular determination" (*LS* 325, which is part of a two-paragraph addition to the original publication [Deleuze 1967b]). Other modifications are made to

the order of presentation found in the original publications, and there are further instances where parts of the original publications are removed from the versions found in the appendices.

6. Saussure speaks similarly of language as an articulation connecting the disparate orders of signifier and signified: “Linguistic structure might be described as the domain of articulations, taking this term in the sense defined earlier (p. [26]). Every linguistic sign is a part or member, an *articulus*, where an idea is fixed in a sound, and a sound becomes the sign of an idea” (Saussure 1986, 156).

## Chapter 14

1. All references to Plato’s dialogues come from Plato (1961).

2. The young Socrates of the *Parmenides* doubts whether Forms exist for such “trivial and undignified objects” as mud or hair, but Parmenides says his uncertainty will disappear with his philosophical maturation (*Parmenides* 130c–e).

3. In contrast, in the earlier *Theaetetus*, knowledge remains undefined because it is impossible to specify false judgment as, for example, thinking something that “is not” (*Theaetetus* 187d–189d).

4. “The essential difference is no longer simply between Chronos and Aion, but between the Aion of surfaces and the whole of Chronos together with the becoming-mad of the depths. Between the two becomings, of surface and depth, we can no longer say that they have in common the sidestepping of the present. For if depth evades the present, it is with all the force of a ‘now’ which opposes *its* panic-stricken present to the wise present of measure; and if the surface evades the present, it is with all the power of an ‘instant,’ which distinguishes its occurrence from any assignable present subject to division and redivision. Nothing ascends to the surface without changing its nature” (*LS* 165). Deleuze associates the bad Chronos with Saturn, who “grumbles from deep within Zeus” (164). The Greek correlate to Saturn is Cronos, and the French original is clearly playing on the homophony between the two names (which are *Chronos* and *Cronos* in French too). Saturn/Cronos was the Titan who revolted against his father, Uranus, to become ruler, and his last son, Zeus, in turn later defeated Cronos to become king of the gods.

5. All references to the ancient sources of Stoic philosophy are from Long and Sedley (1987), with citations consisting of the reference to the ancient text followed by the chapter and subsection (here 39A) and the page numbers of Long and Sedley’s text.

6. “The periodic return of everything occurs not once but many times; or rather, the same things return infinitely and without end. [. . .] For there will be nothing strange in comparison with what occurred previously, but everything will be just the same and indiscernible down to the smallest details” (Nemesius 309.5–311.12, 52C, 309).

7. The first assumption of Chrysippus's theory of mixture is that "the whole of substance is unified by a breath which pervades it all, and by which the universe is sustained and stabilized and made interactive with itself" (Alexander, *On Mixture* 216.14–218.6, 48C, 290).

8. Bréhier (1997, 1–2) notes that incorporeals are rarely mentioned in previous doctrines and almost never refer to Ideas. Plato's *Statesman*, however, refers to τὰ ἄσώματα as "the existents which are of highest value and chief importance" (*Statesman* 286a).

9. Bréhier also writes: "*Ces résultats de l'action des êtres, que les Stoïciens ont été peut-être les premiers à remarquer sous cette forme, c'est ce que nous appellerions aujourd'hui des faits ou des événements: concept bâtard qui n'est ni celui d'un être, ni d'une de ses propriétés, mais ce qui est dit ou affirmé de l'être*" (Bréhier 1997, 12).

10. For Aristotle, the proper place of water is the inside surface of the jug containing it, and if the jug moves its place changes but the water's place inside it does not (Aristotle 1984, *Physics* 210b–212a).

11. "(1) It is contrary to the [common] conception to hold that future and past time exist while present time does not, but that recently and the other day subsist while now is nothing at all. (2) Yet this is the result for the Stoics, who do not admit a minimal time or wish the now to be partless but claim that whatever one thinks one has grasped and is considering as present is in part future and in part past" (Plutarch, *On Common Conceptions* 1081c–1082a, 51C, 304).

12. Bréhier twice relates Stoic understandings of facts and their relations to Hume (1997, 13, 26).

## Chapter 15

1. The English translation refers on the duality's linguistic side to "names [noms] and adjectives which *denote* the state of affairs; and also there are verbs which *express* events or logical attributes" (LS 24). However, the French *nom* can be rendered as "name" or "noun," and the latter seems better in this context, since Deleuze's point is that the three grammatical categories here serve as names for their corporeal and incorporeal counterparts.

2. Frege outlines the matter at the start of "On Sense and Reference": " $a=a$  and  $a=b$  are obviously statements of differing cognitive value;  $a=a$  holds *a priori* and, according to Kant, is to be labelled analytic, while statements of the form  $a=b$  often contain valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot always be established *a priori*. [. . .] Now if we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the names ' $a$ ' and ' $b$ ' designate, it would seem that  $a=b$  could not differ from  $a=a$  (i.e., provided  $a=b$  is true). [. . .] What is intended to be said by  $a=b$  seems to be that the signs or names ' $a$ ' and ' $b$ ' designate the same thing. [. . .] If the sign ' $a$ ' is distinguished from the sign ' $b$ ' only as object (here, by means of its shape), not

as sign (i.e., not by the manner in which it designates something), the cognitive value of  $a=a$  becomes essentially equal to that of  $a=b$ , provided  $a=b$  is true" (Frege 1960, 56, 57).

3. Deleuze explains the difference between the duality's second and third formulations through the Mouse's dry tale in *Alice* and the Duck's confusion about the meaning of "it" when hearing that "the archbishop of Canterbury found *it* advisable" (Carroll 2010, "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland," 32, quoted in *LS* 25). "It is clear that the Duck employs and understands 'it' as a denoting term for things, states of affairs, and possible qualities (an indicator). It specifies even that the denoted thing is essentially something which is (or may be) eaten. Everything denoted or capable of denotation is, in principle, consumable and penetrable; Alice remarks elsewhere that she is only able to 'imagine' food. But the Mouse made use of 'it' in an entirely different manner: as the sense of an earlier proposition, as the event expressed by the proposition (to go and offer the crown to William). The equivocation of 'it' is therefore distributed in accordance with the duality of denotation and expression. The two dimensions of the proposition are organized in two series which converge asymptotically, in a term as ambiguous as 'it,' since they meet one another only at the frontier which they continuously stretch" (*LS* 26).

4. "Desire is the internal causality of an image with respect to the existence of the object or the corresponding state of affairs. Correlatively, belief is the anticipation of this object or state of affairs insofar as its existence must be produced by an external causality. We should not conclude from this that manifestation is secondary in relation to denotation. Rather, it makes denotation possible, and inferences form a systematic unity from which the associations derive. Hume had seen this clearly: in an association of cause and effect, it is 'inference according to the relation' which precedes the relation itself" (*LS* 13).

5. Deleuze makes this point against not Frege but Husserl: "the Husserlian genesis seems to be a slight-of-hand. For the nucleus has indeed been determined as *attribute*; but the attribute is understood as *predicate* and not as verb, that is, as concept and not as *event*" (*LS* 97).

6. "I never state the sense of what I am saying. But on the other hand, I can always take the sense of what I say as the object of another proposition whose sense, in turn, I cannot state" (*LS* 28).

7. Deleuze references "On Sense and Reference" (*LS* 337–38), where Frege does not set out any situation of regress and states only that "if words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of is their reference. It can also happen, however, that one wishes to talk about the words themselves or their sense" (Frege 1960, 58).

8. Later in the text Deleuze declares: "We must, therefore, dissociate the notions of the double and of neutrality. Sense is neutral, but it is never the double of the propositions which express it, nor of the states of affairs in which it occurs and which are denoted by the propositions" (*LS* 123). Being radically distinct from

the proposition's three dimensions, sense is apprehended only indirectly in the regress, which conceives it "within the circuit of the proposition" (123) that it conditions; when considered in its genetic capacity as a quasi-cause, it can no longer be considered the proposition's double, nor merely an effect of bodies and mixtures (124). Sense's neutrality is still linked to a "doubling up," but this doubling is "defined by the production of surfaces, their multiplication and consolidation" (125).

9. See Poe (2001, "The Purloined Letter," 125–38) and Lacan (2006, 6–48).

10. "For if it is a question of knowing 'why at this moment rather than at another,' 'why water changes its state of quality at 0° centigrade,' the question is poorly stated insofar as 0° is considered as an ordinary point on the thermometer. But if it is considered, on the contrary, as a singular point, it is inseparable from the event occurring at that point, always being zero in relation to its realization [*effectuation*] on the line of ordinary points, always forthcoming and already passed" (LS 80).

11. See LS 269–70; also Widder (2002, 76–82).

12. Lacan holds that it is not because the letter is hidden in plain sight but because it is a signifier rather than a real object that the police cannot find it despite their inch-by-inch search of the minister's apartment: "For the signifier is a unique unit of being which, by its very nature, is the symbol of but an absence. This is why we cannot say of the purloined letter that, like other objects, it must be *or* not be somewhere but rather that, unlike them, it will be *and* will not be where it is wherever it goes" (Lacan 2006, 17).

13. Deleuze also discusses, as terms that ensure communication between series, strange objects that anticipate events and appear in modified form in different series, and onomatopoeias (words formed from the sounds associated with them, like "cuckoo" or "meow") that enact transitions from one series to another by means of sounds partaking of both (LS 42–43).

14. "Any normal name has a sense which must be denoted by another name and which must determine the disjunctions filled by other names. Insofar as these names, which are endowed with sense, are subject to these laws, they receive *determinations of signification*" (LS 68).

15. The barber of the regiment shaves all those, and only those, who do not shave themselves, but then either option of the barber shaving himself or being shaved by another entails a contradiction with that rule.

16. While "the paradoxes of signification are essentially that of the *abnormal set* (which is included as a member or which includes members of different types) and the *rebel element* (which forms part of a set whose existence it presupposes and belongs to two sub-sets which it determines)," those of sense "are essentially that of *subdivision ad infinitum* (always past-future and never present), and that of the *nomadic distribution* (distributing in an open space instead of distributing a closed space). They always have the characteristic of going in both directions at once, and of rendering identification impossible, as they emphasize sometimes the first, sometimes the second, of these effects" (LS 75). Signification's paradoxical element thereby

becomes a paradox of sense only insofar as it is involved in organizing the surface.

17. “To the physics of surfaces a metaphysical surface necessarily corresponds. Metaphysical surface (*transcendental field*) is the name that will be given to the frontier established, on the one hand, between bodies taken together as a whole and inside the limits which envelop them, and on the other, propositions in general. This frontier implies, as we shall see, certain properties of sound in relation to the surface, making possible thereby a distinct distribution of language and bodies, or of the corporeal depth and the sonorous *continuum*. In all these respects, the surface is the transcendental field itself, and the locus of sense and expression” (*LS* 125).

18. Sartre gives the example of an unreflective subject absorbed in reading a book, conscious of the book and its activity without any ‘I’ being present until someone asks the subject what it is doing and the subject, reflecting on its act, answers, “I am reading” (Sartre 1957, 46–47). The “I” thereby accompanies all our reflections or representations, as Kant maintains, and is indispensable for forms of concerted action that must be accomplished over time (68–69), but it is specious to hold this necessary condition for the possibility of experience to be some kind of reality standing behind it (32–33).

19. “The transcendental field becomes impersonal; or, if you like, ‘pre-personal,’ *without an I*” (Sartre 1957, 36).

20. “The reflective attitude is correctly expressed in this famous sentence by Rimbaud (in the letter of the seer): ‘I is *an other*.’ The context proves that he simply meant that the spontaneity of consciousness could not emanate from the *I*, the spontaneity *goes toward* the *I*, rejoins the *I*, lets the *I* be glimpsed beneath its limpid density, but is itself given above all as *individuated* and *impersonal* spontaneity” (Sartre 1957, 97–98).

21. “Naturally, my attention was caught by the sentence, ‘I leave to various future times, but not to all, my garden of forking paths.’ I had no sooner read this, than I understood. *The Garden of Forking Paths* was the chaotic novel itself. The phrase ‘to various future times, but not to all’ suggested the image of bifurcating in time, not in space. Rereading the whole work confirmed this theory. In all fiction, when a man is faced with alternatives he chooses one at the expense of the others. In the almost unfathomable Ts’ui Pên, he chooses—simultaneously—all of them. He thus *creates* various futures, various times which start others that will in turn branch out and bifurcate in other times. This is the cause of the contradictions in the novel” (Borges 1993, “The Garden of Forking Paths,” 75; see also *LS* 114–15).

22. “We have seen the way in which the order of language with its formed units comes about—that is, with denotations and their fulfillments [*remplissements*] in things, manifestations and their effectuations in persons, signification[s] and their accomplishments [*accomplissements*] in concepts; it was precisely the entire subject matter of the static genesis. But, in order to get to that point, it was necessary to go through all the stages of the dynamic genesis. [. . .] In order that there be language [*langage*], together with the full use of speech conforming to the three dimensions

of language, it was necessary to pass through the verb and its silence, and through the entire organization of sense and nonsense on the metaphysical surface—the last stage of the dynamic genesis (*LS* 241).

## Chapter 16

1. Tournier writes of Robinson's early experiences when he hoped for escape from Speranza: "His field of concentration seemed to be both deepening and narrowing. He was finding it increasingly difficult to think of more than one thing at a time, or even to transfer his attention from one thing to another. He discovered that for all of us the presence of other people is a powerful element of distraction, not only because they constantly break into our activities and interrupt our train of thought, but because the mere possibility of their doing so illumines a world of concerns situated at the edge of our consciousness but capable at any moment of becoming its center. That marginal and almost ghostly presence of things with which he was not immediately concerned had gradually vanished from Robinson's mind. He was now surrounded by objects subject only to the arbitrary law of all or nothing, and thus it was that, being wholly absorbed in the business of building the ship, he had completely overlooked the problem of launching her" (Tournier 1997, 38).

2. Robinson writes in his diary: "*As the social structure within me has crumbled to ruins over the years, so also has perished the framework of institutions and myths that permits desire to become embodied, in the twofold sense of the word—that is to say, to assume a positive form and to expend itself in the body of a woman. To say that my sexual desire is no longer directed toward the perpetuation of the species is not enough. It no longer knows what its purpose is! For a long time memory was sufficiently active in me to feed my imagination with objects of desire, non-existent though they were. But that is over now. Memory has been sucked dry. [ . . . ] Does this mean that desire has died in me for lack of use? Far from it! I still feel within me that murmur of the spring of life, but it has become objectless*" (Tournier 1997, 113).

3. Through his early reflections on his solitude, Robinson "evolved a philosophy which might have been his father's own. Only the past had any worth or existence deserving of note. The present was valueless except as a repository of memories accumulated in the past, and to add to that increasing fund was the only reason for living. In the end came death; and death itself was no more than the long-awaited moment when this treasure might be wholly enjoyed. Eternity was bestowed on us so that we might relive our life in death, more observantly, more intelligently, and more sensually than was possible in the turmoil of the present" (Tournier 1997, 41).

4. "*But my relationship to material things is also undermined by solitude. When a painter or engraver introduces human figures into a landscape or alongside a monument, they are not there merely as an accessory. Human figures convey the scale,*

*and what is still more important, they represent attitudes, possible points of view, which enrich the picture for the outside observer by providing him with other, indispensable points of reference*" (Tournier 1997, 54).

5. *"At first, and as it were instinctively, I projected possible observers—parameters—onto hilltops or behind rocks or into the branches of trees. The island was thus charted by a network of interpolations and extrapolations which lent it different aspects and rendered it meaningful. That is what every normal man does in a normal situation. I became aware of this function—with many others—only when I found it dying within me. Today the process is complete. My vision of the island is reduced to that of my own eyes, and what I do not see of it is to me a total unknown. Everywhere I am not total darkness reigns"* (Tournier 1997, 55).

6. *"The explosion had still not quite destroyed the old Robinson: it occurred to him, as he looked at his sleeping companion [Friday], that he could very easily kill him—he deserved death a hundred times over!—and then methodically set about the rebuilding of his shattered world. That he did not do so was not only because of his fear of solitude, or his instinctive recoil from such an act of violence. The truth was that the cultivated island had begun to oppress him almost as much as it had Friday. In his heart he had longed for something of this kind to happen. And so, having released him from his earthly bonds, Friday would now show him the way to something else, substituting for an existence he had found intolerable a new order which Robinson longed to discover"* (Tournier 1997, 180).

7. *"For example, the notion of depth, which I never troubled to scrutinize when using it in such expressions as 'a deep thinker' or 'a deep love.' It is a strange prejudice which sets a higher value on depth than on breadth, and which accepts 'superficial' as meaning not 'of wide extent' but 'of little depth,' whereas 'deep,' on the other hand, signifies 'of great depth' and not 'of small surface.' Yet it seems to me that a feeling such as love is better measured, if it can be measured at all, by the extent of its surface than by its degree of depth"* (Tournier 1997, 67).

8. But see Ventura (2020), which draws on Levinas to argue that Others also reveal elemental surface intensities.

9. *"As to my sexuality, I may note that at no time has Friday inspired me with any sodomite desire. For one thing, he came too late, when my sexuality had already become elemental and was directed toward Speranza. But above all, Venus, or Aphrodite, did not emerge from the waves and tread my shores in order to seduce me, but to drive me into the realm of her father, Uranus, the 'sky crowned with stars,' whose bleeding genitals, severed from his body and cast into the sea, broke into a white foam from which the goddess was born. It was not a matter of turning me back to human loves but, while leaving me still an elemental, of causing me to change my element. This has now happened"* (Tournier 1997, 211–12).

10. The privileged status of alcohol in revealing the silent crack belongs to the literature of Zola, Fitzgerald, and Lowry (*LS* 321, 323).

## Chapter 17

1. I have modified the translation of *leur profondeur indifférenciée* to follow the way Patton's later translation of *Difference and Repetition* reflects Deleuze's distinct uses of *différentier* and *différencier*. It would be inconsistent with Deleuze's rejection of the undifferentiated ground or abyss without differences posed by metaphysics and transcendental philosophy as the alternative to a fully ordered being (*LS* 106) were he to treat the depths as a domain without differences. It would also be inconsistent with his presentation of the depths as a simulacrum. What characterizes the depths, as we will see in the next section, is that its differences are not articulated—that is, differenciated—because articulation or differenciation occur only with a surface.

2. "For, from the point of view of the other [static] genesis, we posit eating and speaking by right as two series already separated at the surface. They are separated and articulated by the event which is the result of one of them, to which it relates as a noematic attribute, and renders the other series possible, to which it relates as an expressible sense. But it is an entirely different question how speaking is effectively disengaged from eating, how the surface itself is produced, or how the incorporeal event results from bodily states" (*LS* 186–87).

3. For example, Žižek (2004), which notably does not once mention Klein's presence in Deleuze's work.

4. As discussed earlier, Freud himself is hesitant to frame the death instinct in terms of negation (see Interlude, note 16).

5. French translations of Klein use *l'objet partiel* to render what Klein, writing in English, calls a "part-object." Except for Massumi's translation of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze translators have consistently translated it back into English as "partial object." The translators of *Anti-Oedipus* explain that they render the term in this way throughout the text in anticipation of the point, late in the work, where Deleuze and Guattari hold these objects to be partial, not as extensive parts of a larger whole, but in the sense of being one-sided, biased, or perhaps even perspectival, Deleuze and Guattari here playing on the distinction between *partiel* and *partial* (*AO* 309 and 309, translator's note). Regardless of whether this justifies the misrendering throughout the rest of the text, it is unclear whether other translators, who are usually silent on the matter, are even aware of Klein's original terminology.

6. There is some support for this maneuver in Klein's explanation of her use of the term: "I chose the term 'position' in regard to the paranoid and depressive phases because these groupings of anxieties and defences, although arising first during the earliest stages, are not restricted to them but occur and recur during the first years of childhood and under certain circumstances in later life" (Klein 1975, 93).

7. On Leclaire's role in *The Logic of Sense*, see Collett (2016, esp. chap. 3).

## Chapter 18

1. Deleuze makes this point explicit in an interview on his monograph on Foucault: “Yes, it’s a wonderful saying [Valery’s maxim that ‘there’s nothing deeper than skin’]. Philosophy as a general dermatology or art of surfaces (I tried to describe such surfaces in *The Logic of Sense*). The new forms of image give the problem a new impetus. It’s in Foucault himself that surfaces become essentially surfaces on which things are inscribed: this is what utterances being ‘neither visible nor hidden’ is all about. Archaeology amounts to constituting a surface on which things are inscribed. If you don’t constitute a surface on which things are inscribed, what’s not hidden will remain invisible. Surface isn’t opposed to depth (from which one resurfaces) but to interpretation. Foucault’s method was always opposed to any interpretive method. Never interpret; experience, experiment . . . The theme of folds and enfolding, so important in Foucault, takes us back to the skin” (*N* 87).

2. Deleuze’s use of “value” should again be treated along Saussurean lines as what “provides the operative bond between phonic and mental elements within each sign” (Saussure 1986, 166). As the schizophrenic language being considered here invokes language-affects, however, it can be considered as much a bond with physical as with mental elements.

3. Deleuze, for his part, responds that the problems raised by Artaud here “no longer pertain to Carroll” (*LS* 339n.2).

4. “Chrysippus used to distinguish two kinds of mixtures: imperfect mixtures which alter bodies; and perfect mixtures which leave bodies intact and make them coexist in all their parts. Undoubtedly, the unity of corporeal causes defines a perfect and liquid mixture wherein everything is exact in the cosmic present. But bodies caught in the particularity of their limited presents do not meet directly in line with the order of their causality, which is good only for the whole, taking into consideration all combinations at once. This is why any mixture can be called good or bad: good in the order of the whole, but imperfect, bad, or even execrable, in the order of partial encounters” (*LS* 131).

5. I am unsure of the origin of this now common description of the body without organs as a body without an organization of organs, but the earliest English usage at least seems to be Best and Kellner (1991, 90).

6. The *Logic of Sense*’s third appendix on “Klossowski Or Bodies–Language” could be considered an exercise in bringing this contact about.

7. “We can not give up the hope that the effects of drugs and alcohol (their ‘revelations’) will be able to be relived and recovered for their own sake at the surface of the world, independently of the use of those substances, provided that the techniques of social alienation which determined this use are reversed into revolutionary means of exploration” (*LS* 161). And: “Could what the drug user or

masochist obtains also be obtained in a different fashion in the conditions of the plane, so it would even be possible to use drugs without using drugs, to get soused on pure water, as in Henry Miller's experimentations?" (*ATP* 166). One of Smith's key assumptions, made more explicit in a later publication that covers much of the same ground (Smith 2022), is that intensities populate the depths in *The Logic of Sense*. He draws for his claim on Daniel N. Stern's description of "the world of the newborn infant as a kind of human 'weatherscape,' made up entirely of sequences of rising and falling *intensities*" (Smith 2022, 5; stated almost verbatim in Smith 2006, 136). But while Stern may have been influential to Guattari (Smith 2006, 136), he never appears in *The Logic of Sense*—or, for that matter, in *Anti-Oedipus* or *A Thousand Plateaus*—and, as already discussed, *The Logic of Sense* explicitly rejects the association of intensity with depth.

## Epilogue

1. Dosse (2010, 227) holds it was written in 1968 based on the letter Deleuze wrote to Althusser when sending him the paper. However, the text opens with the declaration "*This is 1967*" (*DI* 170).

2. Kazarian (2009) lays out such a thesis concerning Deleuze's relation to psychoanalysis from the early 1960s up to the mid-1970s. Deleuze's eventual rejection of this supportive if critical position is summed up in a December 1981 letter to Arnaud Villani, which states: "I attach little importance to the text on structuralism and very little importance on the entire part on *The Logic of Sense*, which is still in the clutches of psychoanalysis (the empty compartment, and a much too structural conception of 'series')" (*LOT* 79).

3. *Difference and Repetition* has no point-by-point definition of structure but offers a comparable description of "a system" constituted by two or more series communicating through a differentiator or dark precursor (*DR* 117–18) and uses it to answer the question of whether psychic life is structured like a language (122–23).

4. Guattari (2015, 381–82n.2). Thornton (2017) deftly highlights the importance of Guattari's use of this opening distinction.

5. Guattari's statement plays on Lacan's declaration that "a signifier is that which represents a subject for another signifier" (Lacan 1981, 207).

6. Deleuze takes the term "transversality" from Guattari and credits him in the text (*PS* 188n.5).

7. "In every respect, machinic assemblages *effectuate* [*effectuent*] the abstract machine insofar as it is developed on the plane of consistency or enveloped in a stratum" (*ATP* 71).

8. "This is not, however, a question of a linguistic operation, for a subject is never the condition of possibility of language or the cause of the statement:

there is no subject, only collective assemblages of enunciation [*agencements collectifs d'énonciation*]" (ATP 130).

9. "Collective assemblages of enunciation function directly within *machinic assemblages*. [. . .] Our criticism of these linguistic models is not that they are too abstract but, on the contrary, that they are not abstract enough, that they do not reach the *abstract machine* that connects a language to the semantic and pragmatic contents of statements, to collective assemblages of enunciation, to a whole micro-politics of the social field" (ATP 7).

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